PLATO.

GORGIAS

EDITED

ON THE BASIS OF DEUSCHLE-CRON'S EDITION

BY

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BOSTON, U.S.A., AND LONDON
PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPANY
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This edition is based on Deuschle-Cron’s fourth edition, Leipzig, 1886, but the original has been treated with considerable freedom.

In more than sixty cases, where the text varies from that of Cron, the readings of Schanz have been adopted. A few conjectures have been introduced, but the editor has endeavored to follow a middle course between those who do not allow emendations, and those who, like Schanz, employ them too freely.

The introduction is a free rendering of the original, with additions.

The commentary will be found to differ materially from the German, especially in grammatical matters. The editor has not thought it advisable to deviate from the line of literary interpretation adopted by the German editor, but the exact study, which has been bestowed of later years in the United States upon the subject of Greek Syntax, has rendered it possible to make this part of the book to a certain extent American.

The appendix, which is much more extensive than that of the German edition, will be found to contain, in addition to the register of textual variations, much matter which could not be inserted in a commentary, but which students should know.

Much assistance has been drawn from other editions, especially those of Hirschig and Thompson. Woolsey’s edition also has been in the hands of the editor.

The editor is under great obligations to Professor Gildersleeve, who examined the commentary in manuscript and made many
valuable suggestions. Those who may use the book will share
the editor's regret, that owing to delay in the printing he was
unable to avail himself fully of Professor Gildersleeve's kind
offer to read and criticise the proof-sheets.

The edition owes much also to Professor Seymour, who has
read all the proof, and has cheerfully given the editor the bene-
fit of his scholarship and editorial experience.

Reference is made throughout to Riddell's *Digest of Platonic
Idioms* (Rid.), printed with his edition of the *Apology* (Oxford,
1877). Occasional references are made to Madvig's *Griechische
Syntax*, and to Meisterhans' *Grammatik der Attischen Inscriften*.

Bryn Mawr College, October, 1890.
INTRODUCTION.

1. The Beginnings of Rhetoric.¹

The mighty impulse which the Hellenic spirit, throughout the whole extent of the Hellenic nationality, received from the successful result of the great conflict waged by the might of the people against the overwhelming power of the Barbarians, had made Athens, the city which had distinguished itself beyond all others by the sagacity and self-sacrificing courage of its citizens, the centre of all the intellectual effort and life of Greece. Poetry, which in conjunction with its sister arts had not become merely inseparably associated with all religious and national feasts, but had acquired also a recognized position in every-day life, obtained by the new and especially brilliant productions of this period a much wider influence upon the culture and public life of the people. Meanwhile the political activity and progress of the time was pushing forward with rapid and irresistible strides to the development of Prose, to which up to this time the artistic genius of the Greeks had been less directed than to Poetry. With the fortunes of this new medium of human thought were inseparably connected those of a new department of Literature, — History, — which had its real beginning, artistically considered, in that magnificent work whose worthy subject was the famous struggle between the Greeks and the Barbarians, so remote in its origin, so long in its duration, so momentous in its character, so fortunate in its result. An inexhaustible opportunity for practice in the art of public speaking was afforded by the assemblies of the people and the courts of law. From these

were derived two varieties of political oratory, the Forensic (τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν or τὸ δημηγορικὸν) and the Judicial (τὸ δικανικὸν γένος). Very soon it became the duty of those most noted for their talents in speaking, to deliver speeches in honor of those citizens who had fallen in battle for their country. Hence Aristotle in his Theory adds to the two varieties already mentioned a third, — τὸ ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος.

2 But it was not in accordance with the intellectual character of the Greek people to rest content with a merely practical skill in the employment of language. They rather, by virtue of their disposition towards investigation and science, turned their attention to the discovery of the means through which speech might attain its greatest power, and thereby be the more likely to bring about any desired result. The unprejudiced mind could not but see that this oratorical success was not always due to a deeper insight and more thorough knowledge of the question at issue. Consequently their attention was directed to the formal side of the art, and thus the first rude beginnings, naturally empirical, were made of a Theory, i.e. of a scientific conception, which claimed for itself the ability to communicate to others the skill and knowledge which had been acquired, or in other words, to teach to others this new art, so useful, nay, almost indispensable for practical life.

3 That such an art should find ready acceptance and cultivation in Athens is but natural. We need only refer to the orator Antiphon, who both as the founder of a school of oratory and as a composer of written speeches, as well as from his political activity, exercised a wide influence there. But Athens was not the earliest home of this art. That honor belongs to Sicily. Under similar circumstances the beginnings of oratory would probably have been made simultaneously in Attica and Sicily. But in the latter country the conditions were somewhat different. The population was very composite, given to disputation, and less fully organized than that of Athens. Besides, the severe measures of the tottering tyrants to preserve their power had caused many changes in the ownership of land and the rights of property. Consequently the overthrow of the tyranny was
followed by a perfect tempest of litigation out of which oratory emerged as a fully established art. Its invention is ascribed to Corax,—a man who had taken a leading part in the political upheavals and governmental changes of his country, but who in the new order of things devoted himself to the teaching of Rhetoric—especially that in use in the courts—of which he composed also a short 'teehne.' His pupil and successor was Tisias, who, according to the story, used his newly acquired skill in speaking to defeat his teacher in a lawsuit,—a course of action which could not but show the tendency of the new art, and which drew down a scathing rebuke from the judge. Tisias had many pupils who afterwards became famous; among them Lysias and Isocrates, as well as Gorgias, after whom this dialogue is named.

2. GORGIAS' LIFE AND ACTIVITY.

Gorgias was the son of Charmantides of Leontini. The year of his birth as well as that of his death is uncertain. Apollodorus and Quintilian state that he lived to the age of 109, while others allow him only 105 years. Quintilian also says that he outlived Socrates, a statement which may or may not be confirmed by *Apol. 19 e.* With these data alone to build on, it is not strange that authorities have been unable to agree on the dates to be assigned for his birth and death. We may assume that he was born between 492 and 483 B.C. and died between 384 and 375. Of his family and early life and training we have very scanty notices. We hear of a sister married to a certain Deicerates and of a brother Herodicus. It is likely that he early became acquainted with the teachings as well as the dia-

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3 The indignant exclamation κακοὶ κόρακος κακὰ φίδ.
5 The inscription on a statue of Gorgias at Olympia reads Χαρμαντίδου Γοργίας Λεωντίνος. Suidas and Pausanias give it wrongly as Καρμαντίδου.
6 Sittl, *Gesch. d. Gr. Lit.* ii. 36 n. thinks that Quintilian's statement may be based on Socrates' words.
7 Foss gives the dates 496-388; Deuschle, 492-384; Frei, 483-375, which is agreed to by Zeller, Diels, and Susemihl; Fränkel, 487-379; Unger, 507-500. Blass thinks Gorgias was born probably before 480. *Att. Bered.* i. p. 47 n.
lectic of the Eleatic school, as we may judge from the fact that he employed their arguments in his philosophic work. It was reported in antiquity that he had been a pupil of Empedocles, and it is probable that he wrote a philosophic treatise in the spirit of the Empedoclean theory. His natural gifts, however, as well as the spirit of the times, inclined him to the newly invented art of speech. And if Empedocles was really the inventor, as Aristotle declares, it is probable that he gained some light from him. Tradition made him also the pupil of Tisias as already mentioned, but Blass does not believe in the truth of the story. It is certain that he soon became a formidable rival of Tisias. He gained a great reputation in his native city as an orator and teacher of rhetoric, and many students flocked to his lectures. Among these was his truest follower Polus, who accompanied him on his travels afterwards. Soon came an opportunity for him to make his art felt and his name famous outside of his country. The inhabitants of Leontini were hard pressed by the Syracusans, and in their distress sent Gorgias as ambassador to Athens in 427 B.C. to plead the claims of kinship and to beg assistance. Gorgias was eminently successful in his mission. The Athenians—the most loquacious people of Greece—were charmed by the magic of his graceful eloquence. Never before had they heard an orator who was such a master of form as Gorgias, or whose words fell so sweetly and melodiously upon the ear. Consequently he was soon able to return to Leontini and announce the prosperous issue of his mission. But he did not stay. The poison of Athenian life had penetrated, and he was drawn back. He had recognized also that the field was more favorable there for the practice of his profession than in Sicily. The Athenians were seized with enthusiasm for him. Crowds of young men and older men also of the best families in the state

8 Hippiai Mai. 282 b Γοργίας τε γὰρ ὁτός ὁ Λεοντῖνος σοφιστὴς δεύορ ἄφικε τὴν δημοσίαν οἰκοθεν πρεσβεύων, ἃς ἰκανώτατος ἐν Δελφοῖς τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ ἔδοξεν ἀριστα ἐπιτείν, καὶ ἰδία ἐπιδείξεις ποιοῖμενοι καὶ συνὼν τοῖς νείσις χρήματα πολλὰ εἰργάσατο καὶ ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῆς τῆς πόλεως. Thucydides does not mention the name of Gorgias in his account of the matter (iii. 86), but Diodorus does (xii. 53).
INTRODUCTION.

crowded around him and paid gladly extraordinary sums for the privilege of hearing his instructions. The days on which he lectured they called festivals. His phrases were compared to gleaming torches, and Plato\(^9\) himself goes so far as to compare him with the Homeric Nestor, the ἰδνετής λεγός Πνέων ἀγορητής.

Gorgias was especially happy in the discourses he delivered 5 for display, or on festive occasions, called ἐπίδειξεις, and found many occasions to show his ability. But he also came forward as a teacher of oratory and found a ready body of pupils among the higher classes. See Apol. 19 e, Gorg. 449 b. He does not, however, appear to have remained very long at Athens despite his success. This may have been due to the fact that Athens soon became the resort of a numerous company of Sophists, whose mutual relations were not always pleasant, and the bustle and instability of Athenian life may have become somewhat irksome to a man now well advanced in years. He therefore soon left Athens,—though he must have returned thither several times. He travelled considerably, but when or where, we cannot with certainty state. We only know that he discussed in Olympia, before the concourse of assembled Greeks, with great applause, a purely national theme,—afterwards treated by many others,—the ‘Eastern question.’\(^{10}\) The most of his time, however, he spent in Thessaly, for which he seems to have conceived a great fondness. There the tyrants, especially those of Larissa, honored him, and the rich young nobles became infatuated\(^{11}\) with him and flocked in great crowds to hear his teaching.\(^{12}\) Among his pupils were Meno, one of Cyrus’

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9 Phaedr. 261 b. It is likely also that the fact that Gorgias, like Nestor, 'saw three generations of men,' had something to do with this comparison.  
10 Philostr. Epis. 73, ii. p. 257 K. Blass, i. § 54.  
11 The expression γοργιάζειν, which we find applied to this infatuation, is probably of later origin, and has some allusion to the story of the charmed Gorgon head.  
12 Meno 70 δ τούτον δε υμῖν αἰτίως ἐστὶν Γοργίας (i.e. that the Thessalians, especially those of Larissa, are so noted for their wisdom). ἄφικσμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφία εἰληφεν Ἀλεουάδων τε τοὺς πρῶτους, ὃν δ' ςὺς ἐραστὴς ἐστίν Ἀριστιππος, καὶ τῶν ἀλλων Θεσσαλῶν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτῳ τῷ ἐθνὶ υἱὸς εἰλίκειν ἀφιέμεν τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐν τῷ τι ἐρήματι, ὥσπερ εἰκός τούς εἰδότας, ἄτε
INTRODUCTION.

in the march of the Ten Thousand, Proxenus, another of these generals, and Aristippus, an Alcmaeon, and of noted Athenians, at least Philostratus, Thucydides, Critias, and Alcibiades, besides the celebrated teachers Isocrates and Antisthenes. Gorgias was not a cheap teacher; his charge was 100 minae for each pupil. It seems, therefore, strange that he should have left only 1000 staters, or 200 minae, behind him when he died; that too, when he had neither wife nor family to spend his money for him. But although he lived simply, he loved parade and to make an imposing display in public. In imitation of the priestly garb of his old master, Empedocles, he used to wear a purple mantle and golden sandals. It is said also that he had a golden statue of himself set up at Delphi, at the dedication of which he delivered a great oration. Otherwise even his enemies could find nothing in his manner of life to criticise, and were obliged to feel the highest respect for him. To his simple manner of life is attributed the fact that he not only reached a very great old age, but retained his bodily freshness and vigor until the end. Anecdotes are related of him to show his preference for old age instead of a disgust at it. When finally his death was approaching,—a death which was without sickness and rather like a falling asleep,—he is said to have murmured, 'Now Sleep is beginning to conduct me to his brother Death.'

Gorgias left behind him various writings, six speeches — he seems not to have written a work on rhetoric — and a philosophical treatise περὶ φύσεως ἡ περὶ τῶν μηδῶν ὀντός. It is not certain that any of these have come down to us. It is true that we possess two declamations which pass under Gorgias' name, the Encomium of Helen and the Defence of Palamedes; but the genuineness of these speeches cannot yet be said to be beyond question. We

καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν τῶν Ἔλληνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὑπὶ ἐν τῷ βούληται.

13 Aelian, V. II. xii. 32.

14 Whether Gorgias had it set up, or it was set up in his honor by friends, and whether it was solid gold or only gilt, are questions not yet settled. Cf. Blass, i. 58, n. 1, where the authorities are given.

15 Blass, i. 51, n. 6, 7.

16 In his first edition Blass restricted himself to the view that these speeches were either genuine, or had been designedly counterfeited, inclining rather to the latter alternative.
also know the contents and arguments of the philosophical treatise from two sources. Gorgias tries to prove: 1, that nothing exists; 2, if anything exists, it cannot be recognized or known; 3, even if it could be known, it cannot be communicated by words. To prove these statements he employs two modes of proof,—one of his own invention, and the other an adaptation of the arguments of the Eleatics. If one considers the result desired only, there appears to be a contradiction between the theory of Gorgias and his actual practice. How, we may ask, can a man come forward as an orator and profess to teach the art of speaking (or communication) who denies the possibility of communicating knowledge? On closer examination, however, the inconsistency disappears. What Gorgias attempted to prove was, in the first place, the impossibility of objective existence or of a knowledge of such existence; in the second place, granted that there was such a thing as existence and a knowledge of it, the impossibility of bringing this fact by means of speech to the knowledge of others. He was not, however, bound by this view to deny the appearance of existence, or the possibility of conception and opinion. On the contrary, he rests the proof of his second point just on this argument, that the existent is of itself not a matter of thought, because otherwise what every one thinks must exist, and this would do away with the possibility of a false conception. He denied, therefore, that there was any connexion between human thought and conception, and existence, but he by no means denied the existence of conceptions. Hence the use of the art of speech must be on the supposition that the art of speech is designed to inspire in the hearers, without any reference to the

In his second edition, p. 79, n. 1, he distinctly abandons his earlier position, saying he was too much influenced by the spirit of the times, and comes out squarely on the side of the genuineness of the speeches. Diels had done the same in 1884, Ber. d. Ber. Akad.

17 Pseudo-Aristoteles de Gorgia, c. 5, 6, and Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. vii. 65–87. These two versions do not agree in all respects, and have been made the subject of careful study lately by O. Apelt in Rhein. Mus. 43. 202–210. Apelt shows that the account of Aristotle must be held as more accurately giving the mode of argument of Gorgias than that of Sextus Empiricus.

18 Apelt, p. 204 f.
actual existence, simply those conceptions which will be useful to the design of the speaker. In addition, however, the speaker is at liberty so thoroughly to acquire the power of expression that he may be able, by the perfection of form, to awaken in his hearers feelings of pleasure and assent.

7 Such, then, was Gorgias' view of Rhetoric. The contents, or subject of the speech, were a matter of indifference to him; the form was the great object. Hence he undertook to speak on any subject whatever, no matter whether he was acquainted with it or not. He challenged his hearers to put to him any question they pleased, and pledged himself to speak concerning it better and more elegantly than any one else, and at whatever length might be desired. Through the art of speech he undertook to make the great appear small, the small great, the old new, the new old; in short, to make anything appear its exact opposite. He cared nothing for the real nature of anything, but only sought to make it assume some particular appearance. His pupils were to acquire the same skill in the use of form, and to this end he imparted to them certain rules and artistic conceptions, or a technique of speech. Of course the most of his directions applied to the outward form merely; and his great merit lies in the fact that he was the first to direct attention to this side of oratory. He was the first to recognize the importance of figures of speech, and is said to have invented the names 'antithesis,' 'paronomasia,' 'parisosis' (or repetition of the same expression in different connexions), etc. He loved to give a poetic coloring to his ideas, and he laid especial weight on the symmetrical balancing (isokwlia) and rhythmical swing of his clauses. Probably, however, because he was a pioneer, he did not reach the degree of perfection in his treatment of form, which either himself, or the laws of symmetry and beauty demanded. His metaphors were

19 Gorg. 447 c, Cic. de Or. i. 22. 103 (Gorgias) permagnum quiddam suscipere ac profiteri videbatur cum se ad omnia de quibus quisque audire vellet, esse paratum denuntiaret. Cf. also iii. 32. 129, de Fin. ii. 1. 1.

20 Gorg. 449 c, Phaedr. 267 b (Teias Gorgias te) sustomian te logon kal ἄπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνευρον.
often harsh and bald, and his affectation of distinctly poetic words and phrases drew upon him the ridicule of later critics. He could not get beyond a certain uniformity; for example, he seems to have considered the mere division into two corresponding or opposing halves to be entirely sufficient for symmetry. In short, the means at the command of Rhetoric were still too limited for perfection. But Gorgias nevertheless exercised an immense influence upon the later Attic literature, and his merit cannot be over-estimated, in awakening in the Greek mind the consciousness that the laws of beauty should prevail in every literary effort, in prose as well as in the domain of poetry. His example was followed by many men of high literary importance. Besides those already mentioned, the influence of Gorgias can be traced in Antiphon, Thucydides, Critias, the dramatist Agathon, Aeschines, and others.


The culture of the time in which the activity of Gorgias fell is called the Sophistical. Its peculiar characteristic lies in the fact that it denied the reality of knowledge, morality, and justice, and admitted only an appearance of knowledge, morality, and justice, or rather, declared to be true, moral, and just only that which appeared so subjectively, to this person or that,—and this, of course, was different with every different individual. Gorgias, it is true, looked down upon the Sophists with scorn, and refused to be classed with them; but this scorn was not directed against the immoral view of life which the Sophists held, in looking towards the appearance, and not the reality; for, as we have seen from the sketch just given of his teaching, he agreed with them in this; what he found ridiculous was that the others who called themselves Sophists should claim to teach wisdom and virtue, or human culture, while imparting knowledge of every variety. For him there was but one art, which was the

21 See references in Blass, p. 64.
22 Μένο 95 ε καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα ταῦτα ἐγγαμάζει διτα ὧν καὶ ποτε αὐτοῦ τότε (ἀρετῆς διδάσκειν) ἀκούοντες ὑπί-σχισμένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν καταγελά, ὅταν ἄκουσθαι ὑπίσχισμένων· ἀλλὰ λέγειν οἶτει δεῖν ποιεῖν δειμωίς. The feeling is shared by Callicles.
essence of all arts, and made all knowledge unnecessary, the acquisition of the so-called virtue needless; namely, the art of speech or Rhetoric. But the Sophists also were well aware of the great value of a ready command of language, for it was this on which their mental superiority over others rested; and the most important of them, e.g. Protagoras and Prodicus, had paid great attention to linguistic investigation. Hence Gorgias, in point of fact, came to their assistance with his art of speaking; for it was just in so far as he declared the contents of the speech a matter of indifference, and laid the greatest emphasis on the development and perfection of form, that the art of speaking became the means of commending to the minds of others, according to the pleasure of the speaker, an appearance of truth, morality, and justice. Thus behind Rhetoric, so defined, lay hidden the worst and most dangerous form of Sophistic. For it not only urged the man who employed it to the practical accomplishment of any design, no matter how arbitrary, but provided him with the means best suited to it. Under the constitutional government of the majority of Hellenic states, a man’s success in politics depended largely upon his ability to address an audience with readiness and force. This ability Gorgias professed to give by his new art of speaking. But when thus equipped what else could his pupils expect or strive for by means of their new weapon but the highest possible power in the state? And by power, what else could they understand but the power of doing whatever they pleased and of managing affairs according to their own caprice? And only then would the orator have achieved his object most completely when he had succeeded in raising himself to a tyranny and putting his fellow-citizens under his feet. Such was in reality the necessary aim of this rhetorical training; for it recognized beside itself no other knowledge as legitimate, and not only offered itself no moral view of state relations, but even declared the knowledge of justice to be useless, inasmuch as it was the office of the orator to decide first for himself what justice was, and then to make use of the art of speaking to compel from others the acknowledgment and acceptance of his view.
Now of course Gorgias did not recognize these necessary consequences of his principles, much less did he declare them. He did not even seem to see the close relationship of his efforts with those of the other Sophists. And this was one reason, perhaps, why so many of the cultured men of the period who were seeking certain practical ends in politics—that is, the rising statesmen—flocked so eagerly to hear him. Behind their praise of Rhetoric they concealed their sympathy with Sophistic. It was not long, however, before they ventured to proclaim their designs openly. For the moral sense of the period was declining so rapidly that but few, at least in Athens, its home, were disposed to object to the new culture. Plato therefore rendered the Athenian state a great service when he drew off the mask from this influential art of appearances, and showed it in its true nature as a form of Sophistic, and the worst form, too, because the emptiest. He had inherited likewise from his master Socrates the calling of scientifically destroying Sophistic in all its forms, and the founding and defence of a moral view of life in opposition to it. His theory of Ethics, as can be abundantly recognized from the dialogue before us, was already fully developed in its essential characteristics, and was quite strong enough to carry through this struggle successfully. If, however, the opposition in which Ethics stood to this so-called Rhetoric and its results was to be entirely understood, and if it was to be brought out a victor over its opponent, then it was necessary to lay quite bare the immoral principles on which Rhetoric rested, whether any one of his rhetorically trained contemporaries was acquainted with the real bearing of those principles or not. The aim of that method of training was seen to be the domination of the individual’s caprice, wantonness, or arbitrary will. This assumes as the true principle of action, since it denies the validity of the existing laws of the state, the so-called law of nature, so widely defended by the Sophists, which is nothing more nor less than the law of the stronger. But this principle also can be traced to a far deeper-lying spring, the source of all immoral views of life; namely, the idea that the guide of a man’s action should be not his mental but his sensual nature, and the therefrom resulting
impulses and passions. Satisfaction of these, therefore, or in other words, sensual enjoyment, is obedience to this law of nature, which was synonymous with happiness according to the spirit of the times. The idea of happiness is common to both the moral and immoral views of life; but they look at it in different lights, and define it differently in consequence. Plato conceived happiness to lie in the absolute freedom of the mental and spiritual nature of man from the domination of sense. His opponents, on the other hand, looked upon this Platonic freedom as a matter of no consequence, and held that happiness could be reached only when the sensual nature was as free as possible, and could hurry without restraint from pleasure to pleasure. This opposition was the chief motive which led Plato to the composition of this dialogue, with which he may be said to have entered the lists in his contest with the tendency of the age.

To this motive for the composition of the dialogue must be added certain external causes which are of value for its correct understanding. The trial and condemnation of Socrates in open court had really been a contest between the old and dominant system and the new ethical theory. In this conflict Ethics experienced a defeat at the hands of its enemy, which showed that it must not extend its operations too far into the domain of political life. If it was to conquer, it must be in the domain of scientific and philosophical investigation and criticism. The Socratic theory of Ethics was confined to the teaching of virtue to the individual. Plato widens the circle of investigation. He starts the question, What relation does the Socratic ethical theory hold to the state, and has the dominant political principle any real justification in opposing it? If, as is to be supposed, the death of Socrates gave a mighty impulse to these investigations of the young philosopher, it must have led him to a sharper limitation and deeper conception of the department of science which he had entered. Another probable supposition may be added. Plato must have undergone much unfavorable criticism for holding himself aloof from all political activity, and making philosophy his calling; for the cultured men of his time looked upon politics
as the only worthy pursuit for a free man. And Plato may have wished to defend himself against such attacks.

Plato was led, therefore, both by sincere differences of opinion as well as by external circumstances, to make the question of the false and true theories of life—the former claimed and taught by the rhetorical culture of the time, the latter by philosophy—the subject of discussion for a public treatise. We should not, accordingly, expect in the *Gorgias* a full criticism of Rhetoric from all sides, for the various rules which it laid down for the correct arrangement of a speech have no place here; but we must also not lose sight of the fact that the discussion of the moral question already mentioned necessarily involves also the question as to the real nature and principles of Rhetoric. We cannot, therefore, consider Rhetoric as the general subject of the dialogue, as the *peri rhetorikês* which the manuscripts affix to the title would indicate. Rhetoric enters into the discussion only as far as its relation to actual life is concerned; that is, so far as it was the means through which the business of the state was conducted. Now because, according to the general view, the duties of the citizen began, continued, and ended in politics, Rhetoric soon claimed and was admitted to be the real art of life. In this way, then, the consideration of Rhetoric may easily and naturally be made the occasion for a consideration, also, of the more general question of the true principle of life. This hand-in-hand consideration can, however, only continue to a certain degree, for the opposition of the two questions soon becomes evident as the discussion proceeds. The proper opposite to Rhetoric is Philosophy; but just as the former is represented by politics, the latter also appears in the form of ethics. Plato shows first, that real, genuine politics can only be founded upon the same ethics which prescribes the rules of life for the individual man; secondly, that the individual is only justified in turning his attention to politics, when he has made himself ethically perfect; and thirdly, that he must enter politics only in order to discharge his duty to his fellow-citizens,—in a word, only to make them better. In this way, philosophy becomes also the true art of life, not merely for the individual, but also for the association of individuals
INTRODUCTION.

which is called a state. The aim of the false art of life is to satisfy the caprices of an ever-changing passion; that of the true, is to bring about the supremacy of the good. Hence Plato undertook in this dialogue to set forth scientifically the distinction that exists between the good and the pleasant.23


A. Persons.

In the artistic development and arrangement of a dialogue in which alone, as an artistic form of prose, it can be opposed to the poetic drama, a matter of the utmost importance is the choice of the characters which are to carry on the conversation. That it is not those who give their names to the dialogues who are to be considered as the chief characters, is shown by a cursory glance over the various works of Plato. None of these works bears the name of Socrates, although (or rather because) not in one only, but in the majority of them, he is the leading character, i.e. the one whom the author makes the exponent of his own opinions, feelings, and efforts. Thus in our dialogue, likewise, Plato has assigned this role to his beloved teacher. He is throughout the leader of the conversation, for even the sections which seem to form exceptions to this rule serve only to show the inability of any one else to fill this position. In the most intimate connexion with this skill of Socrates stands the moral feeling, which he defends with especial emphasis and earnestness against a very different method. He shows himself here, as in other dialogues, to be a man in whom reason and will, thought and action, have been blended, by conscientious effort, into an almost ideal harmony. According to 461 e, we must suppose him to be already well advanced in life.

Compared with Socrates, all the other characters who take part in the dialogue fall somewhat into the background, because no single one has been chosen to bear alone the role of respondent,

23 The various opinions of modern commentators are well discussed in the introduction to Cope's translation of the Gorgias. They agree, generally, with the view expressed by Cron. Cope bases his opinion on 527 b, c, which seems to be an explicit statement of the results of the dialogue.
which is divided, but unequally, between three persons. Hence it is that Gorgias cannot be called the leading character next to Socrates, as may be said of Protagoras in the like-named dialogue, but he rather has a position analogous to that of Laches in the dialogue which bears his name. The fact, however, that he is less prominent in this dialogue than his importance would seem to require, is more than balanced by the marked respect which all parties to the discussion show him, as a man of upright aims and high attainments. For even though his theory did contain the germ of that immoral view of life which Plato made it his business to combat, yet it was only an undeveloped germ, and his whole life had been so honorable, and had borne testimony to such a high degree of moral feeling, according to the general Greek conception, that he could scarcely be held responsible for the results which were first drawn by his pupils and followers. As far as he was himself concerned, he only desired to be a master of language and of speaking, with skill to communicate to others also the art which he had practised with so much success. It was his fault that he had no clear insight into the nature of this art, and did not notice the inconsistency in which it involved him as regards his own moral feelings and opinions. The immoral principles which naturally corresponded to the art which he practised were championed not by him, but by his followers. He himself, the aged master, retires with unimpaired dignity from the discussion, in which he has shown no dialectical skill, it is true, but still a certain appreciation of dialectical methods. With him, Socrates reaches his aim without difficulty. But even when he has been defeated he does not take offence, but still shows a lively interest in the investigation, and when the excitement or sensitiveness of his pupils threatens to put an end to it, he comes to the rescue, and by his personal dignity causes its continuance.

Polus is one of the pupils of Gorgias, and assumes immediately after him his position as respondent in the discussion. As regards the facts of his life, we know that he was born in Acragas, a Sicilian city of great wealth and power, and was therefore a countryman of the celebrated philosopher and statesman Empecoces. He became a disciple of the new school of rhetoric, and
attached himself to Gorgias, whom he also accompanied on his travels, partly still to profit from his instruction, partly to obtain some reputation for himself by his dexterity in the handling of words. In this way he had now come with him to Athens. He is still young, as Plato emphasizes, but doubtless, according to 462 b, had already composed his treatise on Rhetoric. But we must not look upon this so-called τεχνη as a theory based upon acknowledged principles. For such a work Polus was much more incapable than Gorgias. He had only learned from him the means of dazzling the minds of his hearers, a species of word-jugglery in the practice of which he had obtained considerable readiness. The picture which Plato draws of him shows him to be an immature young man, not yet beyond the phrases of his student life, the height of whose self-conceit is only to be measured by the shallowness of his performances. He has absolutely no appreciation of dialectical methods; hence he has to be instructed in them repeatedly by Socrates, only to make the same mistakes again. In moral questions he displays weakness and uncertainty. He cannot deny a certain innate feeling for a moral standard in human actions (τὸ καλὸν); and yet all his efforts are directed to the acquisition and possession of external power. Whenever this comes before his vision in all its glitter, he is filled with admiration for it, and overlooks entirely the immoral means which are employed in the attainment of his end. The examples of good and bad rulers, of well-ordered and lawless government, which his own country furnished, have taught him nothing. Nay, rather, his own case serves to show most clearly how small a foundation of truth lies in the admission wrung from Gorgias, that some knowledge of the principles of right and morality was an indispensable necessity for his instruction in rhetoric.

24 Chronological accuracy is hardly to be demanded.
25 In Phaedr. 267 b he is said to be the inventor of such devices of εὐέρεια as διπλασιολογία, γνωμολογία, εἰκονολογία, and artistic word-coinage after the fashion of Licymnius. See Thompson's note on this passage.
26 What Socrates says with unmistakable irony of the pupils of Gorgias in Meno 70 b, applies excellently to Polus: καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἰδικεῖν (Γοργίας), ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, εὖν τίς τε ἐρηται, ὡσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότας κτὲ.
27 Cf. 470 e.
INTRODUCTION.

The small formative power of this instruction is well shown by the case of the trained disciple himself, while the opposition of its pretended aims to all moral principles is clearly brought out by the inconsistency and self-contradiction displayed in the views which he advances. For a refutation of these false views, nothing further is necessary than the exposition of the few remnants of truth still remaining in them. From what has been said, we can easily appreciate the importance of the character of Polus for the artistic development of the dialogue.

Next in importance to Polus is Callicles, who, however, stands in a different and much freer relation to Gorgias, although he may also in a certain sense be looked upon as his pupil. Of the circumstances of his life we know nothing more than can be gathered from this dialogue. He must have been of noble rank and rich, else Gorgias would hardly have been staying at his house. He seems to be abreast of the culture and spirit of his age, is versed in the poets, and wholly devoted to politics. From 515 a, we judge that he must have entered practical life not long before; and we may accordingly consider him as a man in the early prime of life. He is no theorist, like the other two, but a practical politician; not a teacher, but a statesman, who from his past life has drawn much useful experience, and now prosecutes his designs with definite purpose. For him the art of speech is only that for which it was intended,—namely, the means of acquiring a high position in public life. Since he was already fully in possession of the training of the period, he was well adapted to disclose all the principles on which his view of life was founded, and in accordance with which he was now pursuing his public career. Hence he represents the materialistic tendency, which recognizes profit only in enjoyment, only in the sensual pleasures, and scorns as an antiquated prejudice all acting in conformity with moral principles. But his materialism is by no means either coarse or effeminate; it is joined with a delicate culture and an energetic spirit; at least, he would wish it so. Hence he appears as an aristocrat (καλὸς κἀγαθὸς in its political sense) and despiser of the ignoble crowd, while at the same time he holds himself aloof from philosophy, because it makes men unpractical
and unfits them for great efforts and designs. As a practical orator, he possesses a perfect mastery of form, and knows not only how to utter his sentiments with rhetorical swing and force, but also how to defend them with spirit, wit, and (what Polus could not do) with arguments of logical sequence. Socrates is able to defeat him only by contrasting with the false view the better and true one, and supporting the latter by all the means of positive dialectic at his command. Of course Callicles' point of view does not permit him to acknowledge his defeat by dialectic; for he despises its methods from the outset, believes that he has advanced far beyond it, and professes to find the position occupied by Socrates one which has been long abandoned by thinking men. He is complete in himself, and entirely self-sufficient, and therefore becomes annoyed that Socrates should wish to awaken him out of his security or abase his self-confidence. This is the reason that he continually (482 c, 491 a, 499 b) speaks as if he were vastly beyond Socrates; that he makes really unreasonable objections to Socrates' method of argument (497 a, 511 a); that in his irritation he tries to withdraw from the discussion, or declares that he continues it only out of courtesy (501 c, 505 c, 510 a, 516 b); and that while he finally (513 c) admits the correctness of Socrates' teachings, he refuses to accept it for himself. With this, at the same time, the personal good will which he expresses (486 a) for Socrates agrees. But this is due really to his courteous disposition or to circumstances, rather than to genuine respect and appreciation. How much it is worth, is clearly shown by what Socrates says in 487 c.

16 On Socrates' side we find Chaerephon. Xenophon (Mem. I. 2. 48) numbers him among those friends of Socrates who in their intercourse with him had none but the purest motives and designs. In his nature there was something enthusiastic, even flighty, and this caused the surname μανικός to be applied to him as well as to Apollodorus. In Apol. 21 a Socrates himself relates the story

28 Charm. 153 b Χαλεφίν δὲ, ἃτε καὶ μανικὸς ἄν, ἀναπτόθησα ἐκ μέσων ἔθει πρὸς μέ. For the application of the name to Apollodorus, cf. Sym. 173 d, where, in a description of his character, we find these words, καὶ ὅπωθεν ποτὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔλαβες τὸ μανικὸς καλεῖσθαι, ὅπε πώς ἐγώγε.
that Chaerephon had the boldness to demand of the oracle at Delphi whether any man were wiser than Socrates. In the same passage, it is mentioned that he was among those banished under the government of the Thirty. Soon after his return he died, not living to see the trial of his master. He is made an object of ridicule by Aristophanes, along with Socrates, inasmuch as he was looked upon as his master’s model pupil. Hence it is fitting that he should appear here with Socrates. He is, even though he has only an unimportant part to play, the representative of Socrates’ followers and friends, and thus far serves to offset Polus. He understands the Socratic method and knows how to employ it skilfully, while Polus was but a clumsy imitator of the external features of his master’s style. Hence while Polus places himself if not above his master, at least on an equal plane, Chaerephon shows throughout a heart-felt love and subordination to Socrates.

B. Place.

As regards the place where we are to assume that this dialogue took place, Plato does not give us any such definite information as he does in other dialogues, for example, in the Crito, Phaedo, or Protagoras. Only certain expressions in the introductory conversation between Callicles, Socrates, and Chaerephon show clearly the negative fact, that we are not to look upon the house of Callicles as the scene of the Gorgias. This follows first of all from the words of Callicles in which he invites Socrates and Chaerephon to come to his house to listen to a lecture similar to the one which Gorgias has just held. Since, however, the preceding words of Socrates and Chaerephon show that they have come to the spot where the festal exhibition has just taken place, and that the lecture promised by Callicles can only be intended for some later time, and is so understood and courteously put aside by Socrates, and since, on the other hand,

29 Ar. Nub. 104, 503 et al. Schleiermacher was the first to oppose this, and he was followed by Woolsey, Cron, and later by Kratz. In addition to the German critics, the house of Callicles is assumed also by Thompson (?) and Cope.
the discussion is immediately opened in the name of Socrates by Chaerephon, without any intimation of a pause or change of place, which would hardly be consistent with the simple setting of the dialogue, therefore it follows of necessity that the whole discussion takes place in the very spot where Gorgias had just held his splendid harangue. But since the house of Callicles, where Gorgias is staying as a guest, cannot be the scene of this harangue, we must lay aside any idea of a private dwelling, such as is the scene of the Protagoras, and imagine the scene of the Gorgias to be, perhaps, one of the gymnasiums so often mentioned in Plato’s writings, which owing to its size and arrangement, was well adapted for such exhibitions before a large number of hearers, with the view of drawing pupils. Other persons, beside those already named, must also have been present at this discussion as silent listeners, as we can assume from several passages; and the use of θόρυβος in 458c seems to indicate that their number was considerable.

C. Time.

18 The time at which the dialogue is to be conceived as taking place must be determined by the different allusions which occur in the course of it. These unfortunately refer to events so various that their dates mutually exclude each other; and the author seems to have allowed himself almost a poet’s license. We must, therefore, from all these different allusions, try to select that especial circumstance which would be likely to have made the deepest impression upon the minds of contemporaries; and having decided upon this, we have a good basis from which to assume a date for the dialogue. The most important event alluded to is the death of Pericles (503c), which compels us in any case to assume a time different from that which the mention in the Protagoras of Pericles and his sons as living, causes us to assume for

51 447c, 455c, 458c, 473e, 490e. See note on 455c.
52 A complete discussion of the various views regarding the supposed date of the Gorgias is given in Cron’s Beiträge, pp. 35-47. Since that time (1870) there has been but little discussion. Hirschig (1873) does not agree with Cron,—nay, does not even mention his view; Thompson (1871) and Schmelzer (1883) do not touch the question.
that dialogue. At first sight the addition of the adverb ἐνωστίτι, "lately," seems to go far towards fixing the date, but the indefiniteness of ἐνωστί (see the note) and its entirely relative meaning forbid us to trust to it as a backward limit of time. The fact that Gorgias came from Leontini to Athens as ambassador in 427, Ol. 88. 1, also gives us no certain help, for we have no reason to suppose that he was only once at Athens—rather the contrary—and in the passage there is no definite allusion to that especial period. Still, the assumption that we have to imagine the period of this apparently first acquaintance of the Athenians with Gorgias as the time of our dialogue, would harmonize well enough with the above-mentioned allusion to Pericles's death, and also with the circumstance, that in 472 a, Nicias and Aristocrates are referred to as living, of whom we know that the former perished in the expedition against Syracuse, and the latter was one of the condemned after the battle of Arginusae. This allusion prevents us from setting the date of the dialogue later than 413, and at the same time weakens the value of the otherwise especially noteworthy passage in 473 e, where Socrates speaks of his unskilfulness in political matters as shown by his conduct in the assembly. The mention of his office as senator and the duty of ἐπιψηφίζειν reminds us strikingly of the chronologically exact account of this same occurrence in the Apology. But Plato has avoided an express reference to the historical event mentioned there, perhaps designedly, in order not to give any too definite chronological background to his story. Hence we may possibly, if not probably, consider that he is alluding to some other event than the celebrated trial of the impeached generals, and need not be compelled to hold to the year 405 as the supposed time of our dialogue. The citations from the Antiope of Euripides, which was brought out in 410, need not cause us any trouble either, since it is just in such matters that Plato allows himself the greatest liberties, as is shown by the celebrated anachronism in the Protagoras, the mention of the Ἀγριώ of Pherecrates.  

33 Apol. 32 b. 
34 This play was brought out in 420, while the supposed time of the Protagoras is put at 432 or 433 by most editors. See Towle-Sauppe's Introd. pp. 6 f.
The important references seem therefore to point to a period of time included between the years 427 and 413. Other allusions to circumstances and events also agree with this assumption. Thus in 481 a, Alcibiades, who was born in 450, and Demus, son of Pyrilampes, are contrasted,—the former as the sweetheart of Socrates, the latter as that of Callicles. Again, in 519 a, there is an allusion to the political activity of Alcibiades. Finally in 470 a we find a reference to Archelaus, who seized the kingdom of Macedon in 414, as a ruler who was now at the height of his fortune, the admiration and envy of the world. To fix the date more definitely within this period seems to be a matter of impossibility. If we assume it to be nearer to 413, we do not attach so much weight to the reference to the death of Pericles as it apparently deserves. If from other grounds we desire to keep the year 427 for the visit of Gorgias to Athens which we are now discussing, the reference to Archelaus adds another anachronism to the one already mentioned of the Antiope of Euripides. Such an anachronism, it is true, would not be more strange than the well-known one in the Symposion, where the violence shown the Mantineans by Sparta, fifteen years after the death of Socrates, is mentioned at a banquet, at which Socrates is represented as being a guest; but the rise of the kingdom of Macedon could not but have a very important bearing on the politics of Greece, and it is likely that the Athenians regarded, even at this early day, the intrusion of a new force into the political arena as more momentous than even the death of Pericles. This reference would then be a clear indication for the time when the star of the Macedonian king was already in the ascendant.

Certain other references to persons and facts are also found, such as the mention of the painters Polygnotus and Zeuxis in 448 b, 453 e, and of the dithyrambic poet Cinesias in 501 e, but these are not definite enough to be exactly dated, and therefore need not be taken into consideration in the present question.

Zeller, in an article Über die Anachronismen in den Platonischen Gesprächen (Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie, 1873), places the assumed date before 420, and Susemihl seems now (Bursian's Jahresbericht, i. 5) to hold the same view. Cf. his Kleine Beiträge zur Literaturgeschichte in Fleckeisen's J. J. cxv. pp. 793 ff., and Bursian's Jahresbericht, xix. p. 144.
5. **Plan of the Dialogue.**

The plan of the dialogue would depend of course on the object which the author had in mind. The third section of this Introduction has already shown that that object was to make clear and emphasize the opposition from the moral point of view between Rhetoric, as the generally recognized medium of political activity and ambition, and Philosophy, the true calling and aim of a man's life, as claimed by Socrates. This contrast is, however, not made prominent at once, but is the subject of the discussion with Callicles, which must therefore be considered as the most important part of the dialogue. This is preceded by the conversation of Socrates with Gorgias and Polus, which although it is divided between the two persons, is still shown clearly to be practically a single discussion. For not only are the discussions with these two persons outwardly united by the forwardness of Polus, whose pushing egotism is only equalled by his dialectical incapacity, but they betray also an internal connexion in their subject-matter, inasmuch as they both treat the question as to the nature and value of rhetoric, and both likewise are marked by vagueness of idea and uncertainty of moral feeling in the answers given it. This vagueness and uncertainty is in striking contrast to the reckless decision with which Callicles announces and defends his principles,—a contrast, too, which must be the more mortifying to Gorgias and Polus, since they, as theorists and teachers, are opposed to the mere practical statesman, who, however, of himself more than overbalances both the others together. In like manner, the discussion with Callicles, as its subject is more important, has a much wider compass than both the preceding together. A certain parallelism with the previous double discussion is also very apparent, in the fact that the discussion with Callicles is broken nearly in the middle by the

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36 Bonitz (*Platonische Studien*, Wien, 1858, i. p. 33) well says: "It can hardly be doubted any longer that the substance and object of the whole dialogue is given in the question, 'Is Philosophy in the Platonic sense, or is political Rhetoric, in the condition in which it at that time actually was, a worthy calling for life?'" See Cron, *Beiträge*, 47-65.
interruption caused by Callicles' refusal to take part further in
the discussion; owing to which refusal and because no one else is
willing to enter the lists, Socrates is compelled to answer his
own questions in Callicles' place, until he succeeds in drawing
him again into the conversation. With this section the dialec-
tical development reaches its highest point; now begins that
change (μετάβασις) which in the poetical drama is denoted by the
term περιφέρεσις, — the catastrophe; for up to this point the oppo-
nents of Socrates' view of life and its duties, in the case both of
the individual in private and of the public aggregations of
individuals into a state, have been continually increasing their
efforts, partly owing to the growing heat of argument, partly also
because they have had to call all their resources to their aid;
now, however, a relaxation takes place — they have failed in the
opposition — and it only remains for Socrates to expound more
fully the theory which he has defended so successfully. Very
effectively as far as the chief object of the dialogue is concerned,
and also with admirable artistic feeling, the author makes Socrates
begin this final section with a résumé of the results obtained in
the conversation with Callicles. But inasmuch as the latter, in
accordance with his deeply rooted manner of thinking and living,
even at the last moment obstinately clings to his view of what
the true man ought to do, Socrates finds it necessary to show the
universal and eternal application of his theory, the inevitable and
decisive victory of truth over error, in an independent section.
In striking contrast with the dialectical sharpness and accuracy
of the previous discussions, this conclusion appears couched in
the guise of a mythical story. There is, however, a special fitness
in this, for its religious coloring causes the whole exposition to
appeal with convincing power to the feelings of the reader, and
goes far to prepare him for the earnest and solemn warning with
which the dialogue closes. This conclusion, short in compass, in
contents and form intensely oratorical, serves also to preserve
the due artistic proportions of the work; for it corresponds to the
short introductory conversation between Callicles, Socrates, and

37 505 d Ξ. τός οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; ἄνφορος ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὧν διαλέγεσθαι.
INTRODUCTION.

Chaerephon. And just as this introduction, through the medium of the question which Chaerephon propounds to Gorgias, and which Polus presses forward to answer, leads naturally and gradually to the progressively developing scientific discussion,—so this discussion through the medium of this mythologically colored λόγος is led over to the concluding exhortation in which we, whose eyes are opened, can see clearly the power and warmth of deep moral conviction.

Simple as is the setting of the Gorgias, it yet belongs among the greatest, from the point of view of artistic perfection, of the dialogues of Plato. For, aside from the absorbing interest of the question discussed, one can hardly fail to notice as he reads, both in the choice and characterization of persons (γόος), and also in the progressive development of the discussion, how completely all the requirements of art are satisfied, thus making the Gorgias as a prose work fit to challenge comparison with any of the works of the poetical drama.


Introduction. Preliminary conversation on the scene of Gorgias' just concluded speech. Socrates desires to have some conversation with Gorgias. Callicles invites him to his house for the purpose. Socrates bids Chaerephon ask Gorgias what he professes to be.

In the Introd. to Apol. § 52, Dyer-Cron divides the dialogues of Plato into three classes, according to their setting: (1) the simplest form, which has no introduction or preamble, but is a dialogue, with occasional interruptions from interested bystanders, in which one of the parts is taken throughout by the same speaker, usually Socrates, while the other may be successively assumed by various persons. Then the narrated dialogues: (2) those 'without preface, and with no account of the persons to whom the narrative or reading is made, or (3) those introduced by a short dialogue between the narrator and his friends, who soon become his attentive listeners.' Typical examples are Gorgias, Republic, and Phaedo.

This summary, which is not found in Cron's edition, is drawn from Deuschle's Dispositionen der Apologie und des Gorgias von Platon (2d ed. by Cron, Leipzig, 1867), and adapted to the short skeleton of the dialogue which is given by Cron in his Beiträge (Leipzig, 1870), pp. 73 ff.
Discussion. 447 d–527 a.

I. 447 d–481 b. Dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias and Polus. What is Rhetoric, and what is its power?

Introduction. 447 d–448 d. Chaerephon puts the question to Gorgias. Polus pushes forward and attempts to answer the question, of what art Gorgias is master, by praising the art.


Introduction. 448 d–449 d. Socrates shows the error into which Polus has fallen. Definition of his art, Rhetoric, by Gorgias. Socrates insists upon a discussion according to dialectical methods.

1. 449 d–457 c. Attempt to obtain a definition of Rhetoric.

a. 449 d–453 a. Determination of the specific class to which Rhetoric must be assigned.

a. 449 d–451 a. First attempt at definition. But the characteristic is too general and only external.

β. 451 a–453 a. Second attempt at definition. Rhetoric (with its varieties) is classed under the specific idea \(\pi\epsilon\theta\omega\).

b. 453 a–457 c. An examination of the definition just obtained.

a. 453 a–455 a. Its meaning.

aa. up to 454 c. Determination of the object to which the \(\pi\epsilon\theta\omega\) is directed,—right and wrong.

ββ. up to 455 a. Determination of the nature of the \(\pi\epsilon\theta\omega\),—pretence without knowledge.

β. 455 b–457 c. Its compass.

aa. up to 456 c. Indefinite extension of the field of Rhetoric.

ββ. up to 457 c. Admission of the possibility of a misuse of the power Rhetoric gives.

2. 457 c–461 c. Proof of the contradiction between Gorgias' conception and presentation.

Transition. 457 c–458 e. Question as to the continuation of the discussion.
A definite statement of Gorgias' view.

In general, the orator need have no knowledge of the matters on which he speaks.

In the special case of right, however, he must be able as well as desirous to know it.

(This involves an inner contradiction.)

Proof of the (external) contradiction between this definitely stated view and the admission made above of the possibility of a misuse of Rhetoric.

Dialogue between Socrates and Polus. Value of Rhetoric according to the standard of moral principle.

Polus objects to Socrates’ method. Socrates exacts a condition in regard to the manner of conducting the discussion.

Exposition of the real nature, and little value of Rhetoric (in general).

The real nature of Rhetoric.

Vain attempt of Polus to lead the discussion by propounding the questions himself.

General characterization of Rhetoric.

Complete presentation and exposition of Socrates’ view of the nature of Rhetoric.

From this determination of the nature of Rhetoric is deduced the result that it is of little value.

Polus questions unskilfully. Socrates declares as a consequence of the definition the entire weakness of Rhetoric.

Socrates takes control of the discussion and proves this consequence from the difference between \( \beta \omega \lambda \varepsilon \sigma \tau \alpha \) and \( \delta \omega \kappa \varepsilon \iota \).

Declaration of the moral principles which serve as the standard for this judgment.

A discussion in which the meaning of Polus is formulated (by a limitation) in opposition to the principle enumerated by Socrates.

Negative portion. Vain attempt of Polus to combat the moral principles of Socrates.
INTRODUCTION.

a. 470 c–472 d. Vain attempt of Polus to refute the proposition, 'If any one do wrong, he is not happy.'—Criticism of the argument by Socrates.

β. 472 a–474 a. Vain attempt of Polus to refute the proposition, 'He who suffers punishment for a wrong committed is happier than he who escapes such punishment.'—Criticism of the argument by Socrates.

b. 474 b–479 e. Positive portion. Socrates brings forward his proofs.

a. 474 b–475 e. Proof of the proposition, 'Doing wrong is a greater evil than suffering wrong.'

β. 476 a–479 e. Proof of the proposition, 'To remain without punishment for a wrong committed is the greatest possible evil.'

Conclusion. 480 a–'81 b. Results in regard to the employment of Rhetoric

a. For protection of one's self or one's friends.

β. For the injury of one's enemies.

II. 481 b–522 e. Dialogue between Socrates and Callicles. What is the true theory in life,—the rhetorical-political or the philosophical-ethical?

Introduction. 481 b–482 e. Callicles recognizes that the ethical theory of life advocated by Socrates and the ordinary practice of men are diametrically opposed. Socrates shows that all human effort should be the outcome of a harmony of the soul in thought and action.


1. 482 e–495 a. Exposition of the rhetorical-political theory of life.

a. 482 e–486 d. General exposition. Commendation of the political, rejection of the philosophical calling.

(Rhetorical part.)

Introduction. 482 e–e. Criticism of the manner of procedure which Socrates has followed towards Polus and Gorgias.
INTRODUCTION.

a. 482 e–484 e. Opposition between natural right and legal right.
   aa. up to 483 e. Explanation of the nature of both and of the origin of the latter.
   ββ. up to 484 e. Alleged proofs of the right of the stronger, drawn from history and from Pindar.

β. 484 e–485 e. Opposition between political and philosophical activity.
   aa. up to 485 a. Objections to the latter.
   ββ. up to 485 e. Its usefulness is limited to a preparation for political activity.

   Conclusion. 485 e–486 d. Recommendation of the rhetorical-political activity for Socrates, on the ground of the danger which threatens him.

Transition. 486 d–488 b. Socrates shows the importance of the question under discussion and the conditions which allow the hope of a satisfactory result.

b. 488 b–495 a. Exposition of the view of Callicles from the point of view of its leading principle in a dialectical discussion.

   a. 488 b–491 b. (Preparatory portion.) Test of the proposition as to the right of the stronger.
      aa. up to 489 b. First limitation of the stronger, to that which is more powerful in bodily strength or greater in mass.
      ββ. up to 491 b. Second limitation to that which is more clever.

      aa. 491 c–492 d. In general. The essence of happiness and the end of human effort is the satisfaction of the desires, however great they may be.
      ββ. 492 d–495 a. In particular. Passion of itself without limitation, or the pleasant, is the good.

2. 495 a–505 e. Refutation of the theory of Callicles as shown in its fundamental principle.
INTRODUCTION.

a. 495 a–499 b. Refutation of the theory that pleasure is the chief end of man. Arguments against the identity of the pleasant and the good.
   a. 495 a–497 a. Direct proof.
   β. 497 a–499 b. Indirect proof.

Transition. Acknowledgment that only a part of man's desires are good, the other part being evil.

b. 499 b–505 c. Deduction of the immediate consequences of that principle.
   a. 499 b–501 d. Determination of a general antithesis, to serve
      aa. up to 500 a. As a standard of judgment in regard to human actions.
      ββ. up to 501 d. As a means of determining the principles which underlie human occupations.
   β. 501 d–505 e. Application of it to special occupations.
      aa. up to 502 d. To the varieties of music and poetry.
      ββ. up to 505 e. To Rhetoric in particular. The standard of judgment for the actions of the statesman.

B. 505 e–522 e. Dialectical exposition of the philosophical-ethical theory of life, as opposed to the rhetorical-political.

1. 505 e–513 c. This theory must determine the life of the individual. Ethics per se.
   a. 505 e–508 c. Positive arguments to show that this theory must determine the life of the individual.
      a. up to 507 e. The teaching of virtue for its own sake.
      β. up to 508 c. The teaching of virtue in relation to the attainment of happiness.
   b. 508 e–513 e. Negative justification. Refutation of the objection that life according to philosophical principles must make a man incapable of helping himself.
      a. up to 511 a. Determination of what true self-help is: Defence against wrong doing, not wrong suffering.
      β. up to 513 e. Refutation of the idea which lies at the basis of this objection, viz. that under any circumstances a man should try to live as long as he can.
2. 513 c–521 a. Application of the ethical principle to Politics.
   a. 513 c–517 a. Empirical determination of the business of the statesman
      a. 513 c–515 c. By establishing the preliminary conditions which must be fulfilled.
      β. 515 c–517 a. By a criticism of the most celebrated Athenian statesmen, from the point of view of their skill as displayed in the results of their efforts.
   b. 517 a–521 a. Logical confirmation of this judgment
      a. 517 a–519 b. By a distinction between the true art of statesmanship and that which is only time-serving (pretended).
      β. 519 b–521. By the demonstration of the necessary connexion which exists between the statesman's course of action, and the behavior of the citizens toward him. Analogy between Rhetoric and Sophistic.

Conclusion and transition, 521 a–522 e. Choice between the two kinds of statesmanship. Callicles commends the time-serving or flattering art with regard unto the danger of death which would otherwise threaten. Socrates declares himself as one who under existing circumstances intends, as far as possible, to practise the true statecraft in spite of the danger of death which threatens.

III. 523 a–527 a. Epilogue. Mythical exposition of the object, 24 after death, to which the efforts of a man should be directed in life.

A. 523 a–524 b. Myth of the origin of the judgment of the souls of the dead, and how this is conducted.

B. 524 b–527 a. Results.
   a. up to 525 b. The nature of death and the form in which the soul appears after death.
   b. up to 527 a. The condition of the soul after death, under a system of rewards and punishments, in accordance with each man's life in this world.

Conclusion. Recapitulation of the leading contents of the dialogue, and exhortation of Callicles.
7. **Time of Composition of the Dialogue.**

This must of course be distinguished from the time assumed for the meeting of Socrates, Gorgias, and Callicles (§§ 18 ff.). Hence to determine it, the very anachronisms which offer so much difficulty in determining the assumed time are often of great value. This is not so much the case, however, in the *Gorgias* as in some other dialogues, since, leaving out of account the anachronisms, no ground exists for assuming the date of composition to be before 405. Nay, rather, the subject and whole tone of the work, as shown in the many passages which must strike every reader as plain allusions to the fate of Socrates as an already accomplished fact, compel the assumption of some time subsequent to this tragic event. But that it was written not very long after Socrates' death is shown by the evident traces of moral indignation in the references to the existing government and the actions of prominent statesmen. This assumption would fix the date as shortly after the composition of the *Apology* and *Crito*. This is supported, though one could hardly say confirmed, by the statement of Athenaeus, that Gorgias was still living when this dialogue was brought out.

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40 This is the view generally adopted. The majority of the editors are content to give this period, rather than a definite date. Thompson puts it at 395, and Cope in the period between 395–388. The most recent treatment of the question is by S. Sudhaus in *Rhein. Mus.* xlv. pp. 54–63, who thinks that the *Gorgias* is directed against Isocrates, who is represented by Callicles, and is a kind of reply to the Πρὸς Νικοκλέα (377 b.c.). Isocrates, on this view, defends himself against the strictures of the *Gorgias* in the Νικοκλῆς (375 b.c.). Hence the date of the composition of the *Gorgias* must be 376.

41 Athenaeus xi. 113 (505 d).
ГОРГИАΣ.

TA TΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ, ГОΡΓΙΑΣ, ΠΟΛΟΣ.

I. ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ. Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὡ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἅλλ' ὑπὲρ λεγόμενον κατόπιν έορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῖμεν;

5 ΚΑΛ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἐορτῆς. πολλά γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἥμιν ὅλιγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο.

447 I. 1. πολέμου καὶ μάχης: Socrates and Chaerephon come just after Gorgias has finished his lecture. Callicles receives them with a jest, the point of which lies in the ὁδώ. In the double expression, the more general precedes, as is natural, the more definite. — μεταλαγχάνειν: occurs also in Rep. 429 a with ἐπιστήμης, and Leg. 873 c with ἀδελφῶν. It is rare.

3. τὸ λεγόμενον: in appos. with the sentence. See G. 137, 3; H. 626 b. — κατόπιν ἐορτῆς: proverbial, like post festum. This would call up to the Greek mind their public exhibitions, and the banquets with which they closed. Here is probably also an allusion to the extravagant enthusiasm which led the Athenians to designate as festivals those days on which Gorgias lectured. See Introd. 447 § 4 fin.

5. καὶ μάλα γ' ἀστείας: Hirschig remarks the frequency of such answers as these, which avoid the repetition of the last word of the preceding question. Cf. Theaet. 168 e ἀλλ' οὐ τοι σοῦ γε, ὧ Θεόδωρε, ἄμενον, Crat. 391 b. — ἀστείας: properly belonging to a city. It became an adj. of quality inasmuch as city festivals and celebrations are naturally superior to those of the country. It is used here in a good sense, though it may also mean "citified."

6. ἐπεδείξατο: the aor. is necessitated by the time-limit (ὅλιγον πρῶτερον). — ὅλιγον πρῶτερον: the first word is an acc. of extent; the second is adverbial.

33
St. I. p. 447.

Σα. Τούτων μέντοι, ὡς Καλλικλείς, αἰτίος Χαίρεφων ὁδε, ἐν ἄγορᾳ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρήσαι.

Χαίρεφων. Οὐδέν πράγμα, ὡς Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ 10 ἱάσομαι. φίλος γὰρ μου Γοργιάς, ἄστρ’ ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, εἰσαύθις.

Καλ. Τί δέ, ὡς Χαίρεφων; ἐπιθυμεὶ Ὀσκράτης ἀκούσαι Γοργίου;

Χαλ. 'Επ’ αὐτὸ γέ τοι τούτῳ πάρεσμεν.

15 Καλ. Οὔκοιν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ’ ἐμὲ ἕκεν οἶκαδε, παρ’ ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει, καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν.

447 7. τούτων: the pl. refers to the fact and its consequences. — ὁδε: is deictic. — ἐν ἄγορᾳ: the omission of the art. shows that this was a phrase like ‘in town,’ ‘on change.’ By this time, ἄγορα had come in Athens to mean simply the exchange, or marketplace, where people assembled not for public debate (that was in the ἴνυξ), but for business. It was a favorite resort of Socrates, since there the concourse of people offered him the best opportunity for prosecuting his god-given vocation (cf. Introd. to Ἀπολ. § 25, and Ἀπολ. 33 a ff.). Cf. Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 10 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκεῖνος γε ἀλι μὴν ἢν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ. προὶ τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἤς καὶ πληθοῦσις ἄγορας ἐκεῖ φανερὸς ἦν, κτε. — ἀναγκάσας: the literal meaning is not to be pressed. Chaerophon as the constant companion of Socrates took the liveliest interest in all his actions.

b 9. οὐδέν πράγμα: shows the asyndeton of ordinary conversation. — ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἱάσομαι: prob. contains some allusion to the story of Telephus, who when wounded by Achilles received from the oracle the assurance ὅ τρώσας (καὶ) ἱάσεται. The myth was made the subject of a noted tragedy by Euripides.

10. ὡστε ἐπιδείξεται: ὡστέ, when combined with the ind., can for all practical purposes be treated as if it were compounded of οὖσας and τέ. Cf. Lat. i t a q u e. See on 458 d. — ἐπιδείξεται: here used absolutely in the same sense as above. The fut. has two sides, one corresponding to each condition; thus it is equiv. to (1) ἐθέλει ἐπιδείκνυσθαι εἰ δοκεῖ, and (2) ἐπιδείξεται εἰς βούλῃ. Cf. a different case in 502 b, with note.

12. τί δέ: the question shows that Chaerophon had not anticipated any great eagerness on Socrates’ part.

14. ἵπ’ αὐτὸ: the pronoun is emphatic. See on 458 a. The emphasis is heightened by γέ.

15. ὅταν βούλησθε κτῆ.: contains an invitation, the basis of which is given by the clause with γὰρ. The original conclusion of the condition was to be ἐπιδείξεται, but in the course of the γὰρ clause the speaker lost sight of this and continued with the co-ordinate construction. — παρ’ ἐμὲ ἕκεν οἶκαδε: this shows that the speakers are neither in nor before the house of Callicles. On the place of meeting, see Introd. § 17.
Σωκράτεις. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐρωτάτων, ὁ Σῶκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν τούτῳ ἦν τῆς ἑπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νυνδή ἐρωτάτων ὅτι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἐνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἀπαντα 25 ἐφὴ ἀποκρυνεῖσθαι.

Σωκράτεις. Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις. Ὡ Χαιρεφών, ἔρου αὐτῶν.

447 17. ἐθελήσειν ἄν: Socrates uses the opt. with ἄν a great deal, esp. when he first meets a person. It is the mood of courtesy, but not of argument. In this dialogue the opt. preponderates at the beginning, but the subj. overtakes it in the argumentative passage 471, 472; while in the whole dialogue the proportion of subjs. to opt. is 3 to 2.

18. διαλεχθῆναι: emphasized in order to contrast Socrates' method with the ἑπιδείξις of Gorgias.

19. δύναμις (v.): i.e. the power and inner meaning of the art, with which the ἑπάγγελμα should correspond,—the scope or compass.—ἐπαγγέλλεται κτ. : cf. Ἀρολ. 33 b ἄν μήτε ὑπεσχόμεν μάθημα μήτε ἑπίδαξα. ἑπαγγέλλεσθαι is the regular word in Greek for 'advertise,' 'profess.'

20. τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἑπίδειξιν: it does not follow from this that Socrates considered the διαλεχθῆναι as a kind of ἑπίδειξις. It is only an example of the idiomatic Greek usage of ἄλλος, which does not include but excludes the word with which it is connected. Cf. 473 c πολιτῶν καὶ ἄλλων ξένων, Ἀρολ. 36 b. See G. 142, 2, n. 3; Π. 705. We must use a circumlocution, or another word, in English. In Callicles' answer, however, the attributable force is regained.

21. ὑπερ σὺ λέγεις: const. closely with ἑπισειδοίς, as referring to the invitation of Callicles to come to his home.

22. οὐδὲν οἶνον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτάν: there is nothing like asking the man himself. The articular infinitive is a favorite with Plato. He uses it most commonly in the acc. The nom. comes next in frequency, with the gen. a close third. The dat. is much less frequent. The pr. tense occurs nine times oftener than the aor., showing a great advance on Ἡμίδων. See Am. Jour. Phil. III. 198–201.

23. αὐτῷ: on account of its meaning ("the master," Kr. 51. 5, 4; II. 681 c) is placed in this emphatic position. On the matter itself see Introd. § 7, and the passage from Ἔμνος quoted Introd. n. 12. Auditors are present also at the following dialogue (cf. Introd. § 17 fin.). —ἐκέλευ: imperf., because the same bidding or invitation was given to the different members of the group. He bade us all.

26. καλῶς λέγεις: expresses more satisfaction than ἐν λέγεις just before.
XAI. ἔρωμαι;
ΣΩ. ὁστὶς ἐστὶν.
XAI. Πῶς λέγεις;
30 ΣΩ. ὁσπερ ἄν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὄν ύποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἄν δήπου σοι ὃτι σκυτοτόμος ἕι ὃς μανθάνεις ὅς λέγω;
Π. ΧΑΙ. Μανθάνω καὶ ἔρησομαι. Εἶπε μοι, ὃ Γοργία, ἀλήθη λέγει Καλλίκλῆς ὥστε, ὃτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὃτι ἄν τὸς σε ἐρωτά;
ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ. Ἀλήθη, ὃ Χαιρέφων καὶ γὰρ νυνὶ ἄντά ἐστι 448 ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω ὃτι οὐδείς μὲ πω ἡρώτηκε καὶ οὐδὲν πολλὸν ἐτών.
ΧΑΙ. Ἡ ποὺ ἄρα βαδίως ἀποκρίνει, ὃ Γοργία.
ΓΟΡ. Πάρεστι τούτου πείραν, ὃ Χαιρέφων, λαμβάνειν.
ΠΟΛΟΧ. Νὴ Δία· ἄν δὲ γε βούλῃ, ὃ Χαιρέφων, ἐμοῦ.

447 27. τι ἔρωμαι: deliberative subjunctive.
28. ὁστὶς ἐστὶν: ὁστὶς is regularly used to ask the question ‘who’ after a neg. (cf. 524 e, 526 b); but in all cases it may be used to express the idea of quality. See on 453 b.
30. ὁσπερ ἄν ... ἀπεκρίνατο ἄν: ὁσπερ ἄν εἰ is phraseological, and the second ἄν comes in unconsciously with the conditional apodosis. The use of the aor. with ἄν in the apodosis, following an imperf. with εἰ in the protasis, where both refer to the present sphere of time, is not common, and according to GMT. 414, occurs chiefly in Plato and in such phrases as εἶπον ἄν, ἀπεκρινάμην ἄν. Similar constructions in the past sphere are found with other verbs im Dem., Aristoph., Soph., Eur., Xen., etc. Cf. Dem. xix. 162, Ar. Eq. 507. — δημιουργός: see on 452 a.

Π. 1. μανθάνω: one example suffices 447 to make the idea of Socrates clear to Chaerephon; two are not enough for Polus. This is, however, due to the fact that Chaerephon is familiar with Socrates’ methods, while they are new and strange to Polus.
2. ἀποκρίνεσθαι κτλ.: this is the τὶ of Socrates’ question above in c. The tense shows that it is a general standing announcement.
7. ἡ ποὺ ἄρα κτλ.: spoken in a 448 wondering, admiring tone which ex-
10. Αρτι διελήλυθεν.

ΧΑΙ. Τι δέ, ὦ Πώλε; οἴει σὺ κάλλιον ἄν Γοργίου ἀποκρύνασθαι;

ΠΝΑ. Τι δὲ τούτο, ἐὰν σοὶ γε ἢκανῶς;

15. Θυδέν. ἄλλη ἐπειδή σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρύνου.

ΠΝΑ. Ἐρώτα.

ΧΑΙ. Ῥωτῶ δή, εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ἢν τῆς τέχνης ἢσπερ ὁ ἄδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τίνα ἄν αὐτὸν ὄνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὁπερ ἑκεῖνον;

20. ΠΝΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΧΑΙ. Ἡατρὸν ἁρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἄν ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΝΑ. Ναι.

ΧΑΙ. Εἰ δέ γε ἢσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφῶντος ἢ ὁ ἄδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἐμπειρὸς ἴν τέχνης, τίνα ἄν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν;

ΠΝΑ. Δήλον ὅτι ζωγράφον.

ΧΑΙ. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδή τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἔστιν, τίνα ἄν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῦμεν;

30. ΠΝΑ. Ὁ Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν

448. after τοῦτον. — 'Gor. You may try the experiment if you please, Chaerephon. Pol. Yes, 'egad, and upon me too, if you like, Chaerephon.' Cope.

10. καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι: gives the ground of Polus' offer. Possibly he may also wish to intimate that Gorgias may now fairly retire, and yield the field to another.

14. τι δὲ τοιτο: sc. διαφέρει. "What difference does this make?" Cf. 497 e. Polus does not wish to slight his master, but only to win admiration for himself.

18. Ἡρόδικος: this brother of Gorgias (see Introd. § 4) must not be confounded with another physician of the same name who came from Selymbria (Rep. iii. 400 α, Phaedr. 227 d, Prot. 316 d), and was famed as the first to insist upon the value of gymnastics for health.

19. ὁπερ: after τίνα by an easy transfer to the actual idea, — 'name.'

24. Aristophon's brother was the celebrated painter Polygnotus of Thasus.

He overdoes the use of those figures, with which Gorgias also was accustomed to amuse himself, e.g. 'paronomasia' (κατὰ τέχνην... κατὰ τύχην) and other phonetic figures in regard to the names of which theorists themselves were not at one. He uses the poetic αἰώνα instead of βίον. His statements are indefinite and cloudy, and finally he brings forward a wholly general attribute — as Socrates proves in e by the distinction between ποιά and τίς — of the matter in question, instead of its name. To speak of rhetoric as καλλιστή τῶν τεχνῶν is furthermore dialectically inappropriate, although it well agrees with the artistic design by drawing attention thus early to this idea. For other examples of similar mannerisms, see the speeches which go under the name of Gorgias (e.g. in the appendix to Blass' edition of Antiphon), and which, whether genuine or not, show admirably the peculiarities of the Gorgianic school.

III. 1. παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς: equipped for. The phrase is a military one; hence λόγους is almost equiv. to the later λογομαχίαν, 'disputation.' The reference is to the readiness with which Polus begins his harangue.

4. τι μάλιστα: how so, pray? To Gorgias' view the question has been well answered.

8 f. οὐκ... ἄλλα: the construction is colloquial. οὐκ is to be translated no! The following clause with γέ serves to give the reason for οὐκ, "that is, if." The negative color of the whole complex causes the speaker to ground his position by ἄλλα where one would more naturally find γάρ. It is not necessary to fill out the ellipsis with ἄν ἢδιον σέ either in Greek or English.

9. δήλος γάρ μοι: on the personal construction, see on 449 b.
10 καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν, ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ρητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι.
Πω. Τί δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες; ὁμ. "Οτι, ὦ Πώλε, ἐρωμένου Χαίρεβοωτος τῶν Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην
15 ὡσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ήτις δέ ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.
Πω. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρωνάμην ὅτι εἰδὴ ἢ καλλιστὴ;
ὁμ. Καὶ μάλα γε. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἡρώτα ποία τις εἰδὴ ἢ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τὶς καὶ οὐνία δέου καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν. ὡσπερ τὰ ἐμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαίρεβών καὶ
20 αὐτὸς καλῶς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἶπε
τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρῆ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δὲ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῶν εἰπέ, τίνα σε χρῆ καλεῖν ὃς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης.

25 ὅτις ρητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

26 Ἀγαθὸν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὦ γε εὐχομαι εἶναι,
ὡς εὕφη ὁμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.

21. Socrates accepts tentatively the statement which has been so continually advanced, that ρητορική is a species of art, in order to proceed with the discussion. The correctness of this statement is brought under question later.

26. Ἀγαθὸν γε: the self-satisfaction of Gorgias is so great that he speaks like a Homeric hero. Note the condescension (perhaps unconscious) in the following καλεὶ δὴ (you may call me so, then), of which, however, Socrates takes no notice.—εἰ δὴ: if... really.
40 PLATO'S GORGIAS.

Γορ. Κάλει δή.

30 Σμ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ποιεῖν; б

Γορ. Επαγγέλλομαι γε δή ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλοθι.

Σμ. Ἄρ’ οὖν ἐθελήσας ἄν, δί Γοργία, ὡσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ’ ἀποκρινόμενος,

35 τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τούτο, οὗν καὶ Πῶλος ἡρξατο, εἰσαύθις ἀποθέσθαι; . . . ἀλλ’ ὁπερ ὑπισχνεῖ, μὴ ψεῦσῃ, ἄλλα ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτῶμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Γορ. Εἰσίν μὲν, δέ Σώκρατες, ἑνια τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖοι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι: οὐ μὴν c

40 ἄλλα πειράσομαι γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἑστὶν ὅν φημι, μηδένα ἄν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν.

449 32. ἄλλοθι: on these travels, see b Introd. § 5. The vagueness of the adverb stamps the whole statement as somewhat boastful.

35. τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων: Socrates does not mean that the answers should be restricted to a certain length; but he wishes to exclude those answers which, instead of keeping strictly to the question under discussion, branch off and lose themselves in different trains of thought. By using καὶ before Πῶλος, Socrates gives us to understand that he fears something similar from Gorgias.

36. εἰσαύθις ἀποθέσθαι: put off till another time. — ὁπερ ὑπισχνεῖ: with reference to 447 c.

38. εἰσόν κτέ.: though Gorgias speaks like a master, with the air of authority, he would still like to leave a way of escape open for himself, — which unfortunately his boastful ἐπάγγελμα has rendered impossible, although he had not yet distinctly promised to speak with brevity.

39. ἀναγκαῖοι . . . ποιεῖσθαι: the personal construction proceeds from the 'prolepsis' of the subject of the inf., —a common occurrence with δίκαιος and δῆλος. The real subject of the infinitive is then ἐνια τῶν ἀποκρίσεων. Of this construction Plato affords other examples. Cf. Μενο 79 δ ἀπόκρησιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἐτὶ ζητούμενων . . . ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Phædo 92 δ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἄποδεξεῖς ποιομένως λόγοις. In translation the adj. must be made neuter, or a circumlocution must be used. "There are certain answers in which it is necessary for one to deliver himself more at length." See H. 944 a; Rid. § 250.

40. διὰ βραχυτάτων: simply a circumlocution for the superlative adv., and accordingly const. with ὡς acc. to the usual rule. Kr. 49, 10, 1; H. 651 a. In the next sent., ἐν seems to have much the same force as διά here.

41. μηδένα ἄν . . . εἰπεῖν: the use of μὴ here is not to be considered as due
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

Σδ. Τούτον μὴν δεῖ, ὥς Γοργία: καὶ μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τούτον ποίησαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰσ-
45 αὖθις.

Γορ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογω-
tέρον ἀκοῦσαι.

IV. Σδ. Φέρε δή· ῥητορικῆς γάρ φῆς ἐπιστήμων τέχ-
νης εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄν καὶ ἄλλου ῥήτορα· ἡ ῥητορικήν δὲ τὸν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὖσα; ὡσπερ ἡ ὑφαντική περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄματων ἐργασίαν· ἡ γάρ;

5 Γορ. Ναί.

Σδ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν;
Γορ. Ναί.

Σδ. Νὰ τὴν Ὡραν, ὥς Γοργία, ἀγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρί-
σεις, ὅτι ἀποκρίνει ὡς οἰόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.

10 Γορ. Πάννο γάρ οἴμαι, ὥς Σώκρaτες, ἔπιεικῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

Σδ. Εὖ λέγεις. ἢ δή μοι ἀπόκριναι οὕτως καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τὴν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμην;
Γορ. Περὶ λόγους.

449 to indir. disc. which would require ὃν, but as being in an inf. clause which is in apposition with ἐν.

IV. 1. ῥητορικῆς γάρ κτῆ.: γάρ introduces the reason for the question which is announced in the challeng-
ing phrase, φέρε δή. Hence the position of the causal clause.

d 3. περὶ τί: περὶ with acc., ordinarily of action; περὶ with gen., ordinarily of thought or speech; but thought or speech may be considered as action, and shifts are not uncommon.' B.L.G. Cf. περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς below (12).

8. νὴ τὴν Ὡραν: Socrates rarely uses the same oath twice in the same dialogue. Cf. νὴ τὸν κόνα 466 e, μὰ τὸν — 466 e, Δλ' 470 e, 516 d, τὸν κόνα 449 τὸν Αἰγιντάων θεόν ἕβον 482 δ, τὸν Ζήθον δ 489 e. See on 463 d.

9. ὅτι ἀποκρίνει: the explanatory clause freq. borders on the causal, as here.

10. πάννο ἐπιεικῶς: fairly well. In this self-laudation, Gorgias has in view only the form of his answers without reference to their connexion with the subject-matter. He only wants to show that he is a master of brachylogy, and therefore answers in the shortest formulae of affirmation and negation.

13. ἐπιστήμη: not really different from τέχνη, inasmuch as the orator is ἐπιστήμων ῥητορικῆς τέχνης.
15 Ἔνοιος τούτων, ὦ Γοργία; ἄρα οὖν δηλοῦσι τοὺς εἰς κάμνοντας, ὡς ἄν διαίτωμενοι γναῖνοιεν;

Γορ. Οὐ.

Ση. Ὠκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἡ ῥήτορικὴ ἑστὶν.

20 Γορ. Οὐ δῆτα.

Ση. Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς.

Γορ. Ναι.

Ση. Ὠκοῦν περὶ ὄντερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν;

Γορ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

25 Ση. ἄρ’ οὖν, ἦν νυνθὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν καμνοντων δυνατοὺς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν;

Γορ. Ἀνάγκη.

Ση. Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἁρα, ὡς ἐοικεν, περὶ λόγους ἑστίν.

Γορ. Ναι.

30 Ση. Τοὺς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα;

Γορ. Μάλιστα.

Ση. Ὠκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἑστίν τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ καχεξίαν;

449 15. ποιεῖς τούτως: the acc. instead of the nom. on account of the proximity of λόγους. The const. of the previous clause is continued.—τοὺς κάμνοντας: an example of one of the most common kinds of anticipation, where the subj. of the dependent sent. is drawn forward under the government of the leading verb.

18. οὕτως ἄρα περὶ πάντας κτλ.: accordingly the definition of Gorgias is too wide. Cf. Prot. 312 δ ἵππος ἦν, ἥν τε ἐγὼ, ἀλήθη λέγομεν, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς γε’ ἐρωτηθέως γὰρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπέκρισις ἡμῖν δεῖται περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δείνων ποιεῖ λέγειν.

23. Ὠκοῦν περὶ ὄντερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν: sc. ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς with each clause. Apparently Socrates makes no immediate use of this point, so that it might appear unnecessary. But by contrasting thought with speech he thus at the beginning of the discussion emphasizes the importance of the contents as opposed to the form, a distinction on which he subsequently bases his refutation of Gorgias.

26. δυνατοὺς εἶναι (sc. ποιεῖ from 450 449 e): on the difference between ἄρα a and ἄρα οὖ, where an affirmative answer is expected, see on 479 e.

33. εὐεξίαν τε . . . καὶ καχεξίαν: opposites are regularly connected by τε . . . καί.
Γορ. Πάνω γε.

35 Σα. Καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τεχναί, ὡς Γοργία, οὕτως ἔχουσιν· ἐκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τούτοις, οὕτως b χάνουσιν οὕτε περὶ τὸ πράγμα, οὐ ἐκάστη ἐστὶν ἢ τέχνη.

Γορ. Φαίνεται.

Σα. Τί οὖν δὴ ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τεχνας οὐ ρητορικᾶς 40 καλεῖς, οὕσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην ρητορικήν καλεῖς, ἢ ἂν η̂ περὶ λόγους;

Γορ. Ὄτι, οὐ Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις ὡς ἔπος εἴπειν πᾶσα ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ρητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστὶν τοιότων 45 χειρουργίμα, ἄλλα πᾶσα ἡ πράξεις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγους οὔ γων ἐστίν. διὰ ταύτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ρητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξίω εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὁρθώς λέγων, ὡς ἐγώ φημι.

V. Σα. Ἄρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἷον αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν;

450 36. ἐκάστη: when the second clause explains the first, the asyndeton is but little felt.
37. ἡ τέχνη: const., in spite of the article, not with ἐκάστη, but with ὡς. This is the pred. while ἐκάστη is subject. "Of which each (art) is the art."
41. ἢ οὖν ἢ: the indef. rel. sentence is necessary, owing to the very general character of Gorgias' statements hitherto.—ταύτην: as referring to ἢ ἃν ἢ is also indefinite. "If this you call rhetoric—any art which has to do with discourses."
43. ὡς ἔπος εἴπειν: this phrase occurs in Plato 77 times (GMT. 777, 1). The ὡς is not to be considered as final, as in the Eng. 'so to speak,' but is rather comparative, in the meaning 'in a word;' though it is often convenient to translate by 'so to speak.' It is closely connected with the following πᾶσα, as in 456 a with ἀπάσας, 450 d with οὗτεν ὑποθέν, Phaedo 78 e with οὕταμάως. Cf. Kr. 55, 1, 2. Its force is shown by its opposition to ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ in Rep. i. 341 b ποτέρως λέγεις τὸν ἀρχοντα, τοῦ ὡς ἔπος εἴπειν ἢ τὸν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, and its employment here shows the inability of Gorgias to give a clear and sharp definition of his art.
45. κύρωσις: accomplishment, consequently effect, power. This unusual word, which Thucydides vi. 103 uses in the meaning decision, resolution, determination, is replaced below in e by the equally unusual κήρος. More common is the verb κυρώω confirm and κυρωθαί bring to pass, 451 b, c. Cf. also κύρος void, inoperative, Crito 50 b, Prot. 356 d.
47. ὁρθώς λέγων ὡς ἐγώ φημι: this e addition is also characteristic of his self-confidence.

V. 1. ὁ'/ οὖν μανθάνω κτέ.: this question is put without any expecta-
tάχα δὲ εἶσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι εἰσίν ἡμῖν 
tέχναι. ἢ γάρ; 
Γορ. Ναῖ.

5 Σα. Πασῶν δὲ, οἴμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ 
pολύ ἔστω καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, εἴναι δὲ οὕδενός, 
ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαιότοτα ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οὗν 
γραφικῆ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. τὰς τοι- 
ὰς οὕτως μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἂς οὐ φῆς τὴν ῥητορικήν 
10 εἴναι: ἢ οὖ; 
Γορ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὅ Σώκρατες. 
Σα. Ἐτεραὶ δὲ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν αἱ διὰ λόγου πᾶν 
περαιόνοις, καὶ ἔργου ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ οὕδενός προσ- 
δέονται ἢ βραχέος πᾶυν, οἷον ἢ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ 
15 καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεπτευτικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχ- 
ναι, ὡς εἰναι σχεδόν τι ὑσος τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς 
πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους, καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ 

450 tion of an answer. οἶλαι is used, and this not τίνα, because there is no inquiry after the name of the art (which for the moment is considered satisfactory), but after its nature or kind, which must now be more clearly defined. In the following methodical discussion Socrates makes clear what was present, but in a confused form, in Gorgias' mind. The question now is as to the means of the κύρωσις. The ground of distinction is formed by the contrast so familiar to the Greeks between λόγος and ἔργον (λέγειν and πράττειν). Cf. Apoll. 32 a.

5. τῶν μέν: in part. apposition with πασῶν. See II. 624 d. The correlative is ἔτεραι δέ (12), while εἴναι δέ is to be connected with δέονται as one division of the τῶν μέν, and as correlative with the implied subject (αἱ μέν) of δέονται. Below we find ἢ . . . ἢ instead.

7. τὸ τῆς τεχνῆς: the business, function of the art. See H. 730 b.

9. οὐ ψής: on the adhaerent οὖν d see GMT. 384; H. 1028.

14. ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ: arithmetic is the theoretical science of numbers; logistic, the practical art of reckoning. See the following chapter. On the omission of the article, see Kr. 58, 2, 1; H. 660 a; and note on 409 d.

15. πεπτευτικὴ: seems to be a general name for various games which were played on a board with pieces, whether dice or checkers. The addition of γε indicates that the member of the series is not usually classed with the others; cf. Crito 47 b ταῦτα ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον κτέ.
πράξεις καὶ τὸ κύρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστὶν. τῶν τοιούτων τινὰ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

20  Ἐρρ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σο. Ἀλλ' οὕτω τούτων γε οὐδεμίᾳ οὖμαί σε βούλεσθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι "ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κύρος ἔχουσα ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶν," καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, τίν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀρα ῥητορικὴν, ὥ Γοργια, λέγεις; "ἀλλ' οὖν οὖμαί σε οὕτε τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὕτε τὴν γεωμετριαίαν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν.

Γορ. Ὁρθῶς γὰρ οἶει, ὡ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως ὑπο-λαμβάνεις.

VI. Σο. Ἡθι νῦν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἢν ἡρόμην διαπέρανον. έπει γὰρ ῥητορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὕσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολύ λόγω χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τουαύται οὖσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἡ περὶ τί ἐν

18. αὐταῖς . . . ἐστίν: cf. below in 404 e ἢ διὰ λόγου τὸ κύρος ἔχουσα.
22. οὐχ ὅτι: not but that, although. —τῷ ῥήματι: as far as actual words are concerned; “but you could not have earnestly meant it.”
24. ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις: regular formula for introducing an objection; cf. Apol. 20 e. The opt. is potential. —δυσχεραίνειν: in the proper sense of δύσχερὴς, hard to manage, i.e. to make difficulties. Cf. 488 κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Remark the delicate irony of the words ἀλλ' οὖκ κτὲ, which consists in this, that Socrates apparently passes very gently over the contradiction which exists. between the words and the actual meaning of the teacher of oratory.

28. ὁρθῶς νάο οἶε: acknowledges and accepts the suggestion made by Socrates. Note the oratorical swing in the addition of δικαίως ὑπολαμβανεῖς, which serves also to preserve the dignity of the master who is ever ready to encourage good work in the pupil.

VI. 1. Ἡθι: is simply an encouraging interjection like φέρε δ' 449 c. —καὶ σὺ: acknowledges the courtesy of Gorgias’ preceding words. —τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἢν ἡρόμην: is brachylogie for τὴν ἀπόκρισιν τοῦ ἡρωτήματος δ' ἡρόμην.

2. διαπέρανειν: denotes the suitable conclusion which Gorgias ought to make to his answer, by establishing some distinction characteristic of rhetoric. Socrates assumes then a little ironically that this object has already been almost attained. Since, however, he wishes in what follows to make clear that two or more arts can belong to the same species and yet be entirely distinct from one an-
5 λόγοις τὸ κύρος ἔχουσα ῥητορικὴ ἔστων. ὦσπερ ἂν εἰ τῖς με ἔροιτο ὃν νυνὶ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν.

"ὦ Σώκρατες, τίς ἔστων ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη;" εἶποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὦσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κύρος ἐξουσῶν· καὶ εἰ μὲ ἐπανέροιτο· "τῶν περὶ τί;" εἶποιμ' ἂν ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττόν, οὐσα ἂν ἐκάτερα τυγχάνῃ ὁντα. εἰ δ' αὐ̂ ἔροιτο· "τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην;" εἶποιμ' ἂν ὅτι καὶ αὐτῇ ἐστὶ τῶν λόγω τὸ πάν κυρουμένων. καὶ εἰ ἐπανέροιτο· "ἡ περὶ τί;" εἶποιμ' ἂν ὦσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δὴμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἡ λογιστικὴ ἐξελ. περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐγάρ ἔστι, τὸ τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν. διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλῆθους ἐπισκοπεῖ, τὸ περιττόν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἡ λογιστικὴ. καὶ εἰ

other, it is necessary for him to give a and compare several examples.

6. ὰν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον: logically follows τεχνῶν.

9. τῶν περὶ τί: the sentence would be correctly filled out thus: τῶν περὶ τί διὰ λόγου τὸ κύρος ἔχουσῶν. The use of τῶν, both here and in the following answer, shows that the inquiry is directed to the function of a class. On the other hand ἡ περὶ τί; just below inquires after the function of the individual art. As an example of Plato's ποικίλα, notice the variety in the expressions ἐν λόγοις τὸ κύρος ἐξουσια, διὰ λόγων τὸ κύρος ἐξουσια and λόγων κυρουμένων.

10 f. οὐσα ἂν τυγχάνῃ: however great each happen to be, i.e. to any magnitude you please.

14. ὦσπερ οἱ ἐν δὴμῳ συγγραφόμενοι. Socrates refers to those who bring forward motions in the assembly of the people or have them recorded by the γραμματεύς to be then communicated to the assembly, at the command of the president, by the herald. If there was a previous motion either of the senate or an orator on the same subject before the body, instead of recording and reading the common preamble of both motions, the words τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ Βουλή (or whatever the name of the proposer was) were employed, followed by the modification or amendment. This corresponds in a general way to our 'amend after the words,' etc.

17. πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πτέ.: 'the relative as well as the absolute properties.' Cope. The reckoning can only be made with odd and even numbers; hence πρὸς αὐτὰ means even to even, etc.; πρὸς ἄλληλα, even to odd, etc. The definition of λογιστικὴ runs thus in Charmides 166 a ἡ λογιστικὴ ἐστὶ συν τοῦ ἄρτιον καὶ περιττοῦ ἐπιστήμη, πλῆθους ὑπὸς ἔχει πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. The pl. must be construed according to the sense, not the form.
tis tìn ástrovomiai anéroito, eìmu légyontos óti kai autì
20 logìs kuroûtai tà: pánta, "oì dè logoi oì tìs ástrovono-

µías," eì faîth, "perì tì eîsw, ò òkkrates;" eîpouì ãnv
ôti perì tìn tòn ástrovon fòrâv kai ùlìov kai selînìs,
pòs pròs allìla tâkhous ëxel.

Gor. 'Orhôs ge légyov soú, ò òkkrates.

d 25 Σn. 'Iði òh kai soú, ò òkrgia. tunxánei meû yàr òh ñ

ùptorikì ouða tòn logìs tà: pánta diapràttoménon te kai
kuroûmènov tis ñ yàr;

Gor. 'Estì tâuta.

Σn. Lége òh tòw perì tì; <tì> éstì touto tòw òntwv,

30 perì òh ouðoi oì logoi eîswv, òis ñ ùptorikì xrhîta;

Gor. Òta mégwstà tòw anðrôpseión prágmatow, ò òk-

krates, kai árisita.

VII. Σn. 'All', ò òkrgia, àmfìuðhùstìgìoun kai touto

légeis kai ouðèn tìw xàfèî. ouðoûi yàr se akhkoênai ën è
tòis xumposiôn ùðòntwv anðrôpov touto tô skolìov, ën

451 19. anéroito: sc. tìs èstov, the sub-
ject of which is given in the proleptic
accusative. Cf. Prot. 351 e tìn ùdovh
autìn èposév ei ouk âgâthìn èstov.

d 25. òh soû: the rest of the sentence
is to be supplied from the preceding
words of Gorgias. The clause with
yàr gives the basis of the following
question. Cf. 449 c, d.

30. perì òh: according to analogy
we should expect perì òh. But cf. a
similar shift in 453 b and e with
peîwî. See also 491 a and note on
449 d.

31. tà mégwstà. Gorgias, like Po-
lus, finds it extremely hard to come
out of the rut into which he has
fallen, and give a scientific definition
of his art.

e VII. 3. The scolion was a pecu-

liar kind of drinking-songs, parólìa, sung at banquets. The one here al-
luded to is mentioned by Plato in
Euthyd. 279 a, Phileb. 48 d, Legg.
631 e, 661 a. It probably was com-
posed by Simonides, although accord-
ing to some it was by Epicharmus.
After Bergk’s (Poet. Lyr. Gr. iii, 645)
rhythmlcal changes the words acc. to
the Scholiast read as follows:

'Tyòaînev ìvìn ìrìstov ìnãðì ònàtìf,
ðèùterov ðè ùfàv ìalìv ùgeísthà,
 tô trîtov ðè plîuteîn àðòlìv,
îal tô têtârtov ìhàvì metà tòw ðìlìov.

The last line of the scolion is omitted
by Socrates, because, for his argu-
ment, only those advantages can be
cited which involve the practice of
some art.
451 4. καταρθμοῦνται: the advantages are arranged according to their value in the enumeration. Instead of an object the clause with ὅτι follows, introducing the dir. discourse.

452 8. δημιουργοί: the word is found as early as Homer and denotes all who carry on a business which is public and useful to the people; as, physicians, soothsayers, singers, goldsmiths. Later, the expression was extended to free manual laborers, without, however, losing any of its respectability. Hence it corresponds to our use of the word ‘master’ (master-workman, master-mason). Cf. 455 b. It is noteworthy that only such things are enumerated as, like the assumed result of rhetoric, were reckoned among external advantages; for rhetoric, according to the view of Gorgias, should procure in the state either high office or honors. Hence the seclion is very applicable. Socrates brings forward the physician, the body-trainer, and the banker, in order to contrast with the subjective judgment of Gorgias the subjective opinions of others, and thus to show the subjectivity of the answer.

10. παιδοτρίβης: the body-trainer for boys taught in the gymnastic schools (παλαίστραι). He is often confounded with the γυμναστής, whose proper office was the scientific treatment of the whole subject of bodily exercises, and whose field was the public γυμνασία, where he instructed grown men in general and also those who were training for the games (ἀθληταί). Both the παιδοτρίβης and the γυμναστής are often mentioned alongside of the physician, since the nurture and care of the body was their common aim. Cf. Crito 47 b.

—ἐποιεῖ πρῶτον: the ὅν before παρασταῖν is felt as extending over the whole sentence.

16. ύγίεια: if the word is sound, b it must be taken as an absolute addition to the proper question which ends with ὃ Σώκρατες. The diffuse-
meizov agathon anthetaitos ygniias;" ei de av meta touton o
paidotribhs eitei oti "thamamaoumi tavn, oe Symkrates, kai
autos, ei sou ekoi Gorgias meizov agathon epideixai tis
20 autou technhs h egw tis emhs." eitei an av kai prois touton.
"su de de tis ei, o anthetaite, kai ti to sown ergon;"
"paidotribhs," faia an, "tov de ergon mou estin kalous te
kai iskyrous poiein toun anthetaitous ta sumpata." mete de
tou paidotribhnen ektoi an o chrismatisths, ws egumai, panw
25 katafalonwv apantwv: "skopei dhe ta, o Symkrates, evan sou e
ploutou fainh ti meizov agathon evn h paraph Gorgia h par'
allw strfouwv." faimev an ovin prois auton. "ti de de; h
su tounto dhmiourgyos;" faia an. "tis ant;" "chrismatis-
tis." "ti ovin; krineis su megistou anthetaitous agathon
30 einai plouton;" phiromev. "pws gar ouk;" erei. "kai
mhn amfiosbetei ge Gorgias oide tin par' autw technhs
meizos agathon aitian einai h tin sthn," faimev an hmeis.
dhlon ovin oti ti meta touto erous an. "kai ti estin a
touto to agathon; apokrynavo Gorgias." idi ovin nomi-
35 sas, o Gorgia, erwtasthai kai up ek einov kai up emov,

452 ness of the whole passage favors the
view that the construction must not
be rigidly pressed here.
18. tavn: for tou an, as we frequently
29 a deinou tan eiti.
18 f. kai autos: like et ipse,
"likewise," while recognizing the
claims of the physician, shows also a
consciousness of his own importance
as compared with Gorgias. This calls
forth in the reply the address o
anthetaite, which indicates some degree
of contempt and surprise.
25. The very mode of speaking
declares the pride of wealth.—deita:
with the inv. makes the claim for
recognition more urgent than the sim-
ple de. Kr. 69, 20; H. 1037, 6.—
edev: whether, introducing the indir.
question. But Goodwin (GMT. 493,
680) denies that edev can ever mean
'whether,' insisting that every ex-
pression like the present is condi-
tional. The side-thrust at Gorgias is
very appropriate, as he himself re-
ceived much money from his teach-
ing and lived magnificently upon it.
31. amfiosbetei: affirms (in contra-
diction of his opponent), "disputes
this and says.
33. to meta touto: adverbial acc. d
H. 600 a; 719 b.
In plato's gorgias.

37. αὐτοῦ: shift from the rel. to the leading clause. G. 156; H. 1006.

39 f. αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: the pronoun emphasizes personal freedom as opposed to power over others. In thus stating the aim and purpose of all the sophists’ efforts, Gorgias (acc. to Plato) fails completely to notice the mutual contradiction of the two members.

40. τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν: Heindorf desires τῶν ἄλλων, which would better accord with the ordinary usage. Still the indefiniteness of the expression may not be without object in showing the inexactness of thought which naturally prevailed at a time when the art of speaking was just being brought within the reach of all.


44. καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐκλλόγῳ (sc. τῶν πολιτῶν): is paraphrased with a limitation in the following clause. In this division of the various kinds of bodies in which the orator would have occasion to display his powers we see the basis of the three chief varieties of oratory (γένη, genera) which are generally recognized by later critics. The first, τὸ δημηγορικὸν (συμβουλευτικὸν, deliberativum), was employed ἐν τοῖς βουλευτήριοις καὶ ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις. The second, τὸ δικαστικὸν (iudiciale), was employed ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. The germ of the third, τὸ ἕπιδεικτικὸν, which was not distinguished by Anaximenes, can be discerned in the words καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐκλλόγῳ κτε. This last was first defined by Aristotle, who used as the basis of his division the oratorical characteristics of the several varieties, not the place of their delivery, as Gorgias does here.

45. ἐν δυνάμει κτέ.: “the possession of this power will involve the servitude of the physician,” etc.

46. δοῦλον. This expression seems to be Gorgias’ own, as is to be gathered from the passage in Philebus 58 a, cited by Heindorf. Protarchus says there: ἥκουον μὲν ἐγωγείς, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐκάστοτε Γοργίου πολλάκις, ὡς ἦ τοῦ πείθειν (δύναμις) πολύ διαφέροι πασῶν τεχνῶν: πάντα γὰρ ύπ’ αὐτὴ
παιδοτρίβην. Ὁ δὲ χρηματιστής οὗτος ἀλλὰ ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλῆθη.

VIII. Σα. Νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλώσαι, Ὄ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἦντια τέχνην ἢγεὶ εἶναι, καὶ εἰ τι. Εἴ 453 ἐγὼ συνήμην, λέγεις ὅτι πειθόμεν δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἀπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τὸ τοῦτο τελευταὶ. Ἡ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλέον τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἡ πειθῶ τοῖς ἀκούονσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν;

Γορ. Οὐδαμῶς, Ὅ Σῶκρατεῖς, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς ἵκανὸς ὀρίζονταὶ. ἔστω γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς.

Σα. Ἀκοῦσον δὴ, Ὅ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἵσθαι ὅτι, ὥς

452 δούλα δὲ ἐκόντων ἀλλ' ὅν ὁ διὰ βίας ποι- ωίτο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀριθτῇ πασῶν εἰς τῶν τεχνῶν. — The Gorianic balancing δούλον μὲν . . . δούλον δὲ gives a certain dignity to the words.

47. οὗτος: is scornful, as in Crito 45a. — The thought is expressed first positively, then negatively, then again (by a kind of apostrophe — since σοί cannot be considered as addressed to Socrates) positively. Gorgias cannot refrain from again declaring more distinctly what he has already indicated by ἀλλὰ. Cf. 464 ε ἡ κολακευτικὴ ἀισθομένη, οὐ γνώσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη, where, however, the same device is of value in giving more clearness to the statement.

49. τὰ πλῆθη: sc. in the different assemblies.

VIII. 1. ἐγγύτατα: more definitely. The answer given comes nearer to being an answer indeed.

3. πειθέως δημιουργός ἡ ῥητορική: a definition which Socrates has gathered from Gorgias' verbiage, was not invented by Plato, but was apparently well known in Athens at the time. — πειθέως: to be understood in a passive sense, as πειθῶ ποιεῖν below a shows.

4 f. εἰς τοῦτο τελευταὶ: instead of the regular εἰς, occasionally εὖ and πρὸς are used with but little difference of meaning.

5. τι: is not the object of λέγειν, but is probably to be construed with ἔχειν somewhat as follows, have you any reason to say. The object of λέγειν is contained in the following ἐπὶ πλέον . . . δύνασθαι ("its power extends further than"), with which indeed Hirschig construes τι.

9. εὖ ἵσθεν ὅτι: is occasionally found construed with the inf. like an ordinary verb of perception, even in cases where there is no intervening clause as here to attract a following inf. Cf. Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 2 Λόγανδρος τοὺς φρουροὺς . . . ἀπέπεμπεν εἰς τὰς Ἀθῆνας . . . οἱ δὲ τοῖς πλείους συλλεγοῦσιν εἰς τὸ ἄστυ, βάπτον τῶν ἐπιτη- δεῖων ἑυδείων ἔσεσθαι. Owing to the shift in the construction, εὖ is left absolute at the beginning of the sentence.
10 ἐμαυτόν πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διαλέγεται βουλόμενος εἰδέναι αὐτῷ τοῦτο περὶ οὗτον ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν, καὶ ἐμὲ εἴναι τούτων ἐνα ἀξιω δὲ καὶ σε.

Γορ. Τί οὖν δή, ὦ Σωκρατέσ; Σο. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθώ, 15 ἦτις ποτ' ἐστίν ἢν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ δυντων πραγμάτων ἐστὶν πειθώ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ὅσθ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ὑποπτεύω γε ἢν οἶμαι σε λέγει καὶ περὶ δυν· οὐδὲν μέντοι ήττον ἐρήσομαι σε, τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθώ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἴναι. τοῦ ἑνεκα δή ε 20 αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σὲ ἐρήσομαι, ἄλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἑνεκα, ἄλλα τοῦ λόγου, ὥσα οὔτω προῆ, ὡς μάλιστ' ἄν ἠμῶν καταφανές ποιοὶ περὶ οὗτον λέγεται. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ σοι δοκῶ δικαίως ἀνερωτάν σε. ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ ἐτύγχανον σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστὶ τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεύξις, εἰ μοι εἴπες ὅτι

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453 10. εἴπερ κτέ.: the leading idea of the pred. lies in the participle.
13. τί οὖν δή: inquires what is to follow from the admission of the statement.
14. τὴν πειθώ: proleptic.
15. ἦτις ποτ' ἐστίν: but ἢν οἶμαι is used below, according to the rule that ὁστὶς is required after a negative, while it may occur — though ὦς is regular — with a positive. Cf. 447 d, and see Morris on Thuc. i. 136. 4.— ἢν σὺ λέγεις: indispensable addition to ἦτις. On περὶ ἐντιμῶν, see on 451 d.
19. τοῦ ἑνεκα δή: an example of the 'rhetorical question' which Demosthenes uses to great advantage. Rid. § 325 cites also from Gorgias 457 c, 458 a, 487 b.
20 f. οὐ σοῦ ἑνεκα: in this answer we have merely an indefinite contrast between person and thing; which is much more clearly defined below in

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457 a κατὰ φθόνον οἴνται τοῖν ἐαυτῶν λέγειν and ε οὐ πρὸς τὸ πράγμα φιλονικοῦντα λέγειν ... ἄλλα πρὸς σέ. Socrates guards himself against any suspicion that he may be influenced by personal feelings in his criticism of Gorgias. Cf. 464 c.
21. ὡς: not to be joined with μάλιστα as a superlative phrase, but correlative with οἴτω.
23. ὅσπερ ἄν εἰ: introduces frequently, as an illustration of a general principle, a supposed case similar to it. It is easy to add a second hypothetical clause, not coordinated with the first, but which, combined with the apod., has the first as a common protasis. Cf. below, 468 d, and Apol. 27 d.
24. Zeuxis, the celebrated painter and contemporary of Socrates, was a native of Heraclea in Lower Italy. He was the pupil of Apollodorus,
25 ὅ τὰ ζώα γράφων, ἄρ' οὖκ ἄν δικαίως σε ἡρόμην ὅ τὰ ποία τῶν ζώων γράφων καὶ ποῦ;

Γορ. Πάνυ γε.

Ση. Ἀρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γράφεις ἄλλα πολλὰ ζώα;

30 Γορ. Ναί.

453 who, by a more delicate appreciation and application of the principles of light and shade in painting, greatly furthered the development of the art, and obtained for himself the surname of 'Sciagraph.' The paintings of Zeuxis, who belonged to the Ionic school, were noted for their delicacy and fine coloring. Besides the Helena which he painted for the Crotoniates (Cic. de Inv. ii. i. 1), his most celebrated picture was the Penelope, wherein he depicted with great success pure matronly modesty. The story of his contest with his rival Parrhasius is well known.

25. ζώα: a general expression for every kind of pictures.

26. καὶ ποῦ: Socrates wishes here to make clear that if we wish to define an object exactly, i.e. so as to make it easily recognizable, it is not sufficient to give the characteristic which it has in common with other objects, but rather it is necessary to mention that characteristic which belongs to it alone and distinguishes it from all other objects. So, for example, it is not sufficient to say that Zeuxis is a painter, i.e. one who either paints or has painted pictures; but in order to distinguish him from other painters, who also paint or have painted pictures, we must state more nearly the kind of pictures which he has painted (ποία), as 'he who painted the Helena or the Penelope.' But even this is not entirely sufficient, for there are still other painters who have painted these same objects; but when we say, 'he who painted the Helena in Croton (ποῦ),' we have definitely defined Zeuxis. ποῦ could also, and more naturally, refer to the scene of his labors,—where he had his studio. We must note (1) that ὅ τὰ ζώα γράφων is only the common designation of all painters, by which they are distinguished from the λόγους or νῦμους or συγγράμματα γράφοντες, (2) that ὅ γράφων can and must be understood in the same way in which we so often understand ὅ ἀδικῶν, ὅ κρατῶν, etc., i.e. as a generic word, not limited in time (H. 827), (3) that ποῖος is often scarcely to be distinguished from τίς (cf. Xen. Anab. iii. 1. 14 ἐγὼ όν ὁν ἐκ ποίας πόλεως στρατηγὸν προσδοκῶ ταύτα πράξειν; ποίαν δ' ἡλικίαν ἐμαυτῷ ἐλθεῖν ἀναμένω;) With these points understood, we see that the present example suffices to show that to define rhetoric as πειθοῦς δημιουργός, i.e. ἃ τὴν πειθῶ ἀπεργαζόμενη τέχνη is insufficient, so long as the πειθῶ wrought by it is not more exactly specified in order to distinguish it from that wrought by other arts which come under the same general definition. Cf. moreover the answer of Gorgias, below, 454 b, which corresponds to the example before us exactly, even as far as the ποῦ is concerned.
31. 
38. 
40. 
45. 
50. 
453.
The definition answers the ποίας as far as the external matters of persons (speakers) and place are concerned, and is used by Socrates (c) in order to obtain a definition that characterizes the nature of the πείθω. Gorgias does not use ὀχλοις with the disparaging feeling which it sometimes has, but as a general word for assemblies.

11. πείθει τούτων κτε.: answers the question πείθει τί 4, above. On the change of case, cf. 449 d.

13. ἀλλ’ ἦν κτε.: this sentence is a good example of those curious anaclathas which occur so often in the conversation of ordinary life, where a slight emphasis on a single word may perhaps change the whole construction, and cause the speaker to lose
δλίγον ύστερον τοιούτων τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὦ δοκεὶ μὲν ε
15 δήλου εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ’ ἐπανερωτῶ· ὀπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἔξῆς
ἐνεκα περαινεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἐνεκα, ἀλλ’
ἰνα μὴ ἐθυζόμεθα ὑπονοούντες προαρτάζειν ἀλλήλων τὰ
λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν
βούλῃ περαινῆ.
20 Γορ. Καὶ ὅρθως γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Σὺ. Ἰθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψόμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμα-
θηκέναι.
Γορ. Καλῶ.
Σὺ. Τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;
25 Γορ. Ἔγωγε.
Σὺ. Πότερον οὖν ταύτων δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ
καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι;
Γορ. Οὐομαί μὲν ἐγώγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο.
Σὺ. Καλῶς γαρ οἴει, γνώσεις δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γαρ τίς σε

454 himself in a network of clauses, of which, while the idea is clear enough, the grammatical construction is hopeless. The idea here is this: "I thought you meant that, but still I asked; and you must not be surprised if I again ask something which seems to be evident enough; for it is absolutely essential for our argument that we proceed upon definitely expressed statements, and not upon mere suspicions, which may prove to be misunderstandings." In the construction the speaker proceeds well enough until he is thrown off the track by ἐγὼ δ’ ἐπανερωτῶ. The use of this seemingly independent clause (it is really, together with δοκεῖ μὲν, in dependence on δ’) causes him to branch off, in the clause ὀπερ γὰρ λέγω, in order to explain the reason for his repeated questioning, and at the same time to reiterate one of the fundamental principles of dialectic.

15. ὀπερ γὰρ λέγω: refers to 453 b.
17. ὑποθέσων: "to form a pre-opinion of what another is likely to think on a subject without his having expressed himself," to impute to him certain views, and thereby to forestall his explaining himself.

18. ὑπόθεσων: is a plan or principle which Gorgias has laid down for himself, and which conditions the direction in which (κατ’) the thesis is to be developed until the end is reached (πραίνης).

21. Ἰθι δὴ κτέ.: see on τάφης, in b, above.

29. καλῶς γαρ οἴει: see on 451 a. d
Note the difference in tone of Gorgias’ answer, as compared with 450 c.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΩΡΓΙΑΣ.

30 ἔρουτο: "ἄρ' ἔστιν τις, ὁ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδής καὶ ἀληθής;" χαῖς ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμαι.

Γορ. Ναὶ.

Σ. Τι δί; ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν ψευδής καὶ ἀληθῆς;

Γορ. Οὐδαμῶς.

35 Σ. Δῆλον γὰρ αὖ ὦτι οὐ ταύτων ἐστιν.

Γορ. Ἀληθή λέγεις.

Σ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσίν ε καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες.

Γορ. Ἑστι ταύτα.

40 Σ. Βούλει οὖν δύο εἰδῆ θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ’ ἐπιστήμην;

Γορ. Πάνυ γε.

Σ. Ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ρητορικὴ πειθῶ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὀχλοῖς περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων; εἴ ἡς τὸ πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἡ εἴ ἡς τὸ εἰδέναι;

Γορ. Δῆλον δῆπον, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ὅτι εἴ ἡς τὸ πιστεύειν.

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31. φαίης ἄν: has the force of an affirmative. You would say 'yes'; so ὥς φημι often means I say 'no,' I deny. See Kr. 64, 5, 4.

33. ἐπιστήμη: from ἐπιστάθαι to understand, i.e. properly, correct understanding, knowledge. This takes the place of μάθησις, which strictly denotes the process of learning, whose result is ἐπιστήμη, because this idea better suits the above opposition between μεμαθηκέναι and πεπιστευκέναι.

35. δῆλον γὰρ αὖ: confirms the distinctness of the two ideas which Socrates had already affirmed much more positively than Gorgias.

37. πεπεισμένοι: so far as the inward conviction is concerned, μάθησις and πίστις agree; objectively, however, they are very different, for μάθησις involves the acquisition of knowledge, while ignorance is the necessary concomitant of πίστις.

40. βούλει οὖν κτέ.: Socrates now proceeds to analyze (diaφορισις, divisio) the general definition in order to obtain that special definition (ὁρμός, definitio) which, according to the requirements of logic, must include, together with the statement of genus (τὸ γένος, genus proximum) also the addition of the characteristic (διαφορὰ εἰδοποίος, differentia specifica) which separates it from other species of the same genus.
48. ἡ ῥητορικὴ κτὲ.: the first definition which had its origin in the technical of the rhetorical schools (see on 453 a) has now acquired a more exact and complete expression by the help of this dialectical investigation. Note the change from περὶ τῶν δικαίων to περὶ τὸ δίκαιον. Cf. 454 b, e.

54. πειστικὸς: able to persuade. Equiv. to ἰκανὸς πειθεῖν, as διδασκαλικὸς to διδασκαλίαν παρέχων or ἰκανὸς διδάσκειν. Neither this nor πιστευτικὸς used above can properly be construed with the genitive. With διδασκαλικὸς, however, we find examples, as Ἐὐθυρ. 3 c Αθηναίοι οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἣν τινα δεινόν οἴωνται εἶναι μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας. See Kr. 47, 26, 9; Ἰτ. 754, b. In the addition of μόνον lies a gentle intimation of some defect, the result of which for the estimation of rhetoric appears more plainly later.

55. ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ: draws attention to a great defect of the Athenian judicial system. It was often impossible to present before the court a clear exposition of the points at issue, as the speeches were limited to a certain length, which was carefully measured by the κλέψοδρα,—a practice which Socrates also complains of in Ἀρ. 19 a ἐπιείκειστόν ὡμοῖον εξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολὴν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἐσχήσετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτω ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, and 37 a ὡμοῖο τούτο οὐ πειθὼ· ὀλίγον τάρ χρόνον διειλέγεμεθα.

X. 1. φέρε δή κτέ.: introduces a new discussion designed to test the definition just obtained, which, although from the point of view of form it satisfies excellently the double requirement made above in 454 a, still leaves some uncertainty as to the exact meaning of Gorgias. Hence the question, ‘What do we really mean thereby?’ Socrates professes to be not yet quite certain himself (οὐδὲν αὐτός), notwithstanding that he has contributed the most to the more close definition of the ποιῶν. His doubts are directed especially to the περὶ τί ἂν it has been just defined according to the specifications made by Gorgias. This discussion forms the transition to the examination of the true value and ethical tendency.
of rhetoric. On the use of καί in questions, cf. Xen. Hell. iii. 3. 11 τέλος αὐτῶν (τὸν Κινάδωνα) ἤρωτο (οί ἐφόροι) τί καὶ βουλόμενα ταῦτα πράττει, what purpose he actually had in so doing.

b 3. ὅταν περὶ κτῆ.: on the whole passage, cf. Prot. 319 b. — λατρῶν αἰρέσεως: during the rise of philosophy in Greece, a science of medicine also gradually developed, which became hereditary among the priests of Aesculapius. Among these various schools arose; as in Cos, Cnidus, Rhodes, and in several cities of Magna Graecia. After a while it became customary for a state to take a noted physician into the public service; as Democedes, who was hired one year by the Aeginetans, the second by the Athenians, and the third by Polycrates of Samos (Hdt. iii. 131).

5. ἐθνος(from the same root as θεός, εἰωθα): denotes a class of people drawn into association either for the purposes of habitation or from force of custom (calling, trade). For δημιουργοί see on 452 a. In such formulæ as ἄλλο τι ἢ καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ the copula is frequently omitted. See H. 1015 b.

7. οὐδέν: not: in close connexion with ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ρητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλέυσει.

12. ἡ πῶς λέγεις κτῆ.: intimates that possibly Gorgias will not accept this limitation of rhetoric.

13. εὖ ἔχει: it is proper, it is in order. c Cf. Phaedo 107 a ei δὴ τι Σιμμίας . . . ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ καταστίγσαι. — τὰ (not τὸ) τῆς τέχνης: because the question is no longer as to the nature of the art, but as to its claims and effects, one by one.

15. τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν: consult your interest.

17. τινὰς σχεδὸν καὶ συχνοὺς: Cron would take this in its entirety as almost
νοιντ' ἄν σε ἀνερέσθαι· ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὐν ἄνερωτῶμενος νόμι·

20 ἔσται, ἕαν σοι συνώμεν; περὶ τῶν τῇ τόλει συμβου·

λεύεων οἴοι τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δικαίου μόνον καὶ

ἀδίκου ἣ καὶ περὶ ὧν ὑνυὴ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν;” πειρῷ

οὐν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Γόρ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι πειράσομαι, ὁ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς

25 ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥήτορικῆς δύναμιν ἀπασαν· αὐτὸς

γὰρ καλῶς ψηφιγῆσω. οἴσθα γὰρ δὴπον ὅτι τὰ νεώρια

taύτα καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατα·

εικονίκη ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονεν, τὰ δ' ἐκ

tῆς Περικλέους, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν.

30 Σ. Ἀλέγηται ταύτα, ὁ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους·

Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡκοῦν ὦτε συμβουλευεν ἡμῖν

περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους.

/ Γόρ. Καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἰφέσις ἢ ὧν ὅτι σὺ ἔλεγες, ὃ

455 equivalent to "quite a number"; but

c it seems better to give each word its

rights, some, I had almost said many. In

Phaedo 58d παρηκάντων τινις καὶ πολλοί γε,

we have almost the reverse of the present

case; that is, the higher estimate is

asserted, while in the present passage

it is denied. The hope of obtaining pu·
pils is the greatest spur to the Sophist

to continue a discussion which cannot

but be unpleasant to him. It serves

also to draw out his true sentiments.

24. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ κτε.: Gorgias allows

himself to be led on by the examples

which Socrates has brought for·

ward, and which seem to him excel·

lently adapted (hence καλῶς ψηφιγῆσω)

to make clear the efficacy of his art.

He therefore tries to prove for it as

great as possible a scope, and thereby

entirely loses sight of his former

definition of the περὶ τί.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οἱ πρήτορες εἰσών οἱ συμβουλεύοντες 35 καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων.

Συν. Ταῦτα καὶ θαναμάζων, ὦ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ, ἢτις ποτὲ ἡ δύναμις ἐστίν τῆς ρητορικῆς. δαμανίει γὰρ τις ἑμοίγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.

XI. Γορ. Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὃς ἐποίησιν ἀπάσας τὰς δύναμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' αὐτῆ ἐξει. μέγα δὲ σοι τεκμήριον ἑρῶ. πολλάκις γὰρ ἢἡ ἔγωγε b μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ιατρῶν εἰσεθῶν

456 rejection to Gorgias' course, thus stimulating him to the detailed statements which follow.

XII. 35. νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας: the verb νικῶν is construed with various accusatives which belong to the 'cognate' class, as ὅλωμοιόδα, παγκράτων, ψήφισμα, etc. G. 150 n.; H. 716 a.

36. πάλαι ἐρωτῶ: for the pres. with πάλαι, see H. 826; G. 200, n. 4, and cf. the similar Lat. use of jam diu with the present (Gildersleeve, Gr. § 221). Goodwin op. cit. 125f.

37. δαμανία: has become by this time so weakened as to mean simply wonderful, extraordinary. Cf. the similar weakening of strong words in English; e.g. 'awful.' — τις: by adding to the vagueness, enhances the vastness of the power, like the Lat. quidam. Cf. Cic. ad Fam, x. 12. 1 idque contigit meritorum tuorum in rem publicam eximia quadam magnitudine, owing to the rather exceptional greatness, etc.

456 the apodosis gives to the sentence the effect of an exclamation. Such a usage is also common in English.

2. ἀπάσας τὰς δύναμεις: may be a compression of ἀπάσων τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς δύναμεις. Of course συλλαβοῦσα is only a figure of speech, though Gorgias claims his rhetoric to be the art of all arts. In his exposition he contents himself with a pair of examples only. That this view is really due to Gorgias is shown by the passage in Philebus, quoted on 452 e.

4. τῶν ἄλλων: with whom he was b on like terms of intimacy. The following passage gives the two leading departments of the physician's profession — pharmacy, φάρμακον πιεῖν, and surgery, τεμεῖν ἣ καῦσαι παρασχέιν — which in ancient times, as is also the case to a large degree at present, were frequently united by the same practitioner. The knife and the cautery, as the two leading instruments of the surgeon's profession, are often mentioned together. Cf. 480 c, 521 e; Prot. 354 a; Aeschy. Ag. 848 ὅτι δὲ καὶ δεὶ φαρμάκων παωμῶν, ἢτοι κέαντες ἣ τέμοντες εὐφρόνως πειρασάμεσθα πὴν ἀποστρέψαι νόσον.
5 παρά τινα τῶν καμνότων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ή φάρμακον πιεῖν
η τεμεῖν ἢ καύσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ιατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένων τοῦ
ιατροῦ πέσαι, ἐγὼ ἐπευσά, οὐκ ἀλλή τέχνη ἢ τῇ ρητορικῇ.
φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅπη βούλει ἐλθόντα ρητορικὸν ἀν-
δρα καὶ ιατρόν, εἶ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ

10 ἦ ἐν ἀλλῷ τυί συνλόγῳ, ὅποτερον δεῖ αἱρεθήναι ιατρόν, ε
οὐδαμοῦ ἄν φανηκαί τὸν ιατρόν, ἀλλ' αἱρεθήναι ἄν τὸν
eἰπεῖν δυνάτον, εἶ βούλομαι. καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἀλλῶν γε δη-
μουργὸν ὄντων ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειν ἄν αὐτῶν ἐλέσθαι
ὁ ρητορικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὀστισοῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστι

15 περὶ ὅστοι ὁκ ἄν πιθανότερον εἴποι ὁ ρητορικὸς ἢ ἄλλος
ὀστισοῦν τῶν δημουργῶν ἐν πλήθει. ἦ μὲν οὖν δύναμις

6. παρασχεῖν: cf. Apol. 33 b καὶ
b πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἔμαυτον ἐρω-
tάν. As here 475 d, Prot. 348 a.
See Kr. 55, 3, 21.

8. ὅπη βούλει: more exactly we should expect ὅποι, and some of the
inferior Mss. have it here. But the
ideas of ‘where’ and ‘whither’ are
often confounded in Greek, while in
Eng. ‘where’ has become the rule
for ‘whither’ in ordinary conversa-
tion. The remark here is very fitting
in the mouth of Gorgias, in view of
his extensive travels. Cf. Introd. §§
4, 5.

c 11. οὐδαμοῦ ἄν φανηκαί: cf. Xen.
Mem. i. 2. 52 ἀναπείδηντα οὖν τοὺς νέους
ὡς αὐτὸς ἐλ τορότατος, καὶ ἄλλους ἵκα-
νότατος πούσατι σοφοῖς, οὕτω διαιτηθέναι
tοὺς ἑαυτῷ συννότας, ὡς μηδαμοῦ παρ'
ἀυτῶς ἄλλους εἰσίν πρὸς ἑαυτόν. Also
Phaedo 72 c. Similarly in Latin. Cf.
Cic. de Fin. v. 30. 90 tantam vim
esse virtutis ut omnia, si ex
altera parte ponantur, ne appa-
reant quidem and ii. 28. 90
Socrates voluptatem nullo
loc o n u m e r a t. Compare also the
exactly similar Eng. colloquialisms, c
‘to be nowhere,’ and ‘to be left
quite out of sight.’

11 f. τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνάτον: λέγειν is
more usual; but the same difference
which exists between ἐλεγε and ἔλεγε
or εἰπε exists also between their in-
finitives. So here εἰπεῖν means to
make or deliver a speech. Cf. Prot.
329 a τάχι ὣν καὶ τοιούτους λόγους
ἀκούσειν ἢ Περικλέους ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς
tῶν ἰκανῶν εἰπεῖν.

16. ἐν πλήθει: though properly
much more general in its meaning
than ἐκκλησία or συνλόγῳ used above,
is probably employed only for the
sake of variety. The distinct and
definite statement with which Gorgias
closes his characterization (ἡ μὲν οὖν
κτέ.) brings up to his mind the
thought that perhaps some might
object to the indiscriminate employ-
ment of such an art. He is thus led
to a defence of it which is so injudi-
cious that it affords the adversary
the very best weapons for attack.
ιφθείται ἐστὶν καὶ τουαύτη τῆς τέχνης. δεῖ μέντοι, δὶ Σώ-
κρατες, τῇ ρητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὁσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγω-
νίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἐνεκα δεῖ πρὸς 456
20 ἀπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἐμαθε πυκτεῦειν τε καὶ
παγκρατιάζεως καὶ ἐν ὁπλοῖς μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείττων
ἐναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἔχθρων· οὐ τούτου ἐνεκα τοὺς φίλους
dεῖ τύπτειν οὖδε κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι. οὖδὲ γε μὰ
Δία εάν τις εἰς παλαίστραν φοιτήσας, εὖ ἔξων τὸ σῶμα
25 καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν
μητέρα ἡ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἡ τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτοις
evκα δεῖ τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὁπλοῖς διδά-
σκοντας μάχεσθαι μυσέω τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων.
ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδοσαν ἐπί τῷ δικαίῳ χρῆσθαι τοῦ-
30 τοὺς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἀμμομέ-
PLATO'S GORGIAS.

St. I. p. 457.

νος, μὴ ύπάρχοντας: οἱ δὲ μεταστρέφαντες χρῶνται τῇ ἴσχυὶ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ οὐκ ὅρθως. οὔκων οἱ διδάξαντες ποιηροὶ, οὐδὲ ἡ τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία οὔτε ποιηρᾶ τούτου ἑνεκά ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι, οἵμαι, ὅρθως. ὁ αὐτὸς 35 δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ρήτορικῆς. δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀπαντάς ἐστὶν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, ὡστε πιθανότερον εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλῆθεσιν ἐμβραχύν περὶ ὅτου ἀν βούληται. ἀλλ' οὔδὲν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἑνεκα δεῖ οὔτε ἕν τοὺς ἱατροὺς τὴν δῶξαν ἀφαιρέσθαι, ὅτι δύνατο ἀν τούτῳ 40 ποιῆσαι, οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ρήτορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὡσπερ καὶ τῇ ἄγωνιᾳ. ἦδ᾿ δὲ,

457 31. μὴ ύπάρχοντας: an integral a part of the subst. inf. clause; hence the μὴ. ὑπάρχειν has here its primitive meaning, to be the first cause, to be there to begin with, as opposed to ἀμώνεσθαι. Cf. Leg. ix. 879 d μὴτε γὰρ ὑπάρχων μὴτε ἀμώνωμενος τὸ παράπαν τολμᾶτω πληγαίς τῶν τοιοῦτον νουθετεῖν. ἀρχεῖν is also similarly used in Leg. ix. 869 c ἀμώνωμενος ἀρχοντα χειρῶν πρότερον, but with a different feeling. The asyndeton of two opposites is not unfrequent. — μεταστρέφαντες: which is regularly transitive (e.g. Rep. ii. 367 a μεταστρέφαντες αὐτοῖς τὴν δύναμιν, utriusque vim pervertentes) is used here absolutely in the sense reversing the matter. Cf. Hom. β 67 θεῶν δ᾿ ὑποδείσατε μὴν, μὴ τι μεταστρέψωσιν (cause a reverse) ἄγασσάμενοι κακά ἑγαρά. 32. τῇ ἴσχυί: corresponds to εὖ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα, as τέχνη το πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, so that both are considered dependent upon training.—οὐκ ὅρθως: a case of litotes.

34. οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι: equiv. to οἱ ἀν μὴ χρῶνται ὅρθως. Hence the μὴ.

35 f. πρὸς ἀπαντᾶς: as above, 457 a d.

37. ἐμβραχύν: denotes what is otherwise expressed by ὡς ἐν βραχί (συνελάστι) εἰπεῖν, and shows that the following περὶ ὅτον ἀν βούληται is absolutely without limitation.

38. οὐδέν κτ.: the dangerousness b of the art is to be offset by the natural feeling of equity which will compel each of the two aspirants to leave uninjured the public position which both desire, as well as the δῶξα, which is the orator's continual and chief aim.—οὐδέν τι: strengthens the negation. Cf. the Eng. 'none the more.' The acc. of this neg. is used, but never the dat. with the comparative.

39. ὅτι: is correlative with τοῦτον ἑνεκα. For the following double καί, see on 457 c.

41. ἦδ᾿ δὲ κτ.: shows again the opposition of practice to theory. Gorgias continually recurs to the same thoughts, as if the rolling swell (ὄγκος) of words could conceal the poverty of ideas. This belongs to the mimetic element of the dialogue.
οἵμα, ἤτορικὸς γενόμενός τις κατὰ ταύτη τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τεχνῇ ἅδικῆ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἑκβάλλεν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκείνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δικαία χρεία 45 παρέδωκεν, ὅ δὲ ἐναντίως χρῆται. τὸν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς κρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἑκβάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι, ἀλλ' οὗ τὸν διδάξαντα.

XII. Σα. Οἵμα, ὁ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἐμπειρὸν εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνυμε, οτι οὐ ραδίως δύνανται περὶ ὃν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες 5 ἐαυτοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀμφισβητήσωσιν καὶ μὴ φημ. ὃ ἐτερος τὸν ἔτερον ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσι τε καὶ κατὰ

457 42. κατα: as well as κατείνει, is b often used after a partic. as if it were following a finite verb, c XIII. 1. οἵμα: the asyndeton shows that Socrates himself is not over-pleased. — ἐμπειρὸν: sc. by having taken part in them either as speaker or listener.

2. λόγων: employed here as the general word including both the public speech as well as the private conversation, which is more properly διάλογοι. Cf. Prot. 335 d ἐὰν ὅλο πέλαθος ἐστοντα ἡμῖν οἴ διαλογοὶ with 337 a ἐρήτο τού ἐν τοίοισδε λόγοις παραγιγομένους κοινοὺς μὲν ἐναι ἀμφοῦ τοῖν διαλεγομένων ἀκροτάς. The word συνουσία is similarly used in 461 b. — καθεωρακέ- ναι: the compound verb, as compared with the simple, shows that the opinion has been gained by a consideration of a number of cases. Cf. 465 d.

3. δύνανται: sc. of λέγοντες or of διαλεγόμενοι, from the preceding λό- γων. — διαλέγονται: belongs to ἐπι-

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γων. — διαλέγονται: belongs to ἐπι-

χειρῆσωσιν. The οὕτω sums up and 457 re-emphasizes the preceding participles, on which lies the chief weight.

4. διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους: “after having, by mutually giving and receiving information, defined to each other’s satisfaction the nature of the question under discussion.” — μαθόντες and διδάξαντες: stand to each other as active and passive; they denote the means by which the disputants have been enabled to define the question at issue (διορισάμενοι), and are hence subordinate to the preceding participle. Plato rather likes such collocations of active and passive ideas. Cf. d below, εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκοῦσαντες, and 462 a.

7. ἢ μὴ σαφῶς: an afterthought. d Had it been present originally in Socrates’ mind, he would have said μὴ ὀρθῶς ἢ κτε.; but not being present, the negative was attracted to the verb of saying, by the regular Greek rule. Looking at it in this light, it is not necessary (with Cron) to supply a
that out of envy, envy of themselves, the opponent said it, actuated by a factional spirit, and not by a desire to search into the matter before them in the discussion.

10. λοιδορηθέντες κτέ.: the two following participles, though logically co-ordinate with λοιδορηθέντες, really give its two sides.

11 f. οἷα ... ἀχθεσθαί ὑπέρ: the use of the acc. with the infin. after forms of οἷος is very rare, and seems to be an extension of the use of the simple infin. with οἷος. See GMT. 759; Madv. 166 c, and note on 452 e. Cf. Apol. 23 e Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἄχθομενος, Αννυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημοσφαγών κτέ. We soon feel anger and indignation for one whom we consider abused.

14. οὗ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα: 'not quite consitent,' Cope.—ἀκόλουθα: denotes the naturally following result; σύμφωνα, the inner agreement of two statements standing in juxtaposition. Cf. Xen. Anab. ii. 4. 19 νεάνισκος δέ τις . . . εἶπεν, ὥς οὖν ἀκόλουθα ἑτὶ τὸ ἐπιθή- σεθαι καὶ λίβεων τὴν γέφυραν, Lach. 193 e τά ἔργα οὗ συμφωνεῖ τοῖς λόγοις. Plato delights in applying musical terms to logical conditions; hence the frequency of συμφωνεῖν and διαφωνεῖν, as also of συνάδειν, συνφόδος. Cf. 461 a, 482 b.
16. φοβοῦμαι: has here a double reference, (1) to an action to be performed (inf.); (2) to an effect to be avoided (μὴ with subjv.). Cf. Xen. An. i. 3. 17 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔκνοιγὼ μὲν ἂν εἰς τὰ πλοία ἐμβαίνειν & ἡμῖν δοιγ, μὴ ἡμᾶς ταῖς τρίθρεσι καταδύνῃ, φοβοῖμαί δ' ἃν τῷ ἡγεμόνι καὶ δοῖ ἐπεσθαί, μὴ ἡμᾶς ἀγάθη ὑθεν οὐκ ἐστι ἐξελθεῖν. In the first we have the will-side of the fear; in the second, the apprehension.

17. οὐ πρὸς τὸ πράγμα: the neg. ὃ is regular with the inf. of the indir. discourse.—πρὸς: denotes the end which the subject has in view. In the present case this is paralleled by τοῦ with the infin.,—one of the many Greek modes of expressing finality (H. 960; GMT. 798). With πρὸς σὲ also the main idea of the πρὸς is that of hostile purpose; the hostility, however, does not lie in the πρὸς, but in the general tone. In a certain sense φιλονικεῖν might also be applied to Socrates, as his search for truth was a continual struggle throughout his whole life.

18 f. καὶ σὺ... καὶ ἔγω: when the second member of a comparison is contained in a relative clause with ὡσπερ or ὡσπερ, the Greek idiom requires καὶ in both members.

20 μὴ, ἐὰν... ἔγω... εἰμί; τῶν ἡδεῶς μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων, εἰ τίς τι μὴ ἄλλθες λέγω, ἡδεώς δ' ἂν ἐλεγξάντων, εἰ 
25 τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι το-
σοῦτον κακῶν εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ὅσον δόξα ψευδῆς περὶ ὧν ὁ τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὑπ. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ φής τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγόμεθα. εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖς χρὴν εἶναι, ἐδὲμεν ἣδη χαῖρειν καὶ διαλύσωμεν τὸν λόγον.

20 Ἰ. Ἀλλὰ φημὶ μὲν ἐγώγε, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἶον σὺ ψηφηγεῖ· ὅσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαί γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἐγώ τοὺς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδείξαμην, καὶ νῦν ἱσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν, ἢν διαλεγόμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν ε ἡ χρὴ καὶ τὸ τοῦτον, μὴ τινὸς αὐτῶν κατέχομεν βουλομένους τι καὶ ἀλλὸ πράττειν.

XIII. Χ. Τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὁ Γοργία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τοῦτον τῶν ἄνδρῶν, βουλομένων 458 σομαὶ Ὢ γε ἑκὼν ποιῶ, and the celebrated phrase ascribed to him, oúdeis ἑκὼν ἀμαρτάνει.

26. δόξα ψευδῆς: the force of οἷμαι extends over the whole sentence, and we should therefore logically expect δόξαν ψευδῆ. But by the use of the nom. Socrates holds the object up to view like an image.

28. εἶ δὲ καὶ: the contrast would rather be given by the harsh εἶ δὲ μῆ, but Socrates modifies it with his usual courtesy.

29. τὸν λόγον: in the same sense as in 457 d, above.

31. ψηφηγεῖ: indicate, sc. by your words and example. Gorgias reconsiders his assent by the expression χρῆν ἐννοεῖν. With χρῆν and ἐδὲ, the opposition is to the inf., not to the obligation. By giving his reason, Gorgias stimulates himself to change from 'we ought to have' to 'we must' (σκοπεῖν ὦν χρῆ).

32. καὶ υμᾶς: as contrasted with the others, who had come earlier.
69

for Xatpe^ai^.

compare became:

7. KaXXt/cXet?,

Here cf. 1 <2<rT

nas note Vv.

x TrpaTTeip,

458 3. μὴ γένοιτο κτέ.: a most emphatic denial in the form of a wish. The sentiment is similar to that of Pindar (Lsth. i. 1 f.), alluded to in Phaedr. 227 b οὐκ ἂν οἶει με κατὰ Πίν-

δαρον καλ ἄσχολια ὑπότερον πράγμα ποιήσαθαι τὸ σὴν τε καλ Λυσίου διατρι-

βὴν ἀκοῦσαι.

d 7. Callicles is very eager to get the conversation directed to his own more especial field—polities. Hence his support of Chracophon's protest, which he emphasizes by the addition of the expression καλ μὲν δὴ καλ αὐτός, where the καλ μὲν approximates closely in force to καλ μὴν.

8. οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ: commonly equiv. to haud scio an, sometimes, as here, to haud scio an non. On εἰ in this double meaning, see Kr. 65, 1, 8.

9 f. ἥστε . . . χαριέσθε: compare with ἥστε . . . πράττειν, a few lines above.

11. τὸ γ' ἐμὸν: has almost the same force as ἐγὼ, only less personal. Like the phrases with περί and ἀμφὶ, it became very common in later Greek. Cf. Rep. vii. 533 a ἐπεὶ τὸ γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἀν προθυμίας ἀπολίσαι with Symp. 210 a ἐφ' ἄλλον οὐν ἐγὼ, καὶ προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω. Kr. 43, 4, 26.

13. αἰσχρόν: note that Gorgias is impelled to a continuation of the dialogue only by regard for his own honor. This motive was especially strong with the Sophists; cf. Prot. 352 d αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἐμὸν σοφίαν μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι. With αἰσχρόν and similar words which imply a negation, it is more usual to find μὴ οὐ. GMT. 817. It is also more common to employ the dat. of reference, instead of the acc.with the infinitive. Rid. § 183.—τὸ λοιπὸν: not 'furthermore,' with Kr. 46, 3, 2, but "finally," "in conclusion," after those present have expressed their desires.

14. ἐπαγγειλάμενον: for the meaning, see on 447 e. Here it acquires almost the force of "challenge," since the subject of the inf. must be supplied out of the following ὅτι τις βουλ-
15 λεταί. ἀλλ' εἶ δοκεῖ τούτους, διαλέγοι τε καὶ ἑρώτα ὅτι ε ἔμπλην.

Σω. Ἀκονε δῆ, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαναμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ. ὦσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς υπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φής ποιεῖν οἷός τ' εἶναι,

20 εάν τις βουληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν.

Γορ. Ναὶ.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὡστ' ἐν ὀχλῷ πιθανὸν εἶναι οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ πείθοντα;

Γορ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

25 Σω. Ἑλεγές τοι νυνδή ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιείνοι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανότερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ.

Γορ. Καὶ γάρ ἐλεγον, ἐν γε ὀχλῷ.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὀχλῷ τούτῳ ἔστω ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσων; οὐ γάρ δῆπον ἐν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανότερος

30 ἔσται.

Γορ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανότερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανότερος γίγνεται;

Γορ. Πάνυ γε.

35 Σω. Οὐκ ἰατρὸς γε ὡν. ἡ γάρ;

458 23. οὗ διδάσκοντα: the regular neg. with ὡστε is μή. The οὐ here may be due to the φήσ above, which throws an indir. disc. coloring over the whole. See Gildersleeve, Am. Jour. Phil. vii. 174.

459 27. ἐν γε ὀχλῷ: Gorgias wishes to protect himself by a restriction which, while it defers, for a brief interval, his defeat, shows plainly the weakness of his professions. See the criticism of Socrates which follows.

28. ἐν τοῖς μή εἰδόσι: the reason for a change of neg. such as occurs in this and the following clauses is often hard to perceive. Here it seems to be the oscillation from generic to particular, which is going on continually in Socrates' mind. Having made his general point with μή, he recurs to the case under discussion with οὐ. So ὁ δὲ μή ἰατρὸς . . . ἀνεπιστήμων (c.f. before, ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσι), but ὁ οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι. It would be possible, but not so good, to take the latter cases as examples of adhærescent οὐ.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

Γορ. Ναι.
Συ. 'Ο δέ μη ιατρός γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ἢν ὁ ιατρός ἐπιστήμων.
Γορ. Δήλον οὔτε.
Sigma. 'Ο οὐκ εἰδὼς ἀρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἦσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ιατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἦν. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι;
Γορ. Τοῦτο ἐνταῦθα γε συμβαίνει.
Sigma. Οὐκόν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τέχνας ὠσαύ.
45 τως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική; αὐτά μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὡσποδὲς ἔχει, μηχανὴν δὲ τινα πειθοῦς ήρηκέναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων;

XIV. Γορ. Οὐκόν πολλῇ ῥαστώνῃ, ὦ Σωκράτες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ἄλλα μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;
Sigma. Εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἡ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεφθείμεθα, εάν τι

459 42. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι: according to the position of ἄλλο τι before or after the ή is the latter to be translated “than” or “or.”

43. ἐνταῦθα γε: Gorgias notices the danger of such a concession, but still thinks he can limit the force of the argument to the single case. Perceiving this, Socrates immediately extends his statement to make it apply καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τέχνας.

45 f. πράγματα... μηχανὴ πειθοῦς: Socrates never lets slip an occasion to emphasize the essential opposition of the aim of rhetoric to the truth of facts, an opposition admitted, indeed, by the Sophists themselves. Cf. the statement of Tisias in Phaedr. 272 d διὰ οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δέοι... τῶν μέλλοντα ικανῶς ῥητορικῶν εἶναι.

XIV. 1. πολλῇ ῥαστώνῃ: Gorgias is continually wandering away from the discussion of the nature of rhetoric to the praise of it, and being set right again by Socrates, who, while he brings back the discussion to the subjects which Gorgias had declared to be the proper province of rhetoric, is at the same time paving the way for an examination of its moral value.

ήμων πρὸς λόγου ἦν τῶν δὲ τόδε πρῶτον σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα τυγχάνει περὶ τό δίκαιον καὶ τό ἄδικον καὶ τό αἰσχρόν καὶ τό καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορικὸς ὡς περὶ τό ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τά ἄλλα δὲν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδῶς, τί ἀγαθόν τί κακὸν ἐστώ τί καλὸν τί αἰσχρὸν τί δίκαιον τί ἄδικον, πειθῶ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος, ὡστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδῶς ἐν οὐκ-εἰδόσι μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος; ἦν ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ ἄρα προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικήν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον — οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον — ποιήσεις δὲ εἶν τοῖς πόλλοις δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθόν εἶναι οὐκ ὀντα; ἦ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἴσω τε ἔσει αὐτὸν διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικήν, εὰν μὴ προειδῆ περὶ τούτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ἦ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὁ Γοργία; καὶ πρὸς Δίος, ὃς περ ἄρτι εἰπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπὲ τίς ποιθ ἡ δύναμις ἐστὶν;

Γορ. 'Αλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὁ Σώκρατες, εὰν τύχῃ μὴ εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοὶ μαθήσεται.

Σν. Ἐχε δη: καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σὺ

6. προὸς λόγον: to the advantage of our discourse. But little different from πρὸς λόγον. Cf. Prot. 351 e εἰν πρὸς λόγον δοκῇ εἶναι τὸ σκέμα. — τόδε: draws the attention in advance to the series of closely interconnected questions, introduced by ἄρα, which, by their very intimate relation one to another, oppose, with a certain importunity, Gorgias' continual wandering and vagueness, and also, by their delicate allusion to the somewhat extravagant expression used above (455 d), have a decidedly ironical tinge, which is rendered more apparent by the doubtful οἶμαι of Gorgias' answer. — ἄρα: see on 476 a.

14. προεπιστάμενον: the partic. is ε another again the most important part of the statement, as in 457 c, 453 b.

22. τῆς ῥητορικῆς: this passage differs from 455 d only in arrangement.

26. Ἐχε δή: a request to pause, whereby the point reached is declared to be an important one, which merits further consideration. Cf. Prot. 349 d Ἐχε δή . . . ἄξιον γὰρ τοι
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

73

τινα ποιήσης, ἀνάγκη αὐτῶν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἦτοι πρότερον γε ἢ ύστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ.

Γορ. Πάνυ γε.

30 Σ. Τὸ ὄν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκῶς τεκτονικός, ἢ οὔ; 

b Σ. Ναί.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικὸς;

Γορ. Ναί.

Σ. Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικὸς, καὶ τᾶλα ὄντω κατὰ τὸν αὐτῶν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἐκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οὖν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἐκαστὸν ἀπεργάζεται;

Γορ. Πάνυ γε.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκῶς δίκαιος;

40 

Γορ. Πάντως δήποι.

Σ. 'Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαια ποιοι πράττει;

Γορ. Ναί.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ὅτι ὁ ἰητορικὸς δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν καὶ δὲ] δίκαιον βουλευσθαὶ ἢ δίκαια πράττειν;

460 ἐπισκέψασθαι ἡ λέγεις. When thus used, ἐχεῖν is of course intransitive. H. 810.

28. ἤτοι ... ἢ: or at least. In English we should naturally use γε with the second member. Cf. Apol. 27 d τοὺς δαίμονας ἦτοι θεούς γε ἡγοῦν-μεθά ἢ θεών παιδας.—παρὰ σοῦ: const. with ύστερον μαθόντα alone; πρότερον with εἰδέναι.

30. τὰ τεκτονικά: "the principles of building."

34 f. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον: according to the same principle (analogy). 'The argument which follows is to our notions sophistical enough. Not so, however, from the Socratic point of view, according to which every virtue is a form of knowledge, and every vice the result of ignorance.' Thompson. See on 458 a.

43. οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη κτῆ.: a few lines below is found a repetition of the first clause of this sentence, in almost the same language, where, too, the statement is natural, and is used as a basis for a further deduction; here, on the contrary, it is out of place, and besides, is not followed up at all in the next sentence. These reasons have led to the omission of the bracketed words, by which we get a clearly logical argument, as follows: "The just man performs just actions." "Yes." "Must he not therefore wish always to perform just actions?" "Apparently." "The just man will never, then, wish to perform unjust actions," etc.
45 Γορ. Φαίνεται γε.
Ση. Οὗτος τε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ γε δίκαιος ἄδικεῖν.
Γορ. 'Ανάγκη.
Ση. Τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιου εἶναι.

50 Γορ. Ναι.
Ση. Οὗτος τε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἄδικεῖν.
Γορ. Οὐ φαίνεται γε.

XV. Ση. Μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ πρότερον, ὅτι οὐ a
dei τοὺς παρατρήβας ἐγκαλεῖν οὔτε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν
πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πῦκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ χρῆται τε καὶ ἄδικῇ;
ὅσαύτως δὲ οὕτως καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἄδικως

5 χρῆται, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδὲ ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄδικοντι καὶ οὖκ ὁρθῶς χρωμένος τῇ
ῥητορικῇ; ἐρρήθη ταῦτα ἢ οὐ;
Γορ. 'Ερρήθη.
Ση. Νῦν δὲ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὕτως φαίνεται, ὁ ῥητορικὸς, οὐκ ε

10 ἂν ποτε ἀδικήσας. ἢ οὐ;
Γορ. Φαίνεται.
Ση. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὥ Γοργία, λόγους ἐλέγετο,
ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἶν οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ
περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἄδικου. ἢ γάρ;

-----
460 1. λέγων: equiv. to ὅτι ἔλε-
ges, that you were saying.
2. οὔτε ἐκβάλλειν: when two verbs
which govern different cases are con-
strained with but one object, it is custo-
mary to construe this object with the
nearer verb. Cf. below (5).
3. χρῆται τε καὶ ἄδικῇ: the co-ordi-
nation of the two ideas by τε . . . καὶ
brings into greater prominence the im-
propriety of thus misapplying other-
wise useful skill, than the more usual
ἀδίκος χρῆται of the following clause.

6. ἄλλα τῷ ἀδικοῦντι: the μηδὲ
ἐξελαύνειν is a result which may or
may not follow the ἐγκαλεῖν, accord-
ing to circumstances. The real op-
opposition is between τῷ διδάξαντι and
τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, hence the second is put
in the same case as the first, although
the acc. would be required by ἐξελαύ-
νειν. Cf. Prot. 327 a πᾶς πάντα ἐδι-
dασκε καὶ ἐπέπλησε τὸν μὴ καλὸς
ἀδικοῦτα.

10. ἂν ποτε ἀδικήσας: represents the
same tense of the optative.
Gor. Naì.

Σα. 'Εγώ τοίνυν σοù τότε ταύτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον, ὡς οὔδεπορ' ἀν εἰή ἡ ῥήτορικὴ ἁδικὸν πράγμα, ὦ γ' ἀεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλγὸν ὑστερον ἑλεγες, ὦτι ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥήτορικῇ κἂν ἁδίκως

ΧΡΩΤΟ, οὖτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος οὐ συνάδεων τὰ 461 λεγόμενα ἐκεῖνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, ὦτι, εἶ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι ὡσπερ ἐγώ, ἄξιον εἰή διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, εὰν χαίρεω· ὑστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπούμενων ὁρᾶς δὴ καὶ αὐτός ὦτι αὐ ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥήτορικὸν

25 ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἁδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ῥήτορικῇ καὶ ἑθέλειν ἁδικεῖν. ταύτα οὖν ὄπω τοτέ ἔχει, μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Γοργία, οἶκ ὀλίγης συνονοσίας ἐστὶν ὡστε ἱκανῶς διασκέδασθαι.

XVI. ΠΩΛ. Τί δὲ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὖτω καὶ σοù περὶ τῆς ῥήτορικῆς δοξάζεις ὡσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἥ οἶει, ὦτι Γοργίας

17. ὦ γε: gives the basis of the statement. The neuter may be due to the πράγμα immediately preceding (H. 631 a), or it may simply be used ad sensum. Cf. 465 d.

20. οὗτω: under these circumstances.

26. μᾶ τὸν κύνα: cf. 460 e, 482 b, Apol. 22 a. Socrates is rather fond of this formula of asseveration, possibly out of aversion to any light handling, even of the Greek divinities. See on 463 d.

27. οἶκ ὀλίγης συνονοσίας: a delicate allusion to 458 e, which shows Socrates' fine feeling in not insisting on a discussion which must be unpleasant and also humiliating to Gorgias. The word συνονοσία is elsewhere employed so as to include the discourses (διάλογοι), e.g. Prot. 310 a τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσον ἡμῖν τὴν εὐνοοσίαν; i.e. in the sense of the Eng. "meeting."

XVI. 1. On Polus, who here again thrusts himself into the discussion, see note to 448 a, and Introd. § 14. — καὶ: belongs, according to the sense, with δοξάζεις. Is what you say also really your opinion? We should expect a second καὶ with ὡσπερ, according to usage. See on 457 e. Others construe καὶ with ὦτι.

2. ἥ οἶει: or do you think. The
PLATO's GORGIAS.

St. I. p. 461.

\[\text{\begin{align*}
\text{ψχώνθη} \ \text{σοι} \ \text{μη} \ \text{προσομολογησαι} \ \text{των} \ \text{βητορικων} \ \text{ανδρα} \\
\text{μη} \ \text{ουχι} \ \text{kai} \ \text{tai} \ \text{δικαια} \ \text{ειδεναι} \ \text{κai} \ \text{tai} \ \text{καλα} \ \text{kai} \ \text{tai} \ \text{αγαθα}, \\
5 \ \text{kai} \ \text{εαν} \ \text{μη} \ \text{ελθη} \ \text{ταυτα} \ \text{ειδωσ} \ \text{παρ} \ \text{αυτων}, \ \text{αυτος} \ \text{διδαξειν}, \\
\text{επειτα} \ \text{εκ} \ \text{ταυτης} \ \text{ισως} \ \text{της} \ \text{ομολογιας} \ \text{εναντιον} \ \text{τι} \ \text{συνεβη} \ \text{εν} \ \text{e} \\
\text{toiς} \ \text{λογοις}, \ \text{τουτο} \ \text{ο δη} \ \text{αγαπας}, \ \text{αυτος} \ \text{αγαγων} \ \text{επι} \ \text{τοιαυτα} \\
\text{ερωτηματα} — \ \text{επει} \ \text{τινα} \ \text{οιει} \ \text{απαρνησεσθαι} \ \text{μη} \ \text{ουχι} \ \text{kai} \\
\text{αυτον} \ \text{επιστασθαι} \ \text{tai} \ \text{δικαια} \ \text{kai} \ \text{αλλους} \ \text{διδαξειν}; \ \text{αλλ'} \\
10 \ \text{εις} \ \text{tai} \ \text{τοιαυτα} \ \text{αγεν} \ \text{πολλη} \ \text{αγροικια} \ \text{εστι} \ \text{τους} \ \text{λογους}.
\end{align*}}\]

\[\text{Ση.} \ \text{Ω} \ \text{καλλιστε} \ \text{Πωλε,} \ \text{αλλα} \ \text{του} \ \text{εξεπιθηδες} \ \text{κτωμεθα} \\
\text{εταφρους} \ \text{kai} \ \text{υεις}, \ \text{ινα}, \ \text{επειδαν} \ \text{αυτοι} \ \text{προσβυτερωι} \ \text{γιγνου-} \\
\text{μενοι} \ \text{σφαλλωμεθα}, \ \text{παροντες} \ \text{υμεις} \ \text{οι} \ \text{νεωτεροι} \ \text{επανορ-} \\
\text{θωτε} \ \text{ημων} \ \text{των} \ \text{βιων} \ \text{kai} \ \text{εν} \ \text{εργοις} \ \text{kai} \ \text{εν} \ \text{λογοις}. \ \text{kai} \ \text{a}
\]

461 second question repeats the first in a
b varied form. Both questions are
\text{rhetorical,} expecting no answer, and
express a protest against the idea
that the art of rhetoric has anything
to do with a knowledge of what is
right.

4. \text{μη} \ \text{ουχι} \ \text{ειδεναι} \ \text{κτει} : two
\text{negs. after} \ \text{ψχωνθη} \ \text{μη} \ \text{προσομολογησαι},
on account of the negative force of
the expression. \text{Cf. Prot. 352 c, d.}
See II. 1034 b, and on 458 d. The
construction is the same as that after
\text{απαρνησεσθαι} below, which is followed
by a double neg. because the question
\text{τινα} \ \text{οιει} veils the assertion \text{οδεις}.
\text{ουχι} is merely more emphatic than
\text{ου}.

5. \text{εαν} \ \text{μη} \ \text{ελθη} \ \text{ταυτα} \ \text{ειδωσ} : more
logically, \text{εαν} \ \text{ελθη} \ \text{ταυτα} \ \text{μη} \ \text{ειδωσ} —
\text{διδαξειν}: depends upon some verb of
saying to be supplied from \text{προσομο-}
\text{λογησαι}. The asyndeton with \text{επειτα}
instead of \text{kαπειτα} (\text{cf. Apol. 23 c}) is
not uncommon, and the clause is to
be construed in dependence on \text{οτι}
\text{because}). By this time, however,
Polus' flow of words has run away
with him; he has only energy enough
461 left to hurl at Socrates the words
\text{τονθ} \ \text{ο δη} \ \text{αγαπας}, before he abandons
his struggling sentence altogether and
starts afresh. Such passages as this
show Plato to have been no mean
dramatist.

6. \text{ισως} : gives expression in pass-
ing to the hint that perhaps the con-
tradiction was not so clearly deduced
from Gorgias' words as Socrates sup-
posed. The whole sentence, however,
shows Polus' complete inability to
grasp the real point at issue.

10. \text{αγροικια} : is the reverse of \text{πει-}
\text{δεια}. By this very criticism, Polus
betrays that he is himself just as
lacking in the polish of a gentleman,
which he denies to Socrates, as in \text{sci-}
\text{entific knowledge}.

11. \text{καλλιστε} : the epithet suits
the pompous rhetor excellently.

12. \text{υεις} : the addition of the word
\text{"sons," though not strictly necessary,}
is quite natural, especially among
people where the support of the par-
ent by the son was so strictly enjoined
as among the Greeks.
15 νῦν εἰ τί ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, 
σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθων· δίκαιος δ' εἰ· καὶ ἐγὼ ἑθέλω 
τῶν ὁμολογημένων εἰ τί σοι δοκεῖ μή καλῶς ὁμολογή-
σθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, ἕάν μοι ἐν μόνον 
φυλάττῃς.
20 Πλ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;
Σμ. Τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὥς Πάλε, ἥν καθέρζης, ἢ τὸ 
πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρήσθαι.
Πλ. Τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὅποσα ἂν βού-
λωμαι;
25 Σμ. Δεινὰ μεντὰν πάθοις, ὥς βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθηναῖζ ο
ἀφικόμενος, οὐ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείοτη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ 
λέγειν, ἐπειτὰ σὺ ἐνταῦθα τοῦτον μὸνο ἄτυχήσας.
ἀλλὰ ἀντίθες τοι· σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος

15. ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας: besides being 
the Greek idiom, the initial position 
of ἐγὼ softens the supposition for 
Gorgias. The Latin has the same 
position.
16. δίκαιος δ' εἰ: the sense is to be 
supplied from what precedes. Cf. 
Lach. 180 d εἰ τί ἐχεις τὸ δὲ τῷ σαντο 
δημότῃ ἄγαθῳ συμβουλεύεις, χρῇ συμ-
βουλεύειν· δίκαιος δ' εἰ. The regular 
neg. of the inf. after δοκεῖ would be 
οὔ. μή is here due to the conditional 
color. For the personal const. see on 
449 c.
18. ἀναθέσθαι: the figure is drawn 
from the draughts-board; it is 
the regular word for 'taking back' a 
move. Similarly, Prot. 354 c ἄλλ' ἐτι 
καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἐξεστίν, εἰ τῆ ἐχετε 
ἄλλο τι φάναι.
20. τί τοῦτο λέγεις: equiv. to τί ἐστι 
tοῦτο δ λέγεις. Kr. 57, 8, 6; Π. 1012 a.
21. ἕάν καθέρζης: as it were, by a 

dam or a fence.
22. χρήσθαι: because in μακρολο-
γία the orator has at his disposal all 
the devices of his art.
25. Ἀθηναῖζ: Athens was noted as 
a πόλις φιλόλογος (Leg. I. 641 e), and 
freedom of speech (παρρησία) was 
held to be the fundamental principle 
of a democratically governed state. 
Cf. Dem. Phil. iii. 3 ὣνεις τὴν παρρη-
σίαν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὔτω κοινὴν 
οίκον δεῖν εἰναι πάσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει 
ὡστε καὶ τοῖς ἐξίσοις καὶ τοῖς δοῦλοις 
ἀντίθες μεταθέσωμεν.
26. τῆς Ἑλλάδος: is the part. gen. 
dependent upon ὥς. The Eng. would 
find ὥς with the dat. more natural. — 
ἐπειτὰ: after all. GMT. 856.
28. ἀντίθες: equiv. to but consider 
on the other hand: lit. put in opposition.
— σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος κτ.: Socrates 
makes a similar remark in Prot. 335 c, 
when he really prepares to leave the 
gathering rather than waste his time 
in words.
PLATO'S GORGIAS.

τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθομι,
30 εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου; ἀλλ' εἰ τι κύριε
tοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἔπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν
βούλει, ὡσπερ νυνὶ ἐλεγον, ἀναθέμενος οτι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν
tῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ
Γοργίας, ἐλεγχὲ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου. φῆς γὰρ δῆπον καὶ σὺ
35 ἐπιστασθαι ἀπερ Γοργίας· ἢ οὖ;
P.λ. Ἐγώγε.
Σ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελευεῖς σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἐκάστοτε
ὁτι ἂν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι;
P.λ. Πάννε μὲν οὖν.
40 Σ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὑπότερον βούλει ποιεῖ, ἐρώτα ἢ ὅ
ἀποκρίνου.
XVII. Π.λ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα· καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι,
ὡς ὅκρατες· ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς
ῥητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῆς εἶναι;
Σ. Ἀρὰ ἐρωτᾶς ἦντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι;
5 P.λ. Ἐγώγε.
Σ. Οὐδεμία ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὡς Πῶλε, ὃς γε πρὸς σὲ
tάληθη εἰρήσθαι.

462 Κήδεσθαι: implies personal interest in the matter.
32 ὡσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον: is to be taken with the following clause, ἀνα-
thέμενος.
34 φῆς γὰρ δῆπον: by quoting his own vaunting words against him, Socrates compels Polus also to adopt the dialectic form.—δῆπον: throws a tinge of irony into the question.

b XVII. 1. ταῦτα: is simply the proposition which Socrates makes, and the words ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα is a formula of acceptance.—ἀλλά: well then, is often thus used in answers. After an inv., as here in Soph. El. 376 ff., H.L. Φέρ' εἰπὲ δὴ τὸ δεινὸν...462 XP. ἀλλ' ἐξερέω τοι πάν όσον κάτοικ' ἐγώ. b 3. τίνα φῆς εἶναι: though assuming it as self-evident that rhetoric is a τέχνη, Polus is compelled, in commencing, to put his question quite generally. Socrates, in his answer, confines himself simply to deducing the consequences of Gorgias' admissions. The substitution of ἦντινα for τίνα is according to the strict rule, which, however, is not rigorously adhered to.
6 f. ὡς... εἰρήσθαι: cf. Rep. x. 595 b ὡς πρὸς ύμᾶς εἰρήσθαι. The active εἰπεῖν is more common. See Madv. 151; II. 956; GMT. 777. 2.
Πολ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι; 
Σο. Πράγμα ὃ φῆς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμ.

10 ματὶ δ ἐγὼ ἐναγχὸς ἀνέγυνων.
Πολ. Τί τούτῳ λέγεις;
Σο. Ἕμπειρίαν ἔγωγε τινα.
Πολ. Ἕμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;
Σο. Ἕμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

15 Πολ. Κίνος Ἕμπειρία;
Σο. Χάριτος τινὸς καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.
Πολ. Οὐκοῦν καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι,
χαρίζεσθαι όνον τε εἶναι ἄνθρωποις;
Σο. Τί δὲ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἢδη πέπυσαι παρ’ ἐμοῦ, ὦτι φημὶ
20 αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὡστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτῆς, εἰ οὐ καλὴ μοι ἄ
dοκεῖ εἶναι;
Πολ. Οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι ὅτι Ἕμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῆς
25 τι μοι χαρίζεσθαι;

462 9. ὃ φῆς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην: is to be explained according to 448 c πολ- 
laiv τέχνην ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν Ἕπειρων ἐμπείρων ἡπειρέων, according to which an art arises from experience. Polus, however, has by this time forgotten his own words.—ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι: see on 448 c and Introd. § 14.

13. Ἕμπειρία: here not an empirical science, but merely a dexterity acquired by much practice. Cf. 463 b. The following question is no advance on his first one, and seems to show that Polus has no definite plan.

16. χάρις: is the grace which causes pleasure, and depends principally on the person of the orator; ἡδονή, the pleasure with which the hearer is inspired by his speech. Quintilian (Inst. or. ii. 15. 24) translates the expression by the words peritia gratiae ac voluptatis. Polus has not yet heard the specific difference which distinguishes rhetoric from other Ἕμπειραι of the same class. Hence he again falls into the same error in his question as he did in his answer above, 448 c. In this way, however, the conversation is again turned to the consideration of the value of rhetoric.

20. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο: see on 452 c. d —ἐλ ὦ κτῆ.: ὦ because Polus expects an affirmative answer. —ἐλ: whether.

24. τιμᾶς: equiv. to καλὸν φῆς εἶναι or περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, as in Crito 47 a.
Πολ. Ἔγωγε.
Σο. Ἐρωτᾷν τίν, ὦφοποια ᾨτίς μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι.
Πολ. Ἐρωτῶ δή, τίς τέχνη ὦφοποια;
Σο. Οὐδεμία, ὡς Πῶλε.

30 Πολ. 'Αλλὰ τί; φάθι.
Σο. Φημὶ δή, ἐμπειρία τίς.
Πολ. Τίνος; φάθι.
Σο. Φημὶ δή, χάριτος καὶ ἱδνονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὡς Πῶλε. ἐ
Πολ. Ταυτὸν δ′ ἐστίν ὦφοποια καὶ ῥητορική;

35 Σο. Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον.
Πολ. Τίνος λέγεις ταύτης;
Σο. Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἄληθές εἰπεῖν· ὡκὼ Γοργίου ἔνεκα λέγεω, μὴ οἴηται μὲ διακωμῳδεῖν τὸ ἐαυτὸν ἐπιτηδεύμα· ἐγὼ δὲ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτο ἐστίν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἢ 463
Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει, οὐκ οίδα· καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἦμιν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο, τί ποτε οὕτος ἤγειται· δ ‡ ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, πράγματος τυός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν.

45 Γορ. Τίνος, ὡ Σώκρατες; εἰπέ, μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθεὶς.

462 — τὸ χαρίζεσθαι: pres. for the habit.
463 — χαρίσασθαι: aor. for the single example.
34. ταύτων δ' ἔστιν: with surprise and disgust. Polus overlooks the fact that there can be two orders belonging to the same species.
37. τίνος . . . ταύτης: in close connexion with what precedes. See on 461 d and 449 e.
38. μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ: it is not necessary to supply a verb of apprehension, though that is the idea suggested by μὴ with the subjv. GMT. 309; H. 807. The employment of the form here is an attempt to conciliate. 462 ate. In 486 e, 509 a καὶ εἰ ἄγροικότερον τι εἰπεῖν ἐστὶ, Socrates has laid aside all idea of conciliation, and speaks the truth with boldness. ἄγροικος is opposed to ἀστείος, and means rude (see on 447 a). It is to be taken in connexion with the reproof administered by Polus in 461 e. Truth often incurs the reproach of ἄγροικα. Note that Socrates still preserves towards Gorgias his courtesy and respect.
44. οὐδενὸς: explanatory of τινός. 463
45. μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθεῖς: cf. Hom. ἡ γ 96 μηδὲ τί μ' αἰδόμενος μειλίσθεο.
XVIII. Ση. Δοκεῖ τοῖνυν μοι, Ὅ Γοργία, εἶναι τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοιχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγώ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακεῖαν. ταύτης μοι b

5 δοκεῖ τῇς ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁψωποκυκῆ. ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὃ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστων τέχνη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τὴν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικὴν, τέταρτα ταύτα μόρια ἐπὶ ε c

10 τέταρσιν πράγμασιν. εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανέσθω. οὐ γάρ πω πέπυσται, ὁποίον φημι ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μόριον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸν λέληθα οὔτω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὃ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ, εἰ οὖν καλῶν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον,

463 XVIII. 2. ψυχῆς δὲ στοιχαστικῆς a

κτέ.: in this characterization, Socrates includes all the good that can be said of the art of rhetoric. It requires cleverness in perceiving and distinguishing between various relations, hardihood to work before the eyes of the world, and skill in dealing with men. — στοιχαστικῆς: is originally connected with shooting and throwing, but is often metaphorically used. With this definition, cf. Isoc. c. Soph. 294 d ταύτα δὲ πολλὰς ἐπιμελεῖας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἐργον εἶναι. In regard to courage in speaking, cf. Cic. de Or. i. 26. 121.

4. κολακεῖαν: the Greek word means more than the English "flat- tery." Under it is included everything whose aim is the agreeable rather than the good.

5. ἐπιτηδεύσεως: notice the variety in the use of the words ἐπιτήδευσις and ἐπιτήδευμα, which are to be distinguished as πράξις and πράγμα, 463 the one being a concrete manifestation of the other.

7. ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή: these words are but little distinguished. The first denotes, as has already been said (on 462 c), the result obtained by practice; the latter is more especially that which is derived from work without any definite object or clear consciousness. So rhetoric is called in Phaedrus. 260 ε ἀτεχνὸς τριβή, and in 270 b τριβή καὶ ἐμπειρία. See on 462 c.

9. κομμωτική: is not only finery c in dress, but also hair-curling, ointments, cosmetics, etc. Cf. Quint. ii. 15. 25 mangonum artificium, quicolo rem fucocoret um rob ur inandi sagina mentiuntur. The addition of γέ emphasizes the examples newly thought of.

13. εἰ οὖ: see on 462 d.

14 πλ. ἀποκρινοῦμαι...πρίν ἄν ἀποκρίνομαι: after the model of the anticipatory conditional. πρίν, "before,"
PLATO'S GORGIAS.

15 eite kalon eite aisxhron hguymi einai tηn rhtorikηn, πριν 
αν πρωτον αποκρινομαι οτι εστιν. ου γαρ δίκαιον, ὃ 
Πωλε· ἀλλ' εἰτερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἑρῶτα, ὅποιοι μόριον 
τῆς κολακείας φὴμι εἰναι την ῥητορικὴν.
ΠΑΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δή, καὶ ἀπόκρυναι, ὅποιον μόριον.
20 ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἄν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένου; ἔστιν γαρ ἡ ῥήτορικὴ 
κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδολον.
ΠΑΛ. Τί οὖν; καλὸν ἡ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἰναι;
ΣΩ. Αἰσχρὸν ἔγνωγε· τὰ γαρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῷ 
ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ως ἡδη εἰδοτι ἕ γώ λέγω.
25 Ἐορ. Μᾶ τὸν Δία, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἕγώ οὖδὲ αὐτὸς 
συνύημι ὦτι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰκότως γε, ὃ Γόργια· οὔδὲν γάρ πτω σαφὲς λέγω, ἐ 
Πώλος δὲ οὔδε νέος ἑστὶ καὶ ὧς.

463 takes the inf.; "until," the indic. e subjv. or opt., according to the sphere of time. See Gildersleeve, Am. Jour. Phil. ii. 465 ff.

d 20. ἀρ' οὖν κτέ.: the question implies doubt, and is intended to stimulate Polus' attention; but for some cause, probably dullness, he merely renews his previous question.—The meaning of eidoIov is made clear by Theawl. 150 e ψευδή καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ 
πλεόνοις ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

23. τὰ γάρ κακὰ κτέ.: that which according to its nature can be characterized as ἀγαθὸν, must be esteemed 
καλὸν. If, however, it is κακὸν, then it must be esteemed αἰσχρὸν.

24. ὧς ἡδη εἰδότι: is a stinging rebuke to Polus.

25. μᾶ τὸν Δία, ἐλλ' ἕγω κτέ.: Socrates' words implied that Polus was either too dull or too careless 
to understand him. Gorgias, while tacitly admitting Polus', incompetency, tries to smooth over his de-
feat by confessing to his own inability 463 to catch Socrates' meaning as it is at present stated. If the master, αὐτὸς, 
cannot understand, the pupil may be pardoned for the same fault. Polus, 
though defeated in his attempt to rout Socrates (461 b ff.), only re-
tires to recover breath before making a final effort (466 a).—μᾶ τὸν Δία: 
is a real asseveration, used designedly 
by Gorgias, who is too much of a 
gentleman to indulge in oaths,—this 
being the only instance in this dia-
logue. It is significant that Polus, 
in spite of his heat, is likewise only 
one (473 a) betrayed into the com-
mon ρήμα μᾶ Δία. Callicles uses oaths 
roundly enough, but restricts himself 
to νῆ τοῦς θεοὺς, μᾶ Δία, and μᾶ Δία. 
On Socrates' habit, see on 449 d, 461 b.

28. Πώλος δὲ . . . δέ: in this re-
mark Socrates both apologizes for 
and explains the reason of the ob-
scenity of his statements; but it is, 
at the same time, an excellent char-
characterization of the impetuosity and heat of Polus, whether he be the questioner or the respondent. It also contains an allusion to the name itself (πῶλος a colt, filly).

35. The division of κολακεία given above was made without specifying the standard of division, and only enumerates the different varieties. Socrates now, at Gorgias' instance, reduces the whole subject to a regular system, by referring κολακεία back to a higher species, θεραπεία, on the basis of a distinction according to reality and appearance. Now, since θεραπεία has for its object the εὐεξία τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, we get two more points of view: (1) that of the object (ἀνθρώπου), as composed of body and soul; and (2) that of the treatment, as being either positive or negative.

37. ὅλον τοιόνθε λέγω: is a formula for introducing an example or a special case in illustration of a general statement.

38. εὐ ἔχειν τὰ σῶματα: τὰ σῶματα here, as well as τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν below, is acc. of specification. H. 718 a.

42. τὸ τοιοῦτον: the article is used on account of its reference to what has just been described. This is more definitely given in the ὅτι (relative) clause which follows.

43. ἔχει δὲ κτέ.: in this change of subject lies no ambiguity either to the Greek mind or to us. It was, besides, a regular way in Greek of expressing "although." The subject is the same indefinite one which must be supplied as the object of the preceding ποιεῖ. See on 456 d.
45 Βορ. *Εστι ταῦτα.

XIX. Σω. Φέρε δὴ σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπὶ-δειξώ δ λέγω. δυνών οὖν τοῖν πραγμάτων δύο λέγω τέχνας: τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικῆν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὖτως ὄνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μᾶς δὲ 5 οὖσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικῆν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικὴν. τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντι-στροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ τὴν νομοθετικῆν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ σὲ ἀλλήλαις, ἀτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαί, ἐκάτερα τοῦτων, ἡ τε 10 ἰατρική τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ, οὕμως δὲ διαφέρουσιν τι ἀλλήλων. τετάρων δὴ τούτων οὖσών, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευοῦσον τῶν μὲν

464 XIX. 2. δυνών κτέ.: the dual in Plato's time is fast fading out, and he uses it as an artistic feature. It disappears entirely before the close of the fourth century B.C. Notice the asyndeton.

4. μίαν ὄνομάσαι: like εἰπὶ ὄνοματι καλῶν, προσαγορεύειν. — οὖτως: is idiomatically used, "thus briefly" or "thus at the moment." See on 503 d.

— οὐκ ἔχω: I am not in position, regularly takes the aor. infinitive.

6 f. ἀντίστροφον μὲν ... ἀντίστρο- φον δὲ: an example of 'anaphora.' — ἀντίστροφον: denotes a part corresponding to a similar part on the opposite side of the symmetrical whole. The function of gymnastic and no- mothic is to lay down, each in its own department, certain positive directions whereby the constitution of the subject under treatment is preserved and improved. The arts of healing and the administration of justice seek in practice to put a stop to the disregard of these directions, and to restore the normal condition. Ac- cording to their object, therefore, medicine and gymnastic, as well as the making and administration of law, all belong to the same class, ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις.

8. δικαιοσύνῃ: is used here in the same sense as δικαστικῆ 520 b below; why, it is hard to understand. It may have been chosen in view of the earlier definition of the object of rhetoric in 454 b, 455 a. The ἰατρική is beyond cavil good; on the contrary, δικαστικῆ is susceptible of a bad construction, whereas here there was need of no doubtful word. Though not customary, there is no reason why δικαιοσύνῃ should not be understood as the practical exercise of that character of the δίκαιος, which for an Athenian was naturally to be found in the δικαστική. The word, then, means here "administration of justice." That the word is genuine is shown by Quintilian's translation iustitia in ii. 15. 28.
πλατωνος γοργιας.

85

σώμα, τῶν δὲ τήν ψυχήν, ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομενή, οὐ γνώσα λέγω, ἀλλὰ στοχασμενή, τέτραχα ἐαυτὴν διανεί-μασα, ὑποδύσα ὑπὸ ἐκαστὸν τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο όπερ ὑπέδυ, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὕδὲν α φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ αἰὲ ἡδίστω θηρεύεται τήν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἔξαπατά, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστον ἀξία εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἱατρικὴν ἡ ὑψοποιικὴ ὑποδέξυκεν καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ 20 βελτίστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ' εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζονα σι σις εἶναι τε καὶ ἱατρὸν ἡ ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὖτως ἁνοίτοις όστερ οἱ παιδεῖς, πότερος ἐπαίητε περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἱατρὸς ἡ ὁ ὑψοποιός, λιμῷ ε ἂν ἀποδανεῖν τὸν ἱατρὸν. κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, 25 καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὥ Πώλε—τοῦτο γὰρ 465 πρὸς σὲ λέγω—ὅτι τοῦ ἡδόν στοχάζεται ἀνευ τοῦ βελτίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν,

13 f. αἰσθομενή and γνώσα: are distinguished both as regards the object and the manner of their activity. γνώσα is directed to the nature, which is only comprehended by thought; αἰσθομενή is merely the visual perception of the outward form or effects, the cause of which, lying in the nature of the object, is not comprehended. By ἀλλ' στοχασμενή the idea of αἰσθομενή is not merely repeated, but also more exactly defined. Similarly, 452 e, and in a different order 521 d, e. On the heaping up of participles and their subordination, see Kr. 56, 15 with notes.

15. ὑποδύσα: as it were under a cloak or mask by which its real nature is concealed. The usage is borrowed from the stage; cf. Luc. Pisc. 33. The simple acc. with this verb is not uncommon.

17. θηρεύεται τήν ἄνοιαν: the application of the figure of the hunt to those arts which seek only the appearance, is frequent in Plato, and most developed in the Sophistes. With the same employment of abstract for concrete Demosthenes expresses himself, Ol. ii. 7 τὴν γὰρ ἐκδοταν ἄνοιαν ἀει τῶν ἄγνωστων αὐτῶν ἔξαιταν καὶ προσαλμαβόν διότω ἀνεύτη.

22. ὁστερ οἱ παιδεῖς (sc. εἰσαι): in such comparisons the nom. is as common as the attracted case. Madv. Syn. 20, 3. — ἐπαίητε περὶ κτῆ.: this otherwise poetic verb is used several times by Plato. Cf. 518 c; Apol. 19 e; Crit. 47 b, 48 a; Lach. 186 e. It also takes the acc. Kr. 68, 31, 2.

25 f. τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω: 465 brings up again Polus' persistent efforts to make Socrates say that rhetoric was καλῶν (462 c, 463 d, e).

26. στοχαζεται: here equiv. to aim at; above 464 c in the derived mean-
PLATO'S GORGIAS.

St. I. p. 465.

οτι ουκ ἔχει λόγον ουδένα ὅπων προσφέρει, ὅποι' ἀττα τὴν
φύσιν ἐστὶν, ὡστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου μη ἔχειν εἰπεῖν.

30 ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ, δ ἀν ἣ ἄλογον πράγμα· τούτων
dὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχέων λόγον.

XX. Τῇ μὲν οὖν Ιατρικῇ, ὡσπερ λέγω, ἡ ψυτουκική b
κολακεία ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γνωμαστικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
τρόπον τούτον ἡ κομματική, κακούργος τε, ὄντα καὶ ἄπα-
tηλῇ καὶ ἁγεννῆς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασιν καὶ χρώ-
μασιν καὶ λειτοτῆτι καὶ ἐσθήσει ἁπατώσα, ὡστε ποιεῖν
ἀλλότριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ ὀἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς
gνωμαστικῆς ἁμελεῶν. ἦν οὖν μη μακρολογῶ, θέλω σοι
eἰπεῖν ὡσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι — ἡδη γὰρ ἀν ἰσως ἀκολουθή-

465 ing guess at. — ἂνευ τοῦ βελτίστου: is
brachylogic. Without regard to what is
best.

28. ἀν προσφέρει: denotes the
means which each employs, and
whereby it works upon others.

29. ὡστε . . . μη ἔχειν: the μη
could very well be omitted, but Greek
usage sanctions the redundancy.

31. ὑποσχεῖν λογὸν: to render ac-
count. Cf. Prot. 338 d ταλήν οὗτος ἐμοὶ
λόγον ὑποσχέτω.

b XX. 1. ψυτουκικὴ: is not attribu-
tive to κολακεία, but the latter is predi-
cate with ὑπόκειται, as flattery. Hence
the point of the following κατὰ λόγον.

2. ὑπόκειται (equiv. to ὑποτέθει-
tαι): is not used in the sense which we
elsewhere find, lie at the foundation
of, as in Prot. 349 b ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὄνομά-
tων ὑπόκειται τις θεὸς οὐσία, but like
ὑποδέδικον above, 464 d.

3. κακούργος κτλ.: these four ad-
jectives go in pairs. The two first
describing the nature of κολακεία per
se, contain the κακόν of it; the first
is more general, the second adds the
special (Kr. 60, 32, 2), at the same
time emphasizing the result for the
world at large. The second pair con-
tains the αἰσχρόν, the verdict on the
value of such skill. The following
participle, with its datives, defines
more narrowly ἀπατηλῆ.

8. οἱ γεωμέτραι: the word denotes
"mathematicians" in general. So e.g.
Theodorus of Cyrene is continu-
ally called γεωμέτρης in the Theae-
etus. Higher arithmetic also is in-
cluded under geometry, because the
Greeks employed geometrical meth-
ods to represent the higher relations
of numbers. In the following pro-
portion, we are reminded at once of
an arithmetical formula; while the
Greeks were reminded of the due
proportion of lines and figures, in
accordance with the development of
mathematical science among them.
The relations of the ideas can, by
means of this threefold division into
pairs, be brought into a simple but
complete scheme. See on 464 a
above. — ἡδη γὰρ κτλ.: mathematics
was looked upon by Plato as a prepa-
ration for 'dialectic.'
In this formula ἐστὶ is always wanting.

10. μᾶλλον δὲ: introduces a comparison equally true, but more to the point of the argument (cf. 449 a), by the completion of the proportions already worked out, and by their extension to the whole system of ideas thus far developed.—It might seem strange that sophistic is paired with nomothetic, and not with philosophy. Philosophy, however, is the science of principles in general, while in this dialogue only ethical and political principles are discussed. These latter, however, the law-giver must make use of, —i.e. must be a philosopher, as is proved in the much more comprehensive and thorough discussion in the Republic.

13. ὤπερ λέγω: refers, as it always does, to a previous statement; here to 464 c, where the close relationship of the τέχναι, which have to do with the same object (body and soul) was spoken of. This idea is here expressed by the words ἄτε δ᾽ ἔγγυς ὄντων, which recall at once the expression above, ἄτε περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὦσιν. The subject of διέστηκεν is not expressed, but is a general one, to be taken out of the preceding proportions, which embrace all τέχναι and ἐμπειρίαι, and the same subject must be thought of with ὄντων. On account of the position of ἄτε ἔγγυς ὄντων the δέ is drawn away from the second member of the contrast, φύσης. — φύση: means the essential peculiarity, actual nature, of the ideas. Instead of these, however, with φύσης we have the persons introduced who employ and practise the τέχναι and ἐμπειρίαι, and who from ignorance of their true nature bring them into activity at the same time, and thus mix together matters which, properly considered, are quite distinct.

14. ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ: probably denotes the soul as the place of action, and περὶ ταύτα the moral questions treated, both of which are reckoned together above (464 c) in the expression περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Socrates restricts himself to the two ἐμπειρίαι to which ἰδιοτική belongs, inasmuch as the object of the whole investigation is only an exact understanding of the nature of rhetoric. This passage is referred to below, in 520 a.—Plato can explain more accurately the relation of sophistic and rhetoric to each other, because he was the first to explain the difference scientifically, whereas Gorgias, though he was unwilling to be reckoned among the sophists, could give no reason therefore.
γάρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἢ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτη, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δ' αὑτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο καὶ διεκρίνετο ἢ τε ὀφοτοική καὶ ἡ ἰατρική, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθ.

20 μώμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ 'Αναξαγόρου ἀν πολὺ ἦν, δ' ἐφιλε Πωλε—σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐμπειρος,—ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀκριτῶν ὄντων τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ψυχεινών καὶ ὀφοτοικῶν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ φημι τὴν ρητορικὴν ἔδωκεν, ἀκήκοας· ἀντίστροφον

25 ὀφοτοιᾶς ἐν ψυχῇ, ὥς ἐκείνο ἐν σώματι. ἵσως μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀτοποῦ πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἔων μακροὺς λόγους λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγ-

17. ἐπεστάτη: we have to imagine such ἐπιστάτη as, like the κυβερνήτης, παῦδοτρῆς, πάλαμη, are at the same time ἐπιστήμων. Cf. Prot. 312 d, where the sophist is defined as ἐπιστάτης τοῦ ποίησα δεων λέγειν, i.e. ἐπιστήμων ποίησα κτέ., a definition which furnishes, at the same time, an example for the φύσαται ἐν τῷ αὑτῷ καὶ περὶ ταύτα σοφίας καὶ ρήτωρ above.

18. κατεθεωρεῖτο: cf. 457 c. Here is meant a thorough critical examination from a higher point of view.

20. τὸ τοῦ 'Αναξαγόρου: see on 450 c, 453 e, and Kr. 47, 5, 10. Anaxagoras, the friend of Pericles, agreed with the Atomic school and Empedocles, in holding that, in their original condition, the elements or atoms (according to him, unlimited in number, but of a certain definite quality) were mixed all together, without any definite arrangement. Into this confusion order was introduced by νοῦς, or the thinking spirit; or at least, this spirit gave the impulse towards it. His thesis describing the primitive condition of matter was this: ὁμοῦ


21. τούτων: perhaps with an intentional ambiguity. — Gorgias himself was not entirely without philosophical culture. See Introd. § 6. But as to Polus, we have no information.

23. τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ψυχεινών: both expressions are frequently connected to denote the same idea, both subjectively and objectively. Now, since ψυχεινῶν is that which ψυχειν ἐμποιεῖ (Rep. iv. 444 e) and ἰατρική is ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ψυχεινῶν, the latter must perforce be the art whose object is to restore the body to a healthy condition.

23 f. ὁ μὲν οὖν κτε.: with this the discussion returns to the point which had given occasion to the above digressions (ὑπὲρ μεντοι).

25. ἐκείνο: refers to ὀφοτοία. The e employment of a neuter demonstrative or relative referring to an antecedent in the masculine or feminine adds to the generalness of the conception. Cf. 463 b, 460 e. But ἐν σώματι may have had some influence.

27. μὲν οὖν: here, as also in ἵσως
γνώμην ἐχειν ἑστίν. λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχεά ὦνκ ἐμάνθανε, οὔδε χρήσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει, ἦν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην, οὖδὲν οἶός τῇ ἴσθα, ἀλλ' ἐδέου διηγήσεως. ἦν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου μὴ ἐχὼ οὕτι χρήσθωμαι, ἀπότεινε καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἦν δὲ ἐχὼ, ἤμε με χρήσθαι. δίκαιον γάρ. 466 καὶ νῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἰ τι ἐχεις χρήσθαι, χρῶ.

XXI. Πωλ. Τι οὖν φήσ; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ ῥήτορική;

Σω. Κολοκειας μὲν οὖν ἐγώγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλ' οὖ μημονεύεις τηλικοῦτος ἦν, ὥ Πωλε; τί τάχα δράσεις;

5 Πωλ. Ἀρ' οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες;

Σω. Ἑρωτημα τοῦτ' ἐρωτάς ἢ λόγον τῶν ἀρχην λέ- νεις;

Πωλ. Ἑρωτῶ ἐγώγε.

10 Σω. Οὔδε νομίζεσθαι ἐμοίγε δοκοῦσιν.

465 μὲν οὖν and ἂ μὲν οὖν just preceding, e οὖν does not denote sequence, but adds force to the statement about to be made in view of what has already been said.—ἐπολε: hints a contrast. 466 XXI. 1. τι οὖν φής: Polus braces himself, and assumes again the office of questioner; but shows, by the vagueness (cf. above, 462 e with note) and inappropriateness of his question, that he is either singularly inattentive or stupid. Hence he receives a sharp rap over the knuckles with the admonition that his question had been some time settled (465 a).

4. τί τάχα δράσεις: is taken by Cron to mean "what can you possibly (τάχα) bring forward?" i.e. in the course of the discussion. The scholiast understood it as meaning "what will you do presently," when you get old, as we see by the addition πρεσβύτης γενόμενον. Probably it is but an exclamation of wonder and surprise; our colloquial "What'll you do next?"

5. ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι: is to be connected with φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι. In spite of his qualification, Polus proceeds to put as bad a color on his assumed view of Socrates as possible, by adding ἀγαθοὶ (cf. 449 a) to ῥήτορες. Cf. 469 a. He does not aim at a refutation of Socrates; with him the question is still not the true nature of Rhetoric, but its value and power in the state.

7. Ἑρωτημα κτε.: probably Socrates only wishes to show that, from the point of view of dialectic, the preceding question is so inappropriate that he is obliged to look upon it as a merely rhetorical one, by which Polus only states his own sentiments. Cf. below e.

10. οὔδε νομίζεσθαι: much more b
Πλ. Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν;
Σα. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθὸν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.
15 Πλ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε.
Σα. Ἐλάχιστον τούν νυ καὶ δοκοῦσιν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.
Πλ. Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὦσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινόσων τε ὑπὸ ἀν ἀν βοῦλωται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἀν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;
Σα. Νη τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνώμενοι, ὡς Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἐκάστου δὲν λέγεις, πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνει, ἦ ἐμὲ ἔρωτάς.
Πλ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σὲ ἔρωτῶ.
25 Σα. Εἶει, ὡς φίλε· ἐπειτὰ δύο ἁμα μὲ ἔρωτάς;
Πλ. Πῶς δύο;
Σα. Οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες, ὃτι ἀποκτεινόσων οἱ αἱ ῥήτορες οὐς ἀν βοῦλωται, ὦσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἀν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς.
Πλ. Ἐγωγε.

466 crushing than φάιλοι νομίζεσθαι. b "They are not considered at all," "they have no value whatever." On νομίζεσθαι, cf. Αρ. Νυξ. 992 ὃ' ἔγω (ὁ δίκαιος λόγος) τὰ δίκαια λέγειν ἢδον καὶ σωφροσύνην ἐνεμίστο ("was in high repute ").
15. μὲν: almost equiv. to μὴν, indeed.— δὴ: equiv. to just. "But that is indeed just what I do (γε) say."
18. ὦσπερ οἱ τύραννοι: by this comparison Polus endeavors to emphasize the importance of his art, careless of the fact that he thereby detracts from its moral value. He employs his strongest expression of power actually used (ἀποκτεινόσων), not even using the circumlocution οἱον τῇ ἐσίν. In spite of his following reassertion, however, the question is really only a rhetorical one, in which he voices his own statements. See on a above.
21. νη τὸν κύνα: see on 461 b. — ἀμφίγνωμοί ... λέγεις: 'I am in doubt at every word you say.' Cope.
25. εἶει: "very well," accepts the issue.
ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

XXII. Σο. Δέγω τοίνυν σοι, ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινομαί γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ Πωλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ρήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον, ὡσπερ νυν ἐπεὶ
5 ἐλεγον· οὔδεν γάρ ποιεῖν ὃν βούλονται ὡς ἔστω εἰπεῖν· και ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι ἄν αὐτοὺς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι.
Πωλ. Οὐκοὖν τούτῳ ἔστω τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι;
Σο. Οὐ, ὃς γέ φησιν Πώλος.
Πωλ. Ἐγὼ οὐ φημί; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.
10 Σο. Μὰ τὸν—οὐ σὺ γε, ἔπει τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι φῆς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.
Πωλ. Φημὶ γάρ οὖν.
Σο. Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἶει εἶναι, εάν τις ποιή ταῦτα, ἄ ἄν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων, καὶ τοῦτo καλεῖς
15 μέγα δύνασθαι;
Πωλ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.
Σο. Οὐκοὖν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ρήτορας νοῦν ἔχουτας καὶ

466 XXII. 4. δύνασθαι μὲν: the correlative has μέντοι, which is much stronger than δὲ.
5. ὃν βούλονται: is a circumlocution for the part. gen.; hence the indicative.—ὡς ἔστω εἰπεῖν: see on 460 b.
7. οὐκοὖν κτέ.: Polus is surprised that Socrates should see any difference in the two phrases.
9. οὐ φημὶ (nego): repeats οὐ, ὃς φησί. Polus does not understand Socrates, who has in mind the results of the admission that the possession of power is a good. The question is merely rhetorical, with an accent of astonishment.

μὲν κτέ. H., 723 a, says that the deity is omitted with humorous effect; but it is much more likely here that Socrates is a little vexed, but stops at once any exhibition of it. The Scholarist's note, εὐλαβεῖς χάριν, may be interpreted as indicating this motive, or the motive assigned to Socrates on 461 b.—φῆς: with a clear reference to Polus' previous statements in b, which he is thus led to reiterate.
12. γὰρ οὖν: is frequently found thus in phrases of acquiescence.
17. οὐκοὖν ἀποδείξεις κτέ.: the fut. in neg. questions forms a lively expression for urgent demand. Kr. 53, 7, 4; H. 844 a.—The pred. noun with the supplementary partic. follows the same rule of agreement, as with the supplementary infinitive.
PLATO'S GORGIAS.

92

St. I. p. 467.

τέχνην τὴν ρητορικὴν ἄλλα μὴ κολακεῖαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; 467 εἰ δὲ μὲ ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ρήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς 20 πόλεσιν ἄ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὔδεν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεκτήσονται. ἣ δὲ δύναμις ἔστων, ὡς σὺ φῆς, ἀγαθοῖν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν άνευ νοῦ ἄ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι; ἢ οὐ;

Π.Λ. Ἐγγυε.

25 Σ. Πῶς ἄν οὖν οἱ ρήτορες μέγα δύναμις ἄ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελέγχη ὑπὸ Πώλου ὁτι ποιοῦσιν ἄ βούλονται;

Π.Λ. Οὗτος ἀνήρ —

Σ. Οὗ φήμι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄ βούλονται. ἄλλα μὲ ἐλεγχε.

30 Π.Λ. Ὁυκ ἄρτι ὁμολογεῖς ποιεῖν ἄ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι, τούτου πρόσθεν;

Σ. Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ.

Π.Λ. Οὐκοῦν ποιοῦσιν ἄ βούλονται;

Σ. Οὗ φήμι.

467 18. ἐξελέγξας: the refutation consists in the proof, and the proof is at the same time a refutation. We must not insist on the priority of the aorist participle (II. 856 b); but the complex is to be considered, and from that point of view it would make no difference whether we had ἀποδείξεις ἐξελέγξας or ἀποδείξας ἐξελέγξεις.

21. ἡ δὲ δύναμις κτλ.: contains one of the propositions on which Socrates bases the statement made above (466 c) and afterwards repeated, καὶ βὴν...μέγα δύναμι. The other proposition is that the possession by the orators of the power of doing what they please is not a good possession.

26. ἐξελέγχη: in the pregnant sense. "If by a refutation of the position taken he be not convinced." Cf. 482 b.

28. οὕτως ἀνήρ —: 'aposiopesis.' 467 Polus is so astonished that he does not know what to say. The complete exclamation (always without the article) occurs 489 b. Cf. 505 e. Polus' astonishment, as well as stupidity, are still more evident in the words which follow, σχέτλια λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυᾶ. σχέτλιος is taken from Homer, where, however, it is only used of persons (except rarely in the Odyssey); ὑπερφυᾶ is not unknown in Attic, but occurs in Plato (except here and 477 d) only in the adverbial form.

31. τούτου πρόσθεν: can, of course, be considered as a gloss on ἄρτι, but it heightens the effect, from a mimetic point of view, as well by its meaning, "a moment ago," as by its position at the end of the sentence.
Ποιοῦντες δὲ ἄ δοκεῖ ἀυτοῖς;

Σημ. Φημί.

Πολ. Σχέτλια λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυά, ὡς Σωκράτης.

Σημ. Μὴ κατηγόρης, ὡς λέγετε Πώλε, ἵνα προσεῖτω σε κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἑρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὦτι εἰ 40 ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνον.

Πολ. 'Αλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἴδω ὦτι λέγεις.

XXIII. Σημ. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀνθρωποί τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὦ ἄν πράττωσιν ἐκάστοτε, ἣ ἐκείνο, οὐ ἐνεκα πράττουσιν τοῦτ' ὃ πράττουσιν; οὗν οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερον σοι δοκοῦσιν 5 τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἣ ἐκείνο, τὸ υγιαῖε, οὐ ἐνεκα πίνουσιν;

Πολ. Δῆλον ὦτι τὸ υγιαῖε.

Σημ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλεόντες τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποι-10 οὐσιν ἐκάστοτε· τὸς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κυνύνευεν καὶ πράγματ' ἐχειν; ἀλλ' ἐκείνο, οἶμαι, οὐ ἐνεκα πλέουσιν, πλούσιουν· πλούσιον γὰρ ἐνεκα πλέουσιν.

467 35. Σφ: almost equiv. to "although."

It is often used in the second of clauses thus connected to emphasize the opposition.

38. ὡς λέγετε Πώλε: 'paronomasia' in Polus' style. See on 448 e.

41. ἵνα καὶ εἴδω: expresses curiosity, rather than a desire for information. Socrates, as leader of the discussion, makes at once an advance, by fixing a very important distinction.

XXIII. 2 f. ὥ ἄν πράττωσιν, ὃ πράττουσιν: the former is generic, the latter is a circumlocution. A few lines below ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν is the special case, explanatory of 467 τοῦτο.

4. πίνοντες παρὰ κτε.: the preposition is personal; "from the hands of."

8. οἱ πλεόντες: the merchants (ἐμέ δι παροι) who engage in transmarine trade. Notice the confusion of the order, in which we can see the natural freedom of conversation. The subject of ἐστὶν is οὐ τοῦτο ὃ ποιοῦσιν, the predicate ὃ βούλονται. The subject οἱ πλεόντες floats until the plural verb appears. The neg. in οὐκοῦν is not felt here. II. 1048 a (β).

11. πράγματ' ἐχειν: is passive to πράγματα παρέχειν.
Πλα. Πάντως.

Σα. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὔτω καὶ περὶ πάντων, εάν τίς τι
15 πράττῃ ἐνεκά τοι, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται, ὁ πράττει, ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οὐ ἐνεκά πράττει;

Πλα. Ναι.

Σα. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐστὶν τι τῶν ὄντων, ὁ οὑχὶ ἢτοι ἄγαθὸν γ' ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων οὔτε ἄγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν;

20 Πλα. Πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σα. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἄγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλούτον καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τάναν-
tία τούτων;

Πλα. Ἐγώγε.

25 Σα. Τὰ δὲ μῆτη ἄγαθὰ μῆτη κακὰ ἄρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἄ ἐνιότε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ, ἐνιότε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνιότε 468 δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθήσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ἥλια καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ' ἂτα καλεῖς τὰ μῆτη ἄγαθὰ μῆτε
30 κακά;

Πλα. Οὐκ, ἄλλα ταῦτα.

Σα. Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἐνεκά τῶν ἄγαθῶν πράττουσιν, ὅταν πράττοσιν, ἢ τάγαθὰ τῶν μεταξὺ;

Πλα. Τὰ μεταξὺ δῆπον τῶν ἄγαθῶν.

14. ἄλλο τι: ἃλλο τι ἡ challenges an affirmation with respect to some special portion of the sentence; ἄλλο τι challenges an affirmation with respect to the whole sentence which follows it.' Riddell, § 22.

18. ὅρ' οὖν ἐστὶν κτ. see a more detailed investigation of this theory in Lysis. Cf. 216 d δοξεῖ μοι ἄσπερει τρὶ' ἂτα εἶναι γένη, τὸ μὲν ἄγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν, τὸ δ' οὔτ' ἄγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν.

20. πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ: the answer is not according to the form of the preceding question, but according to the sense, as if οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων had preceded.

21 f. σοφίαν, ὑγίειαν, πλούτον: types of the three great classes of property, — mental, physical, and material.

25. ἄρα: for position, see on 472 d.

28. αὖ: on the other hand. To actions are opposed things, which, how-

ever, belong to a similar category.
35. Σα. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἁρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν, οταν βα- 
δίζωμεν, οἴομεν ι ήλπτοι εἰμαί, καὶ τὸ ἑντύοι ἐσταμεν,
ὁταν ἐστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἥ οὐ;
Πηλ. Ναί.
Σα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνυμεν, εἰ τινα ἀποκτείνυμεν, καὶ
40 ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἴομεν ι ἡμῶν
εἰμαί ἕμων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἤ μῆ;
Πηλ. Πάντα γε.
Σα. ᾼνεκ ἁρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἁπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ
ποιοῦντες.
45 Πηλ. Φημί.
XXIV. Σα. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἐνεκα τοῦ ποιοῦ- ε
μὲν, μῆ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο, οὐ ἐνεκα ταῦτα
ποιοῦμεν;
Πηλ. Μάλιστα.
5 Σα. Οὐκ ἁρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ᾽ ἐκβάλλεων ἐκ
τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ᾽
ἐὰν μὲν ὁφέλιμα ή ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλα-
βέρα δὲ ὁντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γάρ ἁγαθα βουλόμεθα,
ὡς φης σὺ, τὰ δὲ μῆτε ἁγαθα μῆτε κακα οὐ βουλόμεθα,
10 οὐδὲ τὰ κακα. ἦ γάρ; ἀληθη οὐι δοκω λέγειν, ὦ Πωλε,
ἡ οὐ; τί οὐκ ἀποκρινει;

36. βάλτιον: sc. than its opposite. b When the comparison is self-evident, the Greek, like the English, frequently omits the second member.
468 c XXIV. 2. ἐκείνα, ἐκεῖνο: the immediate repetition of the same pronoun with different reference is remarkable.—ταῦτα: refers back to ἃ.
5. σφάττειν: is purposely substituted as a harsher word for ἀποκτείνων. It implies that the person killed is defenseless: "to slaughter like an ox." — ἀπλῶς οὕτως. thus sim. 468 c ply,"without limitation," as one would have to assume if the view of Polus is to stand. Cf. Prot. 351 ε οὐκ οἶδα ἀπλῶς οὕτω, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτας, εἰ ἐμοι ἀποκρίτεον ἐστίν, ὡς τὰ ἥδεα τε ἁγαθά ἐστιν κτέ. Cf. 464 b.
11. τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει: a challenge in the form of a question, because Polus hesitates to answer. He is beginning to feel concerned for his fondly cherished view and bold state-
Πωλ. 'Αληθη.

Σω. Ούκοιν εἰπέρ ταῦτα ὤμολογοῦμεν, εἰ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἕκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαίρεται χρῆματα, εἰπέ τύ-15 ραννος ὅν εἰτε ρήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἁμεῖνον εἶναι αὐτῶ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὃν κάκιον, οὐτος δὴν ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ γάρ;

Πωλ. Ναί.

Σω. Ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἰπέρ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; τί οὖκ ἀποκρίνει;

20 Πωλ. 'Αλλ’ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

Σω. Ἐστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ ε15 πόλει ταύτη, εἰπέρ ἑστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθὸν τι κατὰ τὴν σῇν ὤμολογίαν;

Πωλ. Οὖκ ἑστιν.

25 Σω. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἐλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἑστιν ἀνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μὴ δὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

Πωλ. Ὁς δὴ σὺ, δ ὉΣκρατε, οὐκ ἂν δέξαυ ἐξεῖναι σου

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468 The same form recurs a few lines below, where Polus is just clearly recognizing his defeat. These artifices belong to the dramatic side of the dialogue, and take the place of the tedious repetitions which weary us in the narrative form; e.g., in Prot. 360 c, d συνέφη—ἐπένευσεν—καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐτι ἐπένευσεν—πάντως μόνοις ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσε—οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὗτ’ ἐπινεύσασθαι ἑξῆλθος εἰσάγα τε.

d 13. εἰπέρ ταῦτα ὄμολογοῦμεν: is the general premiss, while what follows up to οὐ κάκιον is the special application of this to tyrants and orators. For the structure, see on the similar case in 453 c.

15. αὐτῷ: is said from the standpoint of the critic, although referring to the subject of οἰόμενος. The Greek does not cling to the reflexive. Kr. 51, 2, 5; H. 684 a.

15 f. τυγχάνει δὲ κτῆ.: is connected with the participle as an independent clause,—a usage common after relatives. Kr. 59, 2, 6, 9; II. 1005. The Eng. idiom requires 'although' or 'whereas.'

21 f. ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ: in this undefined city of which they were speaking, the abode of the tyrant or orator under criticism (ὁ τοιοῦτος).

25. ὅτι ἑστιν: that it is possible. There need not be in all cases a conflict between what one wishes and what seems best, but the possibility of a single case is enough for Socrates' argument.

28. ὡς δὴ σὺ κτῆ.: is quite ironic; as if you would not! It is really a com-
It is just as true as the fact that," etc. By this fling Polus seems to him like a sin against divinity. Cf. Prot. 330 d.

31. δήσαντα: equiv. to εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀγαγόντα.
33. ζηλωτῶν: envious. By an easy shift, the personal idea is transferred to the action itself.
34. εὐφήμια (fa v e l i n g u a): says Socrates, because the denial of all moral principles implied in the words of Polus seems to him like a sin against divinity. Cf. Prot. 330 d.

39. τῶν: the art. with incorporated antec. is Platonic. Kr. 51, 12, x.
41. δικαίως: is slipped in unfairly by Polus. Cf. 466 a.

46. πρός: is the only preposition that occurs at all frequently in Attic prose as an adverb.
OXI TWS:Te. Life is not the highest good, but guilt is certainly the greatest evil. This was one of the life principles of Socrates. Cf. the beautiful exposition in Apol. 28 b ff., especially 29 b and 30 d, Crito 48 b.

This quibble of Socrates is interesting, as showing the difficulties by which early thinkers were beset. For an accurate statement of principles, an accurate use of synonyms was indispensable; and this was not yet possible, even with the cultured.

XXV. Ω μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ. εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθοῦση λαβὼν ύπὸ α

nearest English equivalent is the half serious “Oh, you awful fellow!” — εἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος: as an offset to Polus’ words ἀλλ’ ἐγώ τοῦτο λέγω. “Let us have, then, argument for argument.” The gen. may depend on ἐπιλαβοῦ, as in 506 b, but it is more likely gen. abs. See on ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, 506 a, and Symp. 214 ε ἐὰν τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, μεταξὺ ἐπιλαβοῦ, ἀν βούλῃ, καὶ εἰπὲ ὃτι τοῦτο ψεύδομαι. The original meaning is made clear by Prot. 329 α τὰ χαλκεῖα πληγέντα μακρὸν ἥχει καὶ ἀποτελεῖ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιλαβήσῃ τις (unless one takes hold of it).

2. ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθοῦσῃ: is not temporal, as in Xen. An. i. 8. 1 ἦδη δὲ ἦν ἀμφὶ ἀγορὰς πληθοῦσαν, i.e. towards noon. It simply indicates the presence of a multitude.
μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγομι πρὸς σέ ὅτι "ὦ Πώλε, ἐμοί δύναμίς τις καὶ τυραννὸς θαμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἤδη
5 γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δοξὴ τινὰ τούτων ἀνθρώπων ὑν σὺ ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὕτος ὅν ἂν
dοξὴ· κἂν τινα δοξὴ μου τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέναι
dεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοιμάτων διεσχι-
σθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται· οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν
10 τῇ τῇ πόλει"· εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντι σοι δείξαμι τὸ ἐγχει-
ρίδιον, ὅσως ἂν εἶποις ἰδὼν ὅτι "ὦ Σῶκρατε, οὕτω μὲν
πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναμεν, ἐπειδὴ κἂν ἐμπροφθείη ὦκία
tῷ τρόπῳ ἤμιν τὸν σοι δοκῇ, καὶ τὰ γε Ἄθηναιων νεώρια
cαὶ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ
15 ἱδιά"· ἀλλ' οὖκ ἄρα τούτ' ἐστὶν τὸ μέγα δύναμθαι, τὸ
ποιεῖν ἄ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἡ δοκεῖ σοι;
Πλ. Οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.

Συ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν δι' ὅτι μέμφει τὴν τοιαύτην δύ- 470
ναμν;

469 3. ἐγχειρίδιον: is not a "dagger,"
but a short sword for striking and
thrusting; the former is shown by
ii. 3. 23 παραγγειλαντες νεανίσκοι . .
ξεφίδια ὑπὸ μάλης ἐχοντας παραγενέσθαι.
6. τεθνήξει: one of the two Greek
verbs with fut. perf. active. See H.
467. The fut. perfect expresses the
certainty as well as the immediate-
ness of the result; cf. κατεαγὼς ἔσται
αὐτίκα μάλα, and see GMT. 79.
7. τῆς κεφαλῆς: is a gen. of the part
affected. H. 738 b. Cf. Ar. Achar. 1180
τῆς κεφαλῆς κατέγε γε πεσίν αἶθθν πεσών.
The acc. could have been used; cf.
516 ε τὰ δίτα. — αὐτῶν: follows τινά,
—a case of 'hyperbaton.'
14. The art. is omitted before τρίθ-
ρεις, although it has a different gender
from that of the preceding substan-
tive. Cf. Phaedo 111 ε καὶ τὸν γε
ξινον καὶ σεληνήν καὶ ἄστρα ὅρασθαι
ἵν' αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τυχήναι ὄμη. Omission
of the art. where both substantives
are of the same gender is not un-
common. The two kindred ideas are
thereby brought together into one
conception. In the present passage,
by this means we have the objects
enumerated divided into classes: (1)
the navy-yard, with the war-vessels
therein contained; (2) the remain-
ing vessels, whether they be public
or private property. Similarly, Dem.
Ol. ii. 9 τῷ τὰ χωρία καὶ λιμένας καὶ
tὰ τοιαύτα προειληφέναι.
17. οὕτω γε: limits the answer, as
if Polus still wished to save something
from his earlier statement.
20 ΠΛΑ. Ἑγώγε.
Σ. Τί δή; λέγε.
ΠΛΑ. "Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὔτω πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαί ἐστιν.
Σ. Τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν;

ΠΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.
Σ. Οὐκοῦν, ὥθαυμάσει, τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι πάλιν αὐτοῦ φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἀ δοκεῖ ἐπηταί τὸ ὦφελιμως πράττειν, ἄγαθόν τε εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς οἰκείω, ἐστὶν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύναμιν σθαί. σκεφτόμεθα δὲ καὶ τὸδε· ἀλλο τι όμολογοῦμεν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἀ νυνθὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτένυναι τε καὶ ἐξελάψειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαίρεισθαι χρήματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐ;

ΠΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.
35 Σ. Τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς οἰκείω, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ ὀμολογεῖται.
ΠΛΑ. Ναι.
Σ. Πότε οὖν οὗ φῆς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὁρον ὀρίζει.

470 26. οὐκοῦν κτέ.; the sentence is merely a statement in the form of an interrogation, and assumes an assent by the opponent, provided no express demurrer is raised. Socrates gives opportunity for this after δύνασθαι (29), but as none is made, he proceeds again with σκεφτόμεθα κτέ.—πάλιν αὐτ.: because in this new conception is contained a correction of the former view held by Polus.

27. φαίνεται: has its subject in τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, and its predicate in ἄγαθόν τε εἶναι. "Does not then this great power of yours (πάλιν αὐτό) appear to you (only provided the one who does what seems good to him proves to be doing what is profitable) to be both a good thing,—and that, as it seems, is the real (τὸ) great power; otherwise it is an evil thing and small power." The sentence begins with a question which is lost in an affirmation.

29. έι δὲ μή: is phraseological, "otherwise." The contrast is with τοῦτο, and through this with ἐὰν μὲν κτέ. The subject of κακῶν (ἔστι) καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι is, of course, the phrase τὸ πράττειν ἀ δοκεῖ, to be supplied from the context. H. 904, 906 a, b.

30. ἀλλο τι: see on 467 d.
40. Πωλ. ἂν μὲν οὖν, ὃς Ὀώκρατες, ἀπόκριων ταὐτὸ τοῦτο.

Σω. Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὃς Πώλε, εἰ σοι παρ' ἐμοῦ ε ὑδίον ἐστὶν ἄκοινεω, ὅταν μὲν δικαῖας τις ταῦτα ποιή, ἄμενων εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἄδικος, κάκιον.

XXVI. Πωλ. Χαλεπών γέ σε ἔλεγχαι, ὃς Ὀώκρατες ἀλλ' οὐχί κἀν παῖς σε ἔλεγχεις, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλληθεν λέγεις;

Σω. Πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγώ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἐξώ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλληθεν λέγεις; ἄλλα μὴ 5 κάμης φίλον ἀνδρὰ εὑρηγετῶν, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε.

Πωλ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὃς Ὀώκρατες, οὐδὲν γέ σε δεὶ παλαιῶς πράγμασιν ἔλεγχειν τά γὰρ ἔχθες καὶ πρῶθην γεγονότα α ταῦτα Ἰκανά σε ἔξελέγξαι ἐστίν καὶ ἀποδείξει, ὅς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἀνθρωποὶ εὐαίμονες εἰσιν.

10. Σω. Τὰ ποία ταῦτα;

Πωλ. Ἀρχέλαον δήποτε τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὀρᾶς ἀρ- χοντα Μακεδονίας;

470 40. σὺ μὲν οὖν κτῆ.: Polus evades the answer and forces it upon So- crates, partly because he is not able to give it, for the distinction de- 
manded lies equally remote from the circle of his thoughts and his feel-
ings; partly because he does not wish it, for he has a suspicion that it will 
contradict all the views which he has thus far expressed. The less, however, 
his is in position to confute Socrates by arguments, the greater is his con- 
fidence in his ability to do so by facts.

5. μὴ κάμης, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε: note the difference between positive and neg.

470 imperative.—εὑρηγετῶν: is to be ex- 
plained according to 458 a. On the supplementary partic., see G. 279, 1; 
P. 983.

7. τὰ γὰρ ἔχθες καὶ πρῶθην: means "recent events." Homer also uses 
the phrase χθεία τε καὶ πρώθηα, B 303. 
The Greek idiom requires καὶ where the Eng. uses "or."

8 f. πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἀνθρωποί: in most cases when the participle is used 
as an attribute, we can still feel the participial plus as compared with the 
adjective. Here, however, that has 
almost completely disappeared, and the participle is as much an adj. as 
προσήκων, πρέπων, etc.

10. τὰ ποία: it is a matter of indi-

11. Ἀρχέλαον: Archelaus, an ille-
Σο. Εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀλλὰ ἄκοινω γε.
Πολ. Εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ ἀθλιός;
15 Σο. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὡς Πώλε· οὐ γὰρ πῶς συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρὶ.
Πολ. Τί δὲ; συγγενόμενος ἄν γνοῖς, ἀλλος δὲ αὐτός ἐθεὶν οὔ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ;
Σο. Μὰ Δί', οὔ δὴτα.
Πολ. Δῆλον δή, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βα-
20 σιλέα γιγνώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα.
Σο. Καὶ ἀληθὴ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἐξεί καὶ δικαιοσύνης.
Πολ. Τί δὲ; ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἑστίν;
Σο. Ἡμι γε ἐγώ λέγω, ὡς Πώλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν
25 κἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαιμονα εἶναι φήμι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἀθλιον.

470 gitimate son of Perdiccas, seized the throne in b.c. 414, after his father’s death, and reigned until 399, when he was murdered by Craterus or Crateus (name and motive are alike uncertain). The facts brought forward by Polus in their darkest colors are probably correct; but Archelaus laid the foundation for the later importance of Macedonia by introducing Greek culture. He invited famous artists, among others Euripides, to his court. There is also a tradition that he invited Socrates, but that is hardly credible. — ὀρᾶς: well expresses the lively interest which Polus, as well as many other Greeks, took in that admired ruler, whose apparent success was doubtless envied by many an aspiring and ambitious man. The answer of Socrates sounds somewhat pedantic, but it is probably jesting, and designed to cool the extravagant ardor of Polus, while at the same time it prepares the way for ὅπως 470 συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρὶ below.

13. ἀλλὰ ... ἐθεὶ: nevertheless, at least. II. 1046, 2, a.
15-26. This passage is translated by Cicero, Tuscr. Disp. v. 12.
16. αὐτόθεν: “instinctively,” “of e yourself.” This is not translated by Cicero, but it forms a good contrast to συγγενόμενος. Polus thinks the very fact of Archelaus being a ruler implies that he is fortunate. That the Persian king was generally esteemed the personification of happiness is shown by Apol. 40 e.
21 f. παιδεία and δικαίωσύνη: together denote moral cultivation. — ὅπως ἐξεί: construed with the part. gen. See G. 168, x. 3; II. 757 a.
25. ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα: virtue, and hence also the foundation of εὐδαι-
omia, is, according to Socrates, one and the same for all, while the pupils of Gorgias recognized different varie-
plies for different classes. Cf. Meno e 71 e πρῶτον μὲν ei boúleis anádrôs árêthn, eî de boúleis γυναικὸς árêthn kî. On the omission of the art. with γυναίκα, see on 460 e.

27. οὔτος ... ο Ἀρχέλαος: the position emphasizes the name; 'this man—Archelaus!'

30. πῶς οὖκ ἄδικος: sc. ἐστίν. This admission, coupled with the opinion that Archelaus is an enviable and happy man, which is very evident from the ironical narrative which follows, shows most plainly the utter opposition between Polus’ view and the moral principle which Socrates champions.—ὁ γε: introduces the authority of indisputable facts. See on 460 e.

32 ff. καὶ, καὶ, καὶ: is in sense almost equiv. to “and therefore.” The construction begun in the clause ὁ γε 471 ... ἄδελφος is naturally varied in καὶ 471 ... Ἀρκέτου by being made personal.

33. εἰ ἐβούλετο, ἦν εὐδαίμον: is an unreal conditional sentence, with opposition to the present. The close proximity of the two clauses in the apodosis explains the omission of the second ἦν.

37. δεσπότην καὶ θείον: denotes b two kinds of moral obligation to which Archelaus paid no attention; ξενίασ adds a third, the violation of which was considered among Greeks the worst of crimes, a sin against Ἴενος. Cf. Hom. N 624, Xen. An. iii. 2. 4. The heaping up of the words καταμεθόδοσας, ἐμβαλὼν (like a thing), ἔξαγαγὼν, ἀπεσφαξέν, ἡφάνισεν makes the impression of the repeated acts of violence very vivid.
ou metemelhsean autw, all' oligoun ustereon ton adelphon, ton gnhsion tou Perdikkou yon, paida ws epteth, ou he e archi e ginisthe kata to dikaios, ouk ebovlhth eu'daimon gnebsthai dikaios ektheias kai apodous tin archin ekewn, all' eis phreak embalwv kai apopnixas prois tin mhtera autou Kleopatra xina efh diwkonta empestein kai apothanvein. touyartoi viv, ate megista 2dikhka toin en

XXVII. Sea. Kai kat' arxhas ton logos, o Phole, egoge se epynesea oti mou dokies eiv pros tin rhetorikh pepaideusthai, tov de dialegesthai hemelhkein: kai viv allo ti ouros estin o logos, o me kai an pais exeleugxei, 5 kai eiv upo sou viv, ois su oiei, exeleugyme toutw to logos, faskow ton adikoonta ouk eu'daimona einai; poden, onath; kai muv oudev ge sou touton omonog kiv su fhis.

471 43. ton adelphon: is emphasized by
b its position in advance of its governing verb (partic.).
44. Perdikkou: Perdiccas II. reigned from b.c. 454 (?) until 414 or 413, after having dispossessed his brother Alcetas. During the Peloponnesian war he pursued a very prudent but faithless policy. — The extraordinary number of participles employed by Polus has an artistic value in showing the tumultuousness of his feelings.
45. ouk e bovlhth (he did not choose) eu'daimon gnebsthai: is very sarcastic. The conclusion introduced by touyartai is equally emphatic. Polus admires in Archelaus the strength of will which hesitates at nothing to accomplish its aim; regret with him is weakness.

51. kal ivos estin ostit is kte.: in these words, in spite of their sarcastic form, lies the only attempt at proof which Polus makes, i.e. an appeal to the opinion of others; he of course thinks that no one will own himself to be such a man.

XXVII. 1. kal kat' arxhas: leads us to expect in the following kal viv a confirmation and climax of praise, — which, however, is changed instead to blame by tov... hemelhkeinai. Note the zeugma in combining tov... hemelhkeinai with esthesa. See on 520 b hy tov aut'. The praise was bestowed in 448 d.

6. poden: is a question with a negative force, to which the affirmative kal muv corresponds.
ΠΝΔ. Οὐ γὰρ ἔθελες, ἑπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὃς ἐγὼ λέγω. e

Ση. Ὡ μακάριε, ὑπηρετικῶς γὰρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἑλέγχειν, καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ὦ ἐτεροί τοὺς ἐτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἑλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν λόγων ὃν ἄν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχωνται καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὃ δὲ τάναντα λέγων ἕνα τινὰ παρέχηται ἡ μηδένα. οὕτως δὲ ὁ ἑλέγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστίν πρὸς 472

15 τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἄν καὶ καταφευγόμαρτυρηθεὶς τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκοῦντων εἶναι τί. καὶ νῦν περί ὅν σὺ λέγεις ὄλγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσι ταῦτα 'Ἄθηναίοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, ἑὰν βούλη κατ' ἐμὸν μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω· μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἕαν

471 8. ἑπεὶ δοκεῖ: in such phrases the ἑπεὶ has the force of "although," "whereas." Cf. Prot. 335 ε σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ· ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἄδυνατος ἑπεὶ ἐβουλήμην ἄν ὄλος τ' ἐναι. Apol. 19 ε. The conj. merely indicates a relation between the two ideas. If these two ideas harmonize, the relation becomes causal; if not, it becomes adversative.

9. ὁ μακάριε (cf. 469 ε): implies the reproof which follows.

10. ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις: the manner of argument practised there frequently incurs Plato's disapproval. Cf. Apol. 34 b ff. The emphasis is laid on ἡγούμενοι and δοκοῦσιν.

13. ἐνα τινά: the indef. pron. emphasizes the number, "a paltry one."

472 15 f. καταφευγόμαρτυρηθείς τις: the Greek idiom does not require intr. verbs to be used impersonally in the passive. Cf. Xen. Apol. 24 καταφευγόμαρτυρηθείς ἐμὸν with Dem. in Meid. 136 καταφευγόμαρτυρόμαι.

16. δοκοῦντων εἶναι τί: equal to εὐδοκίμων. Cf. the English colloquialism 'he pretends to be something.'

17. ὄλγου: almost; the remnant 472 of the phrase ὄλγου δειν. II. 743 b.

19. μαρτυρήσουσι κτλ.: Nicias, the celebrated general in the Peloponnesian war, who met his death in the Sicilian expedition (n.c. 413), was leader of the moderate wing of the aristocratic party. Aristocrates, the son of Scellias or Scellius, belonged, as we can judge from Ar. Av. 125 and Thuc. viii. 89, to the extreme or oligarchical order. He was one of the generals condemned to death for negligence at the battle of Arginusae. Xen. Hell. i. 7. Socrates here speaks of both as if they were still living. (See Introd. § 18.) Next to them, Socrates mentions the house of Pericles; he could not name the statesman himself because he was already dead when Gorgias visited Athens for the first time; but he, with his house, was a champion of the Athenian democracy. So we have here representatives of the chief political parties as witnesses for Polus. They agreed with each other in that they esteemed power in the state,—even tyranny,
20 μὲν βούλη, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτος καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοί μετ’ αὐτοῦ, ὅν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἐστιν καὶ ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίων, οὐ ἂν ἔστιν ἐν Πυθίον τοῦτο τῷ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, ἡ Περὶ-δίκαςον ὁλὴ οἰκία, ἡ ἄλλη συγγένεια ἦτινα ἄν βούλη τῶν 25 ἐνθαδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἄλλ’ ἐγώ σοι εἰς ἄν οὐχ ὀμολογό-ποι ὧν γάρ με σὺν ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατ’ ἕμοι παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἄληθος. ἐγώ δὲ ἄν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἔνα οὕτως μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὀμολογοῦντα περὶ ἄν λέγω, οὐδὲν 30 οἴμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ἄν ἄν ἰμίων ὁ ἐ

472—though purchased at the price of apparent doing, to be the highest good.

20 ff. ἢν μὲν βούλη, ἢν δὲ βούλη: are not pleonastic after ἢν βούλη, but are due partly to courtesy (cf. Prot. 355 b εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἰ σοι φίλον), and serve also by specifying to emphasize the possibility of a free choice among all parties.

21. ὅν οἱ τρίποδες: in this way these men show that they were δοκούντες εἰναι τι. They also, by the magnificence of their offerings, proved their piety, and their ‘testimony’ would be therefore the more weighty. Nicias was, according to all accounts, an honorable man. Thucydides says (vii. 86) of him, in referring to his mournful death: ἡμιστα δὴ ἄξιος ἂν τῶν γε ἐπ’ ἐμοῦ Ἐλευθερίν ἐς τοῦτο δουταχιάς ἀφικέσθαι διὰ τήν πάσαν ἐς ἀρετῆς μενο-
ymiμμένην ἐπιτῆδεως. By Dionysion is to be understood not a temple, but a spot sacred to Dionysus, —a sacred precinct. Nicias built there a kind of shrine, which possessed, among other treasures, some very costly tripods which he had dedicated to Dionysus after he had discharged the office of Choregos—a very costly liturgy in itself. The tripods were arranged 472 apparently ἐφεξῆς with a kind of ostentation.

22 f. ἐν Πυθίον: sc. ἱερ. The offering of Aristocrates must have been, according to the words of Socrates, also costly and well-known.

26. ἀναγκάζεις: sc. to agreement by convincing reasons; often followed by ὀμολογεῖν, but without it in Theol. 196 b τοῦτω αὐτῷ ἀναγκάζο-

27 f. ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς: this is ambiguous, for οὐσία can denote property, material possessions as well as physical existence. Accordingly Polus appears here in the investigation as a tyrant, who drives others from house and home. But it is this same power which the orator wishes to obtain (before a court) by his speech.

28 f. σε αὐτὸν . . . μάρτυρα: the dialectical proof is a course of logic, a process of reasoning, which Socrates carries through, with the help of his adversary, by question and answer. Hence by his enforced agreement a man becomes a witness against himself.
33. ἐστὶν κτέ.: Socrates does not hereby recognize this adducing of 'testimony' to be a correct τρόπος ἐλέγχου, but rather implies by the words ὡς σὺ τε ὁδεγεῖς κτέ. (cf. 471 d, 473 b) that it is only a pretended one, which cannot stand against the true one.

37. σχέδον τι: does not weaken the idea, but merely softens the expression. The question under discussion is really the cardinal one of life, 'How can I be happy?'

40. αὐτίκα: is one of the ways of introducing an example in Greek. Cf. Prot. 359 επὶ τοῦ ναοῦ κτένισεν ἐπὶ & αἱ τε διαμορφώσεται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρεῖς. αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν ἢναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. The addition of πρῶτον shows that there are still other conflicts between their views; e.g. in reference to the nature and value of punishment.

41. εἶναι is thrown forward for the sake of emphasis, as ἐστὶ above. After ἡγοῦμαι, νομίζω, and similar verbs the pred. is often found without a copula. Cf. 473 a.

XXVIII. 1. ἐν: with this are connected other points of difference.

2. ἔλευ: see on 466 c. — ἀπα: the position here is still more remarkable than in 467 e and 476 a. — The whole weight of the question falls on ἔν τυγχάνῃ δίκης καὶ τιμωρίας. The former, δίκη, usually denotes simply the carrying out of the law, the infliction of justice; the latter, τιμωρία, the fine or penalty which falls to the
Πολ. "Ἡκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὐτω γ' ἀν ἄθλιωτατος εἴη.
5 Σο. 'Αλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγχάνη δίκης ὁ ἁδικῶν, κατὰ ε ὁ
τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαιμον ἔσται;
Πολ. Φημί. 
Σο. Κατὰ δὲ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὁ Πώλε, ὁ ἁδικῶν τε
καὶ ὁ ἁδικὸς πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἄθλιωτερος μέντοι, ἐὰν
10 μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνη τιμωρίας ἁδικῶν, ήττον δὲ
ἀθλιος, ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνη δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε
καὶ ἀνθρώπων.
Πολ. 'Ατοπά γε, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν.
Σο. Πειράσομαι δὲ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὃ ἑταίρη, ταύτα
15 ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλου γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν ὡς ὁ διαφε-
ρόμεθα ταύτ' ἐστίν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σὺ· εἴπον ἐγώ ποι ἐν
τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν τὸ ἁδικεῖν τοῦ ἁδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι.

472 injured person or the state. These 
d are both external demands on the 
criminal, called forth by his crime, 
and by which an expiation of it is to 
be effected. On the other hand, κό-
λασις is the discipline which the guilty 
party himself undergoes, designed to 
prevent further transgression; while 
ζυλα (470 a) is only the injury or 
damage which he sustains in expi-
ating his crime. From the outset 
Socrates shows that, even according 
to the view of his opponent, wrong-
doing does not give happiness under 
all conditions. This point is not 
made superfluous by the discussion 
of 469 e–470 e; for there the ques-
tion concerns δύναμις, not εὐδαιμονία.

473 expression of the same idea; as the 
ϕίλου with the gen. would indicate. 
15. φίλου γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι: there, 
fore Socrates does not allow himself 
to be deterred by the trouble it will 
involve to bring Polus to the same 
opinion. ταύτα λέγειν (καὶ φρονεῖν) is 
held as a sign of friendship, just as 
διαφερεσθαι of enmity. See on 510 e 
and Sall. Cat. 20 nām idem velle 
atque idem nolle, ea denum 
firma aamicitia est. At the same 
time the words contain a delicate 
reply to Polus' discourteous exclama-
tion. Socrates will soon bring him 
to say what is in his own view ἄτο-
πον.

16 f. Εν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν: cf. 469 b. 
17. τὸ ἁδικεῖν . . . εἴναι: is cited 
as an example of rather uncommon 
use of the indir. disc. inf. after εἴπο
(GMT. 753, 3), but the clause is to 
be looked at rather as the object of 
εἴπον in the sense of "declare."
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ. 109

Πωλ. Πάνω γε.
Σω. Σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαί.

20 Πωλ. Ναί.
Σω. Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ ἐξηλεγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ.
Πωλ. Ναί μὰ Δία.
Σω. Ὀς σὺ οἶει, ὦ Πῶλε.

25 Πωλ. Ἀληθὴ γε οἰόμενος ἰσως.
Σω. Σὺ δὲ γε εὐδαιμονας αὐτοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, εὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην.
Πωλ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
Σω. Ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀθλωτάτους φημὶ, τοὺς δὲ διδῶν-

30 τας δίκην ᾑττοῦν. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν;
Πωλ. Ἀλλ' ἔτι τούτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ Σῶκρατε, ἐξηλεγχζαι.
Σω. Ὑ δῆτα, ὦ Πῶλε, ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.

35 Πωλ. Πῶς λέγεις; εὰν ἀδικῶν ἀνθρώποις ληφθῇ τυραν-
νίς ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεῖς στρεμπλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται

473 22. καὶ ἐξηλεγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ: of course the addition of Socrates after Polus' reply throws a quite different coloring over this sentence. Polus' self-assurance is apparent in καὶ μὰ Δία, his positiveness in ἀληθὴ γε οἰόμενος. Ἦσως shows no uncertainty, but is only the conscious under-statement which is common in English. See on 480 a.

b 31. ἀλλ' ἔτι τούτο κτὲ.: refers to 470 e and is just as ironical. In sharp contrast with the false assurance which trusts its own cleverness is Socrates' faith in the immutability of truth, τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.

35. ληφθῆ: pictures vividly the actual scene. In compound verbs the metaphorical meaning often pre-dominates, and leaves the actual in the background (cf. ἐπ' αὐτοφάρφα κα-ταλαμβάνεσθαι). In what follows, notice the rhetorical heaping up of the most frightful punishments; which reminds us of Aesch. Eum. 186 ff. κα-ρανιστήρες ὀφθαλμοφόροι | δίκαι σφαγαί τε σπέρματος τ' ἀποφθεγμα | παλίν, κα-κοῦ τε χλοούς ἢ' ἀκρωνία, | λευσμός τε καὶ μόσχων οἰκτισμὸν πολὺν | ὑπὸ ῥάχιν παγέντες. Cf. Rep. ii. 381 e μαστι-γώστεται, στρεμπλώστεται, δεδήστεται, ἐκ-καυθήσεται τῷ φθαλμο, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθῶν ἀνασχινδύλευθησεται.
kai toûs òphiðalmoûs èkkàntai, kai ãllas pollás kai megalas kai pantodapàs lâbas aútòs te õwðhêveis kai toûs aútòv èpidòv paìdàs te kai õunàika tò èsgatòn âna-
40 staunrouthi õ kàtapitpòuthi, õûtos èuðaimonèsteroû èstai, õ èan diaphunÒw túraunnos kàtasthê kai õrkon èn tìn pòleì
diabwû poiôn õti õn boûlthetai, õûlthetai õû kai èuðaimonì-
zómenos upò tòùn polìtòùn kai tòùn ãllwv õènov; tauta a
légei õdûnatôn èinei èxèlêghèv;

XXIX. Ó. Mòrmòlûttei aù, õ geunaiè Pòle, kai
ouk èlèghèis- õrthi ðe èmàrtûròn. õûwv ðe èpòmì-
sôn me ñmikrón. "èan àdikos ètpìboûlevòv túrànnìdî,"
eîtes;

5 Pòl. Ògàgev.

Ó. Èuðaimonèsteroû meû toûwv ouðèpòte èstai ouðè-
teroûs aútòv, îute õ kàteirgàsmènûs tìn túrànnìdà àdikos
îute õ ðidovùs dikhû. õwv ãr ñthlìouv èuðaimonèsteroû

473 37. kai ãllas kte.: notice the õmô-
ce stèlènuta.
39. èpidòûn: sc. õwðhêventas.
40. kàtapitpòuthi: an especially severe
manner of punishment. The
criminal was put into a
sack smeared with
pitch,—the so-called
tunicamolestà, —which
was then set on
fire.
41. diaphunÒw: "if he succeed";
opposed to õphôthê.
42. õti õn boûlthetai: Polus has
again forgotten the
explanation of the
difference between
dòkein and boûlè-
thetai.—èuðaimonìzômenos:
to be thought
èuðaimôn by the
multitude is to be so,
in Polus’ estimation.
43. kai tòûn ãllwv õènov: cf. Hóm.
B 191 âllk aútòs te kàthos kai âllous
òbme õàlous, 480 õ, Piànèldû 110 e âl-
thêis kai õhi kai toûs ãllous õûs te kai
phûis. The same idiom is found in
Latin, as equites et aliud vul-
gus. See on 447 e.
43 f. tauta légeis: Polus is trium-
phant, as if Socrates’ position (tauûta)
were now overthrown.

XXIX. 1. mòrmòlûttei: the ex-
pression for terrifying with
ghost stories. The ‘mormo’ was the ‘bad
man’ with which children were fright-
ened. Cf. Crito 46 e. — õ geunaiè: is
probably designedly used because the
means employed are unfair, being
only a pretended, not a real proof.
Cf. 471 e.

2. õûwv ðe: although in reality
no point has been made, yet Socrates
is ready to assume one and proceed
upon that.

3. èan àdikos ètpìboûlevòv: can be
completed from e. The change in
the expression is due to the colloca-
tion of the two words.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

111

μὲν οὐκ ἀν εἴη: ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ὁ διαφεύγων καὶ τυ- 10 πανεύσας. τί τοῦτο, ὦ Πώλε; γελᾶς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἑλέγχου ἑστίν, ἐπειδὰν τίς τι εἴη, καταγελᾶν, ἑλέγ- χειν δὲ μὴ;

Πλ. Οὐκ οὐεί ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγης, ἃ οὕδεις ἄν φήσειν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ των 15 τούτων.

Σα. ᾿Ω Πώλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέρυσι βου- λευέν τινας, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλή ἐπροτάνευε καὶ ἐδεί με ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλωτα παρείχον καὶ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην ἐπιψη- 474 φίζειν. μὴ οὖν μὴδὲ νῦν με κέλευε ἐπιψηφίζειν τοὺς

9. ὁ διαφεύγων: "whoever remains unpunished." — πανεύσας: "he who attains to the tyranny." The more important idea precedes.

10. τί τοῦτο: what can this mean? The inappropriate laughter of Polus is probably in accordance with the precept of Gorgias that in serious things one must draw the audience to his own side by laughing.

11. καταγελᾶν: to laugh it down. Socrates' opinion of the ἄλλο εἶδος ἑλέγχου is shown by the addition, ἑλέγχειν δὲ μὴ.

14 f. ἐροῦ τίνα τούτων: by again having recourse unto the opinion of others, Polus again reverts, though in a different manner, to his 'witnesses' (469 c), and shows that the rhetorical method of proof is alone comprehensible to him. By inviting Socrates to put the question to those present, he reminds him of the analogous practice of ἐπιψηφίζειν (ro gare pο- pulum), and gives him a chance to plead his own inaptitude as an excuse for not employing rhetorical methods. Socrates in his reply also shows that to accept the opinion of the majority — the method which the state had settled upon as the best way of establishing the truth — was as unsatisfactory, when employed by the individual, as the rhetorical methods. The fact to which Socrates alludes is the well-known trial of the generals who had won the battle of Arginusae and afterwards fell victims to political intrigue. The full proceedings are detailed by Xen. Hell. i. 6. 33 ff. and 7. Socrates was senator this year (Ol. 93. 3, 406 n.c.), and in the memorable assembly ἐπιστάτης τῶν προ- τάνων. As such, he opposed the unlawful proceeding with an intrepid courage which he here humorously calls inaptitude in ἐπιψηφίζειν. Socrates mentions the circumstance also in Apol. 32 b, but in a different manner. On the chronological difficulty, see Introd. § 18.

17. ἡ φυλή: of course that to which Socrates belonged, ᾿Αντιοχίς.

18. γέλωτα παρείχον καὶ κτί: a 474 'hysteron proteron.' See Rid. § 308. a
20 παρόντας, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔχεις τοῦτων βελτίων ἠλεγχον, ὅπερ 
νυν ἐγὼ ἠλεγχον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρα-
σαι τοῦ ἠλεγχον, οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ δι' ἂν 
ἀν λέγω ἕνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπίσταμαι, αὐτόν, 
πρὸς ὅν ἂν μοι ὁ λόγος ἢ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἑώ χαίρειν, καὶ 
25 ἕνα ἐπιστήμης ἐπίτημα, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγο-
μαι. ὃρα οὖν, εἰ θελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἠλεγχον 
ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ 
καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδι-
kείσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ 
30 διδόναι.

Π. Ἄγω δὲ γε ὃν οὖτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. 
ἐπεὶ σὺ δεῖξαι ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

Σ. Καὶ σὺ γ' ἂν καὶ οἶ ἄλλοι πάντες.

Π. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος 
35 οὐδείς.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινεῖ;

Π. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτ' 
ἐρεῖς.

Σ. Λέγε ὅτι μοι, ὥς εἴδης, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ε' ἀρχῆς σε 
40 ἡρώτων: πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὥς Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ 
ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

474 20. τοῦτων: i.e. the various means 
a with which Polus had hitherto at-
temned to confute Socrates.—ὀπερ 

below, διδόναι ἠλεγχον "to give a 
chance for refutation."

25. οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι: because sci-
entific investigation by means of con-
versation is naturally confined to 
individuals.

b 32. ἐπεὶ . . . ἀδικεῖν: this is not 
meant in earnest, but is a reductio 
ad absurdum of the preceding 
words of Socrates, which are so op-
posed to Polus' view. On ἐπεὶ cf. 
471 e, and see GMT. 718, where this 
clause is cited as interrogative.

37. καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ: implies a 
doubt whether Socrates can really 
advance anything in support of his 
view. On the following answers of 
Polus, see Introd. § 14.

39. ὡσπερ κτέ.: as an actual fact, 
the discussion has been concerning 
the question whether ἀδικεῖν or ἀδικεῖ-
Πλατωνος Γοργιας.

πωι. τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε.

Σα. τί δὲ δή; αἰσχιον πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνου.

45 πωι. τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

XXX. Σα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἰπέρ αἰσχιον;

πωι. Ἡκιστά γε.

Σα. Μανθάνω: οὐ ταῦτα ἦγεῖ σύ, ὡς ἐοικας, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν.

5 πωι. Οὐ δὴτα.

Σα. τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἶνον καὶ σῶματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὕδεν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλὰ; οἶον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἦτοι κατὰ τὴν χρείαν λέγεις καλὰ εἰναι, πρὸς ὧ ἐκαστὸν χρήσμῳν ἢ, πρὸς τούτο, ἢ κατὰ ἡδονήν των, εὰν εἰν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς 474 σθαὶ were the greater evil, since the
c middle of ch. XXIV.

43. τί δὲ δή; how so, then? — The predicate is thrown forward in the following clause, because the chief weight of the contrast falls upon it.

XXX. 1. οὐκοῦν κτέ.: the καλὸν is here the species under which the ἀγαθὸν and the ἡδόν are subordinated.

3. ὡς ἐοικας: logically, in such cases as this, an inf. is to be supplied; but it is doubtful if any such ellipses were felt by the Greeks. — καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν, — κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν: 'chiasmus.'

6. τόδε: is probably an acc. with λέγεις understood. Cf. Phaedo 65 d τί δὲ δή τα τοιάδε and Xen. Mem. iii. 1. 10 τί δὲ τούς κυνουνεῖν μέλλοντας. On the other hand, Thil. 27 ε τί δὲ δ ὁδε βλος and Soph. Αφ. 101 τι γὰρ δὴ παῖς δ τοῦ λαερτίου make for the nom. The context must be the guide.

8. εἰς οὕδεν ἀποβλέπων: with regard 474 unto nothing, that is, without searching for some characteristic common to all these things, in accordance with which you would be justified in calling them καλὰ. The word ἀποβλέπω is used also when reference is made to an idea or principle, which conditions a person's action or the manner of appearance of any phenomenon.

9. κατὰ: is used of the scale according to which a thing is to be measured.

10. πρὸς τοῦτο: points emphatically back to πρὸς δ ἑτέ., in a way more remarkable here than in 469 ε. The relative clause itself is an extension of κατὰ τὴν χρείαν, laying especial stress on the relativity of the καλὸν.

11. εἰν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι: notice the use of the passive to denote the point of view from which σῶμα is καλὸν.
theoretical; expresses to the to\'s to\'s to\'s l\'eg\'en peri. s\'w\'matos e kallos;

Παλ. Όυκ ἔχω.

15 Σν. Όυκοιν καὶ τάλλα πάντα ο\'\'τω καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ διὰ ἕδωκά τινα ἢ διὰ ὡφέλιαν ἢ δι' ἀμφότερα καλά προσαγορεύεις;

Παλ. Ἕγγεις.

Ση. Όυ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν

20 πάντα ὀσαύτως;

Παλ. Ναι.

Ση. Καὶ μὴν τὰ γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δήσου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστίν, τὰ καλά, ἢ ωφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἕδεα ἢ ἀμφότερα.

25 Παλ. Όυκ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Ση. Όυκοιν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὀσαύτως; 475

Παλ. Πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὀρίζει, ὦ Σώκρατε, ἕδωκά τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ ὀριζόμενος τὸ καλὸν.

Ση. Όυκοῖν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἑναντίῳ, λύπη τε καὶ κακῶ;

474 12. ἐκτὸς τούτων: i.e. the points of view mentioned in ἦ ... ἦ.

17. προσαγορεύεις: i.e. to designate by the addition of a characteristic, as if one were addressing a person by name.

22. καὶ μὴν: introduces us to a new variety of the beautiful, i.e. the results of mental activity. The νόμος, ἐπιτηδεύματα, and μαθηματα are, with reference to the subject of investigation, fittingly introduced as representatives of this class.—τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους κτέ.: it must be confessed that we could do very well without τὰ καλὰ. If kept, it must be considered as a repetition and restriction of τά γε κατὰ κτέ., and τούτων must be explained by ἦ ωφέλιμα κτέ. in opposition. See H. 950. But Rid. § 271 b seems to have a different view of the sentence, which he holds to be a case of inversion of government, and with this Cope seems to agree in his translation: “And moreover, in all that belongs to laws and habits of life, their beauty, I presume, is to be found nowhere beyond these limits; that is to say, either the utility or the pleasure that is in them, or both.”

27. καὶ καλῶς κτέ.: this lively sent of Polus shows that he thinks a that Socrates is at last veering round to his position. The manner in which he is gradually undeceived is interesting.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

Σα. Οταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θάτερον κάλλιον ἦ, ἣ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τούτῳ ἥ ἄμφοτέρους ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιον ἔστιν, ἦτοι ἴδιοι ἥ ὀψιλία ἥ ἄμφοτέρους.
Παλ. Πάνω γε.

Σα. Καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχρῶν τὸ ἐτέρουν αἰσχρὸν ἦ, ἦτοι λύπη ἥ κακῶ ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχρὸν ἔσται· ἥ ὀὐκ ἡ ἀνάγκη;
Παλ. Ναι.

Σα. Φέρε δή, πῶς ἐλέγετο νυνὶδή περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἐλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχρὸν;
Παλ. Ἠλεγον.

Σα. Οὐκοῦν εἶπερ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἦτοι λυπηρότερον ἔστιν καὶ λύπη ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχρὸν ἄν εἰ ἕκακῳ Ἦ ἀμφοτέρους; οὐ καὶ τούτῳ ἀνάγκη;
Παλ. Ἡ ὅρα οὖ;

XXXI. Σα. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεφώμεθα, ἄρα λύπη ε ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ή οἱ ἀδικούμενοι;
Παλ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὃ Σώκρατες, τούτῳ γε.

Σα. Οὐκ ἄρα λύπη γε ὑπερέχει. κυπηθε}.
Παλ. Οὐ δήτα.

Σα. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μῆ λύπη, ἀμφοτέρους μὲν οὐκ ἄν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι.
Παλ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

36. ἦτοι κτί.: if the text is sound, Socrates here speaks with less exactness than above, omitting what can be easily supplied.
39. φέρε δὴ: the result obtained is applied to the case under discussion.
475. XXXI. 1. λύπη: here denotes, as the following ἀλγοῦσι explains, only c physical pain. No reference can be meant to the gnawings of conscience. 2. ὑπερβάλλει: here construed with gen. like ὑπερέχει (5). Cf. Leg. v. 734 a.
10 Σ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ ἐπέρῳ λείπεται;  
Π.Λ. Ναι.
Σ. Τῷ κακῷ;  
Π.Λ. "Εοικεν.
Σ. Οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλου τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἄν εἴη
15 τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
Π.Λ. Δὴ λον δὴ ὅτι.
Σ. Ἀλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ
ὑπὸ σοῦ ὁμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἰσχυν
εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;
20 Π.Λ. Ναι.
Σ. Νῦν δὲ γε κάκιον ἐφανή.
Π.Λ. "Εοικεν.
Σ. Δέξαιο ἂν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἰσχυν
ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡττου; μὴ δικεῖ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν
25 γὰρ βλαβήσει· ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὠσπερ ἱατρῶν
παρέχουν ἀποκρίνουν, καὶ ἡ φάθι ἡ μὴ ἄ ἑρωτῶ.
Π.Λ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὥ Σώκρατες.
Σ. Ἀλλος δὲ τις ἀνθρώπων;
Π.Λ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

475 17. ἄλλο τι: see on 467 d. Polus had several times given as an authority the opinion of the masses, and had even, in 474 b, by the words ὅτι ἄλλος οὐδεὶς spoken in their name. He thus appears, like Protagoras in Prot. 353 a, as their representative. ὁμολογεῖτο properly applies to ὑπὸ σοῦ, and the present is to be supplied to ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.

23. δέξαιο ἂν: pays back for Polus' remark in 474 b. The construction is varied by the substitution of ἀντὶ with gen. instead of ἡ after μάλ-

24. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡττου: sc. κακοῦ καὶ ἀισχροῦ.

25. γενναίως: bravely; scorning the pain. The comparison is the same as in 480 e παρέχειν . . . ὠσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κάειν ἱατρῷ, and seems to be a Socratic one. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 54. For the construction, see on 456 b.

26. φάντ᾽ ἡ μή (sc. φάθι): affirm or deny. See on 454 d.

29. κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον: a conditional admission, implying that with a different treatment possibly a different result might be obtained.
30 Σν. Ἀληθή ἀρα ἐγὼ ἐλεγὼν, ὅτι οὔτ’ ἄν ἐγὼ οὔτ’ ἄν σὺ οὔτ’ ἄλλος οὔτεις ἀνθρώπων δέξατ’ ἄν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι. κάκιον γὰρ τυχάνει οὐ.

Πηλ. Φαίνεται.

Σν. ὅρφες οὖν, ὃ Πῶλε, ὃ ἐλεγχὸς παρὰ τὸν ἐλεγχὸν παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὔδεν ἐουκεν, ἄλλα σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖστι εἰς ὃν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ 476 μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους ἐὼ καίρειν. καὶ τούτῳ μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω. μετά τούτο δὲ περὶ οὐ τὸ δεύτερον ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν σκεφώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἢρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν, ὡς σὺ ζευ, ἡ μεῖζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ ἐγὼ ὧμην. σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἢρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;

45 Πηλ. Ἐγώγη.

Σν. Ἐχεις οὖν λέγειν, ὡς οὐχὶ τὰ γε δίκαια πάντα καλὰ ἢ ἐστιν, καθ’ ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διάσκεψάμενος εἰπέ.

Πηλ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὃ Σώκρατες.

30 f. οὔτ’ ἂν κτῆ.: ἂν draws attention to the emphatic words. On the position and repetition, see II. 862, 864; GMT. 223, 226.

34. ὅρφες οὖν, ὃ ἐλεγχὸς κτῆ.: we might also have had ὅρφες οὖν τὸν ἐλεγχὸν ὅτι παρὰ κτῆ. But the form chosen by Plato greatly heightens the contrast. Socrates, moreover, is referring to his own words in 472 ε. paraβαλλόντες οὖν παρ’ ἄλληλοις σκεφώμεθα, εἰ τι διϊδοσθαι ἄλληλων. Hence also the addition of the expressions μαρτυρῶν καὶ ἐπιψηφίζων to the more general ὁμολογῶν.

41. ἄρα μέγιστον: the more usual particle for "whether" is ἐι, but cf. Phaedo 70 d ἓδωμεν ἄρ’ οὕτως γλύνεται: 476 ἀπαντα. Π. 1016. In the sentence following, we have ἄρα introducing a direct question previously announced by τῇδε as in 459 d.

43. κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα: the adverb is necessary, because upon it rests the main point in the proof.

43 f. ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς: the position makes the question more pointed.

47. καὶ διάσκεψάμενος εἰπέ: the exhortation to Polus to think well before he speaks is at the same time an intimation to the re-der that the principle touched on in the question is of the greatest importance, as indicative of a man’s moral views, and
XXXII. Σα. Σκόπει δή καὶ τόδε· ἃρα εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τοῦτον τοῦ ποιοῦντος;
Πλλ. 'Εμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Σα. Ἀρα τοῦτο πάσχον, ὅ το ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον, 5 οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιοῦδε· εἰ τίς τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;
Πλλ. Ἀνάγκη.
Σα. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἡ ταχὺ ὁ τύπτων, οὔτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι;
10 Πλλ. Ναὶ.
Σα. Τοιοῦτον ἃρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἀν τὸ τύπτον ποιή;
Πλλ. Πάνυ γε.
Σα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ καίει τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;
15 Πλλ. Ἡώς γὰρ οὕ; 
Σα. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε καίει ἡ ἀλγεινῶς, οὔτως κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον ὡς ἀν τὸ κᾶον κάγ; 
Πλλ. Πάνυ γε.
Σα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τις, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; τέμνεται 20 γάρ τι.
Πλλ. Ναὶ.
Σα. Καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἡ βαθὺ τὸ τμήμα ἡ ἀλγεινόν, τοιοῦτον τμήμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον, οἷον τὸ τέμνον α τέμνει;
25 Πλλ. Φαίνεται.

476 hence is not to be accepted without earnest investigation. How necessary this exhortation is, can be perceived from a question of Polus in 477c.

476c XXXII. 14. καίει: the examples are chosen from cauterizing and surgery, because the healing art is in general for the body what the punitive administration of justice is for the soul. See on 456b. The second example is an advance on the first, in so far as the result of the treatment — corresponding to the general idea πάθος — can be expressed in the substantival form τμήμα.
Σω. Συλλήβδην δὴ ὁρα ei ὄμολογείς, δ ἁρτι ἔλεγον, 
περὶ πάντων, οἶων ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον 
πάσχειν. 
Πωλ. 'Αλλ' ὄμολογῶ.

30 Σω. Τούτων δὴ ὄμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον 
πάσχειν τί ἔστω ἡ ποιεῖν: 
Πωλ. 'Ανάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν. 
Σω. Οὖκοιν ὑπὸ τινος ποιοῦντος; 
Πωλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ὑπὸ γε τὸν κολάζοντος. 

35 Σω. ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων δικαίως κολάζει; 
Πωλ. Ναῖ. 
Σω. Δίκαια ποιῶν ἡ οὖ; 
Πωλ. Δίκαια. 
Σω. Οὖκοιν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδοῦσι δίκαια πά-

40 σχεί; 
Πωλ. Φαϊνεται. 
Σω. Τὰ δὲ δίκαια ποὺ καλὰ ὄμολογηται; 
Πωλ. Πάνυ γε. 
Σω. Τούτων ἄρα ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολα-

45 ζόμενος. 
Πωλ. Ναῖ. 
XXXIII. Σω. Οὖκοιν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθά; ὃ γὰρ 477 
ὅδε ἢ ὀφέλιμα. 
Πωλ. 'Ανάγκη. 
Σω. Ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδοῦσ; 

476 26. συλλήβδην: turns from the 
d particular to the generic, and extends 
to all cases the law which has been 
noticed in special cases. It belongs, 
of course, to the last clause oἶων κτέ. 
30. τὸ δίκην διδόναι: the article 
determines the subject. GMT. 790. 
35. ὀρθῶς: denotes in general the 
proper or appropriate exercise of any 
function, and thus leads up to δικαίως, 
e which is specially ethical. 
osition made in 474 d f.
5 Πλ. Ἐοικεν.
Ση. Ὡφελεῖται ἄρα;
Πλ. Ναι.
Ση. Ἀρα ἦπτερ ἔγω ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὦφελίαν; βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται;

10 Πλ. Εἰκός γε.
Ση. Κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς;
Πλ. Ναι.
Ση. Ἀρα οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ; ὄνθε δὴ σκόπει· ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου κακίαν ἐπὶ ἀλλήν των ἐνορᾶς ἡ πενίαι;
Πλ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαιν.
Ση. Τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν ἄν φήσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἰσχὸς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
Πλ. Ἐγώγε.

20 Ση. Οὐκοὖν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἥγει τινα εἶναι;
Πλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
Ση. Ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

477 θν ὦφελίαν: cognate accusative. After ὑπολαμβάνω we must supply ὑφελεῖσθαι. The asyndeton which follows is of the very common explanatory class.

13. ἄρα οὖν: introduces a new section of the argument, regarding the statement advanced by Socrates in 469 b.

14. κατασκευῇ: is distinguished from παρασκευῇ in that it denotes a preparation designed to endure; παρασκευῇ is for the emergency. Consequently the constitution of the body, so far as it is the result of physical culture, is naturally a κατασκευή.

20. πονηρίαν: not κακίαν. The latter word, according to the prevailing usage, denotes, as applied to the soul, moral depravity only, as above (a). The former denotes a bad condition in general, which may or may not be due to moral depravity. But as the bad condition usually involves bad constitution, πονηρία comes to mean much the same as κακία. The use of the words depends upon κατασκευή.

23. καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα: shows that the enumeration is not complete. The omitted member is given below in d (ἀκόλουθον) and ἀκόλουθος, and thereby the number of πονηρία (i.e. varieties of πονηρία) is made to correspond with the number of cardinal virtues (ἀρετή).
Πνεωμονει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

25 Σωτ. Οὐκόν χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἰρήκας πονηρίας, πεντάν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν;

Πνεωμονει. Ναὶ.

Σωτ. Τὶς οὖν τοῦτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχύστη; οὐχ ἢ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία;

Πνεωμονει. Πολὺ γε.

Σωτ. Εἰ δὴ αἰσχύστη, καὶ κακίστη;

Πνεωμονει. Πῶς, ὃ Σῶκρατες, λέγεις;

Σωτ. Ὅμω: ἀεὶ τὸ αἰσχυστον ἢτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχων ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφότερα αἰσχυστον ἐστίν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογμένων ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν.

Πνεωμονει. Μάλιστα.

Σωτ. Αἰσχυστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νυνδὴ ὀμολόγηται ἡμῖν;

Πνεωμονει. Ὅμολογηται γάρ.

40 Σωτ. Οὐκόν ἢ ἀνιαροτατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνία ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχιστον τοῦτων ἐστίν ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφότερα;

Πνεωμονει. Ἀνάγκη.

Σωτ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἀλγεινότερον ἐστὶν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ καμ-νειν τὸ ἀδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;

45 Πνεωμονει. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὃ Σῶκρατες, ἀπὸ τοῦτων γε.
PLATO'S GORGIAS.

Σω. 'Τπέρφυεί τινι ἅρα ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη καὶ κακὸς θαυμασίων ὑπερβάλλουσα τάλλα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἴσχιστον ἐστὶ πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀληθῶς γεγονεῖ, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. e Πηλ. Φαίνεται.

50 Σω. Ἀλλὰ μὴν που τὸ γε μεγίστῃ βλάβῃ ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἶ ὑτῶν ὄντων.
Πηλ. Ναὶ.
Σω. Ἡ ἀδικία ἅρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακὸν ἐστὶν;

55 Πηλ. Φαίνεται.
XXXIV. Σω. Τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὗ χρηματιστικῆ.
Πηλ. Ναὶ.
Σω. Τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἱατρικῆ.

5 Πηλ. Ἀνάγκη.
Σω. Τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; εἰ μὴ οὗτος εὔπορος τεῖς, ὡδε σκόπει: ποί ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα;
Πηλ. Παρὰ τοὺς ἱατροὺς, ὠΣώκρατες.

10 Σω. Ποι δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολαστάινοντας.

477 Polus has a suspicion of what is coming and so expresses himself guardedly, as if he wished to leave a door open behind him. On the contrary, Socrates speaks with great decision, and probably has in mind Polus' words in 471 a θαυμασίως ὡς ἥλιος γέγονεν.

46. ὑπερφυεῖ ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη: a case of what was originally attraction, but which by long usage has become phrasological. See H. 1003 b; Rid. § 197.

e XXXIV. 2. χρηματιστικῆ: this and the ἱατρικῆ appear already in 452 a ff., where they are associated with γυμναστικῆ.

478 with εὔπορος.

6 f. εὔπορος: is used in a transferred sense, as is more frequently the case with ἀπορεῖν. "If you are a not at once (οὗτος) prepared with an answer.” We must imagine a short pause as occurring before α. Such halts and explanations by means of examples, analogies, suggestive questions, and the like, are of course in accordance with the artistic design of the dialogue, but also serve to keep the attention of the reader. Note the interrogative form of one of Polus' answers. On οὗτος see on 503 d.

10. ἀκολαστάινοντας: appears again in Rep. 555 d, but otherwise seems to be restricted to comedy.
Πιλατώνος Γορτιας.

Πωλ. Παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις;
Ση. Οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας;
Πωλ. Φημίς.
Ση. 'Αρ' οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνη τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζοντων
15 οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες;
Πωλ. Δήλον δή.
Ση. Χρηματιστική μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ιατρικὴ
de νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας.
Πωλ. Φαίνεται.
20 Ση. Τί τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;
Πωλ. Τίνων λέγεις;
Ση. Χρηματιστικῆς, ιατρικῆς, δίκης.
Πωλ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, δὲ Σῶκρατες, ἡ δίκη.
Ση. Οὗκοῦν αὖ ἦτοι ἢδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἡ ὑφελίαν
25 ἡ ἀμφότερα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;
Πωλ. Ναὶ.
Ση. 'Αρ' οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι ἢδυ ἐστιν, καὶ χαῖρονσώ
οἱ ἰατρεύομενοι;
Πωλ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
30 Ση. 'Αλλ' ὑφελίμον γε. ἢ γάρ;
Πωλ. Ναϊ.
Ση. Μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὡστε λυσιτελεῖ,
ὑπομείναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ύγιὴ εἶναι.
Πωλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;
35 Ση. 'Αρ' οὖν οὔτως ἀν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονεστάτος
ἀνθρωπος εἰς, ἰατρεύομενος, ἣ μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν;

32. ἀπαλλάττεται: the subj. is to be supplied from the previous question of Socrates (ἀρ' οὖν... ἰατρεύομενοι). The 478 trans. use of ἰατρεύειν is not common.
33. ὑγιὴ: on the form, see II. 231 b.
35. ἀρ' οὖν κτέ.: Socrates proceeds now to fulfil the promise made in 473 a.—οὔτως: is explained by the partic. which follows.
Πωλ. Δῆλον ὅτι μηδὲ κάμψων.
Σω. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἄρχην μηδὲ κτῆσις.

40 Πωλ. Ἡστὶ ταῦτα.
Σω. Τί δέ; ἀδιόωτερος πότερος δυωῖ ἐχόντων κακῶν ἐν εἴτ' ἐν σῶματι εἴτ' ἐν ψυχῇ, ὁ ἰατρεύομενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ὃ μὴ ἰατρεύομενος, ἔχων δὲ;
Πωλ. Φαίνεται μοι ὃ μὴ ἰατρεύομενος.

45 Σω. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστον κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆ ἦν, πονηρίας;
Πωλ. Ἡν γὰρ.
Σω. Σωφρονίζει γὰρ πον χαὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἢ δίκη.

50 Πωλ. Ναι.
Σω. Εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἁρὰ ὃ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη.
Πωλ. Δῆλον δή.
Σω. Δεύτερος δῆπον ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.

55 Πωλ. Ἡσοκεν.
Σω. Οὔτος δ' ἦν ὁ νουθετούμενος τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδοὺς.

478 38. τοῦτ' ἦν κτέ.: on the gender, e see H. 617; G. 138, n. 2 e. The impf. of 'awakening' is often employed with ἁρα or its equivalents (ὡς ἔοικε). See H. 833.
39. τὴν ἄρχην μηδὲ κτῆσις: is the substantival, hence the general expression for the previous particular partic. clause. τὴν ἄρχην is construed with κτῆσις, which thus far retains its verbal nature.
40 Ἡστὶ ταῦτα: to ιατρεῖν (κάειν καὶ τέμνειν) in the d body.
52. τοῦτο: i.e. τὸ ἔχειν κακίαν ἐν e σῶματι, to be supplied from the preceding clause.
54. δεύτερος: cf. the Eng. colloquial 'second best.'
56. ὁ νουθετούμενος: contains an intimation that the improving punishment need not necessarily be the infliction of physical pain, but may be perceptible only by its effect on the soul. Cf. Apol. 26 a τῶν ἀκοντιῶν ἀμαρτήματων οὐ δεύτο ύμοι εἰςάγειν ὡστίν,
Πωλ. Ναί.
Σν. Κάκιωτα ἄρα ζῆ ὡ ἕχων ἄδικιαν καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλατ.
60 τόμενον.
Πωλ. Φαίνεται.
Σν. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὡν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἄδι-
κῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστη ἄδικία διαπράξῃται ὡστε μὴ
νουθετεῖσθαι μὴτε κολάζωσθαι μὴτε δίκην διδόναι, ὡσπερ 479
65 σὺ φῆς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράν-
νους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας;
Πωλ. 'Εοικε.
XXXV. Σν. Σχεδον γάρ ποὺ οὗτοι, ὡ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ
διαπετραγμένοι εἰσίν, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις
νοσήμασιν συνισχομένοι διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην
tῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἁμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύ-
5 εσθαί, φοβούμενος ὡσπερανεὶ παῖς τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ
tέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγεινόν. ἣ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτω;

478 ἄλλ' ἵδια λαβοῦντα διδάσκειν καὶ νοοῦσθε
tείν. The following expressions can be
conceived as denoting progressively
superior modes of punishment without
going into details. — ἐπιπληττόμενοι:
the act. usually governs the dative.
See on 472 a.
59. ἄδικαιν: in accordance with
the general purpose of the discussion
this word is used as a general represen-
tative of the various varieties of
κακία of the soul.
62. οὗτοι: is pred. and is explained
by the preceding clause. The subject
is the following rel. clause.
63. διαπράξῃται: cf. 473 c.—The
three expressions for the idea of pun-
ishment correspond to those above
used, since κολάζων διείδεσθαι (Lag. viii.
847 a) is but little different from
ἐπιπλήττειν.

a XXXV. 2. ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ τις: a
case of very natural ellipsis. Cf. the
analogous Lat. use of tanquam si, ut si. When used by itself this
expression becomes a relative phrase,
equivalent to the Lat. tanquam
sicut. In this sense it is written as
one word. GMT. 227, 868. The com-
parison to a child occurs in Homer,
and is found also elsewhere in Plato,
e.g. Phaedo 77 d δεδιόνται τὸ τῶν παιδῶν
and ἐ τῶς ἐν τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ὡστε
tὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται. Cf. above, 470 c.
3. μὴ διδόναι δίκην: cf. 478 e just
above, where the same verb is used
with ὡστε μὴ, and below, b, c, where
παῖν ποιοῦσι is used like διαπράξαιτο in
this passage without ὡστε.
5 f. τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι: the
repetition of the art. is unusual; and
serves to keep the two ideas separate.
6. ὅτι ἀλγεινόν: on the causal ὅτι
after verbs of fearing, see GMT. 377. b
Πωλ. Εμοίγε.
Σο. Ἀγνοῶν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἶον ἐστὶν ἡ υγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος. κυνδυνεύονσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὠμολογημένων τοιούτων τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἰ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, ὡς Πώλε, τὸ ἀλγευόν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὦφελίμων τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἄγνοεῖν, ὥσφα ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστιν μὴ ὑγιῶς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεὶς ψυχῆς συνοικεῖν, ἄλλα σαθρὰ καὶ ἀδίκω καὶ ἀνοσίᾳ. ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὡστε δίκην μὴ διδόταν μηδενοὶ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρη-ματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλοις καὶ ὅπως ἀν ὠσὶν ὡς πιθανῶτατοι λέγειν. εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀληθῆ ὠμολογήκαμεν, ὡς Πώλε, ἄρ’ αἰσθάνει τὰ συµβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἡ βούλει συλλογισμόμεθα αὐτά.

8. Ἀγνοῶν γε: Plato frequently employs participial clauses as a kind of addendum to sentences which are either interrupted by the answer of the respondent or already complete in themselves. — οἶον: what sort of a thing.
11 f. καθοράν ... ἄγνοεῖν: is epexegetical to τοιούτων τι, and corresponds to συνισχύομενοι ... φοβοῦμενοι and ἄγνοῶν in the comparison above.
12 f. μη υγιοῦς σώματος: a harsh use of the comparative gen. equiv. to ἡ μὴ ὑγιεὶς σώματι. See Madv. Ἐπικ. § 90.
13. συνοικεῖν: divorces the human personality from the soul and body, by a union of which it exists. With καθοράν κτέ., Plato thinks especially of the νοῦς to which he opposes that part which, in its subserviency to the lusts and appetites, willingly withdraws from the control of reason. — σαθρά: is used of injuries and defects of all kinds, whether of material things, as jars (493.e), or of the body (Dem. Ol. 479 b ii. 21 καὶ ῥήγμα (fracture) καὶ αστέραμα (dislocation) καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σαθρῶν ἢ). From this meaning comes its transferred use in application to the soul or the state. Notice that the unhealthy soul is designated as σαθρά from a physical point of view, ἀδικος in its dealings with its neighbors, and ἀνάσιος in its attitude towards the divine.
15 f. καὶ χρηματα παρασκευαζόμενοι: epexegetical partic. to πῶν ποιοῦσιν.
16. ὅπως ἀν ὃσιν κτέ.: is a circumlocution for a third substantive.
18. τὰ συμβαίνοντα: “the results” obtained.
19. συλλογισμόθα: “to sum up what has been proved.” See on 478 a above, in regard to the answers of Polus.
20. εἰ μὴ κτέ.: affirms and admits; but because nothing else can be done.
21. ἄρ’ οὖν: regularly introduces a conjecture, which is expected to be confirmed by the other party; ἄρα alone is also often so used; ἄρα οὖν expects distinctly an affirmative answer. Often ἄρ’ οὖν approximates to ἄρ’ οὖν. Cf. 450 a. — μέγιστον κακόν: συμβαίνει has (in addition to the inf.) the constr. of τυχάνω. Hence the omission of the partic. is allowable. GMT. 890.

24. καὶ μὴν κτέ.: in this and in the following utterance of Socrates, the question is denoted merely by the tone.

29. δεύτερον κτέ.: cf. the similar 479 usage above in 478 e. If the reading is sound, we must infer from the following clause that τὸ ἄδικεῖν has the same force as τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην.

34. τὸν Ἀρχέλαον . . . τὸν κτέ.: the main force of the example lies in the predicate, τὸν . . . διδόντα, as the art. shows. Constr. τὸν with διδόντα, to which ἀδικοῦντα is subordinate.

37 f. διαφερόντως: is construed like ε the corresponding verb. Cf. Apol. 29 b ἐγὼ τούτῳ ἦσας διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.
XXXVI. Ἡ μεγάλη κτέ.: the use of the adj. is a slightly sarcastic allusion to Polus' extravagant encomiums on rhetoric. The rhetorical question has the force of a neg. Hence the following causal clause.

3. αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν κτέ.: the prefixing of αὐτὸν emphasizes the reflexive. II. 688. The subj. of ἐφολαττεῖν is indefinite; cf. 456 d.

4. ἰκανόν: the use of this word is an example of μελωσις, or understatement, the peculiar characteristic of American humor. A similar case is Ant. Tetral. A. β 2 ἐμοὶ δὲ ζῶν τε ἀνθρωπος ἀνατρεπεῖν τοῦ οἶκου ἐγένετο ἀποθανόν τε... ἰκανὰς λύπας... προσβέβληκεν.

10. ὑπονοῦν: is stronger than σα-θρόν. The disease leaves the surface, and fastens on the innermost kernel of the soul. We are reminded of the Ovidian Principii obsta. serto medicina paratur, cum mala per longas convaluer moras (Rem. Am. 91 f.).

14. τί γὰρ δὴ κτε.: the rhetorical question has the force of an emphatic affirmation, τί being almost equiv. to τί ἀλλα. 16 f. πατρίδος ἀδικούσθη: the speeches in the assembly are hereby put in the same category with the judicial.—ἀδικούσθη: is a colloquial repetition of ἀδίκιας.
κούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὔδὲν ἡ βητορική ἡμῖν, ὃ Πῶλε, εἰ 17 f. etsi 1480
μή εἰ τις ύπολάβοι τούναντίων, κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα e 1480
μὲν ἐαυτοῦ, ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσ 18 f. 473 d.
20 ἀν αἰ τῶν φίλων τυχάνη ἀδικών, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, 1480
ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἄγει τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῷ δίκην καὶ 23. τῶν φίλων 5 482 b 1480
ὑγίης γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους 18 f. 1480
μὴ ἀποδειλιᾶν, ἄλλα παρέχει μόναντα καὶ ἀνδρείως 20. τῶν 18 f. 1480
ώσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κάειν ἱατρῷ, τὸ ἄγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν 25 18 f. 1480
διώκοντα μὴ υπολογίζομενον τὸ ἀλγεῖνόν, εάν μὲν γε πλη-
γὼν ἀξία ἡδικηκός ἢ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, εάν δὲ δεσμοῦ, a 19 f. 1480
δεῖν, εάν δὲ ἐξέλιξ, ἀποτινοῦσα, εάν δὲ φυγής, φεύγοντα, 25 f. 480
εάν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνησκοῦσα, αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατη-
γορον καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τούτο χρώ-
30 μενον τῇ βητορικῇ, ὁπως ἄν καταδηλών τῶν ἀδικημάτων 18 f. 1480
γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας. 20. τῶν 1480
φῶμεν οὕτως ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὃ Πῶλε;
Πλ. Ἀτοπα μέν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέν- e 18 f. 1480
τοι ἐμπροσθεν ὦσς σοι ὁμολογεῖται.
35 Ἀφ' Οὔκον ὑπὸ κάκηνα λυτέον ἤ τάδε ἄναγκη συμβαίνειν ἡ

Πλ. Ναί, τοῦτο γε οὐτός ἔχει.

Σά. Τούναντίον δε γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα, εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινα
cakwas poiēn, eit' ἔχθρον εἴτε ὀντινοῦν, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ
40 αὐτὸς ἁδικήται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχθρου᾽ τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐνλαβη-
tένον· ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἁδικὴ ὁ ἔχθρος, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρα-
σκευαστέον καὶ πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῶ δίκην 481

480 nor as 477 d above, aίσχυστον ἁδικία
e... ἦμολογηθαί ἡμιν, for ἦμολογηθαί
(convenient, consensus tant) has its dat. in τοῖς ἐξαποσθειν.
But it is not superfluous; its force
seems to be this: "but perhaps you
can make it agree with what precedes."
Thus the dat., as well as τοίως, would
serve the author’s purpose in deline-
ating Polus’ character, who by such
shallow artifices seeks to weaken his
admissions, and, as far as possible, re-
lieve himself from any responsibility
in the results,—a design which So-
crates balks by his following ques-
tion. See on 477 d, 478 a, and II.
770, 771.

35. κάκηνα: καί assumes εἰ τάδε
ἀποτα ὄνει, thus noticing Polus’ obser-
vation.—λυτέον: a metaphor drawn
from such usage as λύσιν γέφυραν. Cf.
Prot. 332 e, Xen. An. ii. 4. 10. A dif-
ferent meaning appears in διαλύειν τὸν
λόγον, 458 b, after διαλύειν τὴν συνο-
σίαν in 457 e.

38. τούναντίον: the heaping up of
such kindred ideas as αὖ, αὖθις, πάλιν
is not uncommon (see examples in
Kr. 69, 12); τούναντίον means “on the
contrary”; αὖ, “on the other hand”;
μεταβαλόντα (intransitive), “vice
versa.”—εἰ ἄρα: if, assuming the ordi-
nary view to be the correct one (άρα).
—
tivá: is object, and with it εἴτε...

ὄντινοῦν is in apposition. ἔχθρος is a
personal enemy, as distinguished
from πολέμιος, a national enemy.

39. ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς κτῆ.: be-
cause experiencing injury might be
held as a kind of substitute for the
punishment due for inflicting it.

40. αὐτός: refers to the subject of
κακῶς poiēn, which is indefinite.—
tοῦτο κτῆ.: the insertion of this clause,
which is due to the preceding ἐὰν μο-
νον κτῆ, defers the completion of the
sentence to παντὶ τρόπῳ κτῆ.

42. πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα: the 481
two species of activity do not exclude
each other, for the effect of πράττειν
may be more thoroughly completed
by λέγειν, and vice versa.—The acc.
case is in agreement with the unex-
pressed indefinite agent of παρακεν-
αστεόν. On the case of the agent
with verbal adjs., see G. 281, 2; II.
991 a.—ὄπως μὴ δῶ κτῆ.: this sen-
tence is remarkable on account of the
variety of the constructions found
after ὀπως,—three out of the perhaps
eight varieties being found, viz.
subjv., ἵν with subjv., fut. ind. We
should not attempt to make any
sharp distinctions here, for Plato
is capable of changing the construction
for the sake of variety. We may,
however, say this much. ὀπως μὴ δῶ
is purely final, the conjunction not
When the delinquent is brought before the judge, there is some doubt as to his escape, and ὅπως ἂν (equiv. to ἐὰν πῶς) gives expression to this doubt. In the long sentence following the ἂν gradually fades away, and the most common relative construction with the fut. indic. closes the series. On εἰ δὲ μὴ after ἐὰν, see on 502 b.

43. ἐὰν δὲ ἐλθῇ: in thus stating the opposite alternative, Socrates takes for the moment the standpoint of the orators. That it is only for the moment is seen from Crito 49 c ὅστε ἀνταδίκειν δὲι ὅστε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ ἂν ὅσιον πάσην ὑπ’ αὐτῶν.

46. ἀναλίσκῃ: to make the statement of the wrong complete, the way in which the money is wasted is added.

After Polus has shown himself incapable of maintaining his views of rhetoric against the superior dialectical skill of Socrates, Callicles enters the discussion with a thought quite similar to the one with which Polus had entered it in 461 b. The view of life on which all of Socrates' deductions rest is so abhorrent to his innermost nature and all his hitherto cherished ideas that he cannot be brought to look upon the principles here advocated as the earnest convictions of a reasonable man. He does not, however, rush into the lists so roughly as Polus, but, being a more polished man of the world, turns first to Chaerephon, who is thoroughly acquainted with Socrates' views. He, however, wittily refers him to the master, in the same words with which Callicles himself had in 447 c referred Socrates to Gorgias.
5. καλ. η' τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμω. εἰπέ μοι, οὐ δισκρατεῖς, πότερον σε φῶμεν νυνι σπουδάζοντα ή παιζοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὅντα ἄ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἡ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἄν εἰη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ζοικεν, 
10 ἡ ἄ δει;

Σωκράτης, εἰ μὴ τι ἢν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἄλλα τις ἡμῶν ἑνών τι ἐπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἀν ἢν βάδιον ἐνδεί-αξαθαὶ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δὲ ἐννοήσας, 
15 ὅτι ἕγω τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταῦτον τι πεποιθότες,

5. νη τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμω: c ἀλλά is used after an expression of asseveration, as in 463 d. The words of Chaerephon contain the challenge, “Why don't you rather turn to Socrates himself?” to which Callicles replies, “But that is just what I do desire.” In Callicles’ manner of expression we discern his excitable nature as well as his strong faith in his own views, which he is the more surprised to find opposed, not only by Socrates, but also by Chaerephon. artistically also his words form the text for the discussion which follows.

6. φῶμεν ... παιζοντα: this is a very unusual construction for φημί. G. 200, 2, x. 1.

8. ἀνατετραμμένος: cf. ἀνατρέπειν τὰ πράγματα, πάλιν, οἰκλαν. For if you be both in earnest, and the thing which you say prove to be (τυγχάνει) true, would not the only (ἄλλο τι ἢ) conclusion be that the manner of life of us men has been entirely upside down? — τῶν ἀνθρώπων: is emphatically added because Callicles does not intend that under ἡμῶν only a limited circle shall be understood. Cf. Ar. Plut. 500 ἦς μὲν γὰρ νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ βίος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διάκειται.

9. πάντα τὰ ἐναντία: like πᾶν τοῦναντίον, quite the contrary.

11. εἰ μή τι κτ.: Socrates recognizes indeed the opposition in their views of life, but refers it to the different exercise of a common feeling, —love,— which varies according to the difference in the objects to which it is directed. The comparison of love of wisdom with other varieties of human love is often found in Plato, e.g. Phaedo 68 a.—πάθος: denotes a state of mind brought about by external influences. According to cause and circumstances it may be love, hate, admiration, or scorn. But no variety is peculiar to any single man; this is made clear by the explanatory clause inserted between πάθος and τὸ αὐτό.

13. ἑνών: contains in itself an idea of comparison, like ἄλλο ἐτέρον, and hence takes ἢ.

15. ταύτον τι: the πάθος experienced by each one, is first roughly characterized as “about the same thing,” and later clearly defined by
the explanatory ἐρώτει κτλ. The variation from the pl. to the dual is interesting. The lack of a first person dual compels the first pl., with its accompanying partic. πεπονθέτες, while the following dual emphasizes the exact similarity of the two experiences.

16. Ἀλκιβιάδου: the mental and moral training of the rising youth was largely directed by prominent older men with whom they associated, usually according to individual preference. One of these prominent teachers, and one who made it the business of his life, was Socrates, and among the young men who clustered around him and followed his conversations was Alcibiades, whom Socrates greatly loved for his mental gifts. Owing to his great beauty he was jestingly called Socrates' sweetheart (τὰ παιδικά). Cf. Prot. init. Πάθεν, ἐ Ἑκάτρατες, φαίνει; ἃ δὴλα δὴ ὃτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ἥραν. This is the point of the allusion here. υ.κ., ι.κ.τ.

18. δῆμου: has two allusions. The son of Pyrilampes, a rich Athenian and friend of Pericles, was called Demus. Like his father, he is reported to have been especially beautiful, and is also mentioned by Ar. Vesp. 97 ff. as a much admired sweetheart. This fact Socrates skilfully uses to characterize Callicles' relation to the Athenian demus. This people needed, like a boy, a leader and guide; but the orators, instead of governing it, regulated their actions according to its whims.

—τοῦ Πυριλάμπου: is of course to be understood in the usual way, like τοῦ Κλεινίου. Cf. τοῦ Πυριλάμπου below, and 513 b.

18 f. ἀισθάνομαι . . . οὐ δυσαμένου: on the gen. partic. construction see GMT. 884-6; Π. 742, 982. — δεινοῦ: is often joined with λέγειν, in order to describe a skilful orator, but can also be used without this addition, in the sense of "skilful," "clever."

20 f. ἄνω καλ κάτω: like Lat. sur-e sum deorsum, with metasprēveis, στρέφειν (511 a), metabάλειν, μεταπίπτειν (493 a) denotes a changeable and uncertain course of action. Variations of the phrase are ἄνω τε καλ κάτω, and more often ἄνω κατω.

25. βουλεύμασι: i.e. the fanciful plans and designs of boys.
30. παύσει τον ταύτα λέγων. νόμιζε τούς καὶ παρ’ ἐμοῦ χρῆναι ἑτερα τοιαύτα ἄκουειν, καὶ μὴ θαυμάζει ὁτι ἐν ταύτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά, παθόσον ταύτα λέγονταν. λέγει γὰρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ἃ νῦν ἐμοῦ ἄκουεις, καὶ μοι ἐστὶν τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ

35. ἦτον ἐμπληκτός: ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὗτος ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. λέγει δὲ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρῆσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. ὃ ὢν ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγξον, ὄπερ ἄρτι ἐλεγον, ὥς οὖ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἀπάντων ἔσχα.

40. τὸν κακῶν: ἡ εἰ τοῦτο ἐάσεις ἄνελεγκτον, μᾶ τὸν κύνα τὸν Ἀιγυπτίων θεόν, οὐ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὁ

481 28. ἐλ βούλοιο: which probably was e hardly to be expected.
482 31. ἑτερα τοιαύτα: cf. above (24), a τοιαύτα ἑτερα.
34. τῶν ἑτέρων παιδικῶν: in the above-cited passage from Phaedo (68 a) we find the word ἄνθρωπων in the same connexion.
36. ἄλλων ... τῶν αὐτῶν: gen. of characteristic is not common in Greek, and is always predicate. Cf. Thuc. i. 113 ἦσοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἤσαν. See II. 732 d.
37. παρηθᾶ δὲ: change from the rel. to the independent construction. See on 452 d. Here, however, we must supply the pronoun (αὐτοῖς) to which λεγομένοις is a subordinate tem-
possible the inner conflict which must continue to rage in Callicles' soul, so long as one opinion has not decisively vanished the other.

44. áναρμοστεῖν: applies especially to imperfection in the general harmony, while διαφωνεῖν is used of the discord between single tones. Two different principles exert their effects upon the soul.—χορηγοίν: this liturgy, which has been already mentioned in note on 472 a, was of course not possible for Socrates, and could be only for the rich. But in proportion as a victory in this kind of musical competition was looked upon as a great honor, so a failure was a great humiliation. The opt. is ideal, and to be translated "which I might conduct."

c 46. μάλλον: frequently follows a comp. to reiterate the idea with a slight modification (rather than). Cf. below, 487 b, Phaedo 79 e, and see for other examples, Rid. § 166.

XXXVIII. 1. νεανιεύσθαι: "to act like a wild young man." Callicles has in mind especially the insolent, bold, and reckless conduct of the rich and proud Athenian youth. This is usually the meaning of the adjec-

tive νεανικός (so in our dialogue, 508 d, 482 e, 509 a), which, however, is sometimes used only of the freshness and the vigor of youth, as below, 485 e. The verb applies especially to the training of the youth by the Sophists, which leads them to light and idle speeches and to a defense of the most conflicting principles without having regard unto the higher and earnest problems of life. Cf. Phaedrus 235 a καὶ ἐφανερωτευτὸς δὴ μοι νεανιεύσθαι ἐπιδεικνύομενος ὡς οἷός τε ἢν ταῦτα ἔτερως τε καὶ ἔτερως λέγων ἀμφότερος εἰπεῖν ἁρίστα.

2 f. δημηγόρος, δημηγορεῖν: indicate dissatisfaction, sometimes with the length of the speeches, as opposed to διαλέγεσθαι, e.g. 519 d, e, Prot. 329 a, 336 b; sometimes, as here and in 494 d, with the means employed by those who, unconcerned for the truth, seek only the approbation of the multitude. In the mouth of Callicles, who is the real δημηγόρος, this reproof sounds very strange, especially with the addition ὡς ἀληθῶς. It is a kind of unconscious self-criticism.

4. πρὸς σὲ: cf. 485 b below, and Apol. 21 c πρὸς δὲν ἐγὼ τοιοῦτον τι ἔπαθον, "at whose hands I had some such experience."
5 μενον ύπο σοι, ἐὰν ἄφικηται παρ' αὐτῶν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος
tὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ῥητορικὴν Βουκόλενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξοι αὐτὸν ὁ
 Γοργίας, αἰσχυνθήναι αὐτῶν καὶ φάναι διδάξεων
dιὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἄγανακτῶν ἄν εἰ τις μὴ
φαίη· διὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθήναι ἐναν·
10 τία αὐτῶν αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἄγαπάν. καὶ σοι
κατεγέλα, ὦς γέ μοι δοκεῖν, ὅρθως τότε· νῦν δὲ πάλιν
αὐτὸς ταύτῳ τοῦτο ἐπαθεῖν, καὶ ἔγγυε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ
ἀγάμαι Ἡῶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησε τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχὺν
ἐναί τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὐ τῆς ὁμολογίας εἰ
15 αὐτὸς υπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη,
αἰσχυνθεῖς ἅ ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὀντὶ, ὡς Σώκρατες,
eἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικά καὶ δήμηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν

482 6. διδάξοι: the fut. opt. is only
found in indir. disc. as a representative
of the fut. indicative. It is post-
Homeri, the first example occurring
in Pindar.
7. αὐτῶν: repeats with emphasis
the subject Γοργαῖ, which is already
expressed. Cf. Xen. Cyr. i. 3. 15 πει-
ράσσομαι τῷ πάση ἄγαθων ἰππίων κράτι-
στος δὲν ἰππεῖς συμμαχεῖν αὐτῷ. The
clause with ὅτι is causal, and is ex-
planatory of διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
which is to be connected with φαίη,
not with διδάξειν.
10. ἄγαπάν: cf. 461 c ὄ δὴ ἄγαπάς.
11. ὥς γε μοι δοκεῖν: as it seemed to
me. The phrase is found sometimes
with ὥς as here and Hdt. ii. 124; sometimes
without, as Meno 81 a; ἐξωγε δοκεῖν Soph. El. 410.
15. συμποδισθεῖς ἐπεστομίσθη: a
combination of two metaphors, both
of which refer to a horse which has
been caught by a noose, and then
guided according to a strange will by
a bridle which has been forced into
its mouth. In the same way Polus,
by that unlucky admission, allowed
herself to be noosed, and was thus
compelled to follow the lead of So-
crates, wherever that might take him.
16. τῷ ὄντι: affirms the justice of
the accusation made against Socrates
by Polus.
17. φορτικά: a word not uncom-
mon in Plato, is used in Euthyd. 287 a
of insidious catch-questions. See on
Apol. 32 a, where combined with δικα-
ικά it is used of the tediousness of
those detailed discussions from which
Socrates, after the manner of an ora-
tor before a court, seeks to draw his
proofs. Here Callicles probably wants
to indicate the vulgarity of such il-
ustrations and talks, as being fit
only for the uncultured multitude.
The rel. sentence καὶ φόσει κτῆ. is con-
nected epexegetically with τοιαύτα,
and thereby the conclusion from the
special case is made of general appli-
cation. It was indeed from the idea
of the καλὸν that Socrates drew the
whole argument with which he refuted Polus.

18. φύσει μὲν, νόμω δὲ: the opposition of natural right to conventional right (law) was first definitely maintained by Hippias of Elis. Cf. Prot. 337 c d, Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 14. After him this principle was accepted and made a commonplace by all the Sophists. It is probable that Gorgias himself did not defend it, but his teaching can be traced back to it. This principle Callicles now proceeds to unfold. Of kindred import is also the discussion between Alcibiades and Pericles, related by Xen. Mem. i. 2. 40 ff.

21 f. ὁ δὲ καὶ σὺ τούτῳ τὸ σοφὸν ἑτέρων: τὸ σοφὸν (artifice, trick) is used somewhat scornfully in the sense in which the sophistical Eristics employed it, with whom Callicles puts Socrates on a level. Hence he also employs towards him the word κακουργεῖν, which was used among the Eristics to denote crafty tripping in discussion. Cf. Rep. i. 341 a ὄστε γὰρ ἂν μὲ λάθοις κακουργῶν, by which Thrasymachus declares his ability to defend himself against such unfair treatment; so ib. 338 d. The same feeling determines the choice of the compound ὑπερωτάν “to slip artfully into the question,” “ask slyly.” — τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν: is epexegetic to δὲ.

23. ἐὰν δὲ κτῆ.: supply the same verbs as are found in the first member of the sentence.

24. ὡσπέρ αὐτικά: as, for example. See on 472 d.

26. ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν: ‘you followed up what he meant “conventionally” by arguing upon it in the “natural” sense.’ Cope. I.e. Socrates had treated the concession of Polus, and drawn his results from it, as if Polus had therein conceded that to do wrong was by nature, i.e. of itself, more ugly than to suffer wrong. “For — so runs the argument of Callicles — that which is by nature ugly coincides with what is evil, which latter, however, is the suffering of wrong. But we must not conclude from this that what is by law the more ugly is also the greater evil.”

27 f. τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι: as the passage stands, must be considered as explanatory of the preceding, without close construction.
28. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδρός τούτῳ γ' ἐστὶν τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνδραπόδου τινός, κρείττον ἐστὶν τεθνάναι ἡ ζην, ὥστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οίος τε ἐστὶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλω οὐ ἄν κηδηται. ἀλλ', οἴμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενείς ἀνθρωποὶ ἔστω καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ. πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τοὺς τε νόμους τίθεν- 35 ταί καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ τοὺς ψόγους ψέγουσιν. εἰκοστοῦτοι τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὀντάς πλεόν ἔχειν, ἦν μὴ αὐτῶν πλεόν ἔχωσιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αὐσχρόν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τούτῳ ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλεόν τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν.

483. 31 f. αὐτὸς ... κηδηται: the same ideas were presented in 480 a. Here every man is expressly thrown upon his own resources and the state abolished.

32. ἀλλ', οἴμαι κτέ.: this exposition of the origin of conventional right is designed by Callicles to show the superior authority of the natural right which he advocates. — οἱ τιθέμενοι: "the law-makers." The active is used of the law-giver. On the force of the article with the predicate, see H. 609 a; G. 141, n. 8.

33. καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ: it is just this addition which contains the most important point, according to Callicles' real view, though he keeps it in the background, because for him the contrast between stronger and weaker is of more value for his argument. It is this begging of the question to which Socrates first turns his attention in 488 c ff. — πρὸς αὐτοὺς: usually we find βλέποντες, but the preposition itself is sufficient. Kr. 68, 39, 5.

35. ἐπαίνους, ψόγους: the people not only makes laws, — i.e. commands and prohibitions, the transgression of which is punished by penalties, — but also expresses in manifold ways, by offices, honors, etc., its judgment on the value of men and actions.

36. Another case of explanatory asyndeton. — ἐρρωμενεστέρους: how completely this word has become an adjective is shown by the fact that it is the only partic. which admits comparison.

38. πλεονεκτεῖν: is an expression for every effort of self-aggrandizement, and was often used as a political watchword in opposition to ἰσονομία. Cf. τὸ ἴσον, two lines below.
483 40. ἀγαπώσι: in mockery, because c satisfaction is a sign of weakness. Cf. what Adimantus says in Rep. ii. 366 e οἴδεν ὃτι πλὴν εἰ τις θεία φύσει διασχειράνω τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἡ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέκειται αὐτῷ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἑκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἀναβρίασ 

III. 4. αὐτῷ: draws especial attention to the following clause, which it introduces. By its proximity to αὐτῷ this emphasis is still more increased.—ἀμείλινον: is here probably used purposely instead of κρείττα, as Callicles had in mind also the mental superiority of the rhetorically educated over the great multitude. Hence, too, δυνατώτερον.

5. δηλοὶ: can be taken in construction with φύσις, or, which is better, as an impersonal verb equiv. to διήλθ (δῆλος) ἐστὶν. The subj. is the following ὅτι clause, whose own subj., ταῦτα, has been attracted to the gov-
10 Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ ἡ Ἀκυθα ἢ ἄλλα μυρία ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν: ἄλλ', οὕτω, οὕτω κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου ταύτα πράττουσιν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἰσώς κατὰ τοῦτον, ὃν ἡμεῖς [τιθέμεθα] πλάττοντες τοὺς ἑπτάμοντι καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὡσπερ λέοντας κατεπάδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα λέγοντες, ὥσ τὸ ἵσον χρῆ ἔχειν καὶ ἑπτάμοντι ἑστίν τῷ καλὸν καὶ τῷ δίκαιον. ἐὰν δὲ γε, οὕτω,

of declaring Xerxes to be ἀμείνων and δυνατώτερος τῶν Ἑλλήνων, and therefore hastily seeks another example which will not arouse personal feeling.

e 11. ἄλλα μυρία: is simply rhetorical exaggeration. The concluding summarizing clause deviates from the regular construction of the sentence, as also in a similar passage in Apol. 41 ε ἐπὶ τὸ σφυὲ δ' ἐν τίς δεξαίον ἐξετάσαι ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίνιφον, ἢ ἀλλ' ἐμφέροις ἄν τις ἐπίκειτο.

12. οἴμαι: as well as τιμᾶ, a couple of lines below, merely softens the expression, without diminishing its positiveness. Cf. 473 a.—τὴν τοῦ δικαίου: if these words, which we would rather miss, are genuine, we have a case of word-play, which may be justified on the ground of the proposition above, ἡ δὲ γε . . . ἄδυνατωτέρον. The same force must be assigned to τοῦ δικαίου φύσει below (484 e), though the form is different.

13. ναι μᾶ Δία κατὰ κτέ.: a clever play upon the word νόμος. "Nature, too, has its law,—right and custom."

14. ἡμεῖς: contains, by the implied contrast, a rebuke. Notice the heap- ing up of the participles, which, though connected with one verb, are subordinated one to another, quite after the Greek habit. See Kr. 50, 15, with notes.—πλάττοντες: the side-idea of artificiality and amateurishness easily attaches itself to this verb. Cf. Apol. 17 ε μερακλὴ πλάττοντι λόγους. It is applied to laws, as here, also Leg. iv. 712 b πειράμεθα καθάπερ παίδες πρεσβύται πλάττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς νόμους.

15 f. ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες: cf. Apol. 18 b ἐκ παίδων παραλαβόντες. The usual word for 'receiving into school' is the compound. Cf. 510 b. The use of the simple verb here implies a forcible compulsory manner of treatment.

16. ὡσπερ λέοντας κατεπάδοντες: the comparison describes with bitterness the suppression of the so-called natural freedom, in that it compares education to the taming of wild beasts (καταδουλούμεθα). κατεπάδειν applies to soothing by certain formulae, or charms; γοητεύειν to the employment of forms of magic and witchcraft. Meno uses the same expression regarding the dialectic proof of Socrates, 80 a καὶ νῦν, ὅς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις μὲ καὶ φαρμάτεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπάδεις. In a jesting way, without feeling, ἐπάδεων is used in Phaedo 77 c, ἐπιφόνη in Charm. 155 c.

18 f. ἐὰν . . . γένηται: Callicles 484 does not doubt that this future absolute ruler will come.
Platônous Gorgias.

19. φύσιν ἴκανήν: "a nature which is equal to all difficulties." There is no understatement, as in 480 a.—All the following expressions are chosen so as to be appropriate to the much-loved comparison with wild beasts. ἀποσείεσθαι can apply both to the shaking off of any bond or yoke and to the throwing of his rider by a horse; διαφυγόν is used more of breaking a hedge or an enclosure than a halter, etc. ἀπορρῆξας would be more natural for the latter; cf. Hom. Z 507 δεσμῶν ἀπορρῆξας, which passage quite suits the view of Callicles.

20. διαφυγόν: calls to mind what has been previously said by Polus (473 ε.).—καταπατήσας: depicts the insolence of the victor to the vanquished. In Δ 157 Homer makes Agamemnon say of the perjured Trojans κατὰ δ’ ὄρκια πιστὰ πάτησαν.

21. γράμματα κτε.: the γράμματα denote, in contradistinction to the unwritten laws implanted in man by nature, the "written laws" which limit and regulate the exercise of the will; μαγγανεύματα "works of deceit and witchcraft," which fetter the reason; ἐποϑαί "incantations" which palsy the feelings. These ideas correspond in the reverse order to the preceding participles, καταπατήσατες, γοητεύοντες, λέγοντες, and the participles just in advance ἀποσειεύμενος . . . διαφυγόν are probably chosen with reference to them. All three ideas serve, moreover, to show from the various sides what objections can be made to the laws which are opposed to nature, and are hence crowded together for greater emphasis.

22. ἐπαναστάς: is used of one who has lain prostrate for a time and now unexpectedly shows his strength.—ἀνεφάνη: is 'gnomic aorist.' The single past example (aor.) serves as a norm for the general statement (pres.). H. 840; GMT. 155.

23. ὁ δούλος: as a result of καταδουλούμεθα above, 483 ε., "the one whom we brought up as a slave."—ἐξελαμψε: shone forth in splendor, a poetical word also employed in Rep. iv. 435 a.

24. δοκεῖ δὲ μοι: introduces a new element,—the authority of Pindar. Knowledge of the poets was a requirement of the culture of the period. Cf. Prot. 338 ε. The last words of the fragment are restored by Bergk (Poet. Lyr. Gr. p. 344, ed. 3) from the citation of the Scholiast as follows:
oúτος δὲ δὴ, φησὼν,

ἀγεῖ δικαῖων τὸ βιαστάτου

ύπερτάτα χειρί· τεκμαίρομαι

ἐργοισιν Ἡρακλέος, ἐπεὶ ἀπριάτας —

λέγειν οὗτω πως· τὸ γὰρ ἀσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι· λέγει δ᾽ ὅτι

οὐτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἡλάσατο τὰς

βοῦς, ὡς τούτων ὄντως τοῦ δικαίων φύσει, καὶ βοῦς καὶ ε

35 τάλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελτίωνός τε καὶ κρείτ-

τονος τὰ τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἦττόνων.

XL. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὗτως ἐχει, γνώσει δὲ, ἄν ἐπὶ

τὰ μείζω ἐλθῆς ἐάσας ἣδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γάρ

Since we do not know the context in which these verses stand, Pindar's views cannot be determined from them with certainty; but they were probably based on the principles of religious belief. In this νόμος ὁ πάν-

των βασιλεὺς Pindar may be thinking of the power of that fate which is superior even to the gods themselves. — Geryones, son of Chrysaor ("lightning") and the Oceanid Callirhoe ("beautiful stream"), was a giant with three bodies and three heads. He lived with his dog Orthros, or Or-

thos, on the fertile island Erytheia, and possessed great herds of cattle. These were stolen from him by Her-


32. οὐκ ἐπισταμαι: says Callicles, because the exact words of the poem are not at his command. The verb has the same meaning in Prot. 339 b, Phaedo 61 b. After ἀπριάτας Callicles breaks off, intending to give the sense of what follows, and resumes the idea with οὔτε πριάμενος.

33. ἡλάσατο: the use of the middle instead of the active is normal, but is well suited to Callicles' con-

ception.

34. ὡς τούτων ὄντως: the use of ὡς e ascribes this view to Hercules, as his basis of action. τούτων is explained by the clause καὶ βοῦς κτέ.

36. τὰ τῶν χειρόνων κτέ.: notice the rhetorical position.

XL. 1. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς: introduces a new topic, that of the value of philosophy. Its connexion with the preceding lies in the fact that Callicles looks upon philosophy as the hindrance which prevents Socrates from recognizing the truth of what he says. — ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω: is indefinite, and is employed only to depreciate philosophy and relegate it to a lower plane, as is evident from Callicles' further exposition.
that the "333 but Callicles 3. can his not is suitable Xaiot? /cat raw aircipov x
his words are almost the tone of an oracle.
3. χαριν: with a pleasing conception, recognizing its merit, — but what a poor merit! Cf. 485 b.
4. ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ: "in the time of life suitable for it." What period this is can be gathered from the expressions πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας and περατέρω τοῦ δέοντος. The words μετρίως and ἁψηταί are also designedly chosen.
5. διαφθορά: Callicles assumes almost the tone of an oracle.
d 7. ἀπειρον γεγονέναι: "a man cannot practise philosophy and at the same time fulfil the requirements of his civil position."
8. The καλὸς κἀγαθός, according to the idea of Callicles, is shown by the addition of εὐδόκιμος, to be the man who, through practical activity, obtains reputation and honor. With μέλλω we find the pres. and fut. almost equally common, the aor. exceptional.
9. τῶν νόμων: that Callicles is laying great stress on the knowledge of the laws in this passage, seems at first sight inconsistent with the view which he has already expressed; but in reality he has shifted his point of view but little, since he advocates the study of the laws, not for the purpose of following them, but as being necessary for the work of the practical statesman, whether he be in the senate or assembly, or hold any public position. The force, therefore, of νόμοι is much that of our "constitution." The λόγοι οἷς δεῖ χράμενον κτέ. belong to the department of jurisprudence in both its divisions, individual and national. ἰσμβόλαια is characterized in Ἱερ. i. 333 a, as the variety of κοινωνίματα (i.e. mutual intercourse, trade, and commerce) in which δικαιοσύνη is of especial value. It denotes, accordingly, treaties and the law-business connected with them.
11 f. τῶν ἡδονῶν κτέ.: the enjoyment of life consists, according to Callicles, in satisfying the appetites.
12. τῶν ἡθῶν: can be considered as a general comprehensive term, in so far as we understand by it the peculiar traits of mind and character which impart individuality to a man.
15 γίγνονται, ὡσπερ γε, οἴμαι, οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὰν αὕτε ἐισὶ τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς ἐλθὼσιν καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καταγέλαστοι εἰσιν. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Ἑὐριπίδου. λαμπρὸς τ' ἐστίν ἐκαστὸς ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,

νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,

16 οὕτως οὗτοι τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὥς.

17 ὡσπερ γε: makes a concession, in order to anticipate the retort which could easily be made here.

18. διατριβάς: is used especially of philosophical discussions. Cf. Apol. 37 e οὐχ οἷοι τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεχειν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, Charm. 153 a ἥμα ἐπὶ τὰς ξυνθέσεις διατριβὰς.

19. συμβαίνει: is in point. — τὸ τοῦ Ἑὐριπίδου: inasmuch as his works abounded in gnomes and sententious sayings, and he himself was not far removed from the sophistic way of looking at things, Euripides was frequently quoted by sophists and orators, and also by Socrates (Plato). The present passage is from the lost tragedy Antiope. See below, 485 e.

20. έν τούτῳ καλ ἐπὶ κτλ.: the demonstratives are antecedent to the adverbial rel. clause with ἐν, “in which each one is most successful.” The words λαμπρὸς... ἐπείγεται, by omitting what would not be missed, and reading κατί for καλ ἐπὶ, form a trimeter. Cf. Λρ. Ἄρση. 1431 ἐροις τις ἢν ἐκαστὸς εἰδείς τέχνην.

21. τυγχάνει: is to be compared with ὡσπερ ἢν ἡγεῖτο to show the difference between definite and indefinite antecedent. — οὗτος οὐτού βέλτιστος: the gen. with sups. may be an extension of the gen. with comparatives. See Η. 644 b.

22. διατριβάς: i.e. philosophy and politics. — ὡσπερ παιδείας χάριν: as far as it serves the purpose of education. Cf. Ἱππ. iii. 403 ε ὡσπο τοὺς τύπους, ᾙθυκλ. 273 a τὴν φύσιν ὡσον. See Η. 719 b; Σ. 160, 1. The opposite is ἐπὶ τέχνην, or something similar, as seen from Prot. 312 b τοῦτῶν οὐ ἐκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνην ἐμαθεῖ, ὡς ὀνομανυγος ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείας, ὡς τῶν ἰδιώτην καὶ τῶν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει. Culture was the watchword of the time.

23. καλ οὐκ αἰσχρῶν: change from the καλὸς to the καταγέλαστον.
γίγνεται, καὶ ἐγώγε ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς ἕλευθερον καὶ παῦτον.

30 ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίων ἰδίων, οὕτως μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἕλευθερον καὶ παῦτον, χαίρω τε καὶ χαίρειν μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἔλευθερον καὶ πρέπον τῇ τοῦ παιδίων ἡλικίᾳ, ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλέγεσθαι παιδάριον ἀκούσω, πικρόν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρήμα εἶναι καὶ ἄνια μοι τὰ ἄτα καὶ μοι 35 δοκεῖ δοιλοπρεπές τι εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις ἑλευθερίων ἔπεμψεν παῖς καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιων. ταύτων οὖν ἐγώγε τούτῳ πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἕλευθερον καὶ παῦτον.

40 καὶ ἥγουμαι ἐλευθερίων τινα εἶναι τούτων τὸν ἀνθρώπον τόν δὲ μὴ ἕλευθερον καὶ ἰωτίπτοτο ποιεῖται ἀξίωσουσα ἀντί τοῦ ᾗ ἐυτέρτι τοῦ καὶ τοῦ γενναίου πράγματος· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἰδιώς ἐτί ἕλευθερον καὶ μὴ α.

485 28. πάσχω πρὸς: as 482 c. The St. comparison, however sensible the b thought therein expressed may be, c still is not in place here. For it describes only the subjective impression d which philosophizing at different periods of life makes on Callicles. It is therefore only a rhetorical reaffirmation of the statement that philosophy is not appropriate for a mature man. In his mind, however, Callicles has still a tertium comparationis which he does not express, viz. the objects of philosophical research afford no real interest, hence resemble παῦλα. Further, so much trouble about single ideas is like ἑλευθερίων (stammering). On the contrary, σαφῶς διαλέγεσθαι (ἄλγεις) is the business of orators.

32. ἐλευθερίων: Callicles speaks of stammering thus, as contrasted with 485 b the restraint which the child must exercise in order to learn to speak clearly, which latter seems to him to be δοιλοπρεπές. Note also the contrast in χαίρειν and πικρόν.

38. παρά νέω κτέ.: the companion of c a youth. The duplication of the idea is also found in Prot. 315 d νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον.

40. ἐλευθερίων: is amplified and illustrated by the following clause, οὐδέν τοῦ ἀξιώσουσα κτέ. Philosophy gives the youth an opportunity for the practice in mental gymnastics, which is as yet denied him in public life, and thus prepares him for his future career as a speaker in the assembly.

43. δή: deictic. This is just the case about which Callicles raises the question.
St. I. p. 485.

ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγών μοι δοκεῖ ήδη δείσθαι, ὁ Σώ-
45 κρατεῖ, οὔτος ὁ ἀνήρ. ὁ γὰρ νυνὶ ἔλεγον, ύπάρχει
tούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καν πάνυ εὐφυῆς ἤ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι
φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἁγορὰς, εὖ αἰς ἐφη
ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀριστερῶς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυ-
kότι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν βίων βιώναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γνώια
50 τριῶν ἡ τεττάρων ψυχαρίζοντα, ἔλευθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ ὁ

καλλικοῦν μηδεποίηοι φθέγξασθαι.

XLI. 'Εγὼ δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλι-
κῶς. κινδυνεύω ὅπως ἀναστύχων νῦν ὀπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς

d 44. δείσθαι: is still stronger than
d εξίον, and declares that it is to
the man's own interest to be so dealt
with.
47. τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως: is empha-
sized together with the ἁγορά, in op-
position with the following ἐν γνώιᾳ.
Cf. Cic. de Or. i. 13. 57 quibus
(philosophis) ego ut de his
rebus in angulis consumendi
otii causā disserant cum con-
cessero, illud tamen oratori
tribuam, etc.
48. ὁ ποιητὴς: the poet, of course,
is Homer. He says, 1 440, νήπιον,
οὕτω εἰδώλ ¢ δ λωμοὺ πολέμου | οὐδὲ ἁγο-
ρέων, ἵνα τ' ἀνδρὲς ἀριστερῶς τελέσων.
καταδεδυκότι: "in retirement,
"as contrasted with the brilliant life
of the public man. The word is
used somewhat differently in Rep. ix.
579 b, where it is said of a tyrant
οὔτ' ἀποδημήσαι εξεστιν (ἀυτῷ) οὐδαμῶς
οὕτως θεωρήσαι ὅσον δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
ἔλευθεροι ἐπιθυμητὰ εἰσι, καταδεδυκώς
δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ ἃς γνωρίζῃ.
49. μετὰ μειρακίων: as contrasted
with association with men and with
the whole people. It is evident that,
in spite of Callicles' exaggeration,
he is striking continually at Socra-
tes' (and Plato's) occupation. Quite
naturally and conversationally ψυχαρίζοντα suggests again its opposite,
which is added in ἔλευθερον φθέγξασθαι.
51. νεανικὸν: for the meaning, see e
on 482 e above. Cf. Dem. Ol. iii. 32
ἔστι δ' οὐδέποτ', οἵμαι, μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν
φρόνημα λαβεῖν μικρὰ καὶ φαίλα πράττοντα.

XLI. 1. After this general pre-
sentation of his views of philosophy,
Callicles now proceeds to make a
special application to Socrates' case,
with apparent personal good-will, it
is true, but still with the condescend-
ing mien of the superior man of the
world.
2 f. ὀπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμ-
φίονα: the omission of πρὸς σὲ is
hardly felt. Callicles cleverly illus-
trates his exposition of the opposition
between the principles of practical
life and this theoretical philosophiz-
ing by reference again to the already
cited Antiope of Euripides. Antiope
had borne to Zeus twin sons, Amphion
and Zethus, but was afterwards taken
by her uncle Lycus to Thebes, where
she suffered for a long time the most
cruel treatment at the hands of Ly-
τῶν Ἀμφίονα ὁ Ἐυρυπίδου, οὕτε ἐµνήσθην. καὶ γὰρ ἐµοὶ τοιαύτ' ἀττα ἐπέρχεται πρὸς σὲ λέγειν, οὗτα ἐκεῖνος 5 πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὅτι "ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ὄν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς (ἐχων) ὅπε γενναίων μειρακιώδει τοῖς διαπρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ οὐτ' ἂν δίκης 485 βουλαίσι προσθῆκεν ὧν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὐτ' εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανῶν λάκων ὦθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλον νεανίκων βουλευμα βου- 10 λεύσατο." καὶ τοι, ὁ γάρ Σῶκρατεσ—καὶ μοι μηδὲν ἀχθε- σθῆσ. εἰνοίᾳ γὰρ ἐρῶ τῆ σῇ — ὁν αἰσχρον δοκεῖ σοι

5 f. The words of Euripides are given by Nauck. Eur. frag. 2 185, as follows:

... ἀμελεῖς, ὃν σε φροντίζειν ἐχρήν· ψυχῆς ἐχων γὰρ ὅπε γενναίων φύσιν γυναικομίμῳ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι... κατ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει ὀρθῶς διμήλησεις οὐτ' ἄλλων ὑπὲρ νεανίκων βουλευμα βουλεύσαε τι.

Yet these lines do not contain all that seems poetical in this passage. In place of γυναικομίμῳ Callicles naturally, from his point of view, uses μειρακιώδει, which is quite different from νεανίκος in its meaning (boorish).

7 f. δίκης βουλαύσασι προσθῆκεν ἄν λόγον: would give an opinion in counsels of justice.

9. ὑπὲρ ἄλλων: is in the mouth of Callicles a very natural change of the word of the poet. The sing. of ἄλλος, ἄτερος, and of τίς is easily used in a generic sense.

10. καίτοι: would naturally lead us to expect some qualification of his severe criticism; instead of this he glides over to the rhetorical question, which, while reaffirming his opinion, summons Socrates to decide. Cf. b below.

εἶναι οὖτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἔγω σὲ οἴμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρρω ἄει φιλοσοφίας ἑλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἰ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος ἡ ἄλλον ὅτουν ὕπω τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δει-
15 σμωτήριον ἀπάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχουσ ὅτι χρήσαι σαντῷ, ἄλλ' εἰλιγγυψής ἂν β καὶ χασμῷ οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατηγόρου τυχῶν πάνω φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀποθάνοις ἄν, εἰ βούλευτο θανάτον σοι τιμᾶσθαι. καὶ τοίς
20 πῶς σοφὸν τούτῳ ἐστιν, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰ τις εὐφυὴ λαβὼν

486 τῇ ἐμῇ, Ἑμ. T. 321 σῇ παθῇ, Soph. O. C. 332 σῇ προμηθίᾳ. See II. 694;
G. 147, x. 1.

13. τοὺς πόρρω ἄει φιλοσοφίας ἑλαύνοντας: has a poetic coloring, but also occurs in Xen. and in Crot.
410 εῖ πόρρῳ ὧδ' φαίνομαι σοφίας ἑλαύνει. Euthyp. 4 b. The gen. is partit.
ive. See II. 757; G. 168. — ἄει: when used with the art. and partic.
has a distributive sense. In the present case its position between πόρρω and φιλοσοφίας is also to be
noted.

15. ἀπάγοι: this was the summary process called ἀπαγωγή, in which the
guilty person, when caught in the act, was immediately arrested and
brought before the Eleven. Cf. Apol.
32 b. The expression here is simply
a rhetorical hyperbola, but it sounds
prophetic in view of Socrates' trial
later on, and was probably written
designedly by the author. See In-
trod. § 10. — ἀδικεῖν: the pres. is the
customary tense in accusations. Apol.
19 b, 24 b. — οἶσθ' ὅτι: parenthetical,
with no effect on the construction,
much in the same way as the Eng-
lish phraseological 'you know.' The
Greek expression is, however, not so
colorless as the English, but assumes
a recognition of the truth of the ob-
server.

16 f. εἰλιγγυψής, χασμῷ: vividly b
portray the confusion and terror of
the prisoner.

17. ὅτι εἴποις: this opt. and the
preceding χρήσαι both represent de-
liberative subjv. GMT. 186.

18. ἀναβάς: the regular expression
for appearing before a court. Its
origin may have been from the loca-
tion of the court; cf. Lat. de-
ser e in f orum and Apol. 17 d, 33 d.
— κατηγόρου τυχῶν: "if chance so
willed it." The words πάνω φαύλου
καὶ μοχθηροῦ are again designedly
given to Callicles by Plato. Socrates'
accuser would of necessity be such a
man.

19. θανάτου τιμᾶσθαι: if the crime
had no definite punishment fixed by
law (ἀγὼν ἀτίμητος), the accuser pro-
posed some special punishment, for
which the accused was at liberty to
offer a substitute, and the court had
to accept one or the other. Cf. Apol.
36 b ff. and for the gen. see II. 746 b.

20. According to Nauck, Fr. 186,
the following citation from the Anti-
ope runs thus: —
πῶς γὰρ σοφὸν τοῖτ' ἐστιν, εἰ τις εὐφυὴ
λαβὼν τέχνη φῶτ' ἔθηκε χειρονα.
23. perisulásisai: implies that the e one robbed is vanquished or defense-less, and contains the side-idea of insult added. This inf. as well as ζην is used freely after ἔθηκε to define in what respects the man who follows philosophy becomes xelṓn.

24. ἀτιμον: 'atimia' in various degrees of completeness was a punishment attached to transgressions against the state. Complete 'atimia' involved deprivation of all civil rights. See Busolt, Gr. Alter, § 158, and cf. Andoc. i. 73–76. According to Callicles, Socrates will bring himself virtually into this condition by his continual philosophizing.

25. εἰ... ἀγρουκότερον: see on 462 e. Cf. Lys. in Andoc. 24 προσε-ψηφίσασθε ύμεις αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν ἀτιμόν) εἴργεσθαι τῆς ἁγορᾶς καὶ τῶν ιερῶν ὥστε μὴ ἀδικούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἔχθρων δύνασθαι δίκην λαβεῖν.

26. ἐπὶ κόρης τύπτοντα: a blow on the head was considered especially dishonorable.—κόρη (old Attic κόρ-σῃ), κόρη, δέρη, and ἀδάρη are the sole exceptions to the rule which requires a after ρ in Attic.

27. Callicles closes with a further citation from the Antiope, which Nauck, Fr. 188, gives thus: —

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tέχνη φώτα ἔθηκε χείρωνα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον
βοηθεῖν μηδ’ ἐκσωσάι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε
ἐαυτὸν μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἔχθρων περισυλά-
σθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνώς δὲ ἄτιμον ζην ἐν τῇ
25 πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἰ τι καὶ ἀγρουκότερον εἰρήσθαι,
ἐξεστώ ἐπὶ κόρης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ’,
ὡγαθε, ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ, παῦσαι δ’ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ’
εὐμονείαν ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὅποθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις
τὰ κομψὰ ταύτ’ ἀφεῖς, εἴτε ληρήματα χρή φάναι εἴαι εἴτε

28. εὐμονείαν: was appropriate in Zethus' speech, as he wished to show his brother wherein the εὐμονεία, which he sought in κυθαρφία, was really to be found; less so in Callicles', who probably is thinking rather of εὖβουλία. The contrast to φρονεῖν would be ληρεῖν or φλαρεῖν. Hence Callicles substitutes ληρήματα and φλαρίας (trifling and prattling) for σοφίσματα.

29. κομψά: witty, subtle, often used with an unfavorable connotation, both of persons and things; but it
30 φλυαρίας, ἕκ δὲν κενοῖς ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις, ἐγόνοιν οὐκ ἑλέγχουσας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷς ἔστιν καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθά.

XLII. ᾿Σν. Ἐτὶ χρυσῆν ἔχων ἐπίγγχανον τὴν ψυχήν, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἄν οἴει με ἀσμηνον εὑρέθην τοῦτων τινα τῶν ἀθων, τὴ βασανίζονσιν τὸν χρυσὸν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἢμτινα ἐμέλλον προσαγαγών αὐτήν, εἰ μοι ὀμολογήσειν εἰκανόν ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν μοι δεῖ ἄλλης βασάνου.

ΚΑΛ. Πρὸς τὶ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾶς, ὁ ᾿Σώκρατες;

Σ. Ἐνω σοι ἐρώτ' νῦν οἴμαι ἐγώ σοι ἐντυπικῶς τοιούτῳ ἐρµαίῳ ἐντυπικέκαναι.

10 ΚΑΛ. Τί δή;

Σ. Ἐν οἴδ' ὅτι, ἄν μοι σὺ ὀμολογήσῃς περὶ δὲν ἡ ἐμὴ

486 is applied especially to the quibbles of the Sophists and Eristics. Cf. κομψευέθαι in Lach. 197 d.

31. τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα: i.e. those subtle distinctions of words and ideas which in Callicles' view yield no advantage; while political activity and its results — these are τὰ μεῖζων (484 c above).

32. βίος: as opposed to κενοῖς δόμοις means "means of livelihood," an abundance of the good things of life. — δόξα: contrasted with ἀτίµον ἔτη.

XLII. 1. The delicate irony which characterizes the reply of Socrates is in striking contrast with the rudeness with which Callicles began, in 482 c above, the exposition of his view of life. — χρυσῆν: is pred. of τὴν ψυχήν. "If the soul which I have were of gold."

2. οὐκ ἄν οἴει με ἀσμηνον: the main idea lies in ἀσμηνον.

2 f. τινὰ τῶν λιθων: equiv. to the more common βάσανος alone.

3. τι: after λίθων instead of αἰς. Cf. 486 d 521 d.

4. ἐμέλλον κτῆ.: 'The relative fut. after an unreal conditional is ἐμέλλον with the infinitive.' Gildersleeve. Cf. Isae. ii. 25.— ὀμολογήσειν: the choice of this expression in the comparison is due to the nature of the discussion. The testing which Socrates is undergoing at the hands of Callicles must end in ὀμολογεῖν (cf. εἰν μοι σὺ ὀμολογήσῃς).

5. καλῶς τεθεραπεύσθαι: leads back to the idea of θεραπεία τῆς ψυχῆς already discussed in 464 b above, and thus immediately prepares the way for making progress in the investigation. Cf. 487 a. — The subject of τεθεραπεύσθαι must be supplied from μοι.

9. ἐρµαῖο: all unexpected gains (κέρδοις ἀπροσδοκητον) were supposed to come from Hermes, who had among other surnames that of κερδόως.

11. ἄν μοι κτῆ.: we miss the less
ψυχή δοξάζει, ταύτ' ἦδη ἐστίν αὐτὰ τάληθη. ἐννοού γὰρ,
ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα βασανίζειν ἰκανός ψυχῆς πέρι ὅρθως τε
ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἐχεῖν, ἀ σὺ πάντα ἐχεῖς, ἐπι-
15 στήμψα τε καὶ εὐνοιαν καὶ παρρησίαν. ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλοῖς
ἐντυγχάνω, οἱ ἐμὲ οὐκ οἶοι τὲ εἰσὶν βασανίζειν, διὰ τὸ μὴ
σοφοὶ εἰναι ὁσπέρ σὺ· ἐτεροὶ δὲ σοφοὶ μὲν εἰσὶν, οὐκ
ἐθέλουσιν δὲ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, διὰ τὸ μὴ κήδεσθαι
μου ὁσπέρ σὺ· τῷ τῷ δ' ἐξένω τάδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ Πώλος,
20 σοφώ μὲν καὶ φίλῳ ἐστόν ἔμω, ἐνδεεστέρω δὲ παρρησίας
καὶ αἰσχυντηρότερῳ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γὰρ οὖ;
ὁ γε εἰς τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνῃς ἐληλύθατον, ὡστε διὰ τὸ
αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾶ ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἐναντία
λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταύτα περὶ τῶν
25 μεγίστων. σύ τῷ ταύτα πάντα ἐχεῖς, ἀ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἐχοῦ-
σιν· τεπαίδευσαί τε γὰρ ἰκανὸς, ὡς πολλοὶ ἀν φήσαιν

486 an object to ὁμολογήσῃ since the idea
e is made especially prominent by the
following ταύτα. Cf. 487 ε ἐάν τι σὺ
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃ μοι.
12. δοξάζει: is a vox media.
The same activity of the soul may,
according to circumstances, lead to
error or to truth. Cf. also δόξα ἀλη-
θῆς and πειθής.— ἦδη: at once (J am),
without need of further discussion.
487 14. τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἐχεῖν: must of
a necessity possess three qualities. The
particle ἄρα shows that this lies in
the nature of the matter.
15 f. πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω κτὲ.: So-
crates gives examples in Apol. 21 b ff.
19. τῷ τῷ δὲ ἐξένω κτὲ.: Socrates says
what follows with an irony which
applies especially to Polus; but at
the same time it is a significant
criticism of the παρρησία of Callicles.
b 21. μᾶλλον: see on 482 c.
22. ὁ γε: the γε emphasizes the
pronoun. The irony from here on is
quite distinct, and no longer veiled.
— διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾶ: an ex-
ample of 'oxy moron.' Timidity and
shame are not usually the basis of
b boldness. The opposite of τολμᾶ
is implied. The reference to 483 a is
unmistakable: ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται
καὶ μὴ τολμᾶ λέγειν ἀπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκα-
ζεται ἐναντία λέγειν.
23. αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ: the position
makes the contradiction beat
heavily upon the ear.
24 f. περὶ τῶν μεγίστων: in con-
trast with 486 ἐ τὰ μικρὰ ταύτα. Cf.
484 c τὰ μειζόνων.
26. τεπαίδευσα: see on παιδείας,
485 a. The addition of ὃς πολλοὶ ἀν
φήσαιεν 'Ἀθηναίων implies, of course,
the usual opposition of the many
ignorant to the few capable, and this
makes the tone of ἰκανὸς almost
b bitter.
ST. I. p. 457.

'Αθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἰ ἑννοεῖ. τῶν τεκμηρίων χρῶμαι; ἐγὼ σοι ἐρω. οἶδα ὡμᾶς ἐγώ, ὥστε τεῦτον καὶ Καλλίκλεις, τέτοιας καὶ ἑννοείτοις γεγονότας σοφίας, σὲ τε καὶ Τείχανδρον τὸν Ἀφιδναίον καὶ Ἀνδρῶνα τὸν Ἀνδροτένων καὶ Ναυσικάδην τὸν Χολαργέα: καὶ ποτε ὡμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπῆκονος βουλευομένων, μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκήτεον εἰ, καὶ οἶδα ὅτι ἕνικα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἄλλα εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκελεύ- α

35 εσθε ἀλλήλοις, ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοϕότεροι γενόμενοι λήστε διαφθαρέντες. ἐπειδὴ οὖν σοι ἀκοῦω ταύτα ἐμοὶ συμβουλεύοντος, ἀπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἑταροτάτοις, ἰκανόν μοι τεκμηρίων ἐστιν, ὅτι ὃς ἀληθῶς μοι εὑνοῦσι εἰ καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ὅιος παρησιαζέσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι,

487 29 f. Of the three companions of Callicles we know but little. Tisander is mentioned only here. Andron appears in Prot. 315 e as a defender of Hippias. Naucydes had, according to Xen. Mem. ii. 7. 6, acquired wealth from his business of ἀλφατοποια. The dème Cholargus belonged to the tribe Acamantis, Aphidnae to Aiantis.

32. μέχρι ὅποι: the use of μέχρι with an adverb is unusual. Cf. Crat. 412 e, Symp. 217 e, and Kr. 66, 1, n. 4.

33. ἐνίκα: has a somewhat comic effect, inasmuch as it brings before the mind the image of an earnest and thorough deliberation engaged in by some public body (e.g. the senate), followed by the putting of the question. These young men, however, judge philosophy without understanding it.—προθυμεῖσθαι: exegetic inf. to τοιάδε τις δόξα.

33 f. εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν: recalls the τὰ μικρὰ ταῖτα above. This cautious decision contrasts remarkably with the ἑλεύθερον and νεανίκον which Callicles defends in 485 c, d.

35 f. ὅπως μὴ... διαφθαρέντες: the same state of mind is shown in the accusation brought later against Socrates, the second part of which ran thus: ἄμαν ἄξι καὶ τῶν νόμων διαφθείρων. That this was Callicles' judgment is shown by his words in 484 e ff. above.

37. ἑταροτάτοις: is found also in Phaedo 80 d.

39 f. ὅτι... αὐτῶς τε φησὶ κτῆ.: this must not be considered as a valid example of ὅτι after φησί, which regularly takes the infinitive. The ὅτι clause precedes, and may have escaped the speaker's mind when he was about to make the collocation of αὐτῶς and λόγος. The occurrence of two forms of λέγω in the same clause would likewise have been awkward. — ὁιος παρησιάζεσθαι: you are disposed to free speech. See on 452 e. The omission of the first and second persons of the copula is rare. When εἰ is omitted, σῶ is generally found. On the inf. see on 457 d.
40 autòs te φής kai ὁ λόγος ὑπ' ὀλέγων πρώτερον ἔλεγες ὀμολογεῖ σοι. ἔχει δὴ οὖτωσι δήλου ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυν ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὀμολογήσης μοι, βεβασανισμένων ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἐσται ἱκανός ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτὸ δεῖσει ἐπ' ἀλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
45 ποτε αὐτὸ συνεχόρησας σὺ οὖτε σοφίας ἐνδεία οὖτε ἀισχύνης παρουσία, οὐδ' αὖ ἀπατών ἐμὲ συγχωρήσας ἀν' φίλος γάρ μου εἰ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φής. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ σή ὀμολογία τέλος ἡδὴ ἔξει τῆς ἀληθείας. πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, ὥς Καλλίκλεις, περὶ
50 τούτων ὑπ' σὺ δὴ μου ἐπετύμησας, ποιόν τινα χρή εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί ἐπιτηδεύει καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαντοῦ, ἐν ἰσθι τούτῳ ὅτι οὖν ἐκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνω ἄλλη ἀμαθία τῇ ἐμῇ. σὺ οὖν, ὅσπερ ἡρξὼ νοθετεῖν

487 41. ἔχει δὴ κτ.: with this Socrates d i d return to what was said in 486 c.
488 44 ff. ἀν συνεχόρησας, συγχωρήσας ἀν: the time is pushed into the fut. pf. by the previous βεβασανισμένων ἐσται, and standing on this assumed plane, Socrates uses naturally the unreal past. The second clause is, as the αὐ shows, a second thought, and being of general application, is put into the ideal (potential) optative. The whole sentence shows the narrow line that separates between unreality and ideality.
49. τέλος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔξει: the gen., as in the Homeric phrases τέλος γάμου, θανάτου. Every effort must be directed to a terminus or completion. Here the end is perfect truth.
50. καλλίστη: refers to its value. It yields a rich return.
51. τί χρή ἐπιτηδεύειν: is the question about which the following discussion revolves. Cf. 492 d, 500 c, 512 e, 515 a, 521 a, 527 b, e.
52 f. κατὰ τὸν βίον: refers, not to the period of life, but to the manner of living.
53. τούτο: Heindorf, followed by Cron, construes this word with the following verb. But it is more natural to look upon it as antecedent to the following sentence, know well this fact, etc. — οὖν ἐκών: sc. according to the Socratic view as to the cause of wrong doing.
54. νοθετεῖν: according to the rule, when ἡρξεσθαι is used with the inf. the inf. is emphasized; when with the partic. the 'beginning' is emphasized. So Thucyd. 1.87 a ἡρξόμεθα διαλεγόμενον, "we commenced the discussion on which we are still engaged.' — Here, as in 458 a, Socrates looks upon the correction of any erroneous views as a favor.
55 μὲ, μὴ ἀποστῆσ, ἀλλ' ἰκανῶς μοι ἐνδείξαι, τί ἐστιν τοῦτο ὁ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτησάμην ἂν αὐτὸ, καὶ εάν με λάβῃς νῦν μέν σοι ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ύστερῷ χρώμω μὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα ἄπερ ὁμολόγησα, πάνυ με ἡγοῦ βλάκα εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ποτὲ με νουθετήσῃς.  60 υστερον, ὡς μηδενος ἀξίων ὄντα. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δὲ μοι ἐπανάλαβε, πῶς φῆς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἄγειν βία τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡπτώνων καὶ ἀρχεῖν τὸν ἑλτίω τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνῳ τοῦ φαιλοτέρου; μὴ τί ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι;

XLIII. ΚΑΛ. ἈΛΛὰ ταῦτα [ἐλεγον] καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν λέγω.

Συ. Πότερον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττω; οὐδὲ γὰρ τοι τότε οἶδος τῇ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτὲ λέ- 5 γεις. πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ δεὶ ἀκροάσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους, οἶον μοι δοκεῖσ καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὡς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπί τὰς σμικρὰς κατὰ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὃτι κρείττους εἰ ὕν καὶ ἰσχυρότεραι, ὡς τὸ κρείττον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ βελτίων ταῦτὸν ὄν, ἢ ἐστὶ βελτίω μὲν εἶναι, ἢττω δὲ καὶ ἀσθενεστέρον, καὶ κρείττῳ μὲν εἶναι, μοχθηρότερον

59. βλάκα: 'implies feebleness both of mind and character, a dolt,' Thompson.
60 f. ἐπανάλαβε: we find ἀναλαβίν in this sense in 506 c and Apol. 19 b.
61. σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος: see on 484 b:
62. ἄγειν βία: is a freer expression of the sense of Pindar's words.
64. μὴ λέγας: in spite of the addition of ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι, the tendency of the question is towards a negative answer, as is also to be gathered from the ἀλλὰ of Callicles' answer.

XLIII. 4. τότε: refers to what was said in 483 d, e, and ἐνδείκνυσθαι is accordingly imperfect infinitive.—ἡ: appears to be the old Attic form.
9 f. ὡς ταύτον ὄν: on the assumption that, etc. See on 491 a.
10. ἢ ἐστι: begins the second member of the double question introduced by πότερον.
12. ὁ αὐτὸς ὤρος: cf. 470 b. The question is, whether the range of each idea is the same. A clear distinction (σαφῶς διόρισον) would obviate any false application.

14. τὸ κρείττον κτέ: the position of the three terms is arbitrary; but Socrates seems to put first the two on which he lays most stress.

17 f. ἐρετε... ἔλεγε: this appeal to the statement of Callicles reveals a contradiction between his statements, inasmuch as he had said above, 483 b, 488 that the πολλοὶ were the ἀσθενεῖς.

28 f. ὃς ἄρτι αὐ τοῦ ἔλεγε: the αὖ εγα draws attention again to the above ὠσπερ καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγε. See 483 a–d.

30 f. ὁπως μὴ ἀλώσει: an ironical allusion to Callicles’ reproaches of Gorgias and Polus in 482 e.

33. μὴ φθόνει: a formula for entreaty and urging, still more frequent in the form μη φθονῆρ. Regularly μὴ with pres. inv. prescribes a neg.
APOKRÍNASTHAI TOÚTO, KALLIKLÉIS, 'ΩN, ÉAY MΩI ÓMLOLOGHΣ
35 SÊS, BÈBEAIÓSWMAI ᾫΔΗ PARÁ SOÚ, ĀTE ÍKANOU ÆNDÒS
DIAGWṆNAV ÓMLOLOGKHÔS.

KAL. 'ALΛ' OI GE PΟLŁOI NOΜÍZΟUVN OÛTVΣ.

ΣΩ. OÙ NÓMΩ ΆΡΑ ΜÓNΩN ÈSTÎN AÍΣΧΙΟΝ TÔ ÆDIKEÎN TÔU
ÆDIKEÎßHAI, OÜDÈ DÎKAOU TÔ ÍΣON ËXEΩN, ÁLLΑ KAI FÙSΕI-
40 ÆSTÈ KIΩDWNÈIEΣ ÔUK ἈΛΗΘΗ LÉGEVN EN TOÎS PRÓΣΘΕΝ OÜDÈ b
ÓRHÔS EMÔU KATHYOREÎV LÉGΩN, ÓΤI ÊNANTIÔN ÈSTÎN Ô NÔMOS
KAI ᾫ FÛŚIΣ, Â ᾫ KAI ÈGW ΓΝΩΣ KAKOÛRGÔ EN TOÎS LÓGOIΣ,
EÀN MÉN TIS KATÀ FÛŚIΣ LÉGΓΗ, ÊPÎ TÔN NÔMÔN ÂΓΩΝ, EÀN DÉ
TIS KATÀ TÔN NÔMÔN, ÊPÎ TΗΝ FÛŚW.

XLIV. KAL. OÛTÔSÍ ÂNΗΡ OÙ ΠΑÙSETAI ΦΛΝΑΡΩΝ. ÉIΠÉ
MÔI, Ô ΣΩΚΡΑΤΕΣ, ÔUK AÍΣΧÎΝΕI, ΤΗΛΙΚΟÛTÔS ÔN, ÓNÔMATA
THREÚΩN, KAI ÉAY TIS ŘΗΜΑΤI ÂMÂΡΤΗ, ÊRMÂIÔN TÔTO POI-
489 OÛMENOS; ÉME ΓÂΡ OÏEI ÁLLO TÎ LÉGEV N TÔ KREÎTTOUS ÉÎNAI
course of action, with an aor. subjv.
a negatives a course of action. Socrates wishes at the outset to obviate
any tendency to a refusal to answer, or hesitancy.
34. KALLIKLÉIS: the omission of the Ï is unusual.
35. BÈBEAIÓÔWBAS: to become strengthened in one's opinion. It is used with
παρÎ to designate the quarter from which the influence comes; direct
agency would require ὑπά. — ÍKANÔ
ΔΙΑΓΝÎVΝΑI: competent to decide, with
reference to 487 e.
b 40 f. LÉGEVÎN, KATHYOREÎV: indir. disc.
for impîl. indicative. The kathyporia
proper begins with â δή. The use of
δή implies a fact beyond controversy.
XLIV. 1. ÔÛTÔSÍ ÂNΗΡ: Callicles
with this turns to the surrounding
listeners to give vent to his indignation.
Cf. 467 b, 505 c. — ÔÜ ΠΑÙSÊTÀI
ΦΛΝΑΡΩΝ: Callicles, who looks upon
all philosophical activity as φλλαρία, b
objects to having dialectical treat-
ment applied to him. — éiπé mòi: the
asyndeton renders the question es-
cially incisive, and hence is a meas-
ure of excitement. The question ôuk
aíσχύνει is a rhetorical imperative.
2 f. ÓNÔMATA THREÚÔN: the same
image is employed in Theæt. 166 e,
with the substantive ÏNOMÂTÔN THREÚ-
ÓS to denote logomachy, where the
matter at issue has been quite for-
gotten.
3. ŘΗΜΑΤI: in an expression. See e
on 450 e.
4. Callicles takes his stand on the
identity, which he had maintained,
of BÈLTÎN and KREÎTÔN, but reverses
the relation of these words to each
other; for while above he considered
BÈLTÎN to be synonymous with KREÎ-
TÔN, now he wishes KREÎTÔN to be un-
derstood in the sense of BÈLTÎN.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΘΟΡΙΑΣ.

5 ἢ τὸ βελτίων; οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω, ὅτι ταύτον φημι εἶναι τὸ βελτίων καὶ τὸ κρείττον; ἢ οἶει με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφε-τός συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἵσως τῷ σώματι ἵσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὕτω φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταύτα εἶναι νόμιμα;
10 Σκ. Ἐλευ, ὥ σοφότατε Καλλίκλεις, οὐτῶ λέγεις; Καλ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Σκ. 'Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν, ὧν δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω τιούτον τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρείττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλυχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήποτε σὺ γε τοὺς δύο βελτίων ἥγεῖ τοῦ ἔνος, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίων σοῦ, ὅτι ἵσχυρότεροι εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπέ, τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδῆ ὅτι τοὺς ἵσχυρο-τέρους; καὶ ὥ θαυμάσιε πραότερον με προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ.

489 5. οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω: he adds, in order to cover this change of conception. See on 456 a.

6. ἢ οἶει κτέ.: Callicles allows himself to be clearly recognized as a member of that political party which applied to itself by preference the name ὁ καλὸς κἀγαθὸς, and which both during the latter part and after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war obtained for a brief period the ascendancy in Athens.—σύρφετος: from σφρα, sweep. Cf. the English colloquial words 'off-scourings' and 'scum.'

8. ἀξίων πλήν: without a following gen., instead of which we find τῷ σῶματι ἤσχυρίσασθαι by means of their bodily strength. Others construe τῷ with σῶματι, making the inf. depend upon some word of ability to be taken from ἀξίων, but this is harsh.

9. αὐτὰ ταύτα εἶναι νόμιμα: construe with λέγειν as an indignant dis-claimer in the shape of a question. 489 "Or think you I mean that if a rabble be got together, of slaves and all sorts of wretches, good for nothing unless perhaps for feats of physical strength, and these people say this or that, that these their mere dicta are to have the force of law?" Thompson.

12. αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω: why So- crates does not express his conjecture, he has already explained in 453 b, c.

14. σὺ γε: you, at least, for your part. Cf. what has just preceded in c.

16. ἀλλὰ πάλιν: in what precedes Callicles has really succeeded merely in eluding the expression of any positive view.

18. προδίδασκε: the πρό in composition indicates the progress or going forward, which ought to attend teaching.

19. ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ: run away from your school. Cf. 456 d.
20 ΚΑΛ. Εἰρωνεύει, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΝ. Μά τὸν Ζήθον, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὁν σὺ χρώμενος, πολλὰ νυν ἐϊρωνεύουν πρὸς με· ἀλλ' ἵνα εἰπέ, τίνας λέ- 

gεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Τοὺς ἁμείνους ἐγώγη.

25 ΣΩΝ. Ὄρασ ἁρα, ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὄνοματα λέγεις, δηλοῖ δὲ 

οὐδέν; οὔκ ἐρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον 

tοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τυλάς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλά ναὶ μᾶ Δία τοῦτον λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩΝ. Πολλάκις ἁρα εἴς φρονὸν μυρίων μὴ φρονοῦντων490 

30 κρείττων ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν δὲι, 

tοὺς ὄ' ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἄρχο-

μένων—τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν—καὶ οὔ 

ῥήματα θηρεύω—εἶ δὲ εἰς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλά ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁ λέγω. τοῦτο γάρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ 

35 τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίων ὄντα καὶ φρονιμωτέρων 

cαὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν φαιλοτέρων.

XLV. ΣΩΝ. Ἐχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὐ τῶν λέγεις; ἐὰν 

β 

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἄθροι ἄνθρωποι, 

καὶ ἦμιν ἡ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὀμεν 

δὲ παν-

tοδαπόι, οἱ μὲν ἵσχυροι, οἱ δὲ ἄσθενεῖς, εἰς 

3. τὸν Ζήθον: with μᾶ we always infer the negative. The allu-

sion to Zethus, whom Callicles had brought forward as an author-

ity, has a very comic effect.

22. ἀλλαί θὰ: see on 451 a.

25. Ὄρας κτέ.: alludes to 480 e, where βέλτιον and κρεῖττον were said by Callicles to be identical. Here he characterizes the βελτίους as ἁμείνους, showing, as Socrates declares in δη-

λοῖς οὐδέν, that at this time there was no distinction of consequence between these two words.

26. οὐκ ἐρεῖς: again asyndetic, as 489 above in b.

27. φρονιμωτέρου: excludes the ambiguity which was still possible with ἵσχυροτερος.

29. μὴ φρονοῦντων: the neg. is condi-

tional.

33. ῥήματα: a clear reference to 489 b, c. ῥήμα has rather the force of "phrase."

XLV. 1. Ἐχε δή: see on 460 a. 

3. ἐν κοινῷ: i.e. so that, as being public property, it must be distributed.

4. οἱ μὲν ἵσχυροι κτέ.: added be-
5 φρονιμότερος περὶ ταῦτα, ἰατρὸς ὡς, ἢ δὲ, οἷον εἰκός, τῶν μὲν ἵσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἀλλο τι ἢ οὔτος, φρονιμότερος ἡμῶν ὡς, βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

10 ὣν τούτων τῶν συτίων πλέον ἡμῶν ἐκτέων αὐτῶ, ε ὡς βελτίων ἔστιν, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκεῖνον δεῖ νέμειν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἐαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτήσεων, εἰ μή μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλέον, τῶν δ' ἐλαττον ἐκτέον. ἐὰν δὲ τύχῃ 15 πάντων ἀσθενεστάτος ὡς, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὡ Καλλίκλεις; οὕχ οὔτως, ὤγαθε;

ΚΑΛ. Περὶ συτία λέγεις καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ιατροῦ καὶ φλαναρίας. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω.

ΣΝ. Πότερον οὖν τὸν φρονιμότερον βελτίων λέγεις; φάθι 20 ἡ μη.

490 cause it is just in the distribution of b food that one would expect bodily strength to form the standard.

5. περὶ ταῦτα: the acc. implies some mental activity.

c 10. ἐκτέον: the verbal of ἔχω, which is quite rare, shows two forms, this and the more normal one σχέτεος, also used by Plato. (in composition).

11. τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν: this comes to him according to 490 a, because he is φρονιμότερος. The dat. is one of cause. νέμειν is an action for which are necessary wisdom, justice, and self-control.

12. καταχρῆσθαι: not misuse, but use up. κατὰ frequently has the force of "completely" in composition. Kr. 68, 46, 10.

13. ζημιοῦσθαι: used metaphorically, of the natural result which follows the over-engorgement of the stomach with food.

14. τῶν μὲν . . . τῶν δὲ: with reference to b.

15. τῷ βελτίστῳ: used instead of the pron. for the sake of the contrast with ἐλάχιστον.

17. περὶ συτία: this is a very unusual construction. The gen. is the rule with περὶ after λέγω. Cron thinks it is calculated to define the region in which the speeches of Socrates move. The word φλαναρία serves also to characterize all that precedes. Cf. 519 a λιμένων καὶ νεαρών καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων Φλαναρίων, the companion passage to this one. Cf. also Dem. Or. i.29 τάς ὀδοὺς ὅς ἐπισκέψεως, καὶ κρήνας, καὶ λήρων.

19. πότερον: the second member d is to be supplied from the following question.

20. ἡ μη (sc. φάθι): to be understood like ὅφιμο (n e g o).
24. μανθάνω: ironic; as if Socrates could by any means judge what Callicles did mean from a general statement of what he did not mean. — ύφαντικώτατον: a sup. coined for the occasion.
26. περιέναι: sc. in order to show off in them; still stronger is the following (31) περιπατεῖν ("strut about").
27. ποῖον ἵματιον: expresses indignant contempt. Cf. Charm. 174 b ἀρά γε (οὐδὲ) τὸ πεπτευτικόν; ποῖον πεπτευτικόν;
32. φυλαρεῖς ἔχων: a manner of speech taken from the common life, and hence especially frequent in the comic poets. Cf. τὰ ἔχουν ληπέσι (497 a), τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφει; (Phaedr. 236 e), τί δῆτα διατρίβεις ἔχων; (Arist. Ecles. 1151). ἔχων seems to imply a kind of continual persistence. You still persist in talking nonsense.
33. τοιαῦτα, τοιάδε: correspond in usage to ὄτος and ὄδε. The article divides the examples into classes.
37. ὃς ἀεί κτῆ.: an exclamation implying a taunt, which was so often directed against Socrates e.g. (according to Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 6) by the sophist Hippias, who receives about the same answer that Callicles does here, with the ironical addition: σὺ δὴ ᾧ ὄτος διὰ τὸ πολυμαθῆς εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις. Cf. 482 a.
40 Кал. Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀπεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέασ τε καὶ κναφέασ καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ίατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει, ὡς περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὅντα τὸν λόγον.

Σώ. Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ φρο-νιμώτερος πλέον ἐχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὔτε ἐμοῦ 45 ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξει οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς;

Καλ. Ἀλλ' ἐγγυθα καὶ πάλαι λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς κρείττους οἱ εἰσιν οὐ σκυτοτόμους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους, ἀλλ' οὐ ἄν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι δύσιν, ἢ ὅντα ἄν τρόπου ἐν οἴκοιτο, καὶ μὴ μονὸν φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ 50 καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἢ ἄν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίας τῆς ψυχῆς.

XLVI. Σώ. Ὄρας, ὃ βέλτιστε Καλλίκλεις, ὃς οὐ ταῦτα σὺ τ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῆς ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγεις, καὶ μέμψει μοι. ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τούναντιον,

491 40. ἀεὶ σκυτέασ κτέ.: Charicles, one of the thirty, irritated by some keen remark of Socrates, expresses himself similarly in Xen. Mem. i. 2. 37 οὐκοῦν, ἐφη δὲ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων τοῦ- τοι τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ δύσιον καὶ τῶν ἐλλων τῶν τοιοῦτων. καὶ μὰ Δ', ἐφη δὲ Χαρικλῆς, καὶ τῶν βουκόλων γε.

41 f. ὡς ὅντα τῶν λόγων: the acc. abs. is rare, except with impers. verbs. GMT. 853; G. 278, 2; II. 974. The inference here is that the assumption introduced by the ὡς is untenable; in which case we more commonly have ὅσπερ.

43. περὶ τίνων: due to assimilation after περὶ τοῦτον, for, acc. to the usage, we should expect περὶ τίνα after πλεονεκτεῖ. Cf. Lach. 182 ε ὡς οὖνδὲν ἄλλο μελέτη ἡ τοῦτος ἐτεῖν, ὅτε ἄν μαθόντες πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἐλλων περὶ τοῦ τόλεμον. The ἐρεῖς may also have had some effect. See on 449 d. For οὐκοῦν ἐρεῖς, see on 489 e.

46. ἀλλ' ἐγγυθα καὶ πάλαι λέγω: see on 450 a and 489 e. Callicles' irritation shows itself again in the side-thrust, οὐ σκυτοτόμους κτέ.

46 f. τοὺς κρείττους οἱ εἰσιν: equiv. to τοῦτος οἱ κρείττους εἰσίν. See Kr. 61, 6, 2; II. 878. Such prolepsis usually occurs after verbs which express recognition or make declarations. Here the relative clause is almost pleonastic, but this is the more in harmony with the excited feelings of Callicles.

48. εἰς . . . πράγματα: denotes the d object, as περὶ ταῦτα (above 490 b) denotes the field, to which the φρόνι-μος is directed; and from it we must take the subject of οἴκοιτο.

50. ἱκανοὶ ὄντες κτέ.: is to be con- sidered as explanatory of ἀνδρεῖοι and φρόνιμοι δύσιν.

XLVI. 3. ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τούναντιον: this use of σοῦ, with which we must
ὅτι οὐδὲποτε ταυτά λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν
5 τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρεῖττοις τοὺς ἴσχυρότεροις ὦρίζον, εἰ
ἀδίκες δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, νῦν δὲ αὐτον τὴν ἥκεις
ἔχων· ἀνδρειότεροί τινες ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρεῖττοις
καὶ οἱ βελτίους. ἀλλὰ, ὡγαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι, τίνας
ποτὲ λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρεῖττοις καί εἰς ὅτι.

10 Καλ. 'Ἤλλ' εἰρηκά γε ἐγγόγε τοὺς φρονίμους εἰς τὰ τῆς
πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τούτους γὰρ προσήκει
τοῖς πόλεωι ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, πλέον ἔχειν ἄρ
tοῦτοι τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχουσας τῶν ἀρχομένων.
Σ. Τί δὲ αὐτῶν, ὡ ἐταίρε;  

15 Καλ. Πῶς λέγεις;
Σ. Ἔνα ἐκαστὸν λέγω αὐτοῦ ἐαυτοῦ ἄρχουσα. ἦ τούτο
μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἐαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;

supply κατηγορῶ, is somewhat harsh
b after ἐμέ, with which it contrasts,
and leads Cron to prefer to consider
οὐ as dependent upon τούς αὐτοὺς, in
the sense "the opposite of you," — i.e.
of what you say,— and the clause
with ὥτι as epexegetic to τούς αὐτοὺς,
—a harsh and doubtful construction.
c
5. τοὺς ἴσχυρότερους: the art. is
employed, because ἴσχυρότερους is not
merely a pred. to τοὺς βελτίους κτλ.,
but both ideas are considered as identical.
6 f. ἥκεις ἔχων: as 518 a. In English
also we often say, 'here you are with,' etc.
7. τινές: 'tis may express indefin:
iteness of nature: "a sort of."' II.
702.
8. εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι: relieve your
mind by saying, tell and be done with
it. Cf. below, εἰ ἔγω σοι τὸν παρθέ-
sιαζόμενος λέγω. The use of the nor-
itst tense of the partic. may be simply
a case of attraction; it certainly loses
its connotation of past time, being
practically identical with the time of
the leading verb, as in Phaedo 60 c
eδ' ἐποίησας ἀνακρίνοντας με. See GMT.
150, 845; II. 856 b.
12. τοῦτ' ἐστίν: does not refer to d
ἄρχειν, but simply, as often, intro-
duces the following clause.
14. τί δὲ αὐτῶν: the indefiniteness
of the question shows that it is only
designed to draw Callicles' attention
to the necessity of some rule govern-
ing the actions of the κρεῖττοις to one
another. According to the connexion
we may supply either ἄρχειν or
πλέον ἔχειν to govern the gen., or we
may consider it as a free genitive.
The idea of a man's governing him-
self is so entirely new to Callicles
that he is unable to catch Socrates' 
meaning at first.
16. Ἔνα ἐκαστὸν: the single con-
crete case to explain the principle.
Kαλ. Πῶς ἐαυτοῦ ἁρχοντα λέγεις;
Σω. Οὔδεν ποικίλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὁσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, σωφρονα
20 ὡντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὕτων ἐαυτοῦ, τῶν ἥδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν
ἀρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.
Kαλ. Ὡς ἠδύς εἶ· τοὺς ἠλιθίους λέγεις, τοὺς σωφρο-

19. οὔδεν ποικίλον: means that the
question is about a simple matter,
whereas the person addressed imagi-

22. ὃς ἠδύς εἶ: is often used ironi-
cally.— ἠδύς: corresponds best to
our naive. Callicles means that So-

24. οὔτω: we should naturally ex-
pect τούτων. Of course there is a
tinge of irony in the allusion to Cal-

26. πάνυ γε σφόδρα: sc. οὔτω λέ-

27. δουλεύων: not to be conceived
literally of human servitude, but
rather equiv. to ἀρχόμενος and that
too ἀυτὸς ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, which Callicles
considers just as bad as if the slavery
were to some one else, ὀτρών. The lot
of thraldom is considered so unhappy
that Callicles conceives δουλεύων, even
in the sense which it has here, as the
exact opposite to εὐδαίμων. That self-
control is not consistent with the gen-
erally held idea of freedom is spoken
plainly in Meno 86 d ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ
σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ᾽ ἐπιχειρεῖτι ἂρχειν ἴνα δὴ
ἐλεύθερος γὰς, and is at the present
day a principle of the opponents of the
temperance movement.
30 μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐὰν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, ταῦτας δὲ ὡς μεγίστας οὕσας ἵκανῶν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι’ ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀποπτιμξάνα τὸν ἄν ἂεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνεται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό, οἴμαι, τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατῶν· ὅθεν ἠγουσίων τοὺς τοιούτους δι’ αἰσχύνην, ἀποκρυπτόμενου τὴν αὐτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δὴ φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ὁπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίως τὴν φύων ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορύζεσθαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπαινοῦσιν τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν. ἐπεὶ γε οἷς ἐξ ἀρχής ὑπηρξεν ἡ βασιλείαν ἴσσων εἶναι ἡ αὐτῶς τὴν φύσει ἰκανοὺς ἐκπορύζεσθαι ἀρχὴν τινα ἡ τυραννίδα ἡ δυναστείαν, (τι) τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἰσχρον καὶ κάκιον (ἀν) εἰς σωφροσύνης τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· οἷς ἐξόν ἀπολαμένων

492 31. κολάζειν: in the sense of "discipline" is quite in place here. At the same time its use forms a link between this and the earlier discussion between Polus and Socrates. ἀκολασία is the proper opposite to σωφροσύνη, and as such is praised by Callicles.

32. ὑπηρετεῖν: Callicles says this, without noticing that thereby the servitude (δουλεία) in which man stands to his appetites is recognized.

34. τοὺς τοιούτους: τινὰ τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἀποπιμπλάναι κτὲ.

36. αἰσχρὸν δὴ: with ironical reference to αἰσχύνην.—ὅπερ: introduces what follows. The reference is to 483 e ff.

41. οἷς ὑπηρξέειν: whose fortune it was. The original meaning of ὑπάρχειν, "to be as a foundation," "to begin with," becomes gradually weaker as time goes on. The dat. in the pred. here passes over into the acc. as subj. of the inf. (ἰκανοῖς καὶ εἶναι) as is frequently the case, especially in long periods.

42. ἀρχὴν τινα κτέ.: the word ἀρχὴ can be applied to any position of power, whether in a democracy or not. Thuc. ii. 65. 9 says of Athens ἐγίγνετο τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρῶτου ἀνδρὸς (i.e. Pericles) ἀρχὴ. The idea of τυραννίς is well known; cf. Nepos, Milt. 8. 3. δυναστεία combined with τυραννίς is not infrequently (479 a, Thuc. iii. 62. 3) used of oligarchs, but it is also a designation of princes, both smaller and greater (524 e, 525 d).

43. αἰσχρὸν καὶ κάκιον: declare as strongly as possible the inappropriateness of the practice of virtue for such men; it becomes for them really a shame and an evil.

44. τοῦτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: pur-
45 τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδῶν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἐαυτοὶς δεσπότης ἐπαγάγωντο τῶν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον; ἦ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἄθλησ εὐγονότες εἰεν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφρο−ε σύνης, μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὐτῶν ἦ τοῖς 50 ἕχθροις, καὶ ταῦτα ἁρχοντες ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὡ Σώκρατες, ἦν φης σὺ διώκειν, ὦ διέχει· τρυφῇ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τούτ’ ἐστὶν ἀρετή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία, τὰ δὲ ἀλλα ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα ἀν− 55 θρώπων, φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενός αξία.

XLVII. Σ. Οὐκ ἀγαννώς γε, ὡ Καλλικλεις, ἐπεξέρχει α

492 posely placed at the end of the clause b (as above διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀναδριαν), and to emphasize the contrast, ἀνθρω−πον, which is usually wanting, is added in the next clause after τῶν πολλῶν.—οῖς ἐξόν κτέ.: such connexion of the subordinative to the principal clause is idiomatic in Greek and Latin. Cf. Symp. 174 ειδε μὲν γὰρ εὖθες παιὰ διὰ τῶν ἐνδυν ἀπαντήσαστα ἔγειν οὐ κατέκειντο οἱ ἄλλοι. Nep. Thrasy. 4.1 huic . . . corona a populo data est; quam quod . . . non vis expresserat nullam habuit invidiam. Notice the necessary shift in ἐξόν and μηδενὸσ . . . ὄντος due to the change from impersonal to personal. The participles are both practically concessive, the neg. μὴ being due to the conditional coloring.

46. τῶν πολλῶν κτέ.: notice the assonance (παρίσωσις) in νόμον, λόγον, ψόγον.

48. τού καλοῦ: is said with bitter irony. Callicles shows here, as well as in 486 b above, the code of morals prevalent at that time and which Xen. expresses in the praise awarded to Cyrus, Anab. i. 9. 11 φάνερος ἦν εἰ τίς 492 τί ἀγαθὸν ἦ κάκων ποιήσειν αὐτὸν, εἰκὰν πειράμενος.

51. ἦν φῆς σὺ διώκειν: as above 482 εφάκην τὴν ἀληθείαν διώκειν.

52. ἐπικουρίαν: capacity to help (one’s self); i.e. to provide means for pleasure and to ward off hindrances. So also ἐπικουρεῖν and ἐπίκουρος. Cf. below, the recapitulation of Socrates.

53. τὰ δὲ ἀλλα κτέ.: the subject, which at first is only inferred as the opposite of the three qualities specified, is nearer specified first by the characteristic addition τὰ καλλωπίσματα (affectations) and then by a definite expression which at the same time shows Callicles’ opinion.

53. φλυαρία κτέ.: is predicate.

XLVII. 1. οὐκ ἀγαννώς: like γεν−d ναίως 475 d, 521 a, transferred from its original application to the free independent conduct proper for a man of noble birth; hence equiv. to “spirited,” “brave.”—ἐπεξέρχει: an image from war. Cf. ἐπιχειρώμεν 495 c.
τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος· σαφώς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις, ἂ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μὲν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἔθελονσι. δέομαι οὖν ἐγὼ σοὶ μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι 5 κατάδηλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καὶ μοι λέγει· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φης οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει μισὸν δεῖ εἶναι, ἐὼντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πληρωσίν αὐταίς ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν ἐτομαξέων, καὶ τούτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετήν;

Καλ. Φημὶ ταύτα ἐγώ.

10 Σω. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαίμονες εἶναι.

Καλ. Οἱ λίθοι γὰρ δῇ οὖτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαίμονε· στατοὶ εἰσιν.

Σω. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὡς γε σὺ λέγεις δεὼς ὁ βίος.

492 2. τῷ λόγῳ: refers to the view just stated, the position defended. Cf. Prot. 345 δ, where Socrates says of Simonides δί οἶνον τοῦ ἀσματος ἐπιθυμήσεα τῷ τοῦ Πιστακοῦ ρήματι. We may, however, consider ἐπιθυμίας as used absolutely and τῷ λόγῳ as dat. of accompaniment.

6. εἰ μὲλέει τις (sc. τοιοῦτος εἶναι) οἶον δεί (ἀυτὸν sc. τὸν ἄνθρωπον) εἶναι: the absence of the inf. after ἐώντα is strange; cf. 491 e above.

7 f. ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν: Socrates wishes to settle beyond all cavil that Callicles sanctions the employment of all means, without limitation and in the broadest sense, to satisfy his desires. As ἐτομαξεῖν is in the same construction with κολαστέον, we must conceive an idea of obligation connected with it. Cf. Crito 51 c ποιητέον ... ἡ πείθειν.

8. τῇν ἄρετίν: the sole true virtue (manliness), which is recognized also by Callicles.

10. ἄρα: “it appears,” “according to your view.” — οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι Δεῷτ.: the fundamental principle of the Cynic school (of Antisthenes), which also derived its origin from Socrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 6. 10, where to the sophist Antiphon, who maintains similar principles to those of Callicles here, Socrates says ἐνικάς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τροφήν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἰσιν· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἰσίν, τὸ δὲ ἔλαχιστον ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου.

12. οἱ νεκροὶ Δεῷτ.: Socrates mentions the prevalence of this view in Phaedo 65 a καὶ δικαίος γε ποι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ... ἔγγος τι τελείν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν προντιζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰσίν. Sophocles, however, makes the sorely afflicted Ajax say (Ajax 554 f.) ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν γὰρ μηδὲν ἡδίστος βίος, ἐκ τῶν παθεῖν καὶ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μαθήσι. 14. Now that Callicles has stated exactly the manner in which he looks at life, Socrates proceeds to contrast that view with his own, not directly
15 οὐ γὰρ τοι θαυμάζομεν ἂν, εἰ Εὐρυπίδης ἀληθῶς ἐν τοῖς δὲ λέγειν, λέγων

τις δὲ οίδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ καταθανεῖν,

tὸ καταθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;

καὶ ἡμεῖς τὸ ὅντι ᾠσώς τέθναιμεν. ἦδη τοῦ ἐγγυμε καὶ 493
20 ἡκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναιμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν
σώμα ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο, εὖ δὲ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσι, τυγχάνει δὴ οἶον ἀναπέδεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν

492 indeed, but by a series of comparisions and similes, which serve the double purpose of calming the feelings of the listeners and readers after the impassioned speech of Callicles and, by presenting these pictures to the fancy, of preparing their minds for the following dialectical argument.

15. Εὐρυπίδης: the same poet to whom Callicles has several times appealed. Socrates also can quote for his own purpose. The passage is from the Polydides, and has the second line completed by the words κάτω νομίζεται. Quite similar is a passage which has come down to us from another lost tragedy, the Phrixus, τις οἴδεν εἰ ζῆν τοῦτο κέκληται θανεῖν, ἢ τὸ ζῆν δὲ θυήσκειν ἐστὶ. See Nauck, Fr. 639, 830.

493 19 f. ἐγγυε καὶ ἡκουσά τοῦ: the following comparisons are probably taken from the book of Philolaus, a Pythagorean who, after having been driven from Italy, wandered to Thebes, and there engaged in teaching and writing. Socrates was acquainted with the Pythagorean teaching probably only orally, from association with his Theban friends Simmias and Cebes. For this reason Plato implies by the manner of expression that this knowledge, which Socrates himself in a nowise valued, was as general as possible. See Thompson.

20 f. τὸ μὲν σώμα ἐστὶ σῆμα: this comparison, though ascribed to the Pythagoreans, is connected also with the Orphic saying that the body is the custodian of the soul. Plato combines both in the same manner in Crat. 400 ἃ καὶ γὰρ σήμα τινες φασιν αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ σώμα) εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς. Cf. Phaedo 62 b.

21. τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο: in order to continue the discussion, a distinction between the separate parts of the soul is necessary. This could not be given here scientifically; but as much as is needful is stated by the comparison. Elsewhere Plato distinguishes three parts of the soul, — τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές (θυμὸς), and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. For his present purpose two are sufficient,— the really spiritual, the reason, and that part which clings greedily to the body; for the question to be decided is: Shall life be directed according to the nature of the soul or of the body?

22. μεταπίπτειν: the active is found in 481 d, e. Cf. 517 β μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας.
23. μυθολογών: "speaking in mythic-al (here allegorical) form," in contradistinction with the dialectical method. Cf. Phaedo 61 ε διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν. — κομψός: of delicate perceptions. Often with irony, but not here. See on 486 ε. Σικελός refers to Empedocles, Ἰταλικός to Philolaus. Neither was able, in the infancy of the science, to clothe his profound thoughts in philosophical form. Cf. Cron-Dyer Introd. to Apol. §§ 3 and 8. Σικελός, and not Σικελικός, may be due to the old love song of Timocreon Rhodius, which began: Σικελός κομψός ἀνήρ | ποτὶ τὰν ματέρ' ἑρα.

24. παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι: by a slight variation of the word. παράγειν is otherwise used of etymologies which are effected by small variations in the sound. — διὰ τὸ πιθανὸν τε καὶ πειστικόν: Philolaus was very fond of such tricks of derivation (cf. Bocckh, Philolaos, p. 188). Both words are obviously, as was shown above by ἀναπείθηθαι and μεταπίπτειν, to be considered as passive, and applying to something that can be easily persuaded. In form πιθανὸν approaches closest to πιθὸν, and hence stands first. It is usually active, yet it occurs also as a passive, e.g. Xen. Cyr. ii. 2. 10 πιθανὸν δ' οὕτως εἰσὶν τινες, ἢστε, πρὸν εἰδέναι τὸ προστατόμενον, πρότερον πειθοῦται. — πειστικόν: adapted and inclined to belief, presupposes also some persuasion.

25. ἀνοίγων: is chosen here as the opposite of σώφρονος, on account of its assonance with ἀνοίγων, and denotes those who are under the control, not of the νοῦς, but of the ἐπιθυμία. ἀνοίγω, according to the regular usage, denotes those who are not initiated into the mysteries. Hence Plato applies it also, in Phaedo 69 ε and Theaet. 155 ε, to those who have not been initiated into wisdom, or Philosophy, which causes — as the mysteries were also designed to do — an actual inner purification of the soul. But here is also probably, at the same time, an allusion to the actual untransferred meaning of μέν, close, — i.e. the "unconfined." With this agrees the following explanation, οὐ στεγανόν and τετρημένον πῖθος. The ἀνοίγων stand open to all the charms of sense and the outer world.

27. τὸ ἀκόλαστον: an allusion to the expression of Callicles. — οὐ στεγανόν: which does not cover and preserve its contents, gives cause and introduction for the image of the jar. It is noteworthy that this greedy part of the soul is designated entirely by neg. expressions.

27 i. ὡς τετρημένος εἶτι πῖθος: depends on an ἔλεγε, which is implied in ἄνοιγμα. It is true, however, that after a verb of naming we find occasionally a relative clause, as Soph. O. R. 780 καλεῖ (με) πλαστός ὡς εἶπεν πατρὶ. The comparison reminds one of the myth of the Danaidæ. With the image of the πῖθος and κόσκινων Thompson compares Shaks. Cym. i. 7
ménos eîn πíthos, diá tēn ἄπληστιαν ἀπεικάσας. τοῦναν-
tión δὴ οὗτος σοί, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται ὡς τῶν ἐν
30 Ἁιδοῦ — τὸ ἀειδῆς δὴ λέγων — οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶν
οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῦν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὑδώρ
ἐτέρῳ τοιούτω τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ. τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἁρα
λέγει, ὦς ἐφῇ ὁ πρὸς ἐμε λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ἡ τὴν
dὲ ἐπὶ ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπήκασεν τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημέ-
35 νῆν, ἀτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι᾽ ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην.
tαῦτ’ ἐπιεικῶς μὲν ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τι ἁτοπα, δηλοὶ μὴν ὁ ἐγὼ
βούλομαι σοι ἐνδείξαμενος, ἐάν πως οίος τε ὁ, πείσαι

493 'The cloyed will. That satiate yet
unsatisfied desire. 'That tub both filled
and running,' and All's Well i. 3. 193
'Yet in this captious and untenable
sieve, I still pour in the waters of my
love, And lack not to lose still.'

28. ἀπεικάσας: the necessary ob-
jects in the acc. and dat. are to be
supplied from the context.—τοῦναν-
tίον: construe with σοί.

29 f. ἐν 'Αιδοῦ: the following ety-
mological explanation is found also
elsewhere. It draws attention to a
consideration of the beyond and the
life after death, which plays an im-
portant part in the close of the dia-
logue. Cf. Phaedo 80 d, 81 c, d.

30. οὗτοι: points back, but is at
the same time fixed by the addition
οἱ ἀμύητοι.

32. ἐτέρῳ τοιούτῳ: "likewise." The
objects are different, but their defects
are similar.

33. ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων: Socrates
again refers to his authority, because
he is still engaged with the details of
the simile.

34. τὴν τῶν ἀμύητων: emphati-
cally added, because what follows ap-
plies only to οἱ ἀμύητοι. The soul is
here, as a whole, compared to a per-
forated sieve, whereas, just before,
only a part of it was compared with
the jar, because thereby was meant
the part attached to the body.

But the other part, the soul proper,
is brought into service to this bodily
part, so that it affords material for
it, and even assumes its nature. Cf.
Phaedo 66 d δουλεύοντες τῇ τοῦ σώμα-
tος θεραπείᾳ.

35. ἀπιστίαν: no contradiction to
the above πειστικῶν, which was said
only of the ἐπιθυμητικῶν of the soul.
By yielding to the sensual, the soul
loses its power of reception and re-
tention, of belief and knowledge.

36. ἐπιεικῶς: reasonably, fairly, and
then very likely, indeed.—ὑπό τι: somwhat, like ὑπὸ in ὑπόδομοσ Rep.
viii. 548 e, belongs to ἁτοπαν. Rid.
§ 131 cites Phaedr. 242 d ὑπὸ τι ἁ-
σεβή (λόγον). Cf. in Lat. subab-
surdus, subrusticus, etc.—μήν: yet, moreover, like the more usual μεν-
toī.

37. σοί: in Greek, when a pron.
has been expressed once with one of
the verbs of a series, it is not neces-
sary to express it a second time, even
though the second verb would require
a different case, as here.
metadésthai, ánti toû aplhéstos kai akolástos éxontos bíou tôn kòsmuws kai toûs aèl paroûsion ikavôs kai éxar-kóuntos éxonta bíou élesôthai. allà póteron peîtho ti se kai metatíthesai evnaimonostérous ein vai toûs kòsmous a tòwn akolástwn, hé oúth av allà polla toiaúta munhologôw, oudeiv ti mällou metadêtse;

KAL. Toût'h álthetaeroun eîrnêsas, ò Sôkrates.

XLVIII. Ïn. Fére de, állhen soi eikôna légo ek toû avtonu gamnasiou iti vûn. skópei gar ei toioûde légeis peri toû bíou èkatérou, toû te sôfronos kai toû akolá-stou, oîon ei duoûn avndrôw èkatérow píthoi pollôi eîen, kai 5 tû mên etérw ùmeis kai plérëis, ò mên oînon, ò de mêli-e-tos, ò de gálaktos, kai állh pollôi pollôn, námata de

493 38. metadéthai: denotes the change of an opinion or statement. Cf. Rep. i. 334 e allâ metadámetha: kînunvebomên gâr oûk órðas . . . ōnedôs.

38 f. ánti ... élesôthai: epexegetic, instead of wste élesôthai.

39. kòsmuws: chiastically contrasted with akolástos.

40. póteron peîtho : the question shows that Socrates himself attaches no especial cogency to the comparison. Cf. below, munhologôw.

41. metatíthesai: here equiv. to metathëmenos ëgei. Mutasne ita sententiam ut statuas feliciores esse modestos libidinosis? Heindorf.

44. toûto: refers to the second part of the double question.

XLVIII. 1. fére de: the employment of another simile after the preceding one is strange; but possibly the second contains an advance on the first, inasmuch as it extends the consideration from the nature to the life. It may, however, be only an-other version of the first one, as the scholiast suggests: ëv de ekheiin mên tûn Ptabagoreán oîkein, tûto de Sô-kratous, òs safèsteroun te kai plhkti-katérou.

2. gamnasiou: it is not necessary to refer this strictly to the philosophical school already mentioned. It rather has the meaning of "place of general exercise," the domain of im-agination and fancy from which So-crates (Plato) draws his new image. On the 'brachylogy' in τη vûn ("where we obtained the one just given"), see Kr. 48, 13, 9.

4. tôdu pollôi: by these are to be understood only the separate desires. Pleasures are the materials with which the jars are filled.

5. ùmeis: in the physical sense, e "undamaged," but with a pre-under-standing of the moral judgment in regard to them; hence the contrast is formed by saðrâ, as in 479 d.

6. pollôn: vîz. toioûtow chrêmátow or naûmátow. The common manner of
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἐκάστου τοῦτων εὔη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐτερος πληρωσάμενος μὴ τ' ἐποχετευόν μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἑνεκα 10 τούτων ἰσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δ' ἐτέρῳ τά μὲν νάματα, ὦσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖνω, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δὲ, τά δ' ἀγγεία τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, ἀναγκάζοντο δ' αἰε καὶ νῦκτα καὶ ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά, ἥ τας ἐσχάτας λυποῦτο λυπ. 494 πας· ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἐκατέρον ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ 15 ἀκολάστου εὐθαμομνήστερον εἶναι ἥ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου; πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμιον βίον τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείων εἶναι, ἥ οὐ πείθω;

Καλ. Οὐ πείθεις, δ' Σώκρατες· τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρωσαμένω ἐκεῖνω οὐκετ' ἐστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τούτ' ἐστιν, 20 ὃ νυνὶ ἐγὼ ἐλεγον, τὸ ὦσπερ λίθον ζήν, ἐπειδὰν πληρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἐτί μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν τὸ ήδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ως πλείστων ἐπιρρέειν.

493 expression would be ἀλλοι ἄλλων πολεάδων οὐ ἄλοι ἄλλων πολλοῖ πολλῶν.

7. χαλεπα: used absolutely and explained by the addition of καὶ ἐκποριζόμενα. Cf. below (11), where the supplement is self-evident.

8. οἱ μὲν ἐτεροι: i.e. ὁ σώφρων.

9f. ἑνεκα τούτων: "so far as it depends upon the filling of the casks or desires." Cf. Theaet. 148 δ προθυμιας μὲν ἑνεκα φαινεται.

11. πορίζεσθαι: probably middle. Kr. 55, 3, 8; H. 813.

14. ἄρα τοιοῦτον κτῆ.: comprehensive resumption of the protasis beginning with εἰ δουῖν.

16. πείθω τι: the adverbial acc. of the indef. neut. pron. is frequent. See H. 719 b; G. 100, 2. The repetition of πείθω shows that Socrates attaches no value to the comparison as a proof, for one simile can be offset by an- other, but it helps to clarify the idea.

20. τὸ ὦσπερ λίθον ζῆν: epexegetical to τοῦτο . . . δ κτῆ., in order to draw attention again to the earlier remark.—We must supply naturally the same subject to πληρώσῃ as to ζῆν.

22. ἐπιρρέειν: Callicles takes up b the simile of Socrates; but at the same time, in this treatment of it there may be some traces of the teaching of Gorgias, if, as is supposed, he accepted Empedocles' ideas of efflux and influx in his views of physics. Cf. Meno 76 c βούλει ὁδὸν σοι κατὰ Γοργιάν ἀποκρίνωμα; —Οὐκόν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατ' Ἐμπεδοκλή; καὶ πόρους εἰς οὺς καὶ διὸ ὃν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται. In this light the word πορίζεσθαι gains especial im- portance.
25. ἐκραίως: this compound with ἐκ is very unusual, but also here very exact.

27. χαράδριον: according to Arist. Anim. Hist. ix. 11, the χαράδριον was a bird of ugly voice and color, which lived in chasms and clefts of the rock, and came forth only at night. Others describe it as a very greedy bird, ὡς ἄμα τῷ ἐπιτυμῆ ἐκκρίνει. It is this peculiarity which explains the reference here. The duck has that reputation with us.— ἄλλῳ οὐ: we might also have simple οὐ (456 e), or καὶ οὐ (Kr. 59, 1, 10).

28. τοῦ τοιῶνδε λέγεις: viz. as the above (ἀλλ᾽... ἐπιρρέειν) used expressions. The following answer of Callicles, λέγω κτῆ, saves Socrates the trouble of enumeration.— τοῦ τοιῶνδε: see on 490 e.

c XLIX. 1. ἔγγει: the verb is regularly omitted with this exclamation, which is usually ironic. By the words τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας, Callicles gives Socrates an open field for attack. Hence the ironical praise. Callicles need only continue to make such rash statements to be soon silenced.

2. ὡς ἐοικε: by this expression Socrates reminds Callicles of the principle he had laid down in 482 e (cf. 489 a), in order, by this ironical praise of his determination which shrinks from no consequence, to make acceptable the diversion of the discussion to less pleasant subjects. At the same time, he shows that he feels himself compelled, by the results of Callicles' moral view, to carry the investigation into this field.

4. ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνήσθαι: the gen., on account of the meaning
ΚΑΛ. ᾽Ως ἀτόπος εἶ, ὦ Σῶκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δήμη- α γόρος.

Σ. Τογάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἑξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, οὐ δὲ οὐ μὴ 10 ἐκπλαγῆς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆς· ἀνδρείος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνοι μόνον.

ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ τούν καὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἥδεως ἄν βιώναι.
Σ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἥδεως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;
ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

15 Σ. Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κυησιώ·, ἢ ἐτι τί σε ε ἔρωτω; ὅρα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρίνει, ἐὰν τίς σε τὰ [ἐχόμενα] τούτων ἐφεξῆ ἀπαντά ἐρωτά· καὶ τούτων τοι-, ούτων ὄντων κεφαλαίων, ὁ τῶν κυναίδων βίος, οὖτος οὐ δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος; ἢ τούτων τολμήσεις λέ- 20 γεν εὐδαιμόνως εἶναι, εὰν ἀφθόνως ἐχωσιν ὅν δέονται;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ αἰσχύνει εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σῶκρατες, τοὺς λόγους;

Σ. Ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος, ὃς

494 of the adverb (cf. φθονεῖν τινι τινοι).  

c — κυησιώ·: contracted like ζην, ψην, 
etc. Cf. πεινην in b above.  
d 6. ὡς ἄτοπος εἰ κτ.γ. — δημηγύρος: see 
on 482 c.  

8. τογάρτοι: this strong inferential particle (cf. 471 c) serves to com- 
pel Callicles, who would gladly have 
evaded the answer by the general re- 
proach ὡς ἄτοπος εἰ, to a definite an- 
swer, by reference to 487 a, b.  

10. ἀνδρείος: with an allusion to 
491 b. It is contrasted with ἐκπλα- 
γῆναι, because, besides φρόνησις, brav- 
ery is the only virtue recognized by 
Callicles as necessary for a states- 
man. He must, therefore, display 
this quality himself.

16 f. τὰ ἐχόμενα: used absolutely 494 
would not indeed be unexampled (cf. 
Isoc. vi. 29 ἐκ τῶν ἐχομένων γνώσεωθε), 
but in connection with τοῦτος ἐπεξής 
is pleonastic. Otherwise Plato's usage 
is either τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα (Rep. iii. 
389 e) or τὰ τοῦτος ἐφεξῆς (Tim. 30 c, 
Phileb. 34 d).  

18. κεφαλαίον: without the article 
is rather uncommon (cf. 453 a, 472 c), 
but does occasionally occur. Cf. 
Dem. ii. 31. — οὐτος: points emphati- 

cally back to δ τῶν κυναίδων βίος, 
which has already received especial 
stress through the preceding word 
κεφαλαίον.  

21. εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων: is the same 
reproach which was made above, 
482 e.
24. \(\text{άνεδην}: \) without limitation, from the same root as \(\text{άνίημι}.\) —\(\text{oútω:}\) see on 408 e \(\text{άπλως oútως}.\)

26. \(\text{άλλ}: \) \(\text{έτι καὶ νῦν:}\) the last attempt to come to an understanding. Cf. Crito 44 b. The answer of Callicles tends to bring into the foreground the question of the identity or opposition of the agreeable and the good.

29. \(\text{άνομολογούμενος:}\) is not to be connected with \(\text{άνομαλογείσθαι,} \) "to repeat an admission already made and to come to an agreement," but is from \(\text{ομολογούμενος}\) in composition with a-privative. By this expression Callicles makes plain the recklessness of his thinking and the obstinacy of his disposition. The sentence is condensed by the omission of a self-evident clause: "in order that I may not make my statement inconsistent, (which I will do) if I say," etc.

31. \(\text{διαφθείρεις τοὺς πρώτους λόγους:}\) cf. Prot. 360 a \(\text{διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς εἰμιπροσθεν ομολογίας.}\) Callicles' words in 491 e and elsewhere gave reason to expect that he would speak his sentiments roundly without any hesitation. Cf. 492 d.

32. \(\text{ικανὸς . . . εξετάζως:}\) has reference to 487 e \(\text{ἐὰν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὄμολογησῃς μοι, βεβαισανισμένον τοῦτῷ ἡδη ἔσται ικανως.} \) —\(\text{έπερ . . . έρεῖς:}\) "if you will persist in speaking," with a decidedly unfavorable color.

33. \(\text{σαυτῷ:}\) rather stronger than \(\text{σοί.}\)

34. \(\text{kαὶ γὰρ σὺ:}\) complete the sentence from what precedes.

36. \(\text{ἄθρει:}\) like \(\text{σκοπεῖν} \) and similar verbs has the construction of verbs of fear.

37. \(\text{αἰνιχθέντα:}\) denotes the consequences previously intimated, though not definitely stated, by Socrates.
40 ἂν ὧς σὺ γε ὦτει, ὧν Σώκρατες.
Σ. Σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὧν Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἵσχυρίζει;
Καλ. Ἠγωγε.
Λ. Σ. Ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὡς σοῦ σπουδᾶς e ζουτος;
Καλ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα.
Σ. ἰθι δὴ μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε: ἐπι-
5 στήμην που καλεῖς τι;
Καλ. Ἠγωγε.
Σ. Οὐ καὶ ἄνδρειαν νυνὴ ἐλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπι-
στήμης;
Καλ. Ἐλεγον γάρ.
10 Σ. Ἀλλο τι οὖν ὡς ἐτερον τῇ ἄνδρειαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης
δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες;
Καλ. Σφόδρα γε.
Σ. Τί δέ; ἡδονήν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταύτον ἢ ἐτερον;
Καλ. Ἐτερον δήπου, ὡ σοφώτατε σὺ.
15 Σ. Ἡ καὶ ἄνδρειαν ἐτέραν ἡδονῆς;
Καλ. ὡς γάρ σὺ;
Σ. Φέρε δὴ ὁπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὦτι Καλλικλῆς

495 40. ὧς σὺ γε ὦτει: evasive, as 473
493 b b. The following question inquires
whether Callicles still holds to his
previous statement, while accepting
the consequences of it.
497 c L. 1. ἐπιχειρῶμεν: see on 492 d ἐπεξήρω.
Notice the determination
and assurance of the answers of Cal-
licles.
4 d. διελοῦ: because it is a question
of distinction between ideas.
7. νυνή ἐλεγές: inasmuch as Cal-
llicles had in 491 a, b classed together
ἄνδρειαν and φρόνιμοι.
10. ὡς ἐτερον (sc. ὦν): the omission
of the partic. in the acc. abs.
with an adj. and ὡς is very rare; e.g. 495
Prot. 323 b ὡς ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα ὄντιν c
οὐχὶ ἰμωσγέπως μετέχειν αὐτῆς. But
Heindorf supplies ὦν.
14. ὡ σοφώτατε σὺ: a humorously d
ironical intimation that Socrates was
asking something quite self-evident.
But Callicles should not recognize an
ἐπιστήμη and an ἄνδρεια, in addition to
"the good," if this is to find its real-
ization in ἡδονή. The argument
which begins 497 d is based upon
this contradiction.
17. ὁπως μεμνησόμεθα: this use of
ὁπως with the fut. is distinctively a
colloquialism, the majority of exam-

έφη Ἀχαρνεὺς ἦδο μὲν καὶ ἄγαθον ταύτων εἶναι, ἐπιστῆμη
μην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλους καὶ τοῦ ἄγαθον ἐτερον.

20 Καλ. Σωκράτης δὲ γε ἦμιν ὁ Ἀλωπεκήθευν οὕχ ὁμολο-
γεῖ ταῦτα; ἡ ὁμολογεῖ;

Σω. Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οὕμαι δὲ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὁταν ε
ἀυτὸς αὐτὸν θεάσηται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μου, τῶν εὗ
πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ κοινοτὸν ἤγει
25 πάθος πεποιθέναι;

Καλ. Ἐγώγε.

Σω. Ἀρ' οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἑστὶν ταύτα ἀλλήλους,
ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὁπερ περὶ ὑγείας ἔχει καὶ
νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἁμα δῆπον ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἀνθρω-
30 πος, οὐδὲ ἁμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγείας τε καὶ νόσου.

Καλ. Πώς λέγεις;

Σω. Οἶον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβῶν
σκόπει. νοσεῖ ποιν ἀνθρωπὸς ὀφθαλμοῦ, ἡ δόμομα ὀφθαλ-

406 μία;

405 ples being found in Aristophanes. For statistics, see GMT, 274.

17 f. Καλλικλῆς ἐφ᾽ Ἀχαρνεὺς: a humorous imitation of the custom
which prevailed in the public assembly,
according to which any one who
introduced a motion or resolution had
to add to his own name the name of
the deme to which he belonged; cf.
the famous line which used to afford
Philip of Macedon so much amusement.
Ἀμοσθένους Ἀμοσθένους Παρα-
νείς ταῦτα ἐπέβαλεν. Callicles falls in
with the humor immediately. Ἀχαρ-
νεῖ belonged to the φυλή Οἰνῆς, Ἀλα-
πεκῆ to the φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς.

19. τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ: does not properly
belong in this summing up (ὅπως
μιμηθοῦσαν οὖσαν) of the foregoing steps,
which define expressly the fact that
ἐπιστήμη and ἀνδρεία on the one hand
are quite distinct from ἦδον (τὸ
ἡδού) on the other. Still, by reason of
the identity of ἦδος and ἄγαθον main-
tained by Callicles, the ἄγαθον would
be very easily substituted for the ἦδος.

23. αὐτὸς αὐτὸν: “himself,” i.e. his own mind.

27. ἐναντία: i.e. logically contrary
and contradictory ideas, between
which a mean is not to be thought of.


33. ἀνθρωπὸς: the same as ὁ ἀνθρω-
πος above.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

35 Καλ. Πώς γάρ οὖ;  
Σω. Οὗ δήπου καὶ ύπιαίνει γε ἀμα τοὺς αὐτούς;  
Καλ. Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν.

Σω. Τί δέ; ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται, ἢρα  
tότε καὶ τῆς υγείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ  
40 τελευτῶν ἀμα ἁμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται;

Καλ. Ὡς τιστά γε.

Σω. Θαυμάσιον γάρ, οἴμαι, καὶ ἀλογόν γίγνεται. η  
γάρ;  
Καλ. Σφόδρα γε.

45 Σω. 'Αλλ' ἐν μέρει, οἴμαι, ἐκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ  
ἀπολλύει;  
Καλ. Φημί.  
Σω. Οὔκοιν καὶ ἵσχυν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὅσαυτως;  
Καλ. Ναὶ.

50 Σω. Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτήτα;  
Καλ. Πάννυ γε.

Σω. Ἡ καὶ τάγαθα καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τάναντια  
τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει καὶ ἐν  
μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἐκατέρου;

55 Καλ. Πάντως δήπον.

Σω. Ἐὰν εὑρωμεν ἀρα ἁττα, δὲν ἀμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ὑ  
ἀνθρωπος καὶ ἀμα ἑχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτα γε οὐκ ἂν εἶν  
το τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ κακὸν. ὄμολογονεμεν ταῦτα; καὶ εὖ  
μάλα σκεφάμενος ἀποκρίνου.

37. οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν: by the addition of οὖν, the relative seems to ac- 
quire the force of an indefinite. See  
Kr. 51, 15, 3; H. 285, 1002 a.

42. θαυμάσιον... γίγνεται: "the result (γίγνεται) so stated is unrea- 
sonable." Note that the Greek uses 
the ind. of the necessary conclusion,  
whereas Eng. would prefer the ideal " 
would be."

58 f. καὶ εὖ μάλα κτέ.: with this c 
formula Socrates warns Callicles of 
the importance of being careful in 
his response,—a warning which the 
latter ignores in the reckless assur- 
ance of his answer.
60 Καλ. Ἄλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὀμολογῶ.

Τ. Σ. ἤθε ἐπὶ τὰ ἐμπροσθεν ὀμολογημένα. τὸ πεινήν ἐλέγες πότερον ἤδυ ἢ ἀνιαρόν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινήν.

Καλ. Ἀνιαρόν ἐγώγη· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἤδυ.

5 Σ. Καὶ ἐγώ· μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν τὸ γε πεινήν αὐτὸ α ἀνιαρόν. ἢ οὐχὶ;

Καλ. Φημί.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψήν;

Καλ. Σφόδρα γε.

10 Σ. Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλεῖω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὀμολογεῖσ ἀπασαν ἐνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρόν εἶναι;

Καλ. Ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.

Σ. Εἰεν· διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἦδυ φῆς εἶναι;

15 Καλ. Ἔγωγη.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο οὖ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δὴπου ἐστὶν;

Καλ. Ναι.

Σ. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἢδονή;


2 f. αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινήν: added by Socrates that Callicles may not think at the same time of the satisfaction of the hunger. How close that idea lay is shown by Callicles' answer, in which he tries to guard himself by adding this idea.

d 5. καὶ ἐγώ· μανθάνω· the asyndetic union of two such expressions, one expressing assent, the other comprehension, is quite isolated and contrary to usage. Cf. 474 c, 490 d.—ἀλλ' 496 οὖν: but in any case, frequently associated with γε. Cf. 506 b and Apol. 27 c ἀλλ' οὖν δαμόνια γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὺν λόγον, 34 e, Prot. 327 c ἀλλ' οὖν αὐθενδαι γ' ἐν πάντες ἴσαν ἱκανοί.

9. σφόδρα γε: see on μᾶλλον in e below.

12. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα: further questions are superfluous.

16. τοῦτον οὖ λέγεις κτέ.: the concrete example διψῶντα πίνειν Socrates uses to distinguish and characterize the two ideas clearly. The generaliz-
20 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.
Ση. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις;
ΚΑΛ. Μάλιστα.
Ση. Δυσώντα γε;
ΚΑΛ. Φημί.
25 Ση. Λυπούμενον;
ΚΑΛ. Ναί.
Ση. Λεισθάνει οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν
λέγεις ἁμα, ὅταν δυσώντα πίνειν λέγησ; ἢ οὖν ἁμα τούτο
γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἶτε ψυχῆς εἶτε
30 σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γάρ, οἴμαι, διαφέρει. ἐστὶ ταῦτα
ἡ οὖ;
ΚΑΛ. Ἕστιν.
Ση. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττεω ἁμα
ἀδύνατον φῆς εἶναι.
35 ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ γάρ.
Ση. Ἀνιώμενον δὲ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν ωμολόγηκας. 497
ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.
Ση. Οὐκ ἀρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττεω οὐδὲ τὸ
ἀνιῶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἐτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὸν τοῦ ἄγαθον.
40 ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ἀττα σοφίζει, ὡς Σώκρατες.

496 ation that pain and pleasure can both e be present in the same act follows later.
22. μάλιστα: like σφόδρα γε in d above, gives emphatic assent. μάλιστα has become the general word for “yes” in modern Greek, almost to the exclusion of ραλ.
29 f. εἶτε ψυχῆς εἶτε σώματος: for Socrates’ argument it is immaterial whether pleasure and pain are looked upon as something bodily or something psychical; for psychology, not so. But here the question is only of the nature of the ideas them- 496 selves, the peculiarity of their association at the same place and time, which distinguishes them from that other class of mutually exclusive ideas.
34. φῆς: with reference to 495 e. The answer of Callicles shows that he still maintains his statement.
40. οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ἀττα σοφίζει: Callicles avoiding his defeat by complaining of Socrates’ methods. Cf. 511 a. σοφίζεσθαι is much the same as “subtilize,” “quibble.”
41. ἄκκιζει: 'this word and its derivative ἄκκιζωσ is used to denote any kind of mock modesty or prudery, especially, though not exclusively, on the part of women.' Thompson. To Socrates' words of encouragement Callicles angrily replies, "What nonsense are you still talking?" whereby, however, Socrates is not deterred from continuing his talk in the courtly manner which is characteristic of him. On the phrase ἐχων ληπεῖς see on 490 e.

47. οὐκ οἴδα ὅτι λέγεις: Callicles sees that from this new turn Socrates will draw the same conclusion which he has drawn above (ἐπερέω γινεται τὸ ἑδὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ). Hence he repeatedly refuses to answer, and so shows plainly that he wishes to break off the conversation. This leads to the deprecatory remark of Gorgias.

48. μηδαμῶς: don't! To be completed by some such general phrase as οὕτως ποίησις. The omission of the verb is common. Cf. Symp. 175 μηδαμῶς, ἀλλ' ἐπέ τε αὐτῷ. — That Gorgias here enters as mediator is quite in keeping with the role assigned him in this dialogue, in accordance with which he is distinguished from his companions by his personal dignity. See Intro. § 13.

50. άλλα τί σοι διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σῇ αὕτη ᾗ τιμή, ὃ Καλλικλεις, ἀλλ' ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὑπὸς ἀν βουληται.

55. Ερώτα δὴ σῇ τὰ σμικρά τε καὶ στενᾶ ταῦτα, ε ἐπείπερ Γοργία δοκεῖ οὕτως.
LII. Ση. Ευδαίμων εἰ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ὁμοὶ θεμιτοῦ εἶναι. οὖθεν οὖν ἀπέλπισε, ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἀμα παύεται διψῶν ἐκαστὸς ήμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.

5 Καλ. Φημὶ.

Ση. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἀμα παύεται;

Καλ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

Ση. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡ δονῶν ἀμα παύεται;

10 παύεται;

Καλ. Ναί.

Ση. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἁγάθων καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἀμα παύεται, ὡς σὺν ὁμολογεῖς· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;

Καλ. Ἐγώγε· τί οὖν δῆ;

15 Ση. Ὅτι οὖ ταῦτὰ γίγνεται, ὃ φίλε, τάγαθα τοῖς ἡδέσω οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀμα παύεται,

497 tio. — στενὰ: mean, paltry, is in c observation of the view expressed by Callicles in 485 d of the relative provinces of philosophy and politics.

LII. 1 f. τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι κτε.: two kinds of Eleusinian mysteries were distinguished, the greater and the lesser. In the great procession which on the 20th of Boedromion (September) conducted Iacchus to Eleusis, no one could take part who had not received previously at Athens the less and preparatory consecration (μύσαι, κάθαρσις, προτέλεια) in the month Anthesterion (February). By this he became eligible to initiation into the Greater Mysteries; and after initiation, as an initiated member (μυστης), to the ἐπιστευεῖα or view of the mysterious sacred relics and participation in the holy rites which were connected with the arrival of the procession at Eleusis and took place in the so-called τελεστήριον. — Socrates meets with most cutting irony the disdainful contempt with which Callicles regards dialectical methods. A different simile for the same matter is found in 514 e.

3. οὖθεν ἀπέλπισε: the interrupted argument is resumed again by Socrates at the point where it had been broken off by Callicles' refusal to answer.

7. ἡδονῶν: corresponding with what precedes we might expect ἡδόμενοι. The noun is used owing to ἐπιθυμῶν, which stands on the same plane as πεινῶν and as a kind of ἐνδεια (496 d) is an ἀνιαρόν. Hence the employment of λυπῶν below.

14. τι οὖν δῆ: well! what then? d

See on 453 b and 515 e.
182

PLATO'S GORGIAS.

St. I. p. 497.

τῶν δὲ οὐ, ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων. πῶς οὖν ταύτα ἂν εἰη τὰ ἡδέα τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς ἢ τὰ ἀνικαρὰ τοὺς κακοὺς; ἡαν δὲ βουλή, καὶ τῇ δ' ἐπίσκεψαι· οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτη ὁμολογεῖ. 20 οὖν. ἄθρει δὲ· τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἁγαθῶν παρουσία ἁγαθοὺς καλεῖσ, ὡσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οῖς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ; 25 ἔλεγε· ἢ οὗ τούτους ἁγαθοὺς καλεῖς;

Καλ. Ἐγγεγ.  Ἡκ. Τί δὲ; ἁγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς ἄφρονας καὶ δειλοὺς; οὐ γάρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἄνδρειούς καὶ φρονίμους ἔξεστιν. Ἡκ. Τί δὲ; παίδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἢδη εἴδες;

Καλ. Ἐγγεγ.  Ἡκ. Τί δὲ; ἄνδρα δὲ οὔπω εἰδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα; 30 Καλ. Οἶμαι Ἐγγεγ. ἄλλα τί τούτο;  Ἡκ. Οὐδέν. ἂλλ' ἀποκρίνων.  

Καλ. Ἐδον.

497 17. ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων: this seems otiose after the preceding sentence. If genuine, it must be considered as mere conversational fullness.

19. τῇ δὲ: refers naturally, according to the regular usage, to the argument begun in τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς κτέ. The introduction of this argument is, however, delayed by the parenthetical clause οἶμαι . . . άθρεὶ δέ. In this clause ταὐτή, though in sense also applicable to the argument which follows, is in form to be connected with τῇ δέ. The subject of ὁμολογεῖσθαι is general, and can be supplied from the clause πῶς οὖν κτέ.

20 f. τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς, τοὺς κακοὺς: the art. as in 490 e collects the individuals into a class or species. ἁγαθῶν is used on account of its nearness to ἁγαθοὺς, otherwise we should expect ἄρετῶν as in 506 d. The way in which we arrive at these ideas of distinction between species is shown by the same expressions which are employed in other places to explain the relation of the ideas to the things themselves. So besides παρουσία (παρείναι) we find κοινωνία and of things also κυττέχειν employed.

23 f. ἄφρονας καὶ δειλοὺς: "unreasoning and cowardly creatures." The absence of the art. does not cause obscurity, because the connexion shows ἁγαθοὺς to be the predicate. In the words ἄνδρειος κτέ. Socrates is referring to 489 e and 491 b.

30. τί τούτο: see on 448 d above.

32. ἔδον: the tense is due to the preceding question. English would require 'I have seen.' This would be permissible also in Greek. The aor. of verbs of perception states the fact; the pf. retains the image. The
Σα. Τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυποῦμενον καὶ χαίροντα;

Καλ. Φημί.

35 Σα. Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες;
Καλ. Οἶμαι ἐγώγε ὑπ' πολύ τι διαφέρειν.
Σα. Ἀλλ' ἄρκει καὶ τούτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἦδη εἴδες ἄνδρα δειλόν;

40 Καλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;
Σα. Τί οὖν; ἀπώντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροι σοι ἐδώκον μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἄνδρεῖοι;
Καλ. Ἀμφότεροι ἐμοίγε μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλη- σίως γε.

45 Σα. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει· χαίρουσιν δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;
Καλ. Σφόδρα γε.
Σα. Καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἐοικεῖν.
Καλ. Ναὶ.
Σα. Προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ ἄνδρεῖοι;

50 Καλ. Ἀμφότεροι.
Σα. Ἀρα ὑπότους;
Καλ. Μᾶλλον ἵσως οἱ δειλοὶ.
Σα. Ἀπώντων δ' οὔ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;

497 negation of the fact involves the negation of the image; hence the neg. is usually followed by the aorist. The pf. with the neg. is, however, also found; cf. Prot. 310 e. But the difference in the force is evident. In 38, below, the tense may be due to the desire for consistency, or to ἦδη.

498 38. ἄρκει καὶ τούτο: gives us to understand that Socrates was expecting a more definite answer.
43. Ἀμφότεροι μᾶλλον: Callicles tries to return such answers as will not afford Socrates any chance for argument. Such action borders on rudeness, and is almost equivalent to a refusal to answer. The addition that he makes, however, gives Socrates a hold. The answers which follow show that Callicles is not stating his real sentiments. The artistic design of the author is therefore now to make his defeat seem all the more decisive.
55 ΚΑΛ. Ἡσσως.
Σ. Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίροντες καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, ὥς σὺ φής, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἄνδρειων;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

60 Σ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ ἄνδρεῖοι ἁγαθοὶ, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοὶ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.
Σ. Παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίροντες καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἁγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοὶ;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.
Σ. Ἄρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσίν ἁγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἁγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ κακοὶ; ἡ καὶ ἐτι μᾶλλον ἁγαθοὶ [οἱ ἁγαθοὶ] καὶ κακοὶ εἰσίν οἱ κακοὶ;

LIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δι' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι λέγεις.
Σ. Οὐκ οἶος' ὅτι τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς ἁγαθῶν φής παρουσία εἶναι ἁγαθοὺς, κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἁγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονὰς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;

498 66. ἅρ' οὖν κτῆ.: this conclusion comes from the fact that Socrates, on the basis of the view set forth by Callicles in 491 e f f., uses in the predicate ἁγαθοὶ in place of χαίροντες, and κακοὶ in place of λυποῦνται, whereas these same words in the subject have an entirely different meaning, which is to be seen from the explanation of Callicles in 491 e d. The two predicates are to be conceived as belonging to two different sentences, thus: οἱ ἁγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ κακοὶ παραπλησίως εἰσίν ἁγαθοὶ and οἱ ἁγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ κακοὶ παραπλησίως εἰσί κακοὶ.

d LIII. 1. Ἀλλὰ λέγεις: this statement of Callicles may be meant in earnest, inasmuch as the previous words of Socrates are really some-what confusing, although they are simply a paradoxical conclusion from Callicles’ paradoxical propositions. But by confessing his inability to comprehend, Callicles gives Socrates the opportunity of supplying a proof of his previous exposition, and setting forth the principles upon which it rests. The distinction made in 497 e now becomes of value.

3. κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν: both the subj. as well as the subst. on which the gen. depends are to be supplied from the context. Note the chiasmus of the arrangement. — τὰ δὲ ἁγαθὰ κτῆ.: the preds. are τὰς ἡδονὰς, τὰς ἀνίας, the art. defining a class. The art. with ἁγαθὰ refers back to ἁγαθῶν. We should also expect one with κακά.
5 Ἐγώγε.
Ση. Οὔκοδόν τοῖς χαίρονσιν πάρεστιν τάγαθά, αἱ ἕδοναι, εἰπερ χαίρονσιν;
Καλ. Πώς γὰρ οὐ;
Ση. Οὔκοδόν ἁγαθῶν παρόντων ἁγαθοὶ εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες;
10 Καλ. Ναί.
Ση. Τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακά, αἱ λύπαι;
Καλ. Πάρεστιν.
Ση. Κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φής σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς ἐ
15 κακοὺς· ἦ οὐκέτι φής;
Καλ. Ἐγώγε.
Ση. Ἅγαθοὶ ἁρὰ οἱ ἄν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἱ ἄν ἀνιωμέν-
tαι;
Καλ. Πάνυ γε.
20 Ση. Οἱ μὲν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ ἥττον ἥττον, οἱ δὲ
παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;
Καλ. Ναί.
Ση. Οὔκοδόν φής παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι
tοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἁφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ
25 τοὺς ἄνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐτί τοὺς δειλοὺς;
Καλ. Ἐγώγε.
Ση. Συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοὶ, τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει
ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων· καὶ δῖς γὰρ τοι καὶ τρῖς φασιν
καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ἁγαθῶν 499
30 μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἄνδρείον φαμεν. ἦ γάρ;

408 20. οἱ μὲν γε μᾶλλον κτέ.: is to be e completed from the context thus: οἱ μὲν (ἂν) μᾶλλον (χαίροσι) μᾶλλον (ἀγαθόν) κτέ.
28. δῖς γὰρ καὶ τρῖς: this proverb is ascribed to Empedocles. Plato employs it also in Phil. 50 ε, where we read: τὸ δῖς καὶ τρῖς τὸ γε καλὸς ἔχον 498 ἐπαναπολείν τῷ λόγῳ. Cf. Soph. Phil. 6. 1238 δῖς ταῦτα βούλει καὶ τρῖς ἀναπολεῖν μ' ἐπη. The first καὶ means also, and its force extends over both members, as Phaedo 63 ε ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δῖς καὶ τρῖς πίνειν τοὺς τι τιοῦτον ποιοῦντας.
Plato's Gorgias.

St. I. p. 499.

KaL. Naį.
Σω. Kakōn de tōn āφrova kai δειλόν;
KaL. Pánv ge.
Σω. 'Agathōn de aδ tōn xaiρontα;

35
KaL. Naį.
Σω. Kakōn de tōn ānįwmeνou;
KaL. 'Anāγkη.
Σω. 'Aniāsθαι de kai xaiρeiν tōn āgathōn kai kakōν ĵmɔiws; ĵsws de kai málλon tōn kakōν;

40
KaL. Naį.
Σω. Oūkōν ĵmɔiws gýνetai kakōs kai āgathōs tã āgathō ĵ κai málλon āgathōs ó kakōs; ou taũta sūμβαινει kai tã prōtēra ekei̇na, ĵav tis taũta φη ḫïdēa te kai āgathâ ĵynai; ou taũta ānāγkη, ᵃ Kαλλίκleïs;

43. tã prōtēra ekei̇na: refer probably to the discussion of 494 a-195 a, where Socrates had urged Callicles to reflect whether he was determined to abide by his statement that ḫôδû and āgathōn are the same.

LIV. KaL. Pálai toì σou ākrōwmaì, ᵃ Σύκρατες, kathomologōn, ēnθymoûmeνos óti, kâv paĩçων tìs soi ēνδοφftimei̇ν, toũτou āsμéνos êxei ωσπερ tã meirâkia. ωs dhî sv ou oiei ême õ kai āllou õνtων tãs μεν bελτίουs ḫŏdonaś, tãs ðe xei̇rōus.

The comparison is not to be pressed. — ωs dhî sv ou oiei: see on 468 c. Callicles tries to heighten the probability that he was only joking, by himself characterizing his first statement as nonsensical.

5. ḫŏdanaś: the natural position would be tãs μεn ḫŏdonaś bελtîous kpté. The reason for the post-position is that the word is an afterthought of Callicles, added from the sudden consciousness that tãs μεn was not sufficiently definite. Just as if you suppose that I, etc., do not believe that some are better,—pleasures, I mean,—others worse.
ΠΑΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

Σημ. Ἰοῦ ἱοῦ, Ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανούργος εἰ, καὶ μοι εἰ ὁσπερ παιδὶ χρῆ, τοτὲ μὲν αὖ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ ᾔμην γε κατ’ ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθῆσεσθαί, ὡς ὄντος φίλου.

10 νῦν δὲ ἐμεύσθην, καὶ ὡς έουκεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρόν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τούτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἐστών δὲ δή, ὡς έουκεν, δ νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἥδοναί τινές εἰσω αἱ μὲν ἁγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί. Ἡ γάρ;

Καλ. Ναι.

15 Σημ. Ἄρ’ οὖν ἁγαθαί μὲν αἱ ὁφέλιμοι, κακαί δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί;

Καλ. Πάννυ γε.

Σημ. Ὡφέλιμοι δὲ γε αἱ ἁγαθῶν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακῶν τι;

6. Ἰοῦ ἱοῦ: exclamation of surprise and wonder, usually with a side-idea of ill-treatment (σχετιστικῶν ἐπηρρήμα), as Λρ. Νυμ. Ι Ἰοῦ ἱοῦ, Ὁ Ζεῦ βασιλεῖ, τὸ χρῆμα τῶν νυκτῶν δοσιν ἀπέραντον, but it also expresses pleasure, as e.g. Rep. iv. 432 A καὶ ἐγὼ κατιδών, Ἰοῦ ἱοῦ, εἰπὼν, Ὁ Γλαύκων· κινδύνουμεν τι ἔχειν ἵχνος (trace) καὶ μοι δοκεῖν τι πάνω τι ἐκφευγέσθαι ἡμᾶς. Ἐδ ἀγγέλλεις, ἦ δ’ ἰς.—πανούργος: sometimes associated with δεινός, denotes a rather excessive adroitness, bordering on rascality, as "artful," "sly"; also "knavey."

7. ὁσπερ παιδὶ: by a delicate use of his own comparison, Socrates characterizes Callicles' conduct in acting as if he were dealing with boys, not men, as improper and unworthy.—τότε μὲν αὖ: it must be confessed that αὖ in this position gives trouble. Cron thinks that it recalls a similar allegation in 491 b; but that is rather far-fetched.

8. καίτοι κτῆ.: in 495 a Socrates' faith in Callicles' παραφοῖα is shaken; in 497 a, that in his σοφία, and now, that in his εὐνοία.

9. ἐκόντος εἶναι: on the use of εἶναι in phrases, see GMT. 780 and Η. 956 a.

10 f. κατὰ τὸν παλαίον λόγον: a common way of introducing a proverb; cf. Symp. 195 b.

11. τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν κτῆ.: a mixture of two proverbs. The first one means literally, to "treat well what is at hand," i.e., 'to make the best of what one has,' according to the English saying. In almost the same sense we use the more colloquial 'grin and bear it.' The second proverb, δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον, applies more exactly to the case in point, the διδόμενον being naturally τὸ λεγόμενον. An English proverb which has much the same force is, 'do not look a gift-horse in the mouth.' After τοῦτο, τὸ διδόμενον serves for a relative clause.

18. κακαί: we should naturally ex-
20 ΚΑΛ. Φημι.

ΣΩ. 'Αρ' οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἶον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἄς νυνθῇ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίεν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς; ἀρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ύγιειν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡ ἰσχῦν ἡ ἄλλην τῶν ἄρετήν τοῦ σώματος, αὕται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ
25 τάναυτία τούτων κακαί;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ λύπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρηστάει εἴσων, εϊ αἱ δὲ πονηραί;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

30 ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστάς καὶ ἡδονάς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἱρετέον ἐστίν καὶ πρακτέον;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δῆ.

35 ΣΩ. Ἕνεκα γὰρ ποὺ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπαντα ήμῖν ἐδοξεῖν πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἔμοι τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἀρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεί οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασάων τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἤνεκα δεῖν πάντα τάλλα πράττεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνω τῶν ἄλλων; σύμψηφος ήμῖν εἰ καὶ 500

40 σόν ἐκ τρίτων;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώγωη.

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀρα ἤνεκα δεὶ καὶ τάλλα καὶ τὰ ἠδέα πράττευν, ἀλλ' οὐ τάγαθὰ τῶν ἡδεῶν.

499 rect βλαβεραί, but κακὸς is elsewhere d also used in this sense.

24. αὐταί μὲν: resumes αἱ μὲν τοῦ σώματος.

e 37 f. τέλος . . . τὸ ἀγαθόν: cf. 468 a ff. The subst. embraces in one idea what has been said, and thus gives it a form of general application.

a 39. σύμψηφος: reminds again of the formal vote, and hence sounds somewhat solemn. Cf. 501 c and 473 e f.

40. ἐκ τρίτων: “of the third part.”

Thompson. Cf. Symp. 213 b ὑπολύετε, παιδε, 'Αλκιβίαδην, ἵνα ἐκ τρίτων (i.e. with Agathon and Socrates) κατακέφαλα. In Tim. 54 a ἐκ τρίτου is used in much the same sense.
KAL. Πάνυ γε.  
45 Σο. 'Αρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστὶν ἐκλέξασθαι, ποία ἀγαθά — τῶν ἡδέων — ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἡ τεχνικὸν δεῖ εἰς ἐκαστὸν.

KAL. Τεχνικὸν.

LV. Σο. 'Αναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὃν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἔπυγχανόν λέγων· ἐλεγον γὰρ, εἰ μυημο-νεῖες, ὅτι εἰὲν παρασκευαί αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦτο μόνον παρασκευάζονται, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χείρον, αἱ δὲ γυνώσκουσαι ὅτι τε ἁγαθὸν καὶ ὁτι κακὸν. καὶ ἐπίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν, ἀλλ' ὅποτε τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἁγαθὸν τὴν ιατρικὴν τέχνην. καὶ πρὸς φιλίου, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, μὴτε αὐτῶς ὁιν δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζεων μῆδ' ὅτι ἄν τύχης.

500 45. παντὸς ἀνδρός: possessive gen. a in pred. See H. 732 a, c.
45 f. ποία . . . τῶν ἡδέων: the position of the gen. shows that it is an example of ἐπιφορά, based on the conclusion drawn in 499 b. The use of ὅποια after ποία may be due to euphonic reasons, or to its distance from the beginning of the question.
46. τεχνικὸν: i.e. of a man who understands the matter thoroughly, who is a master of his profession (whether art or science). Only this man can decide what is to be done and what not. The same point is made in Crito 47 a.

LV. 1. ἄν αὖ: the αὖ belongs to the dem. included in the relative. The arguments which Socrates again calls to mind were set forth in 464 b ff.
3. παρασκευαῖς: contrivances. This word, which is not found in the passage referred to, is used generally instead of ἐπιτηδεύσεις, θεραπεῖαι, as drawing more attention to the end in view (μεχρὶ ἡδονῆς). The prep. shows that the contrivances are not claimed to reach ἡδονή, but must be varied and directed until the object is compassed; hence παρασκευάζονται is conative.—αὐτὸ τοῦτο: i.e. the general idea, ἡδονή.
6 f. τῶν μὲν, τῶν δὲ: take up αἵ μὲν, αἱ δὲ. On the part. gen. with τιθέναι, see G. 169, 2; H. 732 a.
8. πρὸς φιλίου: so 519 e. Cf. Phaedr. 234 e εἰπὲ πρὸς Δώς φιλίου. This adjuration is designed to remind Callicles of his ostentatious profession of ἐννοια, which he had so quickly forgotten.
9. μὴτε αὐτῶς: finds its correlative in μὴτε ἀὖ τα περ' ἐμοῦ, while μὴδὲ serves only to connect the two sections of the first member.—ὅτι ἄν τύχης κτλ.: implies perverseness in addition to chance. Cf. 495 a, b, and 499 c.
10 παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ' αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοὶ οὔτως ἀποδέχον ὡς παίζοντος; ὁρᾶς γάρ, ὅτι περὶ τούτου ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οἱ λόγοι, οὔ τι ἀν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειε τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἀνθρώπως, η τούτο, ὡς τρόπον ζήν, πότερον ἐπὶ δὲ ὁποῖο παρακαλεῖς ἐμε, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ 15 ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντα τε ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτεύμονοι τοῦτον τῷ τρόπον, ὅν ἡμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύσῃ, ἣ ἐπὶ τόνδε τοῦ βίου τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τι ποτ' ἐστὶν οὕτως ἐκείνου διαφέρων. ἦσως οὖν βέλτιστόν ἐστι, ὃς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαρείσθαι, διελο- 20 μένους δὲ καὶ ὀμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἐστιν τούτω διττῷ τῷ βίῳ, σκέψασθαι, τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοι καὶ ὀπότερον βιωτέον αὐτῶν. ἦσως οὖν οὕτως οὕσθα τι λέγω.

Καλ. Οὔ δήτα.

500 12. οὖ: depends upon μᾶλλον and e is explained in η τούτο. Cf. Crito 44 ε τίς ἀν αἰσχὼν εἰή ταύτης δόξα ή δοκειν χρήματα περὶ πλείωνος ποιεῖσθαι η φίλους. See Kr. 47, 27, 8.—σπου- δάσει: in reference to an investigation which one should seriously prosecute.

12 f. σμικρὸν νοὺν ἔχων: indicates that the question is important for every one, not merely for statesmen and philosophers.

14. τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δή: ironically added as a matter already decided, because Callicles had so defined the sphere of the "real man."

17. ἐπὶ τόνδε: anacoluthic, as if ἐπὶ πότερον χρή βιον παρακαλεῖν had preceded, whereas with πότερον we must supply τούτον, i.e. τὸν τρόπον ζήν χρῆ.

18. διαφέρον: on the pred. use of the partic., see GMT. 830.

19. ὃς ἄρτι ἐπεχείρησα: we think at first of the question raised in 491 d ff. as to the nature of self-control, 500 which leads naturally to a distinction between what is good and what is pleasant, but we are also reminded of the earlier conversation with Polus and Gorgias (464 b) in which a distinction was drawn between true arts and various tricks of dexterity, which are designed only to cajołe.

20. εἰ ἐστιν κτῆ.: to be conceived, d not as an interrr. clause depending upon ὀμολογήσαντας, but as the protasis of a logical conditional sentence, the apodosis of which is formed by βέλτιστόν ἐστιν ... σκέψασθαι. The further investigation as to τί διαφέρετον can only take place in case the existence of these two views of life is definitely settled. —ὀμολογήσαντας: as well as διελομένους and διαρείσθαι, whose meaning is defined by its reference to 495 e, are used absolutely.

22. ὀπότερον βιωτέον: sc. βιον. Cf. 485 d and Apol. 38 a ὅ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὖ βιωτός ἀνθρώπ. 
οἵτινες εἰσπίτευσαν μοί, εἰ ἀρα σοι ἐδοξάσα τότε ἁληθῆς λέγειν.
ἐλεγον δὲ πον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὄψισινθεύν οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη ἐστι ἐμπειρία, ἡ δ' ἰατρική, λέγων ὅτι ἡ μὲν τοῦτον 501
5 οὔθεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὅν πρᾶτει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἐκὰστον δοῦναι, ἡ ἰατρική·
ἡ δ' ἐτέρα τῆς ἴδουνῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἐστιν

27. τὴν μὲν κτὲ.: explains ἐκατέρου
κτὲ. by substituting for the somewhat philosophical phrase (μελέτην . . . κτήσεως) one less technical (θηραν). But before Socrates proceeds further he deems it necessary to have these assumptions definitely agreed to, since, although they are indeed the result of the preceding investigations, Callicles has not expressly acceded to them.

1. πρὸς τούσδε: the distinctions between various ideas which have been drawn in ch. XVIII.—XX. serve for Polus as well as Gorgias, inasmuch as the latter entered the discussion again in 463 e of his own accord.

2. διομολογησαι: the διὰ implies 'finally,' 'definitely.' We should be more apt to use the καὶ in the demonstrative instead of the relative clause. — ἐδοξά: Cron thinks the use of the aor. instead of the pres. implies that Callicles must have already at the time come to a decision, though he had not expressed one. But while such was doubtless the case, it is not easy to draw such a conclusion from the tense, for the Greeks in such an expression looked rather to the idea of the whole complex.

4. ἡ δ' ἰατρική: the clause is to be completed from the first member. The following ἡ μὲν . . . ἡ δὲ κτέ. are arranged chiastically.

5. αἰτίαν: cf. 465 a, where the reference was especially to the means employed (ἂν προσφέρει); here it is more general (ἂν πράττει).

6. ἡ δ' ἰατρική: the addition of the substantive to the end of the first member was not necessary for clearness, but very conducive to it. Similarly Prot. 351 a.

7. ἡ δ' ἐτέρα τῆς ἴδουνῆς κτέ.: another case of anacoluthon. If the speaker had followed the line of construction begun in the previous clause, we should have had some
such phrase as ὄντε τὴν φύσιν κτέ., on which τῆς ἡδονῆς would depend, as in the case of τοῦτον above. In true conversational style, however, he is diverted from his line of thought by the relative clause, and proceeds to a detailed account of the method of the ἐμπειρία which κοιμήτη ἀτέχνως ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν ἔρχεται. The result is that τῆς ἡδονῆς is left without government, and that too without the speaker or hearers noticing it.

9. ἀλόγως: as 465 a ὃ ἐὰν ἢ ἀλόγων πράγμα, because the distinctive feature of a τέχνη consists in its ability δοῦναι λόγον. This must not be conceived as closely modifying διαριθμησαμένη, but as being a general criticism on οὐδέν διαριθμησαμένη (“quite foolishly”).

10. ὡς ἐπος ἐπείτη: probably belongs to the following negation. Cf. Αριστ. 17 a ἀληθὲς γε ὡς ἐπος ἐπείτη οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. See on 450 b.

12. ψ δῆ: refers to the whole preceding clause, i.e. equiv. to τῶν σφιζεσθαι μνήμην κτέ.

14. τοιαῦτα ἄλλα: “according to their nature similar, but different in their application.” Supply δοκοῦσιν out of the preceding δοκεῖ.

15. προμηθίαν τοῦ βελτίστου: designed to be in sharp contrast with the μνήμην τοῦ εἰσθότος γίγνεσθαι above.

16 f. ὁσπερ ἐκεῖ: i.e. in the case of the body.

18. ἤτοι δὲ ἡ βελτίων κτέ.: is a circumlocutory reference to φύσις, as ὄντε μέλον in the following member is to αἰτία. The abs. partic. μέλον is likewise combined with an appos. partic. in Phaedr. 235 a ὃς οὐ πάνυ εὐπορών τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ή ἵσως οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ τοιοῦτον.

22. καὶ περὶ ἄλλο: indefinite and c merely preparatory.
πλατωνος γοργιας

23. ἀσκέπτως ἔχων: like ἀμελῶν or ἀλλογρωτῶν. Cf. above, b.

24. συγκατατίθεσαι: reminds again of voting (as above, 500 α. σύμψηφος). It is regularly used without an obj. Here we must consider δόξαν as taking the place of the word ψῆφων, to be construed with this verb after the analogy of the regular phrase θέσθαι ψῆφων. See Thompson. συγκατατίθεσαι has also the meaning "lay aside for future use."

26. οὐκ ἔγογξε κτῆ.: an emphatic assent (see on 453 d). But Callicles weakens it by the addition of ἢνα... χαρίσωμαι, referring to 497 b, c.

31. μηδέ: "without."

LVII. 4. τῆς αὐθητικῆς: Socrates so chooses his examples that he passes from species to species in an ascending scale, and at the same time gradually approaches nearer to rhetoric. Playing the flute passed for the lowest species of music. Cf. the boyish words of Alcibiades in Plut. Alc. 2 αὔλειτωσαν θεβαίων παιδεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἵσασι διαλέγεσθαι. In Athens it was left mostly to such as made a business of it. Female flute-players were accustomed to appear at banquets. The instrument was probably more like a clarionet than a flute.

6. διώκειν, φροντίζειν: these infinitives, while in sense epexegetic to τοιάστη ἐστι, are syntactically dependent on δοκεῖ. See on 487 c.
9. ή ἐν τοῖς ἀγώσιν: Plato considers as a species of flattery only that kind of cithara-playing which was practised in the musical contests at the public festivals. On the other hand, he recognizes a variety of this music which may be helpful to the proper cultivation of the soul of the individual who practises it, and indeed may elevate his moral feeling. This he himself recommends in Rep. iii. 399 d f. Cithara-playing was a part of the education of all young Athenians.

11. ή τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία: διδασκαλία denotes the drill of the chorus for orchestral exhibition as well as for singing. It was the business of the poet. Hdt. i. 23 says of Arion ἐόντα κιθαρίζον τῶν τότε ἐόντων οὐδένς δεύτερον καὶ διδόμουν πρῶτον ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἥμεις ὤμεν ποίησαντά τε καὶ νομάσαντα καὶ διδάξαντα ἐν Κορίνθῳ. What is to be understood here by choruses is explained by the addition ή διδομένων ποίησις. It is not all choric lyric which is condemned, but only that part of it which from its connexion with the Dionysus cult had found entrance into Athens and had there been much fostered by the state, which entrusted both native and foreign musicians with the arrangement and production of the dithyramb at the Dionysiac festivals, where contests (ἀγώνες) took place in it. The founder of dithyrambic melic was the just-named Arion of Methymne (b.c. 600), who resided at the court of Periander of Corinth. He was said to have introduced the strophic arrangement, and the so-called cyclic choros (consisting of fifty members), which was thus named because the chorus was arranged in a circle around the altar. The second period of the dithyramb begins with the settling in Athens of Lasus of Hermione, a contemporary of the Pisistratidæ and a teacher of Pindar. But it soon degenerated in Athens by excessive over-refinement and fantastic cultivation, until it received a new impulse towards the end of the Peloponnesian war by the more artistic cultivation of the dramatic and musical elements by Philoxenus of Cythera.

13. Κινησίας: a very popular dithyrambic poet about the middle of the Peloponnesian war, who deserves a great deal of censure for having helped to debase dithyrambic poetry. He tried to produce a striking effect by fantastic, misty, and often immoral subjects, combined with a pompous diction, excess of imagery, and shallow figures of speech. And he succeeded in a way, for he was ridiculed by the comic
poets Strattis (who composed a comedy upon him), Plato Comicus, and also Aristophanes in the Clouds and the Frogs, as a sinner against art and taste,—one of those who are called in Nub.333 κυκλίων χορών φσαμαςκάμπται. Of his father Meles we know less; he was certainly less important than Cinesias, though he also is ridiculed by the comic poets.

15. τον θεατων: just as in English the general designation for the people who fill the theatre is 'audience,' whether the performance be an opera or a drama, so the Greeks used θεαται, "the spectators," as a general designation for the crowds who thronged the Dionysiac theatre, no matter what sort of a performance was given. So, just below (20), we find ἡνια γαρ ἄδων τον θεατας.

21. οὔχι ἢ τε κιθαρῳδικὴ: this conclusion we must suppose to be permitted because at the moment Callicles can cite no example to the contrary. κιθαρῳστικὴ (above, 501 e) and κιθαρῳδική, which are properly distinct (cf. κιθάρισις and κιθαρῳδία Το 533 b), are here interchanged in accordance with colloquial usage. To fix the meaning of κιθάρισις, the adj. φιλη was added. Cf. Legg. 669 e.

24. ἡ σεμνὴ: viewed in the light of the result which Socrates deduces, this word as well as θαυμαστὴ may be considered ironic. But tragedy was regularly designated σεμνὴ, "venerated," as being the most noble presentation of poetry before the public mind, both from its sage maxims and from the moral effect which was ascribed to it. Socrates' actual view of poetry is well stated in Apol. 22 b, c ἐγνων οὖν και περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖν & ποιοῖν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ενθουσιάζοντες ἄσπερ οἱ θεομάντες καὶ οἱ χρησιμοί. After giving the general question, Socrates follows it by a disjunctive special one. The repetition of the art. ἡ is illustrated by Stallbaum from Symp. 213 ε τὴν τοῦτον ταυτρί τὴν θαυμαστὴν κεφαλῆν. It is not common,
PLATO'S GORGIAS.

St. I. p. 502.

τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ, ὡς σοι δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς, θεαταῖς μόνον, ἡ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἐὰν τι αὐτοῖς ἰδὺ μὲν ἢ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δὲ, ὅπως τούτο μὲν μὴ ἔρει, εἰ δὲ τι τυγχάνει ἄθετος καὶ ωφέλιμον, τούτο δὲ 30 καὶ λέξει καὶ ἄφεται, ἐὰν τε χαίρωσιν ἐὰν τε μὴ; ποτέρως σοι δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἡ τῶν τραγῳδιῶν ποίησις;

Καλ. Δῆλον δὴ τούτο γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὧτι πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὀρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεα- 35 ταῖς.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νυν ἡ κολακείαν εἶναι;

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σο. Φέρε δή, εἰ τις περιέλοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τὸ

502 For the construction ἐπὶ τινι, cf. Lach.

183 a ἕκεινοι μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων σπουδάζουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις, Xen. Mem. i. 3. 11 σπουδάζειν . . . ἐφ’ ὀφ’ οὖν ἂν καὶ μανικόμενοι σπουδάσεις. We find περὶ τι in Phaedo 64 a φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἰδιότατας. For the pf. equiv. to a pres., cf. the passage from Phaedo just quoted.

25 ἐπέτερον ἐστιν . . . ὡς σοι δοκεῖ: the more usual idiom would require πότερον δοκεὶ σοι εἰναι.

27 ff. ἐὰν μὲν, εἰ δὲ: this variation in the employment of the cond. particles has come to be a rule; i.e. the negative of an ἐὰν μὲν clause is introduced by εἰ δὲ. If the condition is particular, we find εἰ with the fut. indic.; if generic, εἰ with the pres. indic., which latter is frequently omitted. In the earlier usage the custom was to give the favorable condition first; hence εἰ δὲ μὴ comes to have an unpleasant or unfavorable connotation, as here. Cf. also 481 b. 502 The omission of μὲν after ἐὰν is probably due to its employment with ἢδυ. On the repetition of μὲν and δὲ with both clauses, see on 512 a.

29. ἄθετος καὶ ωφέλιμον: the connexion of these two words with καὶ seems somewhat strange, when one considers both the relation of the ideas themselves and the fact that they are preceded by ἢδυ μὲν . . . πονηρὸν δὲ. The design is probably to emphasize the co-existence of the two ideas, and not their distinctness. There is no contradiction to ἄθετος in the following ἐὰν τε χαίρωσιν κτέ.; it refers to the manner in which the spectators will receive his words, concerning which the poet has no reason to trouble himself, provided what he says is correct. — On the omission of ὄν, see GMT. 902; P. 384 a.

30. λέξει καὶ ἄφεται. viz. in the dialogue and choruses.

39. περιέλοιτο: Socrates conceives e
40 te melos kai ton rheumon kai to metron, allo ti h logoi ginontai to leiptomevov;
Kal. 'Anagkhe.

Sigma. Ourouin prs polvn ochlon kai dhemon outoi legontai oi logoi;

45 Kal. Phemi.
Sigma. Demeugoria ara tis estin h poietike.
Kal. Phainetai.

Sigma. Ourouin phetorikhe demugoria an eih h ou phetoreuev dokousi sou oi poietai ev tois theatrois;

50 Kal. Emove.

Sigma. Nwn ara hmeis hurykamev phetorikin tina pros dhemon touonton oion pайдwv te omou kai gnvaikwn kai andrown, kai doulwv kai eleuthewv, hyn ou panv agamevtha kolakikin gar autinu famen einai.

55 Kal. Panu ye.
LVIII. Sigma. Eleven ti de h pros ton Athnaiwn dhemov

502 the difference between prose and poetry to lie simply in the dress, which in the case of poetry surrounds the thought as the shell does the kernel, and is only so far of value.

40. melos: i.e. the musical element, the melody, which is especially prominent in lyric productions. — rhymin: i.e. the regular movement, at the basis of which lies the metron, syllable and verse measure.

41. ginontai: prove to be.

46. demugoria: here employed without any unpleasant connotation. It might seem somewhat strange that Callicles so readily admits that demugoria is phetorikhe, — an admission on which the whole deduction rests. The reason may be that these word-artists were very prone to extol the universality of their art, without regard to consequences. See Socrates' conversation with Gorgias (especially ch. XI.).

52. oivon ... gynaikwn: one is certainly justified in assuming according to this passage that women were admitted to the tragedies; whether they also had the right to attend the comedies remains doubtful. The admission of slaves to the theatre was always restricted.

LVIII. 1. eleven: marks the conclusion of one part of the argument, viz. the premises from which the conclusion is to be drawn. Its employment here, however, also draws especial emphasis to the fact that these premises are definitely settled.
2. εν ταῖσ πόλεσιν: in the political sense of the word. Cf. Soph. Ant. 17.17 πόλεις γάρ οὐκ ἐσθ' ήτις ἀνδρός ἐσθ' ἐνός.

3. τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων: is ironic. They consider themselves to be free men, although they are really, even according to the true opinion of Callicles (cf. 489 e above), slaves. Cf. Dem. Ol. iii. 30 τὸ μὲν πρότερον στρατεύεσθαι τολμῶν αὐτὸς ὁ δῆμος δεσπότης τῶν πολιτευομένων ἢ καὶ κύριος αὐτὸς ἀπάνταν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, — νῦν δὲ τοῦνατ' κύριοι μὲν οἱ πολιτευόμενοι τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ διὰ τούτων ἀπαντά πράττεται, όμεις δ' ὃ δῆμος ἐν ὑπηρέτου καὶ προσθήκης μέρει γεγένησθε.

6. ἦ καὶ οὗτοι κτῆ.: testimony to the correctness of this statement is found in the very numerous references and complaints found in the orators, notably Demosthenes. Of course, Plato meant by τὸ βελτίστον something a little different from the orators. Cf. Isoc. de Pace § 5 καὶ γάρ τοι πεποίηκατε τοὺς ῥητορας μελετῶν καὶ φιλοσοφοῦνταμενοι τῇ τὰ μέλλοντα τῇ πόλει συνοίσειν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸς ἀρέσκοντας ὑμῖν λόγους ἐρώσασιν. The apparent pleonasm arising from the recurrence of the same idea in but slightly varied form is artistic in showing that this thought lay uppermost in the speaker's mind.

8. ὠσπερ παίσι: reminds of 464 d.

12. οὐκ ἀπλοῦν: the word has its fundamental meaning. The question requires a double answer. Cf. Luch. 188 e ἀπλοῦν τὸ γ' ἐμὸν περὶ λόγων ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ βουλεύειν, οὐ χαίρει, ἀλλ' ἀρεσκοῦν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν δόξαι τῷ φιλόσοφος εἶναι καὶ ἀδ μισόλαγος. Cf. also 408 e ἀπλῶς οὗτως.

15. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ἐστι διπλῶν, τὸ μὲν


19. ἐτέρον πον τοῦτον κολακεῖα ἂν εἰ σκλαφόντα δημηγορία, τὸ δ’ ἐτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὡς βέλτισται ἐσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἳ ψυχαὶ, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τα βέλτιστα, εἰτε ἢδίω εἰτε ἀγάδηστερα ἢται τοῖς ἀκούον.

20 σω. ἂλλ’ οὐ πῶποτε σὺ ταύτην ἐιδες τῇ ῥητορικῇ. ἢ β εἰ τινα ἕχεις τῶν ῥητόρων τουτοῦτον εἰπεὶν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἐφρασας τίς ἔστιν;

Καλ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔχω ἐγωγεῖ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα.

25 Σω. Τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινα ἐιπείν, δι’ ὀντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναίοι βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδῇ ἐκεῖνος ἥρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόςθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὀντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἔστιν οὕτως.

Καλ. Τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν

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503 19. ἐτὲ ἢδιω εἰτε ἀγάδηστερα: Demothenes, who in many speeches combats the πρὸς ἢδιων and πρὸς χάριν δημηγορεῖν, says in Ol. iii. 18, in harmony with Plato’s teaching, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τα βέλτιστα ἀντὶ τῶν ἢδιων, ἃν μὴ συναμφότερα ἐξήλαμβανειν.

b 21. τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν: speak of as such.

21 f. τί οὐχὶ ... ἐφρασας: in passionate questions τί οὐ is usually construed with the norist. The question marks impatience that a thing which is future is not past. The idea is usually modal, “why will you not?” Cf. Phaedo 80 a εἰ τις ὑμῶν εὐποράτερος ἐμοῦ τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο. Different in 468 c.

26. αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν: αἱ ῥῆμα μέσον (voc media). Originally “to bear the blame,” it was gradually worn down until it became merely a circumlocation for λέγεσθαι, as Theaet. 169 a ἰν δὴ σοὶ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν, or Rep. iv. 435 c οἱ δὲ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τῇ αἰτίᾳ (sc. θυμοειδεῖς εἶναι). Usually, however, it retains its bad sense, e.g. Apol. 38 εἰ ἤναμ ἔστε καὶ αἰτίαν — ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόματε.

28. οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἔστιν: when τίς εἰ instead of the more regular ὅστις is used after a neg., it should be conceived rather as a direct question. See on 447 d.

29. Θεμιστοκλέα κτι.: it is noteworthy that Callicles passes over Aristides, whom Socrates mentions later with respect, and whom also Demothenes in Ol. iii. 21 speaks of among the statesmen who were still honored down to his time. But Callicles was probably hardly able to appreciate the uprightness and unselﬁshness of Aristides, which was displayed so prominently in the formation of the Delian League.—ἀκούεις: Greek, like the Eng., often uses the pres. of the verbs of perception where the pf. would be more exact. See GMT. 28; H. 827.
30 γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτού τὸν νεωστὶ νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὔ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας;

Σα. Εἰ ἐστὶν γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἢν πρῶτον σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετῆν, ἀληθῆς, τὸ τάς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποσπασμάτων καὶ τὰς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὀπέρ ἐν τῷ

35 ύστερῳ λόγῳ ἡναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν, οτι αἱ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμίῶν πληροῦμενα βελτίων ποιοῦσι τὸν ἀνθρωπον, αἱ ταύταις μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἱ δὲ χεῖρω, μὴ· τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι· τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τοιοῦτων τινὰ γεγονέναι ἔχεισ εἰπεῖν;

Καλ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἐγγυως πῶς εἴπω.

LIX. Σα. Ἀλλ' εὰν ζητῆσι καλῶς, εὐρήσεις· ὅδωμεν δὴ ὀὔτωσι ἀτρέμα σκοποῦμενοι, εἰ τὰς τοιούτων τοιοῦτος γέγο-

30. Περικλέα τουτού τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα: we must guard against drawing the conclusion from this passage that this dialogue was intended to be understood as held soon after Pericles’ death. See Introd. § 18. For νεωστὶ simply means “lately” as compared with the other statesmen mentioned, and the interval between that and the date of the dialogue may still have been a great one. Cf. Hdt. vi. 40. See also on 523 b. The same is true of the Lat. nuper, as we see from Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 50. 126 Quid ea, quae nuper, id est paneis ante seculis, medicorum ingeniiis reperta sunt.

31. οὗ ἀκήκοας: sc. λέγωντος. A possible reference to 455 e.

32. εἰ ἔστιν γε κτέ.: “yes, if, etc.” The answer is so closely connected with the preceding question that there is no need of supplying an apod. In the second member, εἰ δὲ μὴ κτέ., for which we must supply a pred. from the first, instead of the expected criticism of the men mentioned we have a question based on the principle just proved.

34. τοῦτο: viz. τὸ ... ἀποσπασμάτων. As a pred. supply ἀρετῆν ἀληθῆς ἐστίν. We should expect after ἀλλ' ὀπέρ ... ὁμολογεῖν some expression corresponding to τὸ ... ἀποσπασμάτων, instead of which we find ὅτι κτέ., due to ὁμολογεῖν, with which we must again supply ἀρετῆν ἀληθῆς ἐστὶν to govern ἀποτελεῖν.

34 f. ἐν τῷ υστερῷ λόγῳ: refers to 499 e. τοῦτο δὲ continues the recapitulation, and refers to 500 a. Instead of τέχνην τινά, which we should expect, we find by an anacoluthon the nom. as if ὁμολογηθῇ preceded. On the neglect of the assimilation in τοῦτο, see Kr. 61, 7, 4.

39. οὐκ ἔχω: Callicles does not d understand the standard of judgment, to the exposition of which Socrates now turns.

LIX. 2. οὔτωσι ἀτρέμα: quietly, just as we are. οὔτως is frequently used by itself to denote “under the conditions or circumstances in which we are at present,” and often with
νεν. φέρε γάρ, ο άγαθός άνήρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἄ ἄν λέγη, ἀλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῆ ἑρεὶ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων 5 πρὸς τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέπουν· ἐπὶ τὸ πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἐργον ἐκαστος οὐκ εἰκῆ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ἀ προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἐργον τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἄν εἶδος τι αὐτῷ σχῆ τούτο ὁ ἐργάζεται. οἶον εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς ὦκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυ-10 πηγοὺς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργοὺς, ὄντων βούλει αὐτῶν, ὃς εἰς τάξιν τών ἐκαστός ἐκαστον τίθησιν ὁ ἄν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἐτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἀρμόττεν, ἐως ἄν τὸ ἀπαν συστήσῃτα τεταγμε-504 νον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πράγμα. καὶ οἱ τε δὴ ἄλλοι

503 an adverb when it is to be translated separately. Sometimes it follows the adverb, and sometimes it has itself an explanatory addition, as Prot. 351 ε ἀπλῶς οὕτω, ὃς σὺ ἐρωτάς. Cf. 460 ε, 464 β, 468 ε, 478 α, 494 δ.

4 f. ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι: with a view to something, which must, in contrast with εἰκῇ, be a definite object, as is afterwards more clearly shown. See on 474 δ.

5 ff. οἱ ἄλλοι ... προσφέρει: a case of part. apposition. See G. 137, n. 2; Η. 624 δ. Cf. 450 δ. The thought with προσφέρει is of the single articles out of which the object is to be made.—δημιουργοῖ: see on 452 α.

8. ὅπως ἄν ... σχῆ: a general rel. sentence, giving the opposite to εἰκῇ, “that it may acquire for itself some form.” The second aor. of ἔχειν is the only second aor. which seems to have an ingressive force. See Gildersleeve’s note to Morris’ Thuc. i. 12.3.—εἶδος: i.e. the outward appearance which an object displays, its figure and form, an image of which the artist carries in his mind and gazes upon with the 503 eye of fancy.

8 f. εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν: with such conversational expressions we should refrain from supplying any definite apod., as doubtless none was felt. The force of this phrase approaches that of a mild ἵνα, ἵπτο, after which the objective clause follows naturally with ὃς. The subject ἐκαστος distributes the τοὺς ζωγράφους which has been appropriated as the obj. of ἰδεῖν.

13. συστήσῃται: is applicable to 504 the form as a whole, because it is only a by the harmony of its several parts (τὸ ἐτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ ἀρμόττευν) that it exists. Cf. Phaedr. 269 e το δ’ ἐκαστα ... λέγειν τε καὶ τὸ ἄλον συνιστασθαι.

14. κεκοσμημένον: this word, as well as κόσμος below (19), has, of course, no reference to any external adornment, but only to an endowment with such qualities as are requisite for the ἀφετῆ of the whole. See on ε below.

14 f. οἱ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοῖ: would require properly some such
15 δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὐς νυνίδῃ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, παι-
δοτρίβαι τε καὶ ιατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα καὶ συν-
tάττουσίν. ὀμολογοῦμεν οὔτω τοὐτ' ἐξειν ἢ οὔ;
Καλ. Ἐστω τοῦτο οὔτω.
Ση. Τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχόνσα οἰκία χρηστὴ ἢν
20 εἰς, ἀταξίας δὲ μοχθηρά;
Καλ. Φημί.
Ση. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῦν ὁσαυτῶς;
Καλ. Ναι.
Ση. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματα φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα;
25 Καλ. Πάνω γε.
Ση. Τί δ' ἡ ψυχή; ἀταξίας τυχόνσα ἐσται χρηστὴ, ἢ
τάξεως τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου τυνός;
Καλ. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθε καὶ τούτο συνομολογεῖν.
Ση. Τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς
30 τάξεως τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομενῶ;
Καλ. Τγίειαν καὶ ἵσχυν ἵσως λέγεις.
Ση. Ἐγώγε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομενῶ ἐκ ε

504 pred. as κοσμούσιν ἐκαστός το ἐκαστόν
a ἔργον. But the general thought is
here, as often, to be completed by a
kind of zeugma from the special one
to which the discussion hurries.
15. οὖς νυνίδῃ ἐλέγομεν: sc. in 500 a,
which in turn refers to 464 b ff. — The
body serves in general as an analogy
for the soul.
18. Ἐστω: the inv. indicates only
a tentative concession, which Callic-
icles reserves the privilege of recall-
ing if he chooses. The same feeling
is felt in ἀνάγκη συνομολογεῖν below.
24. καὶ μὴν κτῆ.: is to be com-
pleted with necessary changes from
the preceding question of Socrates
(τάξεως ἄρα κτῆ.). By καὶ μὴν (and
indeed) we pass to the more impor-
tant part of the argument. Here also the
general ideas τάξις and κόσμος
receive special limitations.
29 f. τῷ γιγνομενῷ: belongs to
ὄνομά ἐστιν, while ἐν τῷ σώματι, in
looser relation to the whole, denotes
the range to which the question ex-

tends.
31. ἵσως λέγεις: in the answer of
Callicles shows that, while indeed
according to his feelings he would
regard such a relation as false and
impossible, his reason compels him
to admit its truth.
32. ἐγγιγνομενῶ: the use of the e
compound verb here, in place of the
simple one in the other member of
the comparison, is probably due to
its close connexion with ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.
καὶ τὸν κόσμον; πειρῶ εὑρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ἀσπέρ ἑκένω τὸ ὄνομα.
35 Καλ. 'Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὥς Σῶκρατες;
Σω. Ἀλλ' εἰ σοι ἡδιόν ἔστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρώ· σὺ δὲ, ἂν μὲν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔλεγχε καὶ μή ἐπίτρεπε. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεις ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεῖνον, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ ἀλλη ἀρετή τοῦ σώματος. ἔστιν ταῦτα ἡ οὐκ ἔστιν;
Καλ. Ἃ' Ἐστω.
Σω. Ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεωι καὶ κοσμήσεις νόμιμα μόνον τε καὶ νόμος, ἄθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμοι ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φησὶ ἡ οὐ;
45 Καλ. ἃ' Ἐστω.

LX. Σω. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἑκένως, ὁ τεχικὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσούσει ταῖς

504 35. τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις: on the meaning of the interro. form, see on 503 b. The question is of the nature of an evasion of the answer, which Callicles pushes upon Socrates to escape responsibility. Cf. 470 b.
37. φάθι: see on 475 e. — εἰ δὲ μῆ: see on 502 b. — ἔλεγχε: with this and ἐπίτρεπε (yield) the neuter object ("what I say") is understood. In a similar way ἐπίτρεπειν is used absolutely, Apol. 35 b and elsewhere.
40. ἀρετή: used at first in the general sense of "proper function or condition," so that it can afterwards appear in its moral force without thereby the standard of judgment being changed.
42. νόμοι τε καὶ νόμος: sc. ὄνομα εἶναι. Both expressions are found elsewhere associated in order to express the idea as fully and completely as possible, e.g. Crito 53 e. Here there is the more reason to add νόμος because Callicles had previously used this word in the passage where he first gave expression to his scorn of right and law (ch. XXXVIII. ff.). The corresponding disposition is also elsewhere called κόσμοι. Cf. the passage in Crito τὰς τε εἰνόμουμενα πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν κοσμωτάτων. Αρροπος is Phaedo 114 e κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχήν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀντίθετοι κόσμῳ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία.
44. ταῦτα: with free reference to what precedes and without assimilation to the predicate, denotes the qualities expressed by νόμιμοι and κόσμοι.
45. ἔστω: see on a above.

LX. 1. πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων: in the choice of words Socrates goes back to what was said in 503 e. Although it is by the λόγοι especially that the soul will be shaped, yet
other influences may be brought to bear, just as the orator or statesman (a good specimen of such an orator was Demosthenes) has power to cause gifts to be made to the people—as, for example, the ðeðερίκον, the δικαστή-κόν, the στρατιωτικόν, and the βουλευτικόν, and the division of booty, public spectacles, etc.—and also to be taken away from them, for example, by taxes (εἰσφοραί) or the abolition of the gifts mentioned.—The connexion forbids us to think of any rougher kind of deprivation, which seemed to Polus (406 e) so enviable a privilege of power.

5. αὐτοῦ: poss. gen., to be closely connected with τοῖς πολίταις ("his fellow-citizens").

13. οὖν ὅνησει: the generic idea causes the negative μη.

14. τούναντίον: is certainly adverbial, and to be attached to ἐλαστὸν (ὅνησει). The sense of this difficult passage seems to be something like this: "What advantage is there in giving to a sick man anything which cannot profit him, more or less"; literally, "sometimes more, or on the contrary, at least rightly considered, less."

22 f. ὑγιαίνοντα . . . πολλά: is added to make the contrast stronger.
μὲν ἦσον οἱ ιατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτ' ἦσον ἐμπύμπλασθαι ὃν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συν-25 χωρεῖς τοῦτο γε καὶ σὺ;

Καλ. Έγγυσ.

Σ. Περὶ δὲ ψυχῆν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἔως μὲν ἀν πονηρὰ ἢ, ἀνόητός τε οὕσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἰργεῖν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ 30 μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἀλλ' ἀττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἄφ', δ' ὑπ' ἀλτίων ἐσται· ἔκα τ' οὐ;

Καλ. Φημή.

Σ. Ῥύτω γὰρ ποι αὑτῆ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ;

Καλ. Πάνη γε.

35 Σ. Ὅψκοιν τὸ εἰργεῖν ἐστὶν ἄφ', δ' ὑπ' ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;

Καλ. Ναι.

Σ. Τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινον ἐστιν ἢ ἡ ἀκόλασια, ὦσμιν σὺ νυνδῇ ψων.

Καλ. Ὅψκ οἴδ', ἀττα λέγεις, ὧν Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον καὶ 40 τινὰ ἐρῶτα.

Σ. Ῥύτος ἀνήρ οὐχ ὑπομέειν ὦφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάρσχων περὶ οὐ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος.

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23 f. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: see on 450 b.

28. ἀνόητος κτέ.: see in the discussion with Polus the remark at 477 b, where the πονηρα of the soul is described in the same way.

29. ἀνόσιος: Plato prefers to use only two endings with this adj., which usually, especially in later Greek, has three. The common collocation, as in the present passage, with several other adj.s. of only two endings, may perhaps explain his usage.

33. Ῥύτω . . . ἄμεινον: sc. than if it were differently dealt with. Cf. 468 b.

38. ὦσμιν σὺ νυνδῇ ψων: refers naturally to the second member, for which a predicate is to be supplied from the first. Socrates has in mind from 491 e ff. The contradiction between this admission and the statement made at the first (νυνδῇ), Callicles seeks, in his accustomed manner, to evade.

41 f. αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάρσχων: Callicles has given in the investigation also a practical example of that ἀκόλασια which he had defended in theory. For him the investigation is only a trial of wits. In Ῥύτος ἀνήρ κτέ. we may have a reminiscence of the expression used by Callicles of Socrates in 489 b.
46. καταλύομεν: this idiomatric use of the pres. instead of the fut. of a course of action to be immediately taken is also idiomatric in Latin and English. See Kr. 553. In a somewhat similar manner the pres. is used of the immediate consequence by Dem. de Falsa Leg. 32: εἰ δὲ ὃποιον ὀνόματι καταφαλής, κἀγὼ καταβάων. Cf. 513 ε. 47. αὐτὸς γνώσει: refuses to answer. "You will have to decide that." 48. οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους: to say nothing of a λόγος which is directed to a definite object. The proverb, which Socrates quotes, seems to rest upon a religious feeling, in accordance with which myths had to be completely narrated in order not to draw upon the narrator the anger of the deity. Cf. Philob. 60: ἐὰν μετὰ ταῦθι ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴρ ὁπερ κεφάλην ἀποδώναι τοῖς εἰρήμενοι, Euthyd. 301 ε τόν κολοφώνα ἐπιτιθέναι. — θέμις: "right acc. to sacred law." 49. περίη: the change from the pl. (τοὺς μύθους) to the sing. is explained by the freedom of conversation. Cf. Prot. 319: δὲντος οὐδείς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὁπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι νοῦθεροθέν μαθών ... συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν. LXI. 1. ως βίαιος: cf. 491 ε ως ἢδος εἰ. — βίαιος: usually in contrast with πείθειν, e.g. Polit. 304: εἰς διὰ πείθους εἰς διὰ τινος βιας is applied here by Callicles to Socrates' persistent argument; cf. Apol. 35: ὡς εἰ πείθουμι ὁμοῖα καὶ τῷ δείσαι βιαζόμην. 4. τῆς οὐν κτέ.: since the question assumes the necessity that some one take the role of respondent, a causal clause follows. 4 f. μὴ ... καταλείπωσιν: for let us no longer leave, etc. 6. αὐτὸς δὲ κτέ.: the question has
πλάτωνος γοργιας.

Συ. Ἡνα μου τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἀ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἅ ἀνδρεῖς ἔλεγον, εἶς ὅν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι; ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει
10 ἀναγκαίοτατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν, οἶμαι ἐγὼνε χρήναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέ-

ναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τι ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος· κοινῶν γὰρ ἁγαθῶν ἅπασι χανέρων γενέσθαι αὐτὸ. δίεμι
μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἔγω ἧς ἀν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν· εάν δὲ τῷ 500
15 ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαιτῶ, χρῆ ἀντιλαμ-

505 a tone of reproof. αὐτός is opposed to ἄλλῳ διαλεγόμενος. The requirements of the question can be fulfilled in two ways,—either in continuous discourse, as 464 b-466 a, or in the form of a dialogue, which Socrates employs later (ch. LXII.).

8. τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου: Epicharmus was a native of Cos, but early went to Sicily (Megara) and devoted himself there to the study of medicine and philosophy, especially the Pythagorean and Empedoclean. But his claim to fame rests on his comedies. He stands at the head of the Sicilian comic poets, being noted for the ethical nature of his poetry. It was full of sententious sayings, and thereby aroused Plato's interest to the highest degree. He flourished during the Persian war, under the government of Gelon. The verse here cited reads, according to Athenaeus:

tὰ πρὸ τοῦ δύ’ ἄνδρες ἔλεγον
eis ἐγὼν ἀποχρῶ (i.e. ἀποχρῶ, I am sufficient.

Socrates means that he is himself assuming a burden which according to the nature of the matter requires two. The answer is in construction connected with the question of Callicles in order to disclose for the others' consideration the doubtful side, as it were, of such a demand. With this the following ἀπάρ (however) agrees.

11. φιλονίκως ἔχειν: see on 457 d. Socrates wishes to direct ambition only to proper objects.

12. τί ψεῦδος: ψεῦδος is frequently found opposed to ἀληθὲς. Cf. Apol. 34 e εἴτε ὄν ἄληθές, εἴτε ὄν ψεῦδος, Euthyd. 272 a εάν τε ψεῦδος εάν τε ἄληθές ἦ. The article with ἄληθές is due to its position. We should also have in like manner τὸ ψεῦδος, did it precede τί ἐστὶν. Cron thinks it denotes that truth is single, while error has many forms.

14 f. εάν . . . δοκῶ, χρῆ κτέ.: is an anticipatory cond. sentence, χρῆ with the inf. having the force of an inv. Cf. ἐπιλαμβάνω in b below.

15. ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαιτῶ: Socrates is about to combine the two roles of questioner and respondent, and hence will have to assent to his own statements.

15 f. ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι: with the gen., means to "break in upon a discourse for the purpose of contesting a point," as in Rep. i. 336 b καὶ ὁ θρασύμαχος πολλάκις καὶ διαλεγόμενων ἡμῶν μεταξύ ἀφρα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου. On the other hand ἐπιλαμβά-

νεσθαι, used below in b, means simply "to arrest the discussion." See on 469 e.
βάνεσθαι καὶ ἑλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδῶς λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ἐξητὸ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ὡστε, ἂν τι φαίνηται λέγων ὃ ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν 20 λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἐώμεν δὴ χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίσωμεν.

Γορ. 'Ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὡ Σώκρατες, χρῆναι πω ἀπίσωμι, ἀλλὰ διεξέλθειν σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δὲ μοι ἢ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαί σου αὐτοῦ διώντος τὰ ἐπίλουπα.

25 Ἔν. 'Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, ὡ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἵδεως μὲν ἂν Καλλικλεῖ τοῦτο ἐτί διελεγόμην, ἐως αὐτῶ τὴν τοῦ 'Ἀμφί- ονος ἀπέδωκα ρήσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ, ὡ Καλλικλεῖς, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπερᾶσαι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούσων ἐπιλαμβάνον, εάν τι σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς 30 λέγειν. καὶ μὲ ἐὰν ἐξελέγχης, οὐκ ἀχθεσθησόμαι σοι ε

506 17. ἂν τί φαίνηται κτέ.: the emphasis is on the indefinite, as in 472 a.

21. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ κτέ.: on the assumption by Gorgias of the role of mediator, and the justice of his claim to speak in the name of all, see Introd. § 13. Cf. 497 b. His request to proceed is a part of the artistic machinery of the dialogue, in that it affords an opportunity for a general summary of what has been already learned in the discussion, which was necessary in order to proceed intelligently. — όυ... πω: a rather unusual 'tmesis,' of which another example is found in Meno 72 d ὥς μέντοι ἃς βοῦ- λομαι γέ πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτῶμεν.

b 23. βούλομαι γὰρ κτέ.: with these words Gorgias expresses his approba-

tion of Callicles' opinion that a respondent is not necessary. The chestnuts are good,—but just as good without the intervention of the cat. Hence γὰρ to give a reason for the continuance of the discussion, καὶ αὐτός to show his agreement with Callicles, and αὐτῶν to exclude the idea of co-operation. The following καὶ αὐτός in the answer of Socrates corresponds to the similar expression of Gorgias.

26 f. Ἀμφίονος: Socrates answers with a pleasant allusion to 485 e. He will really assume the character of Amphion, which had been imputed to him, and as Amphion had in the plays of Euripides defended his calling, so will he prove that the claim of philosophy to be followed as a calling in life is a just and weighty one.

27. ἀπεδωκα: the indic. is due to assimilation with the preceding indic. with ἀρ of the unfulfilled condition.

28 f. ἀλλ' οὖν... ἐπιλαμβάνον: see on 496 d and a above.
words, in the expressions of the public speakers, the eloquent and the orators, the governmental and the political leaders of the state. The greatest benefit consists, according to 458 a, in freeing a man from error.

33. ὁ ἀγαθὲ: a friendly manner of address, which frequently, however, has an ironical coloring, or a tone of condescension, depreciation, or correction. So in Lat., o bone, cf. Hor. Sat. ii. 3. 31; or bone vir in comedy.

LXII. 3. ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὁμολογήσαμεν: sc. in 495 c ff. Cf. especially 500 d.

6. παραγενομένου, παρόντος: the words may have been designedly chosen with reference to the nature of the ideas ἦδος and ἀγαθόν, the former being only a condition, the latter an actuality.

5. ἦδος δὲ ἐστιν κτῆ.: on the ἦδος, cf. what Callicles has himself remarked in 494 a, b, above, and especially Phileb. 53 c ἀν ἐν ἴδιες ὅνικ ἄκηκάμεν, ὡς ἐκ γένεως ἐστίν, ὡς ἐπὶ ὅνικ ἐστὶν τὸ παράπαν ἴδιες. On the ἀγαθόν, cf. above 468 b ἐνεκ' ἢρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀπαντα, ποιούσιν οἱ ποιούσιν and Phileb. 54 c οὐκ οὖν ἴδιες γε, εἰπέρ γένεως ἐστίν, ἐνεκ' ἰπίς ὅνικ ἀλλὰ ἄνγκης γίγνοσθ' ἃν—Τὸ γε ἡμῖν οὐν ἐνεκά ἐνεκά τοῦ γίγνομεν ἄει γίγνοντ' ἃν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἔκεινον ἄτι. This distinction, however, even if intended, is not preserved, as can be seen from the following (8) ἄρετῆς τίνος παραγενομένης. See on 497 c.

10. ἄρετῆ: the subst. to denote the d form in which the Good manifests itself in persons and things. According to its real nature the Good re-
καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζῴου παυτὸς, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ἣτις ἐκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν· ἄρα ἔστιν ταῦτα;

Τάξει ἄρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον εἶναί ἄρητῇ ἐκάστου; Φαῖνην ἂν ἔγονε. Κόσμος εἰ τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὁ εκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἐκάστων τῶν ὄντων; Ἕμοιγε δοκεῖ. Καὶ ψυχῆ ἄρα κόσμου ἐχουσα τὸν ἐαυτῆς ἀμείων τῆς ἀκοσμημένης;

ὁ ἀνάγκη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ γε κόσμου ἐχουσα κοσμία; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Ἡ δὲ γε κοσμία σώφρων; Πολλὴ 507 ἀνάγκη. Ἡ ἄρα σώφρων ψυχή ἀγαθή. ἔγω μὲν οὖν ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἀλλα φαναι, ὦ φίλε Καλλικλεῖς· σὺ δ' εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε.

Καλ. Λέγ', ὑγαθέ.

Σα. Λέγω δὴ ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων ἀγαθῆ ἔστιν, ἡ τοῖναντίον τῇ σώφρων πεποισθεῖα κακῆ ἔστιν· ἣν δὲ αὕτη ἡ 506

draw him into the conversation, be- cause the argument has now been brought just to the point where Callicles broke it off before.

24. λέγε: go on with your exposition. This answer is a refusal to co-operate and at the same time a neg. answer to εἰ ἔχεις.

25 ff. The idea of σωφροσύνη is defined in the most general way by the expression τὰ προσόχουτα πράττειν. We attain to the idea of righteousness and piety by restricting the προσόχουτα to definite domains, according to the personages (men and gods) towards whom we have duties to perform. We attain to the idea of bravery by distinguishing between especial divisions of the idea πράττειν. Accordingly, we have on the one side διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν, on the other ὑπομένουτα καρπερεῖν.
αφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ μήν ὁ γε σῶ-φρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττοι ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοῦ καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους· οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοὶ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα 30 πράττων. Ἄναγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὔτω. Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι· ἂν πράττοι, ἃ περὶ δὲ θεοῦ ὁσία· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὁσία πράττοντα ἄναγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὁσίον εἶναι. Ἡ ἐστι ταῦτα. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀνδρεῖον γε ἄναγκη· οὐ γὰρ δὴ σωφρονὸς ἀνδρός 35 ἐστιν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ὃ μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἃ δὲι καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ ὑπομένουτα καρτερεῖν ὑπὸν δει· ὡστε πολλὴ ἄναγκη, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σωφρόνα, ὢσπερ ε διήλθομεν, δίκαιον ὡντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὁσίον ἀγαθὸν 40 ἀνδρὰ εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὐ τε καὶ καλῶς πράτ-τειν ἃ ἂν πράτη, τὸν δὲ εὐ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαιμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα

507 36. ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας: added by b Socrates in his enumeration because it is just in these spheres that σωφρο-σίνη is usually exercised. The point at which bravery necessarily coincides with it comes out in this way most emphatically. The exhibition of bravery under such conditions is also discussed in Lach. ch. xviii.

c 39 f. ἀγαθὸν ... τελέως: 'the perfection of goodness.' Cope. All the virtues combined make the ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρα. Wisdom is omitted, probably because Socrates has in mind only the earlier discussion, and besides he is taking for the moment the popular point of view; hence the collocation of ὁσίον with δίκαιον, as in Protagoras. Besides, as Socrates' view was that all evil-acting springs from ignorance, the fact that a man was δίκαιος, ἄν

δρεῖος, and ὁσίος would presuppose 507 the possession of wisdom.

41. τὸν δὲ εὐ πράττοντα κτῆ.: not in the sense "he who is fortunate," so often found, but in the sense of the clause εὖ καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράτη preceding; otherwise it would be equivalent to μακάριον καὶ εὐδαιμονα, and the syllogism would gain nothing. Plato therefore conceives εὖ πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράτη the necessary basis for μακάριον εἶναι, and the latter as the natural result of the former. Hence there is no case of a falla-cia secundum dictio-nem (by the use of homonyms or ἀμφιθολία), but the conclusion ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἔθλιος is correctly and legitimately obtained by a combination of the second statement with the first and without any fallacious or sophistical reasoning.
Contrasted with πόλις, ἰδιότης denotes the individual; with ἄρχων, the common man who holds no office; with δημιουργός and similar words, one who is not versed in a certain thing.—ἐπιθετέον δικην: Socrates deduces from the principles proven exactly the conclusions which, in his argument with Polus, had so offended Callicles. Cf. 480, 481.

9 f. πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ: “all the powers of the body and soul.” Cf. the passage quoted below (10), and Crito 46 b τὰ ἔμα. The construction of καὶ πάντα κτῆ. shows another example of the common Greek idiom of following a rel. by a demonstrative. See on 452 d.—ἐἰς τοῦτο: takes up again οὗτος ὁ σκοπός for the purpose of recapitulating in its correlative clause, ὅπως κτῆ., the substance of what has been explained; οὗτω again reiterates in one word the whole previous participial clause, and connects it with πράττειν, which has the same construction as ξην. The positive directions summarized in οὗτω are still further fixed (after Plato’s habit) by the following negative direction.
10 αὐτοῦ συντεῖνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως δικαιοσύνη
pαρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλλοντι ἔσεσθαι,
οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἐστὶν ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ ἐ
tαῦτας ἐπιχειροῦν πληροῦν, ἀνὴρνυν κακῶν, ληστῶν
βίον ζωτα. οὔτε γὰρ ἄν ἄλλω ἄνθρώπῳ προσφιλής ἂν
15 εἰη ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε θεῷ· κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος· ὅτι δὲ
μὴ ἐνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἄν εἰη. φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοὶ, ὥ
Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανόν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἄνθρωπος 508
τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ

506 in the epexegetical participial clause d

10. συντεῖνοντα: the image is that
of drawing the bow and aiming, to
the employment of which, σκότος has
led the way. We find in Rep. ix.
591 e the same image in a similar
connexion, δ γε νοῦι ἐκαεν πάντα τὰ
αὑτοὶ εἰ τοίοτο ἐξουθένας βλέσται.

13. ἀνὴρνυν κακῶν: “an evil to
which there is no end.” The striving
to satisfy the desires is also called an
ἀνὴρνυν ἔργον in Phaedo 84 a, and
compared with the web of Penelope,
which was begun every day anew.
On the apposition, see G. 137, 3; H.
626.

13 f. ληστῶν βίον ζωτα: for the
appositional partic. see Kr. 56, 15, 3.

15. ἀδύνατος: in an active sense.

16. κοινωνία: in passing, Socrates
shows that the only foundation for
an all-embracing view of the world
is found in correct moral principle.

Both in nature and in the universe 507
the harmony of the parts with each
other and with the whole is essential
for existence. The state, and, pro-
ceeding further, the moral condition
of the individual soul, should there-
fore be modelled on the principle of
general order which pervades the
world.—οἱ σοφοὶ: those especially
meant are the Pythagoreans, to whose
views Plato had had recourse before.
Cf. 493 a. Pythagoras is said first
to have applied to the world the
name κόσμος. He was followed by
Empedocles with his scientific sys-
tem, according to which there are
two principles in the world,—love,
φιλότης (στοργή, Ἀφροδίτη, ἄρμονία),
and hate, νέικος. The former is the
cause of association and union, the
latter of separation and disunion.
Cf. Emped. 94, Karst. Ἀλλοτε μὲν
φιλότητι συνεργάμεν εἰς ἐν ἀπάντα, ἤ
Ἀλλοτε β' ἀδ ἔχ' ἐκαστα φορέιμενα
νέικεος ἔχθει.

18. συνέχεια: the subj. of the inf. 508
is τὴν κοινωνίαν, as is shown by the
art. as well as the connexion. Cf.
Soph. 242 e τὸ δ' ἐκθρή καὶ φιλία
συνέχεται. The omission of the art.
in enumerations is common. See on
450 d.
σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιότητα, καὶ τὸ ὀλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα
20 κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὡς ἐταίρε, οὔκ ἄκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολα-
σίαν. σὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς ὃς προσέχειν τὸν νῦν τοῦτοι,
καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὄν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἡ ἴσότης ἡ
γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται:
σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἷς δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμε-
25 λεῖς. εἴεν· ἡ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ οὐτος ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστιν,

19. δικαιότητα: an unusual word for justice, formed like κοσμίας and ἴσότης. It was probably chosen here on account of the assonance. Similarly Prot. 331 b ταῦταν ἑστι δικαιότης δισώτητα. Xenophon also uses the word.

22. καὶ ταῦτα: the regular Greek expression for “and that too.” See II. 612 a.

22 f. ἡ γεωμετρική: adds a limitation to the ἴσότης, that absolute equality, which is impossible in any government. ἴσότης alone is purely arithmetical equality (a = b); ἴσότης γεωμετρικὴ is ratio or proportion (a : b : : c : d). Plato distinguishes between two kinds of ἴσότης in Leg. vi. 757 b, the one τῆν μέτρα ἴσην καὶ σταθμον καὶ ἁριμιτον, the arithmetical; the second, τὴν ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἁριστήν ἴσότητα, the geometric, which is not comprehensible by every man, and which is dependent upon the judgment and decision of the gods. Of this he says (ib.): τῷ μὲν μείζων πλείω, τῷ δὲ ἐλάπτων σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἐκατέργη, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μείζους μὲν πρὸς ἁριστήν δε μείζους, τοὺς δὲ ποινα-
τίων ἠχουσιν ἁρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρίσπον ἐκατέργω σπίνει κατὰ λόγον. On this ἴσότης, which is here opposed to πλεονεξία, is founded the admin-
istration of justice in the state (ib. τὸ
This objection Callicles had only brought forward as a possibility, not as an actual fact (486 a, b). Socrates treats it as the latter, but even thus it does not misrepresent Callicles' sentiments.

5 f. ὁσπέρ ὁ άτιμοι: see on 486 c. As the reading stands, τῷ ἑθέλοντος must be considered as a variant for ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ. In spite of Plato's fondness for τοικια, it is hardly likely that he would use βουλομένῃ and θέλειν as identical in meaning.

6 f. τὸ νεανίκον δὴ τοῦτο: in apposition to the whole clause, but more especially to the words which follow. See on 447 a. For the meaning, see on 482 e.
δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρρης, ἐάν τε χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐάν τε, τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι· καὶ οὔτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ 10 αἰσχυστῶν ἐστὶν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς ὅστις πολ- λάκις μὲν ἦδη εἰρηται, οὔτε δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἐτὶ λέγεσθαι· οὔ φημι, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀδίκως αἰσχυστῶν εἶναι, οὔτε γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ 15 τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἁμα καὶ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι καὶ τουχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήβδην ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κάκιον καὶ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικου- μένῳ. ταῦτα ἢμῖν ἀνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε λόγοις οὖτω 20 φανέντα, ὡς ἐγώ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δεδεται, καὶ εἰ ἄγροι- 509 κότερον τι εἰπεῖν ἐστὶν, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις,

508 10. ὅστις: τις, ἐστὶν. The omission of the verb in the dependent question is very uncommon.

11. ἐτι: almost equivalent to ἐτι πλεονάκις.

13. τέμνεσθαι τὸ σώμα: may be a delicate allusion to 473 ἐ (ἐκτέωμαιται) as τὸ βαλλάντιον and κλέπτειν to 486 ἐ (ὑπὶ δὲ τῶν ἔχοντων περισυλλύσθαι πῶςαν τὴν ὀδοίαν), but it is more probable, owing to its common association with βαλλάντιον, that τέμνεσθαι is used generally like the Lat. secari. In view of Socrates' poverty, this savors of humor.

14. βαλλάντιον: a leathern purse for carrying money, which was fastened to the girdle. The βαλλαντιο- τόμοι (cut-purses) were men who made a business of slipping off such purses in the market-places and the baths, and against whom it was difficult to protect one's self. This sentence is also a commentary on the mischiev- e ous results of the principle defended by Callicles, which was sure to introduce the most outrageous kinds of ἀδικία. Apropos of this, cf. also the view of Thrasymachus in Rep. 1.344, especially β καὶ γὰρ ἤροσόλαι καὶ ἀνδραποδίζονται κτῆς, οἳ κατὰ μέρη ἄδικοιντες τῶν τουτῶν κακοιργημάτων καλοῦνται· ἐπειδὰν δὲ τις πρὸς τοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήματι καὶ αὐτοῦς ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώσηται, ἀντὶ τοῦτων τῶν ἀδικρῶν ὄρνημάτων εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέ- κληται.

20 f. καὶ εἰ ἄγρουκότερον τι εἰπεῖν: 509 see on 462 ἐ. The καὶ εἰ shows that a the word used is correct, though harsh. See crit. note on 503 a. The definite indic. is used in order to ex- cuse the unusual comparison of argu- ments to iron and steel fetters. The simile is well chosen, and is a good retort on Callicles, who in 484 ἐ had
of your an doxein ou'twsi, ous ov ei mu lwo'sis he sou tis neanikoteros, oux oio'n te allas legontai he ous eyw nivn legw kalow legewn. epei emoiye o auto's logos estin aei, 25 oti eyw tau'ta ouk oida opow echei, oti meu'toi oun eyw entetuyxeka, wospere nivn, oudeis oios te estin allas legewn mu ou katagelastos einai. eyw me'n oun aui ti'dhmi tauta ou'twos echei. ei de ou'twes echei kai megiston ton kakon 6 estin he adikia tiv adikounai kai eti tou'ton meizoun megi-
30 ston on'tos, ei oio'n te, to adikouna muhi didonai dikhn, tina an botheiav muh dunamenos antheta'pos botheiav eautu katan-
egelastos an tis altheiav eii; ara ou tauntan, hteis apo-
treivei tihn megisthn hmiow balbhn; alla pollh anagkhe tauntan einai tihn aischiston botheiav muh dunamevai boh-

509 characterized the laws and moral a rules as bonds which the true man must break through (diarpp'gas).

22. ou'twsi: "as matters stand," i.e. so far as these principles have been tested. They may be attacked with new arguments, in which case new defences would have to be made. — ei mu lwo'sis: the stern minatory conditional form. See on 502 b.

23. neanikoteros: i.e. who is more powerful and courageous, just as Callicles surpassed Polus, and Polus Gorgias. — o auto's logos: cf. 506 a oide yar eywge eidows legw & legw.

25 f. ou . . . entetuyxeka: on this unusual kind of attraction, see G. 153, 2; H. 906 a. We miss a mention of the persons with wospere nivn.

26 f. mu ou: after a negativated leading verb, the negative of the inf. is generally made by muh ou. See Madv. Syn. § 211; GMT. 815.

27. aui ti'dhmi: sc. as against the opposing opinions of all others. This statement now, taken as a basis (ei de ou'twos echei) leads to a conclusion which 509 a is given in the form of a question. ti'dhmi is frequently used of the laying down of a principle or assumption. Cf. Rep. ii. 361 b toioi'ton theutes tivn dikaion, Theaet. 191 c.

29 f. toioi'ton meizoun megistou on'tos: b notice the comparison of the superla-

33. allha: introduces a more definite and detailed statement of a thought involved in the previous question.

34. tauntan einai tihn aischiston kte.: a noteworthy instance of the employment of a very common construction, which is as old as Homer (Kr. Di. 55, 3, 8). Logically we should expect tauntan tihn botheiav muh dunamevai botheiav aischiston einai. But botheiav, being uppermost in the speaker's mind, is made the subject, instead of cognate accusative, drawing also the predicate after it (see on 449 b, c). In this way muh dunamevai botheiav is characterized as a species, and the
35 θείν μήτε αὐτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὑτῶν φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκεῖοις, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρίτην τὴν τοῦ e τρίτου καὶ τάλλα οὕτως, ὡς ἐκάστου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος τοῦ δυνατῶν εἶναι ἐφ' ἐκαστα βοήθειν καὶ αἰσχύνη τοῦ μή. ἀρα ἄλλως ἡ οὕτως ἔχει, δὲ 40 Καλλίκλεις;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

ΛΧV. ΣΝ. Δυοῖν οὖν οὔτων, τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μείζον μὲν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἀνθρωπος βοήθησεν αὐτῷ, ὡστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὁμολογίας ταύτας ἔχειν, 5 τὴν τε ἄπο τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἄπο τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι: αἱ πότερα δύναμιν ἡ βούλησιν; ὡδὲ δὲ λέγω: πότερον εἰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσατε, ἢ εἰν δύναμιν παρασκευάσατε τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσατε;  

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτο γε, ὅτι εἰν δύναμιν.

10 ΣΝ. Τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον εἰν μὴ βούληται

509 most shameful species, of βοήθεια, b which was pretty exactly Plato’s opinion of the assistance which the orators were in the habit of rendering to themselves and their friends before a court. This assimilation is extended to the following clauses, δευτέραν etc., for the sake of consistency.  

c  38. ἐφ’ ἐκαστα: νῦς κακά, which are conceived as the enemy to be fought. Instead of αἰσχύνη we should have expected αἰσχύνην.

41. οὐκ ἄλλως: it is remarkable that after his utterances in 505 d CallICLES allows himself to be again drawn into the discussion. Ἐκὼν ἀέκοντι γε θυμῷ: For that the answer slips from him unconsciously, instead of being a willing admission, seems to follow from ἔστω σοι τούτῳ (510 a), where his earlier disposition again becomes plain.

LXV. 1. τοῦ ἀδικεῖν κτέ.: in apposition to the δοιάν.

4. ἀμφοτέρας: the following investigation takes up each of the two cases separately.

6. δύναμιν ἡ βούλησιν: what has been determined in 466 d regarding δύνασθαι and βούλεσθαι still holds good, but is expanded in what follows.

7. ἀδικήσατε: the fut. middle as a passive occurs more commonly with pure verbs. See Kr. 39, 11; II. 496.

9. δῆλον δὴ κτέ.: the form of the answer shows very willing agreement, which applies, however, only to this particular point.

10. τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ κτέ.: cf. Phaedo 78 d τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν, οἶον
πλατωνός γοργιας.

219

αδικείν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτ’ ἐστίν — οὐ γὰρ αδικήσει — ἦ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δεῖ δύναμιν των καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, ε ὡς, εάν μὴ μάθη αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, αδικήσει; τί ούκ αὐτὸ γέ μοι τούτῳ ἀπεκρίνω, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, πότερον σοι 15 δοκοῦμεν ὅρθως ἀναγκασθήναι ὀμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ Πώλος ἢ οὐ, ἡνίκα ὀμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἀκούτας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν;

Καλ. Ἑστῶ σοι τοῦτο, ὃ Σῶκρατες, οὕτως, ἵνα διαπε-510

20 ράνης τὸν λόγον.

Σω. Καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἄρα, ὡς έοικεν, παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ δύναμιν των καὶ τέχνην, ὁπως μὴ ἀδικήσομεν.

Καλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σω. Τίς οὖν ποτ’ ἐστὶν τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν 25 αδικείσθαι ἢ ὡς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι εἰ σοι δοκεῖ ἢπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοί μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ήδε· ἡ αὐτῶν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἡ τῆς ὑπαρχοῦσης πολιτείας ἐταύρον εἶναι.

509 ἀνθράπων ἢ ἵππων . . . ἀρά κατὰ ταῦτα ἐξεῖ κτέ. It is not necessary to supply περὶ or some other word; when put thus freely at the beginning of the sentence, the genitive is held up to view and the case lost sight of. See Rid. § 27. The acc. also is occasionally thus ‘freely’ used. Cf. Lyce. 28 καὶ ταῦτα ἐμοὶ θεωρήσατε, ὡς δικαίων τήν εξέτασιν ποιομένου περὶ τοῦτων.

e 12. δύναμιν καὶ τέχνην . . . μάθη καὶ ἀσκήσῃ: an example of chiasmus. Knowledge is preserved and strengthened by practice.

13. ὡς . . . αδικήσει: the causal use of ὡς is not common. See Kr. 65, 8; Π. 925.—αὐτὰ: for the neut. pl. referring to two preceding fem. sings. see Kr. 58, 3, 5; Π. 630, 633.

13 i. τί οὐκ . . . ἀπεκρίνω: see on 509 e.

17. βουλόμενον: for the usual ἐκόντα, in order not to diminish the contrast between δύναμις and βουλησίς. Besides, it has just been shown to Polus that he who does wrong does only what seems to him good, not what he wishes, because the wish is always for the good.

22. αδικήσουμεν: according to (the amended) Dawes' canon ὀπως in object clauses cannot be construed with the first aor. subjv. either act. or middle. See GMT, 363, 364.

28. ἐταίροιν: the common word to express party affiliation (hence also ἐταίρεια, "clubs"), as in Apol. 21 a ὅμων τῷ πλῆθει ἐταίροις.
220

PLATO'S GORGIAS.

St. I. p. 510.

ΚΑΛ. Ὅρας, ὡς Σωκράτης, ὃς ἐγὼ ἑτοίμός εἰμι ἐπανεὶ, b 30 ἂν τι καλῶς λέγης; τοῦτῳ μοι δοκεῖς πάνυ καλῶς εἰρηκέναι.

LXVI. Σω. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐὰν σοι δοκῶ εὕ λέγειν. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἐκαστός ἐκάστῳ εἶναι ὃς οἴον τε μάλιστα, ὄνπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, "ὁ ὁμοίος τῷ ὁμοίῳ." οὐ καὶ σοὶ;

5 ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε.

Σω. Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννος ἔστιν ἄρχων ἀγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, εἰ τις τοῦτον ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων εἰη, φοβοῖτο δῆπον ἂν αὐτῶν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ εἴς ἀπαντὸς τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύναιο τιλος γενέ- e 10 σθαί;

ΚΑΛ. ᾿Εστι ταῦτα.

510 29. Ὅρας κτε.: expression of joy that Socrates, with whom Callicles has had so often to agree unwillingly and under protest, now speaks quite to his liking. This view is the one thought of his life. Cf. 475 a.

LXVI. 1. σκόπει ... ἐὰν σοι δοκῶ κτε.: for the construction with σκόπει see II. 1016 c, and on 452 c. Cf. above in a. 'What is worth noticing upon this usage is that ἐὰν gives a different shade of meaning from the more usual εἰ. The question submitted is represented by it as a perfectly open one; whereas εἰ would limit the speaker's foregone conclusion, and give a certain appearance of positiveness. ἐὰν is therefore chosen for the sake of expressing more perfect courtesy, in contexts such as this, which relate to the conduct of a dialogue.' Rid. § 64.

2. ἐκαστός ἐκάστῳ: does not de- 510 note an unlimited reciprocity, but a restricted one, as is shown by the following ὁ ὁμοίος τῷ ὁμοίῳ.

3. ὄνπερ ... λέγουσιν: which the wise men of old mean when they say (λέγουσιν). The following proverb occurs very early, e.g. in Homer ρ 218 ἄι εἰς τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεός ἄς τὸν ὁμοίον. Plato often employs it, e.g. Prot. 337 d τὸ γὰρ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φόσει συγγενεῖ ἐστιν, ᾿Συμπ. 196 b δὲ γὰρ παλαιὸς λόγος εὑρίσκει, ἄς ὁμοῖον ὁμοίῳ ἀεὶ πελάς, Λυσ. 214 b τὸ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκῃ ἄεὶ φίλον εἶναι. Of kindred import is the well-known verse ἥλιξ ἥλια τέρπε, γέφων δέ τε τέρπε γέροντα, alluded to in Phaedr. 240 c.

6. ὅπου τύραννος κτε.: 'where a savage and illiterate ruler is lord and master.' Cope. In what follows, τοῦ- του refers to τύραννος, τούτῳ through αὐτὸν to the tis.
Σω. Οὖδε γε εἰ τίς πολὺ φαύλοτερος εἶη, οὖδέ ἄν οὔτως· καταφρονοῦν γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ὡς πρὸς δῖλον σπουδάσειεν.

15 Καλ. Καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ.

Σω. Λείπεται δὴ ἐκείνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, ὡς ἂν ὁμοθήσης ἂν, ταῦτα ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν, ἑθέλη ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὖτος μέγα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνηστεῖται, τοῦτον οὖθεις χαῖρων ἀδική-

20 σει. οὐχ οὔτως ἔχει;

Καλ. Ναί.

Σω. Εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων, τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδεῖς μὲ ἀδικοΐη, αὐτὴ, ὡς ἐοίκεν, αὐτῷ ὀδὸς ἐστίν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἑθίζειν

510 12. οὐδ' ἄν οὔτως: is to be completed according to the previous remark of Socrates.

16. ἄξιος λόγου φίλος: pred. after λείπεται. According to the nature of the case none other could come under consideration as lasting friends of the tyrant, even if they should show themselves friendly for a time.

17. ταύτα ψέγειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν: like τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἀξιόνθαι is the external sign of a similarity of disposition and friendliness. See on 473 a.

18. ὑποκεῖσθαι: in the elsewhere not uncommon meaning, “to be subject to.” Its use here is to emphasize the degradation in the eyes of a free man. Cf. also Crito 53ε ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιωσεί πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων.

19. χαίρων ἀδικήσει: the partic. denotes the result of the verb. “He will have no reason to rejoice,” i.e. he will not injure him with impurity.


22. εἰ ἄρα τις: the case which So- crates here assumes in illustration serves not only to enliven the discourse, but also to show (as opposed to the objections of ch. XL.) how unworthy and debased an object would have to be set before educators if the possession of power in the state is to be the leading aim of mankind.—Noteworthy is the use of the direct question after the introductory protasis, and furthermore the omission of some apodosis corresponding to the protasis, like γνολὴ ἄν δτι, in place of which we find ὡς ἐοίκεν. Kr. gives other similar examples in 65, 5, 14. Similar cases occur in Latin.—ἐἰν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει: see on 468 ε. The position is noteworthy.

23. μηδεῖς μὲ ἀδικοΐη: µὴ was the negative of the wish, underlying the question, and is thus retained. It is therefore not necessary, with GMT. 292, 2, to suppose an idea of prevention to be involved. How could I obtain great power and no one do (prevent any one from doing, GMT.) me wrong?
25 αυτών τούς αυτούς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ
παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὡμοίος ἔσται ἐκεῖνω.
oνχ ὠὔτως;
ΚΑΛ. Ναὶ.
ΣΗ. Οὐκόν τούτω τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα δύ-
30 νασθαί, ὡς ὁ ἱμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπράζεται.
ΚΑΛ. Πάννυ γε.
ΣΗ. Ἀρ ὁν γαί τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; Ἡ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ ὡμοίος ἔσται τῷ ἀρχοντὶ ὅντι ἀδίκῳ καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' ὁμιάν ἔγωγε, πάν τουναντίον ὠὔτωσι ἡ
35 παρασκευή ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπί τὸ ὀφεῖ τε εἶναι ὡς πλείοντα ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην· ἡ γάρ;
ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.
ΣΗ. Οὐκόν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακοὺ ὑπάρξῃ μοχθηρῷ
ὅντι τὴν ψυχήν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μὴ σιν τοῦ
40 δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν.
ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ὤδ' ὀπὴ στρέφεισ ἐκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω
καὶ κάτω, ὦ Σῶκρατες· ἡ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὔτοι ὁ μημο-
μενός τον μὴ μημομένον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται,
καὶ ἀφαιρησται τὰ ὄντα;

30. διαπεπράζεται: the fut. pf. is employed to express finality or fixed-

ness. Cope translates, "he will est-

ablish for himself a lasting immu-

nity from," etc. See on 460 d.

35. ἐπὶ τὸ ὀφεῖ τε εἶναι: this is considered by Callicles and Polus as an end to be desired.—On the change of case, ὀφι and ἀδικοῦντα, see on 492 b.

40. καὶ δύναμιν: the way to be-

come powerful, says Socrates above, is to imitate the δεσπότης. Hence καὶ δύναμιν is the power (τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι) obtained by this μὴ σιν (ὅπως ὅτι μά-

λιστα ὡμοῖος ἔσται).

41. ὀπὴ στρέφεις: the last conclu-

sion of Socrates is not agreeable to Callicles, who therefore declares it an arbitrary perversion of the argument. The στρέφειν ἄνω κάτω (see on 481 e), the twisting this way and that of words and ideas so that their sense was reversed, was an important de-

partment of Eristic.

43. ἐὰν βούληται: the use of βού-

λεσθαι again shows that the detailed explana-

tion by Socrates of the differ-

ence between βούλεσθαι and δοκεῖν (ch. XXIII. f.) was in vain. Hence Socrates himself ceases to regard it in his answer.
50 ΚΑΛ. Οὐκόν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητὸν;

51  Ἔν δὲ, καὶ ἕν τοῦ νεῶν ἐπιστήμης σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι;

51. ἐλ μῆ κωφὸς γ' εἰμί: "otherwise I would have to be deaf." Cf. Prot. 349 e καλλιστον . . . ελ μῆ μαλνμαί γε. 46. πολλάκις: 486 b, 406 c, et al. 48. ἄποκτενε μὲν κτλ.: cf. Plut. Ἀρίτα 20 ὁ μὲν ὅμων Ἀγίς ἐπὶ τὴν στραγγάλην πορευόμενος, ὡς εἰδὲ τινὰ τῶν ὑπηρετῶν δικρύνοντα καὶ περιπαθῶντα, "παύσαι μὲ" εἶπεν, "ὁ ἀνθρώπη, κλαῖτο. καὶ γὰρ οὕτως παρανόμως καὶ ἄδικος ἀπολλύμενος κρεῖττων εἰμὶ τῶν ἀναροῦντων." 50. καί τὸ ἀγανακτητὸν: καί is climactic and the art. emphatic. "So far from this circumstance mitigating the outrage, is it not just the revolting part of it," i.e. especially revolting? Callicles puts himself in the place of the one who suffers the wrong, but with a feeling quite the reverse to that of Agis, quoted in the preceding note. In a similar manner Apollodorus says in [Xen.] Ἀρισ 28 Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐγὼ γε, ὁ Ζάκρας, χαλεπώτατα φέρω ὧτι δρῶ σε ἀδικώς ἀποθησκοῦντα. τὸν δὲ λέγεται καταψάς αὐτὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐπεῖν, Ἐν δὲ, δέ φιλτατε Ἀπολλόδωρε, μᾶλλον ἄν ἐβαθυλεῖ μὲ ὀρῆ δικαίως ἀποθησκοῦντα; 51. ὅς ἐλ λόγος σμαίνει: assumes that the statement has already been proved by the course of the argument. Cf. 527 e. 52 f. δὲν . . . ἔχειν: against such an over-valuation of life Socrates declares himself also in Ἀρισ 28, 29; Κρίτων 48 b. 55. τῆν ἰητορικῆν: the position is ever emphatic. For examples of the rel. clause preceding the antecedent, see Kr. 51, 11. 57. συμβουλεύων: connected in construction with the last words of Socrates, as is frequently the case in answers. Cf. 451 ὁ ἄρσω γῆ λέγων σὺ, 473 b ἀληθῆ γε οἴμενος ἐστοι. See Kr. 56, 8, 7.
511 LXVII. 5. τοιούτου: has its cor-
relative in ὃς, which, like other rel-
ative adverbs, often stands for a
prepositional phrase, as here equiv.
to ἐν φ'. Frequently we find τι added
to τοιούτον. The sense of τοιούτον is
made clear by the context.
8. τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα: probably this phrase was a common
one, and we must therefore not press
a contrast between τὰ σώματα and
tὰ ψυχάς, which latter refers espe-
cially to their lives. Thompson sup-
pposes, with some probability, that
σώματα refers to the other members
of the passenger's family, who may
be conceived as belonging to him.
Perhaps "goods and chattels" may
be as good a rendering as any.
10. προσεταλμένη: "retired," i.e.
unpretending. Still stronger is συνε-
σταλμένος, as e.g. in Isoc. Panath.
230 ἀπήγει φρονουμέτωρ γεγενημένος
καὶ συνεσταλμένην ἐχών τὴν διάνοιαν
("with a feeling of humility").
11. ἐσχηματισμένη: cf. Sophr. 268 a
ὡς ἄγονος ἄνατα ἐν τὸς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώ-
πος ἐιδώς ἐσχημάτισται ("which he has
pretended to know").
12. τῇ δικαίκῃ: used by Socrates
instead of τῇ ἰδιατικῇ because this
species of the art affords the most
room for comparison.
13. δ' ὀβολοὺς: i.e. about six cents.
The price was accordingly very low,
if, as is shown by what follows, the
fare from Egypt or Pontus (a dan-
gerous voyage besides) for a whole
family, including baggage, was only
two drachmae, or about thirty-five
cents.—ἐπράξατο: 'gnomic' or 'em-
piric' aorist.
15. αὐτῶν: the regular designation
for the master of the house, who is
frequently opposed to the rest of the
family as here. See on 447 ε. The
order of enumeration is noteworthy
as showing the low estimation in
which the women were held. The
pl. may be due to assimilation to
παῖδας, as we say "wife and child," or
it may be collective, "women folks."
καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρήματα καὶ γυναῖκας, ἀποβιβάσασθ' εἰς τὸν λιμένα δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἐχὼν τὴν τέχνην καὶ ταύτα διαπραξάμενος ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχῆματι. λογίζεται γάρ, οὖμαι, ἐπίσταται, ὅτι ἀδηλὸν ἔστων, οὕστως τε ὀφέληκεν τῶν συμπλεόντων οὐκ ἐάσας καταποντωθῆναι καὶ οὕστως ἔβλαψεν, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίως εξεβίβασεν ἢ οἱ ἐνέβησαν, οὕτε τὰ σώματα οὐτε τὰς ψυχὰς. λογίζεται οὖν, ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μέν τις μεγάλοις καὶ 25 ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὔτος μὲν ἀθλιός ἔστων ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὀφέληται. εἰ δέ τις ἀρά ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώμα-512

18. παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν: also effective in the portrayal of the seaman's unpretending nature.

19. ἐν μετρίῳ σχῆματι: with unassuming carriage, has nothing to do with the dress, but merely with the deportment (cf. above, προσεσταλμένη). Perhaps there is a slight hit at Gorgias' pompous manner. See Introd. § 5 fim.

19 f. λογίζονται... ἐπίσταται: naturally not meant in full earnest, and not without some color of irony. The change of tense in ὀφέληκε καὶ ἔβλαψε is probably due merely to the frequency of the form.

20 f. οὕστως ὀφέληκε κτέ.: reminds us of Matt. xviii. 6, where of those who offended it is said: συμφέρει αὐτῷ ίνα... καταποντισθῇ ἐν τῷ πελάγει τῆς θαλάσσης.

23. ἡ οὐκ ἀνέβησαν: it is a Greek peculiarity to compare different states by employing the gen. of the reflexive. Here a clause takes its place.

24. λογίζονται ὅτι οὐκ: the force of the neg. extends over the whole sentence, which is developed antithetically. Since both leading clauses are hypothetical, we have a double employment of μὲν and δέ. The first member of the antithesis is given first only for the sake of the contrast; we should use a subordinate clause in English, and lay the most stress on the second member, and, too, on its conclusion. Cf. Apol. 28 κ. εἰς ὅν οὐν δεῖν ἔν ὑπὶ εἰργαζόμενοι, εἰ δὲ μὲν με οἱ ἄρχουντες ἐπαττον, οὐδὲ οἷς εὑρίσκει ἄρχειν μαν, τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐκείνοι ἐπαττον ἔμενον—τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος, ὡς ἔγω ψήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντα με δεὶς ὥπερ—ἐνταίθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὅτι όταν πράγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. See on 502 b and 499 d.

26. ἀθλιος ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν: some such idea as this frequently occurs in Plato; for example, in the Republic and Laws. Cf. Crito 47 d, εἰς διαλέσωμεν (sc. τὴν σῶμα) ἄρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ διεφθαρμένοι αὐτοῦ; Οὐδέμως. Socrates makes there a similar estimate of the relationship of soul to body.
LXVIII. Διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος ἕστι σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σφόξοντα ἢμᾶς· οὐδὲ γε, ὅ θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποιόν, ὃς οὐτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὐτε ἀλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττων ἐνίοτε δύναται σφάζειν· πόλεις γὰρ ἐστών ὅτε ὅλας σφάζει· μὴ σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικαι-κόν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ βουλοῖτο λέγειν, ὅ Καλλίκλεις, ἀπερ e ὑμεῖς, σεμνύνων τὸ πράγμα, καταχώσειεν ἃν ἦμας τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίγνεσθαι μη-χανοποιούς, ὅς οὐδέν τάλλα ἐστών· ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ

512 LXVIII. 1. νόμος: usage, custom.

3. μηχανοποιόν: Socrates has in mind the constructors of great ma-
achines which were used in the de-
fence of beleaguered cities, and of
which the second Punic war offers a
celebrated example. The military
engineer saves at the same time the
lives of many men,—the orator only
one life at a time. —μη (οὐχ) ὅτι:
see on 450 e.

4. ἐλάττω δύναται σφάζειν: this use of
the neut. acc. is extended from the
cognate. Cf. Αριστ. 30 e ἐμὲ μεῖξο
βλάψεσθη. On the pl., cf. the adverbial
use of the neut. pl. by Thucydides.
'A chance is represented as the sum
of so many contingencies; a quantity
as the sum of so many smaller units.'
Rid. § 43.

5. μη σοι δοκεί: the answer as-
sumed in the following καίτοι would
run as above: μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔμαγε. For
the interrogative μὴ, see G. 282, 2. —

κατὰ . . . εἶναι: to be comparable to, i.e. 512
worthy to be put upon the same plane
with. Cf. Αριστ. 17 b ἡμολογοῦσιν ἃν
ἐγὼν εἰ κατὰ τούτοις εἶναι ῥήτωρ.

7. τὸ πράγμα: 'his business.'—
καταχώσειεν: would cover under a mass, e
of. arrows, like obruere. Cf.
Hdt. vii. 225 ἐν τούτῳ σφέας τῷ χώρῳ
ἀλεξασάντωσι . . . κατέχωσαν οἱ 
βάρβαροι τὰ τάβλαιται. The use of this word
brings up the image of war and the
hurling machines of the μηχανοποιοῖ,
whose weapons, however, in this case
are to be λέγων instead of Λῆθος.

8. λέγων: the omission of an ob-
ject clause is accounted for by the
addition of παρακαλῶν, which at
the same time extends and defines λέγων.
The use of δεῖν is rather strange; it
would go better with λέγων. Perhaps
there is a mixture of two construc-
tions. For the matter, cf. 486 e.

9. ὃς κτῆ.: see on 500 e.

9 f. ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος: for
his case is strong enough.
HAATONOS TOPriAX

227
St. I. p. 512.

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Soph. Phil. 384

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16. P\TIWV Kal I K P\TIO VWV such
combinations are common. Cf. Pltaedr.
240 a dfOov fifv oiiv liriroi re Kal ijvioxoi

KaKtav

^tjyavoTroiov

TC /cat o~w^eo~^at.

is

you praise your art&quot;) or K rovnav &
that which you say in praise
(&quot;from
of your art&quot;), more likely the latter.
See H. 996

/cat

o^&amp;gt;a

Greek

The displacement

cov

d

otS*

;

TO 8e

6Vat rov o^w^etv eVe/ca TreaXXo rt ro ye^^ator
/XT)

diroKa.-

vvaifov

common enough.
14.

eXeyof

j)

/^eXrtd^cu^.

ytyverat

i//dyo9

72(3

Ka.irif}ov\evTOv ffrparov
\ovi&amp;gt;Tfs.

wS

z

eavrov oi^ra OTrotd? rt?

TO,

row aXXajy

dXX

TToi rjVTa.i.

/cat

o~ot 6

/carayeXaord?
20 larpov /cat

TO)

wi^

ecrnv o eyw Xeyw, dXX avro rovro ecrrtf a

TO crco^eiv avrov

11.

av

af SovVat ^fyarepa

Tti&amp;gt;t

&amp;lt;^atT^5

/cat

TT^S

aVo/caXe o-at?

cravrov Xafteiv Trp e/cetVou.
/catrot
St/cata&amp;gt;
rov
Xdya&amp;gt;
ii.iqya.vor&amp;lt;S^

et /AT)

Cf.

avrou our

vet

aXXwz^
/cara^o^et? /cat
a^ /3eXrtcu^ et^at /cat e/c

15 TTOIOV

512

a&amp;gt;s

ra cravTov eVat^ets,

o&amp;gt;z/

ort

rw

/cat

/cat
/caTa&amp;lt;/&amp;gt;poi&amp;gt;et&amp;lt;?

oVet Set

&amp;gt;

;

oiroio s TIS trv\tv
cKp^tiv.
without regard to moral qualities.&quot;
22 f. JIT) 70$ rovro (lev, TO t^v /ere.

:

:

change from the subjv. to the
indie, fffrt may be due to forgetfulthe

ness on the part of the speaker, who,
after giving the keynote to the sen

tence with the

p)i

yap at the beginning,

shifts to the independent, straightfor
ward indie, construction. If the eVrt
is

to

be construed rigidly with

p-fi,

un

derstanding again Spa, then we must
consider that Socrates rejected the
subjv., which may refer either to the
present or the future, for the indie.,

which leaves no ambiguity as to its
time sphere. That Socrates is aware
of the grammatically uncertain struc
ture of his sentence is shown by the
Tovd opa below. But see Goodwin s
view,

GMT.

269,


toïto μέν, τὸ ζήν ὁποσονδή χρόνον, τὸν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνδρα ἐστέον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχήτεον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέ-
25 ψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξῖν, ὅτι τὴν εἰμαρμένην οὐδ᾿ ἂν εἰς ἐκφύοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτω
σκεπτέον, τῷ ἂν τρόπον τούτον ὃν μέλλει χρόνον βιώναι ὃς ἀριστα βιοίη, ἁρὰ ἐξομοίων αὐτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ
ἐν ἦ ἂν οἰκή, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἀρὰ δεὶ σε ὁμοίοτατον γίγνεσθαι.513
30 τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλῆς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει· τοῦθ᾿ ὥρα εἰ ὑποτε-

512 23 f. τὸν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνδρα: has reference to the lengthy exposition of Callicles in ch. XXXVIII. ff., especially 485 e, d, where the activity of Socrates is characterized as unmanly. Wherein true manliness consists, Socrates shows in his defence, Apol. ch. XVI. f. and XXIX.—ἐστέον: cf. 484 c ἔσας φιλοσοφίαν. For the construction, see on 507 e.

24 f. ἐπιτρέψαντα ... τῷ θεῷ: this feeling of submission to God's decrees Socrates preserved even to his death. Cf. Apol. 41 d οὐκ ἐστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζωντε οὔτε τελευτή-

25. περὶ τούτων: for emphasis, instead of the simple acc. ταῖτα. But see Rid. § 106.—ταῖς γυναιξῖν: because these hold more firmly to what is old and time-honored, both in dialect (cf. Crat. 418 e αἱ γυναῖκες μάλιστα τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν σφοξύσει, Cic. de Or. iii. 12. 45) and in belief. This same old belief is expressed by Hecato Z 488, μοῦραν (i.e. τὴν εἰμαρμένην) ὧδ τινὰ φημὶ πεφυγμένον ἐμμεναι ἀνδρῶν. It is ridiculed as an old wives' tale by the

Epicurean Velleius in Cic. de Nat. 512

Deor. i. 20. 55 as follows: Hine e

νοβις exstitit primum illa

fatalis necessitas quam εἰμαρ-

μένην dicitis, ut, quidquid ac-

cidat, id ex aeterna veritate

causarumque continuatione

fluxisse dicitis. Quanti au-

tem haec philosophia aesti-

manda est cui tamquam ani-

culis et iis quidem indocitis,

fato fieri videantur omnia?

By the words ἐπιτρέψαντα κτέ., Socrates declares in a delicate way that this belief of the women harmonizes with the principles of true manliness better than the view of the highly cultured Callicles.

26. οὐδ᾿ ἂν εἰς: οὗδεις is separated for the sake of emphasis. See G. 77, 1, 2; II. 290 a.—το ἐπὶ τούτῳ: see on 452 c. ἐπὶ denotes the immediate succession.

27. μέλλοι: is optative by assimilation to the potential ἦν βιοῖν.

29. καὶ νῦν δὲ ἀρὰ: introduces the application to Callicles and his relation to the Athenian state. In sense the clause depends on σκεπτέον above, but loosely.

31. τοῦθ᾿ ὥρα: returns to the beginning, since the sense has become
229

leí kai émi, ópws μή, ó δαιμόνια, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασί
tás tēn σελήνην καθαίρουσα, τάς Θετταλίδας· σὺν τoῖς
φιλτάτοις ἡ αἴρεσις ἡμῶν ἐσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς
35 ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἶ δὲ σοι οἴει ὄντων ἀνθρώπων παραδώ-
σει τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἦτις σε ποιήσει μέγα δύνα-
σθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ δικοῦν ὑποτας ἐπὶ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὡς ὁρθῶς Βουλεύει, ὃ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μμητὴν δεῖ
40 εἶναι ἀλλ' ἀυτοφυῖς ὁμοίων τούτων, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνή-
σιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλιάν τῷ Αθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ
μά Δία τῷ Πυριλάμποις γε πρός. ὅστις οὖν σε
τούτων ὀμοίωτατον ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει,

513 somewhat obscured by the intervening additions. The use of σοι καὶ έμοι resumes the previous unemphatic σε, inasmuch as each one wishes to obtain the others' acceptance of his own view of life.

33. τάς Θετταλίδας: the Thessalian women were very skilful in sorcery and poisoning. They stood in close relation to the night-goddess Hecate; hence people ascribed to them the power to draw the moon from the heavens. Strepsiades says in Αρ. Νυμ. 749 γυναίκα φαρμακίδ' εἰ πρᾶμενος Θετταλὴν | καθέλωμι νῦκταρ τὴν σελή-

νην κτε. Cf. Ηορ. Ερώτ. 5. 45 quae sidera excantata voce Thess-
sala | lunamque caelo deripit. For this, however, the goddess ex-
acted punishment, for Suidas says αἱ τὴν σελήνην καθαίρουσα Θετταλίδες

λέγουσα τῶν ὄφθαλμων καὶ τῶν παιδών (v. l. ποδών) περίσσεσθαι. εἰρήνητα ἐπὶ
tῶν έαυτοῖς τὰ κακὰ ἐπιστομέων ἢ παροιμία. Cf. also Plin. Ν. Η. xxx. 1.
2 (6). Aristophanes' designation of them under the name φαρμακίς, while it implies that their art consisted in
the manipulation of drugs, does not

limit us to that view, because Herod-

otus, vii. 114, uses the verb φαρμακεύειν

in speaking of the sacrifice of white horses by the Magi to the river Stry-

mon.

33 f. σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις: at the risk of
our dearest interests. For the asyn
deton, see on 450 b.—τὰ φιλτάτα: denotes the soul and its ἀρέτη, as in

Prot. 314 ά ρα, ἃ μακάριε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς

φιλτάτοις κυβερνῆσαι καὶ κυνωνεῦσιν. In

ἀίρεσις lies a play on καθαίρειν.

35. ὄντων ἀυτοφὐῶν: recalls the
promises made for rhetoric by Gorgias.

39. μμητήν: imitation is not to be b
thought of, for immoral action with a
correct moral feeling is impossible.
Hence the similarity must be original
(αυτοφύω).

41. φιλιάν τῷ δήμῳ: substantives
involving action, either physical or
mental, sometimes take the construc-
tion of their corresponding adjs. or
verbs. Cf. 522 d βοήθεια έαυτῷ, Ἀροι.
30 a τῆς τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. Η. 765 a.

42. καὶ νὰ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμποις: see on 481 d.
44. **πολιτικός εἶναι**: since these words would be understood if not present, the special insertion of them can only serve to emphasize the identity of wish and result.

45. **τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἥθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἐκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀχθοναι**: εἰ μὴ τι σὺν ἄλλο λέγεις, δὲ φίλη κεφαλή. λέγομεν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, δὲ Καλλίκλεις;

**LXIX. Καλλίκλεις**. Ὑπερ οὖν οὕτω μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, δὲ Σωκράτης: πέπουθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος: οὐ πάντων σοι πείθομαι.

Σο. Ὅ τι δῆμον γὰρ ἐρως, δὲ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνών ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεί μοι: ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλάκις ἱσως καὶ βέλτινον ταῦτα ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθῇσε. ἀναμνή- σθητι δ' οὖν, ὅτι δύο ἐφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἐκαστον θεραπεύειν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς

513 44. **πολιτικός εἶναι**: since these words would be understood if not present, the special insertion of them can only serve to emphasize the identity of wish and result.

45. **τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἥθει λεγομένων**: as an illustration of the sentiment, cf. Dem. Ol. iii. 19 ἀλλ' οἴμαι μέγα τοῖς τοιούτοις υπάρχει ("comes to the aid of") λόγοις ἡ παρ' ἐκάστοι βαύλησις.

47. **ἀφελή κεφαλή**: a humorously pathetic mode of address, borrowed from the Homeric usage (θ 281 et al.). Cf. also Soph. O. R. 950 ἄφιλτατον γυναικάς 'Ικάστης κάρα etc. Our use of the word 'heart' in tender address is analogous. Cf. Shaks. Love's Labor Lost, v. 3: 'Good heart, what grace hast thou thus to reprove?' etc.

**LXIX. 2. τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος**: namely that they listen gladly only to that which harmonizes with their opinions, and are very loath to offer on the altar of more perfect knowledge the views they have come to cherish; hence they remain unde- cided, as Meno says, Meno 95 c ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπουθα τοτὲ μὲν μοι δοκούσι, τοτὲ δὲ οὕ. The candor of Callicles here as compared with his earlier obstinacy is quite remarkable. For the asyndeton, see on 450 b.

5. **ἰσως**: this addition shows that the fulfilment of the condition is still very doubtful. Cf. Socrates' remarks on the necessity of time to convince, in Apol. 19 a, 37 a, b, quoted on 455 a.

7. **δ' οὖν**: but then, emphasizes, in contrast to the uncertain hope just expressed, what must happen in any case. Cf. Apol. 17 a. The Latin equivalent is certe. Socrates has in mind at the moment ch. LV. f., where, however, reference was made to the conversation with Gorgias and Polus in ch. XIX. f.

8. **ἐκαστον**: subject to θεραπεύειν.

8 f. **πρὸς ήδονῆν ὀμιλεῖν**: epegegetic to μίαν (sc. παρασκευὴν). μὴ καταχαρίζομεν limits ὀμιλεῖν which belongs also to πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, and
πλατωνόσ γοργίας.

ἡδονῆν ὀμιλεῖν, τὴν ἐτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ 10 καταχαριζόμενον ἄλλα διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἀπὸ τὸτε ὑρίζομεθα;

Καλ. Πάνω γε.

Σημ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἐτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἡδονῆν, ἀγεννής καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὐσά. ἡ γάρ;

15 Καλ. Ἐστώ εἰ βούλει σοι οὗτως.

Σημ. Ἡ δὲ γε ἐτέρα ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἦς τοῦτο, εἰτε σῶμα τυγχάνει ὧν εἰτε ψυχή, ὁ θεραπεύομεν;

Καλ. Πάνω γε.

Σημ. Ἄρ’ οὖν οὗτος ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἦστων τῇ πολεί 20 καὶ τοὺς πολίτας θεραπεύειν, ὡς βέλτιστος αὐτοὺς τὸν πολίτας ποιοῦντας; ἄνευ γάρ δὴ τοῦτον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἡγρύσκομεν, οὐδὲν ὀφελός ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν οὐδεμίαν προσφέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ καλὴ καγαθὴ ἡ διάνοια ἡ τῶν.

513 requires the supplying of an indefinite d subject. See on 512 d ὑπάτα.

10. καταχαρίζομεν: used in Apol. 35 e with the acc. (τὰ δίκαια). δια-μάχεσθαι frequently takes περὶ τινος. See also on 502 b, 503 a.

15. εἰ βούλει: added by Callicles here, αὐτὸν ὡς σοι χαρίσωμαι 516 b, to avoid responsibility. It is almost parenthetical.

16. τῇ . . . ἐτέρα: there is no need of an explanatory appositional clause corresponding to ἡ πρὸς ἡδονῆν, since the inference from d is sufficient. The lacking verb (τυγχάνει οὐδά) on account of the parallelism must be taken from the preceding words of Socrates. ἐποιεῖ . . . τοῦτο is added to correspond to ἀγεννής . . . κολακεία, thus, "is directed to that end, viz." etc. The connexion is a loose one.

20. θεραπεύειν: the addition of the inf. here is an afterthought, after the object which in sense belongs to it has been already proleptically connected with the preceding verb. Cf. Crito 52 e ἐπιθυμία σε . . . ἄλλων νόμων ἑλάβει εἰδέναι. See Kr. 61, 6, 8; Rid. § 180.

20 ὡς . . . ποιοῦντας: connected (as a correlative) epexegetically with οὗτως. Cf. Phaedo 59 a σχεδόν τι οὗτω διεκελεῖθα, ὅτε μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνιοτε ὦ διεκρίνετε. The position of the οὗτος, which in sense is to be construed with θεραπεύειν, is due to the form of the sentence. The parts. agree in case with the unexpressed subj. of θεραπεύειν, viz. ἡμᾶς.

23. ἐὰν μὴ κτῆ.: explains ἀνευ δῆ 514 τοῦτον. —διάνοια: i.e. the inner activity of the soul itself, its reasoning, thinking; hence it is often used for the mode of thought, the disposition, and even for the soul itself.
μελλόντων ἡ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχὴν τινων ἢ
25 ἀλλην δύναμιν ἦντινων. θώμεν οὔτως ἔχειν;
Καλ. Πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι ἤδιον.
Συ. Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὁ Καλλίκλεις
δημοσία πράξοντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ
30 οἰκοδομικά, ἡ τείχων ἡ νεωρίων ἡ ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα
νην ἡ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, την τέχνην η καὶ παρὰ τοῦ
ἐμάθομεν; ἔδει ἂν ἢ οὔ;
Καλ. Πάνυ γε.
35 Συ. Οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε οἰκοδομήμα
φικοδομήματα ἁδία ἡ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἡ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν,
καὶ τούτῳ τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν ἡ αὐσχρόν ἐστων. καὶ εἴ
μὲν ηὐρίσκομεν σκοπῷ μενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγα-
θοὺς καὶ ἐλλογίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ ἐ
40 μὲν καὶ καλὰ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ψυχοδομημένα ἡμῶν,

27. εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν κτὲ.: by a series of analogies Socrates tries to
show that the profession of statescraft
implies various preliminary qualifications,
and that the incipient statesman ought to be subjected to an
examination as to his education and
previous habits, instead of following the
Athenian practice. Cf. Prot. 319d
ἐπειδάν δὲ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διο-
κήσεως δή βουλεύσασθαι, συμβουλεύει
αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως
μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεῖς σκυτοτό-
μος, ἐμποροὶ ναύκληροι, πλούσιοι πένης,
γενναῖος ἀγεννής, καὶ τούτοις οὐδὲις ἐπι-
πλήττει ὅτι οὐδαμόνῳ μιᾶς οὐδὲ ὀνόμα
διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ, ἐπεὶτα συμβου-
28. δημοσίᾳ πράξοντες: almost
equivalent to δημοσιεύωντες. — τῶν
πραγμάτων: must be considered as
part. gen. after δημοσία πράξοντες, and
is not to be construed with the fol-
lowing clause, with Cron.
29. ἡ τείχων ἡ νεωρίων ἡ ἱερῶν: these are themselves the greatest
public works, but the addition of
μέγιστα serves to emphasize the
importance of the matter and the re-
sponsibility of the person.
30. πότερον: the second member
of the double question is found in
the ἢ ὅ which follows the repeated
ἐδει ἂν below.—ἐδει ἂν: instead of
ἐδεί, shows that the whole condition
is purely fictitious and unreal. The
simple ἐδεί would have drawn atten-
don only to the inf. GMT. 423.
35. δεύτερον αὖ τόδε: to be com-
pleted from the preceding πότερον κτὲ.
πολλά δὲ καὶ ίδια διὰ ήμῶν ἐπειδῆ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλ-
lάγημεν, οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων νοῦν ἔχοντων ἢν ἢν ἕναι ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἰχομεν ήμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιδείξας οἰκοδομήματα τε ἡ μηδὲν ἡ πολλά 45 καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια, οὕτω δὲ ἀνόητον ἢν ἢν ποι ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἀλλήλους ἐπ’ αὐτά. φῶμεν ταῦτα ὅρθως λέγεσθαι ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

LXX. Σω. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τὰ τε ἄλλα κἂν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς ἰκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκεφάμεθα δήπον ἄν ἑγώ τε σὲ καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, "φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς

514 41. ίδια διὰ ήμῶν: would lead us to expect as a contrast κοινὴ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων. But κοινὴ is omitted as self-evident, while ίδια gives a certain definiteness to διὰ ήμῶν.

42. διακειμένων (viz. ήμῶν): is used absolutely; νοῦν ἔχοντων is to be connected with ἢν as above, 500 a παντὸς ἀνδρός.

45. οὕτω δὲ: correlative with οὕτω μὲν. See on 512 a. — ἀνόητον ἢν ἢν: cf. below, ε καταγέλαστον ἢν ἢν and ἀνόητον ἢν εἶναι.

d LXX. 1. οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα: these words would seem to indicate the conclusion of the induction and the transition to its application to the question under discussion. Meanwhile, however, Socrates cites another example which is still closer to his idea. Hence τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ, which at the same time sums up and emphasizes. — καὶ: is to be resolved into καὶ ἢν, the καὶ being correlative with τέ, and not going with εἰ in the sense "even." For the repetition of the ἢν, two lines below, see 465 c, d, and on 475 e.

2. δημοσιεύειν: the general word to denote the public practice of any profession or business which is for the benefit of the community. See on 452 a δημιοῦργος. In the case of physicians, are included not merely those who are in the service of the government, but also private practitioners. See on 455 b.

3. ὃς ... ὄντες: expresses in a different form what is found above, α, in the phrase ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικὰ, viz. the department of activity to which attention is drawn.

4. φέρε κτέ.: change to direct quotation occurs frequently as here, without the employment of a definite verb of saying. — δὲ: often employed in lively questions which are closely connected with the words of another. So here. Socrates offers himself to the state as a physician, but in what state of health is his own body? Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 26 (in the myth of Prodicus, after Κακία had praised her gifts) καὶ δ’ Ἦρακλῆς ἄκοισας ταῦτα, ὦ γύναι, ἐφη, ὄνομα δὲ σοι τί ἐστι;
5 ἐχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς ύγίειαν; ἢ ἴδη τις ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δούλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος;" καὶ ἐγώ, οἶμαι, περὶ σοῦ ἐτερά τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν· καὶ εἰ μὴ ηὐρίζος σκομέν δι’ ἡμᾶς μηδένα βελτίω γεγονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ἔξονων μήτε τῶν ἀστῶν, μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα,

10 πρὸς Διός, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἄν ἢν τῇ ἀλήθεια, εἰς τοσοῦτο ἄνοιας ἐλθεῖν ἄνθρώπους, ὡστε πρὸς ἰδιωτεύωντα πολλά μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθώσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι ἵκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τούτο ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν

15 μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτοῦς τε δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητον σοι δοκεῖ ἄν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν;

Καλ. Ἐμμογε. 514

514 6. ἢ δούλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος: cf. 502 d and 515 a. The distinction between slaves and freemen, which was always present to the mind of a Greek, is emphasized here because it was common for slaves to be treated by less skilled physicians, who might themselves be slaves, as we learn from Legg. iv. 720 e ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ξυνονεῖς ὅτι δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων ὅστιν τῶν καμώντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τούς μὲν δούλους σχεδόν τι οἱ δούλαι τὰ πολλὰ ἱστρεύοντο. Cf. Herm. Gr. Alt. iv. 6 § 38.

e 11. ἄνθρώπους: from the particular to the general, which also includes the particular. We should say "people" in the same way. It is remarkable, however, how quickly Socrates returns to the first person in the next clause. One must have in mind an individual before he can give particulars.

12. ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι: is the contrast to κατορθώσατα. When one is beginning in a profession much is necessarily, from inexperience, done at a risk, and may or may not succeed. For the phrase ὅπως ἐτύχωμεν, cf. 521 e, Crito 45 d τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὅτι ἄν τύχωσι, τούτο πράξουσι, "the success of your sons is left as far as you are concerned to the caprice of chance." Prot. 353 b ὅτι ἄν τύχωσι, τούτο λέγουσι, qui quidquid in buccam venit dicunt. The usual inference is unfavorable. The participle is to be supplied from the following verb.

14. εἰ τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν: the proverb denotes, "to begin with the large instead of with the small." Cf. Isthm. 187 a εἰ γὰρ νῦν, πράτον ἄρξεσθε παιδείαν, σκοπεῖν ἵνα μή ὡς ἐν τῷ Καρί ὡμέν ὁ κίνδυνος κουφυσθῇ, ἀλλὰ ἐν τοῖς ὑπερ’ τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν φίλων παισιν, καὶ ἀπεξῆς τὸ λεγόμενον κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὡμέν συμβαίνῃ ἐν πίθῳ ἡ κεραμεία γεγονομένη. A proverb from the potter's art was natural among the Athenians, where the art flourished (Κεραμεϊκός).
Σημείωση γορτιας. 235

20 ἀρτι ἀρχεῖ πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ παρακαλεῖς καὶ ονειδίζεις ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεφώ-

μεθὰ ἀλλήλους, "φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἦδη τινὰ βελτίων πεποίηκε

τῶν πολιτῶν; ἦστω δὲ πρότερον πονηρὸς ὁ ἄνδρος, ἂν ἔρχο

τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων, διὰ Καλλικλέα καλὸς τε

25 κάγαθος γέγονεν, ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἢ δούλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος;"

λέγει μοι, ἐὰν τίς σε ταῦτα ἑξετάζῃ, ὃ Καλλικλεῖς, τί ἢ

ἔρεῖς; τίνα φήσεις βελτίων πεποιηκέναι ἁνθρωπον τῇ

συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῇ; ὅμειρα ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἰπερ ἦστω τι

ἔργον σὸν ἑτὶ ἱδωτέυντος, πρὶν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν;

30 Καλ. Φιλόνικος εἶ, ὁ Σῶκρατες.

LXXI. Σά. Ἄλλ' οὐ φιλονικία γε ἑρωτῶ, ἂλλ' ὡς

ἀλθῆς βουλόμενος εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὸ τρόπον οἱ δὲ πολιτεύομεν ἐν ἡμῖν. ἢ ἄλλον τοῦ ἀρα ἐπιμελήσεις ἢ ἡμὲν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἢ ὅπως ὁτι βελτιστοὶ συνοντὸ σὲ

5 πολίται ὁμοία; ἢ οὐ πολλάκις ἦδη ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο

δὲ πράττειν τῶν πολιτικῶν ἄνδρα; ὡμολογήκαμεν ἢ οὐ;

19. ἀρτι ἀρχεῖ: of the age of Cal-

licles at the time of this dialogue, see


36 εἰπεχείρων ἐκαστόν ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ

πρότερον μὴτε τῶν ἐαυτῷ μηδενὶς ἐπι-

μελείσθαι, πρὶν ἐαυτῷ ἐπιμεληθῇ, ὅπως

ὡς βελτιστοὶ καὶ φρονμάταστοι ἐστοι,

μὴτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς

22. φέρε κτέ.: see on 514 d.

23 f. ἀδικός τε κτέ.: various kinds of

πονηρία, as contrasted with the

corresponding virtues. Cf. 491 e ff.

28. εἰπερ κτέ.: Socrates' opinion can

be readily perceived. Between these repeated questions we must

assume short pauses. On the pos-

sressive pronoun followed by the gen.,

see H. 691; G. 137, n. 1.

30. φιλόνικος εἶ: the accusation is a

confession of weakness, having much the same force as Crito's an-

swer (Crito 54 d) ἄλλ', ὁ Σῶκρατες,

οὐκ ἐχω λέγειν. See on 457 d.

LXXI. 3. ἢμῖν: cf. ἐν τοῖς πολι-

ταισ, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ. In spite of the ad-

dition of δὲποι, no subject for πολιτεύ-

ομεθί is expressed. But we should not feel the ellipsis in English, and

often make such without noticing it. — ἢμῖν: seems to be a kind of

ethical dat. See G. 184, 3, n. 6; II. 770. Cope translates the clause,

"whether we shall find you concerning

yourself about anything else," etc.
The death of Pericles was an event that shook Athens. Following his assassination in 429 B.C., the city was left in a state of shock. The loss of the greatest statesman of the time was felt deeply in the political landscape of the Peloponnesian War. The fall of Pericles marked a significant turning point in the conflict, as Athens, now leaderless, was unable to maintain its previous momentum.

Pericles was not just a warrior, but a visionary statesman who brought about the Golden Age of Greece. His death was mourned not only by his fellow Athenians but also by his political opponents. It was a loss that changed the course of events in the region, as the Greek city-states, already divided, were now more vulnerable to external attacks.

The loss of Pericles also marked a change in the political dynamic of Athens. The city-state was left to adjust to his sudden absence, with no clear successor to fill the void. This period of transition was marked by political instability and power struggles, which further weakened Athens' position.

The death of Pericles also had a profound impact on Socrates, who was close friends with him. The philosopher, always seeking to understand the nature of truth and justice, could not help but reflect on the loss of such a great leader. His musings on the matter were later recorded and became part of Plato's Gorgias, a dialogue that explores the nature of speech and the role of the orator.

This dialogue begins with the death of Pericles and his successor, Cimon. Cimon was a popular figure, often referred to as the 'friend of the poor', and his rise to power had the potential to change the course of the war. However, his assassination, like Pericles before him, led to a marked shift in the political climate of Athens.

Plato's Gorgias thus serves as a reflection on the importance of leadership and the role of the individual in shaping the course of history. It is a testament to the enduring power of great leaders and the impact they leave on the world.

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515 7. ὑπήρ σοῦ: cf. Apol. 22 e ὅσε με ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωταίν ὑπήρ τού χρησμοῦ, so that I asked myself in the name of the oracle.
11. πολίται: the idea of this word (as also of πολιτεύεσθαι) approaches so near that of "statesmen" that it is frequently used in that sense; e.g. in the speech of Diodotus against Cleon (Thuc. iii. 42. 5) χρῆ τὸν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην μὴ ἐκφροδιντα τοὺς ἀντερούντας ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵσον φαίνεσθαι ἵμεινον λέγοντα. Cf. below, e. Above we find πολιτικὸς ἀνήρ and also ἀνήρ simply, used in the same sense; cf. 517 a.
15. ἐποίη: sc. in the course of his activity as a statesman.—ἄντι χειρόνων: the brachylogy is here harder than in the case where the relation is reversed; e.g. Polit. 308 a ἄντι ἐλεοθέρων γενόμενοι δούλοι. We might have expected εκ.
17. ἥρχετο λέγειν: here denotes not so much Pericles' first appearance before the people as the first period of his political life. This began even before the death of Ephialtes, who, owing to the machinations of his enemies, was murdered shortly after the banishment of Cimon (460 B.C.). The height of Pericles' power was reached after the death of Cimon and the banishment of Thucydides, son of Melesias (443 B.C.). On the construction of ἥρχεσθαι, see on 488 a.
18. τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν: Socrates is referring again, not so much to Pericles' last oratorical efforts, but to the last period of his political activity, which fell within the first years of the Peloponnesian war. On the result of his last speech (430 B.C.) Thucydides (ii. 65) remarks: Τοιαῦτα δ' Περικλῆς λέγεν ἐπειράτο τοὺς 'Ἀθηναίους τῆς τέ έπ' αὐτῶν ὑπῆρ παραλλελευ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἀπάγειν τὴν γνώμην. oi δὲ δημοσία μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἀνεπείθοντο...οὐ μέντοι πρότερον γε οἱ ἡμυπαντες ἐπαίσαστον ἐν ὑπῆρ ἐχοντες αὐτῶν πρὶν ἤημισασαν χρήμασιν. —On the neut. pl., see on 612 b and Kr. 46, 3, 2.
20 Σω. Οὐκ ἵως δή, ὡς βελτίστε, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὀμολογημένων, εἰπερ ἀγαθός γ’ ἦν ἐκείνος πολιτείας. e

ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν δή;

Σω. Οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται Ἀθηναίοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίων γεγονέναι, ἥ πᾶν τούναν-25 τίνω διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ’ ἐκείνων. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγγυε ἄκοινῳ, Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἄργους καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα.

ΚΑΛ. Τῶν τὰ ὅτα κατεαγότων ἄκοινεις ταῦτα, ὡ Σῶ-

30 κρατεῖς.

20. ἀνάγκη: is adverbial dat. corresponding to the adverb ἵως.

e 22. τί οὖν δή: see on 453 b and 497 d. The reply of Socrates shows that he intends Callicles himself to draw the necessary inference from what he proceeds to bring forward.

26. ἄργος κτέ.: this accusation is based upon a suspicion that Pericles, in order to bring about certain desirable measures in the government, employed bribery disguised under the names of μισθὸς στρατιωτικός, δικαστικός, ἐκκλησιαστικός, and θεωρικός, of which, however, only the first two can be ascribed to Pericles. On this dole the Athenian citizens could live in a poor way at the expense of the state, and they lost perhaps some of that energy which was characteristic of them in earlier times.—δειλοῦς: the Athenians became timid, as a natural consequence of their inactivity, in that they (much later however) withdrew from personal war service, and depended on mercenaries exclusively.

27. λάλους: to activity in the real service of the state, principally of course in the assembly, was soon joined a desire to seek entertainment in public. For here their curiosity, a natural failing, was nourished by continual gossip and talk. This was the case in the time of Demosthenes (Phil. i. 10), of Paul (Acts xvii. 18), and is the case at the present day. See on 461 e.—φιλαργύρους: the desire to obtain money from the public treasury became continually stronger and more universal, and wrought great damage to the government. At the time of Demosthenes the continuance of the θεωρικῶν was especially injurious, because the means for military purposes were thereby greatly curtailed. Plato’s criticism of Pericles was always unfavorable, which, however, is not to be wondered at, since his youth fell during the years of Athenian depression, which the oligarchy ascribed to the mistakes of the great democratic leader.—μισθοφορίαν: on the growth and effects of this policy at Athens and elsewhere, see Grote, Hist. xi. 281 (e. lxxvii.).

29. τῶν τὰ ὅτα κατεαγότων: the Laconian imitators (λακωνίζοντες, λακωνομακοῦντες) in Athens were thus
\[\Sigma_. ~ \text{\'Alla tâde oukéti akouw, all' oida saphòs kai évw kai syv, oti to mevn prottov hydokýmei Periklês kai uýde-mían aýxhran díkhen katephfísganto autov 'Athnaiou, hýika xeírous ἤsan: ἐπειδὴ δὲ kaloī kágaðoī ēgevónesav yp'.} \]

515 named from having their ears often broken in the πυγμή by the straps with which the hands were covered (see Herm. Gr. Alter. iv.\(^3\) § 37, p. 347). They formed a party, hostile to the democracy, which saw in Lacedae-mon the model of a noble state, and looked to her for help. They practised Lacedaemonian severity in all external matters; hence they wore mustaches, short mantles, etc., and practised gymnastics very diligently. To harden the body, they even engaged in boxing, which was forbidden in Sparta. They became naturally, therefore, butts for ridicule. Cf. Prot. 342 b.—By this remark Callicles here accuses Socrates of partisanship. 516 34. ἐπειδὴ δὲ kaloī kágaðoī: with bitter irony. If they were really good, the righteousness of the judgment of Pericles would have been recognized; but if this judgment was unrighteous, then Pericles did not make them good.—ὑπ αὐτοῦ: γίγνο-μαι, as passive of ποιώ, requires ὑπο for the agent. 35 f. κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κτέ.: in the second year of the Peloponnesian war, when Pericles returned from an expedition against the Spartan coast, the slumbering discontent of the people, caused by the devastation of Attica by the Spartans and the ravages of the plague in Athens, broke out against him in the form of an accusation as a result of which he was fined a sum of money, the amount of which (15, 50, 80 talents) is not certain. Thuc. ii. 59; 65. See on 515 d. That the ostensible charge was embezzlement of the public funds is supported by this passage alone, but that various rumors were current of his dishonesty can be gathered from the story of Alcibiades' advice to him in Plut. Alcid. vii. Periklēi δὲ boulómenos ἐντυχεῖ ἐπὶ θύρας ἥθεν αὐτοῦ. πυθόμενος δὲ μὴ σχολάζεις, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν καθ' ἑαυτόν, ὅπως ἀποδώσει λόγον 'Αθηναῖοι, ἄπιοι δ 'Αλκιβιά-δῆς. "εἶτα" ἔφη "βέλτιον οὐκ ἦν σκοπεῖν αὐτῶν, ὅπως οὐκ ἀποδώσει λόγον 'Αθηναῖοι;" 516 4. eî paralabôwv: not designed as an exephesis to τοιούτος ὧν, which merely gives the general
5 λακτίζοντας [έαντον] μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνουτας ἄπεδειξε ταύτα ἀπαντα ποιούντας δι' ἀγριότητα. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητής ὁστισοῦν ὀτούοιν ζῷον, ὃς ἀν παραλαβὼν ἁμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα ἢ παρέ- βαβε; δοκεῖ ή οὐ;
10 ΚΑΛ. Πάντως τότε τῶν μοι χαρίσωμαι. Σ.Α. Καὶ τόδε τούνων μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος· πότε- ρον καὶ ὁ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐν τῶν ζώων ἐστὶν ἢ οὐ;
ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γάρ οὐ;
Σ.Α. Ὕψων ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο;
15 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.
Σ.Α. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτοὺς, ὡς ἄρτι ῥμολογοῦμεν, δικαιοτέρους γεγονέναι ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ' ἐκεῖνον, εἰπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐπεμελείτο αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὃν τὰ πολιτικά;
ΚΑΛ. Πάντως γε;
20 Σ.Α. Οὐκοῦν οἶ γε δίκαιοι ἔμεροι, ὡς ἔφη Ὄμηρος. οὐ δὲ τί φής; οὐχ οὕτως;
ΚΑΛ. Ναί.
Σ.Α. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἁγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν ἡ οἶνος παρέλαβε, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὐτὸν, ὅν ἡκιστ' ἄν ἐβοῦλετο.

516 idea which runs through all the preceding thought, but added to give those details to the simile which seem to be requisite. — παραλαβῶν: receiving for training. See on 483 ε. — The position of the words λακτί- ζοντας, κυρίττοντας, and δάκνουτας is probably merely a chance one.
6. ἄπεδειξε: the word means "to show or prove as the result of a process," often in mathematical reasoning; here as the result of training. Cf. below ε ἀπέφηνεν. Hence also the expression ἀποδεικνύναι τινὰ στρα- τηγόν. See on 484 b.
10. ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι: see on 513 e. The reply of Socrates is full of irony.
11. ἀποκρινάμενος: for the tense, see on 491 c.
16. ἔδει: without ἄν. See on 514 a.
17. ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων: see on 515 d.
20. οἶ γε δίκαιοι ἔμεροι ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος: there is no such direct assertion in any passage of Homer, but the same sense is seen in ζ 120, i 175 ἢ β' οἶ γ' ὑβρισταὶ τε καὶ ἄγριοι οὐδὲ δίκαιοι. Here, moreover, the leading thought is the utter exclusion of any idea of δικαιοσύνη from the ἄγριοι.
24. ὅν ἡκιστ' ἄν ἐβοῦλοντο: cf. Αρ. 25 d ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται
25 ΚΑΛ. Βούλει σοι ὁμολογήσω;
ΣΠ. Εἰ δοκῶ γέ σοι ἂληθῆ λέγειν.
ΚΑΛ. Ἑστῶ δὴ ταῦτα.
ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ χείρους;
30 ΚΑΛ. Ἑστῶ.
ΣΠ. Οὐκ ἂρ' ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Περικλῆς ἴν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.
ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σὺ γε φῆς.
ΣΠ. Μὰ Δί' οὐδὲ γε σὺ ἔξ ὅν ὁμολόγεις. πάλιν δὲ
35 λέγε μοι περὶ Κύμωνος· οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὐτοί
οὖς ἔθεράπευεν, ἵνα αὐτὸν δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς
φωνῆς; καὶ Θημιστοκλέα ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ
προσεξημώσαν; Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι εἰς τὸ

516 ὑπὸ τῶν ἔνωτων βλάπτεσθαί μᾶλλον ἢ ἄφελεσθαί. For ὅν, see on 453 e. The ellipsis is to be supplied from what precedes.
33. οὐ ... φῆς: see on 450 d.
35. ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν: Cimon was a supporter of the Lacedaemonian league, and also caused the Athenians to send aid to the Spartans in the third Messenian war. But when the Athenians were dismissed in so humiliating a manner at Ithome, his opponent, Pericles, turning to account the indignation of the people, succeeded in effecting his banishment in n.c. 461. The term of banishment by ostracism was limited by law to ten years. But Cimon was recalled about n.c. 457, also at the instance of Pericles. Since ostracism (Herm. Gr. Alter. i. § 130) was properly not a punishment, Socrates, in the words ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτη μὴ ἀκούσειαν, is merely making a point against the influence of Cimon in the state.

37. Themistocles was banished in n.c. 471, and went to Argos. Here he was accused by the Spartans of participation in the treason of Pausanias, or μηδαμός, and to escape investigations fled to the Persian king, a step which was followed by the confiscation of his magnificent property at Athens.

38. προσεξημώσαν: and in addition they punished, etc. Cf. Apol. 20 u. σφίνον ἐνείηαν κρῆματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. — τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι: this short adverbial expression seems to have been used simply as a distinguishing epithet, and it is not likely that the Greeks supplied or felt any ellipsis such as is suggested by Cron, ἐπὶ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι (Μαραθῶνι alone) παραταξάμενον (μαχασάμενον) or νικήσαντα. The epithet is the more emphatic as the victors at Marathon (Μαραθωνομάχαι Ar. Nub. 986) were unusually revered by posterity. In consequence of the unfortunate expe-
βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐφηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρὺν 40 τῶν, ἐνέπεσεν ἀν; καίτοι οὖντο, εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, ὡς σὺ φῆς, οὐκ ἦν ποτε ταῦτα ἐπασχοῦν. οὖκοιν οἱ γε ἄγαθοὶ ἡμῖνοι κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτοιομεν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ θεραπεύσωσιν τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμείνους γένωνται ἡμῖνοι, τοτ’ ἐκπίπτοιοσίν· οὐκ ἔστι 45 ταῦτ’ οὗτ’ ἐν ἡμῖνοιεῖα οὔτ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ οὐδενί· ἦ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἐμοιγε.

Συ. Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἐμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν, ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἕσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολί. 517 50 τικὰ ἐν τῷ δῆλον τῇ πόλει. ὅπερ δὲ ὠμολογεῖς τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα, τῶν μὲντοι ἐμπροσθεν, καὶ προείλου τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας· οὗτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν εἰς ἦσον τοῖς νῦν ὄντες, ὡστε, εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥήτορικῇ ἔχρωντο—οὐ γὰρ ἄνεξέπεσον—οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.

516 dition against Paros, Miltiades was, on the prosecution of Xanthippus, declared guilty of ἀπάθειας τοῦ δήμου, and fined fifty talents. According to Hdt. vi. 136, his adversary demanded the penalty of death, which was averted by the intercession of friends.

39. εἰ μὴ διὰ: "if it had not been for." The prytanis probably exerted his influence before the division, though this whole story seems to be much overdrawn.

40 f. εἰ ἦσαν...ἐπασχοῦν: opposition to generic present. Cf. 471 a. Goodwin (GMT. 410) considers this as a case of real opposition to the past.

41. οὖκοιν κτε.: the neg. contained in οὖκοιν (Kr. 69, 51, 2) applies not to the second member alone, but to the two members together; the co-

existence of the two clauses is denied. 516 e This form sharply emphasizes the self-contradiction which is fundamental in Callicles' view.—The results of the whole argument are now summed up as briefly as possible.

50. σὺ δὲ κτέ.: with ὠμολογεῖς a must be supplied the participial clause of the preceding sentence. From this also we must take a verb of saying to govern a τινὰς also to be supplied from οὐδένα of the clause τῶν...ἐπαρθεν.

52. ἐξ έσον: has almost the force of an adj. See Kr. 43, 4, 5; H. 798 f.

54. οὐ γὰρ ἐξέπεσον: we find additions, such as ἐκ τῆς παρυσίας, ἀρχῆς, τυραννίδος, and the like; also δέξια, οὐσίας (ἐκ τῶν ἐντόνων, Hdt. iii. 14). The verb ἐκπίπτεν serves thus as a passive to ἐκβάλλειν, though the image is that of a chariot driver who is
LXXIII. Καλ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, δ Σῶκrates, μὴ ποτὲ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται, οἷα τοῦτον ὄς βούλει εὑρασται.

Σε. Ὡ δαμόμυνε, οὖν ἔγω διέγω τοῦτον ὃς γε διακόνωσ 5 εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικῶτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἶοι τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὃν ἔπε-thύμει. ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὥστε ἐμεί-λον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὃς ἔπος ἐπείν οὐδὲν 10 τοῦτων διέφερον ἐκείνωι· ὅπερ μόνον ἐργὸν ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου. ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχη καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἀλλὰ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγώ σοι ὁμολογῶ δεινοτέρους εἶναι ἐκείνους τούτων ἐκπορίζειν. πράγμα οὖν γελοῦν ποιοῦμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὃν διαλε-
15 γόμεθα, οὐδέν πανόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδεὶ περιφερόμενοι καὶ

demonstrated (in ch. XIX. ff. But it is more extensive.

7. μεταβιβάζειν: "to give another direction to." See on 493 a. This verb and ἐπιτρέπειν are resumed by οὐδὲν τούτων, and depend on διέφερον. A similar passage (without the intervening acc.) is Prosl. 328 a ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐλαίγον ἐστὶ τις ὄστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς ἄρετὴν, ἀγαπητῶν.

8. ἐπιτρέπειν: we must supply a dat. from the preceding acc. See on 546 d. The verb has a slightly different sense in 504 c.

10. τούτων: note the variety in the use of the pronouns; τούτων is the same as τῶν νῦν above, and hence ἐκείνοι is required to take the place of τούτων above.

11. ναῦς κτ.: cf. 545 d.

12. εἶναι: equiv. to ὅτι ἔσται.

15. εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ περιφερόμενοι: similar in form, but not in meaning, to
the English phrase “argument in a circle,” i.e. a coming back again to the point of departure. Cf. Rep. v. 456 b ἢκομεν εἰς τὰ πρῶτα περιφέρεσθαι.

16. ἀλλήλων: is to be connected, as a kind of subjective or possessive gen., with the following indirect question. See II. 733; Kr. 47, 10, 8. “Each other’s language.”

17. διττῆ κτέ.: notice the position of the τῆς, which belongs to διττῆ, “a kind of doubled.” See on 491 c.

19. ἡ μὲν ἐτέρα: the second member of the correlation is divided into two parts of which the first is indicated by δὲ ἡκτίν τῆς κτέ. (below, e), and the other by τὴν ὅ ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν Ἑρμῆς ὑπόθεσιν ἐκτίνοις τούτοις (518 a). — ἡ ... ἐκτίναι: the shift from the regular indir. disc. indic. to an inf. is not uncommon. Cf. Rep. x. 616 b ἐστίν ἄριστοι ὑποταμὸι ὑπάρχοι ἐκ τῆς κτέ. Rid. § 281; GMT. 755.

21 f. ἀλλ' ὅ ἐρχεται κτέ.: anything else, that the body comes to want.

24. ποριστικόν ἐκτίναι κτέ.: in what follows, three varieties are distinguished. The κάτηλος is the small dealer, hawker or shopkeeper, who deals properly with products of the land (among which are included wines in 518 b); the ἐμπορος is the regular merchant and wholesale dealer. Cf. Prot. 313 c. The δημοιργός is the one who prepares from the raw material the various articles demanded by the needs of the body.

26. σκυτοδεσφόν: is unusual for βυρ- ε σοδέψης (tanner).

27. ὅντα τοιούτον: includes under one expression all the divisions and subdivisions of the ποριστικόν ἐκτίναι, but owing to the introduction of the βαμμαστόν ἐκτίνως the construction is changed and the partic. takes the place of the inf. What Socrates wishes to explain is that one who attends to the needs of the body, even though he may understand nothing of either gymnastics or medicine, may very easily himself become possessed of the idea that he is the genuine con-server of the body, as well as inspire the same belief in others.
PLATO'S GORGIAS.

εἶναι σῶματος, παντὶ τῷ μη εἴδοτι, ὅτι ἔστιν τὶς παρὰ
taútas ἀπάσας τέχνη γυμναστικῆ τε καὶ ἰατρικὴ, ἦ δὲ τῷ
30 οὖν ἔστιν σῶματος θεραπεία, ἦμπερ καὶ προσήκει τοῦτων
ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἐργοῖς
diὰ τὸ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὸ χρηστῶν καὶ ποιητῶν τῶν σιτίων ἡ
ποτῶν ἔστιν εἰς ἀρετὴν σῶματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας
taútas ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ taútas μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε
35 καὶ διακοινικᾶς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι περὶ σῶμα πραγ-
ματεῖας, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικῆν καὶ ἰατρι-
κὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεσποινας εἶναι τούτων. ταυτὰ ὦν
taúta ὅτι ἔστιν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆν, τότε μὲν μοι δοκεῖς μαν-
θάνειν ὅτε λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὃς εἰδὼς ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω·
40 ἢκεῖς δὲ ὁλίγον ύστερον λέγων, ὅτι ἀνθρώποι καλοὶ κάγα-
θοι γεγονόςδιν πολίται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἑπειδὰν ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶν
οὕτωσ, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτεινέσθαι ἀνθρώπους
περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὃσπερ ἄν ἐν περὶ τὰ γυμναστικὰ ἐμοῦ
ἐρωτώντων, οὕτως ἀγαθοὶ γεγονόςδιν ἡ ἕστιν σωμάτων
45 θεραπευταί, ἐλεγές μοι πάνυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων ὁ ἀρτο-
κόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τῆν ὑψοποιῶν συγγεγραφῶς τὴν

517 28. παντὶ τῷ μη εἴδοτι: added as
a a restrictive explanation to the pre-
ceding τοῖς ἄλλοις, which is far too
general a statement for Socrates.
28 f. παρὰ taútas ἀπάσας: see on
tάς ἄλλας κτδ. below, 518 a.
518 34. δουλοπρεπεῖς: plays on 485 b
a and similar expressions in the earlier
conversation with Callicles, e.g. 485 d.
The attributes of rhetoric and phi-
losophy are just reversed.
36. τάς ἄλλας τέχνας: "arts ordi-
narily designated as such."
518 45. Θεαρίων: and the following-
named persons are sometimes men-
tioned by later authors, Μίθαικος for
example, among those whom Athé-
naeus xii. 12 cites as authors of works
on cookery (τὰ ὀφαστυκά). The
title of his work can be surmised
from this passage. That the art of
cookery, especially in rich and pride
Syracuse, was early de
veloped, Plato
testifies in Rep. iii. 404 d Συρακοσίαν
tράπεζαν καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικιλὰν ὑφων.
Cf. Hor. Od. iii. 1. 18 Siculae da-
pes. The ἀρτοκόπος is at the same
time a cake-baker. The ἄρτος made
from wheat meal was a festival
dainty, as is to be judged from Athé-
naeus iv. 14 Σόλων δὲ τοῖς ἐν πρωτη
νείραν οἰκουμένοις μᾶζαν παρέχειν κελεύει,
ἄρτον δὲ ταῖσ ἐφοταῖς προσπαρατίθεναι.
Sarambus probably had a wine-shop.
Σικελικήν καὶ Σάραμβος ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὕτω θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασιν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἢρτοις θαυμαστοὺς καὶ παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὁψιν, ὁ δὲ ὦνον.

LXXIV. Ἡσως ἄν οὖν ἡγανάκτεις, εἴ σοι ἐλεγον ἐγὼ ὅτι "ἀνθρωπε, ἐπάιεις οὔδεν περὶ γυμναστικῆς: διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ ἐπαίωσας καλὸν κάγαθον οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οὔ, ἀν οὗτος 5 τύχωσι, ἐμπλήσατε καὶ παχύνατε τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπαινοῦμενοι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, προσαπολούσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας. οἱ δ’ αὐδ’ ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς ἐστιώντας αἰτίάσονται τῶν νόσων αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ’ οὔ ἀν αὐτοῖς τύχωσι 10 τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλεύοντες τι, ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἥκη ἡ τότε πλησμονή νόσον φέρουσα συχνῷ ὑστερον χρόνῳ, ἄτε ἀνευ τὸν ύψιευντὸν γεγονοῦτα, τούτοις αἰτίασονται καὶ

518 LXXIV. 1. ήσως ἄν οὖν ἡγανάκτεις: as Callicles really did when Socrates proved to him that he understood nothing at all of statecraft. 2. ὅτι: see on 521 b. 3. παρασκευαστάς ἀνθρώπους: the addition of ἀνθρώπους (“fellows”) is contemnous. 4. καλὸν κάγαθον: is used by Plato regularly of persons. Schanz, ii. 2 prol. 1, has collected only sixteen cases where it is not so used. Three such examples are found in the Gorgias, viz. 514 a, 526 a, in addition to the present passage. —περὶ αὐτῶν: refers according to sense to γυμναστικῆς, but is made general in view of b above. 4 f. ἄν οὗτος τύχωσιν: see on 514 e. Here, “if they so chance,” i.e. perhaps. d 6 f. προσαπολούσιν ... σάρκας: Demosthenes expresses the same idea by a somewhat different simile in 518 Ol. i. 15 ὁσπερ οἱ δανειζόμενοι ῥαδίας ἐπὶ τοὺς μεγάλοις τόκοις μικρὸν εὐπορήσαντες χρόνον ὑστερον καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπέστησαν. Also with the following ἀλλ’ οὔ ἀν αὐτοῖς τύχωσι παρόντες cf. Dem. Ol. i. 16 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ ἄγνω χρόνον ὑπάρχον ἀν δὲ ἀνδρείς Ἀθηναίοι, τοῦθ ὅτι πολλάκις ὑμεῖς οὖν τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὑστάτους περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰπόντας ἐν ὀργῇ ποιεῖτε ἃν τι μὴ κατα γνώμην ἐκβῆ, Phil. ii. 34 ὅρα γὰρ ὃτα τὰ πολλὰ ἐλισον οὖν εἰς τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλ’ εἰς τοὺς ὁποὶ χεῖρα μάλιστα τὴν ὀργὴν ἀφιέν- τας. 7. οἱ δ’ αὐτῷ: the construction is loose, but the context prevents ambiguity. 10 f. ἥκη φέρουσα: gives a picture, — “it is actually at hand, bringing disease with it,” — for the more prosaic “has brought about disease.” See on 491 e.
ψέξουσι καὶ κακῶν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἃν οἶοι τ’ ὀσί, τοὺς δὲ προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν ἐγκαμμάσουσιν.”

15 καὶ σὺ νῦν, ὦ Καλλίκλεια, ὦμουσαντον τούτω ἐργάζει· ε ἐγκαμμάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἱ τούτους εἰστιάσασιν εὐωχοῦντες δὲ ἐπεθύμουν, καὶ φασὶ μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκεναι αὐτοὺς· ὅτι δὲ οἶδει καὶ ὑπολόγος ἔστιν δι’ ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιοὺς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἀνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης

20 καὶ δικαοσύνης λμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τευχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαρίων ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν· ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολή αὐτῆς ἡ ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκαμμάσουσιν, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν

25 κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἱσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῆ, καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἐταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαία προσαπολύσι πρὸς οἷς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν ἀλλ’ ἱσως συναιτίων. καίτοι ἔγγον ἀνόητου πράγμα καὶ νῦν ὄρω γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι.

30 αἰσθάνομαι γὰρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τιμά τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν

518 16. τούτως: is defined by the following τὴν πόλιν. With καὶ φασὶ the subject changes, so that αἰτίοις refers to the same as οἱ, while τοῖς furnishes the subject for καὶ φασὶ.

18. οἶδει καὶ ὑπολόγος ἔστι: the first term denotes an external swelling or bloated condition, which may, however, for the time have all the appearance of health; the latter, the internal and hence invisible seat of disease.

519 20. φόρων: duties and imposts which the Athenians imposed upon other states, but expended only for their own interests.

21. καὶ τοιούτων φλυαρίων: with a side hit at 490 c and a more definite reference to 455 e. Cf. Dem. Ol. iii. 519, quoted on 490 c.

22 f. τοὺς τότε παρόντας κτέ.: again the same thought as in d above.

25. σοῦ ... ἐπιλήψονται: contains an allusion to 486 a. For the partitive gen., see H. 738 a, and on 469 c.

29. ὁρῶ, ἀκοῦω: Socrates desires b to emphasize that in the past as well as the present the same thing has been repeating itself.
metatheorizes; and, accordingly, the guidance and the function of the individual. Cf. Iser. iii. 5 f.

31. ἀγανακτούντων: depends upon b αἰσθάνομαι with the omission of αὐτῶν. The pl. is due to the plural idea, and to the ἀνθρώπων. The statement holds good for all, though the action affects the individual only.

32. ἄρα: postpositive, as in Prot. 355 b ὠς δὲ ταύτα γελοια ἐστι κατάθλησιν ἐσται ἐὰν μὴ πολλοὶ ἀνάμειρα ἐρρωίδησα ἄρα. Here it serves to characterize the assumption as a result that follows of itself.

35. οὔτ' ἂν εἰς: see on 512 e.

36. οὗτοι κτῆ.: loose connexion. The same case, "as well in regard to those who, etc. . . . as, etc."

37. προστοµοῦνται: Socrates is thinking of the task which each class assumes, viz. to make the subject of their treatment better, to endow him with virtue. The pretended statesman promises this result to the whole body of citizens; the sophist, to the individual. Cf. Iser. xiii. 5 f.

40. σφᾶς αὐτοῖς: themselves indeed, with more emphasis than the simple σφᾶς, which is more usual as the indir. reflexive. Cf. 520 b.

42. καλ: but little different from d καὶ τοι (and yet) in rejoinders, especially to statements made by the speaker. Cf. Apol. 29 b καὶ τούτῳ πώς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστίν; Dem. vi. 16 καὶ τίς δὲ ταύτα πιστεύσειεν;

43. ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοῖς κτῆ.: sc. as one must assume, according to the statement of the sophists. The addition of ἔξαιρεθήνατο ἄδικαν . . . ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ (just here lies the ἄδικα) δ' οὖν ἔχουσιν serves to bring out very strongly the want of consistency in the theory.

44. σχόντα: after they had gotten. See on 503 e. Cf. Apol. 19 a, Soph. E. 1256 μόλις γὰρ ἔχον νῦν ἐλεύθερον στόμα.
PLATO'S GORGIAS.

LXXV. Καλ. Σὺ δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἶς τ' εἰς λέγειν, εἴ μη τίς σοι ἀποκρύωτο;

Σ. Ἐοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τεῖνω τῶν λόγων, ε ἐπειδὴ μοι οὐκ ἑθέλεις ἀποκρύνεσθαι. ἂλλ' ὄγαθε, εἰπὲ 5 πρὸς φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ, ὅτι ύφ' ἕαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς γεγονός τε καὶ ὄν ἐπείτα πονηρός ἔστιν;

Καλ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν ἀκοῦεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων 10 παιδεέων ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἁρετήν;

Καλ. Ἐγώγε· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδ' 520 ενὸς ἄξιων;

Σ. Τί δὲ ἂν περὶ ἕκεινων λέγοις, οὐ φάσκοντες προ- εστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅτες ὡς βελτίστῃ 15 ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονη- ροτάτης; οὐεὶ τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνους; ταύτων, ὥ

St. I. p. 519.

46. ὡς ἄληθῶς δημηγορεῖν: here denotes the delivery of a long, connected discourse as opposed to dialectic investigation. It is also a reply to Callicles' accusation in 482 ε ὡς ἄληθῶς δημηγορεῖν ἄν.

LXXV. 3. Ἐοικά γε (sc. οἶς τ' εἶναι κτέ.): is a partial assent to the assertion implied in Callicles' question, "You would doubtless be quite capable," etc. — The following clause with γοῦν seems to be urged in proof, but it is really more of a complaint.

—συχνοὺς ... τῶν λόγων: cf. 465 ε συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτίτακα. The part. gen. emphasizes the distinctness of the arguments. — For the agreement of the adjective in gender and number with the subst., cf. Xen. Cyrb. iii.

2. 2 πολλὴν τῆς χάρας, iv. 5. 4 τῶν 519 ἁρτῶν τοὺς ἐμίσεις. 5. πρὸς φιλίου: see on 500 δ.

10. παιδεέων ... εἰς ἁρετήν: cf. Xen. Cyrb. 13. 3 ἑπ' ἁρετὴν. 11. ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις: what would one have to say? "One need not waste words over such people." Callicles, although at bottom himself a sophist, affects to despise the class in accordance with Gorgias' view concerning them. See Introd. § 8, especially note 22.

15. ὅταν τύχωσιν: has here much the force of "occasionally." See on 518 ε.

16. ταύτων: emphatic asyndeton, which as an answer to the question immediately preceding has the effect of a negation.
μακάρι, ἐστὶν σοφιστής καὶ ρήτωρ, ἥ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγώ ἐλεγον πρὸς Πώλον· σὺ δὲ δι᾽ ἃ ἄγνοιαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἷει εἶναι, τὴν βητορικὴν, τοῦ 20 δὲ καταφρονεῖ. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιον ἐστὶν σοφιστικὴ βητορικὴς ὀσωπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικὴ καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἰατρικής. μόνοις δ’ ἐγγυε καὶ ἄμην τοῖς δημιουργοῖς τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι, δ’ αὐτοὶ παιδεύοσιν, ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφάς, 25 ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἁμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὑφελήκασιν οὐς φασίν ὑφελεῖν. οὐχ οὗτως εἶ ἔχει;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνω γε.

Σα. Καὶ προεσθαι γε δήποτε τὴν ἐυρεγεσίαν ἀνευ μι-30 σθοῦν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἰπερ ἀληθῇ ἐλεγον. ἀλλὰς μὲν γὰρ ἐυρεγεσίαν τις ἐυρεγετηθεῖς, οἶνον ταχὺς γενόμενοι διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἱσως ἄν ἀπο-

17. ἡ ἐγγύς κτέ.: on the use of the adverb, see Kr. 62, 2, 4. τὶ goes with it as τὶς with the adj., "pretty nearly." See on 401 c.

22. καὶ φίλην: the position of καὶ here, which would properly be connected with μόνοις, is due to the desire to emphasize this latter word by putting it at the head of the sentence.

23. τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι: that which receives their training, whether it be a whole commonwealth or an individual. The abstract neut. generalizes, as in Prot. 312 c, where of the sophists themselves it is said: καὶ τοιοῦτοι εὶ τούτῳ (i.e. what a sophist is) ἄγνοεσιν οὐδὲ ὅτι παραδίδουσι τὴν ψυχὴν οἶνοθα, οὗτοι εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε εἰ κακό πράγματι.

25. ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ κτέ.: without, at the same time. Cf. Phaedr. 245 d τούτῳ δὲ οὗτ’ ἀπὸλλυσθαί οὕτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανόν πᾶσαν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήναι. Cron supplies from οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν the words ἀνάγκην εἶναι, but it is very doubtful whether the Greeks felt the ellipsis. Cf. 471 d.

29. προεσθαι τὴν ἐυρεγεσίαν: every c piece of instruction given the scholar by the teacher is looked upon as a benefit, and the pay is simply a compensation for benefit received. To προέσθαι, which of itself denotes a freewill gift, is added ἀνευ μισθοῦ in order to make more plain the contrast with the practice of the sophists, which ran so counter to the customary ideas of the Greeks (cf. Apol. 19 e f., 31 b, 33 a). The practice of Protagoras, as it is told us in Prot. 328 b, c, is noteworthy in this connexion.
στερήσεις τήν χάριν, εἰ πρόοιτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι máλιστα ἀμα 35 μεταδίδουσ τοῦ τάχους λαμβάνοι τὸ ἀργύριον. οὐ γὰρ δ᾿ ἑβαδυτῆτι, οἶμαι, ἄδικοσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ ἄδικις ἢ γάρ;

Καλ. Ναὶ.

Σα. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τις αὐτὸ τούτῳ ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἄδικιαν, οὐδὲν 40 δεινὸν αὐτῷ μῆποτε ἄδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἄσφαλες ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέστη, εἴπερ τῷ ὄντι δύνατό τις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὖτω;

Καλ. Φημί.

LXXVI. Σα. Διὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀρα, ὡς εἰοίκε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλὰς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἶνον ὀἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρῶν.

Καλ. Ἐοικέ γε.

5 Σα. Περὶ δὲ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, οὐτων ἂν τις τρόπον ὡς Βέλτιστος εἶῃ καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῦν ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρῶν νενομισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, εἶν μὴ τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῶ. ἢ γάρ;

Καλ. Ναὶ.

10 Σα. Δῆλον γὰρ ὃτι τούτο αὐτίκῳ ἐστιν, ὃτι μόνῃ αὐτῇ

520 34. οὗτῳ máλιστα: to be connected c with the partic. clause ἀμα μεταδίδουσ, simul atque tradit.—ἀμα: on the adv. with the partic., see II. 976; GMT. 858.

d 39 f. οὐδὲν δεινὸν κτέ.: see on 517α, and cf. Ἀρ. 28 δ οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ. It has much the force of the English, ‘there is no danger that,’ etc. See Gildersleeve, Am. Jour. Phil. iii. 204.

LXXVI. 1 f. ταῖς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλαῖς: almost equiv. to τὰς περὶ ἄλλων συμβουλαῖς.

5 f. οὖν ἂν τις τρόπον κτέ.: ερεχ. 520 eggetic to ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, “this matter.” The ἅρετη πολιτική which the sophists professed to teach included both sides,—management of one’s own household and of the state. Cf. Ἀρ. 318 ὅ τι δὲ μᾶθημα ἐστιν εἴσβουλα περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅτις ἒν δριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῦν, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅτις τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατότατον ἐν εἴῃ καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. 7. μὴ φάναι... ἐὰν μὴ: generic conditional of the present. The first μὴ is due to the infinitive.
520 11 f. ἄντ' εὖ ποιεῖν: the old way of e writing was ἄντευποιεῖν; but a verb can retain its original form only when compounded with preposition. See H. 581. Gratitude is only a kind of justice.

12. ὡστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι: sc. as testimony to the fact that the teacher has really made him better. The common form of the conditional, where the second member is the converse of the first, is εἶναι μὲν... ei δὲ μή. See on 502 b. The use of ei with fut. indic. also in the first member emphasizes the rarity of the case. The subject of εὖ ποιήσας is indefinite, 'any one,' as of μὴ φάναι above.

521 16 f. τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως: a denotes political activity in the sense shown in ch. LVI. above, and in accordance with the principles deduced in ch. XIX. ff. The correct answer to the question propounded would be: 'As matters are, I invite you to neither mode; for the one is immoral, the other (as Socrates also makes plain in Apol. 31 d f.), for the present impossible.' Hence, also, Socrates intimates that the only way of engag-
Kāl. Δέγω τοίνυν ὅτι ὡς διακονήσοντα.

Ση. Κολακεύσοντα ἀρα με, ὡς γενναίοτατε, παρακαλεῖς.

25 Kāl. Eἰ σοι Μυσόν γε ἴδιον καλεῖν, ὡς Σώκρατες ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτα γε ποιήσεις —

Ση. Μὴ εἴπης ὅ πολλάκις εἰρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεὶ με ὅ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὐ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι πονηρός γε ὄν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα. μηδὲ ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται ἕαν τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ 30 αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω ὅτι "ἀλλ' ἀφελόμενον οὐχ ἔξει ὅτι χρήσεται αὐτοὶ, ἀλλ' ὄσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφεἴλετο, οὕτως καὶ λαβῶν ε ἀδίκως χρήσεται, εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχρῶς, εἰ δὲ αἰσχρῶς, κακῶς."

LXXVII. Kāl. "Ὡς μοι δοκεῖς, ὡς Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδὲ ἄν ἐν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδῶν καὶ οὐκ ἄν

521 24. κολακεύσοντα: pronounces such a judgment upon διακονήσοντα that its opposition to the idea γενναίος (γενναίοτατε, γενναίοις εἰπέ) is strongly emphasized.

25. εἰ σοι Μυσόν γε κτέ.: when two conditional clauses are contrasted by εἰ μὲν . . . εἰ δὲ μή, we not infrequently find the conclusion of the first condition omitted. GMT. 482; II. 904 a. The sense of this passage seems to be: "Yes! if you prefer to use the vilest name for it." The Mysians were so despised that even slaves brought from Mysia were as little thought of as the Sarδι ναλες at Rome. Hence Μυσόν έσχατος was a proverb (Theaet. 209 b τδ λεγόμενον Μυσόν τῶν έσχατων), meaning "the vilest of the vile." Cic. pro Flacc. 27 Quid porro in Graeco sermone tam tritum atque celebratum est, quam si quis despicatui ducitur, ut Mysorum ultimus esse dicatur? κολακεύειν was an unpleas-
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

St. I, p. 521.

εἰσαχθεῖσ εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνω ἵσως μοχθηροῦ ἀν-θρώπου καὶ φαύλου.

5 Σα. Ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὥς Καλλίκλες, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οὖμαι ἐν τῇ τῇ πόλει ὄντων ᾄν, ὅτι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τὸ δέ μέντοι εὐ δόδ ὅτι, ἐὰνπερ εἰσίω εἰς δικα- 
στήριον περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων ὅ σὺ λέγεις, πονη- 
ρός τίς μ᾽ ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ
10 ἀδικοῦντ᾽ ἀνθρωπον εἰσαγάγοι· καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνομι. βούλει σοι εἶπω δι᾽ ὅτι τάντα προσδοκῶ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

Σα. Οἶμαι μετ᾽ ὅλγων Ἀθηναίων, ένα μὴ εἶπω μόνος, ἔπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικὴ τέχνη καὶ πράττειν τὰ
15 πολιτικά μόνος τῶν νῦν· ἄτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων 
touς λόγους οὗς λέγω ἐκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, ε 
οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἠδίστον, καὶ οὐκ εθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παρανεῖ,

521 The difference in the participles is 
c the same as it would be in direct dis-
course: οἰκῶ ἐρποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσα-
χεῖν. Cf. 486 b.

5. ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί: the particle 
ἄρα has the force, “as it seems,”
as frequently. Socrates is not to be 
understood as saying that he is ἀνόη-
tος, but only that according to Calli-
cles’ view he would be.

6. ὄντων ᾄν, ὅτι τύχοι: “any 
one may experience anything.” The 
more usual mood would be subjv. ὅτι 
ἂν τύχη, instead of optative. But the 
opt. is not uncommonly found by 
attraction in relative sentences which 
are dependent on clauses with ἂν 
either opt. or indic.). GMT. 558.

On the subject-matter, cf. Meno 94 e 
ἐγὼ (Anytus is introduced as speak-
ing) μὲν οὖν ἂν σου συμβουλέωσαι, εἰ 
θέλεις ἐμοὶ πέλεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι. ὡς 
τῶς μὲν καὶ ἂν ἄλλη πόλει ἰδίων

(ἤδον) ἔστιν κακῶς ποιεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἡ 
ἐν ἂν τῇ τῇ δι καὶ πάνω. Ἀρ. 31 d, c 
e, and Dem. Ol. iii. 11 ff. also agree 
with this.

7 ff. τὸ δέ . . . προσδοκῶ: these d 
words sound like a prophecy in the 
mouth of Socrates, but were probably 
tended by Plato as a severe criti-
cism on his accusers.

8. περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων: 
referring to the nature of the punish-
ment to be undergone. Cf. above, b. 
—ὁ: where we should more naturally 
have ὅν, but see on 486 d.

13. ἦν μὴ εἶποι μόνος: this limitation 
is intended to be exact, as the 
repetition of μόνος shows. On the 
matter, see Ἀρ. 30 d ff.

16. οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἠδίστον: the repe-
tition in a changed form of the 
idea already expressed serves to 
heighten the contrast. See on ὄντος
452 e.
Plato’s Gorgias.

τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὕς ἐξώ ὦτὶ λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. ὃ αὐτὸς δὲ μοι ἦκει λόγος, ὄντερ πρὸς Πόλον ἔλεγον. κρι- 20 νοῦμαι γάρ ὡς ἐν παιδίους ιατρὸς ἀν κρύοιτο κατηγοροῦν- τος ὄψομοι. σκόπει γάρ, τί ἂν ἄπολογοίτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνθρώπως ἐν τούτοις ληφθείς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέ- γων ὦτι ὃ παιδεῖ, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅτε εἰργασται ἀνήρ καὶ αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει τέμ- 25 νων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ ἵσχυναιν καὶ πτώγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεὶ, πικρότατα πώματα διδοὺς καὶ πεινὴν καὶ δυσῆν ἀναγκά- ζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἥδεα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἡμῶν.

521 18. τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα: this employment of Callicles’ epithet (cf. 486 c) is probably not without design on Socrates’ part, according to whose view it applies better to rhetoric than to philosophy.

19. ὃ αὐτὸς . . . λόγος: in the passage referred to (464 d) Socrates is actually speaking to Gorgias, who has taken Polus’ place for the time, but what he says applies just as well to Polus, as is seen by reference to 463 e and 465 a.

19 f. κρυνούμαι: probably passive; but if so, it is the only example in Attic prose (see Kr. 39, 11, A). On the other hand, the fut. middle of ἄδικα is regularly used for fut. passive. Cf. 509 d, and see II. 496 a.

22. ἐν τούτοις ληφθείς: cf. 486 a εἰ τις σοῦ λαθόμενος. Ποῦ ἐν τούτοις is to be understood, is shown by τοὺς τοιοῦτους δικαστάς below.

23. ἃ παιδεῖ: what follows as far as εὐχόντων διὰς is a parody on the accusation made against Socrates, especially in so far as he was declared to be a corrupter of the young.

24. ἀνήρ: without the art, because it is disparaging. But see II. 674.—τοὺς νεωτάτους: instead of τοὺς νέους, because the supposed judge himself is a child.

24 f. διαφθείρει καὶ ἀπορεῖν ποιεὶ: are loosely connected with κακὰ εἰργασται as denoting two species of the evils complained of,—διαφθείρει the more severe treatment by τέμνων τε καὶ κάων,—ἀπορεῖν ποιεὶ, the less severe by ἵσχυναιν καὶ πτώγων. The latter is explained by πικρότατα κτί. and πεινὴν . . . ἀναγκάζων in chiastic position. It denotes, therefore, the condition of wretchedness and discomfort brought about by fasting and nauseating medicines. While δια- φθείρει reminds one of the accusation before the court, ἀπορεῖν ποιεὶ applies especially to the customary criticisms which were made against Socrates. See on 522 b below.

27. οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγώ: a compressed expression, in which ω, though really without a verb, is connected with the following clause as equiv. to οὐχ εὐχόντων, ὥσπερ κτί. Cf. Συμπ. 179 d, ε (θεω) ἐποίησαν τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ('Ορφέως) ὑπὸ μνημάκων γενέσθαι οὐχ ὥσπερ Ἀχιλλέα . . . ἔτιμησαν καὶ εἰς ὕπακον νήσους ἀπέτεμαν. Cf. Dem. Phil. i. 34. Translate οὐχ ὥσπερ by "whereas."
30. πάσην: not  

a) roar would be characterized by volume rather than by distinctness.

31. ἀναβοήσατι: sc. as the judges of Socrates really did. Hence the repeated entreaty of Socrates, μη θορυβεῖτε. Cf. Apol. 30 c ἐφ’ οίς ἴσως βοήθοσθε.

32. ἴσως κτ.ε.: is, according to the sense, a decisive affirmation, though it is given unwillingly and grudgingly.
—οἴεσθαι γε χρή: is not very appropriate here; it is frequently employed where the speaker answers himself, e.g. Critio 53 c καὶ οὐκ οἶει ἄσχημον ἐν φαίνεσθαι τό τοῦ ἴσως σωκράτους πράγμα; οἴεσθαι γε χρή, Prot. 325 c.

33. ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ κτ.ε.: cf. Iltt. ix. 98 ἐν ἀπορίᾳ εἰσχύντο ὦτι ποιέωσι.

LXXVIII. 2. οὔτε γὰρ: the corresponding member to this is ἐάν τέ τις μὲ κτ.

b 4 f. ἐγὼ δὲ (while I) . . . πορίζεται: is outside of the regular construction.

5. η ὑσωτέρους: in view of τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους we might expect τοὺς νεωτέρους. If the reading is sound, we must look upon νεωτέρους as entirely indefinite in the sense of "young people," and τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους as "the older" as compared with them, e.g. their fathers, etc.

6. ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα: this accusation was actually made against Socrates, as we see from Meno 79 c, where Meno says, ὦ Σάκρατε, ἡκούον μὲν ἐγὼ γε πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι, ὦτι σὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ αὐτῶς ἀπορεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν, and Socrates himself says in Theaet. 149 a λέγονσι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὦτι ἀπατώτατος εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν.—τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κτ.ε.: an example is afforded by Apol. 29 d ff., where Socrates represents himself as saying to any one he meets, ὦ ὅστις ἀνδρὼν κτ., χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ ἀληθεῖς ἐπιμελοῦμεν ὡς σοι ἐσταί ὡς πλείστα, φρονήσως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς ὡς
λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἡ ἱδία ἡ δημοσία, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι "δικαιὸς πάντα ταῦτα ἔγω λέγω, καὶ πράττω εἰ τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, ὃ ἀνδρὲς δικασταί," οὔτε ἄλλο οὔδέν.

10 ὡστε ἵσως, ὅτι ἄν τύχω, τούτῳ πείσομαι.

Καλ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὃ Σῶκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἀνθρωποσ ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος οὖν έαυτῷ βοηθεῖν;

Σω. Εἰ ἔκεινό γε ἐν αὐτῷ υπάρχοι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ 15 πολλάκις ὁμολογησάς· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἰη αὐτῷ, μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώπους μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἀδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρήνακώς μήτε εἱργασμένος. αὕτη γάρ τις βοήθεια έαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῶν ὁμολογηται κρατίστῃ εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐμὲ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα 20 ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἄν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν όλίγοις ἐξελέγχομεν καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνον, καὶ εἰ

522 belṭisth ἐσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ ὁ δὲ φροντίζει; Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2, 49 ff.
7. λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους: corresponds to πικράτατα πάματα δίδους in the comparison.
8. ὃνι δικαῖος κτέ.: Socrates really speaks in this vein in Apol. 30 ἐπὶ.
10. ὃνὶ ἄν τύχω: see on 521 ἐπὶ.
12. καὶ ἀδύνατος ὃνι: in form coordinate with, but in sense explanatory of, οὕτως διακείμενος, which refers to what precedes.
14. εἰ ἔκεινό γε κτέ.: the apod. is to be sought in the implied affirmation to the question dokei σοι καλῶς ἔχειν. Cf. 503 ἐπὶ. The addition of ἐν to the pron. makes it very emphatic, as in Rep. vii. 537 ὁ (though here the order is different) μία καὶ αὐτὴ τῶν βασάνων οὐκ ἐλαχιστῇ.
15. βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη: not to be considered as a circumlocutotory perfect; but the partic. denotes a condition brought about by a course of action (eἰρήνακώς μήτε εἱργασμένος) which began in the past, still continues.
17. αὐτὴ γάρ τις βοήθεια: the use of τις instead of the art. shows that d Socrates feels he is stretching language a little. The dat. is after the analogy of the preceding dat. with the partic.; but see on 513 β.
19. ἐξελέγχοι: should confute me by showing. Hence the partic. follows the analogy of verbs of showing.
20. καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν όλίγοις: "whether... or."
21. μόνος ὑπὸ μόνον: the disgrace, to the mind of Socrates, consists, not in the fact that one suffers a defeat at the hands of his adversary ἐναντίον πολλῶν, but in the unsuspected weakness which is thus laid bare. Hence, so far as the purpose in hand is concerned, ταύτην τὴν ἀδύναμίαν would be equivalent to ἀδικίαν.
The death of Socrates also declares after his sentence, Apol. 38 d ἀποφιλεῖ μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὗ μέντα λόγον, ἀλλὰ τόλμη καὶ ἀναισχυντικὰ καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οἳ ἂν ὑμῖν ἡδονή ἕν ἀκούειν, and in 38 e, after he has given a characterization of that rhetoric to the use of which he would not lower himself, οὔτε γὰρ μοι μεταμελεῖν οὕτως ἀπολογησάμενος, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μάλλον αἱροῦμαι ἐνδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθανάται ἦ ἐκεῖνως ἕν. The fear of death Socrates declares also in the Apology to be due to the worst kind of ignorance, that which thinks it knows what it does not know. "Death is commonly considered an evil, although no one knows but that it is the greatest good (Apol. 29 a, 37 b). On the other hand, evil is to be greatly feared for its consequences, both here and hereafter." ὅτι ἀποθνῄσκειν is the "act of dying," τὸ τεθανάται, the resulting condition, death, which latter Socrates discusses in Apol. 40 c.
PLATO'S GORGIAS.

258 St. I. p. 523.

Socrates avoids the common story of hostile relations between Cronus and his sons.

6 f. ἦν οὖν νόμος ἐπὶ Κρόνον...

523 his statement ὁσ ἀληθής κτῆ., looking

a to his explanation in *Phaedo* 114 e

tо μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διασχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἐχοντι ἀνάρη, ὅτι μέντοι ἡ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἡ τοιαύτ' ἄττα περὶ τάς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπεὶ περὶ ἀδάνατον γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τούτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἔξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν. See Thompson's note.

3 f. ὁσπέρ ὁμηρός λέγει: Socrates refers to Ο 187 Π., where Poseidon says:

τρεῖς γάρ τ' ἐκ Κρόνου εἰμὲν ἀδέλφεσιν οὐς τέκετο Ρέα,

Zeus καὶ ἐγώ, πρίτατος δ' 'Αιόθις ἐνέροισιν ἀνάσασσον.

τρικβά δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἐκαστός δ' ἐμοὶ ἐμοὶ τιμῆς.

ἡ τοι ἐγών ἐλαχὸν πολίτην ἂλα ναίεμεν αἰεὶ

παλλομένων, Ἀιόθις δ' ἐλαχεῖ χορὸν ἥρεστα, καθ' ἑαυτὸν

Zeus δ' ἔλαχ' οὐρανὸν εὐρύν ἐν αἰδέρι καὶ νεφέλησιν

γαία δ' ἐτί ξυνὴ πάντων καὶ μακρός ὁ Ολυμπός.

Socrates commences with this passage so as to be able to assume therefrom, or the existence of the soul after death, as an admitted fact which requires no proof.

5. παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον: by making thus the sway over the world a matter of inheritance simply,
νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖων ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἔκτος κακῶν, 10 τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τύσεως τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὦ δὴ Τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἱέναι. τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ζώντες ἥσαν ζώντων, ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικαίου ἤ μέλλονεν τελευτᾶν. κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἔκρυνοντο· ὦ τε 15 οὖν Πλοῦτων καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἱόντες ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία, ὦτι φοιτῆσιν σφίσιν ἀνθρώποι ἐκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. ἔπειν οὖν ὁ Ζεῦς· " ἀλλ' ἐγώ," ἔφη, ἐν " παύσω τούτῳ γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι

Tartarus was originally, according to Homer, the prison of the Titans; cf. θ 13, 478. Plato alone makes it the prison of all wrong-doers. The term μακάρων νήσων became stereotyped very early; hence we never find the prose word μακάρων used in it.

9. ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ: on the omission of the art., see G. 142, 4, ἱ. 5; Η. 672 b.

11 f. τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ: the representation of a court of the dead, with other judges besides Pluto himself, and before the souls enter Hades, is first found in the Platonic version of the myth.

12. ἔτι νεωστὶ: (still more recently, when, etc.) is contrasted with ἐπὶ Κρόνου, so that τοῦ Διός... ἔχοντος forms the explanation of it. Heindorf connects ἔτι νεωστὶ with ἔχοντος, and translates: recente adhuc Iovis imperio. See on 503 c.

13. ζώντες ἥσαν ζώντων: this presentation is quite in harmony with the mythical form which Socrates adopts. The object is to show the contrast between a judgment which is human, uncertain, and based on external appearances, and the true one, which is based on accurate inspection of the unveiled truth. For this purpose the human tribunal is supposed in the myth to have existed first; the second tribunal is then made by Plato to arise as a substitute for the first, although naturally it must be conceived as existent ever since the creation of man. The first tribunal admits of the same criticism as the one in use among men deserves.

15. οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ: who these are remains uncertain. The addition οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων shows that they abode there, though their functions probably extended also to Tartarus. On the attraction of the preposition, see G. 191, ἱ. 6; Η. 788 a.

17. ἐκατέρωσε: i.e. as well to Tartarus as to the Isles of the Blessed; hence ἀνάξιοι refers both to reward and punishment.

18. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κτὲ.: note the repeated employment of γὰρ, which cor-
δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ, ἕφη, "οἱ κρίνομενοι κρίνον-20 ταί. ζωντες γάρ κρίνονται. πολλοὶ οὖν," ἢ δ' ὡς, "ψυχὰς
πονηρᾶς ἐχοντες ἤμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματα τε καλὰ καὶ
γένη καὶ πλοῦτος, καὶ, ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ἢ, ἔρχονται
ἀυτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες ὑπὸ δικαίως βεβιώ-
κασιν. οἱ οὖν δικασταί ὑπὸ τοῦτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ α
25 ἀμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δικάζονσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς
αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὅτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκα-
λυμένοι. τάντα δὴ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται,
καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἄμφιέσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶ-
tουν μὲν οὖν," ἕφη, "πανοστέον ἔστιν προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν
30 θάνατον. νῦν γὰρ προόσασι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ
εἰρηται τῷ Προμηθείῳ ὅπως ἄν παύσῃ αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα γυμ-

523 responds well to the strongly marked
c (repeated ἕφη) direct speech.
21. ἤμφιεσμένοι: the 'clothing' is
to be understood in the wider sense,
as everything external which would
affect the estimation of a man,—e.g.
beauty of person, noble origin, wealth,
etc. Cf. 451 e, and Prot. 319 e καὶ
πάνυ καλὸς ἢ καὶ πλοῦσιος καὶ τῶν γεν-
ναίων.
22 f. ἐρχονται κτε.: here the Attic
court is visible behind the myth.
25. πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς: sense-perception
is, according to Plato, always un-
trustworthy, and hence the knowledge
gained through it is always uncer-
tain, often untrue. With that, Socra-
tes contrasts the knowledge which is
earned by the immediate and thought-
ful action of the soul itself, which he
represents here as soul-perception.
27. ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται: "comes
before them," "puts itself in their
way." Their wrappings become a hin-
drance to perception of the truth.
28 f. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν: introduces
the preliminaries which must first be
d settled.
30. τοῦτο: is the condition of προ-
eιδοσία mentioned in the previous
clause. Closely connected with it is
αὐτῶν as a gen. of possession, such as
we see occurring with ἑθαμάζων, e.g.
Phaedo 89 a ἐγώ γέγονες μάλιστα ἑθαμάζασα
αὐτοῦ (in him) πρῶτων μὲν τοῦτο κτε.,
Apol. 17 a μάλιστα αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαμάζασα.
The regular const. with both verbs
is an acc. of the person with a gen.
of the thing.
31. τῷ Προμηθείῳ: in the Attic cult,
Prometheus was honored next to
Hephaestus and Athena as a bene-
factor of mankind. As such he bore
the surname πυρφόρος, under which
name Sophocles celebrates him in
Oedipus Colonus, where he says of
the neighborhood which Oedipus en-
ters (O. C. 51 ff.): χῶρος μὲν ἱερός πᾶς
δὲ ἐστ', ἔχει δὲ πολυποιεῖσθαι
ἡδ' ὁ πυρφόρος θεὸς | Τιτάν Προμηθεύς.
Of his enmity with Zeus, which Aes-
chylus, following Hesiod, made the
νος κριτέον ἀπάντων τούτων· τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεὶ κρίνεσθαι. καὶ τῶν κριτήν δεὶ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῆν τὴν ψυχήν θεαροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος
35 ἐκάστου, ἔρημοι πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνων τὸν κόσμον, ἔνα δυκαία ἡ κρίσις ἦ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ύμεῖς ἐποιησάμεν πικαστᾶς νεῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθιν, ἕνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, Λιακὸν.

523 central point of his magnificent poem, there is no mention either in Sophocles or in Plato, who also, in the Prot. 320 d, in the myth of the Gods related by the sophist, says: προσεταχαν Προμηθεῖ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεὶ κοιμήσατε τε καὶ νείμασι δυνάμεις ἐκάστοις ὡς πρέπει. As a Titan he is called the son of Iapetus. — Not to be mistaken is the allusion to Aeschylius P. v. 248–251, though with a modification of the tone:
Πρ. Θεητοῦς ἐπαυσα μὴ προδέρκεσθαι μόρον.
Χορ. Τὸ πόλεως εὐρωπὸς τῆς δὲ φάρμακον νόσος;
Πρ. Τυφλάς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐπίδας καθώς
ποιός.
Χορ. Μέγας ἀφελήμα τοιτί ἐδωρήσω βροτοῖς.
— ὅπως ἐν παύσῃ: see on 481 a and 480 d. Whether the manner of bringing about this desired object was also prescribed to Prometheus, or left to his own ingenuity, is not said. — αὐτῶν: must be taken as the gen. of the person, with τούτῳ as object of παύσῃ. As a rule we have the reverse.
32. ἀπάντων τούτων: i.e. clothes, etc., mentioned above.—τεθνεῶτας γὰρ κτέ.: does not give the reason, but simply the explanation of the preceding expression; for τεθνεῶτας κτέ. is no basis for γυμνῶς κτέ., but rather the reverse.

33. αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῆν τὴν ψυ-
χήν: emphasizes the immediateness of the scrutiny on the side both of object and subject.
34. ἐξαίφνης: combined, just like ἑμα, with the partic., which it either precedes or follows. See on 520 e.
37. πρότερος ἢ ύμεῖς: on account of his position as king of the gods, for πάντα ἰδὼν Δώσ ὑθάλαμος καὶ πάντα νοῆσαι. Πε. ἔργα κ. ἦ. 267.
38 f. ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας...Εὐρώπης: the prep. ἐκ can be used of parentage or of place of origin; here the latter. According to Hom. Ἤ 321 f. Minos and Rhadamanthys were sons of Europa, and born in Crete, of which Minos was afterwards king, while Aeacus was called the son of Aegina. Minos was famed as a wise law-giver, Rhadamanthys and Aeacus for their wisdom, justice, and piety. — The Greeks of Plato’s time divided the earth into two parts. Cf. Isoc. Ping. 179 τῆς γῆς ἀπάσης τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ κόσμῳ κείμενης, δίχα τετυμπενοῦσα καὶ τῆς ἡμῶς Ἀσίας, τῆς δ’ Εὐρώπης καλομεμνησίας. Plato must accordingly reckon Crete as belonging to Asia, unless we are to conceive that he had in mind the fact that Phoenix or Agenor, father of Phoenix and Cadmus and grandfather of Europa, was king of Phoenicia. To these three, which are also
40 οὖτοι οὖν ἐπειδᾷν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, 524 ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ, ἐξ ἢς φέρετον τῷ ὅδῳ, ἢ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νησίους, ἢ δὲ εἰς Τάρταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδάμανθνος κρίνει, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Ἀλακός. Μήν δὲ πρεσβεῖα δῶσω ἐπὶδιακρίνειν, ἐὰν ἀπορήτον τι 45 τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ἦν ὡς δικαιοτάτη ἡ κρίσις ἤ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

LXXX. Ταῦτ' ἐστών, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, ὃ εὖ χῶ ἄκηκος πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιούτε ὑμεῖς λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν. ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὦν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ δυνών πραγμάτων διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς 5 καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλου ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαλυθῆτον ἁρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλου, οὐ πολὺ ἤττον ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τῆν

523 mentioned by Dem. de Cor. (xviii.)
524 127, the Attic hero Triptolemus is aπολ. 41 a. added in.
40. ἐν τῷ λειμώνι: Soerates is a thinking of the 'asphodel meadow' of Homer, λ 539, 573. According to Homer, it seems to have stretched through the whole of Hades, and to have been the abiding place of the shades. Cf. ὥς 13 ἀδύνα ἐκ λυκνίου κατ' ἀσφοδέλλων λειμώνα | ἑνθα τε ναυσίζω ψυχών, εἰδῶλα καμάντων. Plato places it at the entrance of Hades.
41. ἐν τῷ τριόδῳ: epexegetical ap-proposition according to the σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος. For the matter, cf. Verg. Æn. vi. 540 hic locus est, partis ubi se via findit in ambas: | dextera quae Ditis magni sub moenia tendit, | hae iter Elysium nobis: ac laeva malorum | exercet poe-nas et ad impia Tartara mittit.—τῷ δῶ: the fem. dual of the art. does not occur in Attic. See H. 272 a, Meisterhans, 2 46, 17 e.

44. ἐπὶ διακρίνειν: "to give the final verdict." The office here assigned to Minos is not the same which Homer (λ 538) makes him fill. Cf. 526 ὑμ. 45. περὶ τῆς πορείας: not concerning their course on earth, but as to whether they shall take the road to Tartarus or that to the Isles of the Blessed. Cf. Phaedo 107 d ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείστω πορείας.

LXXX. 2ff. The conclusions which οὐ are drawn from the story here narrated do not begin until below, ἐπειδὰν ὦν. The intervening state-ments contain supplementary matter, which is drawn by very easy deduc-tions, partly from philosophy, partly from experience.
3. ὁ θάνατος κτί.: cf. Phaedo 64 e ἐναι τούτῳ τῷ τεθνάναι, χωρίς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγέν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ τῷ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρίς δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγέσθαι αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτῇ ἐναι.
6. οὐ πολὺ ἤττον: would lead us to expect something like ἢ ὁτε ἐξή.
The transition to the rel. clause is caused by the expression εἰχει τὴν εἰξιν. 

7. εἰξιν: by εἰξις is to be understood the general appearance and condition which a body assumes in virtue of its inner nature, not that nature itself, and not a condition due solely to external agencies. Cf. Theaet. 153 b. — ἤπειρον κτῆ.: on the omission of the verb, see Kr. 62, 4, 1; H. 613. — τὸ τε σῶμα κτῆ.: the correlative member follows in a different form in δ' ταῦτα τὸν δῆ μοι κτῆ. The reason for the change lies in the long-drawn-out οἷν clause, through which the speaker loses the construction.

8. θεραπεύματα, παθήματα: the marks borne by the body are divided into two classes from the point of view of subject and object. See on παθήματα in δ' below. On the -μα termination, see G. 129, 4; Π. 553, 1.

c 10. ἀμφότερα: see on 477 d.

12. κομάν: to wear the hair long, somewhat after the fashion of the Spartans, was customary at Athens only up to the age of the Ephebus, c

with the exception of such men as from their rank (ἐπίσης), or love of display, chose thus to adorn themselves. Hair cut quite short, however, was considered ἀνδραποδώδης ὑπί. See Herm. Gr. Alter. iv.3 § 23.

14. οὐλᾶς: as the explanation ἰχνη... πληγῶν shows, this word denotes not the fresh wounds (ἀτεικαί), but the scars which remained after they had healed.

17 f. εἰνὶ δὲ λόγῳ: sc. εἰπεῖν, like ὡς δ' αὐτέλοντι εἰπέιν. See on 462 b.

18. τὸ σῶμα: in regard to body. Constr. with οἷος εἶναι, which depends upon παρεσκεύαστο (he had formed himself). So also the middle with the inf. in 507 d, 511 b.

19 ταῦτα: though referring generally to the preceding clause, is used according to the con structio ad sen sus, inasmuch as the traces are meant; so that ἡ τάντα κτῆ. very readily follows it.

19 f. ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον: more indefi-
20 χρόνον. ταῦτα δὴ μοι δοκεῖ τοὺς ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, διὸ Καλλίκλεις· ἐνδηλα πάντα ἐστίν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα, ὅ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτίθεσιν ἐκάστου πράγματος ἐσχέν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄφι-κωνται παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθν, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθος ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας θεᾶται ε ἐκάστου τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτιν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὤτον υβασιλέως ἡ δυνάστου κατείδευ οὐδέν ύγίες ὅν τῆς ψυχῆς,

nate than Phaedo 80 e, where Socrates says of the same thing ἐπεικῶς συχ- νὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον.
20. ταῦτα δὴ κτέ.: the analogy of the soul with the body is discussed first in a general way, and then as far as possible worked out in details.
22. τὰ τῆς φύσεως: see on 450 e, 453 e.
23. τὰ παθήματα: in stating (above, b) the condition of the body, when separated from the soul, Socrates (Plato) uses the expression θεραπεύματα καὶ παθήματα. Here, referring to the soul, he uses παθήματα alone. At the basis of this variation seems to lie some such theory as the following: The human body is susceptible of improvement, by care and training; this care must be exerted by the man himself; hence θεραπεύματα are the results of this care. On the other hand, a lack of care will subject the body to the evil effect of outside evil influences, and thereby to deterioration; παθήματα are the results of this outside influence. The soul is not susceptible of improvement, being perfect at the outset; but lack of care will, just as in the case of the body, subject the soul to the influence of outside forces. There is therefore no place for θεραπεύματα when speaking of the soul.
24. ἐσχέν: see on 503 e, 519 d.— ἐπειδὰν οὖν: Socrates resumes his story where he had broken off at the conclusion of ch. LXXIX.
25. οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας: an example of distributive apposition. See on 450 e, 503 d. The correlative second member is simply indicated in 520 e by the words ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτα κτέ.
26. ἐπιστήσας: "he halts them." They would probably otherwise go their own way.
27. ὧν ἐστίν: see on 447 d.
28. τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως: why just this example is chosen, is seen from what is said in 470 e.—ἐπιλα-βομενος: see on 519 a.
29. κατείδευ: another case of 'gnomic aorist,' which gives a certain degree of liveliness to the recital. So εἰδὲν, ἀπίτευμεν. See on 484 a.—οὐδὲν ύγίες ὅν κτέ.: the following passage can be traced in Tac. Ann. vi. 6 neque frustra praestantissimus sapientiae firmare solitus est, si recludar-tur tyrannorum mentes, posse aspici laniatus et ictus, quando
30 ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστήν ὑπὸ ἐπωρκίῶν καὶ ἀδικίας, ἀ ἐκάστη ἡ πράξεις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζόνειάς καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἀνευ ἀληθείας τεθράβθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὑβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν πρᾶ-35 ἦσων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχρότητος γέμουσαν τὴν ψυ-7 χήν εἰδέν· ιδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως ταῦτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς φρούρας, οἱ μέλλει ἐλθούσα ἀνατλήναι τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη.

LXXXI. Προσῆκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὅντι, ἦν δ' ἀλλον ὅρθως τιμωρουμένω, ἥ βελτίον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὄνι-νασθαί ἢ παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἢν ἄλλοι

524 ut corpora verberibus, ita saevitia, libidine, malis cons-ultis animus dilaceretur.

30. διαμεμαστιγωμένην: after the analogy of the body, which belongs to a μαστιγίας (cf. above in c). Likewise σκολιά καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ corresponds to διεστραμμένα, and καὶ ... εἰδέν may also have some connexion with παχὺς above c.

525 31. a: refers to both the previously named conditions; see on ταῦτα above, d. Socrates shows us the immoral condition of the soul under three as-pects: 1. The vital principle of mo-rality is δικαιοσύνη, hence ἀδίκια is placed first. Beside this, as its worst form, stands perjury, the punishment of which after death was assumed even in the Homeric age; cf. I 278, 250 Ἐρυνέναι, αὐθ' ὑπὸ γαίαν | ἀνθρώ-πους πίνυνται δ' τις κ' ἐπιροκὸν ὀμόσση. ἀδίκια accordingly corrupts the very nature itself of the soul. 2. The na-tural development of the soul depends upon its knowledge of the truth. Lies restrict that development, and hence warp and twist the soul. This image at the same time corresponds to the familiar view of the nature of truth. a

3. Since the activity of the soul is from within outwards, there is need of fixed, definite limits. If this quality —σωφροσύνη— is lacking, or rather if it lapses into ἀκολασία, which ac-cording to its surrounding conditions appears as ἐξουσία, τρυφή, and ὑβρις (ἀκρατία is a general term, applicable to all forms), then the proper relation between the separate parts of the soul is destroyed, and its form as a whole becomes unsymmetrical and ugly. One naturally thinks of the extension which the ἐπιθυμίαι strive for.

36. ἀτίμως: corresponds to the ἀτιμία imposed by earthly judges.— εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς: for the gen., see G. 182, 2, and on 486 a.

LXXXI. 1. προσήκει κτέ.: the purpose of the punishment deter-mines also its measure. To the con-sideration of this point, Socrates now turns.

2. τιμωρουμένω: the passive of the middle. See H. 499 a; Kr. 52, 10, 11.

3. ἡ παραδείγματι κτέ.: in this
Plato's Gorgias.

525 also, as is shown by what follows, the object is improvement, but of others rather than the one punished. The terror-theory is put in the mouth of the Sophist in the Protagoras, who says Prot. 324b  that the soul becomes more or less injured with every new evil deed. And indeed it may go so far in the path of wickedness as to be at last incapable of turning back; that is, it may become incurable. Cf. Phaedo 113c 6. If 68' anδήσων ἀνιάτως ἔχεων διὰ τὰ με-γέθη τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων κτέ. We must note, however, that the punishment is not determined according to the evil acts as such,—these the judge may not even know,—but by the condition of the soul as brought about by them.

11. τὰ παραδείγματα: the art is employed on account of the previous mention of this in b, as a result to be gained.

15. παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους: as we are accustomed to hang up warnings that the passer-by may think over them carefully.
ἐν Ὄηδοι ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀκούσιν ἀφικνομένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. διὰ ὧν ἐγώ φημι ἡν καὶ ἂν Ἀρχέλαυν ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει Πώλος, καὶ ἄλλον ὡστὶς ἀν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ἢ. οἴμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς
20 ἐναντίον τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασι-
λέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων ἕγονο-
tας. οὔτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἔξοψιαν µέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώ-
tατα ἀµαρτήµατα ἀµαρτάνουσιν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις καὶ
Ὁµηρός. Βασιλείας γὰρ καὶ δυνάστας ἑκέινος πεποίηκεν
25 τοὺς ἐν Ὄηδοι τὸν ἀκοῦσιν τιµωροµένους, Τάνταλον ἑ
καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν. Θερσίτην δὲ, καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος
πονηρὸς ἦν ἰδιωτής, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκεν µεγάλας τιµωρίας
συνεχόµενον ὡς ἀνίατον. οὐ γὰρ, οἴµαι, ἔξην αὐτῷ. διὸ
καὶ εὐδαιµονεῖστερος ἦν ὡς ἐξήν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὦ Καλλί-

525 16. ἐν Ὄηδοι ἐν τῷ δεσµωτηρίῳ: c both expressions are placed side by side by the σχῆµα καθ' ὄλον καὶ µέρος.
17. θεάµατα καὶ νουθετήµατα: the second substantive gives the design
of the first.
18. Ἀρχέλαυν: cf. 470 d-471 d.
20 f. εἶναι ἢ γεγονότα: partici-
cipal periphrasis. See Kr. 56, 3, 3,
and crit. note on 510 b.
21. δυναστῶν: men possessed of
power, not merely in monarchical
and oligarchical, but also in demo-
cratical states; hence the addition
of the explanation with καὶ. Cf. 479 a,
524 e, 526 b and see on 492 b. Be-
low (30) in the same sense we find
ἐκ τῶν δυναµένων.
22. διὰ τὴν ἔξοψιαν: cf. above, 525 a.
The expression very forcibly reminds
us of the representations of Polus and
Callicles, when praising what they con-
ceived to be the highest happiness.
23. τούτωι: "to these statements,"
"to this view of the matter."

25 f. Τάνταλον, Σίσυφον, Τιτυόν: cf. Hom. λ 576-600. All three were
rulers: Tantalus, the founder of the
house of the Pelopidae, was king in
Sipylos; Sisyphus, in Corinth; Ti-
tyis, in Euboea. Thersites was a bad
and despicable man, but his sphere
of action was limited and he experi-
enced rough treatment even during
his lifetime; B 211-277.
28. ἔξην: sc. τὰ µέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώ-
tατα ἀµαρτήµατα ἀµαρτάνειν. This was
the reason why Thersites was not
held to be ἀνίατος.
29. εὐδαιµονεῖστερος: Socrates here
expresses himself with less exact-
ness than in 473 c.—ἀλλὰ γὰρ: for,
you see. The clause thus introduced
serves a two-fold purpose. It ex-
presses more plainly and definitely
what had already been implied above,
and it paves the way, by the words
καὶ οἱ σφάδρα πονηροί, for the new
thought which begins with οὔδε
µήν.
30 κλεισ, ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἀνθρωποί· οὐδέν μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγύνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἄγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, καὶ πολλοὶ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν γενόμενον μενον δικαίως διαβιώναι. ἡλίγοι δὲ γίγνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοθι γεγόνασιν, οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ἐσονται καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ταυτὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἄν τις ἐπιτρέπῃ· εἰς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονε καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας, Ἄριστείδης ὁ Ἀρσιφαῖος καὶ Λυσίστος. οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὃ ἀριστε, κακοὶ γίγνονται τῶν δυναστῶν.

LXXXII. "Ὅπερ οὖν ἐλεγον, ἑπειδὰν ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκεῖνος τοιοῦτον των λάβη, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδέν, οὐθ᾽ ὡστὶς οὐθ᾽ ἄντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρὸς τις· καὶ

525 30. καὶ: "also." Is closely connected with τῶν δυναμένων.
526 32 f. ἀγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων: cf. Arist. 482 d οὐκ ἀγασθαι πῶλον. The acc. is rare and states simply the obj.; the gen. gives the cause, and may be a person or a thing. With the person is generally found either a participial or an adverbial clause. See H. 784.
33. γιγνομένων: after ἐγγύνεσθαι, as Crito 44 d ἐργάζεσθαι after ἐργάζεσθαι, is quite in accordance with the customary usage. — χαλεπὸν γάρ: in our admiration for the 'self-made' man we forget that he has had every incentive to rise, while we withhold our sympathy from fallen greatness, which has had every temptation to fall.
35. ἡλίγοι: as also οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ. The most stand in the mean, according to Phaedo 90 a, ὁ οἷς τι σπανιότερον εἶναι ἡ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἑξευρεῖν ἀνθρωπον ἢ κύνα ἢ ἅλλο ότιον; ἢ αὖ αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλὸν κτέ.;
37 f. τὴν τοῦ διαχειρίζειν: notice the expository gen. See on 521 a.
38. ἐπιτρέπῃ: sc. power or property, or whatever it be. Plato is probably thinking of Aristides' position as general of the confederate army during the war against the Persians and as one of the founders of the Delian league, by which especially he gained his reputation for probity. Cf. Plut. Arist. especially ch. XXIII.-XXV. The καὶ before εἰς has almost the force of "and that, too."

LXXXII. 1. ὅπερ οὖν ἐλεγον: goes back to 524 e.
3. οὐθ᾽ ὡστὶς κτέ.: sc. as was the case in life, when the name of the man was followed by the name of his father to indicate his family.
toūto kατιδῶν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς Τάρταρον, ἐπισωμηνάμενος, δ' εάν τε ἱάσμος εάν τε ἀνίατος δοκῇ εἶναι: ο ἰδὲ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει. ἐνίοτε δ' ἄλλην εἰσ-ιδῶν ὀσίως βεβιωκότα καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιῶτον, ἥ ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μὲν, ἐγγυέ φημι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφον τὰ αὐτὸν πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονή-. 10 σαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἡγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. ταύτα δὲ ταύτα καὶ ὁ Αἰακός: ἐκάτερος δὲ τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων δικάζει: ο ἰδὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται, μόνος ἔχων χρυσῶν σκηπτρον, ὃς φησιν 'Οδυσ-σεώς ὁ Ὄμηρον ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν

15 χρύσουν σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσων.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὃς 526 4. ἐπισωμηνάμενος: in accordance b with the results of his scrutiny, the judge puts upon him a mark and thus decides his fate. Cf. Rep. x. 614 c σημεῖα περίάφαντα τῶν δεικτομένων, —also of the judges of the dead.

c 6 f. ἄλλην κτί.: the omission of ψυχήν is so harsh that Heindorf inserts it—but unnecessarily—after ἥ ἐλλον τινός. These latter words form with what follows (μάλιστα μὲν instead of ἥ, "whether philosopher or not, but especially," etc.) an explanatory apposition to the general idea, ἰδιῶτον.

7. μετ' ἀληθείας: cf. the opposite description in 525 a above.

9. τὰ αὐτὸν πρᾶξαντος: 'to attend to one's own business,' was for a Greek to be both σώφρων and δίκαιος. That this did not, however, exclude him from taking interest in other people's lives is shown by Socrates' words in Apol. 33 a τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράςταντος. The contrary of this phrase is πολυπραγμο- 
c μονέν, "to meddle officiously with, and to attack unreasonably the rights of others.” Cf. Apol. 31 c.

12. ῥάβδον ἔχων: the staff was the badge of public authority, and was borne by heralds, seers, priests, generals, and others, but especially by judges. Cf. Dem. de Cor. (xviii.) 210 καὶ παραλαμβάνειν γε ἀμα τῇ βακτηρίᾳ καὶ τῷ συμβόλῳ τῷ φρόνημα τῷ ἃς πό- 

λεως νομίζειν ἔκαστον ὕμων δεί. Also σκῆπτρον (from σκῆπτεσθαι, to lean on, ῥ 199) had originally this value; e.g. A 234 ff., β 37, but became later the name for the badge of a ruler alone.

15. The quotation is from Hom. d λ 569.

17. ἀποφανοῦμαι: the simple φα- 

νοῦμαι is always middle, in the sense “appear”; the compound ἀπο- is almost always transitive or active in sense, "present," "show."
Υγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχήν: χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσας ἄσις τὰς τιμῶς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν πειράσομαι
20 τῷ ὀντὶ ὡς ἄν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὁν καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθυμήσκω ἀποθυμήσκεν. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ’ ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγώνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἐγὼ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι, καὶ
25 ὁνειδίζω σοι, ὅτι οὐχ οἶός τ’ ἔστε σαυτῷ βοηθήσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ὅ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἥν νυνί ἐγὼ ἐλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης ὕν, ἐπειδὰν 527 σοι ἐπιλαβόμενος ἀγη, χασμήσει καὶ εἰλιγγιάσεις οὐδὲν ἤττον ἡ ἐγώ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἐκεῖ, καὶ σὲ ἓσως τυπτήσει τις καὶ
30 ἐπὶ κόρρησ τάμιως καὶ πάντως προπηλακιεῖ.

LXXXIII. Τάχα δ’ οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὡσπερ γραῦς καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐδέν γ’ ἂν ἦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τοῦτων, ἐπὶ δὲ ζητοῦντες εἰχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὑρεῖν · νῦν δὲ ὥρας, ὃ ἐστι τρεῖς οὖντες ὑμεῖς, οὕτε σοφώτατοι ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλή-

526 23. ἀντιπαρακαλῶ: with reference to 521 a and 485 e ff.—τὸν ἄγων: brings up before us at once the public games, at which a prize was awarded. The name is quite applicable to the progress of human life, which is really a contest between different systems as practised by different men. Cf. the passage from Phaedo quoted on 527 e. But a judicial trial was also called ἄγων, and such a one awaits every man at the last judgment. Cf. Apol. 34 e εἰ δὲ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττων τουτού τοῦ ἄγωνος ἀγώνα ἀγωνισόμενος ἑδηθή.

25. ὃ ἐστι οὖν οἶός τ’ ἔστε κτὲ.: corresponds closely to the objections urged by Callicles in 486 a, b, νῦν γὰρ εἰ τίς σοῦ λαβόμενος κτὲ. In what follows, the words καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρησ ex-

press even an augmentation of the insult.

LXXXIII. 2. ὡσπερ γραῦς: cf. 527 a the proverb ὃ λεγόμενος γραῦν ἔθλος Theact. 176 b. So also in Latin, German, and English. Cf. Hor. Sat. ii. 6. 77 Cervius haec inter vicinus garrit anilis | ex re fabellas.

4. ἀληθέστερα: of course in comparison with other views which can show less claim to truth. Cf. 493 d. Grades of truth are conceivable as steps in that approximation to the perfect truth which abides with God. This approximation is nothing more or less than knowledge, which has the stronger claim to be considered truth the better foundation it has.

5. σοφώτατοι ἐστε: such (ironi-
vov, so tê kaî Ïálos kaî Gorjias, óuk échete àpodeîzai, 6 vos dei âllon tvâ bión xîn õ toûton, óstper kaî ékëisê faiêtau symbês. ãllê èn tosoûtous lôgoûs tôvâ âllon ëleugromévov móvousto xîmei ó lôgos, ós éulabhtêov 10 èstiv tô ãdikevûn mâllon õ tô ãdikeisthâv, kaî pautôs mâl-

The Athenians to Aristides. Plut. 527 b

Arist. iii. fin. The two modes of life discussed admit of distinction according to appearance and reality.

14. tô ginvesbâv: sc. díkaiov. c e

17. èpti tô díkaiov: epexegetico to oûto.

19. émôl ouv peithòmenos: begins the conclusion, which is peculiarly pathetic.—ëntauîâ: "in the direction of the attainment of our own perfection." See on ékeiâv above in b.

Cf. Apol. 36 e èntauîâ õuk ýâ, oî èl thôv mîste ýmîn mîste ñamwv. Ëmellov mpîden ñefelos xîvâ. For the adverb of 'place where' with a verb of motion, see on 456 b.

20 f. õs . . . sêmaínev: cf. 511 b.

22 f. su vê bârrwv: thrown in with d emphasis, because what follows in-

527 cal) flattery was submitted to by the
a Sophists the more easily since modesty did not prevent them from applying this epithet to themselves. Cf. Prot. 337 d, where Hippias says hâmàs õun áîcxÔv tôv melôm tôm ñev fôsun tôv pragmatôn eídênav, sofôvatóv õe òntas tôv Êllhnwn kte.

b 7. ékeisê: like ëkei, of life beyond the grave; opposed to èvthâv 525 b.

The terminus in quem is used, inasmuch as the effect is meant, which reaches even to the beyond.

9. xîmei: "stands fast and immovable against all attacks."

11. ouv tô dôkeiv kte.: as Aeschylus makes the messenger of Amphiaraurus say in Sept. c. Theb. 592 ou ýêv dôkeiv ëprastos ãll' éînai bêlêv. These words, as is well known, were applied by
θαρρῶν πατάξαι τὴν ἀτύμων ταυτήν πληγήν· οὐδὲν γὰρ
deivν peîsei, εὰν τῷ ὅντι ἢς καλὸς καγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρε-
tῆν. κάπειτα οὗτο κοινὴ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἥδη, εὰν δοκῇ
χρήναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τῶς πολιτικοῖς, ἢ ὁποῖον ἂν τι ἡμῖν
dοκῇ, τότε Βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίως οὕτε Βουλευέσθαι ἡ
νῦν. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἐχοντάς γε ὡς νῦν φανόμεθα ἔχειν,
ἐπεῖτα νεανιεύσθαι ὡς τι ὄντας, οἷς οὐδέποτε ταύτα δοκεῖ
30 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταύτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· εἰς τοσοῦ-
tον ἥκομεν ἀπαϊδευσιάς· ὥστερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ
χρησόμεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὡς ἡμῖν σημαίνει, ὡς
οὕτως ὁ τρόπος ἀριστος τοῦ βίου, τῆν δικαιοσύνην καὶ
tὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ ἦν καὶ τεθνάναι. τούτῳ
35 οὖν ἐπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακαλῶμει, μὴ ἐκεῖνοι
ὁ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος,
ὡς Καλλίκλεις.

527 flects the deepest disgrace, patáξαι.
d With πατάξαι the repetition in thought
of ἐασὼν την is the easiest construc-
tion. On the common object of the
three ins., see on 493 e sōi.
23. τὴν ἀτύμων ταυτήν κτὲ.: says
Socrates, with reference to 527 a and
486 e.
23 f. οὕτως γὰρ δεινὸν πείσει: external
rough treatment will not affect
the real man.
25. κάπειτα: refers to ἀσκῶν, but
it is more exactly defined by ὀὔτω
ἀσκήσαντες.—τότε ἡδὴ: emph-
atic position. The addition ἐὰν
dοκῇ χρήναι indicates that they may
then find something more important
to do.
26. ἐπιθησόμεθα κτὲ.: cf. 521 d.
This is the answer to Callicles’ ad-
vice in 484 c ff. On the other hand,
ὅποιον ἂν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ can serve for
527 Polus. Cf. 466 e ff.
27. τότε: explained by βελτίως κτὲ.
28. ὡς . . . ἔχειν: a polite expres-
sion which can hardly be misuder-
stood by those present.
31. ἀπαϊδευσιάς: in contrast to the
e παιδεία on which Callicles and Polus
prided themselves. See on 461 b, c.
—ὡστερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι: the λόγος
is treated as a living being, to whose
guidance one can trust himself. It
is the principle from which all other
moral regulations proceed.
33. οὕτως: finds its explanation in
καί . . . τεθνάναι.
34 f. For the conclusion, cf. Phaedo
114 e ἀλλὰ τοῦτων δὴ ἐνεκα χρῆ ὡν
dιεληλύθαμεν πᾶν ποιεῖν, ὥστε ἄρετὴς
καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ Βίῳ μετασχεῖν:
καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη.
CRITICAL APPENDIX.

EDITIONS.

a. COMPLETE EDITIONS OF PLATO.

The following are the most important:—

Platonis Opera quae extant omnia ex nova Ioannis Serrani interpretatione. Henrici Stephani de quorundam locorum interpretatione iudicium, et multorum contextus Graeci emendatio. 3 vell. Folio. Paris, 1578. (The pages of this edition, divided into paragraphs (a, b, c, d, e), have been adopted as a standard of reference in later editions.)

Platonis Dialogi (Gr. et Lat.) ex recensione Imm. Bekker. 8 vell. Berolini, 1816–1823. (This edition contains the first systematic collation of Mss.)


Platonis Opera quae feruntur omnia ad codices denuo collatos ed. Martinus Schanz. Lipsiae, 1875–.

b. SEPARATE EDITIONS OF THE GORGIAS.

The following are the principal more recent editions of the Gorgias alone:—


Platons Gorgias. Erklärt von Julius Deuschle. Vierte Auflage, bearbeitet von C. W. J. Cron. Leipzig, 1886. (This edition is the basis of the present work.)
APPENDIX.

In addition to the complete translation by Jowett may be mentioned the scholarly work—


CRITICAL NOTES.

In the notes which follow, the first reading is that of the present edition; the second, the variant, — usually the reading of Schanz in his edition of 1881 (Platonis Opera, vol. viii., Lipsiae), or of the Mss. which his investigations have shown to have the most weight, viz. the Bodleianus or Clarkianus B (‘second hand,’ b), or the Venetian T (‘second hand,’ t). Other manuscripts sometimes cited are classed generally as cod. or codd., including those designated by Schanz as ‘apographa.’

Title. In the Mss. we find the following addition: ἡ περὶ ῥητορικῆς. ἀνατρεπτικὸς. Schanz brackets the last word.

447 a. καλ ὑστεροίμεν: is bracketed by S, following Cobet. Hirschig also ad loc. gives weighty reasons for the omission of the words. They may readily have crept in from a marginal gloss on κατόπιν... ἥκομεν, but a little fulness at the opening of the dialogue is not out of place.

447 b. καλ: before ἐπιδείκται is bracketed by S, to make the connexion close with ὅταν βοιλησθῇ,—a case of unnecessary accuracy.

447 d. ἀποκρίνεσθαι: B T. ἀποκρινεῖσθαι S after cod. and Coriæs. But the customary tense in advertisements is the present.

448 b. τί δὲ τοῦτο: Cron, Kr. (62, 3, 11), and others supply ἵστιν instead of διαφέρει.

448 b. τίνα: B T. τί Cron following S, Buttmann, and Olympiodorus. It is true that the shift from τίνα to ἵστερ is harsh; but in view of the employment of τίνα with ἐκάλομεν and καλοῖμεν it is better to retain the masculine. A more obvious emendation would be ἓντερ for ἵστερ.

448 c. ἡφημέναι: S. εὐφημέναι B T. But in 514 d, B shows ἑρθολομεν. See on ἡφημέναι 450 c below.—On the Gorgian peculiarities of this passage, cf. Volkmann, Rhetorik der Griechen u. Römer, c. 38; Blass, Att. Bered. 3 i. 68 ff.; Rhet. Graecæ ed. Spengel, especially vol. iii. In later times it became common to ascribe all kinds of rhetorical figures to the invention of Gorgias. Cf. Suid. ἱρογιας ὁποιος πρῶτος μετέτειλε τῆς παιδείας δύναμιν τε φραστικήν καὶ τέχνην ἐδόξη, τροπαῖς τε καὶ μεταφοραῖς καὶ ἀλληγορίαις καὶ ἐπικλαγαίς καὶ καταχρήσει καὶ ἀναδιπλώσει καὶ ἐπαναλήψει καὶ ἀποστροφαι καὶ παρισώσεσιν ἐκρήσατο.

448 e. μάλα γε: the eds. μάλα S (B T ?).

448 e. ἡρωτα: S following Bekker. ἐρωτα B T.
449 b. ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ (ὑπισχνεὶ b): S. ὅπερ ὑπισχνῆ B T. If there is no gap after ἀποθέσαμ, we should naturally expect ὅπερ ἄν ὑπισχνῆ — a reading which is advocated by Morstadt. In any case, however, such an admonition to Gorgias, before he has had time to answer the question ἀρ' ὁν ἐθελήσαις ἄν κτλ., is extremely harsh, and renders it probable that a reply of Gorgias has fallen out. For this reason, S supposes a gap before ὅπερ, and adopts the reading of b as given in the text. Cron reads ὑπισχνεῖ without the gap.

449 c. ἄν φημι: Cron, Hirschig, etc. ἄν φημι S, Thompson, etc.

449 e. μηδένα ἄν ... εἰπεῖν: the use of μή with the inf. even after verbs of saying was probably original, but the ὄδρεν μή almost completely out. Examples are given in GMT. 685 fin., and the whole subject is discussed by Gildersleeve, Am. Jour. Phil. i. 48 ff. In addition to this passage, cited on p. 49, n. 3, Professor Gildersleeve would now add Rep. vi. 497 b.

449 d. οὕτως: T S. οὕτω B Cron.

450 a. ἔλεγομεν: cod. Heindorf, S. λέγομεν B T.

450 d. πεττευτική: B T. παιδευτική (or πιστευτική) Richter. — Olympiodorus explains the equality of ἔγρον and ἄλγον in the πεττεια as follows: ἕμα γαρ τῷ δίπτεν τάς ψήφους (prob. equiv. τῷ κύβοις ἢ πεττότο) καὶ ἐπιλέγουσι τίνα οἶον s' ἄδ ἕτρικτα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. This would seem to indicate a game similar to our 'backgammon.' But that the λόγος element goes beyond this is seen from Rep. ii. 374 ο τεττευτικὸς ἢ κυβερνικὸς ἵκανος οὐδ' ἂν εἰς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδίως ἐπωθηθένων ἄλλα παρέργων χρώμενον, Polit. 292 ε ἵσμεν γαρ ὅτι χιλίων υἱόν τοῖς πεττευτικοῖς τοσοῦτοι (50) πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ’Ελληνοι οὐκ ἃν γένοιτό ποτε. In view of this and other considerations, Kleist, J.J. cxxxi. 477 (1889), thinks the reference here is to a definite theory of the πεττεια. See also Cron, Beitr. 83 ff., and for a discussion of the details of the game, Hern. Gr. Alter. iv. § 55.

450 e. οὐχ ὅτι: The examples cited for this rare and exclusively Platonic construction are, besides this, Prot. 336 ο已经有 ἔγγυσα μὴ ἐπιλησσαῖαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει καὶ φησιν ἐπιλησμον εἴναι, Lys. 220 a οὐχ ὅτι πολλὰς λέγομεν, ὅσ περ πολλὰ ποιούμεθα χρωσιόν καὶ ἀργύριον: ἄλλα μὴ οὕτων τι μᾶλλον οὕτω τὸ γε ἄληθες ἔχρ, Theaet. 157 b τὸ δ' εἴναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρέτους οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἡπαγκάσαμεθα χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. It is to be noticed that in Lys. 220 a alone the οὐχ ὅτι clause precedes. The sense, and also the feeling, is very closely given by the English, "not but that"; the other rendering, "although," fails to give the color. The common explanation is to supply some verb of saying, but that will not account for the second negative required. The question has been touched upon by Kratz in the appendix to his edition, by Münchers (J.J., 1870), to whom Cron replies in Beiträge, 198 ff., and by Kühner, ii. 525, 4 b, who also recognizes the difficulty. Other scholars are inclined to look for the solution in the use of οὐ as a 'free negative.' The speaker anticipates the question, "Do you judge so, from the statements the party in question has made?" "No! because he actually said the contrary, in so many words."
450 e. ἐν τοῖς λόγοις: cod. Heindorf, S. τοῖς λόγοις B T.
451 b. περιττόν: the word γνῶσις, which follows in the Mss., is bracketed by S after Bekker.
451 b. ὤσα ἄν ... τυγχάνῃ: B T. ὤσα ... τυγχάνει S after Ast. But no specific combination of odd and even is thought of, but merely their general relations up to any magnitude. But see Kleist, J.J. cxxxix. 479, and critical note to 453 e.
451 d. τις: codd. S. τινῶν B T.
451 d. τί ἐστι: S after Heindorf. ἐστί B T: a case of ‘haplography.’
451 d. οὗ: B T. ὦ S after Hirschig.
451 e. τὸ σκολιόν: the name was derived from σκολίος, crooked, bent, but variously explained. Some refer it to the order of succession of the singers, who alternated either around the table or in a zigzag across it; others, either to the air as compared with the solemn νόμος ὑβρίστας, or to the verse-measure of the song, which, as the oldest kind of the especially logaoedus μέλος, was thus named to distinguish it from the hexameter. Cf. Engelbrecht, De Scoliorum Poesi, and Gildersleeve, Pindar, I. E. xvi.
452 a. παιδοτρίβης: for the manner in which the distinction between παιδοτρίβης and γυμναστής gradually faded out, as well as the particulars of training of Greek youth, see Herm. Gr. Alter. iv. 3 § 36, p. 335 ff.; Grasberger, Erziehung und Unterricht im klass. Alterthum, i. p. 265 ff.
452 a. καὶ εἶποι: B T S. καὶ εἶποι ἄν Hirschig. But see note.
452 a. ὑγίεια: is omitted by S following Hirschig. As the text stands, it is impossible to construe ὑγίεια. But even with it omitted we are troubled by the following δι, for which we should expect γραμματικά. Perhaps the true solution has not been reached. It might be possible to read ἄκρατες; ὑγίεια;
452 b. θαυμάζομαι τάν: B T S. θαυμάζοιμαι τάν Cron.
452 c. αὐτῷ: B. αὐτῷ T S.
452 e. For Anaximenes' views of oratory, cf. his Ars Rhetorica, ed. Spengel, c. 1.
453 a. πειθός δημιουργός: the originator of this definition cannot be definitely fixed. Thompson quotes Prolegomena ad Hermogenem, where it is ascribed to Corax and Tisias, and Quint. ii. 15. 4, where Isocrates is credited with it.
453 c. καὶ ποῦ: B T. ἦ o' S after Deuschle. (Woolsey had previously made the same emendation in his edition of 1842.) These two words have given endless trouble to the editors, and occasioned numerous emendations, for which see Schanz's note. They seem genuine. In the first place, it is hard to explain how they got in, if they are not genuine. Then, they are read by one of the scholiasts, who makes an attempt to explain them with the words ἐν τῇ ποικιλῇ ἡμέρᾳ. With the Greeks especially, everything with name had to have local habitation. The way of fixing an individual was to
give his own name, his father's, and the place of abode. Socrates is here simply (unconsciously, it may be) following out this Greek habit. The τὰ ποθα corresponds to the genitive, and ποθ marks the scene of his labors. That Socrates does not follow up his comparison in the following question is not remarkable, nor is it necessary that he should follow it up, as Thompson thinks; and the omission of the words by Olympiodorus cannot be placed against the concurrent testimony of B and T. Apply the method to Simonides (Simonides) of Amorgus and Simonides of Ceus. Packard, Transactions Am. Phil. Assoc. 1877, p. 11, defends the conjecture ἥ ὁβ.

453 e. ἔλγωμεν: T S. ἔλγωμεν B.
453 e. ὅσον ἐστὶν: B T S. Rejected by Kratz. Kleist, JJ. cxxxix. 479, wishes to translate ὅσα in ὅσα ἐν τυχάνη, in 451 b above, by quotcumque, and not quantacumque, 'wie viele arten es auf beiden seiten geben mag.' For the sake of consistency, he would also substitute ὅσα for ὅσον in this passage. See Cron, Beiträge, p. 91 ff. But see note.

454 a. ἐστὶν: B. ἐστὶ T. ἐστὶν S.
454 a. ἰπτορική ἐστὶν: B. ἰπτορικὴ ἐστὶν S.
454 e. ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω: on the use of γὰρ to resume an interrupted thought, see Shilleto's crit. note to Dem. de Falsa Leg. 107 (96), quoted by Thompson.
454 d. δ': S (B T ?). δ' ed. s.
454 d. α': B T. δ' S.
455 a. πειστικός: t S. πειστικός B T Cron.
455 b. λατρῶν αἰρέσεως: cf. also Gorg. 514 d, and for details of treatment, etc., see Herm. Gr. Alter. iv. 9 § 38.

455 d. τὰ νεωμα κτέ: to Themistocles was due the fortification of Athens itself (Thuc. i. 90–93), as well as the erection and fortification of the Piraeus, with its commercial-harbor, ἵπτοριον, and its war-harbor, κανθάρου or Κανθάρου λιμή, for both of which the Athenians formerly used the open bay of Phalerum. The dockyards were built to hold four hundred ships. The so-called Long Walls, whose erection had probably been suggested by Themistocles, connected with the city the whole coast, from the southeastern end of the bay of Phalerum to the northwestern end of the peninsula of Piraeus, together with its three harbors (in addition to the chief harbor just mentioned, also Ζέα and Μουνυχία on the southeastern side). They consisted of the shorter Phalerian wall of thirty-five stades, and the longer Piraean (Thuc. i. 107) wall of forty stades. To the latter was afterwards added about the time of the τριακοσίοντεις σπονδαί, for greater security, a second wall, parallel and six hundred feet distant. These two are often distinguished as τὸ βόρειον and τὸ νότιον τεῖχος, and are called by late authors τὰ μακρὰ σκέλη. For details of location, see Bursian, Geographie von Griechenland, i. p. 265 ff., and Lolling's Hellenische Landeskunde (Müller's Handb. der Klass. Altertumsw. iii.) pp. 118, 290 ff.

455 e. τῶν: B T. τῆς S after Buttmann. τῆς τῶν Schaefer, Hirschig.
APPENDIX.

456 a. ei: B T. τι, ei S after Madvig.
456 b. ὲτῃ: B T. ὲτοι S after codd. and Heindorf.
456 d. ἀγνώλα οὐ τοῦτον ἐνεκα: the last two words are bracketed by S after Findleisen, who puts a colon before ἀτι and a comma after ἐχθραν. With either reading an easy asyndeton is involved; and while τοῦτον ἐνεκα is rather redundant, it conflicts neither with sense nor construction.—On the ὀπλομαχία cf. Lach. init. τεθάσθη μὲν τὸν ἀνδρα μαχόμενον εν ὀπλοις κτε., Euthyd. 273 e. For the development of this practice, see Herm. Gr. Alter. iv. § 35.
456 d., ἀποκτεινόναι: B S. ἀποκτεινόναι T. Schanz, vol. viii. proll. p. vi f. shows from the Mss. that the form ἀποκτεινόναι is better attested for the Gorgias, though in other dialogues the weight of evidence seems to be in favor of the second form.
456 e. μή ὑπάρχοντας: for the different varieties of asyndeton and their effect on the style, see Rehdantz, Dem. Phil. Reden Index, under the word 'asyndeton,' and Volkmann, Rhetorik d. Gr. u. Röm. § 48.
457 c. λόγων: B T. φιλολόγων S. λογίων Madvig. ἀνθρώπων Cobet. Any of these emendations would make the text more exact, it is true, but would not give any other advantage than that of formal exactness, there being no ambiguity of meaning as the passage stands.
457 d. φιλονικοῦντας: S (vol. vii. prolegg.). φιλονικοῦντας B T.
457 d. λοιδορθήντες τε καὶ: is bracketed by S after Hirschig.
457 c. οὐ πάνω ἀκόλουθα: Cobet maintains that οὐ πάνω is an unqualified negation in classic Greek, although the sense "not entirely" is common in later authors. Cope and Riddle demand the weaker force here; and this corresponds much better with Socrates's whole bearing. See the discussion in App. to Cope's translation.
458 b. χρῆν: B T. χρῆ S with codd. See the note. The context, as well as ἐδει in the margin, b t, makes for the impf.
458 b. παρούσιν: T S. παροῦσι B.
458 c. μὴ τίνος: Madv. Syn. § 124, 1, and Kr. 54, 8, 12, consider the μὴ in this case to have an interrogative force, "whether." It is better to look at the indic. as an attempt to avoid any ambiguity, since the subjv. may have two sides, the indic. but one. See GMT. 360, 1.
458 c. κατέχομεν: B t S. κατέχομεν T.
458 d. ὥστε χαριεῖσθε: on ὥστε with the inf. to express tendency, 'so as to,' without specifying as to the reality of the occurrence, and with the indic. to express actual result, see Gildersleeve, Am. Jour. Phil. vii. 161 ff.
458 d. ἐρωτάν... βούλεται: is bracketed by S after Badham, perhaps rightly.
459 c. πυρηκέναι: S. εὔρηκέναι B T. Cf. 448 c. The evidence of inscriptions shows that after the middle of the fourth century, verbs in εὗ- were not augmented; the latest inscription containing νδ- dates from 321 B.C. See Reinach, Traité d'Épigraphie Grecque, 285, Meisterhans, Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften, § 64, 14.
APPENDIX.


460 c. The reading here adopted is that of Thompson, which differs from Hirschig's only in the position of ἄει. Schauz, followed by Cron, brackets οὐκ οὖν . . . φανεται γε; but, as Thompson points out, the words οὐδὲποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ɔ γε δίκαιος δικεῖν seem to require an intermediate step in the argument, while to retain the words τὸν ἤτοιμον . . . τὸν δὲ in their present position is to disturb badly the otherwise plain course of reasoning. See the notes of Thompson and Hirschig ad loc.

461 b. ἡ οἰκ.: S with the eds. ἡ B T Cron. Packard, Transactions Am. Phil. Assoc. 1877, p. 12, defends the explanation given in the note, which is now generally accepted.

461 c. ἑταίρους καὶ οὐεῖς (οὐεῖς): t and eds. ἑταίρους οὐεῖς B T. ἑταίρους S. I have adopted the first reading with a slight change in the spelling ('οὐεῖς est un forme ionienne et vulgaire,' Reinach, Epig. p. 270; cf. Meisterhans, § 17, 4), though it must be confessed that οὐεῖς is decidedly suspicious.

462 d. οὐδεμιᾶ κτ.: S, following Hirschig, divides the words as follows: Σ. οὐδεμιᾶ — φαβλ. Π. Φημι δή. ΧΝ. ἐμπειρία τις. τίνος φαβλ. Π. Φημι δή. ΧΝ. Χάριτος . . . Πάλε. But one can hardly conceive how Polus could have failed to catch the spirit of the play, after Socrates had shown the way.

463 e. ἡ ἤτοιμι: T Aristides. ἤτοιμι B Cron. In 451 a, 454 a, the article is omitted in both Mss., though it might stand as well there as here.

464 b. ἀντιστροφῶν μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ: Aristides, S after Heindorf. ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς B T.

464 d. ὀπερ: b Aristides. ὀποὺ B T. ὀπὸ δ S.

465 b. οὐδα καὶ: codd. καὶ B T S.

465 b. ἐσθήσει: S after Coraes. αἰσθήσει B T. ἐσθήτι Aristides,—which would correspond better to usage than ἐσθήσει. See Schanz's note for the many emendations.

456 c. διεστηκέν: B T S. διεστήκε μὲν cod., the editions.

466 c. χρήσωνται: T S after Bekker. χρήσωνται B Cron. Cf. 465 e.

466 a. ἄρι: S. ἄρι B. ἅρι T Cron.

466 b. δοκούσω: T S. δοκοῦσι B Cron.

466 d. ὀτί: cod. S eds. ei ὀτὶ B T. ei ὀβχί cod., Hermann, Cron.

466 d. ἐςφικιματά: codd. S. τὰ ἐςφικιματα B T.

466 e. οὐκοῦν: οὐκ οὖν S after Hermann, who defends this reading in the words: 'negative responsio disiungi partículas postulat.' But, as Cron justly observes, Polus anticipated no such negative reply, but rather the contrary. He fails to see any difference in the two expressions used by Socrates; which makes the case for οὐκοῦν overwhelming.

466 e. φῆς: S after Baiter. ἐφῆς B T, Cron, eds. The passages in which this anomalous form occurs are as follows: Xen. Cyr. iv. 1, 23; Pl. Gorg. 466, 496 (φῆς Baiter, S), Euthyd. 293 (-ησθα Baiter); Aeschines, ii. 86 (-ησθα Franke, Weidner); Aeschy. Ag. 1613 (φῆς Dindorf, Hermann) and five pas-
sages from Lucian. The only passage remaining unchanged apparently is Xen. Cyr. iv. 1. 23, where it is true, as Cron says, that φης cannot be read; but a change to ἐφησθα is not difficult, and then, as the word is put into the mouth of a foreigner, Cyrus, it might have been designed. Phrynichus (ed. Rutherford, p. 225) says ἐφης: ἐστι μὲν παρὰ τοῖς ἄρχαίοις, ἀλλ’ ἀλίγων· τὸ δὲ πνεύστων ἐφησθα. Lobeck questions the truth of this statement, and Rutherford denies flatly that ἐφης is Attic. Almost all modern editors agree with Rutherford.

466 e. ἀποδείξεις... ἔξελέγξας: B T. ἀποδείξας ἐξελέγξεις S after Hirschig. It is true that Hirschig’s reading makes the thought a little more exact, for strictly speaking the refutation consists in the proof. But, at the same time, the best proof of Polus’s position would be the refutation of Socrates; so that in either case the general result is much the same.

467 a. κεκτήσωντα. ἦ: κεκτήσωντα, ἦ S.

467 b. τούτου πρόσθεν: is bracketed by S after Schleiermacher. Its genuineness had been already questioned by Heindorf.

467 b. ὑπερφυά: S. ὑπερφυῆ B T Cron. Meisterhans, § 58, 11, says: ‘In the acc. sing. the ending ἄ instead of ἦ is found when a vowel precedes. In the case of ὑγία, we find a variation in the use of ἄ and ἦ after 300 B.C.’ The same seems to hold true for the neut. pl. Cf. 468 b.

467 d. πλουτὸς γὰρ ἕνεκα πλέονσιν: is bracketed by S after Cobet.

468 a. ἑνεκα: S. ἑνεκεν B T Cron and eds. Meisterhans, § 83, 26: ‘The forms in -ευ (ἑνεκεν, ἑνεκεν, οὔνεκεν) are entirely foreign to Attic.’ The earliest example of ἑνεκεν is after 350 B.C.

468 e. ὡς δὴ σὺ κτέ.: Cron considers the construction here to be causal at bottom. Others regard it as exclamatory.

469 a. ζηλωτὸν: B T. ζηλωτός cod. S after Ast, who remarks (Tom. xi. p. 169 f.): ‘Quod coniceream (Præf. p. vi. T. 1) ζηλωτός id confermatum nunc video a Flor. d. idque tam praegressa quam sequentia videntur flagitare.’ But the reading of the codex itself rests probably upon an emendation, and the neuter is merely a case of colloquial inexactness. Cf. a similar case in Legg. v. 730 c, where it is said that ‘who would be happy, must be truthful,’ πιστὸς γὰρ, ὁ δὲ ἀπιστὸς, ἢ φιλὸν ψεύδος ἐκούσιον· ὅτι δὲ ἀκούσιον, ἀνουσ. ἦν τοῦτον ζηλωτὸν. Here probably no one will employ an emendation, although the author continues: ἐφιλοῦ γάρ δὴ πᾶς ὃ τε ἀπιστὸς καὶ ἀμαθὴς.

469 b. ἐλεείνον γε: S after Stobaeus. ἐλεείνον δὲ B T.

469 c. ἦμιν’ ὃν σοι δοκῇ: codd. S. δοκοὶ B T.

470 a. πράττειν, ἀγαθὸν τε: S. πράττειν ἀγαθόν τε Cron. ἀγαθόν τι Heindorf. Although the idea is plain enough, the arrangement of the words has caused great difficulty. Schleiermacher, followed by Cron, construes ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι closely with ὃφελίμοι πράττειν, under the article, thus making τέ a ‘postscript’ τέ. To do this, he has to take φανεται as a complete predicate, in
the sense, "seem good or correct." Ast wrenches the construction so as to supply a predicate, μέγα δύνασθαι, to φαίνεται, and follows it by ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, making the contrast κακόν (sc. εἶναι) καὶ σμικρόν δύνασθαι in chiastic position. But as Cron observes, it is quite out of the question to connect a τέ clause with a supplied predicate. Thompson uses the heroic treatment of bracketing the first τό μέγα δύνασθαι and the last δύνασθαι after σμικρόν. Most of the eds. — and this is best — put a comma after πράττειν, and construe ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι and καὶ τότο κτέ. together. This is not without difficulties, as Cron shows. The second clause deviates from the construction, but of this Plato shows several examples in this same dialogue. Socrates changes his expression to bring out with greater emphasis the εἶν μέν clause: "and that (καὶ τοῦτο), it seems, is the real μέγα δύνασθαι." This translation obviates the objection to τοῦτο. Cron does not like the τό with the second μέγα δύνασθαι, but the τό seems to have much the force of the English emphatic the, and that force can be brought out by adding the word 'real.' By thus making τοῦτο a reiteration of εἶν μέν κτέ, we have the contrast ei δὲ μὴ coming regularly with ἐστὶν to be supplied after κακόν.


470 b. ταῦτο: is bracketed as a dittograph by S, who refers to a similar case in Theaet. 186 d. This is not unlikely; but at the same time we can explain the word as it stands as showing a trace of sophistical quibbling.

470 d. ἐχθές: on the form, Rutherford, New Phrynichus, § 295, says: 'ἐχθές was the regular Attic form, the old Ionic χθές being naturally retained in phrases like χθές τε καὶ πρόγυν and occasionally, as in Ar. Nub. 353, Vesp. 242, to help the metre. After a word ending in a vowel, ἐχθές yielded to its older rival even in prose.'


470 e. κάγαθον: S. καλὸς κάγαθος, more rarely, καλὸς τε κάγαθος, but not καλὸς καβ ἀγαθός, or καλὸς τε καβ ἀγαθός.

471 b. τόν: S. οὐδ B T Cron. See critical note on 461 c.

471 b. On the general stylistic effect of the partic. see Gildersleeve, Am. Jour. Phil. ix. 136 ff., who discusses this passage, showing that we should naturally expect such an outburst from Polus, 'Πῶλος by name and πῶλος by nature.'
471 c. τοῦ Περδίκκου: cod. S. τοῦ Περδίκκου B T. Cron, Beiträge, p.118, thinks that perhaps it would be better to join τοῦ γρήγορον with τοῦ ἀδελφῶν, in which case τοῦ Περδίκκου ὦν would be a gloss by a later hand.

471 c. ἐπτήτη: S after Ast. ἐπταετή B T. But Heindorf had already observed, before Ast, with the approval of Lobeck, Phryn. 407, 'Ἀττικὸν magis esse ex grammaticorum praeceptis ἐπτήτη.'

471 d. ἐπήνεσα: B T. ἐπήνεσα † S after Cobet.

471 d. τοῦ δὲ ἡμεληκέναι: Thompson construes this clause under ἐπήνεσα in its full sense, considering that Socrates ironically calls his remark in 448 d (δῆλος γὰρ μοι Πάλος..., ὥστε τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμεληκέναι) a compliment. This view has found a supporter in Packard, Transactions Am. Phil. Assoc. 1877, 14. But the passage seems to be rather playful than ironic; and it is not uncommon in Greek to supply a colorless verb of saying from a preceding verb which involves it.

471 d. ὡγαθῇ: ὡγαθέ B T. ὡ γαθέ S.

472 a. εἶναι τί: S. εἶναι τί B T Cron. S is right in thinking the greater emphasis to be upon τί. This understatement implies much more importance, actual or pretended, in the persons mentioned than would be felt if εἶναι had the emphasis.

472 d. ἔστιν: S after Hermann. ἔστιν B T.

472 d. ἐν Πυθλοῖ: cod. S. ἐν Πυθλῷ B T. Heindorf recommends ἐν Πυθλῷ, referring to the note of Suidas: Πυθλόν ἵππον 'Ἀπάλλων Αἴθηρισμον ὑπὸ Πεισιστράτου γεγονός, εἰς ὅ τους πρότοδας ἐτίθεσαν οἱ τῷ κυκλῳ χορῷ νικήσαντες τὰ Θαργήλια. But we find also in Thuc. vi. 54. 7 ἐν Πυθλοῖ. In C. I. A. i. 422, we have a dedication by Aristocrates, son of Scelilus, which may have belonged to this offering. See Roberts, Introduction to Greek Epigraphy, i. p. 97.

472 e. πάντως...μέντοι: S after Stobaeus. ἀπάντων...μὲν τοῖνν B T.

473 b. ἐσω: is bracketed by S, following a suspicion of Heindorf, who, however, afterwards recalled his suspicion by referring to Phaedrus 233 e.

473 b. ἄδικων: is bracketed by S after Dobree. But Socrates' words in d, ἐὰν ἄδικως ἐπιθουλείων, seem to favor the retention of ἄδικων here.

473 c. καταπαττωθῇ: such punishments were but rarely inflicted in the Hellenic states, and were never sanctioned by law. When inflicted, they were dictated only by the fury of the moment, as we learn from Ath. xii. 26, p. 524 πρῶτον μὲν κρατήσας ὁ δῆμος καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους ἐκβαλὼν καὶ συναγαγὼν τὰ τέκνα τῶν φυγόντων εἰς ἄλωνιας, βοῦς συναγαγόντες συνηλιόσαν καὶ παραγωματάτης θανάτῳ διεισειράν: τοιγάρτοι πάλιν οἱ πλουσίοι κρατήσαντες ἄπαντας, ἄπων κύριοι κατέστησαν, μετὰ τῶν τέκνων κατεπίπτωσαν. Routh identified the punishment here mentioned with the Latin tunica m olesta, alluded to by Juv. viii. 235, on which Mayor gives references; among others Plut. de ser. num. vind. 9'some men are just like children, who often when they behold malefactors in the theatres in tunics of gold and purple shawls, crowned and dancing the pyrrich, admire and envy them as happy; until they are seen goaded and

473 c. εὐδαμονεύστερος: cod. S. εὐδαμονεύστατος B T.
473 d. δίδους δικήν: cod. δίκην δόους S after Schmidt. διδὼς B T. The pres. is better than the aor. because the punishment is kept up.

473 e. διαφεύγων: B T. διαφυγῶν cod. S. Socrates is speaking generally.

473 f. ἔρωτι τινα: Stallbaum. ἔρω τινὰ B T. ἔρου τινὰ S.

474 a. άδικεῖν: S as Heindorf and Ast, following Ficinus, demanded. άδικεῖν; the eds.

474 c. εἶναι, τὸ: εἶναι τὸ S and eds. Cron regards πότερον as an adj. with τὸ άδικεῖν κτἑ. in apposition.

474 c. τὶ δὲ δῆ; αἰσχρον: Heindorf. τὶ δὲ δῆ αἰσχρον S after Aldus.

474 e. αἰσχρον;: eds. αἰσχρον. S.

474 e. τὰ καλὰ, ἦ: B S. τὰ καλὰ τοῦ T. τὰ omitted, cod. καλὰ τοῦ Thompson.

475 a. θάτερον: is said to be a Doric form, adopted into Attic, but this is doubtful. Attic inscriptions always have ἔτερος. Reinach, Ἐπιγ. p. 249, thinks that originally in Attic ἔτερον may have been pronounced ἀτερον. But Smyth, *The Vowel System of the Ionic Dialects* (Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc. 1889), p. 20, claims ἀτερος itself for Attic. This claim, if true, would imply that old Attic has two forms, ἀτερος and ἔτερος, the former of which became fixed in the form θάτερον, dying out otherwise. Others hold the very reasonable view that θάτερα was a familiar form and θάτερον carelessly taken for the singular.

475 b. κακῷ: B T. κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις S after Hirschig. Perhaps it is easier to bear with the inexactness than to explain the omission.

475 d. χρόνῳ: B T. Cron would either omit this word as not agreeing with the connexion, or change it to λόγῳ after Findeisen. But the usage is phraseological, and for that reason defensible.

476 c. κάι ... κάιςθαι: codd. S. καὶ ... καἰςθαὶ B T. So also in the following examples; but in 479 a, B T both have καὶςθαὶ. The spelling of this verb is still an open question. Only two inscriptions contain present forms, and they are both before 400 B.C., and both show the diphthong. Meisterhans, § 63, 24.

477 c. οῖς: S eds. φῖς B Cron.

477 d. ὁμφατερα: Rid., § 17, classes this with such expressions as καὶ ταύτα, under the head of acc. in apposition. See another example in 524 e.

478 b. τί: B Stobaeus S. τὶ ὄν T. ὄν λέγεις, which follows ἐστὶν in B T, is bracketed by S after Bekker and Ficinus.

478 e. καὶ ὑμη ἐναι: is bracketed by S after Morstadt. It is true that the addition is unnecessary, and even illogical, but it serves to emphasize the result of the endurance.

478 e. ἐοικε: B. ἐοικε T S.
479 a. μὴ διδόναι δίκην κτέ.: this passage shows well the narrow line which sometimes separates the tendential from the substantival acc. with the inf. and may help to explain the way in which ἀοτε, which with the inf. is post-Homeric, came to be introduced to fix the idea of tendency. See Gildersleeve, The Consecutive Sentence in Greek, Am. Jour. Phil. vii. 161 ff.

479 b. οὕτω: B T. οὕτως S and eds.

479 c. εἰ μὴ σοι γε ἀλλας: codd. eds. εἰ σοι γε ἀλλας B T. εἰ σοι γε S, who compares Προπ. ii. 367 d εἰ γε σὺ βούλει. But the interpolation of ἀλλας is hard to explain, while μὴ can easily have dropped out, under the influence of itacism.

479 d. ἀδικεῖν: B T. ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην S after Hirschig.

480 a. ἀδικήσει: S after Heindorf. ἀδικέσῃ B T.

480 b. τοιᾷσθαι: S after Heindorf. τοιῇσθ B T.

480 b. λέγωμεν: B T. λέγαμεν codd. S.

480 c. τούναντιον: Deuschle. ἐπὶ τούναντιον B T S Cron. Cron, following Heindorf, thinks that we must supply χρῆσιμον εἰναι, which would make ἐπὶ τούναντιον correspond to ἐπὶ τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι. But this would leave δεῖn unaccounted for. Thompson supposes ἐπὶ τούναντιον to be a phrase equivalent to εἰς τούναντιον Soph. 221 a, or κατὰ τούναντιον Tim. 36 d, or εἰς ἐναντία, which is common enough. And if the ἐπὶ is kept, this is the only way of regarding it. But it is the sole example in such a phrase, and Deuschle bracketed it for that reason.

480 c. δὲ: B T. τε S with codd. and Heindorf.

480 e. τῇ κακείνα (κακείνα B T). τῇ κείνα S after Hirschig.

481 a. τῇ ἡρτεφακῶς: S. ἡρταφακῶς B T. ἡρταφακῶς ἢ cod.

481 a. ἀναλίσκηται: S after L, Dindorf, and Coraes. ἀναλίσκηται B T.

481 c. φώμεν: B T. θώμεν S after Madvig, who declares (Adversaria, i. 410) the connexion of a participle with φάναι not to be Greek. But λέγειν can be so construed, and we find φάναι followed by μὴ as if it were a verb of asseveration, which latter could take a participle.

481 d. θεόν: according to Rid. § 173, Plato combines with ἦ the following: διπλοῦς, πολλαπλάσιος, διαφερόντως (διαφέρειν), ἀνωμοίος, ἐναντίος, τῆς.

481 d. ὅτι (ὅ τι) ἄν φη: S with cod. and Ast. ὅτι ὡς ἄν φη B. ὅτι ὡς ἄν ἀντιφη T. ὅτι ὢτον ἄν φη' eds. after Bekker. It is a good example to show how variations might arise.

482 a. ἀ νῦν: Cron, who claims the authority of B T for the omission of ἀεί. But S (with the eds.) reads ἀεί without noting any change in B T, and it is perhaps better to restore it to the text here before ἀ νῦν.

482 a. ἐμπληκτος: is explained by the scholiasts and grammarians by ἄστατος, εὐνετάθειος (i n c o n s t a n t s), with which agrees Lysis 214 c μηδέποτε ὃμοιος αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἰναι, ἀλλ' ἐμπληκτος τε καὶ ἄσταθμήτους.

482 a. ἀεί τῶν αὐτῶν: cod. S. τῶν αὐτῶν B T.
APPENDIX.

482 b. Ἀλγυπτῖων: B T. Ἀλγυπτῖον S after Stallbaum, following Olympiodorus, to obviate the omission of the art.; but see Reinach, Ἐπίγ. p. 275: ‘Jusqu’au IVe siècle et même jusque’au IIIe on ne trouve que rarement le nom d’un peuple, d’un dême etc. précédé de l’article.’

482 b. κρείττον εἶναι ἀνάρμοστεν τε: S after Van Heusde. κρείττον εἶναι ἀνάρμοστον τε B T. κρείττον ἀνάρμοστον τε εἶναι Ast after Heindorf.

482 d. διδάξοι: B T. διδάξει codd.

482 e. ἐναντί: S on the basis of the reading of B, which according to S is ἐναντι. ἐναντία T.

483 a. τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν: RId., § 15, considers this and similar cases as acc. in apposition to the sentence. Cf. Theaet. 167 b ἐν δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπερίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, and other examples, Prot. 352 e, Theaet. 158 b.

483 a. κάκιον, τὸ ἄδικείσθαι: B T. κάκιον ... ἄδικείσθαι S after H. Stephanus, — perhaps correctly.

483 c. τὸ ἱσον: on the principles of democratic government as conceived by the Greeks, the equality of the individuals as well as their subservience to law, see Busolt, Gr. Alter. i. § 45 (Müller’s Handbuch, iv).

483 e. τὴν τοῦ δικαίου: is bracketed by S after Schleiermacher.

483 e. τὸν τῆς φύσεως: eds. τὸν φύσεως S (B T?).

483 e. τιθέμεθα: is bracketed by S after Hermann.

484 a. διαφυγών: is bracketed by S after Naber, καλ διαφυγών by Morstadt. Cron prefers the latter, but καταπατήσας would continue the metaphor of the escaping beast much better as a co-ordinate participle than it could as a subordinate.

484 c. διαφθορά: the speech of Callicles affords a good example of the σεμνότης which Aristides (Rhet. Gr. ed. Spengel, ii. 468) says is caused by the employment of ὀνοματικά λέξεις ἀντὶ δηματικῶν.

484 e. καλ ἐπὶ: B T S. καπὶ eds.

484 e. τυγχάνει: T S. τυγχάνη B.

485 b. καλ παίζοντας: is bracketed by S after Morstadt.

485 b. ψελλιζόμενον καλ παίζον: is bracketed by S after Cobet.

485 c. ἥ παίζοντα ὄρα: is bracketed by Morstadt.

485 e. ψυχῆς ἔχων: Nauck. ψυχῆς B T S.

485 e. διαπρέπεις: B T. διαπρέπεις S after Grotius. It can hardly be said that the emendation of Schanz is any more satisfactory than the text. I have followed Nauck in inserting ἔχων to make the construction better Greek. But most likely the correct reading of the passage is beyond the efforts of the eds. The trouble with διαπρέπεις is that while not unknown to Euripides’ vocabulary, it is never used transitively; hence Nauck’s insertion, for which Cron suggests λαχών, which would serve as well. In this way διαπρέπειν would be used just as we find it in Eur. Alc. 602, where Admetus says to his father, with bitter irony, ἥ τάρα πάντων διαπρέπεις ἄψυχα.
485 e. **οὐτ’ ἄν . . . λόγον:** these words are shown by the metre, οὖτ’ ἄν δίκης βουλαισται, as well as by the form βουλαισται, to have belonged in some form to Euripides. This has led Hartung to add them to the fg. with slight changes, though Nauck and Schanz do not feel justified in so doing.

486 a. **λάκοις:** S after Bonitz. λάβοις B T. λάκοις is not a prose word, but is very common in Euripides.

486 b. **εἰλιγγυφῆς:** B T S. Ἠλιγγυφῆς b t Cron. Schanz, vii. Prolegg. § 1, compares all the passages, and refers to the note of Suidas: εἰλιγγυφῆς τὸ μὲν ἰδίᾳ διὰ διφθόγγον, ἀντὶ τοῦ σκοτοδινῶ — τὸ δὲ δύομα Ἠλιγγυφῆς διὰ τοῦ ι.  

486 b. **εὐφυὴ:** S. εὐφυὴ B T. Cf. crit. note on 467 b.

486 c. **κόρρης:** the retention of η after the ρ in the words given in the note. It is explained as due to the fact that the older forms were κόρης, δέρης, etc., and that afterwards assimilation took place, as in the case of θάρσος to θάρρος. Curt. Stud. i. a 248.

486 c. **πιθών:** S after Cobet. πείδου B T Cron.

486 c. **ταὐτ’ ἀφεῖς:** eds. ταύτα ἀφεῖς S (B T?).

486 d. **ἀμενον:** B S. ἀμενον eds.

486 d. **ἡ:** B T. ἀίς S after Stallbaum. αἰ cod. This deviation from the more rigid construction is quite comprehensible in the freedom of conversation. Cf. 521 b.

486 e. **ἄν:** B T. ἄν S after Bekker.

486 e. **ταὐτ’ ἡδη:** eds. ταύτα ἡδη S (B T?).

487 c. **Τεϊγανδρον:** S with inscriptions. Τεϊγανδρον B T Cron.

487 d. **ταυτά:** S after Ficinus. ταύτα B T. Cron remarks that ἐμοί makes for the first reading, for with ταύτα we would more usually find ταύτα μοι.

487 e. **ἡ σὴ:** B T S. σή eds.

488 a. **ἐστιν:** S Thompson. ἐστιν B Cron. ἐστι T.

488 a. **ταὐτά:** B S. ταύτα T eds.

488 b. **πλέον:** S after Heindorf. πλέον B T.

488 b. **ἐλεγον:** is omitted by S, following common Greek usage. Both the position and the sense make for the omission.

489 a. **τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις:** B T. τοῦτ’ ἄν Καλλίκλεις S after Heindorf.

489 c. **ἐρμαίον:** B S. ἐρμαίον T.

489 e. **συλλεγῆ:** T b S. συλλέγῃ B.

489 c. **φῶσιν κτέ.:** the omission of an object to φῶσιν has caused a great deal of trouble, and it is certainly harsh to consider the word as used absolutely in the sense “declare,” “speak”; but such must be done as yet, for the emendations and other explanations are not satisfactory. Schanz changes αὐτά to ἄττα. Cron construes αὐτά . . . νόμιμα with φῶσιν, and translates: ‘Or do you think I mean (by the statement that τὸ βέλτιον and τὸ κρείττον are the same) that (i.e. the case) when . . . and these say that this and nothing else is lawful,’ viz. & ἄν φῶσιν. But this is too trying a species of mental gymnastics for conversation.
APPENDIX.

489 c. αὐτὰ: B T. ἄττα S after Heindorf, possibly with right. Some eds. insert comma after αὐτὰ. Cron omits comma both after φῶςιν and αὐτὰ.

489 d. τί: B T eds. τίνας S after Routh.


490 a. ἐστίν: S and eds. ἐστιν B. ἐστίν T Cron.

490 b. ἄφενος: T S. ἄφενος B Cron.

490 c. ἐν δὲ τῷ: codd. ἐν τῷ δὲ B T S, referring to Kr. 68, 5, 1.

490 c. περὶ στὶλα: B T. Thompson follows Hirschig in bracketing the words, which certainly are here a violation of usage. Cf. his note ad loc.

491 a. ως: B T S. ὡσπερ Baiter.

491 d. ἐταίρε;: cod. Bekker S. ἐταίρε τί ἢ τι ἀρχομένους B. ἐταίρε τί ἢ τι ἀρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους T. Many attempts have been made to emend this passage. Schanz gives the emendations of Stephanus, Cron, Bernardakes, Ast, Hermann, Stallbaum, Schuster, Madvig, Kratz, Kleanthes, Heindorf, Beck, E. Jahn, Findeisen, Baiter.

492 b. ἐδεν: S. ἔδεσαν B T Cron.

492 c. ταύτ' ἐστίν: B. ταυτ' ἐστι T. ταύτ' ἄρα S.

492 d. ἀμοθέν: S after Bekker. ἀλλοθέν B T.

492 e. ἤδη: B T S. ἤ δὴ Hermann, Cron. ὡσπερ ἤδη cod. Thompson.


493 a. τῶν δ' ἀμνήτων: B T. τῶν ἀμνήτων S after Madvig. But the passage offers an additional difficulty in αὐτοῦ where we desire αὐτῆς. If αὐτοῦ is genuine, we must conceive the clause τὸ ... στεγανῶν as in part. opposition to τοῦτο. This would make αὐτοῦ partitive genitive instead of possessive, which Cron insists upon calling it.

493 c. ἀπήκασε: T (in the margin) S. ἀπελκάσε B T.

493 c. μετατίθεσεν: cod. eds. μετατίθεσθαι B T S. Ast attempts to defend the reading of the Mss. by translating, 'Do I also persuade you to change your opinion to this, that,' etc. But, as Cron remarks, this gives an utterly impossible construction for καλ, and besides there is no meaning in "also."

494 c. πληροῦν: S after Stephanus. πληροῦτα B T. πληροῦν, πληροῦτα καλ χαίροντα Heindorf.

494 e. κνησιών: S after Heindorf. κνησιῶ B T. κνησιῷ Bekker, Cron. κνησιῷ Coraïs.

494 e. ἐχομενα: is bracketed by S.

495 a. ἀγαθαλ: codd. S. αἰ ἀγαθαλ B T. Heindorf appeals to 501 b; but since Bekker that has been read ἡ βελτίων, instead of ἡ βελτίων.

495 d. ἀγαθῶν: B T. ἡδέος H. Schmidt, to make the clause correspond more accurately with the previous discussion. See the discussion in Cron, Beiträge, p. 156, 209.

496 a. ἀνθρωπος: S after Bekker. ἀνθρωπος B T Cron.
496 b. **ἀπολλύει**: B according to Gaisford. **ἀπολλυει** S after Cobet’s dictum that forms in -ὡ are not Attic. Thompson quotes Porson on Eur. **Me-dea**, 744: ‘Observandum est hac forma, ea nempe ubi ὥ pro ὑμι in fine verbi ponitur nunquam uti Tragicos; rarissime veteres Comicos; saepius mediae, saepissime novae Comoe-diae poetas. Paullatim et parce adhiberi coepta est sub medium fere Aristophanis actatem; tantum enim occurrit ὥμυν᾽ Αν. 1610, συμπαραμενών in ultima eius fabula Pluto 719. Cetera loca, ubi usurpari videtur, aut emendata sunt aut emendanda.’ The evidence of the inscriptions seems to substantiate this. Meisterhans, § 74, 14, says: ‘Regarding the transition of verbs in -ρροι to the -ω conjugation, we find in 6th cent. B.C. ὁμνύτω, ὁμνύτων, ὁμνύαι. The 4th cent. still shows ὁμνύαι, but also ὁμνον (336 B.C.). Only after the 2d cent. does the inf. take the -ω ending; οὐροννύειν, ὁμνύειν.’

496 c. **ἄνθρωπος**: S after Bekker. **ἄνθρωπος** B T Cron.

496 d. **καὶ ἐγὼ μανθάνω**: Hermann. **καὶ ἐγὼ μανθάνω** B T. **Μανθάνω** S after Ast.

496 e. **φήσις**: S after Baiter and Deuschle. **ἐφης** B T Cron. Cf. critical note on 466 e.

497 a. **ἀκκαίς**: the scholiasts connect the word with a certain woman named Ἀκκώ, who was so foolish that she took from the loom a half-finished garment, and, clad in it, conversed with her own image in a mirror. The story is varied in the different accounts, and the connexion between Ἀκκώ and this verb is very uncertain. We learn from Plutarch that Ἀκκώ was used like Μορμώ, etc., as a bugbear to terrify children, and we find its employment as early as Pindar, ἑς. 127,—which makes the loom story highly improbable.

497 a. **ἐμπροσθεν** —: Cron. **ἐμπροσθεν**; S. The interrogation after the inv. is difficult to account for.

497 a. **τὶ ἐχων ληρεῖς**; S after Badham. **ὅτι ἐχων ληρεῖς** B T, without any division of persons.

497 d. **ὡς ἐτέρων ὄντων**: is bracketed by S after Deuschle.

497 e. **ἀφρονας**: B T. **τοὺς ἀφρονας** cod. S after Heindorf, who holds, however, the addition of the article to be unnecessary.

498 b. **ἐμοιγε μᾶλλον**: B T. **ἐμοιγε, μᾶλλον** δ᾽ ἵσως οἱ δειλοὶ S after a conjecture of Hermann. This addition would, however, make superfluous the following questions, **ἀπιόντων δ᾽ οὖ μᾶλλον κτέ.**

498 c. **ἀγαθόθι**: Routh. **ἀγαθόθι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ** B T. S brackets the words ἀγαθόθι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ εἶσον.

499 b. **λοῦ λοῦ**: T. **ἰοῦ ἱοῦ** B S. According to Cron, the authority seems to be on the side of the first accentuation, even when the expression is a joyful one.

499 d. **ἀρα**: S with Hermann after Heindorf. **εἰ ἄρα** B T.

499 e. **ἐνεκα**: S. **ἐνεκεν** B T Cron. See critical note on 468 a.
APPENDIX.

500 a. ἀγαθά — τῶν ἡδῶν — ἔστιν: this reading follows a suggestion of Professor Gildersleeve in regard to the recitation of the passage. ἀγαθά τῶν ἡδῶν ἔστιν B T eds.

500 a. ἀναμνησθῶμεν: S. ἀναμνησθῶμεν B eds.

500 c. ἐπί: is bracketed by S after Findeisen.

500 d. εἰ ἔστιν κτέ.: an example of the Schema Pindaricum, on which see Thompson ad loc. Gildersleeve on Pindar, Ol. xi(x) 61, and R. S. Haydon, Am. Jour. Phil. xi. No. 2.

501 a. τῇ ἐπάρθενῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς κτέ.: it is impossible to look upon τῆς ἡδονῆς as a "free gen." because the τοῦτον of the preceding clause has given the key to this, neither can Cron's explanation of it as 'gen. of belonging' ('angehörigkeit connexion'), with the translation "that which is directed to," be deemed satisfactory. Hirschig inserts τῇ before τῆς, supplying, and, as it seems, necessarily, τέχνη, in which case there would be a tacit acknowledgment of a τέχνη τῆς ἡδονῆς — an admission the very opposite of what Socrates intends, for he emphatically insists that the παρασκευή τῆς ἡδονῆς rests on ἐμπειρία only.

501 c. ἐνα σοι καὶ περαιθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ κτέ.: Cron, referring to Kr. 69, 32, 16, 17, considers this a case of the use of καὶ in clauses of purpose to add emphasis in the sense 'ja,' 'doch.' But while this use of καὶ is undoubted (cf. Rep. i. 346 a μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἐνα τι καὶ περαινωμέν) it seems much more natural here to make it correlative with the following καὶ, "both . . . and."

501 d. ἀδρόαις: T S Cron. ἀδρόαις B eds.

502 a. ἡμίρησθαι: S. εὐρήσθαι B T.

502 b. τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνή . . . ἐφ' ὕσποουδακεν; πότερον: S places the mark of interrogation after δὴ, construes with Hermann, ἡ σεμνὴ . . . with πότερον and brackets ἐφ' ὕσποουδακεν after Cobet. The remedy is violent and perhaps needless.

502 b. ἐσποουδακέναι: Curtius, Verb. ii. p. 154 ff., distinguishes five classes of perfects which are originally as presents, viz. perfects of sound (κλήραγα), of sight and smell (ἀκοῦντα), of gesture (δειδέχαμαι, ἦ 72), of emotion (ἀποδηκτεία, κτ.) and intensive perfects. Under the same categories fall all those perfects which, though originally full perfects, have acquired a present meaning; e.g. εὐγήγαρα, τέθυνε, περάθημα, ἐσποουδακε, τέθυνα, etc.

502 b. ὥσ σοι (ὅσ σοι T) δοκεῖ: B T. ὥσ μοι δοκεῖ, ὥσ σοι δοκεῖν, Kratz.

502 c. σοῖ: S. σοὶ Cron and eds.

502 d. ἤπτορικὴ: codd. S after Heindorf. ἤ ἤπτορικὴ B T.

502 d. ἡμῆρκαμεν: S. εὐρήκαμεν B T.

503 a. εἴ γὰρ καὶ: according to Kr. 65, 5, 15, καὶ εἴ implies that the statement of the leading clause is absolutely unassailable, even in the extreme case which καὶ εἴ introduces; with εἴ καὶ the realization of the condition, which may easily happen, is still a matter of no importance, as far as the statement of the leading clause is concerned. Cf. also Madv. Syn. § 194 d.
503 a. *τοῦτο*: codd. Aristides, Heindorf, S. *τοῦτο* θ B T.

503 d. *ἐλναί· τοιούτων*: B T. S marks a gap after *ἐλναί*, and omits the weakly attested *ἐχεις* *εἰπείν* after *γεγονέναι*. Heindorf thinks that some word like *ἐφάνη, ὑμολόγησα* is to be added, or *ἐλναί* changed into *εἰ* θ. See the numerous conjectures in S.

503 e. *προσφέρει α ἀνασφέρει*: this reading of cod. has been adopted by the eds. since Heindorf. It is not certainly Plato’s, of course, but it fills the space and makes sense. *προσφέρει* B T. S marks a gap after this word.

503 e. *αὐτοῦ*: codd. S. *αὐτῶν* B. *αὐτῶν* T.

504 e. *ἐκέινο*: S after Heindorf. *ἐκέινο* B T.

504 e. *αὐτοῦ*: B T. *ἀὑτῷ* Deuschle. δι’ *αὐτοῦ* conjectured, but not adopted by S.

504 e. *πλέον, ἡ τοιναντίων κατά γε*: B T. *πλέον ἡ τοιναντίων, κατά γε* S after Schleiermacher’s first edition. This passage has given a good deal of trouble, and the explanation given in the note is only the lesser of two evils. The second construction, that of S., Schleiermacher, and others, is thus paraphrased by Thompson: “What is the use of administering to a diseased body a variety of dishes when these will frequently be of no more service to it than abstinence and mortification (*τοιναντίων* *πολλάν* συνίων κτ.), nay, rightly considered will do it even less good than abstinence?” This view makes excellent sense, but is open to several objections. 1. The use of *τοιναντίων* is harsh and probably unexamined. 2. There is a case of asyndeton before *κατά* which Woolsey, a good critic, pronounced intolerable, and which Heindorf was moved to avoid by the insertion of ἦ, an impossible remedy owing to the preceding ἦ (than). 3. This view involves the supplying of the positive ὀνήσει from the preceding μὴ ὀνήσει. No complete collection of examples of this usage seems to have been made. Kühner, ii. § 597 n., cites the following cases where a positive verb is supplied from a negative. Ηom. E 819 οὗ μ’ εἶπας μακαρέσσοι θειός ἀντικρυ μάχεσθαι, ἀτὶρ (sc. έκέλευες), Eur. Ph. 1217 τί μ’ οὖκ εἶπας εξ ἐναγγελέου φήμης ἀπέλειθεν ἄλλα (sc. έκέλευες), Soph. O. R. 236 τὸν ἀνδρ’ ἀπανδῶ τούτων... ἢθεῖν δ’ ἀπ’ οὐκος (sc. αὐδᾶ), Eur. Supp. 467 ἕγα δ’ ἀπανδῶ “Ἀδραστον εἰς γῆν τὴνδε μὴ παρέναι εἰ δ’ ἔστιν κτέ. (sc. αὐδᾶ), Soph. E. 71 ἓν θεί μ’ ἀτιμον τῆδ’ ἀποστείλητε γῆς, ἀλλ’ (sc. στέλλετε), Hdt. vii. 104 δ’ νόμοσ... οὐκ ἐσεν φέουγεν ἄλλα (sc. κελεύων), ix. 2 οὐδὲ ἐσεν λέναι ἄλλα (sc. κελεύων), Pl. Apol. 30 ἀμελήσας, ἢν οἳ πολλοί (sc. ἐπιμελοῦνται). Add Soph. O. R. 818 ἢν μὴ ἐξητί... ἢθεῖν δ’ ἀπ’ οὐκον (sc. χρή), Hdt. v. 82 ἢ δὲ Κυθῆ οὐδέτερα τοιτών ἕα ἄλλα (sc. έκέλευεν), v. 143 οἷ οὐκ ἐσον... ἄλλα (sc. έκέλευον). It will be noticed that the range in these passages is limited, and in every case (except Apol. 30 b) the positive is to be supplied after a disjunctive conjunction. A few cases are cited where adjs. are involved, but here also we find the conjunction. The peculiar passage Eur. O. 717 is different. No example, accordingly, is cited to support the usage of the text (according to Thompson’s view). On the other hand the interpretation
APPENDIX. 291

advocated in the text is not free from objections. τοῦναρτίον seems an unnecessarily strong adversative. Perhaps it would be better to consider the passage as a case of colloquial inexactness.


§ 15.

505 c. καταλύωμεν: B T. καταλύσομεν S after Stephanus.


506 b. ἔως ... ἀπέδωκα: the construction employed here must be carefully distinguished from the common use of the aor. indic. after ἔως of a definite past fact. See GMT. 613, 2 and Am. Jour. Phil. iv. 416 n.

506 c. ἀξιθεσθήσομαι: B T eds. ἀξιθέσομαι Thompson after Hirschig, on the ground that the longer form is not Attic.

506 d. κάλλιστα: is bracketed by S after Coraës. We could very easily do without it.

508 b. οἵ ἀθλιοί ἀθλιοι: S after Heindorf. οἵ ἀθλιοί B T. ἀθλιοί οἵ ἀθλιοι Beckker. Ast and Vahlen both defend the Mss. reading, but unsuccessfully.

508 c. ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ: is bracketed by S after Morstadt, τοῦ ἑθελοντος by Hirschig. On the ground of meaning and usage the latter is to be preferred.

508 d. ἀποκτεῖναι: B T. ἀποκτενώμαι S, to avoid change of tense.

509 a. ἔστιν: B T. ἔστιν S after Hermann (ἔστι).

509 a. ἀπατηρ χῦν: B T. ἀπατηρ χῦν ὑμῖν Coraës.

509 b. τίνα ἄν: B T. τίνα ἄν S after Hirschig.

509 b. τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν: B T. τὴν αἰσχίστην ἐπί βοήθειαν S. Morstadt brackets τὴν αἰσχίστην — ὀικείοις, Cobet even more.

509 c. τοῦ ἀδίκειν κτλ.: on the gen. abs. with the articular inf. see Am. Jour. Phil. iii. 201, where Crito 44 d, Polit. 310 c, Euthyd. 285 d, are cited as being, in addition to the present passages, the only cases in Plato.

510 a. ἔστι: B. ἔστιν T S.

510 a. ἀδίκησομεν: S after Heindorf. ἀδίκησομεν B T.

510 b. ἑτοίμος: S according to the rule of Herodian and other grammarians. ἑτοίμος B T.

510 b. ἐστὶν ἄρχων: Cron seems to consider this a case of participial periphrasis for the verb; but Alexander, in his article, Am. Jour. Phil. iv. 291, does not so regard, or at least does not mention it, and it is more likely from the following adjs. that ἄρχων is substantival.

510 b. ὑμιῶς: S. ὑμιῶς B T. See on ἑτοίμος above.
510 c. οὖτως: S. οὖτος B T eds.
510 d. ταύτη: cod. S. αὐτῇ B T, defended by Ast.
510 d. ἀδικοὶ, αὐτῇ: S with the second Basle ed. ἀδικοὶ ἡ αὐτῇ B T.
511 c. συμβουλεύων: cod. S after Wytenbach and Heindorf. συμβουλεύω B T.

511 d. τά σῶματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα: Packard (Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc. 1877) considers σῶματα an emphatic repetition of ψυχάς, the variation in the words being due to the frequency of the phrase σῶματα καὶ χρήματα. He translates: “The art of navigation, which saves not only lives, but both lives and property.”

511 e. γνώικας: B T. γνωικα S after Naber. Morstadt brackets καὶ παιδας and καὶ γνωικας, and it must be said that ἐν νυνὶ ἔλεγον, which refers back to σῶματα in d above, seems to favor this course.

512 a. οἱ: B T S with Ast and Winckelmann. οἱ t codd.
512 a. ὁνήσει: S after Deuschle. ὁνήσει B T. ὁνήσει ἐν Heindorf.
512 c. αὕ τῷ σαντοῦ: αὗτος τῷ σαντοῦ codd. Cron. αὐτός B T. αὐ S. But there seems to be some need of an antithesis to τῷ ἕτε αὐτοῦ.

512 d. ἔστιν: T S and eds. ἔστιν B Cron. Cron defends his manner of accentuation on the ground that the emphasis is on ὅ ἐγὼ λέγω.

512 e. ὃ ἡ τῶ: S after Heindorf. ἢ τῶ B. ἦ τῶ T. ἦ τῶ ἐν eds.
512 d. μὴ γὰρ: B T. ἦ γὰρ S following a suspicion of Ast. καὶ γὰρ Butt mann. ἦδι γὰρ Hermann. εἶν γὰρ Madvig.

512 e. ὁποσοῦν ὁ (ὁπόσον ὁ): codd. Antoninus S. ὁπόσον δὲ B T.
512 e. μική: S. βιότη B T Cron.

513 a. σύν τοῖς φιλάτοις: the prep. σύν is intensely personal, and always involves in the action of the verb the case it governs. In the classic Attic there seems to be no difference in meaning, only one in frequency, between it and μετά. It is regularly retained in legal phrases and in old formulae, as here, where the personal idea was originally predominant. Cf. Gildersleeve, μετά and σύν, Am. Jour. Phil. viii. 218; Meisterhans,2 § 83, 35, 47. 48.

513 b. πολιτικός: is bracketed by S after Heindorf and Ast, probably rightly.

513 c. τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἦθελ: this dat. (equiv. to 'according to to,') is probably an extension of the dat. of interest; though Cron, following Kr. 48, 15, 4, looks at it as developed from the side of means.

513 e. πολλάκις ἵσως: is bracketed by S; ἵσως, Schaefer. Ast conjectures that ἵσως is to be put before πεισθείς.

513 d. ἀναμνήσθητί: S. ἀναμνήσθητι B Cron.

513 d. θεραπεύειν καὶ: θεραπεύειν, καὶ S after Stallbaum. This would make ἔκαστον the object to θεραπεύειν, καὶ σῶμα κτ. in apposition with it,—a view which is held by Schleiermacher and Ast. On the other hand, Kratz agrees with Cron in making ἔκαστον the subj. of θεραπεύειν.

513 e. σοι: B T. σοι S and eds. with comma before and after εἰ βούλει.
513 e. θερατεύομεν: B T. θερατεύομεν . . . S, on the basis of a free rendering of Aristides which adds σπουδαίων καὶ καλῶν.
514 a. πράγοντες: b S with eds. πράξαντες B T Stallbaum, Cron. τάξαντες Madvig. This passage has given a great deal of trouble. The Mss. reading seems to be utterly indefensible. Stallbaum, followed by Cron, regards the aor. as ingressive and equiv. to ἐπιχειρήσαντες πρᾶξα, but it is very doubtful whether the aor. of πράττειν can be thus used. No example is cited for it. On the other hand the fut. is not free from criticism.
514 b. τὴν τέχνην ἣν οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα: is omitted by S, being only found on the margin of B T. Heidorn reads ἐπιστάμεθα in both cases, while Cobet omits ἣν οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα.
514 c. ἀν που: S. δὴ ποι B T Cron.
515 c. πολίται: S after Hirschig. οἱ πολίται B T. The apposition seems too harsh to be natural.
515 d. ραὶ: B T S after Stallbaum. ἐποίει the eds. after Aldus.
515 d. ἀνάγκη: S. ἀνάγκη B T Cron, eds.
516 a. ἐαυτόν: is bracketed by S after cod. and Ast, but retained by Cron.
516 b. ἐπεμελέτο: so B T eds. This is the only passage cited for Plato where this form of the imperfect is found. The evidence of the inscriptions is not conclusive. Meisterhans,2 § 63, 4, says that after 380 B.C. the form ἐπιμελεῖσθαι is almost universal (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι: ἐπιμελεῖσθαι: 4:34); in regard to the usage before this time, owing to the uncertainty of the orthography, no certain conclusion can be reached. It seems likely, however, that Plato would hardly have varied his usage within six lines (cf. ἐπεμελεῖτο 18 below). In any case, L. Dindorf's claim that forms of ἐπιμελεῖσθαι should be everywhere written in Plato is not borne out by inscriptions.
311 d καὶ τὰ τῶν φιλῶν προσαναλίσκοντες.
516 e. ἐν Μαραθῶν: B T. Μαραθῶν S.
517 b. μὴ: B T. οὐ μὴ S after Madvig. But Schanz repudiates this emendation in Grammaticische Bemerkungen Rhein. Mus. xlii. 152 ff., and now agrees with Ast, who (p. 432) regards πολλοῦ δὲι μὴ as equivalent to οὐ μὴ with the subjunctive. The similar case in Epist. vii. 344 e he regards as an imitation, and therefore a confirmation, of a manner of expression not found elsewhere in Plato. Rid. § 60 also regards πολλοῦ γε δὲι as a substitute for οὐ, giving (in § 259) other examples where πολλοῦ γε δὲι fill the place of a negative. Cron in his latest edition accedes to this view although in his third edition he looked upon μὴ with the subjv. as an unusual const. for the simple inf. after δὲι, δὲι taking the place of a negativated verb of fear. Kühner § 589, 1, n. 1, says the passage is elliptical, "aber wahrlich es fehlt
viel daran, dass man besorgt sein sollte, ob nicht Einer der jetzt Lebenden solche Werke ausführen werde." Goodwin does not treat the question. In spite of the agreement of later editions, Cron seems to have been on the right track in his earlier edition. In the first place the position is against the explanation that πολλοῦ γε δεῖ is equivalent to οὐ. Then there is no occasion here for the strong οὐ μή construction. Callicles wants merely to say, "But at least you will admit that the men of the present day are far from being able to accomplish such acts." The usual const. (itself very rare) after δεῖ in this sense is the infinitive; but the inf. denies the fact, while Callicles would deny the likelihood merely. We have then a shift from the object construction to the final. Similar but not entirely parallel are passages like Phaedo 70 α τά περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπίστια παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, ὁδαμοῦ ἐτίμη, and the use of έδήλων μή in Phaedo 91 d.

517 d. ἐστὶν: B T. ἐστίν S after Vögelin.
517 d. ἀλλ' ὡν: codd. ἀλλῶν ὡν B T (defended by Ast). τῆλλα Heindorf after Ficinus.

518 a. περὶ σῶμα πραγματείας: S after Cobet. περὶ σώματος πραγματείαν B T Cron. Cron admits that the change is desirable, but contends that it is not necessary. If the traditional reading is kept, σώματος must depend on πραγματείαν, the whole clause meaning, "as regards the treatment of the body."

518 a. τότε: B T S. τοτέ the eds.
518 a. ὅτε: S after Madvig (Heindorf had already suggested it). ὅτε B T.
518 d. δὴ: S after Heindorf. δὲ B T.
519 d. καὶ: B T. καίτω S after Heindorf. The τοι might easily have fallen out before τοῦτο.

521 a. Καλλικλέης: B T. Καλλικλέης S after codd. and Bekker.

521 b. εἰ σοι Μυσών γε ἡδίων καλεῖν κτῆ.; since Bekker, this passage has been explained as in the text. Before him, the editors vexed themselves greatly over it. Heindorf remarks: Locum mendosissimum verisimillima, opinor, emendatione sanavit Cornarius, corrigens, Ei μη σοι Μυσών γίγνεσθαι ἡδίων λειαν... Unus tamen in hac lectione verborumordo nonsatis placeat, propiusque etiam videtur ad veritatem accessisse magnus ille Casaubonus, cuius ex notulis hanc correctionem protulit Routhius: Ei μη σοι Μυσών γε ἡδίων εἶλαι λειαν... Λεια inter Platoniceas voces laudatus a Timaeo Lex. p. 174, ubi hanc vocem in Pla tone reperisse se negat Ruhnkenius. Huic igitur sedem suum inventam putamus." The sense would then be: "If you do not prefer to fall a prey to the worst of mankind."

521 b. χρήσται: B T. χρήσται S.
521 c. δοκεῖς, ὡς Σώκρατες: Stephanus. δοκεῖ Σώκρατες B T. δοκεῖ Σώκρατες S. δοκεῖς, ὡς Σώκρατες, πιστεύεις (for πιστεύειν) Heindorf with Aldus and the two Basle editions.
APPENDIX.

521 d. ὅ: B T. ἄν S with cod. and Heindorf. Cf. 486 d.
521 e. ἄνηρ: B T. ἄν ἵρ S after Bekker.
521 e. καλ αὐτῶς ... διαφθείρει: is bracketed by S after Cobet.
522 a. ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ: is bracketed by S after Madvig and Cobet. By means of these omissions the connexion is made more exact, but there is also a loss to the description of several points which could hardly have been added by an interpolator. Madvig declares ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ to be an idea entirely foreign to medical theory; but while this may be technically true, the phrase is well adapted to describe that state of feeling into which the patient comes after taking nauseous medicines, the result of which is often choking and gasping. Cf. Rep. viii. 556 d ἄσθματος τε καλ ἀπορίας μεστῶν. As opposed to this, διαφθείρει applies to heroic treatment which leaves traces or scars behind. The addition of these two varieties to κακὰ εἰργασται certainly gives color to the picture.

522 a. πώματα: S after Bekker. πώματα B T. In his collection of examples, vol. xii. praef. § 2, Schanz shows that πώματα is found everywhere except in Phaedo 117 b, Gorg. 522 a.
522 a. ἡνύχουν: S. εὔχακον B T Cron.
522 a. εἰ εἴποι: S after codd. Stephanus. εἴποι B T.
522 a. οἰσθαλις γε χρή: has been transferred perhaps to the wrong place in the course of the tradition. It would suit much better at the close of the preceding words of Socrates, but is hardly appropriate in the mouth of Callicles after ὥσ. Hence Heindorf and Ast unite it closely with ὥσ. Hirschig and Cobet omit it.
522 c. ἑν: S after Heindorf and Coraës. ἑν B T.
522 d. γάρ τις: B T. γάρ ἦ S after Cobet.
523 b. οἱ ἐκ μακάρων: S after Plutarch. ἐκ μακάρων B T.
523 b. σφίσιν: S after Stobaeus, Plutarch. σφίν B. σφίν T.
523 c. ἐρημον: S. ἔρημον B T. See 510 b.
524 c. οὐλάς: is bracketed by S after Heindorf.
524 c. καὶ κατεαγότα: S. κατεαγότα B T. κατεαγότα τε Cron, Thompson.
524 e. Ῥαδάμανθου: Ῥαδαμάνθου, οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Ἐυρώπης παρὰ τὸν Ἀιακὸν cod.
524 e. οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκίων καὶ ἀδίκλας: Lucian probably had this passage in mind in Catulus c. 24 ἀπόσα ἐν τις οὐμῶν πονηρὰ ἐργάσθηται παρὰ τὸν βίον, καθ’ ἐκαστον αὐτῶν ἀφανῆ στίγματα ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς περιφέρει. See Kittredge, Am. Jour. Phil. vi. 165, and Gildersleeve, Essays and Studies, p. 344. The idea that after death the soul retains marks and scars resulting from evil deeds done in the body is said by Josephus to have been common among the Jews in his day.
525 b. παραδειγματι: S after cod. and Forster. παράδειγμα τί B T. παρά-δειγμα Eusebius, approved by Cobet.

525 e. οὐ γὰρ . . . οἷς ἐξήν: is bracketed by S after Morstadt. In favor of the omission is the rather difficult ellipsis, as well as the disagreement of the remark with 473 d δυοῖν ἀθλίοιν εὐδαιμονεῖστερος οὐκ ἀν εἶν, according to which we should have ἢπτον ἄθλιοι instead of εὐδαιμονεῖστερος.

526 b. ἀφετήν τὴν: cod. S. ἀφετήν B T.

527 a. ἐλλιγγιάσεις: B S. ἐλλιγγιάσεις T Cron. See on 486 b.

527 a. καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ατίμος: B T. ἐπὶ κόρρης S after Cobet.

527 c. ὁ λόγος: cod. S. ὁ σὸς λόγος B T.

527 d. πατάξαι: B T eds. The insertion σὺ γε θαρρῶν has caused the editors some trouble in the construction of πατάξαι. It is easiest and most natural to supply ἐασών τινα. Stephanus, however, wrote παταξαί. This was objected to by Routh and championed by Van Heusde. It is doubtful whether there is any authority for using the middle in the sense “allow yourself to be,” etc. Cobet also feeling some difficulty proposes to insert πάρεξε. But the explanation offered in the note, renders emendations unnecessary.

527 d. ὡς τι ὑντας: S. ὡς τι ὑντας Cron and eds. Cf. 472 a.
GREEK INDEX.

[References in brackets are to the Appendix.]

ἀγασθαὶ constructions with 526 a.
ἀγορά 447 a.
ἀγορά πλήθουσα local 460 d.
ἀγροκία 461 c.
ἀγών of the human life 526 e.
ἀδικία 478 c.
ἀδύνατος 507 e.
ἀἱ distributive 486 a.
ἀἱ ἐπικρατεῖν construction with 495 b.
ἀισθάνεσθαι distinguished from γν.

ἀνώσκειν 464 c; with gen. of partic. 481 d.
ἀλοχρόν with μῆ 458 d.
ἀλία 503 b.
ἀκκιζεῖσθαι 497 a.
ἀκολασταίνειν rare 478 a.
ἀκόλουθος 477 e.
ἀλλά, well, then 462 b; where γὰρ is ex.
pected 448 d; in asseverations 481 b.
ἀλλά γε 470 d.
ἀλλά οὖν 496 d.
ἀλλος excludes 447 c, 473 c; generic in
sing. 486 a.

ἀλλο τι, ἄλλο τι ἦ 467 d.
ἀμα with partic. 520 c.
ἀμύνης 493 a.
ἀμφισβητεῖν 452 c.
ἀν repeated 447 d, 475 e, 514 d; omitted 452 a, 471 a.
ἀναβαίνειν legal 486 b.
ἀνακαζεῖν 472 b.
ἀναγκαῖος personal constr. 449 c.
ἀναλαβεῖν, ἐπαναλαβεῖν 488 b.
ἀναρμοστεῖν 482 b.
ἀναθέσθαι ‘ take back’ 461 d.
ἀνδρεῖος 494 d.
ἀνέθην 494 e.
ἀνία, ἀναρός 477 d.
ἀνομολογομένως 495 a.
ἀνόσιος form 505 b.
ἀντ’ ε’ ποιεῖν 520 e.
ἀντ’ for ἕ after μᾶλλον 475 d.
ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι 506 a.
ἀντιστροφος 464 b.
ἀντιτιθέναι 461 d.
ἀνω καλ κάτω 481 c.
ἀπαγωγή 486 a.
ἀπλοῦς 503 a.
ἀπλώς οὖνς 468 c.
ἀποβλέπειν εἰς 474 d.
πρὸς 503 d.

ἀποκάλεῖν 512 c.
ἀποκαλύπτειν of rhetorical treatment 455 d.
ἀποκτεινύναι form [456 d].
ἀπολαμβάνειν 495 c.
ἀπορεῖν, εὐπορεῖν 478 a.
ἀπορεῖν ποιέi charge against Socrates 521 e.
ἀποσεισθαί 484 a.
ἀποφανεῖσθαι deponent 526 d.
ἀποφαίταν 489 d.
ἀφα inferential 448 a, 487 a, 492 e; post-
position, 519 b.
ἀφα ‘ whether’ 476 a; position 467 c, 472 d.
ἀφα, ἀφα οὗ, ἀφ’ οὖν 450 a, 479 e.
ἀρετή 492 d, 504 c, 506 d.
ἀρισμητική 450 d.
ἀρχεῖν and πλέον ἔχειν 483 d; construc-
tions with 488 a.
ἀρχὴ 492 b.
ἀστεῖος 447 a, 462 e.
ἀτμία, ἀτμίος 486 c.
ἀξ 468 a, 480 e, 500 a.
ἄλητική 501 d.
GREEK INDEX.

δ’ οὖν ‘but then’ 472 d, 483 a.

diomołogéiσθαι 500 e.
diopriσvθai 457 c.
doi diáevn 486 e.
doioulevn 491 e.
doiulos used by Gorgias 452 e.
dívamos vis 447 c.
dívvaselía, týrannís 492 b.
dívvaselía 525 d.
divškeraíven 450 e.
edán ‘whether’ 452 e.

and ε after σκópeī 510 b.
edýkriov 460 d.
edýrro 455 b.
el δὲ μη’ phraseological 470 a; reg. follows εάν μὲν 502 b.
el δῆ ‘if really’ 449 a.
el kal, kal el [503 a], 509 a.
el μη διά 516 c.
el μη δὲ nisi si 480 b.
el μη, ἐπερ with fut. indic. 495 a, 509 a.
oúk oǐ’d’ el hau’d’ seio an non 458 d.
oúth’ ὅτι parenthetical 486 a.
eldos 503 e.
elđmov 463 d.
elnai in phrases 490 c.
elnev ‘very well’ 466 c.

ἡ Attic form 488 b.
el, φέρε δή 451 a.
elpein for λέγεν 456 c.

inf. with 473 a.
els with παρέειν 519 e;
teleután 463 a.
εκ of origin 523 e.

εκ τῆς τρίτην ‘of the third part’ 500 a.
GREEK INDEX.

éβάλλειν, ἐκπίπτειν 517 a.
ἐκεῖσθε of life beyond the grave, 527 b.
ἐκλάμπειν poetic 484 a.
ἐκροή rare 494 b.
ἐλέγχειν 486 c.
ἐμβηχαύ 457 a.
ἐμπερία, τριβή 462 c, 463 b.
ἐμπληκτὸς [482 a].
ἐμπωρός, κάπηλος 517 d.
ἐν with тελευτάν 453 a.
ἐν Πυθού [472 d].
ἐνδεικνύναι, ἀποδεικνύ
ναι 484 b.
ἐνέκα 'so far as' 493 e; forms [468 a].
ἐνθάδε of life here 527 b.
ἐνταῦθα with verb of motion 527 c.
ἐξαίφνης with partic. 523 c.
ἐξελέγχειν pregnant use of 467 a; with partic. 522 d.
ἐξει 524 b.
ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι 'advertise' 417 c, 458 d.
ἐπαίδευσιν poetic 464 d.
ἐπαναλαβεῖν, ἀναλαβεῖν 488 b.
ἐπαναστήναι 484 a.
ἐπεὶ 'whereas' 471 d.
ἐπειτα 461 b.
ἐπεξέρχεσθαι 492 d.
ἐπτι of immediate succession, 512 c; with παιδεύειν 519 c.
ἐπιδεικνυθαί 447 a, b.
ἐπιδιακρίνειν 524 a.
ἐπὶνεικὸς 493 c.
ἐπικουρεῖν, ἐπικουρία, ἐπίκουρος 402 c.
ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἀντι-
λαμβάνεσθαι 506 a.
ἐπιπλήττειν with dat. 478 e.
ἐπιρρέειν 494 b.
ἐπιστασθα 484 b.
ἐπιστήμη equiv. to τέχνη 449 d; for μάθησις 454 d.
ἐπιτηδευμα, ἐπιτιθευμα
463 b.
ἐπιτρέπειν 504 e, 517 b.
ἐπισχεῖν 492 d, 495 c.
ἐπίφαν 'incantation' 484 a.
ἐρμαῖος 486 e.
ἐρωμένοις compared 483 c.
ἐταιρίστα 'club' 510 a.
ἐταῖρος 510 a; compared 487 d.
ἐτέρος generic in sing. 486 a.
ἐν- augmented to ἦν-
[448 e], [459 e].
ἐν γε 494 c.
ἐν ἔχει 'it is in order'
455 c.
ἐν ὅτι with inf. 453 a.
ἐνεργέτης 506 e.
ἐνύμωσα 486 c.
ἐνυπορείν, ἀποποιεῖν 478 a.
ἐνυφήμαι f a ve l i n g u a
469 a.
ἐνείδη 460 a, 490 b.
ἐνχον ingressive 503 e, 519 d.
ἐνχων in phrases 490 e.
ἐκτένον, σχέτεον 490 c.
ἐκστασι with gen. 499 b.
τὰ ἐχόμενα 494 d.
ἐχόντες, χθές [470 d].
ἐς constructions with 506 b.
ἐνμελα, τιμωρία, δίκη
472 d.
ἐνμούσαθα for over-
eating 490 e.
ἐφον 453 c.
ἦν 'at once,' jam 486 e.
ἐδομή, χάρις 462 c.
ἐδύμ 'naive' 491 e.
ἐδος 484 d.
ἐκισε ἐχον 401 c.
φέρουσα 518 d.
ηλικία for philosophy
484 e.
θάτερον form [475 a].
θεατά 'audience' 502 a.
θέμεσ 505 d.
θεραπεία 464 a.
θεράπευμα, παθήμα 524 b, d.
θηρεύονται 464 d.
ιατρεύων transitive
478 e.
ιατρική 465 d.
ἰδίος followed by ἦ
481 d.
ἰδιώτης 507 d.
ικανός 480 a, 484 a.
ιοῦ ιοῦ 499 b.
ἰσότητις, γεωμετρική 508 a.
ἰσως of understatement
473 a.
καθοράν, ὁράν 457 e.
καὶ in questions 455 a; doubled in comparison 457 e; cli-
mastic 511 b; 'and therefore' 471 a.
GREEK INDEX.

καλ el, el καλι [503 a],
509 a.
καλ ταίτα 'and that
too' 508 a, 526 b.
equiv. to καίτα 510 c.
κακία, πονήρα 477 b.
κακουργεί 483 a.
καλλωπίσματα 492 e.
καλός κάγαθος [484 d],
518 e.
κάπηλος, ἐμπορος 517 d.
kata of the scale 474 d,
512 b.
kατα with partic. 457 b.
kαταθύμειν 485 d.
kαταδεικνύσεθαι 465 d.
kαταπτωσόν [473 c].
kαταρθύμειν 451 e.
kατασκευή, παρασκευή
477 b.
kαταχαρίζεσθαι 513 d.
kαταχρῆσθαι 'use up'
490 c.
kαταχωνύναι, obru-
er 512 c.
kατεπάθειν 483 c.
κεφάλαιον without art.
494 d.
kήδεσθαι 462 a.
kιθαριστικὴ 502 a.
kιθαρισθεία 486 c.
kιθαριστική 502 a.
kοινωνήματα 484 d.
kοινωνία 507 e.
kολάζειν 'discipline'
491 c.
kολακεία 463 b.
divisions of 464 a.
kολάσις, ξημία 472 d.
kομπάνι 524 c.
kομμωτική 463 c.
kομψός 486 c, 493 a.
κόρη [486 e].
kοσμείν, κόσμος 504 a.
kόρος, κυροίν, κύρωσις
450 b.
λαμβάνειν, παραλαμβά-
νειν 483 e.
λογιστική 450 d.
λόγος in general 457 c;
'story' 522 c.
λόγος, μῦθος 523 a.
to λοιπόν 458 d.
λύειν, διαλύειν 480 e.
λύπη 475 c.
-μα termination 524 b.
μά 489 e.
μαγγανεύματα 484 a.
μάθησις, ἐπιστήμη
454 d.
πίστις 454 e.
μάκαρ, μακάριος 523 b.
ο μακάριο 469 e.
μάλιστα 'yes' 496 d.
μᾶλλον after comp.
482 e.
μειράκιον 485 e, d.
μέλλειν tenses with
484 d.
ἐμελλον after unreal
cond. 486 d.
μέλος, μυθός 502 e.
μέν almost equiv. to
μήν 466 b.
μέν οὖν 465 e.
μεταβαθάζειν 517 b.
μεταλαχάζειν rare
447 a.
μετατίπτεται 493 a.
μεταστρέφειν absolute
457 a.
μετατίθεσθαι 493 c.
μέχρι 487 e.
μή with inf. in appos.
[449 e]; with
subs. inf. 456 e;
'whether' [458 c];
generic 459 a; ab-
solute with subjv.
462 e; redundant
with ὧστε 465 a;
with pres. indec.
458 e, 512 d; with
opt. in question
510 d; with inv.
489 a.
μὴ 'ou after αἰσχύς-
σθαι 461 b; after
neg. 509 a.
μὴν equiv. to μέντοι
493 e.
μηχανοσόμος 512 b.
μισθοφορία 515 e.
μορμολύττειν, μορμο
473 d.
μυθολογεῖν 493 a.
μῦθος, λόγος 523 a.
μύσατα 480 c.
νεανιέσθαι 482 e.
νεανίκος 482 c, 485 c.
νεωτί 503 c, 523 b.
νικάν with acc. 456 a.
νομίζεσθαι 466 b.
νομίζεσθαι, κρίνεσθαι
483 d.
νόμιμος, νόμος 504 d.
νόμος 'usage' 512 b.
νόμοι, 'constitution'
484 d.
ἐμβολαια 484 d.
ὁδε deictic 447 a.
oδείν 518 e.
oμαί softens 483 e.
oιος with inf. 457 d.
oιος, οίος te 452 c.
GREEK INDEX.

παγκρατιάξειν 456 d.
παθήματα, θεραπεύματα 524 b, d.
πάθος 481 c.
παιδέα 470 e.
παιδεύειν εἰς, ἐπὶ 519 e.
παιστρίβης, γυμναστής [452 a].
πᾶλαι σαράντα with pres. 456 a.
παλαιέν 456 d.
πανούργος 499 b.
οὖ πάνν [457 e].
παρά 'at the hands of,' 467 c; 'the companion of' 485 c; with βεβαιούσθαι 489 a.
παραδίδοναι t r a d e r e 456 e.
παραλαμβάνειν 483 e, 516 a.
παρασκευάζοντα with inf. 524 d.
παρασκευάζοντα εἰς 448 d.
παρασκευαστέον m i d d l e 507 d.
παρασκευή, κατασκευή 477 b.
παίνειν construction with 523 d.
πειθός 453 a.
πειστικός 455 a, 493 a; construction with, 455 a.
περὶ with gen. and acc. 449 d; with acc. after a verb not of action 490 c; with gen. instead of acc. 451 d, 491 a.
περιμένειν 490 d.
περιπατεῖν 490 d.
περισυλάσθαι 486 c.
περιφέρεσθαι εἰς ταύτο 517 c.
πεττευτικ' 450 d; the λόγος element in [450 d].
πίστις, μάθησις 454 e.
πλάτειν 483 c.
πλεονεκτεῖν 483 c.
οἱ πλέοντες 'merchants' 467 d.
πλῆθος equiv. to ἐκκλησία 466 c.
πλῆν with ἡ instead of gen. 489 c.
ποικίλια of Plato 451 b.
ποῖος contemptuous 490 d; equiv. to τίς 453 c.
πολίτης 'statesman' 515 c.
πολλοῦ γε δεῖ followed by μή [517 a].
πονηρία, κακία 477 b.
πορίζεσθαι m i d d l e 493 e.
πράγμα 'business' 512 e.
πράγματα ἕχειν, παρέχειν 467 d.
τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν 526 c.
πρῶν constructions with 463 c.
προδίδασκειν 489 d.
προεσθαί 520 c.
πρός final 457 e; ‘to the advantage of’ 459 c; adverbial, 460 b; ‘at the hands of’ 482 c; pregnant 483 b; with τελευτάν 453 a.

προσεωσταμένη 511 d. τυχνείν 456 d.

ράβδος, σκήπτρον 526 e. ῥήμα 489 b, 490 a.

ῥητορική a species of art 449 a; πειθούς δημιουργός[453 a]; a more complete definition of 455 a; a kind of ἀγωνία 456 d.

ῥυθμός, μέλος 502 c.

σαθρός 479 b.

σεμνός 502 a.

σκήπτρον, ράβδος 526 e.

σκόλιον [451 e]. σκόπει with d, ἔαν 510 b.

σκυτοδέφως 517 e.

σοφίζεσθαι 497 a.

σοφός 483 a.

σπουδάζειν pf. equiv. to pres. [502 b]; ἐπὶ τινὶ 502 b.

στεγανὸς 493 b.

στενά 497 e.

στοχαζόσθαι 465 a.

στοχαστική 463 a.

σύγκατατίθεσθαι 501 c.

συλλογίζεσθαι 479 e.

συμβαίνειν 484 e.

τά συμβαίνοντα ‘the results’ 479 e.

σύμψηφος 500 a.

σῦν ‘at the risk of’ 513 a.

συνδεῖν 461 a.

συνίστασθαι 504 a.

συνοικεῖν 479 b.

συνουσία ‘meeting’ 461 b.

συντείνειν 507 d.

σύρφετος 489 c.

σφάττειν, ἀποκτείνουν 468 e.

σφόδρα γι 496 d.

σχέδον τι softens 472 c.

τινάς σχέδον καὶ συχνοῦσ 455 c.

σχέτλιος 467 b.

σχήμα καθ’ ὅλον καὶ μέρος 524 a, 525 c.

ἐσχηματισμένη 511 d.

σωφρονίζειν 478 d.

σωφροσύνη 507 b.

σώφρων 526 c.

τάν equiv. to τοι ἂν 452 b.

τέ postscript [470 a].

τε . . . καὶ connect opposites 450 a.

τελευτάν εἰς, ἐν, πρός 453 a.

τέμνοσθαι s e c a r i 508 e.

τέχνη for δημιουργός 454 a.

τεχνικὸς 500 a.

τίθεσθαι, τιθέναι νόμον 483 b.

τιμή 497 b.

τιμωρία, δίκη 472 d.

τίς ‘a sort of’ 491 c, 520 a.

τί adv. acc. 453 a, 459 c.

τίς, ποῖος 453 c.

τὶ δὲ τόδε 474 d.

τὶ δὲ τοῦτο [448 b].

τὶ τοῦτο 473 e.

τὶ οὐ with aor. 503 b.

τί ταχὰ δράσεις 466 a.

τό, τὰ with gen. 450 c, 453 e.

τοιοῦτοι 494 d.

τριβή, ἐμπεύρια 463 b.

τυραννίς, δυναστεία 492 b.

ὑμής 493 e; form [467 b].

ὑὸς forms of [461 b].

ὑπάρχειν 456 e, 492 b.

ὑπέρ ‘in the name of’ 515 c.

ὑπερφυῆς 467 b; form [467 b].

ὑπερφυῆς ὡς 477 d.

ὑπερτάν 483 a.

ὑποσχέσθαι λάγον 465 a.

ὑπηρετεῖν 492 a.

ὑπό with γίγνεσθαι 515 e.

τι ‘somewhat’ 493 c.

ὑποδύσα 464 c.

ὑποθέσεις 454 c.

ὑπόκεισθαι 465 b.

ὑπονοεῖν 454 c.

ὑποτείνεσθαι 448 e.

ὑπούλος 480 b, 518 c.

ὑφαντικώτατος 490 d.

ὑφηγεῖσθαι 458 b.

φανεῖσθαι, ἀποφανεῖσθαι 526 a.

φημὶ with ὅτι 487 d.

φημι with partic. [481 e]; ἐφης, ἐφησθα [466 e].

οὐ φημὶ νεγο 466 e.
GREEK INDEX.

φαρμακίς, φαρμακεύειν 513 a.
φέρε δή 440 c, 451 a.
φιλονικεύειν 457 d.
φιλή κεφαλή 515 c.
φιλαρεῖς ἐχων 490 d.
φοβεῖσθαι constructions with 457 e.
φοιτάν 'to go to school' 456 d.
φόροι 519 a.
φορτικός 482 e.
φρόνιμος 489 e.
φύσις 465 c.

χαραδρώς 494 b.
χάρις, ἔδοινη 462 c.

χρῆν, ἐδει construction with 458 b.

ψελλίζεσθαι 485 b.
ψεῦδος 505 e.

ω ἀγαθή 506 c.
βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν 515 a.
καλλιστε 461 c.
μακαρίε 469 c.
σοφώτατε σύ 495 d.
φιλή κεφαλή 515 c.

ός causal 509 e, 521 b; with gen. abs. 484 c; with acc. abs. 488 c; 491 a.

ώς γε ... εἶναι 517 b.
ώς γέ μω δοκεῖν 482 d.
ώς δή σὺ ὁμ ἄν δεῖξαι [468 e].

ώς ἔτοσ ελπεῖν 450 b.

ός ... εἰρήσθαι 462 b.

οὐχ ὠπερ ἄν εἴ 453 c, 479 a; with nom. instead of oblique case 464 d.

οὐχ ὠπερ condensed 522 a.

ὀστε with indic. 447 b, [458 d]; omitted 479 a; with inf. [479 a].

ὀτελή, οὐλή 524 c.
Accusative, adverbial
452 c, 459 c, 477 d, 494 a; absolute
491 a; agent with verbals 481 a, 507 c; in apposition [477 d]; cognate with νυκάν 456 a; specification, 464 a; ‘free’
500 d; for gen. after περ 490 c, 521 d; with inf. substantival, tendential [479 a].
Active and passive designations of the same idea 457 c, 524 d.
Adjective, personal constr. of with inf.
449 c; agrees with a following gen. in gender 519 e.
Adverb, place where for place whither 456 b, 527 c; as adj. 520 a; of time (ἀμ) with partic. 520 c, 523 e; with art. 506 d.
Adverbial acc. 452 c, 469 c, 477 d, 494 a.
Δeicus 523 e.
Afterthought 499 b, 513 e.
Alcibiades 481 d.
Amendment to a bill 451 b.

Amphion 485 e, 506 b.
Anacoluthon 454 b, 470 a, 500 c, 501 a, 503 c.
Anaphora 464 b.
Anaxagoras 465 d.
Andron 487 c.
Anticipation of the subj. 449 e, 453 b.
Antithenes 492 e.
Aorist and imperf. of same sphere of time
447 d; gnomic 484 a, 511 d, 524 e; and pf. in verbs of perception 497 e; partic. not antecedent,
401 c.
Apodosis omitted 456 a, 510 d.
Aposiopesis 467 b.
Apposition to sentence 447 a, 507 e; partic.
450 c, 503 d, 524 d.
Archelaus, life 470 d; disregard of moral obligations 471 b; strength of will
471 c.
Arion 501 e.
Aristides 503 c, 526 b
Aristocrates 472 a.
Aristophon 448 b.
Article, omission of
452 d, 453 e, 469 e, 470 e, [482 b]; in enumerations 450 d,
508 a; inserted
464 a, 470 d; repeated 479 a; with ὁθος 502 b; with incorporated antec.
469 a; classifies
490 e, 497 e; defines subj. 476 d; with adv. 506 d; neut. with gen. 450 c,
453 e; dual form, 524 a.
Asphodelmeadow 524 a.
Assimilation, case 491 a; neglect of 503 c.
Assonance 492 b.
Asyndeton [456 e], 406 d, 520 a; explanatory
450 b, 477 a, 513 a; of opposites 456 e; in question 489 b, e; with ἐπιγια 461 b; with ὁσσερ 448 e.
Athenian judicial system 451 a, 471 e.
Athenians, lazy, timid, loquacious, mercenary 515 e.
Athens, πόλις φιλολογίας 461 e; walls and navy - yards [455 d].
Attraction of case 464 d, 477 d, 509 a; of subj. 483 d; of mood 521 e.
Brachylogy 465 a, 493 d, 515 d.

Callicles, character 481 b; irritation 491 a; irony 492 c; rudeness 497 b, 498 b.

Case, same with different verbs 493 c, 527 d; assimilation 491 a; attraction 464 d, 477 d, 509 a.

Chiasmus, 453 d, 474 c, 493 c, 498 d, 508 b, 509 c.

Choregia 472 a, 482 b.

Chorus 501 e.

Cimon 510 d.

Cinesias 501 e.

Cithara-playing 501 e.

Cognate acc. with νικάν 456 a.

Comparison with ὅσπερ 464 d; with πρός, copula omitted 465 b; omission of second member 468 b; to a child 479 a, 485 b, 499 b; to a wild beast 483 e; body to tomb 493 a, to a jar 493 b, to a sieve 493 c; λόγος to a guide 527 e.

Compression 455 e, 456 a, 522 a. See Brachylogy.

Conditional, variation in 458 a; doubling of one member 453 c, 468 d; unreal 471 a; mina-
tory 509 a; negative 490 a.

Construction, ad sensum 451 c, 460 e, 467 e; shift in 483 e.

Cookery 518 b.

Coordination for subordination 460 d, 525 b.

Copula omitted 465 b, 472 d, 502 b; in first and second person 487 d.

Cynic school 492 e.

Dative with nouns 513 b; instrumental 460 c; cause 490 c; accompaniment 492 d; ethical 480 e, 515 c; predicate 525 b.

Dawes' canon 510 a.

Dead, judgment of 523 b.

Death 522 e, 524 b.

Demonstrative for rel. 408 d.

Demus 481 d.

Dionysion 472 a.

Dithyrambic poetry 501 e.

Double expressions, general precedes special 447 a; adjectives 465 b; negatives 461 b.

Dual, artistic use of 464 b; forms of art. 524 a.

Earth, two parts 523 e.

Eleusinian Mysteries 497 c.

Empedocles 493 a, 507 e.

Epicharmus 505 e.

Epiphora 500 a.

Euripides quoted 484 e, 485 e, 492 e.

Explanatory equiv. to causal 449 d.

Fate, belief in 512 e.

Figure of the hunt 464 d.

Flute-playing 501 d.

Future, two sides of 447 b; in neg. questions 466 e; middle as passive 509 d, 521 e; optative 482 d.

Future perfect, 469 d, 510 e.

Genitive comparative 479 b; characteristic 482 a; epexegetical 521 a, 526 a; free 509 d; of part affected 469 d; partitive with phrases 470 e, 480 e, 507 d; with τόρρα 486 a, εἶδος 525 a; with τιθέναι 500 b; possessive 500 a, 504 e; terminal 487 e; with adverbs 507 d; with verbs of perception 519 b; with ἐπιλαμβάνονταί 489 c, 519 a; with θαυμάζειν 523 b.

Gorgias, boastfulness 449 b; mannerisms [448 c]; oaths 463 d; as mediator 497 b, 506 a.

Herodicus 448 b.

Hippas of Elis 482 e.

Imperative, positive, negative 470 c, 489 a.
Imperfect, distributes 447 c; of awakening 478 c; resolved 453 d.
Indicative after σκοπεῖν 458 c; absolute with μή 512 d.
Infinitive with τοῦ 457 e; epexegetic 486 c, 493 c; articular 447 c; after εὖ ῥεῖθρ' ὅτι 453 a.
Interrogative veils statement 470 a; lost in affirmation, 470 a.
Intransitive used passively 472 a.
Isles of the Blessed 523 b.

Law, natural, conventional 482 e.
Litotes 457 a.

Marathon, victors at 516 d.
Mathematics 465 b.
Medicine 455 b.
Meles 501 e.
Menelaus 523 b.
Metaphor of a horse 482 e; hunt 489 b; mysteries 497 c; bow 507 d; bankruptcy 518 d; games 526 e.

Middle for active, 484 b.
Miltiades 516 d.
Minos 523 e.
Mithaecus 518 b.
Musical terms 457 e.
Mysian slaves 521 b.

Nausicydes 487 c.
Neuter for masc. fem. 448 b, 465 d, 478 c; plural for two fems. 509 e; generalizes 520 b.
Nicias 472 a.

Oaths of Socrates 449 d, 461 b, 463 d; Gorgias, Polus, Callicles 463 d.
Odd and even numbers 451 e.
Optative 447 e; in emphatic denial 458 c; by attraction 521 c.
Oratory, three divisions of 452 e.
Ostracism 516 d.
Oxyburnus 487 b.

Participial clause as addendum 479 b; periphrases 525 d.
Participle contains leading idea 453 b, 459 e, 486 d; a real adj. 470 d; appositional 507 d; acc. abs. in apposition 501 b; omitted in acc. abs. 495 e; epexegetic 513 e; predicate 500 e; connected with verb of preceding clause 511 c; supplemental 470 c; heaping up of [471 b], 483 e; gives result of the verb 510 d; with verbs of perception 519 b.
Perdiccas 471 c.
Perfect for pres. 502 b; and aor. of verbs of perception 497 e.
Pericles 472 a, 503 c, 515 e, 516 a.
Personal, shift to material 469 a, 482 b.
Personal constr. of adj. 448 d, 449 e.
Personal pronoun for reflexive 468 d; emphasizes reflexive 480 a.
Philolaus 493 a.
Philosophy deals with principles 465 e.
Phrase δὲ μὴ 470 a; ἐκθέσε τε καὶ πρώτην 470 d; ὑπερφυς ἡ 477 d; ἀνω καὶ κάτω 481 e; ἥκεις ἐξων 491 c; εὖ ῥεῖθρ' ὅτι 453 a; σώματά καὶ χρήματα 511 d.
Physicists [455 b], 456 b.
Pindar quoted 484 b.
Plural follows sing. 457 d; followed by sing. 480 e; by dual 481 d; indefinite, 484 c; of neuter adj. 512 b.
Polus, book of, 448 e; desires admiration 448 b; pushing na-
ture of, 448 a, 461 b; name 463 e, [471 b]; oaths 463 d; laughter 473 e; attempts proof 471 c; self-assurance 473 a; evades answer 470 b; champion of the masses 475 d.

Position, rhetorical 484 c.

Possessive pron. for personal gen. 486 a.

Preposition omitted with rel. 453 e.

Present, habit, aor., case 462 d; in accusations 486 a; with verbs of perception 503 c; for fut. 505 c.

Prolepsis 449 e, 453 b, 491 a, 513 e.

Prometheus 523 d.

Pronoun, same with different references 468 c; need not be repeated with a series of verbs, 493 e, 527 d; neut. possessive with art. equiv. to pers. 458 d; possessive followed by gen. 515 b; personal for refl. 468 d; personal emphasizes refl. 480 a; possessive equiv. to pers. gen. 486 a; indef. with numeral 471 e.

Protagoras 520 c.

Proverbs, κατόπιν ἱπ- 

τής 447 a; δις καὶ τρίς 498 e; τὸ παρὸν εἰ ποιεῖν 490 e; δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον 499 c; ὁ ὀμίος τῷ ὀμιῶ 510 b; τὸν κολοφώνα ἐπιπλήναι 505 d; ὁ λεγόμενος γραών ὕδλος 527 a; Μυσών ἔσχατος 521 b; ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμεῖαν 514 e.

Punishments [473 c]; terror theory of 525 b.

Pythagoras 507 e, 525 b.

Question, rhetorical 453 b, 480 b; gives challenge 468 c; has neg. force 471 d; postponed for emphasis 496 c.

Relative, shift to dem. 452 d, 482 b, 507 d; ὅστις after indef. 483 b; as a connective 492 b; clause precedes antecedent 511 e.

Rhadamanthys 523 b.

Right, positive, conventional 482 e.

Sarambus 518 b.

Scolion [451 e].

Shift from rel. to dem. 452 d, 482 b, 507 d; from impersonal to pers. 492 b; from masc. to neut. 448 b, 469 a, 482 b; from indic. to inf. (indir. disc.) 517 d; from inf. to partic. 521 a.

Singular verb after pl. subj. 480 c; of ἄλλος, ἕτερος, τὸς used generically 486 a; for pl. 486 d, 508 b.

Sisyphus 525 e.

Slaves, treatment of sick 514 d.

Socrates’ life principle 469 b; faith in truth 473 b; oaths 449 d, 461 b, 463 d; story of senatorship 473 e; courtesy, 447 c, 462 e; irony 486 d, 487 a, 490 d, 407 c.

Sophists claim wisdom, 527 a.

Soul, three parts 493 a; immoral condition, 525 a; incurable 525 c.

Spartan party at Athens 515 e.

Subject, change of of 464 a; unexpressed 465 c.

Superlative compared, 509 a; with gen. 484 e.

Surgery 456 b; analogous to justice 476 c.

Tacitus quotes 524 e.

Tantalus 525 e.

Thearion 518 b.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENGLISH INDEX.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Themistocles [455 d], 503 c, 516 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theodorus 465 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theogony of Socrates 523 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thessalian soothsayers 513 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tisander 487 c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tityus 525 e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tmesis 506 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understatement[472 a], 473 a, 480 a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verb, intr. with pers. pass. 472 a; compound often metaphorical, 473 c;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>simple follows compound 526 a; omitted 524 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal in mid. sense 507 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voyage, cost of 511 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women, conservatism of 512 e; in theatre 502 d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeugma 471 d, 504 a, 520 b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeuxis 453 e.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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</thead>
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414
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