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THE WORKS OF XENOPHON
THE WORKS OF XENOPHON

TRANSLATED BY

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IN FOUR VOLUMES

VOL. II

HELENICA—BOOKS III-VII, AGESILAUS,
THE POLITIES, AND REVENUES

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This is the second of four companion volumes, in which I have attempted to translate the works of Xenophon. The first, containing Hellenica, Books I. and II. (which practically form the Sequel to Thucydides), together with the Anabasis, was published in 1890. In the present volume will be found the five remaining books of the Hellenica (which constitute the Hellenic History proper), along with four of the minor works commonly attributed to Xenophon: the Agesilaus, the Polity of the Athenians, the Polity of the Lacedaemonians, and the pamphlet on Revenues, otherwise entitled Ways and Means. My next volume should include the Memorabilia (and the probably spurious Apology), the Economist, the Symposium, and the Hiero, together with the three remaining minor works, which treat respectively of the Chase, of the duties of a General of Cavalry, and of the Horse and Horsemanship. The final volume will be devoted exclusively to what we may perhaps regard as our author's opus magnum, the Cyropaedia, or Education of Cyrus (the Great).

In the preface to my former volume I have drawn attention to what, apart from personal deficiencies, would seem to be the main difficulties of representing
the style of Xenophon—that is to say, his thought and diction—in English without travesty or insipidity.

To those general remarks I have little or nothing to add. I would only ask the reader who, for whatever reason, may desire to acquaint himself with the subject matter of this volume, not to father upon the ancient historian and essayist shortcomings due to his modern interpreter.

In the introductory pages preceding the translation I have endeavoured to place the reader in a position to form an independent judgment with regard to the particular problems presented by the historical work rather than to enforce opinions of my own. I have further inserted under the title of Lacunae a list of topics such as might conceivably have been included in a more complete edition of the Hellenica, or in a fuller history of the period by another author. However conjecturally arrived at, such a filling up of apparent gaps could not, I thought, fail to be useful to the student of history. And lastly, I have entered into some discussion concerning each of the minor works in turn, chiefly in connection with the vexed question of their authorship.

The text which I have followed is, as previously stated, that of the editio stereotypa of Gustav Sauppe. The occasional variations are for the most part noted at the bottom of the page. In one particular case, that of the Polity of the Athenians, I have availed myself largely of emendations due to the scholarly sagacity of A. Kirchhoff.

I wish here to express my obligations to the many scholars whose editions and notes have been of help to me. In translating the Hellenica I have derived assistance not only from the well-known editions of
Dindorf, of Breitenbach, and of Büchsenschutz, but from the beautiful modern recension of the work by Otto Keller. I wish also to name the serviceable edition of *Hell.* I.-IV. which Dr. Manatt and his collaborators have published in America. Similarly, in reference to the four minor works, I am under obligation not only to Sauppe's last volume and to Dindorf's *Xenophontis opuscula politica,* but to the separate editions of the *Agesilas* by Breitenbach and R. W. Taylor, to the critical school edition of the *Polity of the Athenians* by Kirchhoff above named, to a commentary on the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* by Ernest Naumann, to a commentary on the *Revenues,* and to the annotated edition of that pamphlet, by A. Zurborg, and lastly to the two volumes, *Analecta Xenophontea* and *Analecta Xenophontea Nova* of J. J. Hartman. I have again to acknowledge my indebtedness to three historians of Greece: Thirlwall, Grote, and Curtius; and to other authors named by me in my former Preface. To this list I must now add three works which throw special light on the period of history with which the reader of my present volume will be concerned. I speak of Dr. E. A. Freeman's *History of Federal Government,* the first volume of *Die Lakedaimonier* of Georg Busolt, and a *Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions* by E. A. Hicks.

For much direct and indirect help I am again deeply indebted to many personal friends. To the Master of Balliol for his sympathetic encouragement and for actual assistance in revising a portion of the *Hellenica*; to Professor Jebb for similar assistance in the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians*; to several old friends and former colleagues at Clifton; to Mr. W. W. Asquith, who carefully read through in proof the five books of
the *Hellenica*; to Mr. S. T. Irwin, who rendered a like service with regard to the *Agesilaus*; to Mr. D. Rintoul, who helped me to a better rendering of various military terms. Lastly, I have availed myself, I trust not too greedily, of the inexhaustible self-sacrificing energy of one of my oldest friends, Mr. J. R. Mozley. Mr. Mozley has, I think, perused every word, whether of translation or of comment, here printed. He has worked in my behalf far harder than many men care to work for themselves. The success, if any, which may be in store for this volume is largely due to him.

I take this opportunity of thanking those readers not personally known to me who have already been good enough to favour my work with their criticism. I hope to profit still further by their opinions, and perhaps to make the two remaining volumes in some degree more worthy of their commendation.

*Haslemere, September 1892.*
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ON THE "Hellenica" OF Xenophon: A FURTHER COMMENT, TOGETHER WITH SOME REMARKS ON THE AUTHOR'S PLACE AMONG THE HISTORIANS OF ATHENS.

I HAVE already in my former volume expressed the opinion that the Hellenica of Xenophon, commonly so called, is a composite whole, consisting of three main portions (here for

1 See Note C to Trans. vol. i. p. lviii. foll. The Hellenica, as we possess it, consists, it will be recollected, of seven books (an arrangement known to Demetrius Magnes, the grammarian friend of Cicero, and dating probably from Alexandrian times). It deals with the contemporary history of Greece during half a century of time from B.C. 411 down to B.C. 362 (or as regards the Pheraean dynasty of Thessaly, to a somewhat later date—359 or 358 B.C. See Hell. VI. iv. 33-37). The first two books (translated in my former volume) include the Sequel to Thucydides (Hell. I.-II. iii. 10) above mentioned, down to the end of the Peloponnesian war and the destruction of the Long Walls of Athens, together with a smaller section (Hell. II. iii. xi to the end of that book), which may be regarded either as an appendix to the Sequel or as introductory to the history of Hellenic affairs (or Hellenic History proper), which the historian set himself to write after his return from Asia in B.C. 394. The portion in question serves to complete the history of Attic affairs from the appointment of the Thirty to the date of the amnesty, B.C. 403. The Anabasis fits in chronologically between Hellenica, Books II. and III. (which is my justification for its position in my former volume). To assist the eye of the reader and make my meaning clearer I repeat the table printed on p. lx. of vol. i.—

Hellenica A= Hell. I. and II. = (1) the Paraleipomena or Sequel to Thucydides, Hell. I.-II. iii. 10; and (2) the Appendix, Hell. II. iii. xi to end of Bk. II., which serves to fill up an important gap between the Paraleipomena and the Hellenic History.

Hellenica B= Hell. III. (or perhaps more correctly II. iii. xi)—V. i. 36.
(b.c. 402 [or more correctly 404] B.C. 387.)

Hellenica C= Hell. V. ii.-VII. v. 27, and a digression on Thessalian affairs to B.C. 359 circa, Hell. VI. iv. 33-37. (b.c. 387-362.)
the purpose of reference named *Hell. A, B, and C*, viz. (1) the *Sequel* to Thucydides, and (2) the *Hellenic History*, which itself falls into two parts distinguishable alike by style and date of composition.

I need not repeat the arguments upon which the above conclusion rests, nor need I emphasise the note of compositeness further; it is a fact, the significance of which will be apparent when we come to estimate the sort of influence likely to be exercised on the mind of the historian by the political changes which he had set himself to chronicle.

Meanwhile it is perhaps important to lay stress upon 'the other side of the matter'—that is to say, the element of unity which underlies the collective work as forming (along with the *Anabasis*) an orderly series of studies in the contemporary history of half a century. As I before remarked,\(^1\) although the *Hellenica* is not, in the strict sense of the word, a single work, yet, for aught we know to the contrary, the author himself (or his earliest editors)\(^2\) may have chosen to link the separate parts together so as to form a whole. Indeed, the absence of 'proems' at the commencement of the several divisions\(^3\) (unless it can be otherwise explained) would seem conclusive on that point. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to suppose that the difficulties (or, as most modern critics would plainly call them, the inherent defects) of one portion of the *Hellenica* differ greatly in kind from those of another. On the contrary, though in the treatment of the several parts I see ample proof of an alteration in the dramatising conception and *motif* of the historian, the peculiarities are persistently the same.

These may be briefly spoken of as a certain unevenness (I will not say disorderliness) in the presentation of the story, whether as regards the chronological sequence of events\(^4\) or

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\(^1\) Vol. i. p. ix.

\(^2\) In furtherance of his intention or as marking their own view.

\(^3\) Or rather at the beginning of *Hell. B* and again of *Hell. C*, since *Hell. A* would naturally run on in continuation of the story left incomplete by Thucydides without any pause for introduction. The difficulty there is rather that the *junctura* of the old work and the new is not smoother. For speculations on which matter see vol. i. p. lxiv. See also Diod. Sic. xiii. 42.

\(^4\) *E.g.* in *Hell. A* as handed down to us there is no note of time assigned to show where the year 24 of the Peloponnesian war ends and the year 25 begins. The modern commentator infers that the spring of B.C. 407 is
as regards the relative proportion assigned to them in the artistic perspective of the picture. A kindred perplexity is the omission of matters which, as far as we at this date are competent judges, were not likely to have escaped the emphatic notice of an historian so painstaking and so honest as Xenophon, but which, for whatever reason, are not found recorded in his narrative as we possess it.

Of these three 'imperfections in workmanship,' the most puzzling perhaps (since it could so easily have been remedied)\(^1\) — and certainly, from the point of view of those critics\(^2\) who

hidden in the narrative somewhere about *Hell.*, I. v. 11 or v. 14. The historian, it would seem, is so taken up with the course of events that he has omitted the date ("ita ut scriptor propter perpetuitatem rerum anni delapsi notam suo loco addere neglexerit," Haackii Diss. ap. L. Dind. *Xen. H. G.*, Ox. MDCCCLIII. p. xlvii.) In *Hell.* B (Hell. III. ii. 21) the words τούτων δὲ πραττομένων ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ὑπὸ Δερκυλίδα, Ἀκεδαιμόνιοι κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πάλαι ὄργιζομενοι τοῖς Ἡλεοῖς . . . have caused considerable ambiguity as to the date of the Eleian war relatively to the affairs in Asia. In *Hell.* C the chronology of the Theban invasions is not clear. Indeed, were it not for a passage in Thucydides (v. 20), one might suppose that the chronological conscience had not fully emerged in the middle of the third century B.C.

In the headline of the page I have inserted the date which, on the whole, I believe to be correct, and in case of grave discrepancies between 'the authorities,' I have drawn attention to the matter in a footnote.

I must here apologise to my readers for some unpardonable chronological misprints, for which I am alone responsible, in the headings of *Hellenica* I. and II. of my former volume. These I hope on an early opportunity to rectify.

\(^1\) To take three or four typical examples: how easy, as it seems to us now, it would have been to have mentioned the name of Pelopidas as one of the half-dozen patriots who took a leading part in the deliverance of Thebes, B.C. 379. Or again the names of Epaminondas, Pelopidas, and Gorgidas in connection with Leuctra, B.C. 371. The addition of half a sentence would have left no doubt concerning the origin and import of the new naval confederacy of B.C. 378 (see Rev. v. 6 as compared with *Hell.* V. iv. 34). A single paragraph would have sufficed to explain the founding of Megalopolis and Messene as direct consequences, the one of Leuctra and the other of the first Theban invasion in the winter of B.C. 370-369. *Apparently* the historian does not trouble himself about matters which all the world is aware of. That his silence is due to a desire to minimise the fame of political opponents seems to me incredible (and except for the great authority of those who have countenanced that explanation in modern times, I would say ridiculous) considering the notoriety of the circumstances at the time.

\(^2\) And amongst these some, if not all, of the greatest modern historians of Greece. Grote, indeed, does not question the honesty of Xenophon, but he regards the historian as tongue-tied (or tongue-loosed) by his strong partiality towards Lacedaemon, which in one passage he describes as "glaring" and "discreditable" (*H. G.* x. 315, note 1). Curtius also speaks of intellectual rather than moral disqualifications in his remarks on *Rhetoric and History*
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suspect the honesty of the historian, the more scandalous—is the omission in places of certain names, now of persons and now of occurrences, which we have come to regard as in the highest sense 'historical.'

But to others—who admit the puzzle whilst they repudiate the dishonesty—it may well appear that the want of proportion which they seem to be aware of in the handling of the topics presents the greater difficulty, since it would seem to imply a serious defect of art in the work of an artist.

Such, on the assumption that the work has been transmitted to us in nearly the same condition (apart from the ordinary corruptions to which all ancient texts are liable) as that in which it left the author's hands—such, I say, are the difficulties. How are they to be explained? Largely perhaps by circumstances over which the historian had little or no control. I refer to such accidents as the time and place at which

(bk. vii. ch. ii.), as if Xenophon, "in undertaking to continue Thucydides, had assumed a task far beyond his powers." "At the beginning of the work the influence of his predecessor is still observable as sustaining him; but this only makes it all the more apparent, in the course of his Hellenic History, how he lacks independence of judgment, freedom of view, and intellectual force" (vol. v. 175, Eng. tr.). Thirlwall, however (who like Niebuhr regards the historian as 'a bad citizen'), has a poor opinion also of his honesty; see his valedictory note at the end of ch. xl. (v. 152). And this is the verdict also of Professor Freeman; see his essay, The Historians of Athens, p. 95 and passim. This essay is well worth studying, if only for the delightful criticism it contains of Herodotus. In his praise of Thucydides ουρίκαιος συνηγραφός seems to me to come much nearer the truth of things than in his dispraise of Xenophon. The latter is too distinctly used as a foil to set off the virtues of the former. Indeed, as far as the inferior historian of the three is concerned, περί τῆς κακογραφίας τοῦ Ἑνοφῶντος might have been the title of the essay.

1 See 'Lacunae,' p. xli. foll. below.

2 As arguing either an absolute deficiency of technical skill, or an extraordinary want of finish in the work of art; whereby (if for the profit of others I may venture to analyse my own condition of mind) I find myself in a strange quandary: since clearly to my perception the technical defect is there; and yet the historian, as I am well aware, was pre-eminently an artistic writer (the testimony of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, as cited in my former vol. p. xxvi. foll., seems to me conclusive on that point). Who then am I that I should criticise this master of style on matters which concern his own department? How to escape from this dilemma is not clear immediately. As instances of what offends my sense of proportion I would mention (1) the amount of detail bestowed on Asiatic relatively to Home affairs in Hell. B (Bks. III. and IV. throughout); (2) the space allotted to 'speechifying' in the Assembly at Athens during and after the first Theban invasion, as contrasted with the
he collected his materials—and not as concerning the collection merely, but the sorting and sifting of them; to which must be added the author's whole method of composition, so far as it was influenced by external surroundings; the manner—not improbably haphazard—in which the writings obtained publication; and, as affecting each part of the work in turn conceivably, the amount of time and attention allowed him for the final touches.

Unfortunately (unlike his great predecessor in this as in other more important respects) Xenophon has told us nothing directly as to his motives or his methods. Concerning the surroundings of his life, his opportunities or lack of opportunity, as an exile, to perfect his history, we are left to our own conjectures. We do not know from his own lips what pains he took to make a careful record of personal

marked silence meanwhile concerning the action military and diplomatic of the invader at the seat of war in Heil, C (in Bks. VI. v. and VII.) ; (3) the insertion (as if it were a special point of duty incumbent on the historian) of the whole episode concerning the little state of Philus (Bk. VII. ii.), and similarly concerning the Tagoi of Phrae (VI. iv.), when so much of equal or greater interest concerning other little states and other extra-Peloponnesian affairs is either omitted altogether or hinted at vaguely in a chance parenthesis. Such a procedure strongly suggests to the reader's mind a method of composition which allowed an alteration of scale in the subjects treated of by the historian, and that too perhaps without his own observation. What this might be (on the supposition that our version of the Hellenica is not very different from the original work as it left the author's hands in B.C. 355 or thereabouts) will have to be considered. Meanwhile it is not surprising that many modern critics have seen in our version a mere epitome of the original work; since (if only there were sufficient proof to establish it) such a theory would readily explain the ἀνωμαλία complained of.

1 See the well-known passages in Thucydides, where the historian in the first place explains his motive for writing the history of the war (i. 1), and the great pains taken by him to ascertain the truth about events (i. 22), and concerning his system of chronology by summers and winters (v. 20), and the autobiographic passage in reference to his exile and the chance so given him "to watch quietly the course of events" and hear both sides (v. 26). The explicitness of Thucydides in these personal matters we may be sure is a sign, not of vanity of any sort, but of conscientiousness; the reader ought to be furnished with such information that he may know what manner of history he is reading. Xenophon, whose transparency of character reveals itself at every turn, is, as I keep on insisting, unduly secretive concerning private matters, partly I think because he fails to put himself at the reader's point of view, but also perhaps in obedience to some theory or instinct of history-writing which would exclude such topics as irrelevant — φωνάντα συνετοίς would seem, at times, to have been his motto.
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observations,¹ or failing these to institute a comparison between the reports of others with a view to eliciting the truth.

I am far from suggesting that because the historian has taken us so little into his confidence he was therefore careless about the most rudimentary rules of his profession. From what we know of him, we should certainly suspect the opposite.

His reticence, here and elsewhere, may be allied to shrewdness of mind (ἀγχώνως), as if to be more outspoken were impractical; or it may argue some lack of sympathy or imagination (ἀγνωστήνη), as if what is clear enough to his simple mind must needs be obvious to the intelligence of others; or in the case of deeper matters (as I have before suggested ²) it may be the result of some division of the soul (διψυχία). But whatever the cause was, of this at least we may be certain. This pupil of Socrates, Xenophon, was fully alive to the necessity of careful pains and accuracy (ἐπιμέλεια) as a sine qua non of success in every undertaking, so that if he sinned at all in these respects, it was with his eyes open. But that he so sinned at all is just the one explanation which it would be hardest to accept, partly as being opposed to the general impression of good faith which his works produce, and partly because in the opinion of the ancient world his honesty was unimpeachable.

And so we come to the latter part of this discussion, in which, with a view to stimulate inquiry rather than to state an opinion dogmatically, I have put together some loose remarks

¹ ἀπόστασις, technically so called. That Xenophon's material was collected ἀπόστασις to a great extent is obvious (see Sketch). All I mean to say is that he does not make any direct allusion to his methods.

² See Sketch of Life, vol. i. p. xcii.: Xenophon "was (to use an epithet of his own) to some extent dipsyche and the cherisher of incompatible desires." I was there speaking of his personal ambitions; but in the larger sphere of Politics and History there was, we suspect, in his mind a similar clash of contradictory views and aspirations which kept his judgment in abeyance and his tongue tied. If he had found voice at all at times, it would have been to exclaim with the poet—

Βοῦς μοι ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ κρατερῷ ποδὶ λαξ ἐπίβαλλων
Τόξει κωτλίλεων καλερ ἐπιστάμενον.—Theog. 815;

for which aphasia see below. For his views as to ἐπιμέλεια, see Mem., Cyrop., Econ., passim.
CONCERNING THE POSITION WHICH XENOPHON MAY CLAIM TO HOLD AMONG THE HISTORIANS OF ATHENS

The first and most obvious point to be noted in any attempt to gauge the merits of the historian is the marked divergence of opinion which would appear to subsist between the ancients and ourselves concerning him. Their estimate, it is scarcely too much to say, is without exception laudatory. Ours, if not wholly depreciatory, is qualified with censure and disapproval. The verdict, moreover, of the most famous modern historians of Greece is without exception adverse. Xenophon, according to one of the greatest of these authorities, is not only unworthy to rank with Herodotus and Thucydides, but is altogether an inferior historian. And that too would seem to be the popular opinion of the moment. It is with diffidence, therefore, that I venture to restate the matter concerning Xenophon's position as it strikes myself.

I am well aware of the difficulties which beset the inquiry. The problems already referred to, concerning the composition and publication of the work or works originally, together with the whole subsequent history of the text, are sufficiently indeterminate to warrant a suspense of judgment. That they will one day find their solution in the discovery of some fragment of an earlier and fuller Hellenica, is a delightful hope, too

1 I chose this title out of respect for the name (and now, alas! I must add, the memory) of the great historian, to whose severe judgment of Xenophon I have already referred—Dr. Edward A. Freeman.

2 The criticisms, if unfavourable, concern manner not matter. See, for instance, what Dion. Hal. has to say on the former head (Ep. ad Cn. Pomph. etc. See vol. i. p. xxxv. foll.). Another late writer speaks of the λογος χαρακτήρ of Xenophon, which may or may not be a compliment. The remarkable thing is that not a single writer, great or small, finds any sort of fault with Xenophon on the score of partiality or deflection from the strict path of truth and honesty. It seems to be a foregone conclusion that of course he is honest. And yet even so great a writer as Herodotus is attacked on that very ground. See the well-known tract περὶ κακογράφειας τοῦ Ἡροδότου.

3 See note 2, above, p. xiii., for 'the consensus of experts': since Niebuhr, the weightiest published opinion is clearly adverse to Xenophon's fame as an absolutely honest historian. On the other hand, I believe it would be impossible to quote from the ancient world a single adverse criticism of Xenophon qua δίκαιος συγγραφέας.
visionary to rest upon. Meanwhile I am disposed to think that the merits of the work, as we possess it, would suffice in part to explain the admiring attitude of former ages, and that the demerits by the same showing do not suffice to justify the modern depreciation. Has not the Hellenica after all a quality and distinction, not of manner alone or chiefly, but of manner and matter combined, which would seem to justify the old opinion, according to which Xenophon was worthy in some special sense to rank with his two predecessors, and was certainly habitually spoken of in the same breath with them—Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon?¹

It may be urged that the very collocation of the names is suggestive of greatness on the decline. What is true of the drama (of sculpture and of painting also, doubtless) at that period, and of its evolution as represented by Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, may also be true of history, or history of a certain type, as represented by Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon. In the Hellenica of Xenophon, I admit, what strikes us most is the immense falling-off from Thucydides—a falling-off in dignity and depth of art and philosophy, in matter and manner alike. But then Thucydides, like Sophocles or Phidias, stands alone. The comparison is in one sense too severe; that it was tenable at all, instructive. The ancients in any case, who were in a better position than we to judge, saw no absurdity in drawing it. What they were most aware of was the line of demarcation which separated the three historians from the rest of the world, their contemporaries or successors. So again the evolitional connection between Xenophon and the rhetorical school of history, as represented by Ephorus and Theopompus, to us is manifest; indeed, in some ways (though it is hard to judge from fragments and the criticisms of later writers only), Xenophon may seem closer to the Isocratids than to Thucydides. Yet to the earlier critics the other side of the matter was the more striking. And so we come back to what we started from: the opposition between the ancient and the modern estimate of Xenophon. It is a great misfortune on every ground that the works of Xenophon's contempor-

¹ I refer in particular to the two greatest ancient critics, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Lucian.
aries¹ and immediate successors have not been preserved. If we
had those of Ctesias and Philistus, of Ephorus and Theopompus,
of Clidemus and Callisthenes, etc., some or all of whom ob-
viously had great merits as historians, we should be in a better
position to form a judgment. As it is, we must accept the
fact that in the opinion of antiquity, as far as we can discover,
none of them possessed that special title to rank with Herodo-
tus and Thucydides which was allowed to Xenophon.

This statement of the case, however, is only broadly correct.
It needs qualification in two directions. In the first place, when
it is said that Xenophon as an historian was highly thought of by
the ancients, it must be recollected that some of them looked
upon the Cyropaedia as an 'historical' work² (which probably
shows at once a marked distinction between their views of what
constitutes history and ours), whereas the modern condemnation
is chiefly directed against the defective qualities of the Hellenica.
The Cyropaedia no one would think of criticising as a work of
history; and as to the Anabasis, though no doubt it has been,
and on quite rational grounds may be, criticised adversely as
'unhistorical,' yet there is no 'consensus of experts' against
it; but, on the whole, its great qualities, whether as the vera
narratio of a particular historical episode, or as a literary
composition pure and simple, are probably as highly rated by
us as they were by the ancients themselves.

In the second place, it may be maintained that the criticism
of antiquity in general is wont to refer to the style and manner
rather than to the substance and matter of any particular writ-
ing under consideration, whereas in the case of the Hellenica,

Philistus (B.C. 406), the Sicilian. See Grote, xi. 139; Freeman, Hist.
of Sicily, iii. 597 foll.

Ephorus (B.C. 340) of Cyme
Theopompus (B.C. 360)¹

Clidemus, cot. of Isocrates and
de Glor. Ath. ii. 345.
Callisthenes of Stageirus (B.C. 336-323), who accompanied Alexander to
the east. See Polybius, Hist. iv. 32, vi. 43, xii. 8; de V. et V. xii.

INTRODUCTION

at any rate, it is distinctly from the point of view of history and not of literature that the modern objections are raised.

What we are entitled to say is that the favourable opinion of the older critics must, in default of any evidence to the contrary, be held to have been based on their study of the works as a whole; but within the range of their consideration were included, doubtless, the Sequel and the Hellenic History. This in reference to the first point; and in reference to the second,

1 The earliest direct reference to the historical works of Xenophon is, I think, that of Theopompus, who quotes a passage from Hell. IV. i. 33 (see p. 45, note i). It is a question whether Ephorus also was acquainted with Xenophon's work.

The next and a more important witness is Polybius (b. c. 207, fl. B.C. 160), who was almost certainly well acquainted with the Cyropaedia, and who makes three separate allusions to Xenophon—(1) as to the importance of the march of the Ten thousand, ἡ τῶν μετὰ Ξενοφώτος Ἐλλήνων ἐκ τῶν ἀνω σαταναπείδων ἑπάνω, ἐν ἡ πάσαι την Ἀσίαν διαπορευομένων αὐτῶν, πολεμίων ὑπάρχουσαν, οὐδεὶς ἑτόλια μένει, κατὰ πρὸς ὑπόν τῶν βαρβάρων, as the first cause of the conquest of Persia by Alexander, the second being the abortive project of Agesilaus (as described in Hell. IV.), which Polybius does not indeed actually quote, but probably, I think, refers to: δεύτερα δὲ, Λακεδαίμων βασιλέως Ἀγαμήλαος, διάβασις εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ἐν ἡ ἐκείνος οὐδὲν ἀξίχρεως οὐδὲ ἀντίπαλον εὑρὼν ταῖς σφετέραις ἐπιβολαὶ ἀπρακτὸς ἡμαγκάσθη διὰ τὰς μεταξὺ περὶ τὴν Ἐλλάδα ταραχὰς ἐπανελθεῖν, ἐξ ὧν Φίλιππος κατανυσίζει, κ.τ.λ. (Hist. iii. 6); (x) as a learned historian (in a passage which I shall have occasion to notice in reference to the genuineness of the Pol. Lac.), τῶς οἱ λογισται τῶν ἀρχαίων συγγραφέων Ἐφορος, Ξενοφῶν, Καλλισθένης, καὶ Πλάτων... (concerning the Cretan constitution), πρῶτον μὲν ἄμοιλαν εὖνα φαι καὶ τὴν αὐτήν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων... δεύτερον δὲ ἐπαινετῆνυ ὑπάρχουσαν ἀποφαλλωσιν (Hist. vi. 43); and (3) to the phrase ἐργασηίρων πολέμου in Hell. III. iv. p. 29 below, "the workshop of war", which Polybius applies himself to Carthago Nova in b. c. 209 (Hist. x. 20). But the value of Polybius's testimony, as I hope to show, is weightier than might appear from these passages and others, such as Hist. iv. 33, vi. 4x, viii. 1, and ix. 8 in reference to Epaminondas, which may or may not imply a thorough acquaintance with the Hellenica. (See below.)

We next come to Cicero (55 B.C.) The great passage is de Or. II. xiv. 53, in which occurs an interesting discussion in answer to the question, "qualis oratoris et quanti hominis in dicendo putas esse historiam scribere?" and a comparison of the Roman and Greek methods, with criticisms of different historians: "Denique etiam a philosophia profectus princeps Xenophon Socraticus ille, post ab Aristotele Callisthenes, comes Alexandri, scripsit historiam et hic quidem rhetorico paene more; ille autem superior leniore quodam sono est usus, et qui illum impetum oratoris non habeat, vehemens fortasse minus, sed aliquanto tamen est, ut mihi quidem videtur, dulcior." This criticism, doubtless, chiefly concerns manner, but we may be sure that Cicero had also an eye to matter.

With it should be compared that of Quintilian, who, in his list of the best
we must say that though the ancients set greater store by style than we do, and were more ready perhaps than we to quarrel with the subject matter of the historian on account of defects of manner, yet there is no reason to suppose that they were likelier than ourselves to overlook the more essential deficiencies in connection with the treatment of the narrative itself.

Such is a common-sense conclusion. But we are not left to mere speculation on this point. The fact that three writers

writers, de Inst. Or. x. 509, on the subject of 'Historians,' names Thucydides, Herodotus, Theopompus, Philistus, Ephorus, Clitarchus, Timagenes, and then, with a sort of apology for having not earlier named him, says: "Xenophon non excitet mihi, sed inter philosophos reddendus est." Quintilian's date is 100 A.D., and in order to place him next to Cicero I have omitted Diodorus Sic. (fl. 44 B.C.).

What Diodorus says is short, but to the point: 'Ἡρόδotos δὲ ὁ πολυτράγων, εἶ καὶ τις ἄλλος, γεγονός καὶ πολλῆς ἡσορίας ἐπετειρος ἐπικεχέρωκε μὲν περὶ τούτων (the sources of the Nile) ἀποδιδὼν λόγον, ἥκολουθηκὼς δὲ ἀντιλεγομένως ὄπωνολας οὐδεικατει: Ἴενοφῶν δὲ καὶ Θαυκυδίδης, ἐπαινοῦμενοι κατὰ τὴν ἀληθείαν τῶν ἡσορίων, ἀπέχοντο τελείως κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν τῶν τοῦπ τῶν κατ' Ἀλγυπτόν, οὐ δὲ περὶ τῶν "Εφορον καὶ Θεοτόμπον μάλιστα πάντων εἰς ταύτα ἐπιστάντες ἥκετα τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπέτυχον. καὶ διεφθάρησαν οὕτω πάντες οὐ διὰ τὴν ἀμέλειαν ἄλλα διὰ τὴν τῆς χώρας ἰδιότητα (i. 37).

Plutarch (80 A.D.) is a witness whose testimony, like that of Polybius, has a weight beyond that of his actual references, though these are numberless, and not one of them suggests in the slightest degree that Plutarch doubted Xenophon's truthfulness. (See below.)

Of Dio Chrysostom (fl. 100 A.D.) and Arrian (fl. 124 A.D.) I have spoken in my former volume (p. xxvi. foll.).

Pausanias (138-161 A.D.) testifies to (Hell. C as I call it) the Hellenic History so far as it concerns the struggle for the hegemony, in a passage already referred to: συνέγραφαν δὲ ὄλλοι τε καὶ Ξενοφῶν τῶν πάντων πλεον, καταληψιν τῆς Καίδειας (b.c. 383) καὶ τὸ πατίσμα Δακεδαιμονίων τὸ ἐν Δέκτρω (b.c. 371), καὶ ὡς ἐν Πελοπόννησον εσεβαλὼν Βωστάλ (b.c. 370-369) καὶ τὴν συμμαχιν Λακεδαιμονίων τὴν παρὰ Ἀθηναίων ἐλθοῦσαν (b.c. 362), i. 3. 4.

The last three witnesses whom I need cite 'flourished' in the reign of Marcus Antoninus (160 A.D. circa). They are: Lucian, whose essay on the Right Method of the Historian is full of criticism of a high order. He makes pointed allusion to Xenophon and illustrates from his methods, and all without a suggestion of fault-finding with him as an offender against the canons which he is engaged in laying down. (See below.) Polyaenus, the collector of military anecdotes, στρατηγήματα, which he derived from all sorts of sources, Xenophon's Hellenica and Anabasis included. Hermogenes, the celebrated rhetorician, who somewhere draws this comparison: περὶ δὲ Θεοτόμπου καὶ 'Εφορον καὶ Ἐλλανίκου καὶ Φίλιστου καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων τοῦτοι περιττῶν ἐδοξεὶ μοι γράφειν, καὶ διὶ ζῆλου καὶ μιμήσεως τὰ εἴη τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν οὐ πάνυ τι μᾶλλον δὲ οὕτω διὰ γε ἡγομένως ἠλέλυται παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλληνικαθάπερ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ Θαυκυδίδου, Ἡροδότου, Ἐκαταλού, Ξενοφῶντος (ap. Sprengel, ii. 424).
so different from one another, and yet so able in their several departments—and, I will add, so conscientious and painstaking—as Polybius the historian, Plutarch the biographer and moralist, and Lucian the critic, humorist, and essayist, all concur in speaking well (or by an eloquent silence implying well) of Xenophon's historical writings, seems to me decisive. Whether or not they had the same (or a fuller) text before them may certainly be an open question, but that the judgment of antiquity, finding voice in these three, has declared in favour of Xenophon as an honest and impartial historian, worthy to rank with Herodotus and Thucydides, I consider obvious.

If this is admitted, it still remains for us to discover some reasonable grounds for their appreciation by a study of the Hellenica itself. Considering the nature of the task which he had undertaken, does it appear that the historian was true to himself and to the standard which the age demanded?

The scope of the undertaking might be defined, in the language of Isocrates,¹ as "an attempt to compile a history of events exhibited (chiefly) in wars," between B.C. 411 and B.C. 362. It might have been entitled a series of studies in contemporary history. As to the incidents which form its subject matter, they happened, some of them, before the writer's own eyes, and the rest he would either learn from those who had seen them, or else he must make conjecture of them, and reconstruct them according to his idea of probability. He had a plain duty to record them as truthfully and honestly as possible, since, as Polybius puts it, "neither fear nor favour must tempt him to waver for a moment in his allegiance to truth;" or as Lucian says, "Impartiality! that is the one true characteristic of history. He who sets out to write history has but one goddess to whom he must do sacrifice—the goddess Truth. All things and persons else he must disregard." Such, with regard to moral fitness, was the standard required in the ancient world; and such it remains to-day.²

¹ τὰς πράξεις τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις, Isocr. Antid. 319.
² Only it is to be recollected that many topics which would be appropriate enough and indeed expected in a modern history might fairly well be excluded (and were by Thucydides himself) in a history of events occurring chiefly in wars. The details of the Arcadian confederation as a form of polity which would interest us so much would be fairly excluded, but not, I think, certain statements
As regards intellectual fitness, the historian must possess two crowning virtues—the one a gift of nature and the other to be acquired only by long practice: to wit, political intelligence, the insight of a statesman, and a capacity for the artistic presentation of the truth. And here again I do not know that we can improve on the antique definition of the true historian.

Does the Hellenica satisfy this standard? That is a question which every reader must answer for himself. For my own part, I am disposed to believe that the ancients were justified in that high opinion of Xenophon with which I credit them, and which made the collocation of the three names, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, sound specially suitable to their ears. And with regard to the modern estimate, it presses, as I think, unduly hard on Xenophon for two reasons—partly from his juxtaposition to Thucydides, and partly owing to a misunderstanding as to the nature itself of the Hellenica. That, if I am right, is a single work only in the general sense already noted, but, for the purpose of examining into the historian’s qualifications, it ought rather to be regarded as a series of separate if closely interconnected studies in contemporary history, the design, method, and manner of each composition varying with the political point of view of the historian at different periods of his long life, but never dishonestly or disingenuously. In what way this may have been the case I will presently explain.

But as to relative inadequacies: that Xenophon was certainly not a historian of the high Thucydidean type is too obvious to need further comment. He had neither the statesmanlike comprehension nor the interpretative power of Thucydides, neither his faculty for philosophic generalisation nor his spiritual detachment, nor yet again his supreme artistic skill, that power of presentation which (in spite of some obscurity of diction) makes his history of the Peloponnesian war, in a sense deeper than he dreamed of, an eternal possession. But to Xenophon belong great qualities of his own. If he is not a philosopher, he of fact (see list of lacunae below), the omission of which at the moment (or altogether) is a great puzzle, but from my point of view a puzzle not explained by "partisanship."  

1 πολιτική σύνεσις and ἐρμηνευτικὴ δύναμις.

2 Or perhaps on that very account also, considering the tonic effect produced on the reader ‘working at his history in the rough-hewn sentences of his own tongue.” The words are Dr. Freeman’s (Methods, p. 171).
is a sensible man with a sober-minded and indeed high-minded theory as to the orderly arrangement of the moral world; he is aware of the gods at every turn and yet not superstitious; he is incapable of taking a vulgar or cynical view of the course of events; he has the gifts of lucidity, transparency, intelligibility, and a popular style; he is shrewd himself, and is apt to expect or assume sharpness of wits on the part of his listeners; and hence a certain touch of obscurity when he does not trouble himself to explain what of course every one knows, or with a little reflection might easily arrive at the truth of. And, from another side, it is noticeable that the main thread of his narrative is artistically woven. It may be felt that the whole work from beginning to end, or (which I think would be more correct) that certain portions of it, may best be described in Lucian's phrase as σῶμα ἀκάλλης ἔτι καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτον, a skeleton devoid of beauty as yet and inarticulate; but if so, there it lies ready to be clothed upon with life by a touch of the creator's hand. To these subjective qualities of the historian must be added an accidental one (though it was no accident indeed which, fortunately, induced him to write his history, whatever we think of it), the objective qualification of being a contemporary witness.

But what are we to say to those omissions and reticences which, under the head of artistic (or inartistic) proportion, I have above referred to and below tabulated? Three or four possible explanations suggest themselves.

(1) There is the 'epitome' theory, so often spoken of, according to which our Hellenica is not the original work, or rather it is that work in an epitomised form, the mere skele-

1 See Thirlwall's conspectus of the period (Hell. B and C), analytical and chronological, chaps. xxxv.-xl. of his history. Except for 'flesh and blood' lacunae, the skeleton is all or nearly all there, and on one not extravagant hypothesis the flesh itself was once there. How little do the lacunae even now impair the general aperçu. Indeed it is fair to speak of the work as a living organism; and if any one chooses to say that it is an organism that has not been fashioned into mature beauty and articulate structure, we might admit this without denying the intrinsically vital touch of the author's hand.

2 See what Grote says so well and kindly on this head, x. 371, note 1.

3 See Trans. vol. i. p. lxiv. note 3. The only advocate of this theory whose views I am acquainted with at first hand is the Greek scholar A. Kunstaraos, who stated his thesis, thus: Tά Ἑλληνικά δὲν εἶναι συγγραφή τοῦ
ton in part (to use Lucian's simile in an inverted shape) of a far grander work, from which the flesh and blood has been ruthlessly torn by the epitomist and its beauty marred. This theory, though it has the support of able critics, I cannot accept. It is, I think, fatal to it that the epitomist, who must have done his work not earlier probably than the second century of our era, should exhibit so much animus in the application of his scissors. It is also almost incredible that the epitome should have driven the original work out of the field altogether. Theopompus, we know, made an epitome of Herodotus, but the real work has survived whilst the epitome has perished, which is not surprising. But as the theory has gained little acceptance since it was first put forward, I will not discuss it further.

(2) The second theory is, to my mind, at once more probable and less audacious. I wish that it could be proved to be the true one, as might happen, through the discovery of some manuscript. Those who hold it account for the incompleteness of our Hellenica on the supposition that large fragments of the original were at some time lost, so that what we now have is not the very image, but a mere stump or torso of the work itself.

Or again (3), it may be supposed that the work was never finished, and that the text before us is, in part, an outline. This is that theory of the immature and structurally imperfect organism above suggested, and as I hold to it somewhat myself, I will state what I think has happened. If I may make conjecture, the historian's manner of composing was on this wise. He took notes at the time as an eye-witness when he had the chance, or else from hearsay, which notes he from time to 

Ενοφώντος ἀλλ' ἐπιτομή, γενομένη μετὰ Χριστῶν καὶ τιθανός ύπο Χριστιανοῦ. It is not essential to the theory, of course, that the epitomist was a Christian; but that it was a work done not earlier than the second century of our era is essential to it, since Plutarch is supposed to have been acquainted with the original, and we cannot infer from what Diogenes Laertius tells us as to the canon that it existed even then (200 A.D. circa). The same view has been held in a modified form by Dittrich-Fabricius and Grosser. See, for an elaborate criticism of it, a pamphlet, Besitzen wir Xenophon's Hellenische Geschichten nur in Ausszuge? by J. Haenel, Breslau, 1872; also G. Sauppe, Praef. Hist. Gr. p. xi.; Roquette, de Xen. Vit. p. 61. Though I do not see my way to accepting Kuprianos's views, I wish to say that the little work in which he published them is full of suggestion and interest. See Karl Schenkl, Chrestomathie aus Xen., Einleitung, p. xiii.
time worked up, some immediately and others after long intervals. In this way a large portion of his history was composed currente calamo; other portions were elaborated with a greater or less prolixity according to some instinct of the artist and historian after mature, or it may be over-mature, reflection; 1 others again were put aside, for whatever cause, and never finished. That quality, which I have spoken of above as an unevenness, ἀνωμαλία, distinguishing each section of his

1 I here insert—

A NOTE ON THE HISTORIAN’S PROBABLE METHOD, ETC.

_Hellen._ A.—The _Sequel._

_Design._—To finish Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian war, which he carried out, but through force of circumstances incompletely (see Sketch of Life).

‘Motif’ or subject—Given. The final rounds of the Great Duel; and the year of ‘anarchy.

_Materials._—(1) Possibly furnished partly by Thucydides’s executors (?); (2) chiefly obtained at first hand (ἀυτοπηγή), as he was an eye-witness of a good deal, we may suppose, but (if he was a captive in Boeotia, according to an old story, or for whatever reason) not throughout. Also there is a possible βοῦς ἐπὶ γλῶσση, he is perhaps already somewhat tongue-tied. Anyhow the _Sequel_ is incomplete.

It led to _Hellenica B_ because the history of the year of ‘anarchy’ which completes the Peloponnesian war (θρηκτὸς ἀθλίων κακῶν) is also introductory to the new

_Design._—(‘To-morrow to fresh fields’)—To write a history (or current notes with a view to a history) of _Hellenic Affairs._

‘Motif’ or theme being—(a) The Pan-Hellenic _Anabasis_ and _Conquest of Persia_ (Agesilaus is the semi-divine leader, the ‘archic’ man).

(β) Thwarted and transmuted into a military and diplomatic struggle for the hegemony between _Lacedaemon_ and the _Allied Powers_, ending triumphantly for Sparta in the _Peace of Antalcidas._

_Materials._—Collected autotopically for (a) entirely almost, and hence (?) fullness of detail amounting to prolixity in part, e.g. Asiatic affairs (the scale is not maintained); and for (β) partly, and partly by hearing the testimony, possibly one-sided, of people at Olympia, etc., in the neighbourhood of Scillus. _Hellen._ B is more complete (see lacunae) than either A or C (the βοῦς ἐπὶ γλῶσση is less than anywhere, yet it is there).

It led to _Hellenica C_, the completion of the story, because the Peace of Antalcidas, which marked the zenith of Lacedaemonian domination, is also the birthday (nīdis, origin, fostering cause) of Spartan "Τῆβης—" since, when desire
work, might perhaps be accounted for by such a method of composition.

If it could be proved as an absolute certainty that the *Hellenica* as we now possess it is not only in the actual condition in which it left the author's hands, but as fully finished as he would have wished to make it—and as some portions of it (*e.g.* the very last chapter) most likely are—I should still maintain that the charge of dishonesty is not proven; I should has established its sway within, then comes *excess*" (see Plat. *Phaedr.* 238 Α), with its consequent *Nέμεοι*—*διπέρδικοι νέμεοι* (see Pind. *Pyth.* x. 61), vengeance extreme to mark what is done amiss; beginning with the recovery of the Cadmeia (B.C. 379), and then Leuctra (B.C. 371), and the loss of Messenia (B.C. 370-369), shock upon shock.

'Motifs' or themes being—(a) Spartan "Τθρος . . . divine Νέμεοι, which theme is transmuted into

Dipsychia strongly marked.

(β) The life-and-death struggle of Sparta and Thebes.

*Materials*—Collected after 371, chiefly at Corinth. (The historian has intimate relations with the Laconising families at Philus, we suspect. He uses Procles as a *persona* under which to give out his own political views, much as he uses Callistratus, hence the disproportionate probability of the speeches to action, B.C. 370-369. The scale again not maintained consistently.)

As to the *διψυχia* of Xenophon, the condition of mind may be analysed as a compound of views and emotions, the most pronounced of which are—

1. His religious view of the fortunes of men and states.

2. His belief in the *archic* principle. He is always meditating this; friends and foes alike are laid under contribution—Cyrus the younger, Agesilaus, Teleutias, Jason, Epaminondas, in turn; and would fain make discovery of it in (1) Lacedaemon as a state, (2) Agesilaus as a semi-divine man.

3. His political partisanships 

   \[
   \begin{align*}
   \text{philo-Laonian.} \\
   \text{miso-Theban.}
   \end{align*}
   \]

   Recognition of the *βέλτιστοι* Ignoring of the *δημος* (except that he admires the *ευτάξια* of the Athenian Demos)

4. His moral partisanships in favour of those who behave righteously, against those who do *ἀνθρωπία*. His disillusionment finds an anodyne in the recognition of the ways and hand of Providence, whose guidance he willingly accepts, for that is the deepest thing in him, subservience to the will of heaven—σωφροσύνη περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

*ἀποτολα*. How did he come to see certain individuals so large and with such detail, and certain others, truly their equals, so dimly, as if through a dwarfing medium—Jason (or Agesilaus) on the one hand, and Epaminondas on the other? or, again, compare his treatment of Teleutias and Pelopidas, whose deaths so markedly resembled each other.
fall back upon what at times seems to me a not improbable explanation of more than half the difficulty. This last theory implies that the historian, however worthy or unworthy to rank with Herodotus and Thucydides, composed his histories under limitations; some of which he did not even suspect the existence of, whilst others he consciously imposed upon himself with full volition.

At this point it is only fair to offer an apology not for the historian but for the man. Xenophon the ὁγγραφεύς, the compiler of histories, is only a portion of the whole man, who, to use a simile of his own, is a kind of pentathlete; and the Hellenica, which in some part is ex hypothesi imperfect, is only a portion of his ὁγγράμματα, his compilations. The Anabasis is at least a work of genius, and there are the several partly historical minor works translated in this volume. Besides which, a large portion of the historian’s energy was expending itself, even whilst he collected the material and elaborated the notes of his more matter-of-fact histories, upon questions half historical and half speculative concerning the real prince and ideal forms of education and government. Possibly the Cyropaedia, the Hiero, and the Economist each in turn or simultaneously drew off some of the sap which might have gone to give a greater fulness and vigour of body to the Hellenica. And then there were all the rest of his works. It is a question, I think, whether even Thucydides himself would have made his work so supremely good had he had, to use a common phrase, so many irons in the fire. It is a further question, what sort of history even Thucydides himself would have made of a period so complex and so devoid of unity as that which it was the lot of Xenophon to chronicle. It may certainly be retorted, “And the moral surely is that a man of Xenophon’s mental type should not have undertaken to write the Hellenica at all!” To which the counter-retort may be given, “And what a loss to the world would that self-abnegation have involved!” But I have no desire to apologise for the supposed shortcomings of Xenophon further. It is more important to try to analyse his procedure when writing the history of his times.

As to unconscious limitations: his vision may certainly to
some extent have been troubled (as Schenkl, I think, suggests) by his belief in the greatness of Agesilaus,¹ a belief genuine and well argued, and all the more blinding therefore; or again (until he was gradually disenchanted), by the conservative grandeur and stability of Lacedaemon. His philo-laconism is obvious.²

If, then, his reverence for Agesilaus or his zeal for Sparta was such that he could not bear to speak of adversaries and the adversities of his party (ἐνάντιοι and ἐναντιῶτα), he not only was, but should certainly have known that he was, disqualified to treat of the period. He must in that case have suffered, I admit, from the cacoethes scribendi, if not from the veritable κακοθεία, of which he has been accused; and deserves the condemnation pronounced upon the man whose sole title to write history is a fluent pen.³ At any rate he had better have held his tongue. But perhaps he argued thus with himself: I know and can make others know the main thread of these occurrences, and in spite of personal feelings will honestly do so. In that case he was justified in prosecuting the work.

Again he would be disqualified (but could hardly have discovered the fact, or been expected to know it) if his want of detachment from the politics of the time made him colour-blind or purblind. But perhaps he was aware in his own heart of a

¹ That Agesilaus was apprehended by his own generation as the greatest personage, greater, as was commonly supposed, than Epaminondas, may, I think, be considered certain. See Theopompus apud Plut. Ages. 10, καὶ μέγιστος μὲν ἦν ὁμολογουμένως, καὶ τῶν τότε ἠμαρτων ἐπιφανεστάτος, ὦς εἰρήκε ποιν καὶ θεόπομπος, though τότε may perhaps refer to the particular date at which he was appointed admiral or general, not to the whole period of his life (see Clough, iv. 12).

² Though Grote and others have applied the theory, as I think, too rigidly, and to the detriment of Xenophon, whose view is frequently far more detached and impartial than prima facie appears. If it were the right moment, I should like to go through Grote's strictures point by point, and that is a process which I recommend every youthful student of this period to undertake for himself. He will come, I feel sure, to think not less highly of Grote, but more charitably towards Xenophon.

³ See Freeman, Methods of Hist. Study, "Matter and Manner," p. 103: "Here we have perhaps reached the fullest development of the notion that history is an easy business on both sides, that any man with a fluent pen is qualified to write it, and that any man to whom the work of a fluent pen gives pleasure is qualified to judge of it." The historian is not, of course, referring to Xenophon.
certain detachment and independence of view owing to his 'philosophy'—his theory of divine government—his σωφροσύνη περί τοῦ θεοῦ.¹ I think that he has this detachment—a quite opposite and much less noble, or at any rate grand and useful, detachment than that of Thucydides; yet valuable in its way and alien to malignity.

And with regard to conscious limitations: it is partly, perhaps, for artistic reasons that the historian is sometimes curt or silent when we should have preferred prolixity and distinctness of utterance. Let us consider this view of the matter more closely.

Simplicity of character and transparency of style, these, I imagine, are the two most obvious characteristics of our historian—whether of the man or of the writer. And yet we are perpetually aware (as I have already more than once suggested) of a certain something in him which at first sight might seem to contradict those qualities; but which, as a matter of fact, is compatible with plainness of speech and sincerity of nature, and in Xenophon’s case betokens an attitude intelligible enough on the part of a simple-minded man confronted with the complexities—moral and political—of life. Such a man does not become soured or cynical; but he may easily become reticent. But not to push our diagnosis further—Xenophon’s mind, as I have said above, was shrewd and his imagination (within a certain limit) vivid; that is, his genuine Attic self. As an educator his tendency was to inculcate ‘right’ ideas by suggestion υποδεικτικῶς, persuasively προτρεπτικῶς (in which he might seem to himself to be imitating his master Socrates, as he understood that master’s methods).² I can quite understand that the same person, when he came to consider the proper artistic handling of the troubled period (the ταραχή καὶ ἀκρισία)³

¹ See Dion. Hal. Ep. ad Cn. Pomp. iv. 2, for his ἡθος θεωρεῖται, and Trans. vol. i. pp. xix. xxvii., and Hell. v. iv. 1 foll., p. 119 below; VI. iv. 2, τὸ δαμαρίουν ἡγεῖν, p. 158; and concerning the death of Jason, VI. iv. 23 foll., pp. 164-167; or of Lycomedes, VII. iv. 2, p. 213, etc.
² This whole matter we shall be confronted with immediately in my next volume.
³ And in particular the period between B.C. 374 and B.C. 362, the latter half of Hell. C.
through which the states of Hellas were now passing, might deliberately propose to himself to reduce to the minimum visible, or even to exclude from the field of observation altogether, certain features (names, dates, incidents, isolated or in groups); not that the matters were without importance, but that, if important, they were well known to every one and their omission would be easily supplied, whilst their insertion might tend to divert attention from the main line of his argument; or, in the language of art, to destroy the general harmony of the picture.

As regards the men of his own time he was probably quite correct in his assumption, or again, if his work was intended to catch the popular ear—as a prize essay composition, ἐς τὸ παρὸν ἀγώνωνμα; but as regards later generations and ourselves, if he was proposing to make his work a κτῆμα ἐς ἄεί, he certainly endangered his object. He expects too much of us,\(^1\) and had better have avoided symbols φωνάντα συνετόνων.

Again it strikes me that he might have been led to adopt the same method of treatment (I speak of the arbitrary exclusion of certain topics), but on less distinctly artistic grounds, by circumstances and through conscientiousness, in this way. He is clearly disposed to treat with greater detail those incidents of which he was an eye-witness, and irrespectively of their essential fitness to hold so conspicuous a place in the picture as a whole.\(^2\) The reason is perfectly intelligible. Relying on his own skill as an eye-witness,\(^3\) he systematically insisted on placing at one time the affairs of Asia, and at another the affairs of Lacedaemon, and at a third time the affairs of Peloponnesus, prominently in the foreground: that done, he might content himself with sketching in the remaining details. Now it is home affairs and now those of the northern powers (of Athens and in particular of Thebes) which appear either in the background or in the comparative paleness of a middle distance.

Lastly, he was under the control, and consciously, of certain political and ethical ideas, his own and those of the time. I

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1 This is the ἀγώνωνμα spoken of above.
2 E.g. in Hell. B, Dercylidas’s and Agesilaus’s campaigns; in Hell. C, Phliasian affairs, or, again, Pherean affairs. He is like a photographer who depends for his illustrations of a voyage on the goodness of his negatives and the opportunities which he had for exercising his art.
3 In αἴροψια. See above, p. xvi. note 1.
do not here speak of political partisanship by any means, but
of those dominant notions pervading and leavening the mind
of Hellas in the first half of the third century, which a dull
man might conceivably have made little of, and a philosopher
like Thucydides have taken note of and passed on, but which,
in the case of Xenophon, haunted his brain and controlled his
composition like the leit-motifs, successive and recurrent, of a
dramatic opera shaped by some great musician.

The chief of these ‘leading themes’ after the conclusion of
the great war may be named as the Pan-Hellenic march (that
grander Anabasis which at a certain moment he thought that
he was about to play a part in, and which Polybius refers to
as one of the ‘causes’ of the conquest of Persia, when at
length it was fulfilled in the days of Alexander). Another
is the struggle for the hegemony of the states (an ancient
idea); another the confederation of certain leading states
under the βέλτιστος (a favourite idea of his own, and perhaps
of Socrates); 1 another the ethical doctrine which is a leading
theme of Herodotus’s histories, concerning retributive justice
"γήμην — Ἀγη — Νεις, whether in men or states; another
the idea, to speak of it by its Aristotelian name, of the παρα-
βασιλεύς—in Xenophon’s language, of the archic man, the real
Prince, and so forth.

It would, I think, be quite easy to analyse the three divi-
sions of the Hellenica in turn in reference to such controlling
ideas. We should in that case find that there was a marked
correspondence between the historian’s arrangement of topics
and what I may call the historical momenta of the period. 2 A
conspectus of that sort would show that the leading themes on
the subjective side have their counterpart in the objective
momenta. But on this topic I have perhaps already said more
than enough.

Meanwhile I have omitted to make more than a passing
reference to that particular quality of these histories which
most of all must suffer violence at the hands of a translator,
and which I cannot flatter myself has escaped obliteration in
the particular renderings of this volume. I need hardly say

1 See Mem. II. vi.; also Trans. vol. i. p. lxxiv.
2 See, for an attempt at such analysis, above, p. xxvi. note i.; below, p. lviii.
that I refer to the quality of style and diction. Whether the ancients felt any special charm in the style of the *Hellenica* I cannot tell;¹ but to my mind it has, in spite of its dryness (the word dulness I repudiate), a marked charm of its own which it is easier to feel than to describe. Of this also I am certain—that it is a book which, like some fragment of ancient sculpture, has something in it most congenial to the soil and climate and physical surroundings of the bright land which gave it birth. I will not attempt to analyse these characteristics further, but conclude this part of my subject with two quotations from a former writing.² The first draws attention to the quality just spoken of; the other to the dramatic conclusion of the history, in which the historian who was thought by the ancient critics somewhat to sacrifice τὸ καλὸν to τὸ ἰδιὸν soars for once into the sublime unwontedly and with touching effect.

(1) As to style and diction. It is well to bear in mind that the title of a δίκαιος συγγραφέως—a just historian—has been accorded to Xenophon; and apart from omissions which surprise a modern reader, it is plain that the quality of transparency which belongs to all his writings holds here even in the moral import of the word, so that his demerits, if demerits they be, amount to nothing worse than a species of colour-blindness. We know, and he does not attempt to conceal, the point of view from which he writes; moreover, as a philosopher he has a right to his philosophy, however defective it may render him as a philosophic historian; and he makes no secret of his sympathy with the ideal of Sparta and Lycurgus (his Laconism) or for the 'aristocratic' sections of society.³

But the quality which, like the vigour and the humour and the healthy, joyous youthfulness of the *Anabasis*, permeates this sadder and more sober production, is a certain vividness and brightness of delineation, suited to the clear skies of Hellas and Asia Minor, and the sparkling waves of the Aegean and the Straits.

¹ See Trans. vol. i. p. xix. ² See *Hellenica Essays*, pp. 383, 382. ³ *Hellenica C*, in particular, might appear to have been written somewhat from the point of view of Clarendon, "to vindicate before posterity the conduct and memory of those who have set themselves against this general overthrow." He too sees the finger of God in bringing about the general infatuation.

VOL. II
What M. Renan has said of the Acts of the Apostles may be almost verbatim applied to this work: "Une brise matinale, une odeur de mer, si j'ose le dire, inspirant quelque chose d'allègre et de fort, pénètre tout le livre et en fait un excellent compagnon de voyage; le bréviaire exquis de celui qui poursuit des traces antiques sur les mers du midi."\(^1\)

The \textit{Hellenica} is not a dull book, and the story with which it is concerned, however sad in part and disheartening, is never tedious. With it in our hands we bound over the glancing waves in rhythmical obedience to our beloved keleustes;\(^2\) we scale the heights of besieged citadels; for the moment we are friends with the living personalities of a tumultuous time. We have been Spartans and tramped along by forced marches in the night, after the destruction of a whole army corps by the enemy's forces;\(^3\) thus we proudly sneaked, for fear not so much of the jeers of lukewarm friends or half-foes as of ourselves and the evil that might come of it. We have crossed the heights at Creusis between Attica and Boeotia, and our shields have been snatched by a violent tornado from us and whirled into the abyss.\(^4\) We have watched the deadlock at Coronea, and seen the slain with their shields battered, their swords snapt off at the hilt, their daggers still clutched between their fingers.\(^5\) And all these things, page after page, has Xenophon by his photographic art and his Euripidean or Zeuxis-like skill wrought for us;\(^6\) so that the feeling left on our minds is one of exhilaration and content. Of course, if we had had the making of those days and persons, we should have provided that the hero-friend of Xenophon should be Epaminondas, not Agesilaus; but the gods, it seems, willed it otherwise, and so this matter has issued thus.\(^7\)

(2) As to the dramatic conclusion of the work. In the \textit{Hellenica}, as in the \textit{Anabasis}, there is a twofold climax

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\(^{1}\) Renan, \textit{St. Paul}, p. 12 foll.  
\(^{3}\) See \textit{Hell.} IV. v. 18 (p. 70 below).  
\(^{4}\) See \textit{Hell.} V. iv. 17 (p. 124 below).  
\(^{5}\) See \textit{Hell.} IV. iii. 19; \textit{Ages.} ii. 14 (pp. 56, 249 below).  
\(^{6}\) See the Euripidean touch in the description of the death of Leontiades "reclining in privacy after dinner, his wife seated beside him working wools," \textit{Hell.} V. iv. 6 (p. 121 below).  
\(^{7}\) τοιονδ' ἀπέβη τὸδε πρᾶγμα. If only Xenophon could have known
corresponding to the well-known divisions of the work. The first, attained in the reconciliation of the Demos and the supporters of the Thirty, is the *finale* of the work of Thucydides. The second and larger volume, constituting the Hellenic history proper in two parts, has sometimes been described as the *Epic of Agesilaus*, who is certainly to some extent the protagonist; but the pivot of the piece, the *peripety*, is the turn of the tide of Sparta's prosperity, consequent, in the eyes of Xenophon, upon the lawless seizure of the Theban citadel by the Spartan general Phoebidas. "Abundant examples might be found alike in Hellenic and in foreign history to prove that the Divine powers mark what is done amiss, winking neither at impiety nor at the commission of unhallowed acts; but at present I confine myself to the facts before me." When the end draws nigh—not too soon indeed, but with a certain dimly-realised dramatic effect, owing to the long-sustained silence in praise and blame alike,—the fire of the old soldier burns; and the historian's tongue is loosed in a panegyric of the strategy of Epaminondas; and the pall descends upon the great Theban, but upon Sparta herself the penumbra of total eclipse. Nor is there wanting a touch of pathos in the half-baffled realisation of the beginning of the end. As to Guicciardini, reviewing the posture of affairs after the peace of Cambray, things seem pretty much unaltered; so to Xenophon, after Mantinea, the old balance is renewed, or rather, in the language of the Greek, "Where it was expected that one or other of these fell combatants would rule an empire, there set in once more confusion worse confounded (not an ἀρχὴ ἁμαρτίας, but worse anarchy)." In one case really the knell of Venice was sounded; in the other the prestige of humbled Sparta fled with the triumphant spirit of her mighty rival.

Epaminondas as intimately as he knew Agesilaus, what a splendid portrait might we have had. See Grote x. 483 foll. "Epaminondas, princeps, meo judicio Graeciae!" Cic. *Tusc.* I. ii. 4; "Summum virum unum omnis Graeciae," Ib. *de Or.* III. xxxiv. 139.

1 *Hell.* II. iv. 43, on the supposition that the history of the Thirty, etc., is an appendix to *Hell.* A (though in another sense an introduction to *Hell.* B).

2 See *Hell.* V. iv. 1 (p. 119 below).

INTRODUCTION

XENOPHON AND THE ANCIENT CRITICISM

POLYBIUS—his General Appreciation

That Polybius was an admirer of Xenophon and his writings will be apparent to any one who studies his biography, and in particular his relationship to the younger Scipio, an intimacy which arose out of reading books together and literary conversation, ἐκ τινος χρῆσεως βιβλίων καὶ τῆς περὶ τοῦτον λαλίας (Exc. de V., et V., exc. lib. xxxi. ed. Ernesti, Lips. 1764). Polybius recounts the origin of this ‘notable friendship’ with an echo of Xenophon’s own manner: ἐν πραγμάσιος δ’ αὐτῶν, ὁ Πόλιος ἡσυχῆ καὶ πρῶς τῇ φωνῇ φθεγγάμενος καὶ τῷ χρώματι γεγέμενος ἐνερευθῆ, τι δὲ φησὶν ὁ Πολύβιος, κ.τ.λ.; and a little lower down, as to the boy’s love of hunting, which the elder man, again after the pattern of Xenophon, fully shared, we are told how Paulius Lucius Aemilius, the boy’s real father, after his victory in the war against Perseus, looking upon hunting as the royal road to excellence, like another Xenophon, καλλίστην ὑπολαμβάνω καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν καὶ τὴν σφαγὴν ὑπάρχειν τότε νέοις τὴν περὶ τὰ κυνηγεῖα, κ.τ.λ. (an echo surely of Xen. Cyneget.), ‘gave the lad the free run of the royal forests of Macedon, and young Scipio was happy as a king, νομίζοις γὰρ ἐναυγασίων, in his magnificent playground;’ and again... καθάπερ εὐγενοῦς σκύλακος ἐπίμονον αὐτῶν συνάξῃ γενέται τὴν περὶ τὰς κυνηγείας ὀρμήν (a distinct echo of Cyrop. I. iv. 4). Such passages might be multiplied indefinitely. The last I shall call attention to is Hist. x. 20, in which occurs the quotation of Xenophon’s phrase in the Hellenica about Ephesus ‘the workshop of war.’ The historian Polybius is recounting the exploits of the elder Scipio before Carthago Nova, and how, after he had taken it, that city became a veritable workshop of war; and though he does not name them, it is certain to me that the writer has passages of the Cyropaedia ringing in his ear. Thus the tale of Scipio and the wife of the Spanish chief is copied, so to speak, from the story of Cyrus and Panthea; Scipio’s terms to the captives are parallel to Cyrop. IV. iv. 10 et al.; the military exercises which he instituted and the sham fight, etc., to Cyrop. II. iii. 17 foll., etc.

My argument is that Polybius was well read in Xenophon, and if he had detected any grave defect in him as a historian, he would certainly not have failed to point it out, since of all historians competent to the task he was at once the.readiest to criticise his fellow-workers in the same field and the ablest to lay down rules for the writing of history. See, for instance, on the first head, his criticism (I will not say of Timaeus, on whom, perhaps, he is hard), but of Zeno, his Rhodian friend (xvi. 97). ‘What shall we say, then, is the defect of Zeno? That he is anxious, not so much about inquiring into his facts

1 One of these books, we may be sure, was the Cyropaedia, since we know from Cicero, Tusc. II. xxvi. 62, that Africanus (i.e. the younger Scipio) used to carry about a copy of it ‘in his breast pocket’: ‘Semper Africanus Socraticum Xenophonem in manibus babebat; cujus imprimis laudabat illud, quod diceret eosdem labores non esse aeques, sed gravem imperatori et militi, quod ipse honor leviorum faceret imperatorium,’ in reference to Cyrop. I. vi. 25.
2 A παδίδως λόγος, as Xenophon would have named it (Cyrop. I. iv. 27). See Mr. Strachan Davidson’s transl. Hellenica Essays, p. 397.
3 The words are Mr. Strachan Davidson’s.
4 I again take the liberty of quoting Mr. Davidson’s rendering.
and dealing with the subject, as about perfecting his style; and it is clear from many passages that this is what he prides himself on"; "but," adds the critic, "there are other nobler elements of history on which a statesmanlike historian would rather pride himself," ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καλλίω μέρι τῆς ιστορίας, ἐφ' οὐ δὲ μᾶλλον σεμνωθεὶς πολιτικῶς ἀνήρ (de V. et V. xvi.). If Polybius had noticed the same defect in Xenophon (and it is one with which Xenophon has been charged in modern times), would he not have mentioned it? Or, again, consider his criticism of Ephorus, a writer towards whom he is not unkindly disposed, as touching his ridiculous descriptions of land-battles, Leuctra, Mantinea, and in particular the latter (Exc. Vat. xii. 25, a passage quoted at length below; see 'Lacunae,' p. xlii.). Surely Polybius would have included Xenophon in his condemnation if he had not recognised in his descriptions of land-battles the very quality in which historians as a general rule are wanting. But Polybius not only criticises others: he lays down some of the soundest rules for the writing of history which are to be found in any ancient writer. I will content myself with but one from Hist. i. 14 (see Mr. Strachan Davidson, p. 409 foll.): "Polybius is thoroughly impressed with the majesty of his subject. Neither fear nor favour, he contends, must tempt the historian to waver for a moment in his allegiance to the truth. In this spirit he criticises the rival histories of Fabius and Philinus for their partisan accounts of the first Punic war." Then follows this passage: "Now in most affairs of life, perhaps, a man would do ill to divest himself of such a fellow-feeling. For a good man should be attached to his friend and to his country, and out of sympathy for these should hate their enemies and love their friends. But when a man assumes the attitude of mind that is proper to history, he is bound to leave out of sight all such considerations, and he must often speak well of his enemies and adorn them with the highest praises when the facts demand this; and again he must often blame his nearest friends, and bring their faults home to them whenever their conduct requires it. For just as if the eyes of a living animal are put out, the whole creature becomes maimed and helpless, so if you take away the truth out of history, what is left is merely an unprofitable tale." I repeat that if Xenophon had appeared to Polybius (who was a man of much learning, ἀνὴρ πολυμαθῆς, as Aelian remarks, and a master of historical methods) so "to take away the truth out of history" (and the modern indictment falls little short of that imputation), we should have heard of it. We should also have heard of it from another ancient critic,

LUCIAN,

whose canons of history-writing, as laid down in the famous essay πῶς δὲ ἱστοριῶν συγγράφειν, show that he too was a master of historical methods.1 The occasion of the essay is the craze which seized the whole world of Corinth to write histories of the Parthian war (A.D. 162-165): ἀλλ' ἀφ' οὗ δὴ τὰ ἐν πολι ταύτα κεκυρηθαί, ὁ πολέμος ὁ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ τὸ ἔν Ἀμερική τραύμα καὶ οἱ συνεχεῖς νίκαι, οὔδεις δήσις οὐκ ἱστοριῶν συγγράφει μᾶλλον δὲ θουκυδίδης καὶ Πρὸδοτοί καὶ Χεροφώντες ἦμεν ἄπαντες (everybody must needs be a historian, or rather we are deluged with

1 The rules are none the less golden because the essayist has chosen to give them so humorous a setting. Indeed, "the historian Du Thau thought so much of this essay, that he drew the rules for historical writing in the preface to his work principally from it."—Thomas Dyer, article "Lucianus" in the Dict. of Biography.
INTRODUCTION

Thucydideses, Herodotuses, and Xenophon), καὶ ὃς οὐκεν, ἄληθές ἄρ' ἂν ἐκεῖνο τὸ "πόδεμος ἀπάντων πατήρ" εἰ γε καὶ συγγραφέας τοσούτους ἀνέφυλεν ἀπὸ μιᾶς τῆς δραμῆς (war must indeed be the "father of all things" if at one fell swoop he has given birth to this whole litter of historians). In order not to be the one idle man, Lucian too must roll his tub, like Diogenes on a famous occasion. But as he cannot pretend to write history himself, he will write a little sermon on the art for the benefit of "the historians" if they care to listen. That art indeed is not, as some suppose, so simple a business as eating and drinking, which comes naturally to every one, but it needs a good deal of thought if, as says Thucydides, "one's composition is to be a lasting possession."

The essayist thereupon proceeds to banter the history-mongers, whose sole idea of history is to laud to the skies the chiefs and generals of their own party and to depreciate the enemy, little recking that a great gulf is fixed between his-tory and panegyric, since the genius of history abhors lying, a single crumb of which, to use a medical metaphor, would suffice to choke her windpipe. The canons of poetry are one and of history another. Not that praise is inadmis-sible in history, but it must be applied opportunely and in moderation; charm of style, τὸ τερπόν, at best, like the athlete's beauty, can only be a set-off to intrinsic quality, τὸ χρῆσμον. And the historian must recollect that the critics who will sit in judgment on his work will be keen-eyed judges, extreme to mark what is said amiss, eager to distinguish what is counterfeit and what is true coin. (§§ 2-10.)

Presently (§ 23) he proceeds to give an amusing description of the modern historian, with examples of his manner; how, for instance, he defends his aceanpal composition by remarking that it resembles Xenophon's Anabasis in the want of a preem. "Darins and Parysatis had two sons," not knowing that two or three words on certain occasions may be a preem in themselves, as the essayist will afterwards explain (§ 52 infra); and so on humorously enough (and in various ways suggesting thoughts to any one who is concerned with Xenophon's manner, which I have no space for).

At § 34 he begins to lay down his rules, the first of which is worth the reader's attention in reference to our special problem. There are two supreme qualifications for history-writing, two crowning virtues, which the would-be historian must have, and these are: (1) σύνεσις πολιτικῆς, political intelligence, which is a gift of nature; and (2) δύναμις ἐρμηνεικῆς, a faculty of exposition, which is to be acquired by practice and toil. It is not any-body or everybody whom our essayist will undertake to teach, but prvided the pupil has the right equipment, provided he is φύσει συνετὸς and ἄριστα πρὸς λόγους ἡσυχαμένος, he can perhaps give him some hints to set him on the right road. § 37. His pupil must be some one συνεῖναλ τε καὶ εἰπὼν οὐκ ἀγενής, of apt intelligence and ready speech, keen-eyed, with a turn for practical affairs (politics) if occasion offers, a soldier, statesman, and general in one—if he has chanced to serve in the field so much the better: καὶ ἐν στρατοπέδῳ γεγονός ποτε καὶ γνωσάμενός ἦν ταπείνως στρατιώτας ἑορκός καὶ δὴ λαλῶ καὶ μηχανήματα ἐνια καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ κέρας καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ μετάτοσι, πῶς οἱ λόγοι, πῶς οἱ ίππεῖς καὶ τόθεν καὶ τὰ ἐξελαίνεις ἢ περιελαίνεις, καὶ δίως οὗ τῶν κατοκίσκων τις οὗτος οὗτος πιστεύει μόνων τοῖς ἀπαγγέλλουσι—
ot one of your gentlemen who sit at home at ease and depend on hearsay reports, but a real expert who has seen troops exercising and battalions manoeuvring in the field, and knows all about arms and the engines of war. (It is hard not to believe that Lucian is thinking of Xenophon or Polybius and their special qualifications here.) § 38. But, above all, he must be free, frank,
and fearless, he must be ready to criticise the mistakes and defects of great people. 1 (He illustrates from Callisthenes in reference to Philip and Alexander, Thucydides in reference to Cleon.) Since pen and ink cannot alter facts, nor Clotho herself unspin the thread of destiny (§ 39), the historian's sole business is to narrate what has happened; but this he will fail to do if (like Ctesias) he is court physician to Artaxerxes and is looking for some reward of his flattery. That is not what Xenophon will do, the impartial historian, nor yet Thucydides, but the more he hates the greater the necessity laid on him to speak the truth and the truth only, not looking to the audience of the moment, but to that larger audience of all time, those future generations who will consort with his work when the historian himself is in the grave. (These remarkable words, embedded in such a context, ἀλλ' ὁ ξενοφῶν αὐτὸ πονηρεῖ, δικαιος συγγραφέως, οὐδὲ θεουκτῆτος, seem to me conclusively to show that Lucian, like Polybius, was not speaking at random, but was well acquainted with Xenophon's historical works, and, however we explain the fact, regarded him as at any rate honest and impartial.) § 41. Fearless, uncorruptible, unfettered, a friend of truth and plainness of speech, calling figs figs and a spade a spade, as the comic writer says—that is the type of the true historian (and such was Xenophon among the rest).

At this point (§ 42) Lucian draws an interesting comparison between Thucydides and Herodotus, and gives his explanation of what Thucydides meant by a κτήμα ἐς ἀεί as opposed to an ἐς τὸ παρὼν ἀγώνισμα. (How far Xenophon's work was of the latter class rather than of the former is another question, as to which Lucian says nothing. My suspicion is that Xenophon—always on the supposition that our version of the Hellenica is fairly complete—did fail to picture to himself sufficiently that larger audience of all time, and possibly out of mere modesty wrote rather for the generation in which he lived, but for ourselves, φωνᾶτα συνετοίσι, as I have before suggested.)

Thus far concerning the historian's γνώμη, mental attitude. In § 43 the critic proceeds to offer remarks as to φωνή καὶ τὴν τῆς ἐρμηνείας λαχίν, style and expository skill. § 44. As truth and outspokeness are the goal of the historian's intelligence, so clearness and naturalness should be the first and foremost aim of his style, which should be dignified, σχῆμασι κεκοσμηθένῳ ἀνεπάχθεσι, but exceptis exspectiendis. 2 § 45. His thought should be touched with poetic fire, 3 especially in narrating battles and sea-fights, but his speech should proceed warily, and so he will avoid losing his head in a fit of poetic rapture. To ride the high horse is suicidal. § 46. He is to avoid the rhythms of verse. § 47. His facts must be carefully collected with much pains by eye-witness, or if not, by the most careful comparison of ear-witnesses: κάνταυθα ἡδὴ καὶ στοχαστικὸς τις καὶ συνθετικὸς τοῦ πιθανωτέρου ἔστω. 4 § 48. And when he has collected them all or the greater part, he shall first make a rough draft, a skeleton, which later on he shall clothe upon with the beauty and the order of form and rhythm. 5 § 49. Like Homer's Zeus, he is to take a wide impartial survey, "now of the horse-taming Thracians and now of the Mysians;" and when it comes to setting the battle in array, let him not fix his gaze on one portion nor on a single individual (unless to note the forward dash of Brasidas, or Demosthenes repelling an assault), but on the generals, to

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1 E.g. as Xenophon criticises Agesilaus, Iphocrates, Epaminondas, etc.
2 Cf. the rich twelfth-cake style of Gibbon.
3 Cf. Michelet, Carlyle, Napier.
4 Like Thucydides or like Grote.
5 The Greek is far prettier: let him first ὑπόμνημα τι συννοφαινέτω ... καὶ σῶμα
catch the word of command and to understand the main idea of attack and defence; and when the tug of war comes, κοινῇ ἑστῶ ἃθεα, let him watch both sides as an impartial spectator, weighing all the incidents in his balance; let him pursue with the pursuers, and flee with the fleers. § 50. καὶ πᾶσι τοῖσοι μέτρον ἐπέστω—let there be a limit imposed on the whole treatment—

μὴ ἐς κρήναν μηδὲ ἀπειροκάλλως μηδὲ νεαρῶς—not putting it to the point of satiety or to offence of good taste, or, in raw schoolboy fashion, overdoing it—ἄλλα βαθίου ἀπολυσθῶ—but let him shake himself loose with ease and lightly, here pausing and thither hastening as events demand, backwards and forwards and back again, following on the steps of time, and winging his flight from one quarter of the globe to the other in an instant, never failing to mark each crisis of affairs. § 51. For his mind is to be a well-focused mirror, reflecting all things equally and equably. It shall present the very image of reality undistorted in form or colour: οὐ γὰρ ὅπερ τοῖς βήτορις γράφοντι—since this is no rhetorical history school; but the words to be spoken exist potentially, they are the double of the facts they represent—the only question is how to order them. The historian is like the sculptor Phidias or Praxiteles: the raw material of the historian consists of facts; the sculptor’s of gold, silver, ivory, wood, supplied to him by the mcn of Elis, Athens, Argos, which he shall carve and polish and weld together into a shape of beauty; and so the historian toυοῦτο δὴ τι καὶ τὸ τοῦ συγγράφους ἔργον εἰς καλὸν διαθέσαι τὰ πεπραγμένα καὶ εἰς δόμαν ἐναργέστατα ἐπιδείξαι αὐτά—his business is to arrange in lovely order the things that have been done, and to set them forth lit up with the white light and splendour of reality.

At this point the essayist proceeds to lay down various technical rules, as to ‘proems,’ and the ‘narrative that follows’ (§ 55). § 56. Brevity inculcated, especially where there is no dearth of topic. § 57. This ἀφροτρυπὴ is to be observed especially in descriptions of scenery. He illustrates from Thucydides, vi. 96, 101, on ‘Epipolae’ or ‘the great harbour.’ (Xenophon would do equally well to illustrate from.) § 58. Of speeches (see Thuc. i. 22) appropriate to the character. § 59. Praise and blame to be sparingly applied, or ‘you will fall into the error of Theopompus,’ § 60. Of the mythical, let it be stated and left to take care of itself. § 61. And generally the precept which he keeps repeating is to be borne in mind: Do not look to the present moment as if courting the suffrages of the men of to-day who pass, but aspire to gain the suffrages of all time—ἄλλα τοῦ σύμπαντος αλώνων ἐπαχαρισμένος πρὸς τοῖς ἐπειτα μᾶλλον σύγγραφε καὶ παρ’ ἑκάστοις ἀπαίτει τῶν μισθῶν τῆς γραφῆς—that they may say of you, “See a man who was free and plain of speech, no servile flattery in him, ἄλλοι δὴ θείως ἐπὶ πᾶσι.” § 62. A pretty simile follows or allegory concerning the Cnidian architect of the beacon tower in Pharos, and how he carved his name within, only to be discovered when the tower crumbled. § 63. So history is to be written σων τῶν ἀλθείων μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν μέλλουσαν ἐλπίδα ἥπερ σων κολακείᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἱδρο τῶν νῦν ἐπανομένων—along with truth in reference to the hope to be, rather than with flattery with a view to what may tickle the ear of some ephemeral being. Οὗτος σοι κανῶν καὶ

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1 With what he says compare Dion. Hal. on Xenophon’s skill in marshalling his topics, Trans. vol. i. p. xxvi.
2 The omission of ‘the new naval confederacy’ or of ‘Megalopolis’ is hardly so to be accounted for by us moderns; was it by Lucian?
\textit{στάθμη ἱστορίας δικαίας}—Such is the rule and measure of just and impartial history. Whether it will be acceptable or not, the essayist cannot tell, but his tub is rolled on the Crancion.

**PLUTARCH**

As to Plutarch, who in point of date stands between Polybius and Lucian, and a great deal closer to Lucian, the argument would be more conclusive supposing that the author of the tract on the spitefulness or malignity of Herodotus (see Mahaffy, \textit{Hist. Gk. Lit.} ii. 38, 1st ed.) and Plutarch were one and the same person, since in that case it might be argued: if Plutarch detected so strong an anti-Theban animus in Herodotus, how is it that he does not discover a sign of it in Xenophon, who, according to the modern view, does scant justice, not to say gross injustice, to Thebes? But all one is really entitled to say now is that Plutarch, who was thoroughly acquainted with Xenophon's historical and other writings, and has used the former freely (though possibly he had a fuller text than ours) for his lives of Agesilaus, Alcibiades, Marcellus, Lysander, Anthony, Pelopidas, and Artaxerxes (and doubtless also for that of Epaminondas, which is unfortunately lost), evidently relies on him as trustworthy and honest, and detects in him no \textit{κακοθεία}. Once indeed he does go so far as to say in his \textit{Comparison of Pompey and Agesilaus} (see Clough, iv. 154): "I am persuaded even Xenophon himself would not put the victories of Agesilaus in balance with his (Pompey's), though Xenophon has this privilege allowed him as a sort of special reward for his other excellences, that he may write and speak in favour of his hero whatever he pleases," which is a very different thing from accusing him of defaming the great Theban. On the other hand, neither the author of that 'smart' essay which has crept somehow into Plutarch's works nor any other ancient writer has attacked Xenophon for the very malignity which Herodotus is supposed to have exhibited. To Thirlwall and Freeman it is manifest, but to the ancients, for whatever reason, it was not, or else why have they been so charitable?

**A List of Lacunae**

For the benefit of students I have here drawn up a table of incidents, topics, etc., such as might have been included in a fuller history of the time, but which, for whatever reason, are omitted in the five books of the \textit{Hellenica} translated in this volume.

The object of such a table is to enable the reader to discover at a glance the topics, incidents, etc., of chief historical importance, other than those treated of by Xenophon himself in the pages of these parts of his history.

I have arranged the matter chronologically, and in accordance with my belief that the books in question form (roughly
speaking) the two halves of the *Hellenic History* proper, as opposed to the *Sequel* to Thucydides, which I dealt with in Note C of my former volume.1

I have printed the lacunae occurring in the earlier half (*Hellenica B*), which contains the history of the years B.C. 400 circa to B.C. 387, separately from the lacunae occurring in the latter half (*Hellenica C*), which contains the history of the years B.C. 387 to B.C. 362.

The relative increase of lacunae in this second portion may, perhaps, be accounted for by supposing that the historian for some good reason (possibly in obedience to an artistic instinct 2) had resolved to exclude extra-Peloponnesian topics, in order to concentrate attention on the affairs of southern Hellas3 (as I have elsewhere more elaborately explained).

In drawing up such a table (chiefly from the pages of Grote), I am well aware that I may be doing the historian Xenophon a grave injustice. In the first place, the incidents which we regard as omissions may, some of them, not be omissions at all. They depend for their very existence on the testimony of orators and later authorities such as Plutarch, Pausanias, Diodorus, etc. In the second place, even where the truth of the occurrences is fully established, their exclusion from the pages of our historian may be natural or excusable. In other words, either it did not enter into his scheme to notice them, and that for some good reason, or through ignorance or lack of opportunity he was unable to record them.

*N.B.*—Throughout this table the italics signify the particular topic or incident omitted in the *Hellenica* under the year of its supposed occurrence. The square brackets [ ] signify that the particular lacunae are, according to my notion, natural or pardonable from the point of view of the historian, and considering (i) the design of that portion of his history together with (2) his method of composition.

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1 For like omissions in *Hellenica*, Bks. I. and II., see Trans. vol. i. p. lxv.
2 He was somewhat under the influence of the rhetorical school of Isocrates; he was writing probably in his study at Corinth or Athens, not at the field of action (see Sketch of Life), ἐχαράγητως ὦν, B.C. 359-358.
3 And of the party representing the interests of Peloponnese; see *Hell.* VII. v. i.
LACUNAE in "Hellenica B," b.c. 403-387

B.C. 400 circa.—Lysander's intrigues. See Aristot. Pol. v. 15; Eph. ap. Plut. Lys. 25 (Clough, iii. 133); Diod. xiv. 13. [Grote, ix. 332.]

B.C. 399 circa.—Herrippidas at Heracleia Trachinia—his exploits—occupation of Pharsalus. Diod. xiv. 38 and 81; Polyaen. iv. 27. See below, sub anno 395 b.c. [Grote, ix. 397.]

B.C. 397-394.—Negotiations between Athens and the court of Susa, conducted by Conon (at the court of Evagoras) in Cyprus—Pharnabazus and Ctesias. Plut. Artax.; Ctesiae fr. 29, § 63 (Didot). See Trans. vol. i. p. cv., and in general the doings of Conon and Pharnabazus before the battle of Cnidus. Isocr. Or. viii. (de Pace), 82; Or. iv. (Panegyr.), 165; Diod. xiv. 81. [Grote, ix. 390.]

B.C. 395.—(1) The revolt of Rhodes from Sparta, etc., and (2) the effect of the news on the Athenian Assembly (Hell. III. v. 16),


(2) Dem. de Cor. 28, p. 258; Philipp. i. 7, p. 44; Lys. Or. xvi. 15. [Grote, ix. 407.]

B.C. 395-394.—Successful operations of Isemias to the north of Boeotia, after Haliartus (Hell. III. v. 25)—capture of Heracleia from Sparta—defeat of the Phocians near the Locrian town of Naryx. Diod. xiv. 38-82 (see Hell. IV. iii. 3; Ages. ii. 2). [Grote, ix. 420.]

B.C. 391 (?) (according to Grote, but see Jebb, Att. Or. i. 84).—Alarm at Athens and Thebes consequent on the capture of the long walls of Corinth—propositions sent to Sparta to solicit peace. The discussions come to no result. Andoc. de Pace, and Philochorus (writing circ. 300-260 b.c.), in the argument of that speech. See Hell. IV. v. 6 (Trans. p. 66) for the desire for peace on the part of Thebes, b.c. 390 (al. b.c. 392); and for the prior disinclination to accept peace on the Spartan terms felt by all sections of the confederates, b.c. 392, Hell. IV. viii. 15 (Trans. p. 82). [Grote, ix. 474.]

B.C. 387.—[Financial condition of Athens—the Thébrikon.] See Grote, ix. 525 foll.; but Xenophon could hardly have been expected to introduce a topic of this kind, though he was interested in questions of economy. Thucydides certainly might have done so in a speech or otherwise; cf. Thuc. ii. 13.
INTRODUCTION

Lacunae in "Hellenica C," B.C. 387-362

B.C. 387-386. — [Remarks touching the import and character of the Peace (ἐπ’ Ἀρτακλίδου)], such as Isocrates expresses in his Paneg. passim; or a history of such "applications to the Great King," from the beginning of the Peloponnesian war and throughout on the part of Sparta, and after Aegospotami on the part of Athens (and after the foundation of Messene on the part of Thebes), after the manner of Grote. One certainly seems to miss something in the silence (non-expression of indignation) of the historian. See Plut. Ages. 23; Artax. 21, 22. Well may Grote exclaim, "Great must have been the change," etc. See Dem. i. Aristocr. 33, p. 666; Isocr. Panath. 167 foll. [Grote, x. 1 foll.]

B.C. 387-386. — [The condition of the Asiatic Greeks after being transferred to Persia.] See Isocr. Paneg. 142, 156, 190. An important result of the diplomatic relations of Sparta and the king. Thucydides would surely have traced the connection, and not have left it to Grote to do so. Cf. Curtius, iv. 274 foll. (Eng. tr.). The Great King is the primum mobile; the ninth heaven or sphere, the first mover of all the lower spheres, as the saying ἐν βασιλεί τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων implies. See Aristot. Phys. Ausc. iv. 3, 210 b. [Grote, x. 34 foll.]

B.C. 386 (?). — The restoration of Plataea by Sparta (and the policy of the act). See Isocr. Plat. 54; Paus. ix. 1, 3. [Grote, x. 42 foll.]

B.C. 384-383. — [In detail, the relations of Macedonia and Olynthus and the origin of the Olynthian confederacy (beyond what is given in Cleigenes's speech, Hell. V. ii. 11) with those of Amyntas and Sparta; and so too concerning the competition of Athens and Sparta for the sea; and the dealings of the latter with the Olynthian confederacy.] See Grote's remarks, x. 94 and 191, quite in a Thucydidean manner; but Thucydides would also have brought out Xenophon's point (emphasised neither by Grote nor Freeman) that the confederacy was regarded by the Peloponnesian allies and Sparta as threatening in conjunction with Thebes and Athens. [Grote, x. 92, 94, 191.]

B.C. 383. — The fine inflicted on Phoebidas, according to Diod. xv. 20; Plut. Pelop. 6; de Gen. Socr. 576 a; Corn. Nep. Pelop. 1. [Grote, x. 85.]
B.C. 383-379.—Details of oppression and tyrannical government during the Spartan occupation of the Cadmeia (only suggested), so analogous to that of the Thirty during the year of 'anarchy' which the historian has elaborately treated of in Hell. II. iii. i1 foll. See Plut. Pelop. 6, and de Gen. Socr. passim; Diod. xv. 25.

Grote, x. 109.

B.C. 379.—The name of Pelopidas as a prime mover in the liberation (but perhaps Melon was at the time the person most spoken of and the admitted leader). Plut. Pelop: 7 foll.

Grote, x. 112.

...-(Possibly) some of the details given by Plutarch, e.g. the polemarch's exclamation, "eis a&rovi tα σσποδαία," "business to-morrow" (cf. the remark of Pitt on being informed of the mutiny of the fleet). Plut. de Gen. Socr. 30, p. 596 F.

Grote, X. 116.

...—Hell. V. iv. 1 foll. [The alteration in the balance of power and the tenure of Spartan empire effected by the liberation of Thebes.] See Isocr. Plat. 31. Thucydides would have pointed this; he would have put the topics of the Plataikos into the mouth of one of his dramatis personae. Xenophon's method is different. From his religious point of view it is the peripety of the drama; and see below, Hell. VI. iv. 3.

Grote, x. 127 foll.

B.C. 378.—Hell. V. iv. 22-32. [The historian abstains from moral judgment on the exculpation of Sphodrias], but so would Thucydides qua historian critically, though he would probably have made use of the incident dramatically; it is perhaps not hard to divine how.

B.C. 378.—1 The new Athenian maritime confederacy (except in briefest allusion (see Hell. V. iv. 34); see also Rev. v. 6; Pol. Lac. xiv. 6); and all the details about (1) the σωραζις (not φόροι now) (Harpoekration, s.v.; Isocr. de Pace, 37-46; Plut. Phoc. 7; de Fortuna Athen. p. 351), and (2) the ελπηορυχιαυ (Isocr. Plat. 47; Diod. xv. 28 foll.; the inscription, 'Ενλ Ναυυλων η粉尘 τος, Köhler, C. I. A. ii. 27; Hicks, 81), and (3) the despatch from Athens of Chabrias, Timotheus, and

1 This is a startling omission. Either (1) Xenophon's conception of history was imperfect from a modern point of view, or (2) his work is unfinished, or (3) has been tampered with in transmission. The allusions in the Revenues (if by Xenophon, as I think) make in favour of (2) perhaps.
Callistратus as commissioners in the first organisation of the confederacy (Diod. xv. 29). [Grote, x. 140.]

B.C. 378.—[The doings of Iphicrates; his service in Thrace after the peace of Antalcidas, and marriage with the daughter of Cotys; and about the seaport village of Drys presented to him by his patron] (cf. Xenophon’s own experiences with Seuthes as recounted in the Anabasis, VII. ii. 35, v. 8, etc.), an only natural omission, except that the historian is talkative at times about such matters, and Iphicrates is one of his heroes. See Corn. Nep. Iphicr. 2; Chabrias, 2, 3; Theopomp. fr. 175 (Didot); Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 664; Polyaen. iii. 9 passim.

. . . .—(1) The synod of the new confederates assembled at Athens—votes for war on a large scale. See Diod. xv. 29; Polyb. ii. 62. It is true there is a reference to the enthusiasm of the members in Rev. v. 6, which proves that the historian was aware of the fact before he died, but does not explain the omission here. See Dem. c. Androt. 21, p. 616; c. Timocr. 41, p. 756.

(2) [The census of Nausinikus—the new property-tax—the symmories], all which must have been interesting to the historian, but perhaps seemed outside the sphere of history. For authorities, Demosthenes, etc., see Grote, x. 153 foll.

. . . .—(1) The organisation of the Sacred Band attributed to Gorgidas at Thebes, though he has space for the palisade.¹ See Plut. Pelop. 18, 19, δ νυταχθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἐπαμινώνδου ἱερὸς λόχος. Hieron. ap. Athen. xiii. p. 602 A; cf. Diod. xvi. 80. See also Symp. viii. 34.

(2) Some notice of the two great Theban statesmen (either now or sub anno 371 B.C. at Leuctra), whose names, one would suppose, must have been already on every one’s lips, but who do not appear on the scene, as actors definitely named, till the last book—Pelopidas sub anno 368 B.C. (Hell. VII. i. 34 foll.), and Epaminondas next year (ib. ib. 41 foll.). Is this for some ‘artistic’ purpose? [Grote, x. 171.]

¹ One would have expected that the historian (r) as a military man would have taken note of the Sacred Band and the reforms in general of Epaminondas, 378-371 B.C.; and (2) as a philosopher in search of the ‘archic’ man, might have made a special study of Epaminondas. See Grote’s remark (x. 486), with which I fully concur: “Compare Epaminondas with Agesilaus: how great is the superiority of the first, even in the narrative of Xenophon, the earnest panegyrist of the other.”
B.C. 378 or 377.—[The obnixo genu scuto incident of the campaign], told by Dem. c. Lept. p. 479; Corn. Nep. Chabrias, i; Diod. xv. 32; Polyaeus, ii, 1, to the honour of Chabrias, who commanded the Athenian division on the side of Thebes against the Lacedaemonians; just suited, one would have thought, to Xenophon, if known to him. Gorgidas, the Theban general, deserved mention. [Grote, x. 173.]

B.C. 376, Sept.—Hell. V. iv. 61. The name Naxos and the interesting details of the victory—its consequences also. See Dem. c. Lept. 17, p. 480; Diod. xv. 34, 35. Had the historian forgotten Arginusae? and why does he omit names? Has some epitomist done this? or is the passage a mere note incorporated into the work without further elaboration? That seems to me most probable. [Grote, x. 176.]

B.C. 375-374.—Hell. V. iv. 63; VI. i. 1. Details of Theban political and military achievements in reorganising the Boeotian federation: e.g. “we hear of one victory gained by the Theban cavalry near Plataea, under Charon; and of another near Tanagra, in which Panthoides, the Lacedaemonian harmost in that town, was slain. But the most important of all their successes was that of Pelopidas near Tegyra.” See Plut. Pelop. 15-25; ¹ Callisth. fr. 3 (Didot), “Battle near Orchemenus”; Diod. xv. 37. [Grote, x. 182 foll.]

B.C. 374-373.—Hell. VI. i. 7; ii. 10, 12, 13, 39. Details as to the alliances (1) between Athens and Alcetas, cemented by Timotheus (see Diod. xv. 36; Corn. Nep. Timoth. 2), and between Athens and Jason (early in 373 B.C.?), see Dem. c. Timoth. 3, p. 1187; (2) the preliminary cruise of Timotheus (April-May 373 B.C.), Dem. ib. p. 1186; his trial (Jason and Alcetas come to Athens to support him) and acquittal (Nov. 373 B.C.) [Grote, x. 199, 202, 208 foll.]

The question arises, why is the historian so copious concerning certain individuals and so silent about others?

¹ “But the battle at Tegyrae, which seemed a prelude to Leuctra, won Pelopidas a great reputation; for none of the other commanders could claim any hand in the design, nor the enemies any show of victory” (Clough, ii. 215). See also Ages. (Clough, iv. 33): “Meanwhile the Spartan fortune was but ill: they received many losses both by sea and land, but the greatest was at Tegyrae, where for the first time they were beaten by the Thebans in a set battle.” It is easier to stigmatise these sins of omission than to account for them satisfactorily. As the facts were thoroughly well known there was no object to be gained in suppressing them. Nor do I venture to credit Xenophon with kakophœia. Plutarch does not.
INTRODUCTION

B.C. 372.—[About the earthquakes and destruction of Helike and Bura in Achaia.] See Diod. xi. 48, 49; Pausan. vii. 25; Aelian, Hist. Animal. xi. 19; Callisth. fr. 8 (Didot); Polyb. Hist. ii. 41. This is perhaps striking, considering the historian’s belief in such manifestations of the will of God; the Lacedaemonian triremes, it is said, were destroyed by the rush of waters. [Grote, x. 212.]

B.C. 372.—Hell. VI. ii. 40. (1) The Plataeans secretly try to persuade Athens to annex them (see Diod. xv. 46); (2) destruction of Plataea by the Thebans in detail (ib. 47); (3) case of Plataea debated in the Athenian Ecclesia and in the general congress of the confederates at Athens, Epaminondas and Callistratus taking opposite sides in the discussion, it is said (ib. 38). See also Isocr. Plat. passim. [Grote, x. 217 foll.]

B.C. 371, June.—Hell. VI. iii. 19. Epaminondas at the Spartan congress; his speech, etc. See Plut. Ages. 23;¹ also see Paus. xiii. 1 (who assigns the incidents to 387 B.C., the Peace of Antal-

¹ "All the Greeks were, accordingly, disposed to a general peace, and to that end ambassadors came to Sparta. Among these was Epaminondas, the Theban, famous at that time for his philosophy and learning, but he had not yet given proof of his capacity as a general. He, seeing all the others crouch to Agesilaus, and court favour with him, alone maintained the dignity of an ambassador, and, with that freedom that became his character, made a speech in behalf not of Thebes only, from whence he came, but of all Greece, remonstrating that Sparta alone grew great by war, to the distress and suffering of all her neighbours. He urged that a peace should be made upon just and equal terms, such as alone would be a lasting one, which could not otherwise be done than by reducing all to equality. Agesilaus, perceiving all the other Greeks to give much attention to this discourse, and to be pleased with it, presently asked him, whether he thought it a part of this justice and equality that the Boeotian towns should enjoy their independence. Epaminondas instantly and without wavering asked him in return whether he thought it just and equal that the Laconian towns should enjoy theirs. Agesilaus started from his seat and bade him once for all speak out and say whether or not Boeotia should be independent. And when Epaminondas replied once again with the same inquiry, whether Laconia should be so, Agesilaus was so enraged that, availing himself of the pretext, he immediately struck the name of the Thebans out of the League, and declared war against them." I have quoted Plutarch’s words at length, because he is the sole authority for the fact—if a fact, as I presume it was. Unfortunately we do not know from whom he derived the story. Xenophon certainly missed a great opportunity in not working in Epaminondas's speech, which would have brought out the artistic effect of his three Athenian speeches still more clearly. Grote has availed himself of the sentiments of Thuc. iii. 61 and iv. 126 to produce a very telling Xenophontine account of the matter, but one would like to have had Xenophon's version. Plutarch omits Autocles, etc.
B.C. 371.—_Hell._ VI. iv. 7 foll. Details of strategic movements and the new order of battle adopted by Epaminondas at Leuctra (the λήξη φάλαγξ). See Diod. xv. 54, 55 (who, it is conjectured, follows Ephorus); Paus. ix. 13, 3 foll.; Plut. _Pelop._ 20, 21; Polyænus, ii. 3; _Polyb. Hist._ ii. 39 (see also xii. 25 g, _Excerpt._ Vatican.). As a military critic, the historian might naturally have drawn attention to these points (cf. his greater detail in the battle of Mantinea). 1

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1 See Rüstow and Köchly, _Gesch. des Gr. Kriegswesens_, p. 173; Curtius, iv. 397 foll. (Eng. tr.). It must be borne in mind that Polybius (in the _Vatican Excerpt_) praises Ephorus for his knowledge of maritime warfare, but adds that he was utterly ignorant of the mode of warfare on land. His accounts of the naval battles of Cyprus and Cnidus are admirable; those of Leuctra and Mantinea ridiculous. I quote the passage _in extenso_: ἔκεινος γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς τῶν μὲν κατὰ βάλασταν ἑργῶν ἐπὶ ποιοῦ ὑπόνοιαν ἐσχήκεναι μοι κατὰ τὴν ἀραίων ἀπειρόν εἶναι τελεόν. τουραγὸν δὲν πρὸς τᾶς περὶ Κύπρου ναυμαχίας καὶ τὰς περὶ Κυθῶν ἀνελήγη τις, ἀλλὰ ἐχερόσαντο ὁ βασιλεὺς στρατηγὸς πρὸς Εὐδαγόραν τῶν Σαλαμίνων καὶ πάλιν κατὰ τὴν ἀνὸμον καὶ τὰς ὑγίαις ἀπειραὶ τελεόν 

... _Hell._ VI. iv. 15; v. 21. _The results._ (1) _The disaster to Sparta._ Thucydides would in some way or other have anticipated the remark of Aristotle in his _Politics_, μιὰν γὰρ πληγὴν ὅθεν ὑπήργεκεν ἡ πόλις ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ λεπτοῦ διὰ τὴν ἀληθωρωμᾶν (Pol. ii. 9, 16). “The result proves the faulty nature of their laws respecting property; for the city sank under a single defeat; the want of men was their ruin” (Jowett). Yet Xenophon’s one fact, that one thousand Lacedaemonians and four hundred out of seven hundred Spartans perished, speaks volumes, φωνάτα συνετοίων.

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1 See Rüstow and Köchly, _Gesch. des Gr. Kriegswesens_, p. 173; Curtius, iv. 397 foll. (Eng. tr.). It must be borne in mind that Polybius (in the _Vatican Excerpt_) praises Ephorus for his knowledge of maritime warfare, but adds that he was utterly ignorant of the mode of warfare on land. His accounts of the naval battles of Cyprus and Cnidus are admirable; those of Leuctra and Mantinea ridiculous. I quote the passage _in extenso_: ἔκεινος γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς τῶν μὲν κατὰ βάλασταν ἑργῶν ἐπὶ ποιοῦ ὑπόνοιαν ἐσχήκεναι μοι κατὰ τὴν ἀραίων ἀπειρόν εἶναι τελεόν. τουραγὸν δὲν πρὸς τᾶς περὶ Κύπρου ναυμαχίας καὶ τὰς περὶ Κυθῶν ἀνελήγη τις, ἀλλὰ ἐχερόσαντο ὁ βασιλεὺς στρατηγὸς πρὸς Εὐδαγόραν τῶν Σαλαμίνων καὶ πάλιν κατὰ τὴν ἀνὸμον καὶ τὰς ὑγίαις ἀπειραὶ τελεόν 

... _Hell._ VI. iv. 15; v. 21. _The results._ (1) _The disaster to Sparta._ Thucydides would in some way or other have anticipated the remark of Aristotle in his _Politics_, μιὰν γὰρ πληγὴν ὅθεν ὑπήργεκεν ἡ πόλις ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ λεπτοῦ διὰ τὴν ἀληθωρωμᾶν (Pol. ii. 9, 16). “The result proves the faulty nature of their laws respecting property; for the city sank under a single defeat; the want of men was their ruin” (Jowett). Yet Xenophon’s one fact, that one thousand Lacedaemonians and four hundred out of seven hundred Spartans perished, speaks volumes, φωνάτα συνετοίων.
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(2) The extension of the power of Thebes; treatment of Orcho-
menus and Thespiae; Epaminondas 'alike distinguished for
mild temper and for long-sighted views.' See Diod. xv. 57;
Paus. ix. 14, 1; x. 11, 1. [Grote, x. 263 foll.]

(3) Proceedings in Peloponnesus: 'skytalism' in Argos. See
Isocr. Or. v. 58. [Discouragement and helplessness of Sparta;
the accusation preferred in the Amphiktyonic Assembly by
Thebes against Sparta, and the fine imposed, Diod. xvi.
23-29; Justin. viii. 1 (after Theopompus, see fr. 182-184
(Didot), as Grote conjectures); feeling against Agesilaus at
Sparta, Plut. Ages. 30 foll.] [Grote, x. 273 foll.]

B.C. 371.—[The aspirations of Athens after Leuctra to maritime empire, and
to the partial recovery of kleruchies (out-possessions), and to
recover Amphipolis, etc.] See authorities in Grote, x. 334
foll.

B.C. 370.—Hell. VI. v. 6 foll. Details as to the formation of the Pan-
Arcadian League, see Paus. viii. 27, 3; the application of the
Arcadians, etc., to Athens for aid refused, Diod. xv. 62; Dem.
pro Megalop. 205-207; plans of Epaminondas for restoring
the Messenians in Peloponnesus (and consolidating the Arcadians
against Sparta), Diod. xv. 66; Paus. iv. 26, 3. Our historian
seems to have missed a great opportunity in neglecting to
furnish us with these. [Grote, x. 286-294.]

B.C. 370-369.—Vigilant defence of Sparta (by Agesilaus); see Plut. Ages.
32; Polyaenus, II. i. 14; and Aeneas Poliorc. (a contem-
porary?) i. 2, about the 'barricades'; see also Ages. ii. 20.
It seems then that the historian does at times omit matters
which would redound to the credit of his friends. Perhaps
he thought them beneath the dignity of history. See his
apogetic introduction of such details in Hell. II. iv. 27
(Trans. vol. i. p. 70).

...—Details as to (1) the building of Megalopolis (Diod. xv. 63, 72;
Paus. viii. 27; 35, 5) and Messene, Paus. iv. 26, 6; 27, 3;
31, 10; Strab. viii. 361; (2) the abstraction of Western
Laconia, no doubt a very sore subject to the Spartans and
the philo-Laconian world at the time, and barely recognised
as a fait accompli till long afterwards, see Isocr. Archid. 30,
101 foll.; Polyb. iv. 33 (in reference indeed to a later date,
b.c. 362, after Mantinea); (3) the loss of the Skiritis (at the
time, see Hell. VII. iv. 21); (4) the duration of the stay and
the concerns meanwhile of Epaminondas and the army before
evacuating Peloponnesus, Diod. xv. 67; Plut. Ages. 32.

[Grote, x. 306-320.]
B.C. 369-368.—(1) Athenian affairs outside Peloponnesus: Iphicrates's naval operations on the coast of Thrace and Macedonia, B.C. 368-365, and the achievements of Timotheus in those regions, B.C. 366-365; see authorities in Grote.

(2) Theban affairs outside Peloponnesus: according to Grote (x. 362), Pelopidas made four expeditions into Thessaly—two before 367 B.C., in B.C. 369 and B.C. 368, and two after, in B.C. 366 and B.C. 364-363; see Diod. xv. 71, 80; Plut. Pelop. 26, 27, 32.

...—Hell. VII. i. 27. How Philiscus's mission came about and what it led to. [Grote, x. 342-362.]

B.C. 367.—(1) Liberation of Naupactus and Calydon (which were held by Achaean garrisons), and enrolment of, among the allies of Thebes, a result, according to Diod. xv. 75, of Epaminondas's third invasion of Peloponnesus.

(2) The condition and politics of Sicyon after the trial and acquittal of Euphron's assassin, Hell. VII. iii. 12. [Grote, x. 366, 378.]

B.C. 366.—Affairs of Thebes and Athens in North Greece. Mission (in reference to the Persian rescript) of Pelopidas to Thessaly. He is seized and detained prisoner by Alexander of Pherae; see Polyb. viii. i. "Greatly impressed with the news, the Athenians looked upon Alexander as a second Jason, likely to arrest the menacing ascendancy of their neighbour and rival," Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 660, § 142. "They immediately despatched to his aid thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites under Autoklès." Despatch of an army from Thebes to rescue Pelopidas; its defeat and salvation by Epaminondas, then serving as a private. "Epaminondas accepted the duty (of general), marshalled the retreat in consummate order, took on himself the command of the rear-guard, beating off all the attacks of the enemy, and conducted the army back to Thebes," Diod. xv. 71. Triumph of Alexander in Thessaly, and discredit of Thebes. Harsh treatment of Pelopidas; second Theban army sent into Thessaly, under Epaminondas, for the rescue of Pelopidas, who is at length released by Alexander under a truce. It is perhaps strange that Xenophon, who knew a good deal about the Pheraean dynasty, and describes the death of Alexander, should not mention this matter (see Hell. VI. iv. 35). [Grote, x. 387-392.]

...—Hell. VII. iv. i. [Details in connection with the loss of Oropus. It would seem that we are to refer to this loss of Oropus the
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trial of Chabrias and Callistratus in Athens, together with the memorable harangue of the latter which Demosthenes heard as a youth with such strong admiration. See Rehdantz, *Vitae Iphicr. Chabr. et Tim.* pp. 109-114.]

[Grote, x. 393.]

B.C. 366.—[Epaninondas sent as envoy into Arcadia; he speaks against Callistratus. See Corn. Nep. Epam. 6; Plut. Reipub. Ger. Praec. 810 F; *Apophtheg. Reg.* 193 D. Grote conjectures that the speech of Callistratus in the Messenian Assembly referred to by Aristotle (*Rhet.* iii. 17, 14) was delivered now.]

[Grote, X. 395.]

. . .—*Hell.* VII. iv. 9. The Epidaurians not named along with the Corinthians and Phliasians as obtaining terms, but the historian says “the rest who came”; probably Epidaurus, Troezen, and Hermione were among the number.

[Grote, x. 400.]

. . .—[The fresh embassy sent by Athens to the Persian king, and the altered rescript from him, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian possession], as implied in Dem. F. L. p. 384, § 150; p. 420, § 283; *de Hal.* p. 84, § 30.

. . .—Timoteus sent with a fleet to Asia, and (only in *Ages.* ii. 26) concerning Agesilaus and the revolt of Ariobarzanes; conquest of Samos by Timoteus, Isocr. Or. xv. 118; Corn. Nep. Timoth. 1; Dem. de Rhod. Lib. p. 193, § 10; *c. Aristocr.* p. 666, § 165; p. 687, § 242; Polyaeus, vii. 26. Into these diplomatic and military matters the historian was qualified to enter.

[Grote, x. 402 foll.]

B.C. 365.—Partial admission to the Chersonese obtained by Timoteus; and as to Samos and the Chersonese, a new sphere obtained for kleruchies; Athenian settlers sent out with proprietary rights; difficulties in the case of the Chersonese, Diod. xviii. 8-18; Strab. xiv. 638; Dem. de Sym. p. 182, § 19. That the author of *The Revenues* would take an interest in this question seems obvious.

[Grote, x. 405-408.]

B.C. 365, 364-363.—The progress of (1) Athenian and (2) Theban affairs in the north during the war between Arcadia and Elis, and the discord which broke out within the League itself on its termination, as described in *Hell.* VII. iv. 12-40.

the coast of Macedonia and Chalcidice, but fails at Amphipolis. He acts, B.C. 363, against Cotys and near the Chersonese, where a Theban fleet appears (see authorities in Grote).

2) Epaminondas exhorts the Thebans to equip a fleet against Athens, Diod. xv. 78 (Aesch. F. L. p. 278, 32, ὃς δὲὶ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηνας ἀκροτήνεις προσφέρεια μετενεχθὰν ἐς τὴν προστασία τῆς Καμέλας, “the propylaea must be brought to the citadel of Cadmus”); discussion between Epaminondas and Menecleidas in the Theban assembly, Diod. xv. 78, 79; Corn. Nep. Epam. 5; Plut. Pelop. 25; de sui Laude, 542 A; Epaminondas in command of a Theban fleet in the Hellespont and Bosphorus, B.C. 363 (see Isocr. Or. v. 53; Diod. xv. 79), whilst Pelopidas at the same time attacks Alexander of Pherae; Pelopidas slain in the arms of victory; Alexander of Pherae subjugated, Diod. xv. 80, 81; Plut. Pelop. 31 foll.; Corn. Nep. Pelop. 5.

3) B.C. 364-363. Conspiracy of the knights of Orchomenus against Thebes; destruction of Orchomenus by the Thebans, and probably of Coronea also, see Diod. xv. 79; Dem. c. Lept. 121, p. 489; de Pace, p. 62, § 21; Philip II. p. 69, § 15; F. L. 122, p. 375; 162, p. 387; 373, p. 445. Repugnance excited against the Thebans; regret and displeasure of Epaminondas, Diod. xv. 57; Paus. ix. 15, 2. The historian is at least impartial in his silence. [Grote, x. 409-428.]

B.C. 363-362.—Return of Epaminondas from his cruise; renewed complications in Peloponnese, concerning which the historian has informed us well enough. We gather a few isolated facts from other authorities, e.g. the story concerning

B.C. 362.—[“the bravery of the Spartan Isidas, son of Phaebidas, who sallied forth naked,” etc.], as told in Plut. Ages. 34—one would like to know on whose authority. It is evidently a Spartan story, and not likelier, one would think, to have been known to Ephorus or Callisthenes than to Xenophon.

[Grote, x. 456.]

Grote says (x. 468, note 4), “That the Athenians were on the left in the battle we know from Xenophon, Hell. VII. v. 24, though he gives no complete description of the arrangement of the allies on either side.” “About the practice of the Thebans both at and after Leuctra to make their attack with the left, see Plut. Quaest. Rom. 282 D. The general arrangements of the other contingents we obtain only from
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Diodorus, xv. 85," and Diodorus probably follows Ephorus. See my note above, s. anno 371 B.C. One would have liked some such strategical observations from Xenophon as an expert and concerning the order of battle generally. Xenophon’s conclusion of the work is, I think, masterly.

IN REFERENCE TO THE COMPOSITION OF

HELLENICA B AND C

(A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE)

_Hell. B_, i.e. the Hellenic History down to the _Peace of Antalcidas_, B.C. 387, was still in process of composition as late as B.C. 384, since Pausanias, whose death is spoken of in III. v. 25, p. 39, was still alive in B.C. 384 (V. ii. 5, p. 102; see further for this argument vol. i. p. lxiii.). When Pausanias died is uncertain. But before that work was published—I do not say concluded—and before the idea of continuing it in _Hell. C_ had been fully realised by the historian, another "change," if I may so speak (see vol. i. p. 75, note 1), "came o'er the spirit of his dream" during the years B.C. 383-379; so that when the historian had fully embarked on the latter volume, his thoughts were strongly coloured by the contemplation of the gradual declension of Sparta as the result of _"Τύβρις visited by Νέμεσις_. The following dates are important:—

B.C. 383. The seizure of the Cadmeia, _"Τύβρις_.
B.C. 379. The deliverance of Thebes, Νέμεσις.

In B.C. 374 the reaction had commenced in the ever-growing anti-Theban feeling at Athens, which took practical effect after Leuctra, B.C. 371, and the first Theban invasion of B.C. 370-369.

If this was the feeling at Athens what would Xenophon have felt? According to my theory he was now beginning to collect (or to sift and sort already collected) material for _Hell. C_; which work is more and more restricted in its latter part to a presentation of the struggle from a Peloponnesian point of view. The point of view is adopted partly from inclination, partly because the materials are readier to hand, and partly on artistic grounds. I will add here


B.C.
400-398. Athens follows the lead of Sparta perforce as her subject ally (pp. 2, 17).
398-397. Her emancipation secretly maturing; Pharnabazus and Conan (Didot, _Ctesiæ fr._ 29, § 63).
397-396. [Lukewarmness re Agesilaus’s expedition] (Paus. iii. 9, 2).
396. Beginning of ὁ περὶ Ράδων πόλεμος; first campaign of Agesilaus (p. 24 foll.).
The Boeotian party dominant.

Athens joins the confederacy and goes to war with Sparta, etc.

### B.C. 395
First success of the Boeotian party; aid to be sent to Thebes (pp. 32, 37).

### B.C. 394
Athenian contingents at 'Nemea' and 'Coronea'; Conon at 'Cnidus.'

### B.C. 393
Athenians, Boeotians, Argives, etc., make Corinth their base versus Sicyon (p. 58); rebuilding of Long Walls by Conon (p. 80).

### B.C. 392
Athenian garrison in Corinth; Iphicrates and his peltasts (p. 62 foll.); Antalcidas and the first idea of autonomy (p. 82).

### B.C. 391
[Peace negotiations between Athens and Sparta at Sparta—its terms.] See Curtius (Eng. tr. iv. 259), for position of parties in Hellas.

Andocides, head of Peace (or aristocratic) Party, advocates separation from the allies, and agreement with Sparta. This is not emphasised by Xenophon, though in favour of Lacedaemon and _pro tanto_ against the 'partisan theory.' Xenophon refers to something of the sort in his sketch of naval affairs _sub an._ 390 (al. 392) (Hell. IV. v.; see note 5, p. 64, and note i, p. 82).

### B.C. 390
[Broken off by _ol βουωτίδικωρες_ and democrats. Andocides banished.] Athens and Rhodes (p. 83); Athens and Evagoras (p. 85); Cyprian war (B.C. 390-380 or 379, al. 386-376).

### B.C. 389
Exploits of Thrasybulus; renewal of Athenian power in the Hellespont (p. 85 foll.); influence of Argos dominant in Corinth (p. 88).

### B.C. 388
[Speech of Lysias at Olympia (al. 384); Aristoph, _Ploutos._] Athens and Aegina (p. 90); Chabrias (p. 93); surprise of Piraeus (p. 95).

### B.C. 387
Desire for peace at Athens (p. 97); Peace of Antalcidas (see Jebb, ii. 151), (pp. 97-100). This peace 'without honour' was all the same "a masterpiece of diplomatic skill" (Curt. iv. 278).

(End of Hell. B).

Laconising party dominant.

A blank in Attic history (B.C. 386-383). Sparta versus Thebes and Argos (p. 99). [Persian gains (Curt. iv. 279); Plataeae rebuilt by Sparta as a stronghold against Thebes.]
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The Boeotian party recovers power.

385. The 'ΤΒΡΙΣ of Sparta Sparta and Mantinea (p. 101 foll.).

384. engenders 'ATH seizure of the Cadmeia; three hundred Thebans escape to Athens (p. 109); Olynthus, Athens, and Boeotia (p. 104).

383. The Laconizing party recovers power.

382. and brings down the wrath of Heaven. Sparta and Olynthus (p. 111 foll.); Iphicrates, Cotys.

381. Telentias slain, ὑρισθῆλες (p. 113).

380. NEMΕΣΙΣ, Liberation of Thebes (p. 121 foll.); Θη-βαίκος πόλεμος begins (— b.c. 371); Phlius and Olynthus surrender.

379. "Ὑβρίς, Sphodrias’s attempt on Piraeus (p. 128).

378. The new naval confederacy. [Athenian finance reform; establishment of twenty συμμορφαί for payment of ἐλατορά (war-tax) collected by the state.] New naval confederacy, σύνταξις (Rev. v. 6, p. 346).

377. Third invasion of Boeotia by Lac. under Agesilaus (p. 132 foll.); [Thebes begins to reorganise Boeotian confederacy.]

376. A detachment of Thebans and Athenians occupy Cithaeron (p. 134); battle of [Naxos] (p. 135).

375. Growth of Theban power (p. 135; cf. Rev. v. 7, p. 346); Timotheus, his periplus (p. 135).

374. Jason of Pherae Tagos of Thessaly; Athens annoyed with Thebes in reference to the maintenance of the fleet (p. 143 foll.).

373. Peace with Sparta, which does not last. Destruction of Plataeae by Thebes (Isocr. Plat.; Hell. VI. iii. i. p. 152). Timotheus at Corcyra, afterwards Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Callistratūs.

372. Speeches of Callias, Autocles, and Callistratus (sub Callistrati persona loquitur Xenophon?) at Sparta (p. 153 foll.).

371. Peace ‘ of Callias’—Leuctra—Spartan cavalry defective—Congress at Athens—new Athenian confederacy on the basis of autonomy (p. 169)—Athenian hegemony party incline to a philo-Laconian foreign policy.

370. Athens after Leuctra aspires to hegemony.

369. Iphicrates at Oneion—Proposal of Cephisodotus that Athens and Sparta should exercise command alternately—Dionysius I. of Syracuse.

368. (Beginning of the end—διάλυσις of the dream of Theban ἀρχή ending in ταραχή), (p. 192 foll.). Lycomedes
and the Arcadians—Divergence of views concerning the employment of Dionysius's second reinforcement on the part of Athens and Sparta (p. 194)—Split among the Peloponnesian powers allied to Thebes—Pelopidas, the arch-diplomat (p. 196).

367. Conference at Thebes—Autonomy to be applied against Sparta (Hell. VII. i. 36 foll.)—Thebes fails to win support of the states (p. 198).

366. Loss of Oropus—Athens isolated makes treaty with Arcadian League—Corinth, cold to Athens,—along with Philus, etc., makes a neutrality-treaty with Thebes (p. 212 foll.).

Eleio-Arcadian war.

365. Eleio-Lacedaemonian alliance versus Arcadians (p. 217 foll.).

Maximum of Arcadian, Argive, Messeno-Theban power in Peloponnesus—Cromnus captured. [Timothæus reduces Samos (where κληροδοχοί are established), Sestos, and Crithôtè.]

364. Battle at Olympia (p. 221).

Beginning of the end of pan-Arcadian unity. The split which divides the states, βέλτιστοι versus democrats, is occasioned by the question of pay to the Eparitoi and the use of the Olympian treasure for the purpose. Formation of an anti-Theban Peloponnesian party in which some Arcadian states, e.g. Mantinea, take the lead under their βέλτιστοι versus other states, e.g. Tegea, which under the democrats adhere to Thebes. [Timothæus succeeds to the command of Iphicrates in Thrace: takes Methônè, Pydna, Potidaea, Torônè.]

363. οἱ κηδήμοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου party (Hell. VII. iv. 33, p. 223)—The split between Tegean Democrats and Mantinean Aristocrats—Theban harmost at Tegea. [Campaign of Timothæus against Cotys and Byzantium—his return to Athens.]


(End of Hell. C).

Appendix.

362-36r. The first συμμορία pay down the war-tax προεισφορά, and collect contributions from the inferior symmories (see B.C. 378).

361. Callistratos flies to Thasos—Athenian hegemony and war party dominant under Aristophon. [Archidamus succeeds Agesilas (aliter alii, see p. lxi.).]

360. Athens supports Orontes against the King Artaxerxes Mnemon.
INTRODUCTION

b.c.
359. Xenophon finishing Hellenica (see Hell. VI. iv. 37).
Death of Artaxerxes Mnemon—Accession of Artaxerxes
Ochus—Accession of Philip—Cotys murdered—His
son Cersoleptes succeeds.
358. Athenians alarm their naval allies by self-regarding
policy (see Comment on Minor Works—Revenues).
357. Chios, Cos, Rhodes, Byzantium revolt—Social war—
Philip takes Amphipolis—Treaty between Chares and
Cersoleptes—Thracian Chersonese (except Cardia)
ceded to Athens—Third form of trierarchy by sym-
mories.
356. Philip takes Potidaea—Alexander the Great born—
Delphi occupied by the Phocians—Chares defeats a
Persian force.
Athenian peace party.
355. The historian writes his Revenues—End of Social war
—Sacred war begun.
354 (?). The historian dies at Corinth probably—Eubulus
finance minister—Callistratus returns to Athens.

MOMENTA OF THE HELLENIC HISTORY (HELL. III. I, I-V. I, 36; AND HELL,
The historian’s predominant view of affairs—His guiding political senti-
ment a complex of ideas dipsychically opposed, or one gradually mer-
ing into the other (see note on the Historian’s Method).

In Hellenica B.

(1) Conquest of Persia.—A magnificent Anabasis; everything is ready:
Hell. III. i.-IV. i., A pan-Hellenic movement under Lacedaemon, the leading
pp. 1-47,
state of Hellas (the Lacedaemonians are the admitted
An. 493-394 B.C. προστασία at this date), and the Heracleid Agesilaus.
The writer’s personal interests are concerned; his knowledge of the country,
cavalry, tribes, serves him as a passport; his φιλοτιμία carries him on; he
writes like a modern war correspondent.
After the blow of the recall he proceeds with more aloofness (or out of
philetairic admiration for Agesilaus). The absorbing interest is now

(2) The struggle between Lacedaemon and the Coalition
by land and (with less detail) by sea, by war and diplomatic action, which
struggle ends triumphantly for the leading state of Hellas.
Hell. IV. ii.-V. i. 36,
The historian either ignores1 or fails to recognise the
pp. 47-100,
seeds of dissolution in the system, which will afterwards be
An. 394-387 B.C.
patent enough. To him Sparta reaches the zenith of her
power at the Peace of Antalcidas, B.C. 387.
A further contradiction: ‘The Persian’ is no longer the enemy of
Hellas. He is the friend (or tool) of Lacedaemon. Does the historian feel
the shame? If so, he conceals his feelings. Or is it swallowed up and
cancelled dipsychically, through his counter-desire for Hellenic unity (under
the hegemony of Sparta, or Sparta and Athens, or rather the βέλτιστοι of
the leading states)? For this feeling cf. Lysias, Olymp., B.C. 388.

1 See his own remarks in Pol. Lac.
In Hellenica C.

(1) *The Nέμεσις* which (in B.C. 379, 371, and the winter of B.C. 370-369) *Hell. V.* ii. i-VI. iv. 16, fell upon Lacedaemon in consequence of the "Τβρές exhibited by her in the intoxication of unlimited power (B.C. 387) (pp. 107-110), especially in the case of the seizure of the Cadmeia (B.C. 383), which the historian emphatically notes as the peripety of the plot (p. 119).

This "Τβρές—though the historian does not exactly emphasise the fact, whether as being conscious or unconscious of it, i.e. choosing to ignore it or failing to recognise it, as a matter of art or political bias—is seen working in reference to Mantinea, Philus, Olynthus, Thebes, from B.C. 387 to B.C. 383; and again in B.C. 378, the attempt of Sphodrias; and again in B.C. 371, the Peace of Callias (a reduplication of the Peace of Antakidas as concerning Lacedaemon and Thebes). In the case of the seizure of the Cadmeia (B.C. 383) he emphatically does note it.

This *Nέμεσις* begins to operate in B.C. 379, the deliverance of Thebes (so the hybristic attempt of Sphodrias, B.C. 378, p. 124, finds its retributive contre-coup in the new naval confederacy and Atheno-Theban alliance), and reaches its full force in B.C. 371, "an unseen power driving them onwards" *Hell. VI.* iv. 17-VI. v. 52, (p. 158) to the terrible disaster of Leuctra, B.C. 371, pp. 167-185, followed by the pan-Arcadian movement and the founding of Megalopolis, the Athenian hegemony movement, the first Theban invasion, etc. For the feeling against Sparta, and the idea of a union of states, cf. Isocr. *Panegyr.* , B.C. 380.

That is his first motif (absorbing idea, leading theme, or whatever we ought to call it), but it is speedily swallowed up, unless we ought to say gradually transmuted, as the historian becomes absorbed in the topic (quick with interest, *partium favor, fautoris studium*):

(2) The struggle between the Northern and the Southern Powers, engendering *ταραχή καὶ ἀκραία*, to the disintegration of *ἀρχή*. These Powers are

(a) in the first instance—

Lacedaemon with (1) Athens (after B.C. 369);

against

Thebes* (Boeotia) with (x) her extra-Peloponnesian northern allies;

(2) her Peloponnesian allies (Argos, the old rival of Sparta, and the now hostile, formerly allied, states)

(b) eventually—

Under the disintegrating forces of *φθόνος* (state-rivalry between the states) (e.g. re Elis and Arcadia) and opposite political theory (of the *βελτιστοι* versus the democrats within the states composing the Arcadian league or other) and the new ‘elective affinities’ (see Trans. vol. i., Sketch, p. cxxvi.)

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1 See p. 196. The problem working in the minds of the Thebans was how to compass the headship of Hellas.
INTRODUCTION

Thebes (Boeotia) with (x) her northern extra-Peloponnesian allies (Phocis less actively, but Thessaly added eventually); (x) the four democratic states of the Arcadian League headed by Tegea; the old rival of Sparta, Argos; and the new state of Messene.

Against the coalition of the five great Powers,
- The Lacedaemonians,
- The Arcadians (i.e. the βΔλτιστου-led states, Mantinea and the rest forming the party ηλ τΗς Πελοποννήσου κηδόμενοι),
- The Achaeans,
- The Eleians, and
- The Athenians.

The writer's final mood therefore is at once detached religiously (see above, p. xxx.) and 'prejudiced' politically. This anti-Theban feeling is common; he is not singular in the matter. Cf. Isocr. Plataikos, b.c. 373.

There are two passages which show at once his sentiment (animus) and his σύνεσις πολιτική.

α. The one is about Pelopidas and the failure on the part of Thebes to resuscitate the (Athalcidias) diplomatic instrument in favour of herself as against Lacedaemon, by a turning of the diplomatic tables on her (the principle of autonomy applied to Messene, etc.), b.c. 368, Hell. VII. i. 39, 40. "The striving after empire on the part of Pelopidas and the Thebans was dispelled—διελύθη" p. 198.

N.B.—This is the minor-peripety of Hell. C, in the case of Thebes; see above for that of the whole history, Hell. B and C, in the case of Sparta.

β. The other, the concluding passage of the work in reference to the ironic working of Providence, the παρα προσθοκλαν as regards human intention and divine disposition, instead of an ἀρχὴ renewed ἀναρχία, b.c. 362, Hell. VII. v. 26, p. 233.

NOTE.—As to how the ταξιχῇ arose. The beginning of the end of her dream of empire on the part of Thebes, "the little rift within the lute," is the aspiration after the hegemony of Peloponnese on the part of the Arcadians under the influence of Lycomedes (Hell. VII. i. 23, p. 192), b.c. 398, and the jealousy of the other Peloponnesian Powers, hitherto united among themselves, and in support of their champion leader Thebes against Lacedaemon. See the historian's remark ἀργως of the 'tearless' victory (p. 196), about the Thebans and the Eleians.

For a further symptom of ταξιχῇ see the cross relations Corinth and Athens; Athens and the Arcadians, b.c. 366, Hell. VII. iv. 6, p. 214.

As to (α) the historian's religious detachment, see what he says (definitely states, or hints at silently) about Jason, the Eleians, Euphron, Lycomedes, Philiscus, Pelopidas, Epaminondas, vide Index s.n.

(β) As to the historian's partisanship, see what he says about Philus (a panegyric from a Lacedaemonian point of view); and note the detail (versus curtailment or actual omission of counter-topic) of the long speeches put into the mouth of Procles in two successive debates.
On the Minor Works included in this Volume—
A Comment

To the four compositions before us one general remark applies.¹ Rightly or wrongly attributed to the pen of Xenophon himself, their discussion cannot fail to throw some light on the literary genius of the writer with whose name they have been associated from ancient times; whilst, apart from the question of authorship, each in turn will be found to possess an intrinsic interest, if only as a literary product of the period at which (or close to which) its reputed author lived.²

The "Agesilaus"

Thus it may be considered certain that the encomium³ was written shortly after the death of Agesilaus (which, according to different computations, occurred between B.C. 361 and B.C. 358); and whilst 'the Persian' was still a formidable power. In point of date, therefore, this work may well have been a product of Xenophon's last years, and, apart from the question who wrote it, is a remarkable piece of

¹ And indeed is applicable to the remaining Xenophontis opuscula (even including the Apologia), which will engage our attention in my third volume.
² Or, considering the dates assigned by one critic or another to the several works, perhaps one ought to say: "of a period not widely separated in spirit, if in date distinct, from that at which its reputed author lived."
³ The Polity of the Athenians, not uncommonly regarded "as the earliest specimen of Attic prose and not by Xenophon," is assigned by many moderns to B.C. 425-424 circa, by others to a much later date not incompatible with Xenophontine authorship, and by Bernhardy to Macedonian times.

The Polity of the Lacedaemonians is commonly assigned to B.C. 378 circa.

The Agesilaus to B.C. 357 circa (i.e. to a date between B.C. 361 or 358 circa, the death of Agesilaus, and B.C. 338, Chaeronea, or B.C. 323, the destruction of the Persian empire at latest. See Ages. vii. 7).

The Revenues to B.C. 355 (or to a date as early as B.C. 422 if we are to believe Schneider, or as late as B.C. 346 according to H. Hagen).

³ The latest but one of the four, as I believe, in date, but a work so closely connected in several ways with the Hellenica that I have placed it, out of its chronological order, first.
writing, which some (of whom Cicero \(^1\) is the chief) have extravagantly praised, and others (in modern times) have no less extravagantly blamed.

To Cicero, who felt in it the touch of a master-hand, “this one little book of Xenophon’s” seemed, “for its flattering delineation of the king, its subject, easily to excel all the portrait-pictures and statues that ever were,” yet it has come to be regarded in the eyes of many an able critic \(^2\) among ourselves as the sophistical production of a pedant—a student perhaps of rhetoric, whose want of taste can only be forgiven in consideration of his lack of years.

Here, then, apart from the question of genuineness, is a remarkable divergence of critical opinion. Nor, as far as we can judge, did Cicero stand alone in his appreciation of the literary qualities of the Agesilaus. That all the ancient writers\(^3\) who refer to it regarded it with the admiration of Cicero is perhaps too much to assume. What we are warranted to suppose is that from the days of Aristotle down to the sixth

\(^1\) In the famous “valde bella” epistola (as he names it himself, \textit{ad Att. IV. vi.}), addressed to the historian Lucceius (in May B.C. 58), urging his friend to make an historical study of his life from the conspiracy of Catiline until his return from exile: “Even though you once wrote in a certain proem that you could be no more affected by favouritism (gratia) than the Xenophontine Hercules by pleasure (in reference to \textit{Mem. II. i. 21} fol.), yet, si me (gratia) tibi vehementius commendabitis, ne asperneris amorique nostro plusculum etiam quam concedit veritas, largiere;” and a little lower down the passage with which we are concerned at present, “Nec minus est Spartiates Agesilas ille peribendus, qui neque pictam neque fictam imaginem suam passius est esse” (in reference to \textit{Ages. xi. 7}; see below, p. 269, “Whilst he would not suffer any image of his bodily form to be set up... he never ceased elaborating what should prove the monument of his spirit”)

“quam qui in eo genere elaborarunt. \textit{Unus enim Xenophonis libellus in eo rege laudando facile omnes imaginem omnium statuasque superavit}.” (\textit{Ep. ad Div. V. xii. 3 and 7}). I assume that Cicero’s copy of the Agesilaus did not differ greatly from our version.

\(^2\) From the frigidus Agesilai laudator et sophista of Valckenær (\textit{ad Herod. iii. 134}) down to the scripтор in schola quadam Isocratea eruditus puerulus of J. J. Hartman; see \textit{An. Xen. cap. xi. de Agesilao libello} (a work to which I owe much, and a chapter well deserving the careful attention of every one interested in the matter).

\(^3\) Apart from a doubtful reference to the work in Isocrates’s letter to Archidams (\textit{Ep. ad Archid. i}), the most ancient is that of Dicæarchus, the peripatetic (ob. (?) B.C. 285) (a pupil of Aristotle and friend of Theophrastus), the loss of whose works, and especially of his \textit{βλος τῆς Ἑλλάδος}, is “one of the most severe in Greek literature.”
century of our era all sorts of authorities\(^1\) were cognisant of its existence, and as a work, we must presume of Xenophon's, which they were free to praise or blame. None of those writers—neither Dicaearchus of Messene as quoted by Plutarch,\(^2\) nor Dionysius of Halicarnassus, nor Demetrius Magnes, nor Cornelius Nepos, nor Plutarch himself, nor Athenaeus, nor Themistius, nor Aristides the rhetorician, nor Priscian the grammarian—appears to have detected in it that 'sophistic' ring which grates so harshly on the modern ear; nor did any one of them chance to lay his finger on those peculiarities of \textit{technique} which are a stumbling-block to the modern editor.

Of these it is time to speak more definitely, and in the first place concerning what may be called the structural peculiarities of the composition; which, even in a translation, are plainly visible. It will be observed that (1) with the exception of verbal differences and a variation in the rhythm of the sentences (which, however, are by no means unimportant or uninteresting), the whole of the earlier portion, in which the encomiast recounts the deeds of Agesilaus, consists of a reproduction of passages from the \textit{Hellenic History}.\(^3\) The question is, would Xenophon have so levied toll upon

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\(^1\) It is a long list, beginning with Dicaearchus or perhaps Isocrates, and I forbear to burthen this note with the references, which are given clearly in another work to which I owe much. See G. Sauppe, vol. v., Praefatio (to the \textit{Agesilas}), p. 126, \textit{de fide et auctoritate libri disputatio}.

\(^2\) In his life of Agesilaus, in reference to Xen. \textit{Ages.} viii. 7, ἀκουσάτω δὲ ὃς ἐπὶ πολιτικὸν καννάδρον κατηγε ἐλὶ Ἀμύκλας ἡ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ. [The words ἡ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ, by the way, were supplied (by Casaubon) from Plutarch, a fact for the epitomists which Kuprianos did not fail to note. Possibly Plutarch's copy of the \textit{Agesilas} was fuller than ours]. ‘‘His daughter's \textit{canathrum}, says Xenophon, was no richer than that of any one else. . . . Xenophon has not left us the name of this daughter of Agesilaus, and Dicaearchus expresses some indignation because we do not know, he says, the name of Agesilaus's daughter nor of Epaminondas's mother. But in the records of Laconia” (these ἀναγράμματα, no doubt, were of great use to Plutarch) ‘‘we ourselves found his wife's name to have been Cleora, and his two daughters to have been called Eupolia and Prolyta.”—Plut. \textit{Ages.} 19. (Clough, iv. 23).

\(^3\) \textit{i.e.}, \textit{Ages.} i. 6-ii. 31 \| \textit{Hell.} III. iv., and IV. ii. iii. in part. It is commonly assumed that the encomiast borrows from the historian, and not \textit{vice versa}. It is, however, suggested by the epitomists that both versions are derived from a common source—to wit, the original \textit{Hellenica} ; and,
himself? (2) A second structural peculiarity is the addition of chapter xi. This chapter is certainly not recapitulatory. It is added, if I take the author's meaning, as a sort of *memoria technica*,¹ or table of his hero's virtues; and necessitates a second and final peroration. From the point of view of artistic arrangement, is such an appendix defensible? But defects of this sort, it must be admitted, are a proof at worst of incompleteness. The sculptor, if I may once more avail myself of Lucian's metaphor,² has admitted us into his workshop. The statue has not yet attained its final beauty; some limbs are waiting articulation. Who knows but that either through lack of creative power of the highest order, or under press of time or other like exigency, the artist Xenophon himself may have failed to give the final touches to his creation?

A greater puzzle still to the modern critic than any structural incongruity, is the presence, in the soul and substance of the work, of a quality which, rightly or wrongly, is felt to contradict the plainness and simplicity of Xenophon. What are we to make of that?

Though I have so stated the difficulty from the modern point of view, I admit that here I find myself at issue with recent criticism. I do not certainly deny that simplicity according to Kuprianos, the *Agesilaus* is the nearer of the two to that original. This explanation of the matter must stand or fall with the epitome theory as a whole.

¹ ὃς δὲν ὅ ἑπαινος εὕμνημονεστέρως ἔχῃ. Did he possibly intend the chapter to be committed to memory with a view to recitation on some state occasion such as that referred to in i. 2 (p. 237 below)? The *Agesilaus*, it should be borne in mind, is prose of the "commemoration ode" type. Compare the language of Isocrates, *on the Antidosis*, 319. I quote from Professor Jebb's paraphrase: "First, it must be remembered that there are as many branches of prose as of poetry. Some prose writers have spent their lives in tracing the genealogies of heroes. Others have been critics of the poets. Others have compiled histories of wars. Others have woven discourses into dialogues. My work has been in yet another field—in the composition of discourses bearing upon the politics of all Hellas, and fitted for recitation at Pan-Hellenic gatherings (πανηγυρικῶς λόγους). Such discourses stand nearer to poetry than to prosaic rhetoric. Their language is more imaginative and more ornate" (*Att. Or. ii. p. 137*).

² In his essay already quoted above on the right method of writing history, πῶς δεῖ, 48: τὸ σῶμα ἀκαλλῆς ἐτί καὶ ἀδιάφρωτον.
and a dislike of meretricious ornament are true characteristics of Xenophon's style. But I am perpetually aware of another element of his art which, for want of a better word, I have ventured to call his euphuistic tendency.\(^1\) This quality in him has its good and its less good side. At its best it adds a grace like that of poetry to his well-cadenced prose. The magic of his speech at such times is like that of the Elizabethans. Instinct with emotion, it can give a new dignity to the commonplace. Or again, it seeks to impose upon our minds with verbal antitheses and to charm our ears with plays on words and sonorous nothings.\(^2\) Here we begin to suspect it. In the last degree it is as if the writer had set himself to caricature his own style. The modern critic naturally exclaims: "This is the work of an imitator!"

The object of this digression is to point out that many of the things which offend the modern critic in the diction of the Agesilacus find their parallel in the other writings of Xenophon. That, it may be said, is admitted; only in this particular writing there is so great a multitude of niaiseries. In answer to which I fall back upon the nature of the composition. If a speech attributed to some character in history\(^3\) or the panegyric of a small people pronounced by the historian himself suffice to admit them, what scope would not be given to such a tendency by the very occasion of a panegyric?\(^4\) But I do not deny that various particular difficulties exist which I cannot explain. As a matter of convenience, I will speak of

\(^1\) This manner is visible in very many parts of Xenophon. It is a mark, I think, of his later style. The Cyropaedia is full of it. See Trans. vol. i. p. xli.

\(^2\) One is occasionally reminded of Shakespeare's manner in Xenophon—Xenophon at his best; and when Xenophon is at his worst in this matter, we can still draw a parallel from the occasional lapses of the greatest of euphuists, "quandoque bonus dormitat."

\(^3\) See Polydamas's speech, Hell. VI. i. 2 foll.; and the historian's praise of the Phliasians, Hell. VII. ii. 1 foll.

\(^4\) And that the encomium of so great a man, since, in the eyes of more than half of Hellas at the time, the death of Agesilacus was the removal of their greatest national hero; and whether we share their admiration for the man or not, from that point of view we must needs judge the language of the encomiast, which is not fulsome like that of a flatterer, but effusive with the warmth of a genuine admiration. "

\[\text{Ἀραιάρτηγος, "without offence committed," he has departed and is truly blest. The epithet has caused offence itself, but it}

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these in the footnote,¹ and conclude my remarks with a statement of my own position.

On the whole, my belief is, that the Agesilaus is genuine. In spite of exaggerated phrase and amorphous structure (two is pardonable. Compare the language of our own θρησκός (not that the Agesilaus is a θρησκός—a point denied by its author—but the occasion is parallel):

"The last great Englishman is low.
Mourn, for to us he seems the last,
Remembe ring all his greatness in the Past."

¹ To name, in the first place, the two passages which are to me the most inexplicable. I cannot understand the words ἔτι νέος ὅν in i. 6. Agesilaus, being over forty (see Plut. Ages. 40; Hell. V. iv. 13) when he obtained the kingdom, was scarcely 'still a youth,' unless we are to suppose that νέος = juvenis. But they would be equally puzzling by whomsoever written. Nor, again, can I understand the words τοῖς ψελαΐς in ii. 20, a passage parallel to Hell. IV. vi. 11. The pass, according to the historian, was stormed distinctly by the first and second ranks of the hoplites. It is odd if, later in life, and with the passage before him, the historian should have pictured that dashing charge as performed by the light troops. It certainly looks as if some one ignorant of military terms had penned the passage thinking that τοῖς ψελαΐς might be used as the equivalent of heavy infantry without their heavy shields, like the word εὐθώνως in Anab. VII. iii. 46. I suppose there is no doubt that it cannot. Is it conceivable that Xenophon, writing his encomium 'to order,' as it were, and on the spur of the moment in anticipation of some ceremonial, entrusted the duty of arranging the 'historical' portion of the encomium, so far as preparing 'slips,' etc., to his amanuensis, just as a great painter might leave it to a pupil to finish some portion of a figure? But this is a wild theory. In any case these are the only two insuperable difficulties. The rest seem to me explicable either (1) as licenses permitted by the nature of the work, or (2) as little pieces of private knowledge excluded from the history as unworthy of the subject or for want of space, and, lastly (3), on the principle of euphuistic phraseology, to which Xenophon was prone. The passages so arranged are:

(1) i. 3, οὐ δεύτερων πρωτεύουσιν, κ.τ.λ. The words are not strictly correct in that Lacedaemon lost and never really again recovered her hegemony after Leuctra. But that fact is scarcely realised anno 358 B.C. circa.

ii. 9. 'Coronea,' it is pointed out, was eclipsed by 'Mantinea,' and the words which were natural enough when the historian wrote Hell. B are somewhat out of place now. But it was still true that certain features of 'Coronea' distinguished it beyond all the other battles of his time.

ii. 21. Scarcely historical as regards the Thebans at the Peace of Antalcidas.

ii. 24, ἀφετηρίας μὲν τῶν δοῦλων ... λειτουρητών. There are two points: (a) as to the revolt of the slaves, the historian himself, in his panegyric of the Phliasians (Hell. VII. ii. 2), tells the same tale, ἀποστάντων δὲ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήστων, though in VI. v. 8 he minimises
defects which occur elsewhere in the writings of Xenophon as handed down to us), it is instinct with his spirit. It says concerning his heroic friend almost exactly what I should have expected him to say in a composition of this order. And as

the danger; (β) as to the Spartans slain at Leuctra (cf. Hell. VII. v. 28), the language is strangely ambiguous, unless, indeed, with Breitenbach, we are to understand by λειτομένων e pugna superstition.

(2) i. 10, parallel to Hell. III. iv. 5 (p. 25). "Three months" may well be an addition due to personal knowledge. Xenophon was probably with Agesilaus at the time, B.C. 396.

ii. 1, parallel to Hell. IV. ii. 8. "In a month," i.e. twelve times as fast as the Persian.

ii. 10, δὺ Ἡρακλῆς ἐξενάγει, parallel to Hell. IV. iii. 15. See also Hell. III. iv. 20 for the troops taken out by Agesilaus to Asia. Some of these (possibly four thousand out of the original six thousand forming the στρατήμα of the allies) were left in Asia on his return. At Coronea, as it appears, Herippidas as ἐξεναγός (see Thuc. ii. 75, Arnold's note) commanded this moieties the Cyreians.

vii. 6, parallel to Hell. IV. v. 3. "Noluit," says the encomiast; "non potuit," says the historian (and the encomiast himself, ii. 18), 'Corinthum expugnare'; but the story of the exiles and their engines is quite compatible with the historical version.

(3) Some of these 'euphuisms' are pleasing enough, others sound to me artificial; but in the writers of the sixtieth century a similar difficulty arises; and after all, 'taste' counts for a great deal, and tastes proverbially differ (e.g. curiously enough, the passage, x. 1, p. 267, which Valckenier (ad Herod. ix. 27) thinks is worthier of a sophist than of Xenophon, is selected by Mr. Mahaffy, Hist. of Class. Gr. Lit. vol. ii. p. 270 [ed. 1880], x. 435, as "an elegantly finished period"). To distinguish between what is good and bad in taste is especially hard, I suppose, in a foreign language.

iv. 4, οἱ πρώτα καὶ τεταύθρες, Trans. p. 256, 'the recipient of gratuitous kindness,' is to my ear somewhat of 'a vile phrase.'

vi. 2. The word-play and jingle of sound between μημεία and σημεία, I confess, please me (see Trans. p. 259, 'monuments' and 'marks'); and so does the phrase μάχη αὐτιτύψισ above (cf. Coriolanus, IV. v. 116, "the anvil of my sword").

vi. 3. The passage about trophies seems to me a little forced.

vi. 6. I rather like the word-play ἔχυρα ἀνώχυρα.

vi. 7, Trans. p. 260. Mr. Mahaffy criticises the sentence νομίζειν... δυσεπισθευεττατον as "perhaps the worst possible specimen of Gorgian alliteration." I confess I do not like the sound of the sesquiternaria verba; but what would a modern Greek say? The sense appears to me better than the sound.

viii. 7, θεοσάθω, πειράσθω, ἐννοησάθω, ἀκοώσάθω. This passage offends my taste in some way. I especially resent πειράσθω. It must, however, be borne in mind that the Spartan kings are demigods, and in imagination we are visiting a semi-sacred spot.

viii. 8. The last sentence pleases me.
to the ‘defects,’ I account for them in one or other of two ways. It is to be borne in mind that, if he wrote it at all, he wrote ἵσχατόγηρος ὁ to when quite an old man; and though there is no reason to suppose that old age had in any respect dulled his spirit or warped his reason, he may well have suffered himself for the nonce to indite words which, with the opportunity of a revision, he might well have withdrawn. As I have already noted, the last portion of the Hellenica (Hell. C) seems to furnish evidence of like mannerism and a similar want of finish in parts. That is my first explanation, and my second resembles it. We do not know whether the work was published in Xenophon's lifetime or edited posthumously. Perhaps it is not Xenophon himself but his editors who are wholly or in part responsible for these blemishes.

THE TWO "POLITIES"

The Polity of the Athenians and the Polity of the Lacedaemonians, to which we now come, are works of a very different order. The question at once arises, Could the former of the two have been written by Xenophon? and, if not, how did it come to find its way within the canon of his writings? I have no answer to give to either question. All I can do is to state as briefly as possible the reason of my belief as expressed on p. xlix. of my former volume: “I agree

ix. 1. And so does the ‘euphuistic’ word-play of κάλλος κόσμον: the sentence is a very pretty one, quite spoiled in translation.

Two other observations I have to make in conclusion:

vi. 6 is a reduplication, as it were, of Hell. VI. i. 5, a passage concerning Jason; but such borrowings from himself are quite in Xenophon's manner. The particular passage is applicable to the archie man or Real Prince—now Cyrus, now Jason, now Agesilaus.

vii. 7, concerning the Persian king, to my mind is quite in the manner of Xenophon. Whether it be Darius the Great, or Xerxes, or Artaxerxes Mnémon, or Ochus—no matter—'the Persian' in the abstract is what he is thinking of, and dreaming the while his old dream of a pan-Hellenic conquest of the arch-enemy’s empire.

1 The last chapter itself is highly finished and impressive. See above, p. xxvii.

2 See Trans. vol. i. p. cxxiv. note 3.
with those critics who accept the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* but reject that of the *Athenians*:

At the end of the canon preserved by Diogenes Laertius and based, as it would appear, on information derived, in part or altogether, from Demetrius Magnes (the grammarian friend of Cicero), “among the forty books or thereabouts, divided differently by different editors,” which were recognised as genuine works of Xenophon, are named “the tract on *Revenues, the Hiero* or *despotic man, the Agesilaus*, and (lastly, as if the two were one work) the *Polity of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians*, which Demetrius Magnes asserts is not by Xenophon.” So then it appears that at the time of Cicero some critics, on what grounds we know not, disputed the genuineness of the *Polities*, one or other, or both. This doubt being so set up in the mind, in the absence, if so it should prove,\(^1\) of any strong support from the outside (like that of Dicaearchus and the rest in favour of the *Agesilaus*), we are thrown back, as it were, entirely upon the internal evidence. As to the weight of this, every reader must judge for himself; thus much, however, may, I think, be stated without fear of contradiction, that whilst the *Polity of the Athenians* is altogether unlike in spirit and tone of thought and style to anything else ever attributed to Xenophon, that of the *Lacedaemonians*, though in certain respects it may be thought unworthy of the subject and of the writer, is at any rate highly Xenophonite in spirit and in

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\(^1\) The only references to the *Polity of the Athenians* in ancient times, apart from Diogenes Laertius (beginning of third century A.D.), are, I believe, passages in Pollux, the Atticist (end of second century A.D.), Stobaeus (beginning of sixth century), and Zonaras (at the beginning of the twelfth). With the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* it is different. That work is freely quoted (possibly from a more complete copy than ours) by Plutarch; and by Polybius, vi. 43 foll. (in his discussion and comparison of the Cretan and Lycurgan constitutions); by Longinus also (see below, p. 303), and by several later writers, including Photius (see G. Sauppe, Praef. Pol. Lac. p. 156). As to Polybius and his testimony in this matter, there is some reason for thinking that he is confusing Xenophon with Aristotle when he says: Ὅπλι δὲ τὴν Κρητικήν μεταβάντας, ἄξιον ἐπιστῆσαι κατὰ δύο τρόπους, πῶς οἱ λογίσται τῶν ἄρχοντων συγγραφέων Ἐφορόν, Ξενοφόντα, Καλλισθένης, καὶ Πλάτων πρῶτον μὲν ὡμολόγως εἶναι φασὶ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίᾳ δεύτερον ἐπαινεῖτίνυπάρχωσι άρχοντος, since Xenophon says nothing (in our Pol. Lac.) about the Cretan constitution, and Aristotle (*Pol.* ii.) says a good deal. On the other hand, Aristotle himself is thought to have had Xenophon’s work before him (see below, p. 307), though possibly, like Plutarch, in a fuller text than ours.
to the 'defects,' I account for them in one or other of two ways. It is to be borne in mind that, if he wrote it at all, he wrote ἐσχατὸγήρως ὄν when quite an old man; and though there is no reason to suppose that old age had in any respect dulled his spirit or warped his reason, he may well have suffered himself for the nonce to indite words which, with the opportunity of a revision, he might well have withdrawn. As I have already noted, the last portion of the Hellenica (Hell. C) seems to furnish evidence of like mannerism and a similar want of finish in parts.¹ That is my first explanation, and my second resembles it. We do not know whether the work was published in Xenophon's lifetime or edited posthumously. Perhaps it is not Xenophon himself but his editors who are wholly or in part responsible for these blemishes.²

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² See Trans. vol. i. p. cxlv. note 3.
with those critics who accept the Polity of the Lacedaemonians but reject that of the Athenians.”

At the end of the canon preserved by Diogenes Laertius and based, as it would appear, on information derived, in part or altogether, from Demetrius Magnes (the grammarian friend of Cicero), “among the forty books or thereabouts, divided differently by different editors,” which were recognised as genuine works of Xenophon, are named “the tract on Revenues, the Hiero or despotic man, the Agesilaus, and (lastly, as if the two were one work) the Polity of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, which Demetrius Magnes asserts is not by Xenophon.”

So then it appears that at the time of Cicero some critics, on what grounds we know not, disputed the genuineness of the Polities, one or other, or both. This doubt being so set up in the mind, in the absence, if so it should prove,¹ of any strong support from the outside (like that of Dicaearchus and the rest in favour of the Agesilaus), we are thrown back, as it were, entirely upon the internal evidence. As to the weight of this, every reader must judge for himself; thus much, however, may, I think, be stated without fear of contradiction, that whilst the Polity of the Athenians is altogether unlike in spirit and tone of thought and style to anything else ever attributed to Xenophon, that of the Lacedaemonians, though in certain respects it may be thought unworthy of the subject and of the writer, is at any rate highly Xenophontine in spirit and in

¹ The only references to the Polity of the Athenians in ancient times, apart from Diogenes Laertius (beginning of third century A.D.), are, I believe, passages in Pollux, the Atticist (end of second century A.D.), Stobaeus (beginning of sixth century), and Zonaras (at the beginning of the twelfth). With the Polity of the Lacedaemonians it is different. That work is freely quoted (possibly from a more complete copy than ours) by Plutarch; and by Polybius, vi. 43 foll. (in his discussion and comparison of the Cretan and Lycurgan constitutions); by Longinus also (see below, p. 303), and by several later writers, including Photius (see G. Sauppe, Praef. Pol. Lac. p. 156). As to Polybius and his testimony in this matter, there is some reason for thinking that he is confusing Xenophon with Aristotle when he says:  "Επὶ δὲ τὴν Κρητῶν μεταβάντας, ἅξιον ἐπιστήμηι κατὰ δύο τρόπους, πῶς οἱ λογισματο τῶν ἀρχαίων συγγραφέων "Εφροσ, Ξενοφώ, Καλλιθένης, καὶ Πλάτων πρώτων μὲν ὁμολογεῖ εναλ φαίη καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων : δεύτερον ἐπανατίθην υπάρχονσαν ἄποφαλλονοι, since Xenophon says nothing (in our Pol. Lac.) about the Cretan constitution, and Aristotle (Pol. ii.) says a good deal. On the other hand, Aristotle himself is thought to have had Xenophon’s work before him (see below, p. 307), though possibly, like Plutarch, in a fuller text than ours.
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style. I do not say that such a general impression, however correctly formed, is conclusive on the question of genuineness in either case. But for the time being it would seem to justify an attitude which, to speak for myself, I may best describe as a hesitancy to accept the one or to reject the other in the absence of better evidence.

"THE POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS"

Terse, pointed, logical, this small treatise, even in the mutilated condition in which it has been handed down to us, rivets the attention. It would indeed be delightful to believe simply, with Grote, or to have it proved to one, that Xenophon at some moment of his long life—perhaps in the heyday of youth and before his mind contracted its peculiar bent—so far indulged his native vein of Attic humour as to pen the *Polity of the Athenians*, perhaps in a letter to a Spartan friend, or as an imaginary debate between an oligarch and a democrat at Athens, or as an essay addressed to a political club; since, by whomsoever written, this treatise may best be described, I think, as *An apology for the democracy, by an oligarch of an impartial turn of mind.*

The question next arises, At what date was the composition penned? Here, I need hardly say, we must depend entirely upon internal evidence. There is the evidence to be derived from the author's illustrations or his other references to political events past or current, and there is the evidence of diction.

1 For the nature of the writing see the views of various critics tabulated in Sauppe's Praef. *Resp. Ath.* p. 177 foll.; Roquette, *de Xen. Vit.* p. 98 foll.; Hartman, *An. Xen. Nova*, vii.; Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, i. p. 538. "It is addressed apparently by an Athenian of oligarchical sympathies (ἐπουράσαμεν, i. 12) to a friend (ἀδ νομίζεις, i. 8), and is intended to correct his impressions that the constitution of Athens and the arrangements of the state generally were a monument of folly. There is much method, it argues, in the supposed madness of the Athenians." It is a remarkable fact, and significant of the importance attached to this little work, that it should have become the fruitful parent of so many learned discussions in modern times, and (in support of one plausible theory or another) itself been fathered upon so many illustrious people of old. Besides Xenophon, Thucydides the historian and Thucydides the son of Melesias, Phrynichus, Critias, and Alcibades have been named as possible authors.
To speak of the latter first, I have more than once referred to the view of Bergk and others regarding this work as perhaps the earliest extant specimen of Attic prose, as one which commends itself to my own perception of Greek prose style. But I am well aware that this is only a persuasion of my mind, based half consciously on the authority of better judges. And I am bound to warn the 'English reader' that the above opinion is stoutly contested by other authorities;¹ and that one critic at least, on the strength of a particular passage (ii. 8, p. 284 below) where the author speaks of the mixed character of the Attic dialect, would have us believe that the writing belonged to the Macedonian period.

As to the incidents implied or referred to directly by the writer in the course of his argument, these indeed may well be expected to throw light on the date of the work, and will, I think, be found to do so. But here again it is necessary to enter a caution. The value of the dates so furnished will, in part at least, depend upon the estimate formed of the writer's point of view and perhaps of his temperament. If he is, to borrow a modern phrase, 'a professional politician,' illustrating from the current events of the day, we may well conclude that in speaking (as he does, ii. 13, p. 285) of the advantage to a naval democracy of "some jutting promontory or adjacent island" on the enemy's coast, he is referring to the incidents connected with Pylos and Sphacteria, which have happened, so to speak, 'the day before yesterday,' and we shall be ready to conclude that our pamphlet was written somewhere about 424 B.C. If, on the other hand, we imagine the author to be a political philosopher taking a wide view of history rather than a debater immersed in the politics of the day, we may persuade ourselves that his illustrations are not suggested to him by the striking occurrences of the moment, but rather are generalisations from many instances, though the field of view is still so far limited that the incidents must be typical of

¹ E.g. Hartman, who sees nothing similar to Antiphon or Thucydides (i.e. the earliest Attic prose writing) in the diction (An. Xen. N. p. 299). The critic referred to is Bernhardy, Synt. 10 (ap. G. Sauppe, Praef. R. A. p. 178, but I have not been able to verify the passage). For myself, I can only repeat that it 'feels' to me to be Attic of an early rather than of late date. The writer's manner is antique and his vocabulary not obviously modern.
the Athenian democracy (for that is the theme of his discourse).\textsuperscript{1}

Between these two views it is perhaps hard to decide fairly, since both, to my mind, are rational. But, as regards the date of composition arrived at,\textsuperscript{1} I have a strong conviction in favour of B.C. 424 \textit{circa} rather than of B.C. 371 or any later period suggested; and if I am pressed to give a reason for this conviction, it is that no political philosopher examining the constitution of Athens after 403 B.C. (not Machiavelli himself) could, I think, have contrived to make us live so absolutely in the days of the Peloponnesian war. Some note of the actual moment at which he wrote under the restored democracy would somewhere have crept in. \textit{Sed haec hactenus.}

The last topic of this portion of my comment concerns the subject matter, and may be briefly despatched. The position of the writer is plainly and frankly stated both in the opening sentence (i. 1) and again at the beginning of the third chapter (iii. 1). The type of polity is not to his taste, 'for reasons'; but, given that the Athenians have agreed to be democratically governed, they take the right means to preserve the democracy. What these means are I will leave the reader to discover for himself, and, in conclusion, refer him to certain pages of Mr. Newman's work on Aristotle's \textit{Politics} (already referred to) for an interesting discussion of that philosopher's views, as to the means

\textsuperscript{1} To take ii. 13 as an illustration, Sphacteria and Pylos may be matters, comparatively speaking, of ancient history. In what he says about "a promontory, islands, straits," etc., the author may be thinking not especially of Demosthenes's exploit (\textit{i.e.} B.C. 424), but of incidents as late as the periplus of Iphicrates, as described in \textit{Hell.} VI. ii., B.C. 373. It will be apparent to scholars that in drawing the above distinction I am somewhat crudely, though, I trust, not rudely, referring to two divergent principles of criticism represented to me personally by the names of Kirchhoff and Hartman. I take this opportunity of saying that to both these scholars (and indeed to many others) I am deeply indebted. To Kirchhoff in particular I am indebted for his emended edition of the \textit{Polity of the Athenians}, which I have used for the purpose of my translation. And with regard to the particular question under discussion, though I am one of "those \textit{perpl} Kirchhoff," so to speak, as regards the date, I fully admit the force of Hartman's argument, at least up to a certain point, and I agree with him in regarding the author as a prototype in some sort of Machiavelli. I should like to think he had borrowed from Xenophon's \textit{Hellenica} and \textit{Cyropaedia}, but of that I am not persuaded. For i. 19, see \textit{Hell.} VII. i. 2; and for i. 14, see \textit{Cyrop.} VII. v. 36.
of preserving constitutions, contrasted with those of the writer of our ‘paper.’

"THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS"

I here return to the Polity of the Lacedaemonians. Of this work—albeit considerably larger than the companion treatise and not less full of interest in a variety of ways—it will not be necessary to speak at proportionate length. I have already partially cleared the ground by pointing out that in spite of the ambiguous verdict of Demetrius Magnes (according to Diogenes Laertius), we are warranted in assuming that the work is genuine, both on account of its Xenophontine spirit and because we have the testimony of Plutarch and the rest in favour of that opinion. For myself, I not only regard it as genuine, but as a composition the merits of which, whether from a literary point of view or in reference to the information

1 See Newman, op. cit. i. p. 538 foll. After comparing passages in Pol. Ath. and the Politics, Mr. Newman sums up: "The whole drift of the composition is that a democracy which wishes to be durable must impoverish the rich and diminish their numbers, and see that the demos is as numerous and as well-off as possible. Aristotle recommends democracies to adopt a diametrically opposite course (7 (5) 8, 1309, a 14 sqq.)," etc.

2 It is true that the testimony from without might well be stronger. We should like to know whether Plutarch in his quotations or Aristotle for his references had a text before them largely differing from ours. We should like to come to the truth of the matter concerning Polybius's reference to Xenophon as one of four learned historians who had written on the Cretan constitution (see note above), about which not a word is to be found in our version of the Polity (or elsewhere in Xenophon); since, unless the historian is confusing Xenophon with Aristotle (which seems extraordinary), his remark implies the loss of at least a sentence and perhaps a whole chapter or more from the work of Xenophon. As to the testimony from within, we should like to be able to lay the ghost of this double of Xenophon—this alter ego, this grandson editor, this plagiarising ludi-magister, this epitomist—which, provided we are in a certain frame of mind, will haunt us, and nowhere more persistently than whilst we peruse the Polity of the Lacedaemonians. We should like, in short, the condition of the text to be such that there should no longer be room for doubt in the mind of any reasonable modern critic whether the work before us deserves to be lauded as an aureolus libellus or stigmatised as pessime mutilatus et corruptus. For views for and against and intermediate, see the list in G. Sauppe's Praef. Resp. Lac. p. 155 foll. See also for their own views Roquette, de Xen. Vit. § 21, p. 80 foll.; Hartman, An. Xen. Nova, vii.; and, lastly, a work to which I am especially indebted, de Xen. Libro qui Δακ. Πωλ inscriptur, Ernest Naumann (Berolini, MDCCCLXXVI).
it contains, far exceed its defects—defects which I ascribe to
the thousand and one mischances of publication and editing
inevitable in those early days, and in the case of Xenophon
enhanced conceivably by the accidents of his life. In spite of
everything which has happened to mar the beauty of the
original, we may congratulate ourselves that, even so, the
casion, design, and structure of the work are still quite
plain. Of these I will now speak in some order.

The date of the composition is not difficult to arrive at
by internal evidence, which shows that the latest portion
(chapter xiv.) was penned in B.C. 378, the year of the new
confederacy of Delos (or not later than B.C. 375), and the rest
of the work at some interval, probably during the nine years
preceding (i.e. between B.C. 387 and B.C. 378); 1 or, to put
the matter biographically, this work was one of the fruits of
that *otium cum dignitate* which it was Xenophon’s fortune to
enjoy as a representative of the ruling power (or ought one to
say as the head of a small *πολιτευμα*) on his private estate in
the Triphylian township of Scillus.

As to the design of the work, I have little to add to what

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1 The important passage for arriving at this conclusion is that in which the
author criticises the breakdown of the Lycurgean institutions in modern times
(xiv. §§ 4-6). Time was when the laws were strictly observed, "whereas now
I am well aware that the leading citizens have but one ambition—to live and
die as *harmosts* on a foreign soil"; but this dereliction on her part has brought
upon Lacedaemon its own chastisement: "In old days the states of Hellas
sought her leadership against the supposed wrongdoer" (he is thinking
apparently of the times of the Peloponnesian war and the old watchword,
ελευθερούντες την Ἑλλάδα, Thuc. iv. 85), but "now numbers are inviting one
another to prevent the Lacedaemonians again recovering their empire," νῦν δὲ
πολλοὶ παρακαλοῦσιν ἄλληλους ἐτὶ τῷ διακωλοῦν ἄρξαι πάλιν αὐτοῖς.
The harmosts were not removed till the date of Leuctra (see reference in note 6,
p. 322), and as far as that infirmity in the foreign politics of Lacedaemon
goes, the writer's observations would have been true for several years longer;
but the last passage can only refer, I think, to the incidents of the year 378
(see Hell. V. iv. 34), or (not to put too fine a point) to the general feeling of
irritation against Sparta and desire to prevent that state from resaddling her
yoke upon their necks shown by the newly-confederated states between 378
B.C. and 375 B.C., to which Diodorus (xv. 28, Ἀθηναίοι δὲ προσβῆσις ἐξεπέμψαν
... παρακαλοῦντες) bears witness. See especially the words πρῶτοι δὲ πρῶς
tην ἀπόστασιν ἐνδοικοῦν Χίου καὶ Βυζάντιο, and the text of a treaty with
v. 10).
I have already stated in my sketch of Xenophon's life. I regard the work as a quasi-historical account of Lycurgus's institutions, as seen or pictured in their more or less ideal working, along with a severe criticism (chap. xiv.) on the practical breaking-down of these institutions in modern Sparta. Does it strike any one that there is something paradoxical in the position of a writer thus attempting to expound in laudatory terms the high conception of the lawgiver, whilst in the next breath he is ready to criticise with lamentations the defective working of his 'laws'? It is clear that Xenophon felt some sort of difficulty; and the contrast between the actual and the ideal, of which he was in some degree conscious all the while he wrote, was strongly accentuated before he had ended.

There is no doubt, I imagine (and in dealing with the historical work) I have already pointed out clear indications of the fact), that certain political occurrences, the outcome of Spartan ἵππος, came as a severe shock to him and to others doubtless, in and out of Lacedaemon itself, who were genuine admirers of that state. Hence the insertion of chapter xiv., which might be spoken of as a sort of palinode, and which in a modern work would have appeared as a footnote or in the appendix. But his admiration for Lycurgus and the marvel of his institutions did not cease to exercise a fascination over him. Of the ideal Lacedaemon he is still as ever enamoured. The essentials of her constitution—that which was its animating force and spirit—might at any moment reappear, and to the great gain of the community and of the whole of Hellas re-assert itself; and what are these essentials? "Silence, obedience, endurance, the suppression of self."^4 "The true

1 See Trans. vol. i. p. cxxvii.
2 See again a paragraph in Mr. Newman's Aristotle's Politics, vol. i. p. 384. entitled The Eulogists and Critics of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian States. Here is a passage in apt illustration of what I wish to indicate: "Even the warmest friends of the Lacedaemonian state at Athens, however, betrayed in their mode of life that they were far from resembling its citizens. Cimon would hardly have been at home at Sparta, and Xenophon must have been conscious that his literary gifts and his interest in philosophy drew an impassable barrier between him and the state which he so greatly admired."
3 See Comments on the Hellenica, above, pp. xxvi. xxxii. liv.
4 The words are Mr. Newman's (ii.). In another passage, p. 209, the same writer points out, from a reference to such passages as 2. 6. 1264 b, 31
Spartans magnify themselves on their lowliness,” on their submission to law and to the magistrates, on the golden principle of life, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. For the sake of his own sons, for the sake of education—bethinking him of his master’s teaching,—for the sake of philosophy, he will make a record of what he finds most notable in the system of life encouraged or rather created by the most remarkable of lawgivers. In some parts he is for some reason (or his editors and the copyists have combined to render him) less explicit than we could desire; but in others the writing (or disquisition ought we rather to name it?) flows smoothly on. Now and again some turn of phrase suggests or implies the language of oral delivery. It may even serve to throw light on his manner of composition. It is as if he were talking to his family. He is seated or walking up and down, whilst his amanuensis—a favourite slave perhaps—takes down his words. There is a touch of pedantry in the tone of his voice, as if he must needs play the schoolmaster. He allows his egotism to assert itself quite ingenuously. When the pages are fairly copied out he will read them to a select audience on a festival day. Friends from the little township or grand visitors making a pilgrimage to Olympia will judge of its merits. He delivers himself therefore at times as if he were making a speech. Perhaps he too readily forgets that, if it is ever published, this document will be studied by a larger and more critical audience than those sympathetic listeners about him to whom he appeals tenderly, but with a quasi-authoritative manner, unaffectedly as is his wont, yet in some sort grandiously. Perhaps it was not

sqq., that according to Aristotle “the constitution also regulates or may regulate the whole position of the classes concerned with ‘necessary functions,’ the position of women, and the educational organisation of the state. It is thus that the little treatise of Xenophon which bears the title Δακεδαμονίων πολιτεία concerns itself as much with the ‘pursuits of the Spartans’ (ch. i. init.), their ‘mode of life’ (ch. v.), their enforced abstinence from money-making (ch. vii.)” [and, one might well add, with military rules and tactics, etc.], “as with the political organisation of the state.”

1 This ‘oral’ mannerism can hardly be represented in a translation, yet it is there strongly, if I mistake not. See ii. 12, iv. 2, xii. i, xiii. i, xv. i. Prose ‘essay-writing’ is only emerging as an art out of speaking, and Xenophon is perhaps δυσμαθής, a late learner. At this time, B.C. 378, if we are right in our biographical dates, he would be about fifty-three years of age. I cannot help fancying that it is of himself he is speaking, x. 4, p. 313.
intended for publication. We do not know what ravages time or the hand of man has wrought upon this composition since it was first published. But whatever they are, the subject matter in our version is quite lucidly arranged. There is a suitable proem and conclusion between which the several topics lie structurally distinct. But the reader will doubtless prefer to test these matters for himself.

"WAYS AND MEANS"

It remains to speak of the pamphlet on Revenues, otherwise entitled (and perhaps best known in antiquity as) Ways and Means. Four ancient writers refer to the πόροι as a work of Xenophon. No further evidence on the part of antiquity for and none at all against its genuineness has hitherto been

1 Ch. i. Lycurgus: the originality of his 'laws.' (Some of these are idealised in the Cyropaedia. Did Xenophon see the breakdown of the training as applied to women which was so obvious to Aristotle? One can hardly suppose that he did.)

Birth and marriage and propagation.
iii. Youth: the dangerous age: modesty.
iv. Young manhood: competition in games, hunting. (Idealised in the Cyrop.)

v. The mode of life: public mess, scant fare, gymnastics.

vii. Buying and selling.
viii. An oligarchy: the ephors.
ix. Glory before life: the coward's death in life.
x. The gerousia: reflections of the author.

xi. Mode of life in warfare, tactics, etc.
xii. Encampments and expeditions.

xiii. Power and privilege of the kings.

[xiv. A note by the author, b.c. 378-375; a 'palinode.']

xv. Covenant of kings and state: the kings are 'heroes': climax.

2 The MS. title of the work is ξενοφωντος βῆτορος πόροι ἡ περὶ προσδ-δων, with or without the author's name.

3 They are the author of the Canon (preserved by Diogenes Laertius), which is at least as old as Demetrius Magnes (55 B.C.), and probably much older; Athenaeus (A.D. 70-100), 4, 272 C; Menander the rhetorician, of whose date I am ignorant (I think he wrote a criticism on the τέχνη of Hermogenes the celebrated critic (ὁ ἔφωτηρ) in Aurelius's time (A.D. 161-180), in reference apparently to the passage i. 7 (see Walz, Rhet. Graeci, 9, 161); and lastly, the author of the Etymol. Magn. (A.D. 976-1025), 644, 4. See G. Sauppe, Praef. Lib. de Vect. p. 194; Arm. Zurborg, de Xen. lib. qui πόροι inscribitur, p. 17.
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discovered. In modern times the point has been much debated, and with an equal weight of authority on either side. To the one set of critics it seems unlike or unworthy of Xenophon that certain topics, such as the advantages of peace, commercial activity, and mining operations, should be so largely insisted on, and others which, according to their view of Xenophon’s character, would be more congenial to him, such as agriculture and the occupations of the καλοὶ τε καγαθοὶ, excluded; or else it is insisted that the work bears internal evidence of having been written after the conclusion of the Sacred War in B.C. 346, before which date Xenophon, it is all but certain, had long finished his course. On the other side it is urged that the pamphlet in any case would appear to have been written in the midsummer of B.C. 355 (a year at least before the probable date of Xenophon’s death), that the topics are quite compatible with what we feel to be the idiosyncrasy of Xenophon, and that the style and manner of the composition make it all but certain that the work is his. However much I respect the authority of the former critics, I do not wish to conceal the fact that I agree strongly in opinion with the latter.

In this little work we have set before us certain proposals of the author, Xenophon, for promoting the welfare of Attica at a critical moment of Athenian history. In point of auto-biographic interest, this composition, possibly the last which Xenophon ever penned, is second only to the Hipparch (with which we shall be concerned in my next volume). But on this topic I have already spoken at some length in a sketch of Xenophon’s life,¹ and at present I will confine myself to the subject matter of the scheme itself without immediate reference to the personality of its author.²

¹ Vol. i. p. cxlvi, foll.
² To exclude this whole side of the matter, the element of personality, may appear somewhat unscientific on the part of any one who, like myself, regards the whole composition as instinct with the spirit of Xenophon. On the other hand, I do not wish to force this idea impertinently upon the reader, who, even through the distorting medium of a translation, will be able, I think, to form an independent view of his own. For myself, suffice it to say that I agree with those who, like Zurborg, are aware of a strong Xenophontine flavour about the work. The vocabulary is his, the diction is his, the turn and type of sentence are his, the tone of thought is his—the whole scheme, as I
As I have already suggested (in the passage just referred to), the pamphlet was perhaps written to be delivered (or as if to be delivered) as an address to the senate of Athens whilst engaged on a financial debate in the midsummer of B.C. 355, just after the conclusion of the Social War.1 Such I take to have been the occasion, actual or ideal, of the writing, and in connection with that view I will now proceed to discuss the contents of the author's scheme.2

A work of this sort gives scope for any length of commentary. I propose to pass as rapidly as possible from one point to another of the argument, wherever anything seems to call for further notice than was open to me in the footnote of my translation.

Chapter i.—The author has his own theory as to the moral 'ups and downs' of commonwealths; but, with regard to the current fatalistic doctrine "that, however high the standard of rectitude at Athens, a certain measure of injustice towards the allies is inevitable owing to the pressure of poverty

say, bears the impress of the very man, but this very man now in his old age, desiring while it is yet to-day to give utterance and perhaps practical effect to more than one project or day-dream of his early manhood: the political rehabilitation of his country; the development of her revenues, and in particular of her mineral resources; and, finally, a plan to diminish pauperism, for which see Mem. II. vi., III. vi. (and in particular § 12); Anab. III. ii. r (see vol. i. p. 158, note r), etc.

For a forcible statement of similar views see Hartman, An. Xen. Nov. ix.: "Minime tamen absurdum videtur credere Xenophonem spem concepisse sua de patria bene merendi atque co consilio bune edidisse libellum, quo doctrinae suae politicae gravissimam partem exponeret" (p. 303); and in reference to the astonishment of some that Xenophon (!) should be so enamoured of peace: "Neque hoc neglegendum ab Homerí inde tempore Graecorum neminem tam belli amantem fuisse quin tamen magis etiam vitae domesticae lautae et quietae teneretur dulcedine. . . . Tacendam erat de bello, tacendam de agricultura, alia erat monstranda ratio eniendandae Reipublicae, 'E fodinis reipublicae salus est petenda' haec est scriptoris sententia, hoc consilium" (p. 306).

1 For the date see iv. 40 below (p. 342), "If, however, you are persuaded," etc., where the present war would seem to be the Social War just ended (in the peace of B.C. 355, there referred to), yet with a prospect of war soon again breaking out (ib. 43); and below, v. 12 (p. 347), where the peace established by sea is the same peace. (See Diod. xvi. 22; Grote, H. G. xi. 325.) So Cobet, Zurhörge, Roquette, etc., aliter H. Hagen, etc.

2 Besides Boeckh and Grote (see references in footnotes to translation), the treatise is discussed by Col. Mure, Hist. Gk. Lit. vol. v.; Sir A. Grant, Xenophon, p. 154 foll.; Prof. Mahaffy, Hist. Gk. Lit. ch. x.
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on the masses at home," he has set himself to face the underlying economic problem: Can the soil of Attica be made to support its own free citizens? That would be a doubly happy solution; there would be no further excuse for injustice to the allies on the score of poverty, and there would be no more poverty. 1

Fortunately, this is found to be the case, thanks partly to the climate of Attica and the natural productivity of the soil (both in fruits of the earth and mineral wealth), partly to the


Grote says (p. 310 foll.): "It was shortly after the recent successes in Euboea (against the Thebans, who had been stirring up a revolt) that Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium revolted from Athens by concert, raising a serious war against her, known by the name of the Social War. Respecting the proximate causes of this outbreak we find unfortunately little information. There was now, and always had been since 378 B.C." (when the new maritime confederacy was formed), "a Synod of deputies from all the confederate cities habitually assembling at Athens, such as had not subsisted under the first Athenian empire in its full maturity. How far the Synod worked efficiently we do not know. . . . But the Athenian confederacy, which had begun in a generous and equal spirit of common maritime defence (Dem. de Rhod. Lib. 194, 17, παρὼν αὐτῶς (the Rhodians) Ἑλλησι καὶ βελτίων αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ ἐς τοὺς συμμαχεῖς, etc.), had gradually become perverted, since the humiliation of the great enemy Sparta at Leuktra, towards purposes and interests more exclusively Athenian"—e.g. the conquest of Samos, of Pydna, Potidæa, and Methone, and of the Thracian Chersonese, "all of them acquisitions made for herself alone, without any advantage to the confederate Synod, and made, too, to become the private property of her own citizens as Kleruchs, in direct breach of her public resolution passed in 378 B.C. not to permit any appropriation of lands by Athenian citizens out of Attica."

The headings of Grote's paragraphs briefly narrate the melancholy story: "Athens acts more for her own separate interests, and less for that of her allies—her armaments on service—badly-paid mercenaries—their extortions." (For this difficulty cf. Hell. passim.) "b.c. 358: the four cities declare themselves independent of Athens—interference of the Karian Mausôlus." (For this prince of Halicarnassus see Curtius, v. 108; Percy Gardner, Types of Greek Coins, pl. x. cl. 39, Nos. 22, 36, ΜΑΣΣΩΔΛΟ; Index to this volume, s.n.) "Great force of the revolters—armament despatched by Athens against Chios—repulse of the Athenians and death of Chabrias." "b.c. 357: farther armaments of Athens—Iphikrates, Timotheus, and Chares—unsuccessful
topographical position of the peninsula at the centre of the civilised world.

Chapter ii.—These natural blessings may be further enhanced by a better treatment of the resident alien population, 'the metics,' a self-supporting class, who (not being free citizens, but foreigners) do not share in the μυρθος (payment of members as ecclesiasts, senators, or diasts, or otherwise), but, on the contrary, pay into the treasury as sojourners' poll-tax twelve drachmae per annum for males and six drachmae for females. In various ways the status of this class may be so improved by exempting them from disagreeable duties (or operations in the Hellespont, and quarrel between the generals." (See Index to this volume for all four.) B.C. 357-356 (?): "Iphikrates and Timotheus are accused by Chares at Athens."—"Iphikrates is acquitted—Timotheus is fined and retires from Athens."—"Arrogance and unpopularity of Timotheus attested by his friend Isokrates."—"Exile of Timotheus—his death soon afterwards."—"Iphikrates no more employed—great loss to Athens in these two generals."—"B.C. 356: Expedition of Chares—Athens makes peace with her revolted allies, recognising their full autonomy."—"B.C. 355: End of the Social War—great loss of power to Athens."

"Such was the termination of the Social War, which fatally impaired the power and lowered the dignity of Athens. Imperfectly as we know the events, it seems clear that her efforts to meet this formidable revolt were feeble and inadequate, evincing a sad downfall of energy since the year 412 B.C., when she had contended with transcendent vigour against similar calamities only a year after her irreparable disaster before Syracuse. Inglorious as the result of the Social War was, it had nevertheless been costly and left Athens poor. The annual revenues of her confederacy were greatly lessened by the secession of so many important cities, and her public treasury was exhausted. It is just at this time that the activity of Demostenes as a public adviser begins. In a speech delivered this year (355 B.C.) he notes the poverty of the treasury, and refers back to it in discourses of after-time as a fact but too notorious" (p. 326). See also Isocr. on the Peace (B.C. 355); Dem. in Lept. 464, 26, 27, a speech delivered in the same year; and de Cor. 305, 29 (B.C. 338). It was just at this time also that the work of Xenophon under consideration was put on paper.

Grote continues (p. 339): "But the Social War had not yet terminated when new embarrassments and complications, of a far more formidable nature, sprang up elsewhere, known by the name of the Sacred War, rending the very entrails of the Hellenic world, and profitable only to the indefatigable aggressor in Macedonia." Into these we are not called upon to enter. Concerning Philip, Xenophon gives not a hint, unless, as Zurborg (de Xen. Lib. p. 5) suggests, he and Cersobleptes are in the writer's mind (iii. xi, p. 333 below) among the kings, etc., referred to. To the occupation of Delphi by the Phocians, which in one sense was the fons et origo belli, he distinctly refers in a passage which has caused much discussion (v. 9, p. 347 below). See Trans. vol. i. p. lviii.
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possibly by conferring on select members of the class the fee—simple of building sites within the walls), and by government protection of their interests, that the good-will of this section of the community will be increased, and people without a city of their own will aspire to become 'sojourners' in Athens, and so further increase the revenues of the city.¹

Chapter iii.—The author dilates on the advantages of Athens as an emporium and centre of commercial enterprise —her secure harbourage, the opportunity presented to the foreign trader of taking back in lieu of other merchandise that most marketable of commodities, Attic silver. At this point some simple expedients suggest themselves for diminishing the friction incidental to commercial transactions, which being to the relief and honour of the foreign trader, will make him all the more anxious to have dealings with Athens, and with the ultimate result that 'the pot will be kept boiling': there will be more imports and exports; the rent of slaves will go up—a gain to private owners; and the state exchequer will gain in an expansion of dues and customs. To secure this

¹ Directly, by increasing the sojourners' tax; but be means, I think, indirectly also, by bringing their wealth to Athens; since this class of foreign residents were, like the rest of the citizens, liable to be called upon to contribute to the extraordinary taxes, and in their everyday life, like the rest of the world, would be contributing to the state revenues as ordinary taxpayers. He does not seem to have apprehended any risk of attracting so many foreigners that there would be a chance of their swallowing up the citizens; but there is one portion of his scheme which is somewhat 'sketchy.' He suggests (p. 329) that the foreign residents should be exempted from hoplite service (which will be good for the citizens proper and pleasant for themselves), and (no doubt again, in exceptional cases) be allowed to serve in the cavalry (a favourite idea, since he advocates it also in the Hipparch); but below (p. 342) he notes as one of the advantages of the new state of things to result from his measure that there will be an increase of troops to serve not only on shipboard, but on land (as infantry, one would suppose), where see Zurborg's note, op. cit. pp. 43, 44.

As to the numbers of the metics, see Boeckh, bk. i. ch. vii., and in a compendious shape, J. Gow, A Companion to School Classics, ch. xiii. According to the census of 309 B.C., at the time of Demetrius of Phalerum, it is computed that there were in Athens and Attica—slaves, 400,000; metics, 10,000 (heads of families, implying 45,000 altogether); and citizens, Πθρωνείον, 21,000 (again heads of families, implying 94,500). The μετοχιον, on the supposition that the whole 45,000 pay poll-tax, infants and adults alike, and that half are females, would apparently yield a little over £15,000 (£15,187:10s.) per annum. But to what extent he hoped to increase this item of the revenue does not appear.
augmentation of the revenue the scheme does not require the outlay of a single penny; nothing is needed beyond one or two philanthropic measures and certain details of supervision.

For the other sources of revenue contemplated an initial outlay is demanded. A capital must in the first instance be subscribed. But there is every reason to hope that the necessary sum will be heartily subscribed; considering the readiness displayed to contribute the necessary funds in order to embark on far less hopeful ventures. The zeal displayed on two notable occasions—to send reinforcements to the Arcadians in B.C. 366 and to the Lacedaemonians in B.C. 362, and on various naval expeditions, is encouraging. There was no remuneration to be got of a pecuniary sort by the contributors to those undertakings, whereas the contributor to the fund, contemplated in the scheme, will see from a purely commercial view of the matter that, as the recipient of a daily *tribololon*, he gets ample interest—as high, in fact, as he would get on bottomry (18% per cent) if his contribution amounts to 10 minae, and higher and higher in proportion as his contribution drops below that sum (36% per cent for 5 minae and 18% per cent for 1 mina); and considering that he does not set foot out of Attica, the investment of money in such a fund is as good and the security as sound as possible.¹

¹ This, however (possibly owing to our ignorance of the details), is the *crux* of the whole scheme. The question is, what does he mean by the words (i) *κτήσην δὲ ἀπ’ οὐδενός δê οὕτω καλής κτήσας δωστε ἄν αδ’ ό τιν προτελέσασιν εἰς τὴν ἀφορμήν?* and below (2), *τριβόλον τῆς ἡμέρας λαμβάνων?* I do not think that either Boeckh, whose explanation Grote criticises, or Grote himself quite explains the matter. Still less do I think that what I am about to say will be of much help.

(i) From the similarity of the terms used, ἐλαφρεγκέν, ..., ἐλαφρεγκεῖν, in recalling occasions on which the special tax in war time was imposed (by a vote of the Ecclesia), and in discussing his own scheme (iii. 7, 8, 9; iv. 40), I conclude that, though it is now a time of peace, he is advocating an enforced extra-municipal contribution like the *elaphorad*.

As is well known, "the *elaphorad* was a kind of income tax" (I quote from Mr. Gow’s chapter on Athenian Finance, xviii. § 77 G) "levied according to the Solonian classification in such a manner that the richer citizens paid a higher percentage than the poorer. For the Solonian property classes a new system was introduced B.C. 378-377, in the archonship of Nausinicus. From this time the people were divided, for purposes of *elaphorad*, into *symmoriai*, graded according to their wealth. The first *symmoria* (i.e. the first class of the *symmoriai*) "consisted of the three hundred richest citizens.
Apart from which, the author would hold out moral inducements: he would stimulate the zeal of foreigners—foreign states, kings, tyrants, and satraps—to contribute, by means of *stelai* on which the names of contributors should be inscribed as *benefactors* for all time.

To come to the point: given that the capital is subscribed, how is it to be productively employed? In the following several ways:—

A. In building State or Public (1) lodging-houses for ship-masters near the harbours;

The tax was at first collected by the state, but after B.C. 362-361" (al. B.C. 378) "these three hundred citizens paid the whole produce of the tax down (*proemepoioi*), and collected afterwards the contributions of the inferior symmories. The *stratagol* determined the amount of the contribution of each symmory." See the article "Symmoria" in *Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, last edition.

That being the nature of the *elaphora*, I suppose that Xenophon's 'contribution' is to be enforced on all members of the community, citizens and sojourners alike, as a graduated income tax by symmories.

(2) As to the words *trιωβοιον της ημέρας λαμβάνωντι*, I suppose he means that any *citizen* who chooses to accept it will be guaranteed three obols a day in return for his subscription, "on the principle of the Theôrikon," as Grote says, or as we might say nowadays, like the remittance of a State Pension.

In this context it is well to remind the reader that the *Theôrik Fund*, according to the law of Pericles, who invented it, was originally a payment to help the poorer citizens to keep holiday, being the price of admission to the theatre, the fee of which was two obols. "In process of time this donation was extended to other entertainments besides theatrical ones, the sum of two oboli being given to each citizen who attended; if the festival lasted two days, four oboli; and if three, six oboli; but not beyond, *Hence all theoretic largesses received the name of *bhobema*" (*Dict. Ant.*). See Grote, *H. G.* xi. 465 foll. 484 foll. 492 foll., where the historian speaks of it as "the Church Fund, that upon which were charged all the expenses incurred by the state in the festivals and worship of the gods. The diobely or distribution of two oboli to each citizen was one part of this expenditure. . . . To this general religious fund it was provided by law1 that the surplus of ordinary revenue should be paid over, after all the cost of the peace establishment had been defrayed." "The annual surplus might have been accumulated," Grote continues, "as a war fund; but how far Athens is blamable for not having done so" is another question.

To put my two conclusions briefly: The scheme contemplates (1) an enforced subscription (imposed by the Ecclesia) on the analogy of the *elaphora*, and (2) a permanent first charge on the capital subscribed, to serve as a Pension Fund for the poorer citizens, which we may call the *Triobely*.

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1 This law was passed within a year of the ideal date of the *nêror*. "During the period 354-339 B.C. any surplus of income over expenditure was returned to the *people as *theorikow*. At this time, therefore, the treasurer of the theoretic fund, *δ έρι τη *theorikow, was the most important of the financial officers." See Gow, *op. cit.* xiv. 60, p. 171.
(2) meeting-places and exchanges for the same;  
(3) lodging-houses (hotels) for visitors;  
(4) dwelling-houses and stores or shops for retail dealers in Piraeus and the city.

B. In acquiring the germ of a public merchant navy (state merchant vessels), on the analogy of the state war-fleet, which will be let out on the security of guarantors like any other state property; and, lastly (a new topic):

Chapter iv.—C. In establishing the silver mines of Laurium on a new and sounder footing, which the author proceeds to explain at considerable length; but before stating the actual plan (§ 17, p. 337), he points out, for the benefit of those who may be ignorant, what the capacity of these mines really is. Long ago worked, they are to-day apparently as inexhaustible as ever. The cry is only for more hands. This, in fact, is the one business in which there is no danger of over-production and no dread of over-competition, since depreciation of the product itself is out of the question, silver being apparently in perpetual demand. He gives illustrations from farming and various industries. He discusses the relation of gold to silver.

The lesson to be learned from the above facts is to pour into the mines human labour in as large doses as possible, and to extend the scale of operations by increase of plant, etc.; indeed, the state herself suggests the course by the facilities offered to foreigners who desire to undertake mining (the foreigner only pays the same rent [or royalty?] as the free citizen).

This brings him back to his scheme—a method for working the mines more productively. There is nothing wonderful about it; the facts are patent to the eyes as recorded in history; the wonderful thing is that the state, with the experience of so many private individuals growing wealthy at her expense, should have failed to imitate them. And now for the scheme itself (§ 17). Why should not the state follow the lead of the private capitalist? The private capitalist (Nicias, the son of Niceratus, or whoever it be) purchases a slave-gang which he lets out to the practical miner for an obol a day per head free of charge. That is what the state ought to do: she should possess herself of a body of slaves (say
three to every citizen\(^1\) as the total number), and enter into competition with the private capitalist.

The proposal will be found feasible, in spite of possible objections. As a purchaser and a farmer (or lessor) of slave labour the state can easily hold her own as against the private owner; her credit being more secure, she will let her slaves to practical miners more easily on the same terms. The risk of losing her slaves (who will bear the state brand) through fraud on the part of the lessee will be less than the risk of losing her moneys through fraud on the part of the tax-farmers\(^2\) (\(τελωναί\)). But with this increase in the supply of

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\(^1\) Three to every citizen—if we take the number only of adult males (according to the census of B.c. 309 above referred to)—would give 21,000 x 3 = 63,000 slaves, who at the lowest computation will bring in 63,000 ob. a day (this figure, he says, § 25, is far too low, if any one there present can carry back his memory sixty years to the palmy times of mining 'before Decleea') = 630 tal. per annum (say £150,000 per annum). But there are certain preliminary considerations. There is the price of the slaves to be considered, and the possibility of letting them, and finally the question whether the mines can stand such an influx of labour. It will be seen that, for various reasons, he proposes to work each part of the scheme, A, B, C, tentatively and bit by bit; and as to this part, C, concerning the mines, he only carriers us on to a point at which the state has 10,000 (not 63,000) slaves, allowing a profit, or rather yielding a rent, of 100 tal. per annum. As to the price of slaves, see Boeckh, bk. i. ch. xiii. (Eng. tr. p. 67 foll.), for an interesting discussion of the question based on Lucian, Βλων πρᾶσις, 27; Dem. c. Pantaen. 967; Mem. II. iii. 2, and this passage: "Some slaves are well worth 2 minas (=£8), others hardly half a mina (£2); many sold for 5 or 10 minas (=£20 or £40), and Nicias, the son of Niceratus, is stated to have given no less than a talent (£235 CIRCA) for an overseer of the mines" (Mem. II. iii. 2). In our passage the price is apparently taken at from 125 to 150 drachmae = £4 : 13 : 3 to £5 : 12 : 6. Taking the lower figure, the initial outlay on the purchase of 1200 slaves for mining purposes would be £50,000 drachmae (1500 min. or 25 tal.) = nearly £6000. N.B.—In all these calculations it will be borne in mind that the equivalent English sums are equivalents in weight of silver (based on the best calculations of the actual weights of obols, drachmae, etc.). As to the purchasing power of the money, that is, of course, another matter. See Gow, op. cit. xi. 47.

\(^2\) I am not sure that I quite take his meaning about the greater difficulty of recovering 'moneys' than slaves lost, stolen, or strayed, since I should have thought that the τελωναί would be held to account by the πωλητής (or πράκτορας), and the πωλητής would be accountable to the ἀποδεκτα (receivers-general), and the receivers to the prytany of the Senate, and finally to the Ecclesia when their secretary (ἀντιγραφής) made his periodical report. See, for the officers of the treasury, Gow, op. cit. xiv. 60. But in a general sense it is easier to steal 300 drachmae than a couple of slaves. He says nothing about the risks of the slaves absconding or dying in the fetid atmosphere of the mines and of sheer exhaustion. But he is not bound to, since apparently
slaves, will the contractors go on demanding slave labour? There are various reasons for supposing that there will be no cessation in the demand for slave labour.

Test the working of the scheme (i.e. part C) on paper. Say the state starts with 1200 slaves at first. Out of profits alone (or rather out of income derived from their rent) in five or six years the number may be increased to 6000; and (it is only a question of arithmetic) each slave bringing in an obol a day clear of all expenses—that means 60 tal. a year. Lay out 20 tal. on more slaves, and you have 40 tal. left for state purposes. By the time 10,000 is reached there will be a yearly income of 100 tal. (= £23,500 circa).

These figures are below the mark, as any one who can remember the state of things sixty years ago, before 413 B.C. (Deceleia), will bear the author witness. And the condition of the mines after all these hundreds of years during which they have been worked tells the same tale. They are inexhaustible—there is room for an indefinitely greater number of workers.

The hesitation at present shown to open up a new area is owing to the risk to the individual, who stakes his all in the venture—'win or lose'—and may draw a blank; in other words, spend his capital on an unproductive cutting.

But the author has a plan to reduce the risk of opening new cuttings. Why should not the state slaves be worked in divisions of tribes by the ten tribes (one or other of which is sure to hit upon a productive lode for the benefit of all)?

Such a state mining-company [i.e., as I understand, state-favoured tribal (or state corporation) mining-company] will not

the lessee has to run the risks of all that, and in spite of the cruel rate of mortality of these poor souls, etc., will be able to make a profit. See Cornewall Lewis's note to Boeckh's P. E. A. p. 675, criticising Boeckh's argument (in bk. i. ch. xiii. p. 73, and bk. iv. ch. xvi. p. 606).

1 Xenophon would, if we are right in our biographical dates, have been nearly eighteen at that date, and doubtless had a vivid recollection of the occurrences.

2 I do not quite understand the working of this part of the scheme. Are the slaves to be presented by the state, or loaned by the state, or let by the state to the Ten Tribes? I suppose that in each of the tribes, as a matter of local business encouraged by the state, a syndicate will be formed and a tribal mining company started who will work the state slaves, paying the usual rent,
be a thorn in the side of the private owner (or the private company), nor he (or it) of the state.

If this scheme (as a whole, $A$, $B$, $C$) works, every Athenian will or may be supplied with ample maintenance at the public expense.\(^1\)

But (exclaims an objector) the capital! It will need to be enormous, and who is going to subscribe it?\(^2\) The answer is that it need not be subscribed all at once. The scheme is to be worked in its several parts and tentatively. (A) The public-buildings scheme, (B) the state-merchant-ships scheme, (C) the state-slaves scheme, will each pay its own way and be remunerative if they are all three started side by side and bit by bit. That will also give us time to see where to expand and where to draw in. Moreover, the tentative process will spread the expense of the scheme over several years and not let it fall on us entirely.

So far concerning the enormous capital. To come now to what every one will probably regard as the really grave danger—that of the state getting too many slaves and the works being overstocked. The solution again is: to proceed tentatively; to pour only small doses of human labour into the mines at a time.

So far, unless the author is mistaken, the easiest method in every case is the best. But if, owing to the extraordinary εἰσφόρατ, property taxes, to which they have been subjected during the war,\(^3\) they are not equal to any further subscriptions

\(^1\) Perhaps this passage throws light on iii. 9 above discussed. He evidently contemplates not a διώβελα merely, like the 'Church Fund' for holidays, but a τριώβελα, like the dicsasts' fee, only it is to last from year's end to year's end. See Boeckh, P. E. A. p. 605.

\(^2\) He is again harking back to the same passage, iii. 9, the difficulty of getting his novel εἰσφόρα classified (whether it is voted for by the Ecclesia, or, like a modern state loan, only 'advertised for,' so to speak). The εἰσφόρα proper was, we know, even in stress of war hard enough to collect; at present, b.c. 355, we are living in what may be called the προεισφόρα era. (See note above.) I think the author of the scheme despairs in his heart of getting his ἀφορμή subscribed. To work with the financial surplus saved in the expenditure of the year [as a matter of history it was next year, b.c. 354, thrown into the θεωρυκοῦν or 'Church Fund'] is a second string to his bow. For the ordinary and extraordinary sources of income, πρόσοβοι and λειτουργαί, see Gow, op. cit. xviii.

\(^3\) I.e. the Social War just ended. The importance of the allusions here, as giving the date of the pamphlet, I have already discussed. See above, p. Ixxix.
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just yet, he would advise them during the current year (B.C. 355-354) to carry on the administration within the limits of what their taxes (dues) realised before the peace (i.e. when things were at their worst), and then to feel at liberty to take any surplus sum, however derived, and to invest that so as to bring in the greatest revenue (i.e. according to his view, in mining-slaves, or public-houses, or state-merchant-vessels).

To the objection that war might upset the working of the whole scheme at any moment, the author demurs. That is an alarmist notion. If there be war, so much the worse for the enemy. Under the condition of things which it is proposed to bring about, there will be an increase of population—more men, and the population itself will be in better heart. “Think of the many ships,” he says, “which they will be capable of manning on public service! Think of the number who will serve on land (as infantry, περιφόλιον), and will bear hard upon the enemy; only we must treat them with courtesy.”2 And as to the mines themselves, they will be safe enough from attack whether from Thebes or Megara (points on which, as a military man who has studied the fortification question, he speaks with some confidence).

He here reverts to his scheme and its merits. It is not the mines alone which will bring profit to the state, but with

1 I.e. due to the peace itself, which will set the wheels of commerce going again, or to his own scheme as far as it involved no outlay (see above), the better treatment of metics, growth of imports and exports with increase of population, augmentation of harbour and market dues.

2 I have already said something (p. lxxxii. note 1) on the apparent contradiction (at first sight) between the passage iv. 42 (p. 343 below) and the two earlier passages ii. 2 and 5 (p. 330 below). It is partly owing to this and to other similar ‘contradictions’ that H. Hagen bases his theory that the Ἡβοῖος consists of two separate speeches tacked together—the first contained in i. 1–iv. 33, and the other in iv. 34–vi. 3, and both belonging, as he argues, to B.C. 346. But I do not think that the contradiction is formidable, and it is quite like Xenophon to carry two ideas in his head at once in a quasi-illogical manner. He would like to exempt the metics from hoplite service altogether, and draft a few leading metics into the cavalry. (Lysias surely would have made a good cavalry officer if he had the taste for the service, but was, of course, ineligible as a metic.) On the other hand, that reform could not be carried out in a day. The oarsmen of the fleet, ναῦδρα or ναυβάρας, were, as a rule, obtained from the poorer citizens and metics, though on occasion the richer citizens and knights might handle the oar, or again, as at Arignusae, the slaves be drawn upon. See Hell. I. vi. 24, 25 (Trans. vol. i. p. 26); Hell. V. iv. 61 (below, p. 135).
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the increase of population there will be new sources of revenue derived from market-dues at Sunium, public buildings in connection with the mines, furnaces, etc., and the rise in the value of land ("the unearned increment" which the state directly or indirectly will get a share of).

If at this point he may assume that his proposals have been carried into effect, he can promise that the city shall not only be relieved from financial strain, but make a great advance in orderliness and tactical organisation; the whole heart of the community will beat more quickly; the human war material will be vastly improved; gymnastic training will no longer be a disagreeable duty to be shirked; garrison troops, peltasts, and the mounted police (the peripoloi protecting the rural districts and frontier), one and all, will carry out their respective duties more ardently when pay and maintenance are forthcoming.

Chapter v.—Peace is a sine qua non for the full benefits of the scheme; and for the furtherance of peace he would suggest a new government board (as he has already suggested the institution of μετοικοφύλακες), a court of arbitration, as it were [such as we are accustomed to in our capital and labour disputes, or like our international arbitration-boards on questions of fishery rights and so forth], who will act as ἐιρηνοφύλακες, 'guardians of peace.' He points out the desirability of such a court, and here he has a word to say to the war party. A peace policy, he insists, is best. That is the lesson taught by an impartial survey of history from the Median war to the 'confusion worse confounded' which was the one dominant result of Mantinea, and which still reigns, though, thanks to the present peace, their prospects are brightening. This policy implies a readiness for war, com-

1 He is referring to various καταβολαὶ, rent from state property, steady sources of revenue, such as: the ἐπιτώνον, a duty on all sales; the διατύλιον, an octroi on all goods brought to market, etc. See Gow, op. cit. xviii. 77.

2 The whole of this passage is to my mind highly characteristic of Xenophon. His mind reverts to old conversations between Socrates and his young friends sixty years ago.

3 Again thoroughly Xenophontine.

4 As he himself has already pointed out—ἀκρισία δὲ καὶ ταραχὴ ἐτὸς πλεῖστον μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐγένετο ἡ πρόσθεν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. Hell. VII. v. 27 (below, p. 233).
bined with moral influence, as the best weapon for the moment. The Phocians will presently evacuate Delphi, and then "if certain friends of ours yonder or whoever they be" (indicating by a gesture the Thebans) "seek to step into the place so vacated,"¹ this moral influence of Athens, exerted by embassies to the different states, will be found effectual enough—a coalition will be formed at once to put physical pressure on the offenders. War is less profitable than peace, but he repudiates the assumption that therefore Athens is to truckle to any foe. No! certainly not; but "we should be in a better position to defend ourselves if war comes in proportion as we have done no wrong to any one ourselves. The gods will fight upon our side."

Chapter vi.—He holds out a fair prospect. Should his proposals appear practicable, he urges upon the senators (or whatever larger audience he is addressing) to consult the will of heaven both at Dodona and Delphi; and, if so be the divine powers will that the scheme should be carried out, to carry it out at once. The whole of this chapter, with its peroration, is quite in the manner of Xenophon.

It is pleasant to think that these are probably the last words he ever penned.

¹ I have, as I have so often said, adopted the reading ἔρπωντο for the vulgate ἔρπωντο (see vol. i. p. lviii. note 1); but even if we were driven to read ἔρπωντο I should still think that the date of the pamphlet was B.C. 355, and not B.C. 346, and fall back upon Cobet's explanation of a double seizure of Delphi by the Phocians, and an earlier evacuation of the temple (than that which is historically established as taking place in B.C. 346), followed by attempts on the part of the Thebans to seize the temple. The dates of the sacred war are somewhat uncertain. According to Grote and Thirlwall, etc., it began in B.C. 357; according to Curtius, Jebb (Att. Or., Annals), Abbott (Outlines), Peter (Chron. Tables), etc., it began in B.C. 355. The authority for either view is Diod. xvi. 14, B.C. 357-356, and xvi. 23, B.C. 355-354; Paus. x. 2, 3 giving apparently B.C. 358-357.
I. B.C. 403-402.—Thus the civil strife at Athens had an end. At a subsequent date Cyrus sent messengers to Lacedaemon, claiming requital in kind for the service which he had lately rendered in the war with Athens.\(^1\) The demand seemed to the ephorate just and reasonable. Accordingly they ordered Samius,\(^2\) who was admiral at the time, to put himself at the disposition of Cyrus for any service which he might require. Samius himself needed no persuasion to carry out the wishes of Cyrus. With his own fleet, accompanied by that of Cyrus, he sailed round to Cilicia, and so made it impossible for Syennesis, the ruler of that province, to oppose Cyrus by land in his advance against the king his brother.

B.C. 401.—The particulars of the expedition are to be found in the pages of the Syracusan Themistogenes,\(^3\) who

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\(^1\) Lit. "what Cyrus himself had been to the Lacedaemonians in their turn be to Cyrus."

\(^2\) Samius (Diod. Sic. xiv. 19). But see Anab. I, iv, 2 (Trans. vol. i. p. 91), where Pythagoras is named as admiral. Possibly the one officer succeeded the other.

\(^3\) Lit. "as to how then Cyrus collected an army and with it went up against his brother, and how the battle was fought and how he died, and how in the sequel the Hellenes escaped to the sea (all this), is written by (or 'for,' or 'in honour of') Themistogenes the Syracusan." See Trans. vol. i. pp. lxvi, lxvii. My impression is that Xenophon's Anabasis, or a portion of the work so named, was edited originally by Themistogenes. See Philol. Museum, vol. i. p. 489; L. Dindorf, Εἰς, Ειλλ., Ox. MDCCCLIII., note ad. loc. Θεμιστογένεια. Cf. Diod. Sic. xiv. 19-31, 37, after Ephorus and Theopompus probably.
describes the mustering of the armament, and the advance of Cyrus at the head of his troops; and then the battle, and death of Cyrus himself, and the consequent retreat of the Hellenes while effecting their escape to the sea.¹

B.C. 400.—It was in recognition of the service which he had rendered in this affair, that Tissaphernes was despatched to Lower Asia by the king his master. He came as satrap, not only of his own provinces, but of those which had belonged to Cyrus; and he at once demanded the absolute submission of the Ionic cities, without exception, to his authority. These communities, partly from a desire to maintain their freedom, and partly from fear of Tissaphernes himself, whom they had rejected in favour of Cyrus during the lifetime of that prince, were loth to admit the satrap within their gates. They thought it better to send an embassy to the Lacedaemonians, calling upon them as representatives and leaders² of the Hellenic world to look to the interests of their petitioners, who were Hellenes also, albeit they lived in Asia, and not to suffer their country to be ravaged and themselves enslaved.

In answer to this appeal, the Lacedaemonians sent out Thibron³ as governor, providing him with a body of troops, consisting of one thousand neodamodes⁴ (i.e. enfranchised helots) and four thousand Peloponnesians. In addition to these, Thibron himself applied to the Athenians for a detachment of three hundred horse, for whose service-money he would hold himself responsible. The Athenians in answer sent him some of the knights who had served under the Thirty,⁵ thinking that the people of Athens would be well rid of them if they went abroad and perished there.

B.C. 400-399.—On their arrival in Asia, Thibron further collected contingents from the Hellenic cities on the continent; for at this time the word of a Lacedaemonian was law. He had only to command, and every city must needs obey.⁶ But although he had this armament, Thibron, when he saw the

¹ At Trapezus, March 10, B.C. 400 (Trans. vol. i. p. 209).
² προστάται, "patrons and protectors."
³ "As harmost." See Anab. ad fin.
⁴ See Hell. I. iii. 15 (Trans. vol. i. p. 13 note); Thuc. vii. 58.
⁵ See above, Hell. II. iv. 2 (Trans. vol. i. p. 63); and Sketch, pp. lxxxvi, note, xcvi.
⁶ See Anab. VI. vi. 12 (Trans. vol. i. p. 269).
cavalry, had no mind to descend into the plain. If he succeeded in protecting from pillage the particular district in which he chanced to be, he was quite content. It was only when the troops¹ who had taken part in the expedition of Cyrus had joined him on their safe return, that he assumed a bolder attitude. He was now ready to confront Tissaphernes, army against army, on the level ground, and won over a number of cities. Pergamum came in of her own accord. So did Teuthrania and Halisarna. These were under the government of Eurysthenes and Procles,² the descendants of Demaratus the Lacedaemonian, who in days of old had received this territory as a gift from the Persian monarch in return for his share in the campaign against Hellas. Gorgion and Gongylus, two brothers, also gave in their adhesion; they were lords, the one of Gambreum and Palae-Gambreum, the other of Myrina and Gryneum, four cities which, like those above named, had originally been gifts from the king to an earlier Gongylus—the sole Eretrian who “joined the Mede,” and in consequence was banished. Other cities which were too weak to resist, Thibron took by force of arms. In the case of one he was not so successful. This was the Egyptian³ Larisa, as it is called, which refused to capitulate, and was forthwith invested and subjected to a regular siege. When all other attempts to take it failed, he set about digging a tank or reservoir, and in connection with the tank an underground channel, by means of which he proposed to draw off the water supply of the inhabitants. In this he was baffled by frequent sallies of the besieged, and a continual discharge of timber and stones into the cutting. He retaliated by the construction of a wooden tortoise which he erected over the tank; but once more the tortoise was burnt to a cinder in a successful night attack on the part of the men of Larisa. These ineffectual efforts induced the ephors to send a despatch bidding Thibron give up Larisa and march upon Caria.

He had already reached Ephesus, and was on the point of

¹ March B.C. 399. See the final sentence of the Anabasis (Trans. vol. i. p. 318).
² See Anab. VII. viii. 8-16 (Trans. vol. i. pp. 316, 317).
³ Seventy stades S.E. of Cyme in the Aeolid. See Strabo, xiii. 621. For the origin of the name cf. Cyrop. VII. i. 45.
marching into Caria, when Dercylidas arrived to take command of his army. The new general was a man whose genius for invention had won him the nickname of Sisyphus. Thus it was that Thibron returned home, where on his arrival he was fined and banished, the allies accusing him of allowing his troops to plunder their friends.

Dercylidas was not slow to perceive and turn to account the jealousy which subsisted between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. Coming to terms with the former, he marched into the territory of the latter, preferring, as he said, to be at war with one of the pair at a time, rather than the two together. His hostility, indeed, to Pharnabazus was an old story, dating back to a period during the naval command of Lysander, when he was himself governor in Abydos; where, thanks to Pharnabazus, he had got into trouble with his superior officer, and had been made to stand "with his shield on his arm"—a stigma on his honour which no true Lacedaemonian would forgive, since this is the punishment of insubordination. For this reason, doubtless, Dercylidas had the greater satisfaction in marching against Pharnabazus. From the moment he assumed command there was a marked difference for the better between his methods and those of his predecessor. Thus he contrived to conduct his troops into that portion of the Aeolid which belonged to Pharnabazus, through the heart of a friendly territory without injury to the allies.

This district of Aeolis belonged to Pharnabazus, but had been held as a satrapy under him by a Dardanian named Zenis whilst he was alive; but when Zenis fell sick and died, Pharnabazus made preparation to give the satrapy to another. Then Mania the wife of Zenis, herself also a Dardanian, fitted out an expedition, and taking with her gifts wherewith to make a present to Pharnabazus himself, and to gratify his concubines and those whose power was greatest with Pharnabazus, set forth on her journey. When she had obtained audience of him she spoke as follows: "O Pharnabazus, thou knowest that thy servant my husband was in all

2 See Plut. Aristid. 23 (Clough, ii. p. 309).
3 I.e. as suzerain.
respects friendly to thee; moreover, he paid my lord the tributes which were thy due, so that thou didst praise and honour him. Now therefore, if I do thee service as faithfully as my husband, why needest thou to appoint another satrap?—nay but, if in any matter I please thee not, is it not in thy power to take from me the government on that day, and to give it to another?” When he had heard her words, Pharnabazus decided that the woman ought to be satrap. She, as soon as she was mistress of the territory, never ceased to render the tribute in due season, even as her husband before her had done. Moreover, whenever she came to the court of Pharnabazus she brought him gifts continually, and whenever Pharnabazus went down to visit her provinces she welcomed him with all fair and courteous entertainment beyond what his other viceroys were wont to do. The cities also which had been left to her by her husband, she guarded safely for him; while of those cities that owed her no allegiance, she acquired, on the seaboard, Larisa and Hamaxitus and Colonae—attacking their walls by aid of Hellenic mercenaries, whilst she herself sat in her carriage and watched the spectacle. Nor was she sparing of her gifts to those who won her admiration; and thus she furnished herself with a mercenary force of exceptional splendour. She also went with Pharnabazus on his campaigns, even when, on pretext of some injury done to the king’s territory, Mysians or Pisidians were the object of attack. In requital, Pharnabazus paid her magnificent honour, and at times invited her to assist him with her counsel.¹

Now when Mania was more than forty years old, the husband of her own daughter, Meidias—flustered by the suggestions of certain people who said that it was monstrous a woman should rule and he remain a private person²—found his way into her presence, as the story goes, and strangled her. For Mania, albeit she carefully guarded herself against all ordinary comers, as behaved her in the exercise of her “tyranny,” trusted in Meidias, and, as a woman might her own son-in-law, was ready to greet him at

² Or, “his brains whimsied with insinuations.”
all times with open arms. He also murdered her son, a youth of marvellous beauty, who was about seventeen years of age. He next seized upon the strong cities of Scepsis and Gergithes, in which lay for the most part the property and wealth of Mania. As for the other cities of the satrapy, they would not receive the usurper, their garrisons keeping them safely for Pharnabazus. Thereupon Meidias sent gifts to Pharnabazus, and claimed to hold the district even as Mania had held it; to whom the other answered, "Keep your gifts and guard them safely till that day when I shall come in person and take both you and them together"; adding, "What care I to live longer if I avenge not myself for the murder of Mania!"

Just at the critical moment Dercylidas arrived, and in a single day received the adhesion of the three seaboard cities Larisa, Hamaxitus, and Colonae—which threw open their gates to him. Then he sent messengers to the cities of the Aeolid also, offering them freedom if they would receive him within their walls and become allies. Accordingly the men of Neandria and Ilium and Cocylium lent willing ears; for since the death of Mania their Hellenic garrisons had been treated but ill. But the commander of the garrison in Cebrenè, a place of some strength, bethinking him that if he should succeed in guarding that city for Pharnabazus, he would receive honour at his hands, refused to admit Dercylidas. Whereupon the latter, in a rage, prepared to take the place by force; but when he came to sacrifice, on the first day the victims would not yield good omens; on the second, and again upon the third day, it was the same story. Thus for as many as four days he persevered in sacrificing, cherishing wrath the while—for he was in haste to become master of the whole Aeolid before Pharnabazus came to the succour of the district.

Meanwhile a certain Sicyonian captain, Athenadas by name, said to himself: "Dercylidas does but trifle to waste his time here, whilst I with my own hand can draw off their water from the men of Cebrenè"; wherewith he ran forward with his division and essayed to choke up the spring which supplied the city. But the garrison sallied out and
covered the Sicyonian himself with wounds, besides killing two of his men. Indeed, they plied their swords and missiles with such good effect that the whole company was forced to beat a retreat. Dercylidas was not a little annoyed, thinking that now the spirit of the besiegers would certainly die away; but while he was in this mood, behold! there arrived from the beleaguered fortress emissaries of the Hellenes, who stated that the action taken by the commandant was not to their taste; for themselves, they would far rather be joined in bonds of fellowship with Hellenes than with barbarians. While the matter was still under discussion there came a messenger also from the commandant, to say that whatever the former deputation had proposed he, on his side, was ready to endorse. Accordingly Dercylidas, who, it so happened, had at length obtained favourable omens on that day, marched his force without more ado up to the gates of the city, which were flung open by those within; and so he entered. Here, then, he was content to appoint a garrison, and without further stay advanced upon Scepsis and Gergithes.

And now Meidias, partly expecting the hostile advance of Pharnabazus, and partly mistrusting the citizens—for to such a pass things had come—sent to Dercylidas, proposing to meet him in conference provided he might take security of hostages. In answer to this suggestion the other sent him one man from each of the cities of the allies, and bade him take his pick of these, whichever and how many soever he chose, as hostages for his own security. Meidias selected ten, and so went out. In conversation with Dercylidas, he asked him on what terms he would accept his alliance. The other answered: "The terms are that you grant the citizens freedom and self-government." The words were scarcely out of his mouth before he began marching upon Scepsis. Whereupon Meidias, perceiving it was vain to hinder him in the teeth of the citizens, suffered him to

1 Grote (H. G. ix. 294) says: "The reader will remark how Xenophon shapes the narrative in such a manner as to inculcate the pious duty in a general of obeying the warnings furnished by the sacrifice—either for action or for inaction. . . . Such an inference is never (I believe) to be found suggested in Thucydides." See Breitenbach, Xen. Hell. i et ii, præf. in alteram ed. p. xvii.
enter. That done, Dercylidas offered sacrifice to Athena in the citadel of the Scepsians, turned out the bodyguards of Meidias, and handed over the city to the citizens. And so, having admonished them to regulate their civic life as Hellenes and free men ought, he left the place and continued his advance against Gergithes. On this last march he was escorted by many of the Scepsians themselves; such was the honour they paid him and so great their satisfaction at his exploits. Meidias also followed close at his side, petitioning that he would hand over the city of the Gergithians to himself. To whom Dercylidas only made reply, that he should not fail to obtain any of his just rights. And whilst the words were yet upon his lips he was drawing close to the gates, with Meidias at his side. Behind him followed the troops, marching two and two in peaceful fashion. The defenders of Gergithes from their towers—which were extraordinarily high—espied Meidias in company of the Spartan, and abstained from shooting. And Dercylidas said: “Bid them open the gates, Meidias, when you shall lead the way, and I will enter the temple along with you and do sacrifice to Athena.” And Meidias, though he shrank from opening the gates, yet in terror of finding himself on a sudden seized, reluctantly gave the order to open the gates. As soon as he was entered in, the Spartan, still taking Meidias with him, marched up to the citadel and there ordered the main body of his soldiers to take up their position round the walls, whilst he with those about him did sacrifice to Athena. When the sacrifice was ended he ordered Meidias’s bodyguard to pile arms¹ in the van of his troops. Here for the future they would serve as mercenaries, since Meidias their former master stood no longer in need of their protection. The latter, being at his wits’ end what to do, exclaimed: “Look you, I will now leave you; I go to make preparation for my guest.” But the other replied: “Heaven forbid! Ill were it that I who have offered sacrifice should be treated as a guest by you. I rather should be the entertainer and you the guest. Pray stay with us, and while the supper is

¹ *I.e.* take up a position, or “to order arms,” whilst he addressed them; not probably “to ground arms,” as if likely to be mutinous.
preparing, you and I can consider our obligations, and perform them."

When they were seated Dercylidas put certain questions: "Tell me, Meidias, did your father leave you heir to his estates?" "Certainly he did," answered the other. "And how many dwelling-houses have you? what landed estates? how much pasturage?" The other began running off an inventory, whilst some of the Scepsians who were present kept interposing, "He is lying to you, Dercylidas." "Nay, you take too minute a view of matters," replied the Spartan. When the inventory of the paternal property was completed, he proceeded: "Tell me, Meidias, to whom did Mania belong?" A chorus of voices rejoined, "To Pharnabazus." "Then must her property have belonged to Pharnabazus too." "Certainly," they answered. "Then it must now be ours," he remarked, "by right of conquest, since Pharnabazus is at war with us. Will some one of you escort me to the place where the property of Mania and Pharnabazus lies?" So the rest led the way to the dwelling-place of Mania which Meidias had taken from her, and Meidias followed too. When he was entered, Dercylidas summoned the stewards, and bidding his attendants seize them, gave them to understand that, if detected stealing anything which belonged to Mania, they would lose their heads on the spot. The stewards proceeded to point out the treasures, and he, when he had looked through the whole store, bolted and barred the doors, affixing his seal and setting a watch. As he went out he found at the doors certain of the generals and captains, and said to them: "Here, sirs, we have pay ready made for the army—a year's pay nearly for eight thousand men—and if we can win anything besides, there will be so much the more." This he said, knowing that those who heard it would be all the more amenable to discipline, and would yield him a more flattering obedience. Then Meidias asked, "And where am I to live, Dercylidas?" "Where you have the very best right to live," replied the other, "in your native town of Scepsis, and in your father's house."

1 Lit. "of the taxiarchs and lochagoi."
11.—Such were the exploits of Dercylidas: nine cities taken in eight days. Two considerations now began to occupy his mind: how was he to avoid falling into the fatal error of Thibron and becoming a burthen to his allies, whilst wintering in a friendly country? how, again, was he to prevent Pharnabazus from overriding the Hellenic states in pure contempt with his cavalry? Accordingly he sent to Pharnabazus and put it to him point-blank:—Which will you have, peace or war?

Whereupon Pharnabazus, who could not but perceive that the whole Aeolid had now been converted practically into a fortified base of operations, which threatened his own homestead of Phrygia, chose peace.

B.C. 399-398.—This being so, Dercylidas advanced into Bithynian Thrace, and there spent the winter; nor did Pharnabazus exhibit a shadow of annoyance, since the Bithynians were perpetually at war with himself. For the most part, Dercylidas continued to harry Bithynia in perfect security, and found provisions without stint. Presently he was joined from the other side of the straits by some Odrysian allies sent by Seuthes; they numbered two hundred horse and three hundred peltasts. These fellows pitched upon a site a little more than a couple of miles from the Hellenic force, where they entrenched themselves; then having got from Dercylidas some heavy infantry soldiers to act as guards of their encampment, they devoted themselves to plundering, and succeeded in capturing an ample store of slaves and other wealth. Presently their camp was full of prisoners, when one morning the Bithynians, having ascertained the actual numbers of the marauding parties as well as of the Hellenes left as guards behind, collected in large masses of light troops and cavalry, and attacked the garrison, who were not more than two hundred strong. As soon as they came close enough, they began discharging spears and other missiles on the little body, who on their side continued to be wounded and shot down, but were quite unable to retaliate, cooped up as they were within a palisading barely six feet

1 φέρων καὶ δρυω, i.e. "there was plenty of live stock to lift and chattels to make away with."

2 For Seuthes see Anab. VII. i. 5 (Trans. vol. i. p. 274); and below, IV. viii. 26, p. 85.

2 Lit. "twenty stades."
high, until in desperation they tore down their defences with their own hands, and dashed at the enemy. These had nothing to do but to draw back from the point of egress, and being light troops easily escaped beyond the grasp of heavy-armed men, while ever and again, from one point of vantage or another, they poured their shower of javelins, and at every sally laid many a brave man low, till at length, like sheep penned in a fold, the defenders were shot down almost to a man. A remnant, it is true, did escape, consisting of some fifteen who, seeing the turn affairs were taking, had already made off in the middle of the fighting. Slipping through their assailants' fingers, to the small concern of the Bithynians, they reached the main Hellenic camp in safety. The Bithynians, satisfied with their achievement, part of which consisted in cutting down the tent guards of the Odrysian Thracians and recovering all their prisoners, made off without delay; so that by the time the Hellenes got wind of the affair and rallied to the rescue, they found nothing left in the camp save only the stripped corpses of the slain. When the Odrysians themselves returned, they fell to burying their own dead, quaffing copious draughts of wine in their honour and holding horse-races; but for the future they deemed it advisable to camp along with the Hellenes. Thus they harried and burned Bithynia the winter through.

B.C. 398.—With the commencement of spring Dercylidas turned his back upon the Bithynians and came to Lampsacus. Whilst at this place envoys reached him from the home authorities. These were Aracus, Naubates, and Antisthenes. They were sent to inquire generally into the condition of affairs in Asia, and to inform Dercylidas of the extension of his office for another year. They had been further commissioned by the ephors to summon a meeting of the soldiers and inform them that the ephors held them to blame for their former doings, though for their present avoidance of evil conduct they must needs praise them; and for the future they must understand that while no repetition of misdoing would be tolerated, all just and upright dealing by the allies would

1 Or, "slipping through the enemy's fingers, who took no heed of them, they," etc.
receive its meed of praise. The soldiers were therefore summoned, and the envoys delivered their message, to which the leader of the Cyreians 1 answered: "Nay, men of Lacedaemon, listen; we are the same to-day as we were last year; only our general of to-day is different from our general in the past. If to-day we have avoided our offence of yesterday, the cause is not far to seek; you may discover it for yourselves."

Aracus and the other envoys shared the hospitality of Dercylidas's tent, and one of the party chanced to mention how they had left an embassy from the men of Chersonese in Lacedaemon. According to their statement, he added, it was impossible for them to till their lands nowadays, so perpetually were they robbed and plundered by the Thracians; whereas the peninsula needed only to be walled across from sea to sea, and there would be abundance of good land to cultivate—enough for themselves and as many others from Lacedaemon as cared to come. "So that it would not surprise us," continued the envoys, "if a Lacedaemonian were actually sent out from Sparta with a force to carry out the project." Dercylidas kept his ears open but his counsel close, and so sent forward the commissioners to Ephesus. 2 It pleased him to picture their progress through the Hellenic cities, and the spectacle of peace and prosperity which would everywhere greet their eyes. When he knew that his stay was to be prolonged, he sent again to Pharnabazus and offered him once more as an alternative either the prolongation of the winter truce or war. And once again Pharnabazus chose truce. It was thus that Dercylidas was able to leave the cities in the neighbourhood of the satrap 3 in peace and friendship. Crossing the Hellespont himself he brought his army into Europe, and marching through Thrace, which was also friendly, was entertained by Seuthes, 4 and so reached the Chersonese.

This district, he soon discovered, not only contained something like a dozen cities, 5 but was singularly fertile. The soil was of the best, but ruined by the ravages of the Thracians,

1 Trans. vol. i p. cx. 2 See Grote, H. G. ix. 301.
3 Or, reading, after Cobet, τὰς περὶ ἑκείνην πόλεις—"the cities of that neighbourhood." 4 See Anab. VII. vii. 51 (Trans. vol. i. p. 314).
5 Lit. "eleven or twelve cities." For the natural productivity, see Anab. V. vi. 25 (Trans. vol. i. p. 232).
precisely as he had been told. Accordingly, having measured and found the breadth of the isthmus barely four miles,\(^1\) he no longer hesitated. Having offered sacrifice, he commenced his line of wall, distributing the area to the soldiers in detachments, and promising to award them prizes for their industry—a first prize for the section first completed, and to the rest as each detachment of workers might deserve. By this means the whole wall begun in spring was finished before autumn. Within these lines he established eleven cities, with numerous harbours, abundance of good arable land, and plenty of land under plantation, besides magnificent grazing grounds for sheep and cattle of every kind.

Having finished the work, he crossed back again into Asia, and on a tour of inspection, found the cities for the most part in a thriving condition; but when he came to Atarneus he discovered that certain exiles from Chios had got possession of the stronghold, which served them as a convenient base for pillaging and plundering Ionia; and this, in fact, was their means of livelihood. Being further informed of the large supplies of grain which they had inside, he proceeded to draw entrenchments round the place with a view to a regular investment, and by this means he reduced it in eight months. Then having appointed Draco of Pellene\(^2\) commandant, he stocked the fortress with an abundance of provisions of all sorts, to serve him as a halting-place when he chanced to pass that way, and so withdrew to Ephesus, which is three days' journey from Sardis.

B.C. 397.—Up to this date peace had been maintained between Tissaphernes and Dercylidas, as also between the Hellenes and barbarians in those parts. But the time came when an embassy arrived at Lacedaemon from the Ionic cities, protesting that Tissaphernes might, if he chose, leave the Hellenic cities independent. "Our idea," they added, "is, that if Caria, the home of Tissaphernes, felt the pinch of war, the satrap would very soon agree to grant us inde-

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\(^1\) Lit. "thirty-seven stades." Mod. Gallipoli. See Herod. vi. 36; Plut. Pericr. xix.

pendence.” The ephors, on hearing this, sent a despatch to Dercylidas, and bade him cross the frontier with his army into Caria, whilst Pharax the admiral coasted round with the fleet. These orders were carried out. Meanwhile a visitor had reached Tissaphernes. This was no less a person than Pharnabazus. His coming was partly owing to the fact that Tissaphernes had been appointed general-in-chief, and partly in order to testify his readiness to make common cause with his brother satrap in fighting and expelling the Hellenes from the king’s territory; for if his heart was stirred by jealousy on account of the generalship bestowed upon his rival, he was not the less aggrieved at finding himself robbed of the Aeolid. Tissaphernes, lending willing ears to the proposal, had answered: “First cross over with me into Caria, and then we will take counsel on these matters.” But being arrived in Caria, they determined to establish garrisons of some strength in the various fortresses, and so crossed back again into Ionia.

Hearing that the satraps had recrossed the Maeander, Dercylidas grew apprehensive for the district which lay there unprotected. “If Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus,” he said to Pharax, “chose to make a descent, they could harry the country right and left.” In this mind he followed suit, and recrossed the frontier too. And now as they marched on, preserving no sort of battle order—on the supposition that the enemy had got far ahead of them into the district of Ephesus—suddenly they caught sight of his scouts perched on some monumental structures facing them. To send up scouts into similar edifices and towers on their own side was the work of a few moments, and before them lay revealed the long lines of troops drawn up just where their road lay. These were the Carians, with their white shields, and the whole Persian troops there present, with all the Hellenic contingents belonging to either satrap. Besides these there was a great cloud of cavalry: on the right wing the squadrons of Tissaphernes, and on the left those of Pharnabazus.

Seeing how matters lay, Dercylidas ordered the generals of brigade and captains to form into line as quickly as possible, eight deep, placing the light infantry on the fringe of battle,
with the cavalry—such cavalry, that is, and of such numerical strength, as he chanced to have. Meanwhile, as general, he sacrificed.\(^1\) During this interval the troops from Peloponnese kept quiet in preparation as for battle. Not so the troops from Priene and Achilleum, from the islands and the Ionic cities, some of whom left their arms in the corn, which stood thick and deep in the plain of the Maeander, and took to their heels; while those who remained at their posts gave evident signs that their steadiness would not last. Pharnabazus, it was reported, had given orders to engage; but Tissaphernes, who recalled his experience of his own military exploits with the Cyreian army, and assumed that all other Hellenes were of similar mettle, had no desire to engage, but sent to Dercylidas saying, he should be glad to meet him in conference. So Dercylidas, attended by the pick of his troops, horse and foot, in personal attendance on himself,\(^2\) went forward to meet the envoys. He told them that for his own part he had made his preparations to engage, as they themselves might see, but still, if the satraps were minded to meet him in conference, he had nothing to say against it—"Only, in that case, there must be a mutual exchange of hostages and other pledges."

When this proposal had been agreed to and carried out, the two armies retired for the night—the Asiatics to Tralles in Caria, the Hellenes to Leucophrys, where was a temple\(^3\) of Artemis of great sanctity, and a sandy-bottomed lake more than a furlong in extent, fed by a spring of ever-flowing water fit for drinking and warm. For the moment so much was effected. On the next day they met at the place appointed, and it was agreed that they should mutually ascertain the terms on which either party was willing to make peace. On his side, Dercylidas insisted that the king should grant independence to the Hellenic cities; while Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus demanded the evacuation of the country by the Hellenic army, and the withdrawal of the Lacedaemonian governors from the cities. After this interchange of ideas a truce was

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\(^1\) *I.e.* according to custom on the eve of battle. See *Pol. Lac.* xiii. 8 (below, p. 321).

\(^2\) Lit. "they were splendid fellows to look at." See *Anab.* II. iii. 3 (Trans. vol. i. p. 125).

\(^3\) Lately unearthed. See *Class. Rev.* v. 8, p. 391.
entered into, so as to allow time for the reports of the proceedings to be sent by Dercylidas to Lacedaemon, and by Tissaphernes to the king.

B.C. 401 (?).—Whilst such was the conduct of affairs in Asia under the guidance of Dercylidas, the Lacedaemonians at home were at the same time no less busily employed with other matters. They cherished a long-standing embitterment against the Eleians, the grounds of which were that the Eleians had once contracted an alliance with the Athenians, Argives, and Mantineans; moreover, on pretence of a sentence registered against the Lacedaemonians, they had excluded them from the horse-race and gymnastic contests. Nor was that the sum of their offending. They had taken and scourged Lichas, under the following circumstances:—Being a Spartan, he had formally consigned his chariot to the Thebans, and when the Thebans were proclaimed victors he stepped forward to crown his charioteer; whereupon, in spite of his gray hairs, the Eleians put those indignities upon him and expelled him from the festival. Again, at a date subsequent to that occurrence, Agis being sent to offer sacrifice to Olympian Zeus in accordance with the bidding of an oracle, the Eleians would not suffer him to offer prayer for victory in war, asserting that the ancient law and custom forbade Hellenes to consult the god for war with Hellenes; and Agis was forced to go away without offering the sacrifice.

In consequence of all these annoyances the ephors and the Assembly determined “to bring the men of Elis to their senses.” Thereupon they sent an embassy to that state, announcing that the authorities of Lacedaemon deemed it just and right that they should leave the country townships in the territory of Elis free and independent. This the Eleians flatly refused to do. The cities in question were theirs by right of war. Thereupon the ephors called out the ban. The leader of the expedition was Agis. He invaded Elis through Achaia by the Larisus; but the army had hardly set foot on

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1 For the chronology of the Eleian war, see note 3, p. 18.
2 In 421 B.C. (see Thuc. v. 31); for the second charge, see Thuc. v. 49 foll.
3 See Mem. I. ii. 61; Thuc. v. 50; and Jowett, note ad loc., vol. ii. p. 374.
4 See Grote, H. G. ix. 311 note.
5 Lit. "perioecid."
6 From the north. The Larisus is the frontier stream between Achaia and Elis. See Strabo, viii. 387.
the enemy's soil and the work of devastation begun, when an
earthquake took place, and Agis, taking this as a sign from
Heaven, marched back again out of the country and disbanded
his army. Thereat the men of Elis were much more em-
boldened, and sent embassies to various cities which they
knew to be hostile to the Lacedaemonians.

The year had not completed its revolution 1 ere the ephors
again called out the ban against Elis, and the invading host of
Agis was this time swelled by the rest of the allies, including
the Athenians; the Boeotians and Corinthians alone excepted.
The Spartan king now entered through Aulon,2 and the men
of Lepreum 3 at once revolted from the Eleians and gave in
their adhesion to the Spartan, and simultaneously with these
the Macistians and their next-door neighbours the Epitalians.
As he crossed the river further adhesions followed, on the part
of the Letrinians, the Amphidolians, and the Marganians.

B.C. 400(?).—Upon this he pushed on into Olympian territory
and did sacrifice to Olympian Zeus. There was no attempt to
stay his proceedings now. After sacrifice he marched against
the capital, 4 devastating and burning the country as he went.
Multitudes of cattle, multitudes of slaves, were the fruits of
conquest yielded, insomuch that the fame thereof spread, and
many more Arcadians and Achaeans flocked to join the standard
of the invader and to share in the plunder. In fact, the expedi-
tion became one enormous foray. Here was the chance to fill
all the granaries of Peloponnese with corn. When he had
reached the capital, the beautiful suburbs and gymnasia became
a spoil to the troops; but the city itself, though it lay open
before him a defenceless and unwalled town, he kept aloof from.
He would not, rather than could not, take it. Such was the
explanation given. Thus the country was a prey to devastat-
ion, and the invaders massed round Cylene.

Then the friends of a certain Xenias—a man of whom

1 Al. "on the coming round of the next year." See Jowett (note to Thuc.
i. 31), vol. ii. p. 33.
2 On the south. For the history, see Busolt, Die Laked. pp. 146-200.
"The river" is the Alpheus. For the topography of Elis and the Triphylia,
see map.
3 See below, VI. v. 11, p. 172; Paus. IV. xv. 8.
4 I.e. Elis, of which Cylene is the port town. For the wealth of the dis-

tRICT, see Polyb. iv. 73; and below, VII. iv. 33, p. 222.
it was said that he might measure the silver coin, inherited from his father, by the bushel—wishing to be the leading instruments in bringing over the state to Lacedaemon, rushed out of the house, sword in hand, and began a work of butchery. Amongst other victims they killed a man who strongly resembled the leader of the democratic party, Thrasydaeus. Every one believed it was really Thrasydaeus who was slain. The popular party were panic-stricken, and stirred neither hand nor foot. On their side the cut-throats fondly imagined all was over; and their sympathisers poured their armed bands into the market-place. But Thrasydaeus was laid asleep the while where the fumes of wine had overpowered him. When the people came to discover that their hero was not dead, they crowded round his house this side and that, like a swarm of bees clinging to their leader; and as soon as Thrasydaeus had put himself in the van, with the people at his back, a battle was fought, and the people won. And those who had laid their hands to deeds of butchery went as exiles to the Lacedaemonians.

After a while Agis himself retired, recrossing the Alpheus; but he was careful to leave a garrison in Epitalium near that river, with Lysippus as governor, and the exiles from Elis along with him. Having so done, he disbanded his army and returned home himself.

b.c. 400-399 (?).—During the rest of the summer and the ensuing winter the territory of the Eleians was ravaged and ransacked by Lysippus and his troops, until Thrasydaeus, the following summer, sent to Lacedaemon and agreed to dismantle the walls of Phea and Cyllene, and to grant autonomy to the Triphylian townships together with Phrixia and Epitalium, the Letrinihs, Amphidolians, and Marganians; and besides these

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1 See Paus. III. viii. 4. He was a friend of Lysias (Vit. X. Orat. 835).
2 The house was filled to overflowing by the clustering close-packed crowd.
3 Grote (H. G. ix. 316) discusses the date of this war between Elis and Sparta, which, he thinks, reaches over three different years, 402-400 B.C. But Curtius (vol. iv. Eng. tr. p. 196) disagrees: "The Eleian war must have occurred in 401-400 B.C., and Grote rightly conjectures that the Eleians were anxious to bring it to a close before the celebration of the festival, But he errs in extending its duration over three years." See Diod. xiv. 17, 34; Paus. III. viii. 2 foll.
4 Grote remarks: "There is something perplexing in Xenophon's description of the Triphylian townships which the Eleians surrendered" (H. G. ix. 315). I adopt Grote's emend. καὶ Φρχα. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 176.
to the Acroreians and to Lasion, a place claimed by the Arcadians. With regard to Epeium, a town midway between Heraea and Macistus, the Eleians claimed the right to keep it, on the plea that they had purchased the whole district from its then owners, for thirty talents,¹ which sum they had actually paid. But the Lacedaemonians, acting on the principle "that a purchase which forcibly deprives the weaker party of his possession is no more justifiable than a seizure by violence," compelled them to emancipate Epeium also. From the presidency of the temple of Olympian Zeus, however, they did not oust them; not that it belonged to Elis of ancient right, but because the rival claimants,² it was felt, were "villagers," hardly equal to the exercise of the presidency. After these concessions, peace and alliance between the Eleians and the Lacedaemonians were established, and the war between Elis and Sparta ceased.

¹ — After this Agis came to Delphi and offered as a sacrifice a tenth of the spoil. On his return journey he fell ill at Heraea—being by this time an old man—and was carried back to Lacedaemon. He survived the journey, but being there arrived, death speedily overtook him. He was buried with a sepulture transcending in solemnity the lot of ordinary mortality.²

When the holy days of mourning were accomplished, and it was necessary to choose another king, there were rival claimants to the throne. Leotychides claimed it as the son, Agesilaus as the brother, of Agis. Then Leotychides protested: "Yet consider, Agesilaus, the law bids not 'the king's brother,' but 'the king's son' to be king; only if there chance to be no son, in that case shall the brother of the king be king." Agesilaus: "Then must I needs be king." Leotychides: "How so, seeing that I am not dead?" Agesilaus: "Because he whom you call your father denied you, saying, 'Leotychides is no son of mine.'" Leotychides: "Nay, but my mother, who would know far better than he, said, and still to-day says, I am." Agesilaus: "Nay, but the god himself, Poteidan, laid his finger on thy falsity when by his earthquake he drove forth thy father from the bridal chamber into the

¹ = Ἑυτῆρας οἰκεῖος ἔδωκεν ἠρμόσης Διός. ² I.e. the men of the Pisatid. See below, VII. iv. 28, p. 221; Busolt. op. cit. p. 156.
³ See below, Ages. xi. 16, p. 272; Pol. Lac. xv. 9, p. 324.
light of day; and time, 'that tells no lies,' as the proverb has it, bare witness to the witness of the god; for just ten months from the moment at which he fled and was no more seen within that chamber, you were born."  

So they reasoned together.

Diopeithes, a great authority upon oracles, supported Leotychides. There was an oracle of Apollo, he urged, which said, "Beware of the lame reign." But Diopeithes was met by Lysander, who in behalf of Agesilaus demurred to this interpretation put upon the language of the god. If they were to beware of a lame reign, it meant not, beware lest a man stumble and halt, but rather, beware of him in whose veins flows not the blood of Heracles; most assuredly the kingdom would halt, and that would be a lame reign in very deed, whenever the descendants of Heracles should cease to lead the state. Such were the arguments on either side, after hearing which the city chose Agesilaus to be king.

Now Agesilaus had not been seated on the throne one year when, as he sacrificed one of the appointed sacrifices in behalf of the city, the soothsayer warned him, saying: "The gods reveal a conspiracy of the most fearful character"; and when the king sacrificed a second time, he said: "The aspect of the victims is now even yet more terrible"; but when he had sacrificed for the third time, the soothsayer exclaimed: "O Agesilaus, the sign is given to me, even as though we were in the very midst of the enemy." Thereupon they sacrificed to the deities who avert evil and work salvation, and so barely obtained good omens and ceased sacrificing. Nor had five days elapsed after the sacrifices were ended, ere one came bringing information to the ephors of a conspiracy, and named Cinadon as the ringleader; a young man robust of body as of soul, but not one of the peers. Accordingly the ephors ques-

1 I have followed Sauppe as usual, but see Hartman (Anal. Xen. p. 327) for a discussion of the whole passage. He thinks that Xenophon wrote 

έκ οὔ γάρ τοίς ἐφυγεν (ὅ σοι πατήρ, ἠ. adulter) ἐκ τῷ θαλάμῳ δεκάτῳ μνή τῷ ἐφύς. The Doric ἐκ τῷ θαλάμῳ was corrupted into ἐν τῷ θαλάμῳ and καὶ ἐφάνη inserted. This corrupt reading Plutarch had before him, and hence his distorted version of the story.

2 See Plut. Ages. ii. 4; Lys. xxii. (Clough, iv. 3; iii. 129); Paus. III. viii. 5.

3 Pol. Lac. xv. 2.

4 For the διοκοί, see Müller, Dorians, iii. 5, 7 (vol. ii. p. 84); Grote, H. G. ix. 345, note 2.
tioned their informant: "How say you the occurrence is to take place?" and he who gave the information answered: "Cinadon took me to the limit of the market-place, and bade me count how many Spartans there were in the market-place; and I counted—'king, and ephors, and elders, and others—maybe forty.' But tell me, Cinadon,' I said to him, 'why have you bidden me count them?' and he answered me: 'Those men, I would have you know, are your sworn foes; and all those others, more than four thousand, congregated there are your natural allies.' Then he took and showed me in the streets, here one and there two of 'our enemies,' as we chanced to come across them, and all the rest 'our natural allies'; and so again running through the list of Spartans to be found in the country districts, he still kept harping on that string: 'Look you, on each estate one foeman—the master—and all the rest allies.' The ephors asked: "How many do you reckon are in the secret of this matter?" The informant answered: "On that point also he gave me to understand that there were by no means many in their secret who were prime movers of the affair, but those few to be depended on; 'and to make up,' said he, 'we ourselves are in their secret, all the rest of them—helots, enfranchised, inferiors, provincials, one and all.' Note their demeanour when Spartans chance to be the topic of their talk. Not one of them can conceal the delight it would give him if he might eat up every Spartan raw." Then, as the inquiry went on, the question came: "And where did they propose to find arms?" The answer followed: "He explained that those of us, of course, who are enrolled in regiments have arms of our own already, and as for the mass—he led the way to the war foundry, and showed me scores and scores of knives, of swords, of spits, hatchets, and axes, and reaping-hooks. 'Anything or everything,' he told me, 'which men use to delve in earth, cut timber, or quarry stone, would serve our purpose; nay, the instruments used for other arts would in nine cases out of ten furnish weapons enough and to spare,

1 For the neodamodes, hypomeiones, periocci, see Arnold, Thuc. v. 34; Müller, Dorian, ii. 43, 84, 18; Busolt, op. cit. p. 16.
2 See Anab. IV. viii. 14 (Trans. vol. i. p. 206, note 3); and Hom. II. iv. 34.
especially in dealing with unarmed antagonists." Once more being asked what time the affair was to come off, he replied his orders were "not to leave the city."

As the result of their inquiry the ephors were persuaded that the man's statements were based upon things he had really seen, and they were so alarmed that they did not even venture to summon the Little Assembly, as it was named; but holding informal meetings among themselves—a few senators here and a few there— they determined to send Cinadon and others of the young men to Aulon, with instructions to apprehend certain of the inhabitants and helots, whose names were written on the scytalë (or scroll). He had further instructions to capture another resident in Aulon; this was a woman, the fashionable beauty of the place—supposed to be the arch-corrupress of all Lacedaemonians, young and old, who visited Aulon. It was not the first mission of the sort on which Cinadon had been employed by the ephors. It was natural, therefore, that the ephors should entrust him with the scytalë on which the names of the suspects were inscribed; and in answer to his inquiry which of the young men he was to take with him, they said: "Go and order the eldest of the Hippagretas (or commanders of horse) to let you have six or seven who chance to be there." But they had taken care to let the commander know whom he was to send, and that those sent should also know that their business was to capture Cinadon. Further, the authorities instructed Cinadon that they would send three wagons to save bringing back his captives on foot—concealing as deeply as possible the fact that he, and he alone, was the object of the mission. Their reason for not securing him in the city was that they did not really know the extent of the mischief; and they wished, in the first instance, to learn from Cinadon who his accomplices were before these latter could discover they were informed against and effect their escape. His captors

1 "And pointed to a well-concerted plan."
2 See Grote, H. G. ix. 348.
3 See Thuc. i. 131; Plut. Lys. 19 (Clough, iii. p. 125).
4 "The Hippagretæ (or commander of the three hundred youthful guards called horsemen, though they were not really mounted)." Grote, H. G. vol. ix. p. 349; see Pol. Lac. iv. 3 (below, p. 303).
were to secure him first, and having learnt from him the names of his confederates, to write them down and send them as quickly as possible to the ephors. The ephors, indeed, were so much concerned about the whole occurrence that they further sent a company of horse to assist their agents at Aulon.\(^1\) As soon as the capture was effected, and one of the horsemen was back with the list of names taken down on the information of Cinadon, they lost no time in apprehending the soothsayer Tisamenus and the rest who were the principals in the conspiracy. When Cinadon\(^2\) himself was brought back and cross-examined, and had made, a full confession of the whole plot, his plans, and his accomplices, they put to him one final question: "What was your object in undertaking this business?" He answered: "I wished to be inferior to no man in Lacedaemon." Let that be as it might, his fate was to be taken out forthwith in irons, just as he was, and to be placed with his two hands and his neck in the collar, and so under scourge and goad to be driven, himself and his accomplices, round the city. Thus upon the heads of those was visited the penalty of their offences.

iv. B.C. 397.\(^3\)—It was after the incidents just recorded that a Syracusan named Herodas brought news to Lacedaemon. He had chanced to be in Phoënicia with a certain shipowner, and was struck by the number of Phoenician triremes which he observed, some coming into harbour from other ports, others already there with their ships' companies complete, while others again were still completing their equipments. Nor was it only what he saw, but he had heard say further that there were to be three hundred of these vessels all told; whereupon he had taken passage home on the first sailing ship bound for Hellas. He was in haste to lay this information before the Lacedaemonians, feeling sure that the king and Tissaphernes were concerned in these preparations—though where the fleet was to act, or against whom, he would not venture to predict.

These reports threw the Lacedaemonians into a flutter of expectation and anxiety. They summoned a meeting of the

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1 Or, "to those on the way to Aulon."
2 See for Cinadon's case, Aristot. \(Pol\). v. 7, 3.
3 See Grote, \(H. G\). ix. 353. for chronology, etc.
allies, and began to deliberate as to what ought to be done. Lysander, convinced of the enormous superiority of the Hellenic navy, and with regard to land forces drawing an obvious inference from the exploits and final deliverance of the troops with Cyrus, persuaded Agesilaus to undertake a campaign into Asia, provided the authorities would furnish him with thirty Spartans, two thousand of the enfranchised, and contingents of the allies amounting to six thousand men. Apart from these calculations, Lysander had a personal object: he wished to accompany the king himself, and by his aid to re-establish the decarchies originally set up by himself in the different cities, but at a later date expelled through the action of the ephors, who had issued a fiat re-establishing the old order of constitution.

B.C. 396.—To this offer on the part of Agesilaus to undertake such an expedition the Lacedaemonians responded by presenting him with all he asked for, and six months' provisions besides. When the hour of departure came he offered all such sacrifices as are necessary, and lastly those "before crossing the border," and so set out. This done, he despatched to the several states messengers with directions as to the numbers to be sent from each, and the points of rendezvous; but for himself he was minded to go and do sacrifice at Aulis, even as Agamemnon had offered sacrifice in that place ere he set sail for Troy. But when he had reached the place and had begun to sacrifice, the Boeotarchs being apprised of his design, sent a body of cavalry and bade him desist from further sacrificing; and lighting upon victims already offered, they hurled them from off the altars, scattering the fragments. Then Agesilaus, calling the gods to witness, got on board his

1 Technically "neodamodes."  
2 Pol. Lac. xiii. 2 foll. (p. 319, below).  
3 Or, "To the several cities he had already despatched messengers with directions," etc.; see Paus. III. ix. 1-3; see Trans. vol. I. p. civ.  
4 See Freeman, Hist. of Federal Government, ch. iv. "Constitution of the Boeotian League," pp. 162, 163. The Boeotarchs, as representatives of the several Boeotian cities, were the supreme military commanders of the League, and, as it would appear, the general administrators of Federal affairs. "The Boeotarchs of course command at Delion, but they also act as administrative magistrates of the League by hindering Agesilaus from sacrificing at Aulis."  
trireme in bitter indignation, and sailed away. Arrived at Geraestus, he there collected as large a portion of his troops as possible, and with the armada made sail for Ephesus.

When he had reached that city the first move was made by Tissaphernes, who sent asking, "With what purpose he was come thither?" And the Spartan king made answer: "With the intention that the cities in Asia shall be independent even as are the cities in our quarter of Hellas." In answer to this Tissaphernes said: "If you on your part choose to make a truce whilst I send ambassadors to the king, I think you may well arrange the matter, and sail back home again, if so you will." "Willing enough should I be," replied Agesilaus, "were I not persuaded that you are cheating me." "Nay, but it is open to you," replied the satrap, "to exact a surety for the execution of the terms. 'Provided always that you, Tissaphernes, carry out what you say without deceit, we on our side will abstain from injuring your dominion in any respect whatever during the truce.'" Accordingly in the presence of three commissioners—Herippidas, Dercylidas, and Megillus—Tissaphernes took an oath in the words prescribed: "Verily and indeed, I will effect peace honestly and without guile." To which the commissioners, on behalf of Agesilaus, swore a counter-oath: "Verily and indeed, provided Tissaphernes so acts, we on our side will observe the truce."

Tissaphernes at once gave the lie to what he had sworn. Instead of adhering to peace he sent up to demand a large army from the king, in addition to that which he already had. But Agesilaus, though he was fully alive to these proceedings, adhered as rigidly as ever to the truce.

To keep quiet and enjoy leisure was his duty, in the exercise of which he wore away the time at Ephesus. But in reference to the organisation of the several states it was a season of vehement constitutional disturbance in the several cities; that is to say, there were neither democracies as in the old days of the Athenians, nor yet were there decarchies as in the days of Lysander. But here was Lysander back again. Every one recognised him, and flocked to him with petitions

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for one favour or another, which he was to obtain for them from Agesilaus. A crowd of suitors danced attendance on his heels, and formed so conspicuous a retinue that Agesilaus, any one would have supposed, was the private person and Lysander the king. All this was maddening to Agesilaus, as was presently plain. As to the rest of the Thirty, jealousy did not suffer them to keep silence, and they put it plainly to Agesilaus that the super-regal splendour in which Lysander lived was a violation of the constitution. So when Lysander took upon himself to introduce some of his petitioners to Agesilaus, the latter turned them a deaf ear. Their being aided and abetted by Lysander was sufficient; he sent them away discomfited. At length, as time after time things turned out contrary to his wishes, Lysander himself perceived the position of affairs. He now no longer suffered that crowd to follow him, and gave those who asked his help in anything plainly to understand they would gain nothing, but rather be losers, by his intervention. But being bitterly annoyed at the degradation put upon him, he came to the king and said to him: "Ah, Agesilaus, how well you know the art of humbling your friends!" "Ay, indeed," the king replied; "those of them whose one idea it is to appear greater than myself; if I did not know also how to requite with honour those who work for my good, I should be ashamed." And Lysander said: "Maybe there is more reason in your doings than ever guided my conduct;" adding, "Grant me for the rest one favour, so shall I cease to blush at the loss of my influence with you, and you will cease to be embarrassed by my presence. Send me off on a mission somewhere; wherever I am I will strive to be of service to you." Such was the proposal of Lysander. Agesilaus resolved to act upon it, and despatched Lysander to the Hellen- pont. And this is what befell.1 Lysander, being made aware of a slight which had been put upon Spithridates the Persian by Pharnabazus, got into conversation with the injured man, and so worked upon him that he was persuaded to bring his children and his personal belongings, and with a couple of hundred troopers to revolt. The next step was to deposit all the goods safely in Cyzicus, and the last to get on shipboard with

1 See Ages. iii. 3; Anab. VI. v. 7 (Trans. vol. i. p. 264).
Spithridates and his son, and so to present himself with his Persian friends to Agesilaus. Agesilaus, on his side, was delighted at the transaction, and set himself at once to get information about Pharnabazus, his territory and his government.

Meanwhile Tissaphernes had waxed bolder. A large body of troops had been sent down by the king. On the strength of that he declared war against Agesilaus, if he did not instantly withdraw his troops from Asia. The Lacedaemonians there present, no less than the allies, received the news with profound vexation, persuaded as they were that Agesilaus had no force capable of competing with the king's grand armament. But a smile lit up the face of Agesilaus as he bade the ambassadors return to Tissaphernes and tell him that he was much in his debt for the perjury by which he had won the enmity of Heaven and made the very gods themselves allies of Hellas. He at once issued a general order to the troops to equip themselves for a forward movement. He warned the cities through which he must pass in an advance upon Caria, to have markets in readiness, and lastly, he despatched a message to the Ionian, Aeolian, and Hellespontine communities to send their contingents to join him at Ephesus.

Tissaphernes, putting together the facts that Agesilaus had no cavalry and that Caria was a region unadapted to that arm, and persuaded in his own mind also that the Spartan could not but cherish wrath against himself personally for his chicanery, felt convinced that he was really intending to invade Caria, and that the satrap's palace was his final goal. Accordingly he transferred the whole of his infantry into that province, and proceeded to lead his cavalry round into the plain of the Maeander. Here he conceived himself capable of trampling the Hellenes under foot with his horsemen before they could reach the craggy districts where no cavalry could operate.

But, instead of marching straight into Caria, Agesilaus turned sharp off in the opposite direction towards Phrygia. Picking up various detachments of troops which met him on his march, he steadily advanced, laying cities prostrate before him, and by the unexpectedness of his attack reaping a golden harvest of spoil. As a rule the march was prosecuted safely;
but not far from Dascylium 1 his advanced guard of cavalry were pushing on towards a knoll to take a survey of the state of things in front, when, as chance would have it, a detachment of cavalry sent forward by Pharnabazus—the corps, in fact, of Rhathinés and his natural brother Bagaeus,—just about equal to the Hellenes in number, also came galloping up towards the very knoll in question. The two bodies found themselves face to face not one hundred and fifty yards 2 apart, and for the first moment or two stood stock still. The Hellenic horse were drawn up like an ordinary phalanx four deep, the barbarians presenting a narrow front of twelve or thereabouts, and a very disproportionate depth. There was a moment's pause, and then the barbarians, taking the initiative, charged. There was a hand-to-hand tussle, in which any Hellene who succeeded in striking his man shivered his lance with the blow, while the Persian troopers, armed with cornel-wood javelins, speedily despatched a dozen men and a couple of horses. 3 At this point the Hellenic cavalry turned and fled. But as Agesilaus came up to the rescue with his heavy infantry, the Asiatics were forced in their turn to withdraw, with the loss of one man slain. This cavalry engagement gave them pause. Agesilaus on the day following it offered sacrifice. "Was he to continue his advance?" But the victims proved hopeless. 4 There was nothing for it after this manifestation but to turn and march towards the sea. It was clear enough to his mind that without a proper cavalry force it would be impossible to conduct a campaign in the flat country. Cavalry, therefore, he must get, or be driven to a mere guerilla warfare. With this view he drew up a list of all the wealthiest inhabitants belonging to the several cities of those parts. Their duty would be to support a body of cavalry, with the proviso, however, that any one contributing a horse, arms, and rider, up to the standard, would be exempted from personal service. The effect was instantaneous. The zeal with which the recipients of these orders responded could hardly have been greater if they had been seeking substitutes to die for them.

1 For Dascylium, see Trans. vol. i. pp. cxiv. cxix.
2 Lit. "four plethra."
3 See Xenophon's treatise On Horsemanship, xii. 12; Trans, vol. i. p. cxiv.
4 Lit. "lobeless," i.e. with a lobe of the liver wanting—a bad sign.
B.C. 395.—After this, at the first faint indication of spring, he collected the whole of his army at Ephesus. But the army needed training. With that object he proposed a series of prizes—prizes to the several heavy infantry regiments, to be won by those who presented their men in the best condition; prizes for the cavalry regiments which could ride best; prizes for those divisions of peltasts and archers which proved most efficient in their respective duties. And now the gymnasiums were a sight to see, thronged as they were, one and all, with warriors stripped for exercise; or again, the hippodrome crowded with horses and riders performing their evolutions; or the javelin men and archers going through their peculiar drill. In fact, the whole city where he lay presented under his hands a spectacle not to be forgotten. The market-place literally teemed with horses, arms, and accoutrements of all sorts for sale. The bronze-worker, the carpenter, the smith, the leather-cutter, the painter and embosser, were all busily engaged in fabricating the implements of war; so that the city of Ephesus itself was fairly converted into a military workshop.\(^1\) It would have done a man’s heart good to see those long lines of soldiers with Agesilaus at their head, as they stepped gaily be-garlanded from the gymnasiums to dedicate their wreaths to the goddess Artemis. Nor can I well conceive of elements more fraught with hope than were here combined. Here were reverence and piety towards Heaven; here practice in war and military training; here discipline with habitual obedience to authority. But contempt for one’s enemy will infuse a kind of strength in battle. So the Spartan leader argued; and with a view to its production he ordered the quartermasters to put up the prisoners who had been captured by his foraging bands for auction, stripped naked; so that his Hellene soldiery, as they looked at the white skins which had never been bared to sun and wind, the soft limbs unused to toil through constant riding in carriages, came to the conclusion that war with such adversaries would differ little from a fight with women.

By this date a full year had elapsed since the embarkation of Agesilaus, and the time had come for the Thirty with Lysander to sail back home, and for their successors, with

\(^1\) See Plut. *Marc.* (Clough, ii. 262); Polyb. *Hist.* x. 20.
Herippidas, to arrive. Among these Agesilaus appointed Xenocles and another to the command of the cavalry, Scythes to that of the heavy infantry of the enfranchised, Herippidas to that of the Cyreians, and Migdon to that of the contingents from the states. Agesilaus gave them to understand that he intended to lead them forthwith by the most expeditious route against the stronghold of the country, so that without further ceremony they might prepare their minds and bodies for the tug of battle. Tissaphernes, however, was firmly persuaded that this was only talk intended to deceive him; Agesilaus would this time certainly invade Caria. Accordingly he repeated his former tactics, transporting his infantry bodily into Caria and posting his cavalry in the valley of the Maeander. But Agesilaus was as good as his word, and at once invaded the district of Sardis. A three days' march through a region denuded of the enemy threw large supplies into his hands. On the fourth day the cavalry of the enemy approached. Their general ordered the officer in charge of his baggage-train to cross the Pactolus and encamp, while his troopers, catching sight of stragglers from the Hellenic force scattered in pursuit of booty, put several of them to the sword. Perceiving which, Agesilaus ordered his cavalry to the rescue; and the Persians on their side, seeing their advance, collected together in battle order to receive them, with dense squadrons of horse, troop upon troop. The Spartan, reflecting that the enemy had as yet no infantry to support him, whilst he had all branches of the service to depend upon, concluded that the critical moment had arrived to risk an engagement. In this mood he sacrificed, and began advancing his main line of battle against the serried lines of cavalry in front of him, at the same time ordering the flower of his heavy infantry—the ten-years-service men—to close with them at a run, and the peltasts to bring up their supports at the double. The order passed to his cavalry was to charge in confidence that he and the whole body of his troops were close behind them. The cavalry charge was received by the Persians without flinching, but presently find-

1 See Trans. vol. i. p. cxv. note 2.  
2 The neodamodes. See above, pp. 21, 24.  
3 I.e. Lydia. See Plut. Ages. x. (Clough, iv. 11).  
4 See note to Hell. II. iv. 32 (Trans. vol. i. p. 71).
ing themselves environed by the full tide of war they swerved. Some found a speedy grave within the river, but the mass of them gradually made good their escape. The Hellenes followed close on the heels of the flying foe and captured his camp. Here the peltasts not unnaturally fell to pillaging; whereupon Agesilaus planted his troops so as to form a cordon enclosing the property of friends and foes alike. The spoil taken was considerable; it fetched more than seventy talents, not to mention the famous camels, subsequently brought over by Agesilaus into Hellas, which were captured here. At the moment of the battle Tissaphernes lay in Sardis. Hence the Persians argued that they had been betrayed by the satrap. And the king of Persia, coming to a like conclusion himself that Tissaphernes was to blame for the evil turn of his affairs, sent down Tithraustes and beheaded him.

This done, Tithraustes sent an embassy to Agesilaus with a message as follows: "The author of all our trouble, yours and ours, Agesilaus, has paid the penalty of his misdoings; the king therefore asks of you first that you should sail back home in peace; secondly, that the cities in Asia secured in their autonomy should continue to render him the ancient tribute." To this proposition Agesilaus made answer that "without the authorities at home he could do nothing in the matter."

"Then do you, at least," replied Tithraustes, "while awaiting advice from Lacedaemon, withdraw into the territory of Pharnabazus. Have I not avenged you of your enemy?"

"While, then, I am on my way thither," rejoined Agesilaus, "will you support my army with provisions?" On this wise Tithraustes handed him thirty talents, which the other took, and forthwith began his march into Phrygia (the Phrygia of Pharnabazus). He lay in the plain district above Cyme, when a message reached him from the home authorities, giving him absolute disposal of the naval forces, with the right to appoint the admiral of his choice. This course the Lacedaemonians were led to adopt by the following considerations: If, they argued, the same man were in command of both services, the land force would be greatly strengthened.

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1. See Diod. xiv. 80.
2. See Cyrop. VII. i. 45.
through the concentration of the double force at any point necessary; and the navy likewise would be far more useful through the immediate presence and co-operation of the land force where needed. Apprised of these measures, Agesilaus in the first instance sent an order to the cities on the islands and the seaboard to fit out as many ships of war as they severally might deem desirable. The result was a new navy, consisting of the vessels thus voluntarily furnished by the states, with others presented by private persons out of courtesy to their commander, and amounting in all to a fleet of one hundred and twenty sail. The admiral whom he selected was Peisander, his wife's brother, a man of genuine ambition and of a vigorous spirit, but not sufficiently expert in the details of equipment to achieve a great naval success. Thus whilst Peisander set off to attend to naval matters, Agesilaus continued his march whither he was bound to Phrygia.

v.—But now Tithraustes seemed to have discovered in Agesilaus a disposition to despise the fortunes of the Persian monarch—he evidently had no intention to withdraw from Asia; on the contrary, he was cherishing hopes vast enough to include the capture of the king himself. Being at his wits' end how to manage matters, he resolved to send Timocrates the Rhodian to Hellas with a gift of gold worth fifty silver talents,\(^1\) and enjoined upon him to endeavour to exchange solemn pledges with the leading men in the several states, binding them to undertake a war against Lacedaemon. Timocrates arrived and began to dole out his presents. In Thebes he gave gifts to Androcleidas, Iserneas, and Galaxidorus; in Corinth to Timolaus and Polyanthes; in Argos to Cylon and his party. The Athenians,\(^2\) though they took no share of the gold, were none the less eager for the war, being of opinion that empire was theirs by right.\(^3\) The recipients of the moneys forthwith began covertly to attack the Lacedae-monians in their respective states, and, when they had brought these to a sufficient pitch of hatred, bound together the most important of them in a confederacy.

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\(^1\) = \(\xi 12,187\) : rws.\(^2\) See Paus. III. ix. 8; Plut. Ages. xv.\(^3\) Reading \(\nu o l i z o u r e s \ a i t o w n \ \tau o \ \alpha r c h e n \) with Sauppe; or if, as Breitenbach suggests, \(\varepsilon o f m i t o n \ \delta e \ \sigma x \ \a i t o w \ \tau o \ \alpha r c h e o v a i, \) translate "but thought it was not for them to take the initiative."
But it was clear to the leaders in Thebes that, unless some one struck the first blow, the Lacedaemonians would never be brought to break the truce with the allies. They therefore persuaded the Opuntian Locrians\(^1\) to levy moneys on a debatable district,\(^2\) jointly claimed by the Phocians and themselves, when the Phocians would be sure to retaliate by an attack on Locris. These expectations were fulfilled. The Phocians immediately invaded Locris and seized moneys on their side with ample interest. Then Androcleidas and his friends lost no time in persuading the Thebans to assist the Locrians, on the ground that it was no debatable district which had been entered by the Phocians, but the admittedly friendly and allied territory of Locris itself. The counter-invasion of Phoci and pillage of their country by the Thebans promptly induced the Phocians to send an embassy to Lacedaemon. In claiming assistance they explained that the war was not of their own seeking, but that they had attacked the Locrians in self-defence. On their side the Lacedaemonians were glad enough to seize a pretext for marching upon the Thebans, against whom they cherished a long-standing bitterness. They had not forgotten the claim which the Thebans had set up to a tithe for Apollo in Deceleia,\(^3\) nor yet their refusal to support Lacedaemon in the attack on Piraeus;\(^4\) and they accused them further of having persuaded the Corinthians not to join that expedition. Nor did they fail to call to mind some later proceedings of the Thebans—their refusal to allow Agesilaus to sacrifice in Aulis;\(^5\) their snatching the victims already offered and hurling them from the altars; their refusal to join the same general in a campaign directed even against Asia.\(^6\) The Lacedaemonians further reasoned that now, if ever, was the favourable moment to conduct an expedition against the Thebans, and once for all to put a stop to their insolent behaviour towards them. Affairs in Asia were prospering under the strong arm of

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1 For an alliance between Athens and the Locrians, B.C. 395, see Hicks, 67; and below, IV. ii. 17.  
2 Lit. "the." See Paus. III. ix. 9.  
3 See Grote, H. G. ix. 309, 403; viii. 355.  
4 *Hell.* II. iv. 30 (Trans. vol. i. p. 71), B.C. 403.  
5 See above, III. iv. 3, p. 24; and below, VII. i. 34, p. 196.  
6 See Paus. III. ix. 1-3.
Agesilus, and in Hellas they had no other war on hand to trammel their movements. Such, therefore, being the general view of the situation adopted at Lacedaemon, the ephors proceeded to call out the ban. Meanwhile they despatched Lysander to Phocis with orders to put himself at the head of the Phocians along with the Oetaeans, Heracleotes, Melians, and Aenianians, and to march upon Haliartus; before the walls of which place Pausanias, the destined leader of the expedition, undertook to present himself at the head of the Lacedaemonians and other Peloponnesian forces by a specified date. Lysander not only carried out his instructions to the letter, but, going a little beyond them, succeeded in detaching Orchomenus from Thebes.\(^1\) Pausanias, on the other hand, after finding the sacrifices for crossing the frontier favourable, sat down at Tegea and set about despatching to and fro the commandants of allied troops whilst contentedly awaiting the soldiers from the provincial \(^2\) districts of Laconia.

And now that it was fully plain to the Thebans that the Lacedaemonians would invade their territory, they sent ambassadors to Athens, who spoke as follows:—

"Men of Athens, it is a mistake on your part to blame us for certain harsh resolutions concerning Athens at the conclusion of the war.\(^3\) That vote was not authorised by the state of Thebes. It was the utterance merely of one man,\(^4\) who was at that time seated in the congress of the allies. A more important fact is that when the Lacedaemonians summoned us to attack Piraeus\(^5\) the collective state of Thebes passed a resolution refusing to join in the campaign. As then you are to a large extent the cause of the resentment which the Lacedaemonians feel towards us, we consider it only fair that

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\(^1\) See Freeman, op. cit. p. 167, "ill feeling between Thebes and other towns."—"Against Thebes, backed by Sparta, resistance was hopeless. It was not till long after that, at last [in 395 B.C.], on a favourable opportunity during the Corinthian war, Orchomenos openly seceded." And for the prior "state of disaffection towards Thebes on the part of the smaller cities," see Mem. III. v. 2, in reference to B.C. 407.

\(^2\) Lit. "perioecid."

\(^3\) See Hell. II. ii. 19 (Trans. vol. i. p. 48); and below, VI. v. 35, p. 180.

\(^4\) Plut. Lys. xv. "Erianthus the Theban gave his vote to pull down the city, and turn the country into sheep-pasture."—Clough, iii. 121.

\(^5\) See Hell. II. iv. 30 (Trans. vol. i. p. 71).
you in your turn should render us assistance. Still more do we demand of you, sirs, who were of the city party at that date, to enter heart and soul into war with the Lacedaemonians. For what were their services to you? They first deliberately converted you into an oligarchy and placed you in hostility to the democracy, and then they came with a great force under guise of being your allies, and delivered you over to the majority, so that, for any service they rendered you, you were all dead men; and you owe your lives to our friends here, the people of Athens.¹

“But to pass on—we all know, men of Athens, that you would like to recover the empire which you formerly possessed; and how can you compass your object better than by coming to the aid yourselves of the victims of Lacedaemonian injustice? Is it their wide empire of which you are afraid? Let not that make cowards of you—much rather let it embolden you as you lay to heart and ponder your own case. When your empire was widest then the crop of your enemies was thickest. Only so long as they found no opportunity to revolt did they keep their hatred of you dark; but no sooner had they found a champion in Lacedaemon than they at once showed what they really felt towards you. So too to-day. Let us show plainly that we mean to stand shoulder to shoulder² embattled against the Lacedaemonians; and haters enough of them—whole armies—never fear, will be forthcoming. To prove the truth of this assertion you need only to count upon your fingers. How many friends have they left to them to-day? The Argives have been, are, and ever will be, hostile to them. Of course. But the Eleians? Why, the Eleians have quite lately³ been robbed of so much territory and so many cities that their friendship is converted into hatred. And what shall we say of the Corinthians? the Arcadians? the Achaean squares? In the war which Sparta waged against you, there was no toil, no danger, no expense, which those peoples did not share, in obedience to the dulcet coaxings⁴ and persuasions of that power. The Lacedaemonians gained what they wanted,

¹ See Hell. II. iv. 38, 40, 41 (Trans. vol. i. p. 74).
² Lit. "shield to shield."
³ Lit. "to-day," "nowadays."
⁴ μᾶλα λιπαρόδμενοι. See Thuc. i. 66 foll.; vi. 88.
and then not one fractional portion of empire, honour, or wealth did these faithful followers come in for. That is not all. They have no scruple in appointing their helots\(^1\) as governors, and on the free necks of their allies, in the day of their good fortune, they have planted the tyrant's heel.

"Take again the case of those whom they have detached from yourselves. In the most patent way they have cajoled and cheated them; in place of freedom they have presented them with a twofold slavery. The allies are tyrannised over by the governor and tyrannised over by the ten commissioners set up by Lysander over every subject city.\(^2\) And to come lastly to the great king. In spite of all the enormous contributions with which he aided them to gain a mastery over you, is the lord of Asia one whit better off to-day than if he had taken exactly the opposite course and joined you in reducing them?

"Is it not clear that you have only to step forward once again as the champions of this crowd of sufferers from injustice, and you will attain to a pinnacle of power quite unprecedented? In the days of your old empire you were leaders of the maritime powers merely—that is clear; but your new empire to-day will be universal. You will have at your backs not only your former subjects, but ourselves, and the Peloponnesians, and the king himself, with all that mighty power which is his. We do not deny that we were serviceable allies enough to Lacedaemon, as you will bear us witness; but this we say:—If we helped the Lacedaemonians vigorously in the past, everything tends to show that we shall help you still more vigorously to-day; for our swords will be unsheathed, not in behalf of islanders, or Syracusans, or men of alien stock, as happened in the late war, but of ourselves, suffering under a sense of wrong. And there is another important fact which you ought to realise: this selfish system of organised greed which is Sparta's will fall more readily to pieces than your own

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\(^1\) See *Pol. Lac.* xiv. (below, p. 322).  
\(^2\) Grote (*H. G.* ix. 323), referring to this passage, and to *Hell.* VI. iii. 8-11 (below, p. 155), notes the change in Spartan habits between 405 and 394 B.C. (*i.e.* between the victory of Aegospotami and the defeat of Cnidos), when Sparta possessed a large public revenue derived from the tribute of the dependent cities. For her earlier condition, 432 B.C., cf. Thuc. i. 80. For her subsequent condition, 334 B.C., cf. Aristot. *Pol.* ii. 6, 23.
late empire. Yours was the proud assertion of naval empire over subjects powerless by sea. Theirs is the selfish sway of a minority asserting dominion over states equally well armed with themselves, and many times more numerous. Here our remarks end. Do not forget, however, men of Athens, that as far as we can understand the matter, the field to which we invite you is destined to prove far richer in blessings to your own state of Athens than to ours, Thebes."

With these words the speaker ended. Among the Athenians, speaker after speaker spoke in favour of the proposition, and finally a unanimous resolution was passed voting assistance to the Thebans. Thrasybulus, in an answer communicating the resolution, pointed out with pride that in spite of the unfortified condition of Piraeus, Athens would not shrink from repaying her debt of gratitude to Thebes with interest. "You," he added, "refused to join in a campaign against us; we are prepared to fight your battles with you against the enemy, if he attacks you." Thus the Thebans returned home and made preparations to defend themselves, whilst the Athenians made ready to assist them.

And now the Lacedaemonians no longer hesitated. Pausanias the king advanced into Boeotia with the home army and the whole of the Peloponnesian contingents, saving only the Corinthians, who declined to serve. Lysander, at the head of the army supplied by the Phocians and Orchomenus and the other strong places in those parts, had already reached Haliartus, in front of Pausanias. Being arrived, he refused to sit down quietly and await the arrival of the army from Lacedaemon, but at once marched with what troops he had against the walls of Haliartus; and in the first instance he tried to persuade the citizens to detach themselves from Thebes and to assume autonomy, but the intention was cut short by certain Thebans within the fortress. Whereupon Lysander attacked the place. The Thebans were made aware, and

1 For the alliance between Boeotia and Athens, B.C. 395, see Köhler, C. I. A. ii. 6; Hicks, op. cit. 65; Lys. pro Man. § 13; Jebb, Att. Or. i. p. 247; and the two speeches of the same orator Lysias against Alcibiades (son of the famous Alcibiades), on a Charge of Desertion (Or. xiv.), and on a Charge of Failure to Serve (Or. xv.)—Jebb, op. cit. l. p. 256 foll.

2 See Plut. Lys. xxviii. (Clough, iii. 137).
hurried to the rescue with heavy infantry and cavalry. Then, whether it was that the army of relief fell upon Lysander unawares, or that with clear knowledge of his approach he preferred to await the enemy, with intent to crush him, is uncertain. This only is clear: a battle was fought beside the walls, and a trophy still exists to mark the victory of the townsfolk before the gates of Haliartus. Lysander was slain, and the rest fled to the mountains, the Thebans hotly pursuing. But when the pursuit had led them to some considerable height, and they were fairly environed and hemmed in by difficult ground and narrow space, then the heavy infantry turned to bay, and greeted them with a shower of darts and missiles. First two or three men dropped who had been foremost of the pursuers, and then upon the rest they poured volleys of stones down the precipitous incline, and pressed on their late pursuers with much zeal, until the Thebans turned tail and quitted the deadly slope, leaving behind them more than a couple of hundred corpses.

On this day, therefore, the hearts of the Thebans failed them as they counted their losses and found them equal to their gains; but the next day they discovered that during the night the Phocians and the rest of them had made off to their several homes, whereupon they fell to pluming themselves highly on their achievement. But presently Pausanias appeared at the head of the Lacedaemonian army, and once more their dangers seemed to thicken round them. Deep, we are told, was the silence and abasement which reigned in their host. It was not until the third day, when the Athenians arrived, and were duly drawn up beside them, whilst Pausanias neither attacked nor offered battle, that at length the confidence of the Thebans took a larger range. Pausanias, on his side, having summoned his generals and commanders of fifties, deliberated whether to give battle or to content himself with picking up the bodies of Lysander and of those who fell with him, under cover of a truce.

The considerations which weighed on the minds of Pausanias and the other high officers of the Lacedaemonians

1 See Dem. On the Crown, 258.
seem to have been that Lysander was dead and his defeated army in retreat; while, as far as they themselves were concerned, the Corinthian contingent was absolutely wanting, and the zeal of the troops there present at the lowest ebb. They further reasoned that the enemy's cavalry was numerous and theirs the reverse; whilst, weightiest of all, there lay the dead right under the walls, so that if they had been ever so much stronger it would have been no easy task to pick up the bodies within range of the towers of Haliartus. On all these grounds they determined to ask for a flag of truce, in order to pick up the bodies of the slain. These, however, the Thebans were not disposed to give back unless they agreed to retire from their territory. The terms were gladly accepted by the Lacedaemonians, who at once picked up the corpses of the slain, and prepared to quit the territory of Boeotia. The preliminaries were transacted, and the retreat commenced. Despondent indeed was the demeanour of the Lacedaemonians, in contrast with the insolent bearing of the Thebans, who visited the slightest attempt to trespass on their private estates with blows and chased the offenders back on to the high roads unflinchingly. Such was the conclusion of the campaign of the Lacedaemonians.

As for Pausanias, on his arrival at home he was tried on the capital charge. The heads of indictment set forth that he had failed to reach Haliartus as soon as Lysander, in spite of his undertaking to be there on the same day: that, instead of using any endeavour to pick up the bodies of the slain by force of arms, he had asked for a flag of truce: that at an earlier date, when he had got the popular government of Athens fairly in his grip at Piraeus, he had suffered it to slip through his fingers and escape. Besides this, he failed to present himself at the trial, and a sentence of death was passed upon him. He escaped to Tegea and there died of an illness whilst still in exile. Thus closes the chapter of events enacted on the soil of Hellas. To return to Asia and Agesilaus.

1 Or, add, "as a further gravamen."
2 For the bearing of this statement concerning Pausanias on the composition of the Hellenica, see Trans. vol. i. p. lxiii.
BOOK IV. 1. 1–5

i. B.C. 395.—With the fall of the year Agesilaus reached Phrygia—the Phrygia of Pharnabazus—and proceeded to burn and harry the district. City after city was taken, some by force and some by voluntary surrender. To a proposal of Spithridates to lead him into Paphlagonia,1 where he would introduce the king of the country to him in conference and obtain his alliance, he readily acceded. It was a long-cherished ambition of Agesilaus to alienate some one of the subject nations from the Persian monarch, and he pushed forward eagerly.

On his arrival in Paphlagonia, King Otys2 came, and an alliance was made. (The fact was, he had been summoned by the king to Susa and had not gone up.) More than that, through the persuasion of Spithridates he left behind as a parting gift to Agesilaus one thousand cavalry and a couple of thousand peltasts. Agesilaus was anxious in some way to show his gratitude to Spithridates for such help, and spoke as follows:—“Tell me,” he said to Spithridates, “would you not like to give your daughter to King Otys?” “Much more would I like to give her,” he answered, “than he to take her—I an outcast wanderer, and he lord of a vast territory and forces.” Nothing more was said at the time about the marriage; but when Otys was on the point of departure and came to bid farewell, Agesilaus, having taken care that Spithridates should be out of the way, in the presence of the Thirty broached the subject:3 “Can you tell me, Otys, to what sort of family Spithridates belongs?” “To one

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2 See Ages. iii. 4 (below, p. 255), where he is called Cotys; also Trans. vol. i. cxix. note 2.
3 I.e. "Spartan counsellors."
of the noblest in Persia,” replied the king. Agesilaus: “Have you observed how beautiful his son is?” Otys: “To be sure; last evening I was supping with him.” Agesilaus: “And they tell me that his daughter is yet more beautiful.” Otys: “That may well be; beautiful she is.” Agesilaus: “For my part, as you have proved so good a friend to us, I should like to advise you to take this girl to wife. Not only is she very beautiful—and what more should a husband ask for?—but her father is of noble family, and has a force at his back large enough to retaliate on Pharnabazus for an injury. He has made the satrap, as you see, a fugitive and a vagabond in his own vast territory. I need not tell you,” he added, “that a man who can so chastise an enemy is well able to benefit a friend; and of this be assured: by such an alliance you will gain not the connection of Spithridates alone, but of myself and the Lacedaemonians, and, as we are the leaders of Hellas, of the rest of Hellas also. And what a wedding yours will be! Were ever nuptials celebrated on so grand a scale before? Was ever bride led home by such an escort of cavalry and light-armed troops and heavy infantry, as shall escort your wife home to your palace?” Otys asked: “Is Spithridates of one mind with you in this proposal?” and Agesilaus answered: “In good sooth he did not bid me make it for him. And for my own part in the matter, though it is, I admit, a rare pleasure to requite an enemy, yet I had far rather at any time discover some good fortune for my friends.” Otys: “Why not ask if your project pleases Spithridates too?” Then Agesilaus, turning to Herippidas and the rest of the Thirty, bade them go to Spithridates; “and give him such good instruction,” he added, “that he shall wish what we wish.” The Thirty rose and retired to administer their lesson. But they seemed to tarry a long time, and Agesilaus asked: “What say you, King Otys—shall we summon him hither ourselves? You, I feel certain, are better able to persuade him than the whole Thirty put together.” Thereupon Agesilaus summoned Spithridates and the others. As they came forward, Herippidas promptly delivered himself thus: “I spare you the details, Agesilaus. To make a long story short,
Spithridates says, 'He will be glad to do whatever pleases you.'" Then Agesilaus, turning first to one and then to the other: "What pleases me," said he, "is that you should wed a daughter—and you a wife—so happily. But," he added, "I do not see how we can well bring home the bride by land till spring." "No, not by land," the suitor answered, "but you might, if you chose, conduct her home at once by sea." Thereupon they exchanged pledges to ratify the compact; and so sent Otys rejoicing on his way.

Agesilaus, who had not failed to note the king's impatience, at once fitted out a ship of war and gave orders to Callias, a Lacedaemonian, to escort the maiden to her new home; after which he himself began his march on Dascylium. Here was the palace of Pharnabazus. It lay in the midst of numerous villages, which were large and well stocked with abundant supplies. Here, too, were most fair hunting grounds, offering the hunter choice between enclosed parks and a wide expanse of field and fell; and all around there flowed a river full of fish of every sort; and for the sportsman versed in fowling, winged game in abundance.

In these quarters the Spartan king passed the winter, collecting supplies for the army either on the spot or by a system of forage. On one of these occasions the troops, who had grown reckless and scornful of the enemy through long immunity from attack, whilst engaged in collecting supplies were scattered over the flat country, when Pharnabazus fell upon them with two scythe-chariots and about four hundred horse. Seeing him thus advancing, the Hellenes ran together, mustering possibly seven hundred men. The Persian did not hesitate, but placing his chariots in front, supported by himself and the cavalry, he gave the command to charge. The scythe-chariots charged and scattered the compact mass, and speedily the cavalry had laid low in the dust about a hundred men, while the rest retreated hastily, under cover of Agesilaus and his hoplites, who were fortunately near.

It was the third or fourth day after this that Spithridates made a discovery: Pharnabazus lay encamped in Caue, a

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1 Or, "and may the wedding be blest!"

2 Lit. "paradises." See Anab. I. ii. 7; Cyrop. I. iv. 11.
large village not more than eighteen miles away. This news he lost no time in reporting to Herippidas. The latter, who was longing for some brilliant exploit, begged Agesilaus to furnish him with two thousand hoplites, an equal number of peltasts, and some cavalry—the latter to consist of the horsemen of Spithridates, the Paphlagonians, and as many Hellene troopers as he might perchance persuade to follow him. Having got the promise of them from Agesilaus, he proceeded to take the auspices. Towards late afternoon he obtained favourable omens and broke off the sacrifice. Thereupon he ordered the troops to get their evening meal, after which they were to present themselves in front of the camp. But by the time darkness had closed in, not one half of them had come out. To abandon the project was to call down the ridicule of the rest of the Thirty. So he set out with the force to hand, and about daylight, falling on the camp of Pharnabazus, put many of his advanced guard of Mysians to the sword. The men themselves made good their escape in different directions, but the camp was taken, and with it divers goblets and other gear such as a man like Pharnabazus would have, not to speak of much baggage and many baggage animals. It was the dread of being surrounded and besieged, if he should establish himself for long at any one spot, which induced Pharnabazus to flee in gipsy fashion from point to point over the country, carefully obliterating his encampments. Now as the Paphlagonians and Spithridates brought back the captured property, they were met by Herippidas with his brigadiers and captains, who stopped them and relieved them of all they had; the object being to have as large a list as possible of captures to deliver over to the officers who superintended the sale of booty. This treatment the Asiatics found intolerable. They deemed themselves at once injured and insulted, got their kit together in the night, and made off in the direction of Sardis to join Ariaeus without mistrust, seeing that he too had revolted and gone to war with the king. On Agesilaus himself no heavier blow fell during the

1 Lit. "one hundred and sixty stades."
2 Or, "captains posted to intercept them, who relieved . . ." See Anab. IV. i. 14 (Trans. vol. i. p. 177).
3 See Pol. Lac. xiii. 11 (below, p. 322), for these officers.
whole campaign than the desertion of Spithridates and Mega-
bates and the Paphlagonians.

Now there was a certain man of Cyzicus, Apollonophanes
by name; he was an old friend of Pharnabazus, and at this
time had become a friend also of Agesilaus.¹ This man
informed Agesilaus that he thought he could bring about a
meeting between him and Pharnabazus, which might tend to
friendship; and having so got ear of him, he obtained pledges
of good faith between his two friends, and presented himself
with Pharnabazus at the trysting-place, where Agesilaus with
the Thirty around him awaited their coming, reclined upon a
grassy sward. Pharnabazus presently arrived clad in costliest
apparel; but just as his attendants were about to spread at
his feet the carpets on which the Persians delicately seat
themselves, he was touched with a sense of shame at his own
luxury in sight of the simplicity of Agesilaus, and he also
without further ceremony seated himself on the bare ground.
And first the two bade one another hail, and then Pharna-
bazus stretched out his right hand and Agesilaus his to meet
him, and the conversation began. Pharnabazus, as the elder
of the two, spoke first: "Agesilaus," he said, "and all you
Lacedaemonians here present, while you were at war with the
Athenians I was your friend and ally; it was I who furnished
the wealth that made your navy strong on sea; on land I
fought on horseback by your side, and pursued your enemies
into the sea.² As to duplicity like that of Tissaphernes, I
challenge you to accuse me of having played you false by
word or deed. Such have I ever been; and in return how
am I treated by yourselves to-day?—in such sort that I
cannot even sup in my own country unless, like the wild
animals, I pick up the scraps you chance to leave. The
beautiful palaces which my father left me as an heirloom,
the parks ³ full of trees and beasts of the chase in which my
heart rejoiced, lie before my eyes hacked to pieces, burnt to
ashes. Maybe I do not comprehend the first principles of
justice and holiness; do you then explain to me how all this
resembles the conduct of men who know how to repay a

¹ Ages. v. 4; Plut. Ages. xi. (Clough, iv. p. 14).
² See Hell. 1. i. 6 (Trans. vol. i. p. 2).
³ Lit. "paradises."

At length, after some pause, Agesilaus spoke. "I think you are aware," he said, "Pharnabazus, that within the states of Hellas the folk of one community contract relations of friendship and hospitality with one another;\footnote{Or, add, "we call them guest friends."} but if these states should go to war, then each man will side with his fatherland, and friend will find himself pitted against friend in the field of battle, and, if it so betide, the one may even deal the other his death-blow. So too we to-day, being at war with your sovereign lord the king, must needs regard as our enemy all that he calls his; not but that with yourself personally we should esteem it our high fortune to be friends. If indeed it were merely an exchange of service,—were you asked to give up your lord the king and to take us as your masters in his stead, I could not so advise you; but the fact is, by joining with us it is in your power to-day to bow your head to no man, to call no man master, to reap the produce of your own domain in freedom—freedom, which to my mind is more precious than all riches. Not that we bid you to become a beggar for the sake of freedom, but rather to use our friendship to increase not the king's authority, but your own, by subduing those who are your fellow-slaves to-day, and who to-morrow shall be your willing subjects. Well, then, freedom given and wealth added—what more would you desire to fill the cup of happiness to overflowing?" Pharnabazus replied: "Shall I tell you plainly what I will do?" "That were but kind and courteous on your part," he answered. "Thus it stands with me, then," said Pharnabazus. "If the king should send another general, and if he should wish to rank me under this new man's orders, I, for my part, am willing to accept your friendship and alliance; but if he offers me the supreme command—why, then, I plainly tell you, there is a certain something in the very name ambition which whispers
me that I shall war against you to the best of my ability." 1When he heard that, Agesilaus seized the satrap's hand, exclaiming: "Ah, best of mortals, may the day arrive which sends us such a friend! Of one thing rest assured. This instant I leave your territory with what haste I may, and for the future—even in case of war—as long as we can find foes elsewhere our hands shall hold aloof from you and yours."

And with these words he broke up the meeting. Pharnabazus mounted his horse and rode away, but his son by Parapita, who was still in the bloom of youth, lingered behind; then, running up to Agesilaus, he exclaimed: "See, I choose you as my friend. " "And I accept you," replied the king. "Remember, then," the lad answered, and with the word presented the beautiful javelin in his hand to Agesilaus, who received it, and unclasping a splendid trapping 2 which his secretary, Idaeus, had round the neck of his charger, he gave it in return to the youth; whereupon the boy leapt on his horse's back and galloped after his father. 3 At a later date, during the absence of Pharnabazus abroad, this same youth, the son of Parapita, was deprived of the government by his brother and driven into exile. Then Agesilaus took great interest in him, and as he had a strong attachment to the son of Eualces, an Athenian, Agesilaus did all he could to have this friend of his, who was the tallest of the boys, admitted to the two hundred yards race at Olympia.

B.C. 394.—But to return to the actual moment. Agesilaus was as good as his word, and at once marched out of the territory of Pharnabazus. The season verged on spring. Reaching the plain of Thebè, 4 he encamped in the neighbourhood of the temple of Artemis of Astyra, 5 and there employed himself in

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1 Or, "so subtle a force, it seems, is the love of honour that." Grote, H. G. ix. 386; cf. Herod. iii. 57 for "ambition," φιλορυμία.
2 φάλαρα, bosses of gold, silver, or other metals, cast or chased, with some appropriate device in relief, which were worn as an ornamental trapping for horses, affixed to the head-stall or to a throat-collar, or to a martingale over the chest.—Rich's Companion to Lat. Dict. and Greek Lex., s. v.
3 See Grote, ix. 387; Plut. Ages. xiv. (Clough, iv. 15); Ages. iii. 5 (below, p. 255). The incident is idealised in the Cyrop. I. iv. 26 foll. See Lyra Heroica: cxxv. A Ballad of East and West—the incident of the "turquoise-studded rein."
4 Anab. VII. viii. 7 (Trans. vol. i. p. 315).
5 Vide Strab. xiii. 606, 613. Seventy stades from Thebè.
RECALL OF AGESILAUS

collecting troops from every side, in addition to those which he already had, so as to form a complete armament. These preparations were pressed forward with a view to penetrating as far as possible into the interior. He was persuaded that every tribe or nation placed in his rear might be considered as alienated from the king.

II.—Such were the concerns and projects of Agesilaus. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians at home were quite alive to the fact that moneys had been sent into Hellas, and that the bigger states were leagued together to declare war against them. It was hard to avoid the conclusion that Sparta herself was in actual danger and that a campaign was inevitable. While busy, therefore, with preparations themselves, they lost no time in despatching Epicydidas to fetch Agesilaus. That officer, on his arrival, explained the position of affairs, and concluded by delivering a peremptory summons of the state recalling him to the assistance of the fatherland without delay. The announcement could not but come as a grievous blow to Agesilaus, as he reflected on the vanished hopes, and the honours plucked from his grasp. Still, he summoned the allies and announced to them the contents of the despatch from home. "To aid our fatherland," he added, "is an imperative duty. If, however, matters turn out well on the other side, rely upon it, friends and allies, I will not forget you, but I shall be back anon to carry out your wishes." When they heard the announcement many wept, and they passed a resolution, one and all, to join Agesilaus in assisting Lacedaemon; if matters turned out well there, they undertook to take him as their leader and come back again to Asia; and so they fell to making preparations to follow him.

Agesilaus, on his side, determined to leave behind him in Asia Euxenus as governor, and with him a garrison numbering no less than four thousand troops, which would enable him to protect the states in Asia. But for himself, as on the one hand he could see that the majority of the soldiers would far rather stay behind than undertake service against fellow-Hellenes, and on the other hand he wished to take as fine and large an army with him as he could, he offered prizes first to that state or city which should contribute
the best corps of troops, and secondly to that captain of
mercenaries who should join the expedition with the best
equipped battalion of heavy infantry, archers, and light
infantry. On the same principle he informed the chief
cavalry officers that the general who succeeded in presenting
the best accoutred and best mounted regiment would receive
from himself some victorious distinction. "The final adjudica-
tion," he said, "would not be made until they had crossed
from Asia into Europe and had reached the Chersonese; and
this with a view to impress upon them that the prizes were
not for show but for real campaigners." ¹ These consisted for
the most part of infantry or cavalry arms and accoutrements
tastefully finished, besides which there were chaplets of gold.
The whole, useful and ornamental alike, must have cost nearly
a thousand pounds,² but as the result of this outlay, no doubt,
arms of great value were procured for the expedition.³ When
the Hellespont was crossed the judges were appointed. The
Lacedaemonians were represented by Menascus, Herippidas,
and Orsippus, and the allies by one member from each state.
As soon as the adjudication was complete, the army com-
menced its march with Agesilaus at its head, following the
very route taken by the great king when he invaded Hellas.

Meanwhile the ephors had called out the ban, and as
Agesipolis was still a boy, the state called upon Aristodemus,
who was of the royal family and guardian of the young
king, to lead the expedition; and now that the Lacedae-
omians were ready to take the field and the forces of their
opponents were also duly mustered, the latter met ⁴ to consider
the most advantageous method of doing battle.

Timolaus of Corinth spoke: "Soldiers of the allied
forces," he said, "the growth of Lacedaemon seems to me
just like that of some mighty river—at its sources small and
easily crossed, but as it farther and farther advances, other

¹ Or, "that the perfection of equipment was regarded as anticipative of
actual service in the field." Cobet suggests for ἐκπροεῖν διευκροεῖν; cf. Oecan.
viii. 6.
² Lit. "at least four talents" = λ975.
³ Or, "beyond which, the arms and material to equip the expedition were
no doubt highly costly."
⁴ At Corinth. See above, III. iv. 11, p. 27; below, V. iv. 6r, p. 135,
where the victory of Naxos is described but not localised.
rivers discharge themselves into its channel, and its stream grows ever more formidable. So is it with the Lacedaemonians. Take them at the starting-point and they are but a single community, but as they advance and attach city after city they grow more numerous and more resistless. I observe that when people wish to take wasps' nests—if they try to capture the creatures on the wing, they are liable to be attacked by half the hive; whereas, if they apply fire to them ere they leave their homes, they will master them without scathe themselves. On this principle I think it best to bring about the battle within the hive itself, or, short of that, as close to Lacedaemon as possible."

The arguments of the speaker were deemed sound, and a resolution was passed in that sense; but before it could be carried out there were various arrangements to be made. There was the question of headship. Then, again, what was the proper depth of line to be given to the different army corps? for if any particular state or states gave too great a depth to their battle line they would enable the enemy to turn their flank. Whilst they were debating these points, the Lacedaemonians had incorporated the men of Tegea and the men of Mantinea, and were ready to debouch into the bimarine region. And as the two armies advanced almost at the same time, the Corinthians and the rest reached the Nemea, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies occupied Sicyon. The Lacedaemonians entered by Epieiceia, and at first were severely handled by the light-armed troops of the enemy, who discharged stones and arrows from the vantage-ground on their right; but as they dropped down upon the Gulf of Corinth they advanced steadily onwards through the flat country, felling timber and burning the fair land. Their rivals, on their side, after a certain forward movement, paused

1 Or, "if not actually at Lacedaemon, then at least as near as possible to the hornets' nest."
2 I.e. "the shores of the Corinthian Gulf." Or, "upon the strand or coast road or coast land of Achaia" [alter τὴν ἀλγαλήν (?) the Strand of the Corinthian Gulf, the old name of this part of Achaia].
3 Or, "the district of Nemea."
4 ἐπέλθωσε, but see Grote (H. G. ix. 425 note), who prefers ἔπελθωσεν = retreated and encamped.
and encamped, placing the ravine in front of them; but still the Lacedaemonians advanced, and it was only when they were within ten furlongs\(^1\) of the hostile position that they followed suit and encamped, and then they remained quiet.

And here I may state the numbers on either side. The Lacedaemonian heavy-armed infantry levies amounted to six thousand men. Of Eleians, Triphylians, Acreeians, and Lasionians, there must have been nearly three thousand, with fifteen hundred Sicyonians, while Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, and Halieis\(^2\) contributed at least another three thousand. To these heavy infantry troops must be added six hundred Lacedaemonian cavalry, a body of Cretan archers about three hundred strong, besides another force of slingers, at least four hundred in all, consisting of Marganians, Letrinians, and Amphidolians. The men of Phlius were not represented. Their plea was they were keeping "holy truce." That was the total of the forces on the Lacedaemonian side. There were collected on the enemy's side six thousand Athenian heavy infantry, with about, as was stated, seven thousand Argives, and in the absence of the men of Orchomenus something like five thousand Boeotians. There were besides three thousand Corinthians, and again from the whole of Euboea at least three thousand. These formed the heavy infantry. Of cavalry the Boeotians, again in the absence of the Orchomenians, furnished eight hundred, the Athenians\(^3\) six hundred, the Chalcidians of Euboea one hundred, the Opuntian Locrians\(^4\) fifty. Their light troops, including those of the Corinthians, were more numerous, as the Ozolian Locrians, the Melians, and Acarnanians\(^5\) helped to swell their numbers.

Such was the strength of the two armies. The Boeotians, as long as they occupied the left wing, showed no anxiety to join battle, but after a rearrangement which gave them the

\(^1\) Lit. "ten stades." For the numbers below, see Grote, \textit{H. G.} ix. 422, note 1.

\(^2\) Halieis, a seafaring people (Strabo, viii. 373) and town on the coast of Hermione; Herod. vii. 137; Thuc. i. 105, ii. 56, iv. 45; Diod. xi. 78; \textit{Hell.} VI. ii. 3 (below, p. 144).

\(^3\) For a treaty between Athens and Eretria, B.C. 395, see Hicks, 66; and below, \textit{Hell.} IV. iii. 15; Hicks, 68, 69; Diod. xiv. 82.


\(^5\) See below, \textit{Hell.} IV. vi. 1; \textit{ib.} vii. 1; VI. v. 23, p. 176, note 2.
right, placing the Athenians opposite to the Lacedaemonians, and themselves opposite the Achaeans, at once, we are told, the victims proved favourable, and the order was passed along the lines to prepare for immediate action. The Boeotians, in the first place, abandoning the rule of sixteen deep, chose to give their division the fullest possible depth, and, moreover, kept veering more and more to their right, with the intention of overlapping their opponents' flank. The consequence was that the Athenians, to avoid being absolutely severed, were forced to follow suit, and edged towards the right, though they recognised the risk they ran of having their flank turned. For a while the Lacedaemonians had no idea of the advance of the enemy, owing to the rough nature of the ground, but the notes of the paean at length announced to them the fact, and without an instant's delay the answering order "prepare for battle" ran along the different sections of their army. As soon as their troops were drawn up, according to the tactical disposition of the various generals of foreign brigades, the order was passed to "follow the lead," and then the Lacedaemonians on their side also began edging to their right, and eventually stretched out their wing so far that only six out of the ten regimental divisions of the Athenians confronted the Lacedaemonians, the other four finding themselves face to face with the men of Tegea. And now when they were less than a furlong apart, the Lacedaemonians sacrificed in customary fashion a kid to the huntress goddess, and advanced upon their opponents, wheeling round their overlapping columns to outflank his left. As the two armies closed, the allies of Lacedaemon were as a rule fairly borne down by their opponents. The men of Pellene alone, steadily confronting the Thespiaeans, held their ground, and the dead of either side strewed the position. As to the Lacedaemonians themselves: crushing that portion of the Athenian troops which lay immediately in front of them, and at the same time encircling them with their overlapping right, they slew man after man of them; and,

1 Or, "then they lost no time in discovering that the victims proved favourable."
3 Lit. "a stade."
5 Lit. "men on either side kept dropping at their post."
absolutely unscathed themselves, their unbroken columns continued their march, and so passed behind the four remaining divisions of the Athenians before these latter had returned from their own victorious pursuit. Whereby the four divisions in question also emerged from battle intact, except for the casualties inflicted by the Tegeans in the first clash of the engagement. The troops next encountered by the Lacedaemonians were the Argives retiring. These they fell foul of, and the senior polemarch was just on the point of closing with them "breast to breast" when some one, it is said, shouted, "Let their front ranks pass." This was done, and as the Argives raced past, their enemies thrust at their unprotected sides, and killed many of them. The Corinthians were caught in the same way as they retired, and when their turn had passed, once more the Lacedaemonians lit upon a portion of the Theban division retiring from the pursuit, and strewed the field with their dead. The end of it all was that the defeated troops in the first instance made for safety to the walls of their city, but the Corinthians within closed the gates, whereupon the troops took up quarters once again in their old encampment. The Lacedaemonians on their side withdrew to the point at which they first closed with the enemy, and there set up a trophy of victory. So the battle ended.

III.—Meanwhile Agesilaus was rapidly hastening with his reinforcements from Asia. He had reached Amphipolis when Dercylidas brought the news of this fresh victory of the Lacedaemonians; their own loss had been eight men, that of the enemy considerable. It was his business at the same time to explain that not a few of the allies had fallen also. Agesilaus asked, "Would it not be opportune, Dercylidas, if the cities that have furnished us with contingents could hear of this victory as soon as possible?" And Dercylidas replied: "The news at any rate is likely to put them in better heart." Then said the king: "As you were an eye-witness there could hardly be a better bearer of the news than yourself." To this proposal Dercylidas lent a willing ear—to travel abroad was

1 Lit. "'tribes.'"
2 I.e. "'right.'"
3 See Pol. Lac. xiv. 4 (below, p. 322).
his special delight,—and he replied, "Yes, under your orders." "Then you have my orders," the king said. "And you may further inform the states from myself that we have not forgotten our promise; if all goes well over here we shall be with them again ere long." So Dercylidas set off on his travels, in the first instance to the Hellespont;\(^1\) while Agesilaus crossed Macedonia and arrived in Thessaly. And now the men of Larissa, Crannon, Scotussa, and Pharsalus, who were allies of the Boeotians—and in fact all the Thessalians except the exiles for the time being—hung on his heels\(^2\) and did him damage.

For some while he marched his troops in a hollow square,\(^3\) posting half his cavalry in front and half on his rear; but finding that the Thessalians checked his passage by repeated charges from behind, he strengthened his rearguard by sending round the cavalry from his van, with the exception of his own personal escort.\(^4\) The two armies stood confronted in battle order; but the Thessalians, not liking the notion of a cavalry engagement with heavy infantry, turned, and step by step retreated, while the others followed them with considerable caution. Agesilaus, perceiving the error under which both alike laboured, now sent his own personal guard of stalwart troopers with orders that both they and the rest of the horsemen should charge at full gallop,\(^5\) and not give the enemy the chance to recoil. The Thessalians were taken aback by this unexpected onslaught, and half of them never thought of wheeling about, whilst those who did essay to do so presented the flanks of their horses to the charge,\(^6\) and were made prisoners. Still Polycharmus of Pharsalus, the general in command of their cavalry, rallied his men for an instant, and fell, sword in hand, with his immediate followers. This was the signal for a flight so precipitate on the part of the Thessalians, that their dead and dying lined the road, and prisoners were taken; nor was any halt made until they reached Mount

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1 See below, *Hell.* IV. viii. 3, p. 77.
2 See *Ages.* ii. 4, p. 246; Grote, *H. G.* ix. 420, note 2.
3 See Rüstow and Köchly, § 187 foll.
4 See Thuc. v. 72; Herod. vi. 56, viii. 124.
5 Lit. "and bids them pass the order to the others and themselves to charge," etc.
6 See *Horsemanship,* vii. 16; Polyb. iv. 8.
Narthacius. Here, then, midway between Pras and Nartha-
cius, Agesilaus set up a trophy, halting for the moment, in
unfeigned satisfaction at the exploit. It was from antagonists
who prided themselves on their cavalry beyond everything
that he had wrested victory, with a body of cavalry of his own
mustering. Next day he crossed the mountains of Achaea
Phthiotis, and for the future continued his march through
friendly territory until he reached the confines of Boeotia.

Here, at the entrance of that territory, the sun (in
partial eclipse)\(^1\) seemed to appear in a crescent shape, and
the news reached him of the defeat of the Lacedae-
monians in a naval engagement, and of the death of the
admiral Peisander. Details of the disaster were not wanting.
The engagement of the hostile fleets took place off Cnidus.
Pharnabazus, the Persian admiral, was present with the
Phoenician fleet, and in front of him were ranged the ships of
the Hellenic squadron under Conon. Peisander had ventured
to draw out his squadron to meet the combined fleets, though
the numerical inferiority of his fleet to that of the Hellenic
navy under Conon was conspicuous, and he had the mortifi-
cation of seeing the allies who formed his left wing take to
flight immediately. He himself came to close quarters with
the enemy, and was driven on shore, on board his trireme,
under pressure of the hostile rams. The rest, as many as
were driven to shore, deserted their ships and sought safety
as best they could in the territory of Cnidus. The admiral
alone stuck to his ship, and fell sword in hand.

It was impossible for Agesilaus not to feel depressed by
those tidings at first; on further reflection, however, it seemed
to him that the moral quality of more than half his troops well
entitled them to share in the sunshine of success, but in the
day of trouble, when things looked black, he was not bound
to take them into his confidence. Accordingly he turned
round and gave out that he had received news that Peisander
was dead, but that he had fallen in the arms of victory in a
sea-fight; and suiting his action to the word, he proceeded to
offer sacrifice in return for good tidings,\(^2\) distributing portions

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\(^1\) B.C. 394, August 14.

\(^2\) "Splendide mendax." For the ethics of the matter, see Mem. IV. ii.
17; Cyrop. I. vi. 31.
of the victims to a large number of recipients. So it befell that in the first skirmish with the enemy the troops of Agesilaus gained the upper hand, in consequence of the report that the Lacedaemonians had won a victory by sea.

To confront Agesilaus stood an army composed of the Boeotians, Athenians, Argives, Corinthians, Aenianians, Euboeans, and both divisions of the Locrians. Agesilaus on his side had with him a division of Lacedaemonians, which had crossed from Corinth, also half the division from Orchomenus; besides which there were the neodamodes from Lacedaemon, on service with him already; and in addition to these the foreign contingent under Herippidas; and again the quota furnished by the Hellenic cities in Asia, with others from the cities in Europe which he had brought over during his progress; and lastly, there were additional levies from the spot—Orchomenian and Phocian heavy infantry. In light-armed troops, it must be admitted, the numbers told heavily in favour of Agesilaus, but the cavalry on both sides were fairly balanced.

Such were the forces of either party. I will describe the battle itself, if only on account of certain features which distinguish it from the battles of our time. The two armies met on the plain of Coronea—the troops of Agesilaus advancing from the Cephisus, the Thebans and their allies from the slopes of Helicon. Agesilaus commanded his own right in person, with the men of Orchomenus on his extreme left. The Thebans formed their own right, while the Argives held their left. As they drew together, for a while deep silence reigned on either side; but when they were not more than a furlong apart, with a loud hurrah the Thebans, quickening to a run, rushed furiously to close quarters; and now there was barely a hundred yards breadth between the armies, when Herippidas with his foreign brigade, and with them the Ionians, Aeolians, and Hellespontines, darted out from the Spartans' battle-lines to greet their onset. One and all of the

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1 Lit. "a mora"; for the numbers, see Ages. ii. 6 (below, p. 247); Plut. Ages. 17; Grote, H. C. ix. 433.
2 I.e. "enfranchised helots."
3 See Ages. ii. 10, 11; and above, Hell. III. iv. 20.
4 See Hicks, np. cit. 68.
5 Lit. "a stade."
6 Lit. "Alalah."
7 Like a tornado.
8 Lit. "about three pletbra."
above played their part in the first rush forward; in another instant they were\(^1\) within spear-thrust of the enemy, and had routed the section immediately before them. As to the Argives, they actually declined to receive the attack of Agesilaus, and betook themselves in flight to Helicon. At this moment some of the foreign division were already in the act of crowning Agesilaus with the wreath of victory, when some one brought him word that the Thebans had cut through the Orchomenians and were in among the baggage train. At this the Spartan general immediately turned his army right about and advanced against them. The Thebans, on their side, catching sight of their allies withdrawn in flight to the base of Helicon, and anxious to get across to their own friends, formed in close order and tramped forward stoutly.

At this point no one will dispute the valour of Agesilaus, but he certainly did not choose the safest course. It was open to him to make way for the enemy to pass, which done, he might have hung upon his heels and mastered his rear. This, however, he refused to do, preferring to crash full front against the Thebans. Thereupon, with close interlock of shield wedged in with shield, they shoved, they fought, they dealt death,\(^2\) they breathed out life, till at last a portion of the Thebans broke their way through towards Helicon, but paid for that departure by the loss of many lives. And now the victory of Agesilaus was fairly won, and he himself, wounded, had been carried back to the main line, when a party of horse came galloping up to tell him that something like eighty of the enemy, under arms, were sheltering under the temple, and they asked what they ought to do.

\(^1\) Or, "All these made up the attacking columns . . . and coming within . . . routed . . . ."

\(^2\) Or, "they slew, they were slain." In illustration of this famous passage, twice again worked up in Ages. ii. 12 (below, p. 249), and Cyrop. VII. i. 38, commented on by Longinus, περὶ ὑψιστος, 19, and copied by Dio Cassius, 47, 45. I venture to quote a passage from Mr. Rudyard Kipling, With the Main Guard, p. 57, Mulvaney loquitur: 'The Tyrone was pushin' an' pushin' in, an' our men was sweerin' at thim, an' Crook was workin' away in front av us all, his sword-arm swingin' like a pump-handle an' his revolver spittin' like a cat. But the strange thing av ut was the quiet that lay upon. 'Twas like a fight in a dhrame—except for thim that wus dead.'
Agesilaus, though he was covered with wounds, did not, for all that, forget his duty to God. He gave orders to let them retire unscathed, and would not suffer any injury to be done to them. And now, seeing it was already late, they took their suppers and retired to rest.

But with the morning Gylis the polemarch received orders to draw up the troops in battle order, and to set up a trophy, every man crowned with a wreath in honour of the god, and all the pipers piping. Thus they busied themselves in the Spartan camp. On their side the Thebans sent heralds asking to bury their dead, under a truce; and in this wise a truce was made. Agesilaus withdrew to Delphi, where on arrival he offered to the god a tithe of the produce of his spoils—no less than a hundred talents.\(^1\) Gylis the polemarch meanwhile withdrew into Phoci at the head of his troops, and from that district made a hostile advance into Locris. Here nearly a whole day was spent by the men in freely helping themselves to goods and chattels out of the villages and pillaging the corn;\(^2\) but as it drew towards evening the troops began to retire, with the Lacedaemonians in the rear. The Locrians hung upon their heels with a heavy pelt of stones and javelins. Thereupon the Lacedaemonians turned short round and gave chase, laying some of their assailants low. Then the Locrians ceased clinging to their rear, but continued their volleys from the vantage-ground above. The Lacedaemonians again made efforts to pursue their persistent foes even up the slope. At last darkness descended on them, and as they retired man after man dropped, succumbing to the sheer difficulty of the ground; some in their inability to see what lay in front, or else shot down by the enemy's missiles. It was then that Gylis the polemarch met his end, as also Pelles, who was on his personal staff, and the whole of the Spartans present without exception—eighteen or thereabouts—perished, either crushed by stones or succumbing to other wounds. Indeed, except for timely aid brought from the camp where the men were supping, the chances are not a man would have escaped to tell the tale.

\(^{1}\) = £25,000 nearly. \(^{2}\) Or, "not to speak of provisions."
was disbanded, the contingents retiring to their several cities, and Agesilaus home across the Gulf by sea.

B.C. 393.—Subsequently the war between the two parties recommenced. The Athenians, Boeotians, Argives, and the other allies made Corinth the base of their operations; the Lacedaemonians and their allies held Sicyon as theirs. As to the Corinthians, they had to face the fact that, owing to their proximity to the seat of war, it was their territory which was ravaged and their people who perished, while the rest of the allies abode in peace and reaped the fruits of their lands in due season. Hence the majority of them, including the better class, desired peace, and gathering into knots they indoctrinated one another with these views.

B.C. 392.—On the other hand, it could hardly escape the notice of the allied powers, the Argives, Athenians, and Boeotians, as also those of the Corinthians themselves who had received a share of the king's moneys, or for whatever reason were most directly interested in the war, that if they did not promptly put the peace party out of the way, ten chances to one the old laconising policy would again hold the field. It seemed there was nothing for it but the remedy of the knife. There was a refinement of wickedness in the plan adopted. With most people the life even of a legally condemned criminal is held sacred during a solemn season, but these men deliberately selected the last day of the Eucleia, when they might reckon on capturing more victims in the crowded market-place, for their murderous purposes. Their agents were supplied with the names of those to be got rid of, the signal was given, and then, drawing their daggers, they fell to work. Here a man was struck down standing in the centre of a group of talkers, and there another seated; a third while peaceably enjoying himself at the play; a fourth actually whilst officiating as a judge at some dramatic contest. When what was taking place became known, there was a general flight on the part of the better classes. Some fled to the images of the gods in the market-place, others to the altars; and here these unhallowed miscreants, ringleaders and followers alike, utterly

1 B.C. 393. See Grote, ix. p. 455, note 2 foll.; Hell. IV. viii. 7 (below, p. 79).
2 Others assign the incidents of this whole chapter iv. to B.C. 393.
3 The festival of Artemis Eucleia.
4 See Diod. xiv. 86.
regardless of duty and law, fell to butchering their victims even within the sacred precincts of the gods; so that even some of those against whom no hand was lifted—honest, law-abiding folk—were filled with sore amazement at sight of such impiety. In this way many of the elder citizens, as mustering more thickly in the market-place, were done to death. The younger men, acting on a suspicion conceived by one of their number, Pasimelus, as to what was going to take place, kept quiet in the Kraneion;¹ but hearing screams and shouting, and being joined anon by some who had escaped from the affair, they took the hint, and, running up along the slope of the Acrocorinthus, succeeded in repelling an attack of the Argives and the rest. While they were still deliberating what they ought to do, down fell a capital from its column—without assignable cause, whether of earthquake or wind. Also, when they sacrificed, the aspect of the victims was such that the soothsayers said it was better to descend from the position.

So they retired, in the first instance prepared to go into exile beyond the territory of Corinth. It was only upon the persuasion of their friends and the earnest entreaties of their mothers and sisters who came out to them, supported by the solemn assurance of the men in power themselves, who swore to guarantee them against evil consequences, that some of them finally consented to return home. Presented to their eyes was the spectacle of a tyranny in full exercise, and to their minds the consciousness of the obliteration of their city, seeing that boundaries were plucked up and the land of their fathers had come to be re-entitled by the name of Argos instead of Corinth; and furthermore, compulsion was put upon them to share in the constitution in vogue at Argos, for which they had little appetite, while in their own city they wielded less power than the resident aliens. So that a party sprang up among them whose creed was, that life was not worth living on such terms; their endeavour must be to make their fatherland once more the Corinth of old days—to restore freedom to their city, purified from the murderer and his pollution and fairly rooted in good order and legality.²

¹ See Paus. II. ii. 4.
² ἐξειομα. See Pol. Ath. i. 8 (below, p. 277); Aristot. Pol. iv. 8, 6; iii. 9, 8; v. 7, 4.
was a design worth the venture: if they succeeded they would become the saviours of their country; if not—why, in the effort to grasp the fairest flower of happiness, they would but overreach, and find instead a glorious termination to existence.

It was in furtherance of this design that two men—Pasimelus and Alcimenes—undertook to creep through a watercourse and effect a meeting with Praxitas the polemarch of the Lacedaemonians, who was on garrison duty with his own division in Sicyon. They told him they could give him ingress at a point in the long walls leading to Lechaeum. Praxitas, knowing from previous experience that the two men might be relied upon, believed their statement; and having arranged for the further detention in Sicyon of the division which was on the point of departure, he busied himself with plans for the enterprise. When the two men, partly by chance and partly by contrivance, came to be on guard at the gate where the trophy now stands, without further ado Praxitas presented himself with his division, taking with him also the men of Sicyon and the whole of the Corinthian exiles.\(^1\) Having reached the gate, he had a qualm of misgiving, and hesitated to step inside until he had first sent in a man on whom he could rely to take a look at things within. The two Corinthians introduced him, and made so simple and straightforward a representation\(^2\) that the visitor was convinced, and reported everything as free of pitfalls as the two had asserted. Then the polemarch entered, but owing to the wide space between the double walls, as soon as they came to form in line within, the intruders were impressed by the paucity of their numbers. They therefore erected a stockade, and dug as good a trench as they could in front of them, pending the arrival of reinforcements from the allies. In their rear, moreover, lay the guard of the Boeotians in the harbour. Thus they passed the whole day which followed the night of ingress without striking a blow.

On the next day, however, the Argive troops arrived in all haste, hurrying to the rescue, and found the enemy duly drawn up. The Lacedaemonians were on their own right, the men of

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\(^1\) See Diod. xiv. 86, and below, § 9.

\(^2\) Or, "showed him the place in so straightforward a manner."
Sicyon next, and leaning against the eastern wall the Corinthian exiles, one hundred and fifty strong. Their opponents marshalled their lines face to face in correspondence: Iphicrates with his mercenaries abutting on the eastern wall; next to them the Argives, whilst the Corinthians of the city held their left. In the pride inspired by numbers they began advancing at once. They overpowered the Sicyonians, and tearing asunder the stockade, pursued them to the sea and here slew numbers of them. At that instant Pasimachus, the cavalry general, at the head of a handful of troopers, seeing the Sicyonians sore pressed, made fast the horses of his troopers to the trees, and relieving the Sicyonians of their heavy infantry shields, advanced with his volunteers against the Argives. The latter, seeing the Sigmas on the shields and taking them to be "Sicyonians," had not the slightest fear. Whereupon, as the story goes, Pasimachus, exclaiming in his broad Doric, "By the twin gods! these Sigmas will cheat you, you Argives," came to close quarters, and in that battle of a handful against a host, was slain himself with all his followers. In another quarter of the field, however, the Corinthian exiles had got the better of their opponents and worked their way up, so that they were now touching the city circumvallation wall.

The Lacedaemonians, on their side, perceiving the discomfiture of the Sicyonians, sprang out with timely aid, keeping the palisade-work on their left. But the Argives, discovering that the Lacedaemonians were behind them, wheeled round and came racing back, pouring out of the palisade at full speed. Their extreme right, with unprotected flanks exposed, fell victims to the Lacedaemonians; the rest, hugging the wall, made good their retreat in dense masses towards the city. Here they encountered the Corinthian exiles, and discovering that they had fallen upon foes, swerved aside in the reverse direction. In this predicament some mounted by the ladders of the city wall, and, leaping down from its summit, were destroyed; others yielded up their lives, thrust through, as they jostled at the foot of the steps; others again were literally trampled under one another's feet and suffocated.

1 See Grote, ix. p. 333 foll.
2 Or, "plunged from its summit into perdition." See Thuc. ii. 4.
The Lacedaemonians had no difficulty in the choice of victims; for at that instant a work was assigned to them to do,\(^1\) such as they could hardly have hoped or prayed for. To find delivered into their hands a mob of helpless enemies, in an ecstasy of terror, presenting their unarmed sides in such sort that none turned to defend himself, but each victim rather seemed to contribute what he could towards his own destruction,—if that was not a divine interposition, I know not what to call it. Miracle or not, in that little space so many fell, and the corpses lay piled so thick, that eyes familiar with the stacking of corn or wood or piles of stones were called upon to gaze at layers of human bodies. Nor did the guard of the Boeotians in the port itself\(^2\) escape death; some were slain upon the ramparts, others on the roofs of the dock-houses, which they had scaled for refuge. Nothing remained but for the Corinthians and Argives to carry away their dead under cover of a truce; whilst the allies of Lacedaemon poured in their reinforcements. When these were collected, Praxitas decided in the first place to raze enough of the walls to allow a free broadway for an army on march. This done, he put himself at the head of his troops and advanced on the road to Megara, taking by assault, first Sidus and next Crommyon. Leaving garrisons in these two fortresses, he retraced his steps, and finally fortifying Epieiccia as a garrison outpost to protect the territory of the allies, he at once disbanded his troops and himself withdrew to Lacedaemon.

B.C. 392-391.\(^3\)—After this the great armaments of both belligerents had ceased to exist. The states merely furnished garrisons—the one set at Corinth, the other set at Sicyon—and were content to guard the walls. Though even so, a vigorous war was carried on by dint of the mercenary troops with which both sides were furnished.

A signal incident of the period was the invasion of Phlius by Iphicrates. He laid an ambuscade, and with a small body of troops adopting a system of guerilla war, took occasion of an unguarded sally of the citizens of Phlius to inflict such losses on them, that though they had never previously received

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\(^1\) Or, "Heaven assigned to them a work . . ." Lit. "The God . . ."

\(^2\) I.e. "of Lechaeum."

\(^3\) So Grote and Curtius; al. B.C. 393.
the Lacedaemonians within their walls, they received them now. They had hitherto feared to do so lest it might lead to the restoration of the banished members of the community, who gave out that they owed their exile to their Lacedaemonian sympathies; but they were now in such abject fear of the Corinthian party that they sent to fetch the Lacedaemonians, and delivered the city and citadel to their safe keeping. These latter, however well disposed to the exiles of Phlius, did not, all the time they held the city, so much as breathe the thought of bringing back the exiles; on the contrary, as soon as the city seemed to have recovered its confidence, they took their departure, leaving city and laws precisely as they had found them on their entry.

To return to Iphicrates and his men: they frequently extended their incursions even into Arcadia in many directions, following their usual guerilla tactics, but also making assaults on fortified posts. The heavy infantry of the Arcadians positively refused to face them in the field, so profound was the terror in which they held these light troops. In compensation, the light troops themselves entertained a wholesome dread of the Lacedaemonians, and did not venture to approach even within javelin-range of their heavy infantry. They had been taught a lesson when, within that distance, some of the younger hoplites had made a dash at them, catching and putting some of them to the sword. But however profound the contempt of the Lacedaemonians for these light troops, their contempt for their own allies was deeper. (On one occasion a reinforcement of Mantianians had sallied from the walls between Corinth and Lechaeum to engage the peltasts, and had no sooner come under attack than they swerved, losing some of their men as they made good their retreat. The Lacedaemonians were unkind enough to poke fun at these unfortunates. "Our allies," they said, "stand in as much awe of these peltasts as children of the bogies and hobgoblins of their nurses." For themselves, starting from Lechaeum, they found no difficulty in marching

1 Lit. "laconism."
2 See Thuc. ii. 4.
3 See Grote, ix. 472 note. Lechaeum was not taken by the Lacedaemonians until the Corinthian long walls had been rebuilt by the Athenians. See next page. Possibly the incidents in this section (§ 17) occurred after the capture of Lechaeum. The historian introduces them parenthetically, as it were, in illustration of his main topic—the success of the peltasts.
right round the city of Corinth with a single Lacedaemonian division and the Corinthian exiles.)

The Athenians, on their side, who felt the power of the Lacedaemonians to be dangerously close, now that the walls of Corinth had been laid open, and even apprehended a direct attack upon themselves, determined to rebuild the portion of the wall severed by Praxitas. Accordingly they set out with their whole force, including a suite of stonelayers, masons, and carpenters, and within a few days erected a quite splendid wall on the side facing Sicyon towards the west, and then proceeded with more leisure to the completion of the eastern portion.

To turn once more to the other side: the Lacedaemonians, indignant at the notion that the Argives should be gathering the produce of their lands in peace at home, as if war were a pastime, marched against them. Agesilaus commanded the expedition, and after ravaging their territory from one end to the other, crossed their frontier at Tenea and swooped down upon Corinth, taking the walls which had been lately rebuilt by the Athenians. He was supported on the sea side by his brother Teleutias with a naval force of about twelve triremes, and the mother of both was able to congratulate herself on the joint success of both her sons; one having captured the enemy's walls by land and the other his ships and naval arsenal by sea, on the same day. These achievements sufficed Agesilaus for the present; he disbanded the army of the allies and led the state troops home.

v. B.C. 390.—Subsequently the Lacedaemonians made a second expedition against Corinth. They heard from the exiles that the citizens contrived to preserve all their cattle in Peiraeum; indeed, large numbers derived their subsistence from the place. Agesilaus was again in command of the expedition. In the first instance he advanced upon the

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1 Or, adopting Schneider's conjecture, ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο, add "and encamping."
2 See Thuc. vi. 98.
3 Reading ἔτεκαν, Köppen's emendation for τέτεκαν. In the parallel passage (Ages. ii. 17) the text has κατά τὰ στενά. See Grote, H. G. ix. 471.
4 See below, IV. viii. 11, p. 81.
5 Al. B.C. 392. The historian omits the overtures for peace, B.C. 391 (or 391-390), referred to in Andoc. De Pace. See Jebb, Att. Or. i. 83, 128; Grote, H. G. ix. 474; Curtius, H. G. Eng. tr. iv. 261; below, p. 82, note i.
Isthmus. It was the month of the Isthmian games,¹ and here he found the Argives engaged in conducting the sacrifice to Poseidon, as if Corinth were Argos. So when they perceived the approach of Agesilaus, the Argives and their friends left the offerings as they lay, including the preparations for the breakfast, and retired with undisguised alarm into the city by the Cenchrean road.² Agesilaus, though he observed the movement, refrained from giving chase, but taking up his quarters in the temple, there proceeded to offer victims to the god himself, and waited until the Corinthian exiles had celebrated the sacrifice to Poseidon, along with the games. But no sooner had Agesilaus turned his back and retired, than the Argives returned and celebrated the Isthmian games afresh; so that in this particular year there were cases in which the same competitors were twice defeated in this or that contest, or conversely, the same man was proclaimed victor twice over.

On the fourth day Agesilaus led his troops against Peiraeum, but finding it strongly defended, he made a sudden retrograde march after the morning meal in the direction of the capital, as though he calculated on the betrayal of the city. The Corinthians, in apprehension of some such possible catastrophe, sent to summon Iphicrates with the larger portion of his light infantry. These passed by duly in the night, not unobserved, however, by Agesilaus, who at once turned round at break of day and advanced on Peiraeum. He himself kept to the low ground by the hot springs,³ sending a division to scale the top of the pass. That night he encamped at the hot springs, while the division bivouacked in the open, in possession of the pass. Here Agesilaus distinguished himself by an invention as seasonable as it was simple. Among those who carried provisions for the division not one had thought of bringing fire. The altitude was considerable; there had been a fall of rain and hail towards evening and the temperature was low; besides which, the scaling party were clad in thin garments suited to the summer season. There they sat shivering in the dark, with scarcely heart to attack their suppers,

¹ Grote and Curtius believe these to be the Isthmian games of 390 B.C., not of 392 B.C., as Sauppe and others suppose. See Peter, Chron. Table, p. 89, note 183; Jowett, Thuc. ii. 468, note on VIII. 9, 1.
² Lit. "road to Cenchreae."
³ Near mod. Lutraki.
when Agesilaus sent up to them as many as ten porters carrying fire in earthen pots. One found his way up one way, one another, and presently there were many bonfires blazing—magnificently enough, since there was plenty of wood to hand; so that all fell to oiling themselves and many supped over again. The same night the sky was lit up by the blaze of the temple of Poseidon—set on fire no one knows how.

When the men in Peiraeum perceived that the pass was occupied, they at once abandoned all thought of self-defence and fled for refuge to the Heraion—men and women, slaves and free-born, with the greater part of their flocks and herds. Agesilaus, with the main body, meanwhile pursued his march by the sea-shore, and the division, simultaneously descending from the heights, captured the fortified position of Oenoe, appropriating its contents. Indeed, all the troops on that day reaped a rich harvest in the supplies they brought in from various farmsteads. Presently those who had escaped into the Heraion came out, offering to leave it to Agesilaus to decide what he would do with them. He decided to deliver up to the exiles all those concerned with the late butchery, and that all else should be sold. And so from the Heraion streamed out a long line of prisoners, whilst from other sides embassies arrived in numbers; and amongst these a deputation from the Boeotians, anxious to learn what they should do to obtain peace. These latter Agesilaus, with a certain loftiness of manner, affected not even to see, although Pharax, their proxenus, stood by their side to introduce them. Seated in a circular edifice on the margin of the lake, he surveyed the host of captives and valuables as they were brought out. Beside the prisoners, to guard them, stepped the Lacedaemonian warriors from the camp, carrying their spears—and themselves plucked all gaze their way, so readily will success and the transient fortune of the moment rivet attention. But even while Agesilaus was still thus seated, wearing a look betokening satisfaction at some great achievement, a horseman came galloping up; the flanks of his charger streamed with sweat. To the many inquiries what news he brought, the rider responded never a word; but being now close beside

1 Or, "Heraeum," i.e. sanctuary of Hera, on a promontory so called. See Leake, Morea, iii. 377; and map in Trans. vol. i. to face p. xlii.
2 See Hell. III. ii. 12, if the same.
3 Or, "on the round pavilion by the lake" (mod. Vuliasmeni).
Agesilaus, he leaped from his horse, and running up to him with lowering visage narrated the disaster of the Spartan division\(^1\) at Lechaeum. At these tidings the king sprang instantly from his seat, clutching his spear, and bade his herald summon to a meeting the generals, captains of fifties, and commanders of foreign brigades.\(^2\) When these had rapidly assembled he bade them, seeing that the morning meal had not yet been tasted, to swallow hastily what they could, and with all possible speed to overtake him. But for himself, he, with the officers of the royal staff,\(^3\) set off at once without breakfast. His bodyguard, with their heavy arms, accompanied him with all speed—himself in advance, the officers following behind. In this fashion he had already passed beyond the warm springs, and was well within the plateau of Lechaeum, when three horsemen rode up with further news: the dead bodies had been picked up. On receipt of these tidings he commanded the troops to order arms, and having rested them a little space, led them back again to the Heraion. The next day he spent in disposing of the captured property.\(^4\)

The ambassadors of the Boeotians were then summoned, and, being asked to explain the object of their coming, made no further mention of the word "peace," but replied that, if there was nothing to hinder it, they wished to have a pass to their own soldiers within the capital. The king answered with a smile: "I know your desire is not so much to see your soldiers as to feast your eyes on the good fortune of your friends, and to measure its magnitude. Wait then, I will conduct you myself; with me you will be better able to discover the true value of what has taken place." And he was as good as his word. Next day he sacrificed, and led his army up to the gates of Corinth. The trophy he respected, but not one tree else did he leave standing—chopping and burning, as proof positive that no one dared to face him in the field. And having so done, he encamped about Lechaeum; and as to the Theban ambassadors, in lieu of letting them pass into the city, he sent them off by sea across to Creusis.

But in proportion to the unwontedness of such a calamity

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\(^1\) Technically \textit{mora}.

\(^2\) Lit. the \textit{polemarchs}, \textit{pentecôters}, and \textit{xenagoi}.

\(^3\) See \textit{Pol. Lac.} xiii. i (below, p. 319).

\(^4\) See Grote, \textit{H. G.} ix. 480, in reference to \textit{Ages.} vii. 6.
befalling Lacedaemonians, a widespread mourning fell upon the whole Laconian army, those alone excepted whose sons or fathers or brothers had died at their post. The bearing of these resembled that of conquerors,

1 as with bright faces they moved freely to and fro, glorying in their domestic sorrow. Now the tragic fate which befell the division was on this wise: It was the unvaried custom of the men of Amyclae to return home at the Hyacinthia, 2 to join in the sacred paean, a custom not to be interrupted either by active service or absence from home or for any other reason. So, too, on this occasion, Agesilaus had left behind all the Amyclaeans serving in any part of his army at Lechaeum. At the right moment the general in command of the garrison at that place had posted the garrison troops of the allies to guard the walls during his absence, and put himself at the head of his division of heavy infantry with that of the cavalry, 3 and led the Amyclaeans past the walls of Corinth. Arrived at a point within three miles or so 4 of Sicyon, the polemarch turned back himself in the direction of Lechaeum with his heavy infantry regiment, six hundred strong, giving orders to the cavalry commandant to escort the Amyclaeans with his division as far as they required, and then to turn and overtake him. It cannot be said that the Lacedaemonians were ignorant of the large number of light troops and heavy infantry inside Corinth, but owing to their former successes they arrogantly presumed that no one would attack them. Within the capital of the Corinthians, however, their scant numbers—a thin line of heavy infantry unsupported by light infantry or cavalry—had been noted; and Callias, the son of Hipponicus, 5 who was in command of the Athenian hoplites, and Iphicrates at the head of his peltasts, saw no risk in attacking with the light brigade. Since if the enemy continued his march by the high road, he would be cut up by showers of javelins on his exposed right flank; or if he were tempted to take the offensive, they with their peltasts, the nimblest of all light troops, would easily slip out of the grasp of his hoplites.

1 See Grote, H. G. ix. 488.
2 Observed on three days of the month Hecatombaeus (=July). See Müller's Dorians, ii. 360. For Amyclae, see Leake, Morea, i. ch. iv. p. 145 foll.; Baedeker's Greece, p. 279.
3 See below, Hell. VI. iv. 12; and Pol. Lac. xi. 4, xiii. 4.
With this clearly-conceived idea they led out their troops; and while Callias drew up his heavy infantry in line at no great distance from the city, Iphicrates and his peltasts made a dash at the returning division.

The Lacedaemonians were presently within range of the javelins.\(^1\) Here a man was wounded, and there another dropped, not to rise again. Each time orders were given to the attendant shield-bearers\(^2\) to pick up the men and bear them into Lechaeum; and these indeed were the only members of the mora who were, strictly speaking, saved. Then the polemarch ordered the ten-years-service men\(^3\) to charge and drive off their assailants. Charge, however, as they might, they took nothing by their pains—not a man could they come at within javelin range. Being heavy infantry opposed to light troops, before they could get to close quarters the enemy’s word of command sounded “Retire!” whilst as soon as their own ranks fell back, scattered as they were in consequence of a charge where each man’s individual speed had told, Iphicrates and his men turned right about and renewed the javelin attack, while others, running alongside, harassed their exposed flank. At the very first charge the assailants had shot down nine or ten, and, encouraged by this success, pressed on with increasing audacity. These attacks told so severely that the polemarch a second time gave the order (and this time for the fifteen-years-service men) to charge. The order was promptly obeyed, but on retiring they lost more men than on the first occasion, and it was not until the pick and flower of the division had succumbed that they were joined by their returning cavalry, in whose company they once again attempted a charge. The light infantry gave way, but the attack of the cavalry was feebly enforced. Instead of pressing home the charge until at least they had sabred some of the enemy, they kept their horses abreast of their infantry skirmishers,\(^4\) charging and wheeling side by side.

\(^1\) See Grote, H. G. ix. 467, note on the improvements of Iphicrates.

\(^2\) Grote, H. G. ix. 484; cf. Heli. IV. viii. 39, p. 89; Anab. IV. ii. 20 (Trans. vol. i. p. 182); Herod. ix. 10-29.

\(^3\) Youngest rank and file, between eighteen and twenty-eight years of age, who formed the first line. The Spartan was liable to service at the age of eighteen. From twenty-eight to thirty-three he would belong to the fifteen-years-service division (the second line); and so on. See below, IV. vi. 10, p. 73.

\(^4\) See Thuc. iv. 125.
Again and again the monotonous tale of doing and suffering repeated itself, except that as their own ranks grew thinner and their courage ebbed, the courage of their assailants grew bolder and their numbers increased. In desperation they massed compactly upon the narrow slope of a hillock, distant a couple of furlongs¹ or so from the sea, and a couple of miles² perhaps from Lechaeum. Their friends in Lechaeum, perceiving them, embarked in boats and sailed round until they were immediately under the hillock. And now, in the very slough of despair, being so sorely troubled as man after man dropped dead, and unable to strike a blow, to crown their distress they saw the enemy’s heavy infantry advancing. Then they took to flight; some of them threw themselves into the sea; others—a mere handful—escaped with the cavalry into Lechaeum. The death-roll, including those who fell in the second fight and the final flight, must have numbered two hundred and fifty slain, or thereabouts.³ Such is the tale of the destruction of the Lacedaemonian mora.

Subsequently, with the mutilated fragment of the division, Agesilaus turned his back upon Lechaeum, leaving another division behind to garrison that port. On his passage homewards, as he wound his way through the various cities, he made a point of arriving at each as late in the day as possible, renewing his march as early as possible next morning. Leaving Orchomenus at the first streak of dawn, he passed Mantinea still under cover of darkness. The spectacle of the Mantineans rejoicing at their misfortune would have been too severe an ordeal for his soldiers.

But Iphicrates had not yet reached the summit of his good fortune. Success followed upon success. Lacedaemonian garrisons had been placed in Sidus and Crommyon by Praxitas when he took these fortresses, and again in Oenoe, when Peiraeum was taken quite lately by Agesilaus. One and all of these now fell into the hands of Iphicrates. Lechaeum still held out, garrisoned as it was by the Lacedaemonians and their allies; while the Corinthian exiles, unable since ⁴ the disaster of the mora any longer to pass freely by land from Sicyon, had the sea passage still open to them, and using

Lechaeum as their base, kept up a game of mutual annoyance with the party in the capital.

VI. B.C. 390-389. — At a later date the Achaeans, being in possession of Calydon, a town from old times belonging to Aetolia, and having further incorporated the Calydonians as citizens, were under the necessity of garrisoning their new possession. The reason was, that the Acarnanians were threatening the place with an army, and were aided by contingents from Athens and Boeotia, who were anxious to help their allies. Under the strain of this combined attack the Achaeans despatched ambassadors to Lacedaemon, who on arrival complained of the unfair conduct of Lacedaemon towards themselves. "We, sirs," they said, "are ever ready to serve in your armies, in obedience to whatever orders you choose to issue; we follow you whithersoever you think fit to lead; but when it comes to our being beleaguered by the Acarnanians, with their allies the Athenians and Boeotians, you show not the slightest concern. Understand, then, that if things go on thus we cannot hold out; but either we must give up all part in the war in Peloponnesus and cross over in full force to engage the Acarnanians, or we must make peace with them on whatever terms we can." This language was a tacit threat that if they failed to obtain the assistance they felt entitled to from Lacedaemon they would quit the alliance.

The ephors and the assembly concluded that there was no alternative but to assist the Achaeans in their campaign against the Acarnanians. Accordingly they sent out Agesilaus with two divisions and the proper complement of allies. The Achaeans none the less marched out in full force themselves. No sooner had Agesilaus crossed the gulf than there was a general flight of the population from the country districts into the towns, whilst the flocks and herds were driven into remote districts that they might not be captured by the troops. Being now arrived on the frontier of the enemy's territory,

1 The illustrative incidents narrated in chapter iv. 17 may belong to this period. See above, p. 63, note 3.
2 According to others (who suppose that the Isthmia and the events recorded in chapter v. 1-19 above belong to B.C. 392), we have now reached B.C. 391.
3 Or, "having conferred a city organisation on the Calydonians."
4 See Thuc. ii. 68.
Agesilaus sent to the general assembly of the Acarnanians at Stratus, warning them that unless they chose to give up their alliance with the Boeotians and Athenians, and to take instead themselves and their allies, he would ravage their territory through its length and breadth, and not spare a single thing. When they turned a deaf ear to this summons, the other proceeded to do what he threatened, systematically laying the district waste, felling the timber and cutting down the fruit-trees, while slowly moving on at the rate of ten or twelve furlongs a day. The Acarnanians, owing to the snail-like progress of the enemy, were lulled into a sense of security. They even began bringing down their cattle from their alps, and devoted themselves to the tillage of far the greater portion of their fields. But Agesilaus only waited till their rash confidence reached its climax; then on the fifteenth or sixteenth day after he had first entered the country he sacrificed at early dawn, and before evening had traversed eighteen miles or so of country to the lake round which were collected nearly all the flocks and herds of the Acarnanians, and so captured a vast quantity of cattle, horses, and grazing stock of all kinds, besides numerous slaves.

Having secured this prize, he stayed on the spot the whole of the following day, and devoted himself to disposing of the captured property by public sale. While he was thus engaged, a large body of Acarnanian light infantry appeared, and availing themselves of the position in which Agesilaus was encamped against the mountain side, assailed him with volleys of sling-stones and rocks from the razor-edge of the mountain, without suffering any scathe themselves. By this means they succeeded in dislodging and forcing his troops down into the level plain, and that too at an hour when the whole camp was engaged in preparations for the evening meal. As night drew on, the Acarnanians retired; sentinels were posted, and the troops slept in peace.

1 "The Akarnanians had, in early times, occupied the hill of Olpai as a place for judicial proceedings common to the whole nation" (see Thuc. iii. 105). "But in Thucydides' own time Stratos had attained its position as the greatest city of Akarnania, and probably the Federal Assemblies were already held there" (Thuc. ii. 80). "In the days of Agesilaos we find Stratos still more distinctly marked as the place of Federal meeting."—Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. ch. iv. p. 148 foll., "On the constitution of the League."
2 Lit. "one hundred and sixty stades." 3 See Thuc. ii. 80; vi. 106.
Next day Agesilaus led off his army. The exit from the plain and meadow-land round the lake was a narrow aperture through a close encircling range of hills. In occupation of this mountain-barrier the Acarnanians, from the vantage-ground above, poured down a continuous pelt of stones and other missiles, or, creeping down to the fringes, dogged and annoyed them so much that the army was no longer able to proceed. If the heavy infantry or cavalry made sallies from the main line they did no harm to their assailants, for the Acarnanians had only to retire and they had quickly gained their strongholds. It was too severe a task, Agesilaus thought, to force his way through the narrow pass so sorely beset. He made up his mind, therefore, to charge that portion of the enemy who dogged his left, though these were pretty numerous. The range of hills on this side was more accessible to heavy infantry and horse alike. During the interval needed for the inspection of victims, the Acarnanians kept plying them with javelins and bullets, and, coming into close proximity, wounded man after man. But presently came the word of command, "Advance!" and the fifteen-years-service men of the heavy infantry ran forward, accompanied by the cavalry, at a round pace, the general himself steadily following with the rest of the column. Those of the Acarnanians who had crept down the mountain side at that instant in the midst of their sharpshooting turned and fled, and as they climbed the steep, man after man was slain. When, however, the top of the pass was reached, there stood the hoplites of the Acarnanians drawn up in battle line, and supported by the mass of their light infantry. There they steadily waited, keeping up a continuous discharge of missiles the while, or launching their long spears; whereby they dealt wounds to the cavalry troopers and death in some cases to the horses. But when they were all but within the clutches of the advancing heavy infantry of the Lacedaemonians their firmness forsook them; they swerved and fled, and there died of them on that day about three hundred. So ended the affair.

Agesilaus set up a trophy of victory, and afterwards making a tour of the country, he visited it with fire and sword.\(^1\)

\(^1\) *I.e.* "the first two ranks." See above, IV. v. 14, p. 69.

\(^2\) See *Ages.* ii. 20 (below, p. 251), for an extraordinary discrepancy.

\(^3\) Or lit. "burning and felling."
Occasionally, in obedience to pressure put upon him by the Achaeans, he would assault some city, but did not capture a single one. And now, as the season of autumn rapidly approached, he prepared to leave the country; whereupon the Achaeans, who looked upon his exploits as abortive, seeing that not a single city, willingly or unwillingly, had as yet been detached from their opponents, begged him, as the smallest service he could render them, at any rate to stay long enough in the country to prevent the Acarnanians from sowing their corn. He answered that the course they suggested ran counter to expediency. "You forget," he said, "that I mean to invade your enemies again next summer; and therefore the larger their sowing now, the stronger will be their appetite for peace hereafter." With this retort he withdrew overland through Aetolia, and by roads, moreover, which no army, small or great, could possibly have traversed without the consent of the inhabitants. The Aetolians, however, were only too glad to yield the Spartan king a free passage, cherishing hopes as they did that he would aid them to recover Naupectus. On reaching Rhium¹ he crossed the gulf at that point and returned homewards, the more direct passage from Calydon to Peloponnesus being effectually barred by an Athenian squadron stationed at Oeniadae.

vii. B.C. 389-388.²—On the expiration of winter, and in fulfilment of his promise to the Achaeans, Agesilaus called out the ban once more with early spring to invade the Acarnanians. The latter were apprised of his intention, and, being persuaded that owing to the midland situation of their cities they would just as truly be blockaded by an enemy who chose to destroy their corn as they would be if besieged with entrenchments in regular form, they sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon, and made peace with the Achaeans and alliance with the Lacedaemonians. Thus closes this page of history concerning the affairs of Acarnania.

To turn to the next. There was a feeling on the part of the Lacedaemonians³ that no expedition against Athens or Boeotia would be safe so long as a state so important and so

¹ Or Antirrhium (as more commonly called).
² According to others, B.C. 390. See above, p. 71, note 2.
³ Or, "It was agreed by the Lacedaemonians."
close to their own frontier as Argos remained in open hostility behind them. Accordingly they called out the ban against Argos. Now when Agesipolis learnt that the duty of leadership devolved on him, and, moreover, that the sacrifices before crossing the frontier were favourable, he went to Olympia and consulted the will of the god. "Would it be lawful to him," he inquired, "not to accept the holy truce, on the ground that the Argives made the season for it depend not on a fixed date, but on the prospect of a Lacedaemonian invasion?" The god indicated to the inquirer that he might lawfully repudiate any holy truce which was fraudulently antedated. Not content with this, the young king, on leaving Olympia, went at once to Delphi, and at that shrine put the same question to Apollo: "Were his views in accord with his Father's as touching the holy truce?"—to which the son of Zeus made answer: "Yea, altogether in accordance." 3

Then, without further hesitation, picking up his army at Phlius (where, during his absence to visit the temples, the troops had been collecting), he advanced by Nemea into the enemy's territory. The Argives, on their side, perceiving that they would be unable to hinder his advance, in accordance with their custom sent a couple of heralds, garlanded, and presented their usual plea of a holy truce. Agesipolis answered them curtly that the gods were not satisfied with the justice of their plea, and, refusing to accept the truce, pushed forward, causing thereby great perplexity and consternation throughout the rural districts and in the capital itself.

But while he was getting his evening meal that first evening in the Argive territory—just at the moment when the after-dinner libation had been poured out—the god sent an earthquake; and with one consent the Lacedaemonians, beginning with the officers of the royal quarters, sang the sacred hymn of Poseidon. The soldiers, in general, expected to retreat, arguing that, on the occurrence of an earthquake once before, Agis had retired from Elis. But Agesipolis held another view: if the god had sent his earthquake at the moment when he was meditating invasion, he should have understood that the god

1 *I.e.* 'the season of the Carneia.'

2 Or, 'wrongfully put forward.' See below, V. i. 29; iii. 27 (pp. 98, 119); Paus. III. v. 8; Jebb, *Att. Or.* i. p. 137; Grote, *H. G.* ix. 494 foll.; Jowett, *Thuc.* ii. 315; note to Thuc. V. liv. 3.

forbade his entrance; but now, when the invasion was a thing effected, he must needs take it as a signal of his approval. Accordingly next morning he sacrificed to Poseidon, and advanced a short distance farther into the country.

The late expedition of Agesilaus into Argos was still fresh in men's minds, and Agesipolis was eager to ascertain from the soldiers how close his predecessor had advanced to the fortification walls; or again, how far he had gone in ravaging the open country—not unlike a competitor in the pentathlon, eager to cap the performance of his rival in each event. On one occasion it was only the discharge of missiles from the towers which forced him to recross the trenches round the walls; on another, profiting by the absence of the majority of the Argives in Laconian territory, he came so close to the gates that their defenders actually shut out their own Boeotian cavalry on the point of entering, in terror lest the Lacedaemonians might pour into the town in company; and these Boeotian troopers were forced to cling, like bats to a wall, under each coign of vantage beneath the battlements. Had it not been for the accidental absence of the Cretans, who had gone off on a raid to Nauplia, without a doubt numbers of men and horses would have been shot down. At a later date, while encamping in the neighbourhood of the Enclosures, a thunderbolt fell into his camp. One or two men were struck, while others died from the effect of the concussion on their brains. At a still later period he was anxious to fortify some sort of garrison outpost in the pass of Celusa, but upon offering

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1 Or, "interpret the signal as a summons to advance."
2 See above, Hell. IV. iv. 19.
3 The pentathlon of Olympia and the other great games consisted of five contests, in the following order—(1) leaping, (2) discus-throwing, (3) javelin-throwing, (4) running, (5) wrestling. Cf. Simonides, ἀλμα τοδωκείν δεκκον ἄκοντα πάλην, where, metri gratid, the order is inverted. The competitors were drawn in pairs. The odd man who drew a bye in any particular round or heat was called the ephedros. The successful athletes of the pairs, that is, those who had won any three events out of the five, would then again be drawn against each other, and so on until only two were left, between whom the final heat took place. See, for an exhaustive discussion of the subject, Prof. Percy Gardner, "The Pentathlon of the Greeks" (Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. i. 9, p. 210 foll. pl. viii.), from whom this note is taken.  
4 See Thuc. vii. 57.  
5 περὶ τὰς εἰρκτὰς—what these were no one knows, possibly a stone quarry used as a prison. Cf. Cyrop. III. i. 19; Mem. II. i. 5; see Grote, H. G. ix. 497; Paus. III. v. 8.  
6 Or Celossa. See Strabo, viii. 382.
sacrifice the victims proved lobeless,¹ and he was constrained to lead back and disband his army—not without serious injury inflicted on the Argives, as the result of an invasion which had taken them wholly by surprise.

VIII. 394 B.C.—Such were the land operations in the war. Meanwhile another series of events was being enacted on the sea and within the seaboard cities; and these I will now narrate in detail. But I shall confine my pen to the more memorable incidents, and others of less account I shall pass over.

In the first place, then, Pharnabazus and Conon, after defeating the Lacedaemonians in the naval engagement off Cnidus, commenced a tour of inspection round the islands and the maritime states, expelling from them, as they visited them, one after another the Spartan governors.² Everywhere they gave consolatory assurances to the citizens that they had no intention of establishing fortress citadels within their walls, or in any way interfering with their self-government.³ Such words fell soothingly upon the ears of those to whom they were addressed; the proposals were courteously accepted; all were eager to present Pharnabazus with gifts of friendship and hospitality. The satrap, indeed, was only applying the instructions of his master Conon on these matters—who had taught him that if he acted thus all the states would be friendly to him, whereas, if he showed any intention to enslave them, the smallest of them would, as Conon insisted, be capable of causing a world of trouble, and the chances were, if apprehensions were once excited, he would find himself face to face with a coalition of united Hellas. To these admonitions Pharnabazus lent a willing ear.

Accordingly, when disembarking at Ephesus, he presented Conon with a fleet of forty sail,⁴ and having further instructed him to meet him at Sestos,⁵ set off himself by land along the coast to visit his own provinces. For here it should be mentioned that his old enemy Dercylidas chanced to be in Abydos at the time of the sea-fight;⁶ nor had he at a later date

¹ I.e. "hopeless." See above, III. iv. 15, p. 28.
² Lit. "the Laconian harmosts."
³ See Hicks, 70, "Honours to Konon," Inscript. found at Erythrae in Ionia. Cf. Diod. xiv. 84.
⁴ See Diod. xiv. 83.
⁵ See above, Hell. II. i. 27 foll.
⁶ See above, Hell. IV. iii. 3, p. 53.
suffered eclipse with the other governors,¹ but, on the contrary, had kept tight hold of Abydos and still preserved it in attachment to Lacedaemon. The course he had adopted was to summon a meeting of the Abydenians, when he made them a speech as follows: "Sirs, to-day it is possible for you, who have before been friends to my city, to appear as benefactors of the Lacedaemonians. For a man to prove faithful to his friends in the heyday of their good fortune is no great marvel; but to prove steadfast when his friends are in misfortune—that is a service monumental for all time. But do not mistake me. It does not follow that, because we have been defeated in a great sea-fight, we are therefore annihilated.² Certainly not. Even in old days, you will admit, when Athens was mistress of the sea, our state was not powerless to benefit friends or chastise enemies. Moreover, in proportion as the rest of the cities have joined hands with fortune to turn their backs upon us, so much the more certainly will the grandeur of your fidelity shine forth. Or, is any one haunted by the fear that we may find ourselves blockaded by land and sea?—let him consider that at present there is no Hellenic navy whatever on the seas, and if the barbarian attempts to clutch the empire of the sea, Hellas will not sit by and suffer it; so that, if only in self-defence, she must inevitably take your side."

To this the Abydenians lent no deaf ears, but rather responded with willingness approaching enthusiasm—extending the hand of fellowship to the ex-governors, some of whom were already flocking to Abydos as a harbour of refuge, whilst others they sent to summon from a distance.

So when a number of efficient and serviceable men had been collected, Dercylidas ventured to cross over to Sestos—lying, as it does, not more than a mile³ distant, directly facing Abydos. There he not only set about collecting those who held lands in the Chersonese through Lacedaemonian influence, but extended his welcome also to the governors ⁴ who had been driven out of European states.⁵ He insisted that, if they came to think of it, not even was their case desperate, reminding them that even in Asia, which originally belonged to the Persian monarch, places were to be found—such as the little

¹ Lit. "harmosts." ² Or, "we are beaten, ergo, it is all over with us." ³ Lit. "eight stades." ⁴ Lit. "harmosts." ⁵ See Demos. de Cor. 96.
state of Temnos, or Aegae, and others, capable of administering their affairs, unsubjected to the king of Persia. "But," he added, "if you want a strong impregnable position, I cannot conceive what better you can find than Sestos. Why, it would need a combined naval and military force to invest that port." By these and such like arguments he rescued them from the lethargy of despair.

Now when Pharnabazus found Abydos and Sestos so conditioned, he gave them to understand that unless they chose to eject the Lacedaemonians, he would bring war to bear upon them; and when they refused to obey, having first assigned to Conon as his business to keep the sea closed against them, he proceeded in person to ravage the territory of the men of Abydos. Presently, finding himself no nearer the fulfilment of his object—which was their reduction—he set off home himself and left it to Conon the while so to conciliate the Hellespontine states that as large a naval power as possible might be mustered against the coming spring. In his wrath against the Lacedaemonians, in return for the treatment he had received from them, his paramount object was to invade their territory and exact what vengeance he could.

B.C. 393.—The winter was thus fully taken up with preparations; but with the approach of spring, Pharnabazus and Conon, with a large fleet fully manned, and a foreign mercenary brigade to boot, threaded their way through the islands to Melos.\(^1\) This island was to serve as a base of operations against Lacedaemon. And in the first instance he sailed down to Pherae\(^2\) and ravaged that district, after which he made successive descents at various other points on the seaboard, and did what injury he could. But in apprehension of the harbourless character of the coast, coupled with the enemy's facility of reinforcement and his own scarcity of supplies, he very soon turned back and sailed away, until finally he came to moorings in the harbour of Phoenicus in Cythera. The occupants of the city of the Cytherians, in terror of being taken by storm, evacuated the walls. To

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\(^1\) See Lys. xix. de bon. Arist. 19 foll.; and Hicks, 77, "Honours to Dionysios I. and his court"; Grote, H. G. ix. 453.

\(^2\) Mod. Kalamata.
dismiss these under a flag of truce across to Laconia was his first step; his second was to repair the fortress in question and to leave a garrison in the island under an Athenian governor—Nicophemus. After this he set sail to the Isthmus of Corinth, where he delivered an exhortation to the allies begging them to prosecute the war vigorously, and to show themselves faithful to the Great King; and so, having left them all the moneys he had with him, set off on his voyage home.

But Conon had a proposal to make:—If Pharnabazus would allow him to keep the fleet, he would undertake, in the first place, to support it free of expense from the islands; besides which, he would sail to his own country and help his fellow-citizens the Athenians to rebuild their long walls and the fortifications round Piraeus. No heavier blow, he insisted, could well be inflicted on Lacedaemon. "In this way, I can assure you," he added, "you will win the eternal gratitude of the Athenians and wreak consummate vengeance on the Lacedaemonians, since at one stroke you will render null and void that on which they have bestowed their utmost labour." These arguments so far weighed with Pharnabazus that he despatched Conon to Athens with alacrity, and further supplied him with funds for the restoration of the walls. Thus it was that Conon, on his arrival at Athens, was able to rebuild a large portion of the walls—partly by lending his own crews, and partly by giving pay to carpenters and stone-masons, and meeting all the necessary expenses. There were other portions of the walls which the Athenians and Boeotians and other states raised as a joint voluntary undertaking.

Nor must it be forgotten that the Corinthians, with the funds left them by Pharnabazus, manned a fleet—the command of which they entrusted to their admiral Agathinus—and so were undisputed masters of the sea within the gulf round Achaia and Lechaeum.

B.C. 393-391.—The Lacedaemonians, in opposition, fitted out a fleet under the command of Podanemus. That officer, in an attack of no great moment, lost his life, and Pollis, his second in command, was presently in his turn obliged to retire, being wounded, whereupon Herippidas took command

1 See Hell. I. i. 23 (Trans. vol. i. p. 4, note 2). For these officers, see Index.
of the vessels. On the other hand, Proaenus the Corinthian, who had relieved Agathinus, evacuated Rhium, and the Lacedaemonians recovered that post. Subsequently Teleutias succeeded to Herippidas's fleet, and it was then the turn of that admiral to dominate the gulf.1

B.C. 392.—The Lacedaemonians were well informed of the proceedings of Conon. They knew that he was not only restoring the fortifications of Athens by help of the king's gold, but maintaining a fleet at his expense besides, and conciliating the islands and seaboard cities towards Athens. If, therefore, they could indoctrinate Tiribazus—who was a general of the king—with their sentiments, they believed they could not fail either to draw him aside to their own interests, or, at any rate, to put a stop to his feeding Conon's navy. With this intention they sent Antalcidas to Tiribazus:2 his orders were to carry out this policy and, if possible, to arrange a peace between Lacedaemon and the king. The Athenians, getting wind of this, sent a counter-embassy, consisting of Hermogenes, Dion, Callisthenes, and Callimedon, with Conon himself. They at the same time invited the attendance of ambassadors from the allies, and there were also present representatives of the Boeotians, of Corinth, and of Argos. When they had arrived at their destination, Antalcidas explained to Tiribazus the object of his visit: he wished, if possible, to cement a peace between the state he represented and the king—a peace, moreover, exactly suited to the aspirations of the king himself; in other words, the Lacedaemonians gave up all claim to the Hellenic cities in Asia as against the king, while for their own part they were content that all the islands and other cities should be independent. "Such being our unbiassed wishes," he continued, "for what earthly reason should [the Hellenes or] the king go to war with us? or why should he expend his money? The king is guaranteed against attack on the part

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1 According to Grote (H. G. ix. 471, note 2), this section summarises the Lacedaemonian maritime operations in the Corinthian Gulf from the late autumn of 393 B.C. till the appointment of Teleutias in the spring or early summer of 391 B.C., the year of the expedition of Agesilaus recounted above, Hell. iv. iv. 19, p. 64.

2 See Plut. Ager. xxiii. (Clough, iv. p. 27); and for the date B.C. 392 (al. B.C. 393) see Grote, H. G. ix. 498.
of Hellas, since the Athenians are powerless apart from our hegemony, and we are powerless so long as the separate states are independent." The proposals of Antalcidas sounded very pleasantly in the ears of Tiribazus, but to the opponents of Sparta they were the merest talk. The Athenians were apprehensive of an agreement which provided for the independence of the cities in the islands, whereby they might be deprived of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. The Thebans, again, were afraid of being compelled to let the Boeotian states go free. The Argives did not see how such treaty contracts and covenants were compatible with the realisation of their own great object—the absorption of Corinth by Argos. And so it came to pass that this peace proved abortive, and the representatives departed each to his own home.

Tiribazus, on his side, thought it hardly consistent with his own safety to adopt the cause of the Lacedaemonians without the concurrence of the king—a scruple which did not prevent him from privately presenting Antalcidas with a sum of money, in hopes that when the Athenians and their allies discovered that the Lacedaemonians had the wherewithal to furnish a fleet, they might perhaps be more disposed to desire peace. Further, accepting the statements of the Lacedaemonians as true, he took on himself to secure the person of Conon, as guilty of wrongdoing towards the king, and shut him up. That done, he set off up country to the king to recount the proposals of Lacedaemon, with his own subsequent capture of Conon as a mischievous man, and to ask for further guidance on all these matters.

On the arrival of Tiribazus at the palace, the king sent down Struthas to take charge of the seaboard district. The latter, however, was a strong partisan of Athens and her allies, since he found it impossible to forget the long list of evils which the king's country had suffered at the hands of Agesilaus; so that the Lacedaemonians, contrasting the hostile disposition of the new satrap towards themselves with hisfriendliness to the Athenians, sent Thibron to deal with him by force of arms.

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1 See Andoc. de Pace; Jebb, Attic Or. i. 83, 128 foll. Prof. Jebb assigns this speech to B.C. 390 rather than B.C. 391. See also Grote, H. G. ix. 499; Diod. xiv. 110; above, p. 64, note 5. 2 See Diod. xiv. 85; and Corn. Nep. 5.
B.C. 391.¹—That general crossed over and established his base of operations in Ephesus and the towns in the plain of the Maeander—Priene, Leucophrys, and Achilles—and proceeded to harry the king’s territory, sparing neither live nor dead chattel. But as time went on, Struthas, who could not but note the disorderly, and indeed recklessly scornful manner in which the Lacedaemonian brought up his supports on each occasion, despatched a body of cavalry into the plain. Their orders were to gallop down and scour the plain, making a clean sweep² of all they could lay their hands on. Thibron, as it befell, had just finished breakfast, and was returning from the mess with Thersander the flute-player. The latter was not only a good flute-player, but, as affecting Lacedaemonian manners, laid claim to personal prowess. Struthas, then, seeing the disorderly advance of the supports and the paucity of the vanguard, appeared suddenly at the head of a large body of cavalry, all in orderly array. Thibron and Thersander were the first to be cut down, and when these had fallen the rest of the troops were easily turned. A mere chase ensued, in which man after man was felled to earth, though a remnant contrived to escape into the friendly cities; still larger numbers owed their safety to their late discovery of the business on hand. Nor, indeed, was this the first time the Spartan commander had rushed to the field, without even issuing a general order. So ends the history of these events.

B.C. 390.³—We pass on to the arrival at Lacedaemon of a party of Rhodian exiles expelled by the popular party. They insisted that it was not equitable to allow the Athenians to subjugate Rhodes and thus build up so vast a power. The Lacedaemonians were alive to the fact that the fate of Rhodes depended on which party in the state prevailed: if the democracy were to dominate, the whole island must fall into the hands of Athens; if the wealthier classes,⁴ into their own.

¹ Al. B.C. 392, al. B.C. 390.
² See Hell. VII. i. 40; Cyrop. I. iv. 17; III. iii. 23; Anab. VI. iii. 3.
³ Grote, H. G. ix. 504; al. B.C. 391.
⁴ Or, “the Lacedaemonians were not slow to perceive that the whole island of Rhodes was destined to fall either into the hands of Athens or of themselves, according as the democracy or the wealthier classes respectively dominated.”
Accordingly they fitted out for them a fleet of eight vessels, and put Ecdicus in command of it as admiral.

At the same time they despatched another officer on board these vessels named Diphridas, on a separate mission. His orders were to cross over into Asia and to secure the states which had received Thibron. He was also to pick up the survivors of Thibron's army, and with these troops, aided by a second army which he would collect from any other quarter open to him, he was to prosecute the war against Struthas. Diphridas followed out his instructions, and amongst other achievements was fortunate enough to capture Tigranes,¹ the son-in-law of Struthas, with his wife, on their road to Sardis. The sum paid for their ransom was so large that he at once had the wherewithal to pay his mercenaries. Diphridas was no less attractive than his predecessor Thibron; but he was of a more orderly temperament, steadier, and incomparably more enterprising as a general; the secret of this superiority being that he was a man over whom the pleasures of the body exercised no sway. He became readily absorbed in the business before him—whatever he had to do he did it with a will.

Ecdicus having reached Cnidus, there learned that the democracy in Rhodes were entirely masters of the situation. They were dominant by land and sea; indeed they possessed a fleet twice the size of his own. He was therefore content to keep quiet in Cnidus until the Lacedaemonians, perceiving that his force was too small to allow him to benefit their friends, determined to relieve him. With this view they ordered Teleutias to take the twelve ships which formed his squadron (at present in the gulf adjoining Achaia and Lechaeum),² and to feel his way round to Ecdicus: that officer he was to send home. For himself, he was to undertake personally to protect the interests of all who cared to be their friends, whilst injuring the enemy by every possible means.

So then Teleutias, having reached Samos, where he added some vessels to his fleet, set sail to Cnidus. At this point Ecdicus returned home, and Teleutias, continuing his voyage, reached Rhodes, at the head now of seven-and-twenty vessels. It was during this portion of the voyage that he fell in with

¹ See Anab. VII. viii. 9 (Trans. vol. i. p. 316 foll.) for a similar exploit.
² See above, IV. viii. 11, p. 81.
Philocrates, the son of Ephialtes, who was sailing from Athens to Cyprus with ten triremes, in aid of their ally Evagoras. The whole flotilla fell into the Spartan’s hands—a curious instance, it may be added, of cross purposes on the part of both belligerents. Here were the Athenians, supposed to be on friendly terms with the king, engaged in sending an allied force to support Evagoras, who was at open war with him; and here again was Teleutias, the representative of a people at war with Persia, engaged in crippling a fleet which had been despatched on a mission hostile to their adversary. Teleutias put back into Cnidus to dispose of his captives, and so eventually reached Rhodes, where his arrival brought timely aid to the party in favour of Lacedaemon.

B.C. 389. And now the Athenians, fully impressed with the belief that their rivals were laying the basis of a new naval supremacy, despatched Thrasybulus the Steirian to check them, with a fleet of forty sail. That officer set sail, but abstained from bringing aid to Rhodes, and for good reasons. In Rhodes the Lacedaemonian party had hold of the fortress, and would be out of reach of his attack, especially as Teleutias was close at hand to aid them with his fleet. On the other hand, his own friends ran no danger of succumbing to the enemy, as they held the cities and were numerically much stronger, and they had established their superiority in the field. Consequently he made for the Hellespont, where, in the absence of any rival power, he hoped to achieve some stroke of good fortune for his city. Thus, in the first place, having detected the rivalries existing between Medocus, the king of the Odrysians, and Seuthes, the rival ruler of the seaboard, he reconciled them to each other, and made them friends and allies of Athens; in the belief that if he secured their friendship the Hellenic cities on the Thracian coast would show greater proclivity to Athens. Such being the happy state of affairs not only in Europe but as regards the states in Asia also, thanks to the friendly attitude of the king to his fellow-citizens, he sailed into Byzantium and sold the tithe-duty levied on vessels.

1 See Diod. xiv. 98; Hicks, 72; Köhler, C. I. A. ii. p. 397; Isoc. Evag. 54-57; Paus. i. iii. 1; Lys. de bon. Ar. 20; Dem. p. 161.
2 Grote, H. G. ix. 507.
3 Al. Amedocus.
4 For Seuthes, see above, Hell. III. ii. 2, p. 10, if the same.
arriving from the Euxine. By another stroke he converted the oligarchy of Byzantium into a democracy. The result of this was that the Byzantine demos\(^1\) were no longer sorry to see as vast a concourse of Athenians in their city as possible. Having so done, and having further won the friendship of the men of Calchedon,\(^2\) he set sail south of the Hellespont. Arrived at Lesbos, he found all the cities devoted to Lacedaemon with the exception of Mytilene. He was therefore loth to attack any of the former until he had organised a force within the latter. This force consisted of four hundred hoplites, furnished from his own vessels, and a corps of exiles from the different cities who had sought shelter in Mytilene; to which he added a stout contingent, the pick of the Mytileneian citizens themselves. He stirred the ardour of the several contingents by suitable appeals: representing to the men of Mytilene that by their capture of the cities they would at once become the chiefs and patrons of Lesbos; to the exiles he made it appear that if they would but unite to attack each several city in turn, they might all reckon on their particular restoration; while he needed only to remind his own warriors that the acquisition of Lesbos meant not only the attachment of a friendly city, but the discovery of a mine of wealth. The exhortations ended and the contingents organised, he advanced against Methymna.

Therimachus, who chanced to be the Lacedaemonian governor at the time, on hearing of the meditated attack of Thrasybulus, had taken a body of marines from his vessels, and, aided by the citizens of Methymna themselves, along with all the Mytileneian exiles to be found in that place, advanced to meet the enemy on their borders. A battle was fought and Therimachus was slain, a fate shared by several of the exiles of his party.

As a result\(^3\) of his victory the Athenian general suc-

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1 For the varying fortunes of the democrats at Byzantium in 408 B.C. and 405 B.C., see above, Hell. I. iii. 18; II. ii. 2 (Trans. vol. i. pp. 14, 44); for the present moment, 390-389 B.C., see Demosth. c. Lept. 475; for the admission of Byzantium into the new naval confederacy in 378 B.C., see Hicks, 78; Köhler, C. I. A. ii. 19; and for B.C. 363, Isocr. Phil. 53; Diod. xv. 79; and for its commercial prosperity, Polyb. iv. 38-47.

2 For the spelling of the name, see Trans. vol. i. p. 4.

3 According to some critics, B.C. 389 is only now reached.
ceed in winning the adhesion of some of the states; or, where adhesion was refused, he could at least raise supplies for his soldiers by freebooting expeditions, and so hastened to reach his goal, which was the island of Rhodes. His chief concern was to support as powerful an army as possible in those parts, and with this object he proceeded to levy money aids, visiting various cities, till he finally reached Aspendus, and came to moorings in the river Eurymedon. The money was safely collected from the Aspendians, and the work completed, when, taking occasion of some depredations of the soldiers on the farmsteads, the people of the place in a fit of irritation burst into the general's quarters at night and butchered him in his tent.

So perished Thrasybulus, a good and great man by all admission. In room of him the Athenians chose Agyrrhius, who was despatched to take command of the fleet. And now the Lacedaemonians—alive to the fact that the sale of the Euxine tithe-dues had been negotiated in Byzantium by Athens; aware also that as long as the Athenians kept hold on Calchedon the loyalty of the other Hellespontine cities was secured to them (at any rate while Pharnabazus remained their friend)—felt that the state of affairs demanded their serious attention. They attached no blame indeed to Dercylidas. Anaxibius, however, through the friendship of the ephors, contrived to get himself appointed as governor, on a mission to Abydos. With the requisite funds and ships, he promised to exert such hostile pressure upon Athens that at least her prospects in the Hellespont would cease to be so sunny. His friends the ephors granted him in return for these promises three ships of war and funds to support a thousand mercenaries, and so they despatched him on his mission. Reaching Abydos, he set about improving his naval and military position. First he collected a foreign brigade, by

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1 See Diod. xiv. 94.

2 "Thus perished the citizen to whom, more than to any one else, Athens owed not only her renovated democracy, but its wise, generous, and harmonious working, after renovation."—Grote, H. G. ix. 509.

3 For this statesman, see Demosth. c. Timocr. 742; Andoc. de Myst. 133; Aristot. Ath. Pol. 41, and Mr. Kenyon's note ad loc.; Aristoph. Eccles. 102, and the Schol. ad loc.; Diod. xiv. 99; Curtius, H. G. Eng. tr. iv. 280.

4 For his prior history, see reference, Trans. vol. i. Index s. n., if the same.
help of which he drew off some of the Aeolid cities from Pharnabazus. Next he set on foot a series of retaliatory expeditions against the states which attacked Abydos, marching upon them and ravaging their territories; and lastly, manning three vessels besides those which he already held in the harbour of Abydos, he intercepted and brought into port all the merchant ships of Athens or of her allies which he could lay hands on.

Getting wind of these proceedings, the Athenians, fearing lest the fair foundations laid for them by Thrasybulus in the Hellespont should be ruined, sent out Iphicrates with eight vessels and twelve hundred peltasts. The majority of them\(^1\) consisted of troops which he had commanded at Corinth. In explanation it may be stated that the Argives, when once they had appropriated Corinth and incorporated it with Argos, gave out they had no further need of Iphicrates or his troops; the real fact being that he had put to death some of the partisans of Argos.\(^2\) And so it was he turned his back on Corinth and found himself at home in Athens at the present crisis.

B.C. 389-388.—When Iphicrates first reached the Chersonese he and Anaxibius carried on war against each other by the despatch of guerilla or piratic bands across the straits. But as time wore on, information reached him of the departure of Anaxibius to Antandrus, accompanied by his mercenaries and his own bodyguard of Laconians and two hundred Abydenian hoplites. Hearing further that Anaxibius had won the friendly adhesion of Antandrus, Iphicrates conjectured that after establishing a garrison in that place he would make the best of his way back, if only to bring the Abydenians home again. He therefore crossed in the night, selecting a desert point on the Abydene coast, from which he scaled the hills above the town and planted himself in ambuscade within their folds. The triremes which brought him across had orders at break of day to coast up northwards along the Chersonese, which would suggest the notion that he was only out on one of his customary voyages to collect money. The sequel

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\(^1\) Or, ‘‘The mass of them.’’

\(^2\) See Grote, *H. G.* ix. p. 491 note. The ‘‘Argolising’’ or philo-Argelian party, as opposed to the philo-Laconian party. See above, *Hell.* IV. iv. 6, p. 60.
more than fulfilled his expectations. Anaxibius began his return march, and if report speaks truly, he did so notwithstanding that the victims were against his marching that day; contempituously disregarding the warning, and satisfied that his march lay all along through a friendly country and was directed to a friendly city. Besides which, those whom he met assured him that Iphicrates was off on a voyage to Proconnesus: hence the unusual absence of precaution on the march. On his side Iphicrates saw the chance, but, so long as the troops of Anaxibius lingered on the level bottoms, refused to spring from his lair, waiting for the moment when the Abydenian division in the van was safely landed in the plain of Cremastè, at the point where the gold mines stand; the main column following on the downward slope, and Anaxibius with his Laconians just beginning the descent. At that instant Iphicrates set his ambuscade in motion, and dashed against the Spartan at full speed. The latter quickly discerned that there was no hope of escape as he scanned the long straggling line of his attenuated column. The troops in advance, he was persuaded, would never be able to come back to his aid up the face of that acclivity; besides which, he observed the utter bewilderment of the whole body at sight of the ambuscade. He therefore turned to those next him, and spoke as follows: "Sirs, it is good for me to die on this spot, where honour bids me; but for you, sirs, yonder your path lies, haste and save yourselves 1 before the enemy can close with us." As the words died on his lips he took from the hands of his attendant shield-bearer his heavy shield, and there, at his post, unflinchingly fought and fell; not quite alone, for by his side faithfully lingered a favourite youth, and of the Lacedaemonian governors who had rallied to Abydos from their several cities yet other twelve fought and fell beside the pair. The rest fled, dropping down one by one as the army pursued them to the walls of the city. The death-roll amounted to something like fifty hoplites of the Abydenians, and of the rest two hundred. After this exploit Iphicrates returned to the Chersonese. 2

1 Or, "sauve qui peut." 2 See Hicks, 76; and below, Hell. V. i. 31, p. 98.
BOOK V. i. 1–3.

1. B.C. 388.—Such was the state of affairs in the Hellespont, so far at least as Athens and Sparta are concerned. Eteonicus was once more in Aegina; and notwithstanding that the Aeginetans and Athenians had up to this time held commercial intercourse, yet now that the war was plainly to be fought out on the sea, that officer, with the concurrence of the ephorate, gave permission to any one who liked to plunder Attica. The Athenians retaliated by despatching a body of hoplites under their general Pamphilus, who constructed a fort against the Aeginetans, and proceeded to blockade them by land and sea with ten warships. Teleutias, however, while threading his way among the islands in quest of contributions, had chanced to reach a point where he received information of the turn in affairs with regard to the construction of the fortress, whereupon he came to the rescue of the beleaguered Aeginetans, and so far succeeded that he drove off the enemy’s blockading squadron. But Pamphilus kept a firm hold on the offensive fortress, and was not to be dislodged.

After this the new admiral Hierax arrived from Lacedaemon. The naval force was transferred into his successor’s hands, and under the happiest auspices Teleutias set sail for home. As he descended to the seashore to start on his home-ward voyage there was not one among his soldiers who had not a warm shake of the hand for their old admiral. Here one presented him with a crown, and there another with a

1 Or, “determined to let slip the hounds of war;” or, more prosaically, “issued letters of marque.” See Grote, H. G. ix. 517.
2 i.e. in Aegina as an ἐπιτείχισμα.
victor's wreath; and those who arrived too late, still, as the ship weighed anchor, threw garlands into the sea and wafted him many a blessing with prayerful lips. I am well aware that in the above incident I have no memorable story of munificence, peril, or invention to narrate, but in all sincerity I protest that a man may find food for reflection in the inquiry what Teleutias had done to create such a disposition in his subordinates. Here we are brought face to face with a true man's work more worthy of account than multitudes of riches or adventure.  

The new admiral Hierax, taking with him the larger portion of the fleet, set sail once more for Rhodes. He left behind him twelve vessels in Aegina under his vice-admiral Gorgopas, who was now installed as governor of that island. In consequence of this change the Athenian troops inside the fortress were more blockaded than the Aeginetans themselves, so much so that a vote was passed by the Athenian assembly, in obedience to which a large fleet was manned, and the garrison, after four months' sojourn in Aegina, were brought back. But this was no sooner done than they began to be harassed by Gorgopas and the privateers again. To operate against these they fitted out thirteen vessels, choosing Eunomus as admiral in command. Hierax was still at Rhodes when the Lacedaemonians sent out a new admiral, Antalcidas; they believed that they could not find a better mode of gratifying Tiribazus. Accordingly Antalcidas, after visiting Aegina in order to pick up the vessels under Gorgopas, set sail for Ephesus. At this point he sent back Gorgopas with his twelve ships to Aegina, and appointed his vice-admiral Nicolochus to command the remainder of the fleet.

Nicolochus was to relieve Abydos, and thither set sail; but in the course of the voyage turned aside to Tenedos, where he ravaged the territory, and, with the money so secured, sailed on to Abydos. The Athenian generals on their side, collecting from Samothrace, Thasos, and the fort-
resses in that quarter, hastened to the relief of Tenedos; but, finding that Nicolochus had continued his voyage to Abydos, they selected the Chersonese as their base, and proceeded to blockade him and his fleet of five-and-twenty vessels with the two-and-thirty vessels under their joint command.

Meanwhile Gorgopas, returning from Ephesus, fell in with the Athenian admiral Eunomus, and, shunning an encounter at the moment, sought shelter in Aegina, which he reached a little before sunset; and at once disembarking his men, set them down to their evening meal; whilst Eunomus on his side, after hanging back for a little while, sailed away. Night fell, and the Athenian, showing the customary signal light to prevent his squadron straggling, led the way in the darkness. Gorgopas instantly got his men on board again, and, taking the lantern for his guide, followed the Athenians, craftily lagging behind a little space, so as not to show himself or raise any suspicion of his presence. In place of the usual cry the boatswains timed the rowers by a clink of stones, and silently the oars slid, feathering through the waves; and just when the squadron of Eunomus was touching the coast, off Cape Zoster in Attica, the Spartan sounded the bugle-note for the charge. Some of Eunomus's vessels were in the act of discharging their crews, others were still getting to their moorings, whilst others were as yet only bearing down to land. The engagement was fought by the light of the moon, and Gorgopas captured four triremes, which he tied astern, and so set sail with his prizes in tow towards Aegina. The rest of the Athenian squadron made their escape into the harbour of Piraeus.

It was after these events that Chabrias commenced his voyage to Cyprus, bringing relief to Evagoras. His force consisted at first of eight hundred light troops and ten triremes, but was further increased by other vessels from Athens and a body of heavy infantry. Thus reinforced, the admiral chose a night and landed in Aegina; and secreted himself in

1 Lit. "the boatswains employing a clink of stones and a sliding motion of the oars."
3 According to Diod. xiv. 92, Chabrias had been for some time in Corinth. See also above, IV. viii. 24, p. 85, note r.
ambuscade with his light troops in hollow ground some way beyond the temple of Heracles. At break of day, as prearranged, the Athenian hoplites made their appearance under command of Demaenetus, and began mounting up between two and three miles\(^1\) beyond the Herakleion at Tripurgia, as it is called. The news soon reached Gorgopas, who sallied out to the rescue with the Aeginetans and the marines of his vessels, being further accompanied by eight Spartans who happened to be with him. Not content with these he issued orders inviting any of the ships’ crews, who were free men, to join the relief party. A large number of these sailors responded. They armed themselves as best they could, and the advance commenced. When the vanguard were well past the ambuscade, Chabrias and his men sprang up from their hiding-place, and poured a volley of javelins and stones upon the enemy. At the same moment the hoplites, who had disembarked,\(^2\) were advancing, so that the Spartan vanguard, in the absence of anything like collective action, were speedily cut down, and among them fell Gorgopas with the Lacedaemonians. At their fall the rest of course turned and fled. One hundred and fifty Aeginetans were numbered among the slain, while the loss incurred by the foreigners,metics, and sailors who had joined the relief party, reached a total of two hundred. After this the Athenians sailed the sea as freely as in the times of actual peace. Nor would anything induce the sailors to row a single stroke for Eteonicus—even under pressure—since he had no pay to give.

Subsequently the Lacedaemonians despatched Teleutias once again to take command of the squadron, and when the sailors saw it was he who had come, they were overjoyed. He summoned a meeting and addressed them thus: “Soldiers, I am back again, but I bring with me no money. Yet if God be willing, and your zeal flag not, I will endeavour to supply you with provisions without stint. Be well assured, as often as I find myself in command of you, I have but one prayer—that your lives may be spared no less than mine; and as for the necessaries of existence, perhaps it would astonish

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\(^1\) Lit. “about sixteen stades.”

you if I said that I would rather you should have them than I. Yet by the gods I swear I would welcome two days' starvation in order to spare you one. Was not my door open in old days to every comer? Open again it shall stand now; and so it shall be: when your own board overflows, you shall look in and mark the luxury of your general; but if at other times you see him bearing up against cold and heat and sleepless nights, you must apply the lesson to yourselves and study to endure those evils. I do not bid you do aught of this for self-mortification's sake, but that you may derive some after-blessing from it. Soldiers, let Lacedaemon, our own mother-city, be to you an example. Her good fortune is reputed to stand high. That you know; and you know too, that she purchased her glory and her greatness not by faint-heartedness, but by choosing to suffer pain and incur dangers in the day of need. 'Like city,' I say, 'like citizens.' You, too, as I can bear you witness, have been in times past brave; but to-day must we strive to be better than ourselves. So shall we share our pains without repining, and when fortune smiles, mingle our joys; for indeed the sweetest thing of all surely is to flatter no man, Hellene or Barbarian, for the sake of hire; we will suffice to ourselves, and from a source to which honour pre-eminent invites us; since, I need not remind you, abundance won from the enemy in war furnishes forth not bodily nutriment only, but a feast of glory the wide world over."

So he spoke, and with one voice they all shouted to him to issue what orders he thought fit; they would not fail him in willing service. The general’s sacrifice was just concluded, and he answered: "Good, then, my men; go now, as doubtless you were minded, and take your evening meal, and next provide yourselves, please, with one day’s food. After that repair to your ships without delay, for we have a voyage on hand, whither God wills, and must arrive in time." So then, when the men returned, he embarked them on their ships, and sailed under cover of night for the great harbour of Piraeus: at one time he gave the rowers rest, passing the order to take a snatch of sleep; at another he pushed forward towards his goal with rise and fall of oars. If any one supposes that there was a touch of madness in such an expedition—with but twelve triremes to attack an enemy possessed of a
large fleet—he should consider the calculations of Teleutias. He was under the firm persuasion that the Athenians were more careless than ever about their navy in the harbour since the death of Gorgopas; and in case of finding warships riding at anchor—even so, there was less danger, he conjectured, in attacking twenty ships in the port of Athens than ten elsewhere; for, whereas, anywhere outside the harbour the sailors would certainly be quartered on board, at Athens it was easy to divine that the captains and officers would be sleeping at their homes, and the crews located here and there in different quarters.

Thus minded he set sail, and when he was five or six furlongs\(^1\) distant from the harbour he lay on his oars and rested. But with the first streak of dawn he led the way, the rest following. The admiral’s orders to the crews were explicit. They were on no account to sink any merchant vessel; they were equally to avoid damaging\(^2\) their own vessels, but if at any point they espied a warship at her moorings they must try and cripple her. The trading vessels, provided they had got their cargoes on board, they must seize and tow out of the harbour; those of larger tonnage they were to board wherever they could and capture the crews. Some of his men actually jumped on to the Deigma quay,\(^3\) where they seized hold of various traders and pilots and deposited them bodily on board ship. So the Spartan admiral carried out his programme.

As to the Athenians, meanwhile, some of them who got wind of what was happening rushed from indoors outside to see what the commotion meant, others from the streets home to get their arms, and others again were off to the city with the news. The whole of Athens rallied to the rescue at that instant, heavy infantry and cavalry alike, the apprehension being that Piraeus was taken. But the Spartan sent off the captured vessels to Aegina, telling off three or four of his triremes to convoy them thither; with the rest he followed along the coast of Attica, and emerging in seemingly innocent fashion from the harbour, captured a number of fishing

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\(^1\) Lit. "five or six stades."


\(^3\) See Map, Trans. vol. i. p. 76; Grote (H. G. ix. 523): cf. Thuc. ii. 94, the attempt of Brasidas on the port of Megara. For the wealth of Piraeus, Grote, H. G. ix. 531. See below, Pol. Ath. i. 17; Rev. iii. 13 (pp. 281, 334).
smacks, and passage boats laden with passengers crossing to Piraeus from the islands; and finally, on reaching Sunium he captured some merchantmen laden with corn or other merchandise. After these performances he sailed back to Aegina, where he sold his prizes, and with the proceeds was able to provide his troops with a month's pay, and for the future was free to cruise about and make what reprisals chance cast in his way. By such procedure he was able to support a full quota of mariners on board his squadron, and procured to himself the prompt and enthusiastic service of his troops.

B.C. 388-387.—Antalcidas had now returned from the Persian court with Tiribazus. The negotiations had been successful. He had secured the alliance of the Persian king and his military co-operation in case the Athenians and their allies refused to abide by the peace which the king dictated. But learning that his second in command, Nicolothus, was being blockaded with his fleet by Iphicrates and Diotimus in Abydos, he set off at once by land for that city. Being come thither he took the fleet one night and put out to sea, having first spread a story that he had invitations from a party in Calchedon; but as a matter of fact he came to anchorage in Percotè and there kept quiet. Meanwhile the Athenian forces under Demaenetus and Dionysius and Leontichus and Phanias had got wind of his movement, and were in hot pursuit towards Proconnesus. As soon as they were well past, the Spartan veered round and returned to Abydos, trusting to information brought him of the approach of Polyxenus with the Syracusan and Italian squadron of twenty ships, which he wished to pick up and incorporate with his own.

A little later the Athenian Thrasybulus (of Collytus) was making his way up with eight ships from Thrace, his object being to effect a junction with the main Athenian squadron. The scouts signalled the approach of eight triremes, whereupon Antalcidas, embarking his marines on board twelve of the fastest sailers of his fleet, ordered them to make up their full complements, where defective, from the remaining

1 See above, p. 91; Lysias, de bom. Arist. (Jebb, Att. Or. i. p. 237).
2 See below, VI. ii. 4 foll., p. 144; Hicks, 71, 84, 88.
3 His name occurs on the famous stele of the new Athenian confederacy, B.C. 378. See Hicks, 81; Köhler, C. I. A. ii. 17; Demos. de Cor. p. 301; Arist. Rhét. ii. 23; Demos. c. Timocr. 742.
vessels; and so lay to, skulking in his lair with all possible secrecy. As soon as the enemy's vessels came sailing past he gave chase; and they catching sight of him took to flight. With his swiftest sailors he speedily overhauled their laggards, and ordering his vanguard to let these alone, he followed hard on those ahead. But when the foremost had fallen into his clutches, the enemy's hinder vessels, seeing their leaders taken one by one, out of sheer despondency fell an easy prey to the slower sailors of the foe, so that not one of the eight vessels escaped.

Presently the Syracusan squadron of twenty vessels joined him, and again another squadron from Ionia, or rather so much of that district as lay under the control of Tiribazus. The full quota of the contingent was further made up from the territory of Ariobarzanes (with whom Antalcidas kept up a friendship of long standing), in the absence of Pharmabazus, who by this date had already been summoned up country on the occasion of his marriage with the king's daughter. With this fleet, which, from whatever sources derived, amounted to more than eighty sail, Antalcidas ruled the seas, and was in a position not only to cut off the passage of vessels bound to Athens from the Euxine, but to convoy them into the harbours of Sparta's allies.

The Athenians could not but watch with alarm the growth of the enemy's fleet, and began to fear a repetition of their former discomfiture. To be trampled under foot by the hostile power seemed indeed no remote possibility, now that the Lacedaemonians had procured an ally in the person of the Persian monarch, and they were in little less than a state of siege themselves, pestered as they were by privateers from Aegina. On all these grounds the Athenians became passionately desirous of peace. The Lacedaemonians were equally out of humour with the war for various reasons—what with their garrison duties, one mora at Lechaeum and another at Orchomenus, and the necessity of keeping watch and ward on the states, if loyal not to lose them, if disaffected to prevent their revolt; not to mention that reciprocity of annoyance of which Corinth was the centre. So again the Argives had a strong appetite for peace; they

1 See, at this point, Grote on the financial condition of Athens and the Thêorikon, H. G. ix. 525.  
2 Or, "that give-and-take of hard knocks."
knew that the ban had been called out against them, and, it was plain, that no fictitious alteration of the calendar would any longer stand them in good stead. Hence, when Tiribazus issued a summons calling on all who were willing to listen to the terms of peace sent down by the king to present themselves, the invitation was promptly accepted. At the opening of the conclave Tiribazus pointed to the king’s seal attached to the document, and proceeded to read the contents, which ran as follows:

“The king, Artaxerxes, deems it just that the cities in Asia, with the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, should belong to himself; the rest of the Hellenic cities he thinks it just to leave independent, both small and great, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which three are to belong to Athens as of yore. Should any of the parties concerned not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, will war against him or them with those who share my views. This will I do by land and by sea, with ships and with money.”

After listening to the above declaration the ambassadors from the several states proceeded to report the same to their respective governments. One and all of these took the oaths to ratify and confirm the terms unreservedly, with the exception of the Thebans, who claimed to take the oaths in behalf of all Boeotians. This claim Agesilaus repudiated: unless they chose to take the oaths in precise conformity with the words of the king’s edict, which insisted on “the future autonomy of each state, small or great,” he would not admit them. To this the Theban ambassadors made no other reply, except that the instructions they had received were different. “Pray go, then,” Agesilaus retorted, “and ask the question; and you may inform your countrymen that if they will not comply, they will be excluded from the treaty.” The Theban ambassadors departed, but Agesilaus, out of hatred to the Thebans, took active measures at once. Having got the consent of the ephors he forthwith offered sacrifice. The offerings for crossing the frontier were propitious, and he pushed on to Tegea. From Tegea he despatched some of the knights right and left to visit the perioeci and hasten

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1 See Hicks, 76.  
2 At Sardis, doubtless.  
3 At Sparta, doubtless.
their mobilisation, and at the same time sent commanders of foreign brigades to the allied cities on a similar errand. But before he had started from Tegea the answer from Thebes arrived; the point was yielded, they would suffer the states to be independent. Under these circumstances the Lacedaemonians returned home, and the Thebans were forced to accept the truce unconditionally, and to recognise the autonomy of the Boeotian cities. But now the Corinthians were by no means disposed to part with the garrison of the Argives. Accordingly Agesilans had a word of warning for both. To the former he said, “if they did not forthwith dismiss the Argives,” and to the latter, “if they did not instantly quit Corinth,” he would march an army into their territories. The terror of both was so great that the Argives marched out of Corinth, and Corinth was once again left to herself; and their accomplices in the deed of blood determined to retire from Corinth, and the rest of the citizens welcomed back their late exiles voluntarily.

Now that the transactions were complete, and the states were bound by their oaths to abide by the peace sent down to them by the king, the immediate result was a general disarmament, military and naval forces being alike disbanded; and so it was that the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, with their allies, found themselves in the enjoyment of peace for the first time since the period of hostilities subsequent to the demolition of the walls of Athens. From a condition which, during the war, can only be described as a sort of even balance with their antagonists, the Lacedaemonians now emerged; and reached a pinnacle of glory consequent upon the Peace of Antalcidas, so called. As guarantors of the peace presented to Hellas by the king, and as administrators personally of the autonomy of the states, they had added Corinth to their alliance; they had obtained the independence

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1 See Freeman, op. cit. pp. 168, 169.
2 See Ages. ii. 21, p. 251; Grote, H. G. ix. 537.
3 οἱ σφαγεῖς, a party catchword (in reference to the incidents narrated above, Hell. IV. iv. 2). See below, τῶν βαρέων δημαρχοῦ, Hell. V. ii. 7; οἱ κυδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου, Hell. VII. v. 1, pp. 102, 225; above, οἱ σφαγεῖς, Hell. III. ii. 27, p. 18, of the philo-Laconian oligarchs in Elis. See Dem. c. Lept. 473.
4 Or, more correctly, the peace “under,” or “at the date of,” επ’ Ἄνταλκιδοῦ. See Grote, H. G. x. 1, note 1.
of the states of Boeotia at the expense of Thebes,\(^1\) which meant
the gratification of an old ambition; and lastly, by calling out
the ban in case the Argives refused to evacuate Corinth, they
had put a stop to the appropriation of that city by the Argives.

\(^{\text{II. B.C. 386.—}}\) Indeed the late events had so entirely shaped
themselves in conformity with the wishes of the Lacedaemon-
ians, that they determined to go a step farther and chastise
those of their allies who either had borne hard on them during
the war, or otherwise had shown themselves less favourable to
Lacedaemon than to her enemies.\(^2\) Chastisement was not all;
they must lay down such secure foundations for the future as
should render the like disloyalty impossible again.\(^3\) As the first
step towards this policy they sent a dictatorial message to the
Mantineans, and bade them raze their fortifications, on the sole
ground that they could not otherwise trust them not to side with
their enemies. Many things in their conduct, they alleged,
from time to time, had not escaped their notice: their frequent
despatches of corn to the Argives while at war with Lacedae-
mon; at other times their refusal to furnish contingents during
a campaign, on the pretext of some holy truce or other;\(^4\) or if
they did reluctantly take the field—the miserable inefficiency
of their service. "But, more than that," they added, "we note
the jealousy with which you eye any good fortune which may
betide our state; the extravagant pleasure\(^5\) you exhibit at the
sudden descent of some disaster."

This very year, moreover, it was commonly said,\(^6\) saw

\(^1\) Or, "they had made the states of Boeotia independent of Thebes."
See Grote, \textit{H. G.} x. 44.


\(^3\) Or, "they determined to chastise . . . and reduce to such order that
disloyalty should be impossible."

\(^4\) See above, \textit{Hill. IV.} ii. 16, p. 50.

\(^5\) \textit{Ib. IV.} v. 18, p. 70.

\(^6\) As to this point, see Curtius, \textit{H. G.}, V. v. (iv. 305 note, Eng. trans.).
There appears to be some confusion. According to Thuc. v. 81, "When
the Argives deserted the alliance [with Mantinea, Athens, and Elis, making
a new treaty of alliance with Lacedaemon for fifty years] the Mantine-
ians held out for a time, but without the Argives they were helpless, and
so they came to terms with the Lacedaemonians, and gave up their claims
to supremacy over the cities in Arcadia, which had been subject to them.
. . . These changes were effected at the close of winter [418 B.C.] towards
the approach of spring [417 B.C.], and so ended the fourteenth year of the
war."—Jowett. According to Diod. xv. 5, the Lacedaemonians attacked
Mantinea within two years after the Peace of Antalcidas, apparently in 386 B.C.

the expiration, as far as the Mantineans were concerned, of the thirty years’ truce, consequent upon the battle of Mantinea. On their refusal, therefore, to raze their fortification walls the ban was called out against them. Agesilaus begged the state to absolve him from the conduct of this war on the plea that the city of Mantinea had done frequent service to his father 1 in his Messenian wars. Accordingly Agesipolis led the expedition—in spite of the cordial relations of his father Pausanias 2 with the leaders of the popular party in Mantinea.

B.C. 385.—The first move of the invader was to subject the enemy’s territory to devastation; but failing by such means to induce them to raze their walls, he proceeded to draw lines of circumvallation round the city, keeping half his troops under arms to screen the entrenching parties whilst the other half pushed on the work with the spade. As soon as the trench was completed, he experienced no further difficulty in building a wall round the city. Aware, however, of the existence of a large supply of corn inside the town, the result of the bountiful harvest of the preceding year, and averse to the notion of wearing out the city of Lacedaemon and her allies by tedious campaigning, he hit upon the expedient of damming up the river which flowed through the town.

It was a stream of no inconsiderable size. 3 By erecting a barrier at its exit from the town he caused the water to rise above the basements of the private dwellings and the foundations of the fortification walls. Then, as the lower layers of bricks became saturated and refused their support to the rows above, the wall began to crack and soon to totter to its fall. The citizens for some time tried to prop it with pieces of timber, and used other devices to avert the imminent ruin of their tower; but finding themselves overmatched by the water, and in dread lest the fall at some point or other of the circular wall 4 might deliver them captive to the

According to Thuc. v. 82, and C. I. A. 50, in B.C. 417 Argos had reverted to her alliance with Athens, and an attempt to connect the city with the sea by long walls was made, “certain other states in Peloponnese being privy to the project” (Thuc. v. 83)—an attempt frustrated by Lacedaemon early in B.C. 416. Is it possible that a treaty of alliance between Mantinea and Lacedaemon for thirty years was formally signed in B.C. 416?

1 I.e. Archidamus.
2 See above, Hell. III. v. 25, p. 39.
3 I.e. the Ophis. See Leake, Morea, III. xxiv. p. 71; Pausan. Arcad. 8; Grote, H. G. x. 48, note 2.
4 Or “in the circuit of the wall.”
spear of the enemy, they signified their consent to raze their walls. But the Lacedaemonians now steadily refused any form of truce, except on the further condition that the Mantineans would suffer themselves to be broken up and distributed into villages. They, looking the necessity in the face, consented to do even that. The sympathisers with Argos among them, and the leaders of their democracy, thought that their fate was sealed. Then the father treated with the son, Pausanias with Agesipolis, in their behalf, and obtained immunity for them—sixty in number—on condition that they should quit the city. The Lacedaemonian troops stood lining the road on both sides, beginning from the gates, and watched the outgoers; and with their spears in their hands, in spite of bitter hatred, kept aloof from them with less difficulty than the Mantineans of the better classés themselves—a weighty testimony to the power of Spartan discipline, be it said. In conclusion, the wall was razed, and Mantinea split up into four parts, assuming once again its primitive condition as regards inhabitants. The first feeling was one of annoyance at the necessity of pulling down their present houses and building others, yet when the owners found themselves located so much nearer their estates round about the villages, in the full enjoyment of aristocracy, and rid for ever of "those troublesome demagogues," they were delighted with the turn which affairs had taken. It became the custom for Sparta to send them, not one commander of contingents, but four, one for each village; and the zeal displayed, now that the quotas for military service were furnished from the several village centres, was far greater than it had been under the democratic system. So the transactions in connection with Mantinea were brought to a conclusion, and thereby one lesson of wisdom was taught mankind—not to conduct a river though a fortress town.

b.c. 384-383.—To pass on. The party in exile from Phlius,

1 See Diod. xv. 5; Strab. viii. 337; Ephor. fr. 138, ed. Did.; and Grote, H. G. x. 51.
2 Or, "holders of properties." The historian is referring not to the population at large, I think, but to the rich landowners, i.e. the Βέλτιστοι, and is not so partial as Grote supposes (H. G. x. 51 foll.).
3 Technically κεναγοί, Lacedaemonian officers who commanded the contingents of the several allies. See above, Hell. III. v. 7, p. 34; Thuc. ii. 76; and Arnold's note ad loc.; also C. R. Kennedy, ap. Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities, s.v.; Müller, Dories, ii. 250, Eng. tr.; Busolt, Die Lak. p. 125.
seeing the severe scrutiny to which the behaviour of the allies of Lacedaemon during the late war was being subjected, felt that their opportunity had come. They repaired to Lacedaemon, and laid great emphasis on the fact that, so long as they had been in power themselves at home, "their city used to welcome Lacedaemonians within her walls, and her citizens flocked to the campaign under their leadership; but no sooner had they been driven into exile than a change had come. The men of Phlius now flatly refused to follow Lacedaemon anywhere; the Lacedaemonians, alone of all men living, must not be admitted within their gates." After listening to their story the ephors agreed that the matter demanded attention. Then they sent to the state of Phlius a message to this effect: the Phliasian exiles were friends of Lacedaemon; nor did it appear that they owed their exile to any misdoing. Under the circumstances, Lacedaemon claimed their recall from banishment, not by force, but as a concession voluntarily granted. When the matter was thus stated, the Phliasians were not without alarm that an army might march upon Phlius, and a party inside the town might admit the enemy within the walls; for within the walls of Phlius were to be found many who, either as blood relations or for other reasons, were partisans of the exiles, and as so often happens, at any rate in the majority of states, there was a revolutionary party who, in their ardour for reform, would welcome gladly their restoration. Owing to fears of this character, a formal decree was passed: to welcome home the exiles, and to restore to them all undisputed property, the purchasers of the same being indemnified from the treasury of the state; and in the event of any ambiguity or question arising between the parties, the same to be determined before a court of justice. Such was the position of affairs in connection with the Phliasian exiles at the date in question.

B.c. 383.—And now from yet another quarter ambassadors arrived at Lacedaemon: that is to say, from Acanthus and Apollonia, the two largest and most important states of the Olynthian confederacy. The ephorate, after learning from them the object of their visit, presented them to the assembly and the allies, in presence of whom Cleigenes of Acanthus made a speech to this effect:

1 *A.L.* B.C. 382.
"Men of Lacedaemon and of the allied states," he said, "are you aware of a silent but portentous growth within the bosom of Hellas?\(^1\) Few here need to be told that for size and importance Olynthus now stands at the head of the Thracian cities. But are you aware that the citizens of Olynthus have already brought over several states, by the bribe of joint citizenship and common laws; that they have forcibly annexed some of the larger states; and that, so encouraged, they have taken in hand further to free the cities of Macedonia from Amyntas the king of the Macedonians; that, as soon as their immediate neighbours had shown compliance, they at once proceeded to attack larger and more distant communities; so much so, that when we started to come hither, we left them masters not only of many other places, but of Pella itself, the capital of Macedonia. Amyntas,\(^2\) we saw plainly, must ere long withdraw from his cities, and was in fact already all but in name an outcast from Macedonia.

"The Olynthians have actually sent to ourselves and to the men of Apollonia a joint embassy, warning us of their intention to attack us if we refuse to present ourselves at Olynthus with a military contingent. Now, for our parts, men of Lacedaemon, we desire nothing better than to abide by our ancestral laws and institutions, to be free and independent citizens; but if aid from without is going to fail us, we too must follow the rest and coalesce with the Olynthians. Why, even now they muster no less than eight hundred\(^3\) heavy infantry and a considerably larger body of light infantry, while their cavalry, when we have joined them, will exceed one thousand men. At the date of our departure we left embassies from Athens and Boeotia in Olynthus, and we were told that the Olynthians themselves had passed a formal resolution to return the compliment. They were to send an embassy on their side to the aforesaid states to treat of an alliance. And yet, if the power of the Athenians and the Thebans is to be further increased by such an accession of strength, look to it," the

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1. Or, "are you aware of a new power growing up in Hellas?"
2. For Amyntas's reign, see Diod. xiv. 89, 92; xv. 19; Isocr. Panegyr. 126, Archid. 46; note below, p. 105.
3. See Grote, H. G. x. 72; Thirlwall, H. G. v. 12 (ch. xxxvii.).
Acadian Envoy at Sparta

speaker added, "whether hereafter you will find things so easy to manage in that quarter.

"They hold Potidaea, the key to the isthmus of Pallene, and therefore, you can well believe, they can command the states within that peninsula. If you want any further proof of the abject terror of those states, you have it in the fact that notwithstanding the bitter hatred which they bear to Olynthus, not one of them has dared to send ambassadors along with us to apprise you of these matters.

"Reflect, how you can reconcile your anxiety to prevent the unification of Boeotia with your neglect to hinder the solidifying of a far larger power—a power destined, moreover, to become formidable not on land only, but by sea? For what is to stop it, when the soil itself supplies timber for shipbuilding, and there are rich revenues derived from numerous harbours and commercial centres?—it cannot but be that abundance of food and abundance of population will go hand in hand. Nor have we yet reached the limits of Olynthian expansion; there are their neighbours to be thought of—the kingless or independent Thracians. These are already to-day the devoted servants of Olynthus, and when it comes to their being actually under her, that means at once another vast accession of strength to her. With the Thracians in her train, the gold mines of Pangaeus will stretch out to her the hand of welcome.

"In making these assertions, we are but uttering remarks ten thousand times repeated in the democracy of Olynthus. And as to their confident spirit, who shall attempt to describe it? It is God, for aught I know, who, with the growth of a new capacity, gives increase also to the proud thoughts and vast designs of humanity. For ourselves, men of Lacedaemon and of the allied states, our task is completed. We have played our parts in announcing to you how things stand there. To you it is left to determine whether

1 See Hicks, 74, for a treaty between Amyntas and the Chalcidians, B.C. 390-389: "The article of the treaty between Amyntas III., father of Philip, and the Chalcidians, about timber, etc., reminds us that South Macedonia, the Chalcidic peninsula, and Amphipolis were the chief sources whence Athens derived timber for her dockyards." Thuc. iv. 108; Diod. xx. 46; Boeckh, P. E. A. p. 250; and for a treaty between Athens and Amyntas, B.C. 382, see Hicks, 77; Köhler, C. I. A. ii. 397, 423.
what we have described is worthy of your concern. One only thing further you ought to recognise: the power we have spoken of as great is not as yet invincible, for those states which are involuntary participators in the citizenship of Olynthus will, in prospect of any rival power appearing in the field, speedily fall away. On the contrary, let them be once closely knit and welded together by the privileges of intermarriage and reciprocal rights of holding property in land—which have already become enactments; let them discover that it is a gain to them to follow in the wake of conquerors (just as the Arcadians,1 for instance, find it profitable to march in your ranks, whereby they save their own property and pil-lage their neighbours); let these things come to pass, and perhaps you may find the knot no longer so easy to unloose."

At the conclusion of this address, the Lacedaemonians requested the allies to speak, bidding them give their joint advice as to the best course to be pursued in the interests of Peloponnese and the allies. Thereupon many members, and especially those who wished to gratify the Lacedae-monians, agreed in counselling active measures; and it was resolved that the states should severally send contingents to form a total of ten thousand men. Proposals were also made to allow any state, so wishing, to give money instead of men, at the rate of three Aeginetan obols2 a day per man; or where the contingent consisted of cavalry, the pay given for one horseman was to be equivalent to that of four hoplites; while, in the event of any state defaulting in service, the Lacedaemonians should be allowed to mulct the said state of a stater per man per diem. These resolutions were passed, and the deputies from Acanthus rose again. They argued that, though excellent, these resolutions were not of a nature to be rapidly carried into effect. Would it not be better, they asked,

1 For the point of the comparison, see Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. ch. iv. "Real nature of the Olythian scheme," pp. 190 foll., and note 2, p. 197; also Grote, H. G. x. 67 foll., 278 foll.
2 I.e. "rather more than sixpence a day for a hoplite, and two shillings for a horseman." "The Aeginetan stater weighed about 196 grains, rather more than two of our shillings, and was divided into two drachms of 98 grains, each of which contained six obols of about 16 grains each." See Percy Gardner, "Types of Greek Coins," Hist. Int. p. 8; Jowett, note to Thuc. III. lxx. 4, vol. ii. pp. 201, 202.
pending the mobilisation of the troops, to despatch an officer at once in command of a force from Lacedaemon and the other states, not too large to start immediately. The effect would be instantaneous, for the states which had not yet given in their adhesion to Olynthus would be brought to a standstill, and those already forcibly enrolled would be shaken in their alliance. These further resolutions being also passed, the Lacedaemonians despatched Eudamidas, accompanied by a body of Neodamodes, with Perioeci and Sciritae, to the number of two thousand odd. Eudamidas lost no time in setting out, having obtained leave from the ephors for his brother Phoebidas to follow later with the remainder of the troops assigned to him. Pushing on himself to the Thracian territory, he set about despatching garrisons to various cities at their request. He also secured the voluntary adhesion of Potidaea, although already a member of the Olynthian alliance; and this town now served as his base of operations for carrying on war on a scale adapted to his somewhat limited armament.

Phoebidas, when the remaining portion of his brother’s forces was duly mustered, put himself at their head and commenced his march. On reaching Thebes the troops encamped outside the city, round the gymnasion. Faction was rife within the city. The two polemarchs in office, Ismenias and Leontiades, were diametrically opposed, being the respective heads of antagonistic political clubs. Hence it was that, while Ismenias, ever inspired by hatred to the Lacedaemonians, would not come anywhere near the Spartan general, Leontiades, on the other hand, was assiduous in courting him; and when a sufficient intimacy was established between them, he made a proposal as follows: “You have it in your power,” he said, addressing Phoebidas, “this very day to confer supreme benefit on your country. Follow me with your hoplites, and I will introduce you into the citadel. That done, you may rest assured Thebes will be completely under the thumb of

1 Or, “new citizens, provincials, and Sciritae.”
2 See Grote, H. G. vol. x. p. 80: “We have little or no information respecting the government of Thebes,” etc. The locus classicus seems to be Plut. de Genio Socratis. See Freeman, op. cit. ch. iv. § 2, “Of the Boeotian League,” pp. 154-184; and, in reference to the seizure of the Kadmeia, p. 170.
Lacedaemon and of us, your friends. At present, as you see, there is a proclamation forbidding any Theban to take service with you against Olynthus, but we will change all that. You have only to act with us as we suggest, and we shall at once be able to furnish you with large supplies of infantry and cavalry, so that you will join your brother with a magnificent reinforcement, and pending his proposed reduction of Olynthus, you will have accomplished the reduction of a far larger state than that—to wit, this city of Thebes."

The imagination of Phoebidas was kindled as he listened to the tempting proposal. To do a brilliant deed was far dearer to him than life;\(^1\) on the other hand, he had no reasoning capacity, and would seem to have been deficient altogether in sound sense. The consent of the Spartan secured, Leontiadés bade him set his troops in motion, as if everything were ready for his departure. "And anon, when the hour is come," added the Theban, "I will be with you, and show you the way myself."

The senate was seated in the arcade or stoa in the market-place, since the Cadmeia was in possession of the women who were celebrating the Thesmophoria.\(^2\) It was noon of a hot summer’s day; scarcely a soul was stirring in the streets. This was the moment for Leontiades. He mounted on horseback and galloped off to overtake Phoebidas. He turned him back, and led him without further delay into the acropolis. Having posted Phoebidas and his soldiers inside, he handed him the key of the gates, and warning him not to suffer any one to enter into the citadel without a pass from himself, he straightway betook himself to the senate. Arrived there, he delivered himself thus: "Sirs; the Lacedaemonians are in possession of the citadel; but that is no cause for despondency, since, as they assure us, they have no hostile intention, except, indeed, towards any one who has an appetite for war. For myself, and acting in obedience to the law, which empowers the polemarch to apprehend all

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\(^1\) Or, "Renown was his mistress." See Grote, \textit{H. G.} x. 84.

\(^2\) An ancient festival held by women in honour of Demeter and Persephone (\(\tau\omega \Theta\sigma\mu\omicron\phi\omicron\rho\omega\)), who gave the first impulse to civil society, lawful marriage, etc. See Herod. ii. \textit{171} ; Diod. v. 5.
persons suspected of capital crimes, I hereby seize the person of Ismenias as an arch-fomenter of war. I call upon you, sirs, who are captains of companies, and you who are ranked with them, to do your duty. Arise and secure the prisoner, and lead him away to the place appointed.”

Those who were privy to the affair, it will be understood, presented themselves, and the orders were promptly carried out. Of those not in the secret, but opposed to the party of Leontiades, some sought refuge at once outside the city in terror for their lives; whilst the rest, albeit they retired to their houses at first, yet when they found that Ismenias was imprisoned in the Cadmeia, and further delay seemed dangerous, retreated to Athens. These were the men who shared the views of Androcleidas and Ismenias, and they must have numbered about three hundred.

Now that the transactions were concluded, another polemarch was chosen in place of Ismenias, and Leontiades at once set out to Lacedaemon. There he found the ephors and the mass of the community highly incensed against Phoebidas, “who had failed to execute the orders assigned him by the state.” Against this general indignation, however, Agesilaus protested. If mischief had been wrought to Lacedaemon by this deed, it was just that the doer of it should be punished; but, if good, it was a time-honoured custom to allow full scope for impromptu acts of this character. “The sole point you have to look to,” he urged, “is whether what has been done is good or evil.” After this, however, Leontiades presented himself to the assembly and addressed the members as follows: “Sirs, Lacedaemonians, the hostile attitude of Thebes towards you, before the occurrence of late events, was a topic constantly on your lips, since time upon time your eyes were called upon to witness her friendly bearing to your foes in contrast with her hatred of your friends. Can it be denied that Thebes refused to take part with you in the campaign against your direst enemy, the democracy in Piraeus; and balanced that lukewarmness by an onslaught on the Phocians, whose sole

1 See Ages, vii.
2 ‘‘Select Committee.” See Hell. II. iv. 38 (Trans. vol. i. p. 73); and below, VI. iii. 3, p. 153.
crime was cordiality to yourselves?¹ Nor is that all. In full
knowledge that you were likely to be engaged in war with
Olynthus, she proceeded at once to make an alliance with that
city. So that up to the last moment you were in constant
expectation of hearing some day that the whole of Boeotia was
laid at the feet of Thebes. With the late incidents all is
changed. You need fear Thebes no longer. One brief de-
spatch ² in cipher will suffice to procure a dutiful subservience
to your every wish in that quarter, provided only you will take
as kindly an interest in us as we in you."

This appeal told upon the meeting, and the Lacedae-
monians³ resolved formally, now that the citadel had been
taken, to keep it, and to put Ismenias on his trial. In con-
sequence of this resolution a body of commissioners⁴ was
despached, three Lacedaemonians and one for each of the
allied states, great and small alike. The court of inquiry thus
constituted, the sittings commenced, and an indictment was pre-
ferred against Ismenias. He was accused of playing into the
hands of the barbarian; of seeking amity with the Persian to
the detriment of Hellas; of accepting sums of money as bribes
from the king; and, finally, of being, along with Androcleidas,
the prime cause of the whole intestine trouble to which Hellas
was a prey. Each of these charges was met by the defendant,
but to no purpose, since he failed to disabuse the court of
their conviction that the grandeur of his designs was only
equalled by their wickedness.⁵ The verdict was given against
him, and he was put to death. The party of Leontiades thus
possessed the city; and went beyond the injunctions given
them in the eager performance of their services.

B.C. 382.—As a result of these transactions the Lacedae-
monians pressed on the combined campaign against Olynthus

¹ See vol. i. p. 71; and above, Hell. III. vi. 4, p. 33.
³ See Grote, H. G. vol. x. p. 85; Diod. xvi. 20; Plut. Pelop. vi.; ib. de
Genio Socratis, V. vii. 6 A; Cor. Nep. Pelop. i.
⁴ Lit. "'Dicasts.'"
⁵ Or, "that he was a magnificent malefactor." See Grote, H. G. vol. ix.
p. 420, "the great wicked man" (Clarendon's epithets for Cromwell); Plato,
Men. 90 B; Republic, 336 A, "a rich and mighty man." See also Plut.
Ages. xxii. 2, Agesilaus's exclamation at sight of Epaminondas, ὁ τὸν μεγαλο-
πράγμονον ἀνθρώπου.
with still greater enthusiasm. They not only sent out Teleutias as governor, but by their united efforts furnished him with an aggregate army of ten thousand men. They also sent despatches to the allied states, calling upon them to support Teleutias in accordance with the resolution of the allies. All the states were ready to display devotion to Teleutias, and to do him service, since he was a man who never forgot a service rendered him. Nor was Thebes an exception; for was not the governor a brother of Agesilaus? Thebes, therefore, was enthusiastic in sending her contribution of heavy infantry and cavalry. The Spartan conducted his march slowly and surely, taking the utmost pains to avoid injuring his friends, and to collect as large a force as possible. He also sent a message in advance to Amyntas, begging him, if he were truly desirous of recovering his empire, to raise a body of mercenaries, and to distribute sums of money among the neighbouring kings with a view to their alliance. Nor was that all. He sent also to Derdas, the ruler of Elimia, pointing out to him that the Olynthians, having laid at their feet the great power of Macedonia, would certainly not suffer his lesser power to escape unless they were stayed by force of arms in their career of insolence. Proceeding thus, by the time he had reached the territory of the allied powers, he was at the head of a very considerable army. At Potidæa he halted to make the necessary disposition of his troops, and thence advanced into the territory of the enemy. As he approached the hostile city, he abstained from felling and firing alike, being persuaded that to do so was only to create difficulties in his own path, whether advancing or retreating; it would be time enough, when he retired from Olynthus, to fell the trees and lay them as a barrier in the path of any assailant in the rear.

Being now within a mile or so of the city he came to a halt. The left division was under his personal command, for it suited him to advance in a line opposite the gate from which the enemy sallied; the other division of the allies stretched away to the right. The cavalry were thus distributed: the Laconians, Thebans, and all the Macedonians

1 Lit. "sent out along with him the combined force of ten thousand men," in ref. to § 20 above, p. 106.
2 Lit. "ten stades."
present were posted on the right. With his own division he kept Derdas and his troopers, four hundred strong. This he did partly out of genuine admiration for this body of horse, and partly as a mark of courtesy to Derdas, which should make him not regret his coming.

Presently the enemy issued forth and formed in line opposite, under cover of their walls. Then their cavalry formed in close order and commenced the attack. Dashing down upon the Laconians and Boeotians they dismounted Polycharmus, the Lacedaemonian cavalry general, inflicting a hundred wounds on him as he lay on the ground, and cut down others, and finally put to flight the cavalry on the right wing. The flight of these troopers infected the infantry in close proximity to them, who in turn swerved; and it looked as if the whole army was about to be worsted, when Derdas at the head of his cavalry dashed straight at the gates of Olynthus, Teleutias supporting him with the troops of his division. The Olynthian cavalry, seeing how matters were going, and in dread of finding the gates closed upon them, wheeled round and retired with alacrity. Thus it was that Derdas had his chance to cut down man after man as their cavalry ran the gauntlet past him. In the same way, too, the infantry of the Olynthians retreated within their city, though, owing to the closeness of the walls in their case, their loss was trifling. Teleutias claimed the victory, and a trophy was duly erected, after which he turned his back on Olynthus and devoted himself to felling the fruit-trees. This was the campaign of the summer. He now dismissed both the Macedonian army and the cavalry force of Derdas. Incursions, however, on the part of the Olynthians themselves against the states allied to Lacedaemon were frequent; lands were pillaged, and people put to the sword.

III. B.C. 381.—With the first symptoms of approaching spring the Olynthian cavalry, six hundred strong, had swooped into the territory of Apollonia—about the middle of the day—and dispersing over the district, were employed in pillaging; but as luck would have it, Derdas had arrived that day with his troopers, and was breakfasting in Apollonia. He noted the enemy's incursion, but kept quiet, biding his time; his horses
were ready saddled, and his troopers armed cap-à-pied. As the Olynthians came galloping up contemptuously, not only into the suburbs, but to the very gates of the city, he seized his opportunity, and with his compact and well-ordered squadron dashed out; whereupon the invaders took to flight. Having once turned them, Derdas gave them no respite, pursuing and slaughtering them for ten miles or more, until he had driven them for shelter within the very ramparts of Olynthus. Report said that Derdas slew something like eighty men in this affair. After this the Olynthians were more disposed to keep to their walls, contenting themselves with tilling the merest corner of their territory.

Time advanced, and Teleutias was in conduct of another expedition against the city of Olynthus. His object was to destroy any timber still left standing, or fields still cultivated in the hostile territory. This brought out the Olynthian cavalry, who, stealthily advancing, crossed the river which washes the walls of the town, and again continued their silent march right up to the adversary's camp. At sight of an audacity which nettled him, Teleutias at once ordered Tlemonidas, the officer commanding his light infantry division, to charge the assailants at the run. On their side the men of Olynthus, seeing the rapid approach of the light infantry, wheeled and quietly retired until they had recrossed the river, drawing the enemy on, who followed with conspicuous hardihood. Arrogating to themselves the position of pursuers towards fugitives, they did not hesitate to cross the river which stood between them and their prey. Then the Olynthian cavalry, choosing a favourable moment, when those who had crossed seemed easy to deal with, wheeled and attacked them, putting Tlemonidas himself to the sword with more than a hundred others of his company. Teleutias, when he saw what was happening, snatched up his arms in a fit of anger and began leading his hoplites swiftly forward, ordering at the same time his peltasts and cavalry to give chase and not to slacken. Their fate was the fate of many before and since, who, in the ardour of pursuit, have come too close to the enemy's walls and found it hard to get back again. Under a hail of missiles from the walls they

1 Lit. "ninety stades."
2 I.e. fruit-trees.
were forced to retire in disorder and with the necessity of guarding themselves against the missiles. At this juncture the Olynthians sent out their cavalry at full gallop, backed by supports of light infantry; and finally their heavy infantry reserves poured out and fell upon the enemy's lines, now in thorough confusion. Here Teleutias fell fighting, and when that happened, without further pause the troops immediately about him swerved. Not one soul longer cared to make a stand, but the flight became general, some fleeing towards Spartolus, others in the direction of Acanthus, a third set seeking refuge within the walls of Apollonia, and the majority within those of Potidaea. As the tide of fugitives broke into several streams, so also the pursuers divided the work between them; this way and that they poured, dealing death wholesale. So perished the pith and kernel of the armament.

Such calamities are not indeed without a moral. The lesson they are meant to teach mankind, I think, is plain. If in a general sense one ought not to punish any one, even one's own slave, in anger,—since the master in his wrath may easily incur worse evil himself than he inflicts,—so, in the case of antagonists in war, to attack an enemy under the influence of passion rather than of judgment is an absolute error. For wrath is but a blind impulse devoid of foresight, whereas to the penetrating eye of reason a blow parried may be better than a wound inflicted.1

When the news of what had happened reached Lace-
daemon it was agreed, after due deliberation, that a force should be sent, and of no trifling description, if only to quench the victors' pride, and to prevent their own achievements from becoming null and void. In this determination they sent out King Agesipolis as general, attended, like Agesilaus 2 on his Asiatic campaign, by thirty Spartans.3 Volunteers flocked to his standard. They were partly the pick and flower of the provincials,4 partly foreigners of the class called Trophimoj,5 or lastly, bastard sons of Spartans, comely and beautiful of

1 See, for the same sentiment, Horsemanship, vi. 13. See also Plut. Pel. and Marc. (Clough, ii. p. 278).
3 Lit. "Spartiates." The new army was sent out B.C. 380, according to Grote.
4 Lit. "beautiful and brave of the Perioeci."
5 Xenophon's own sons educated at Sparta would belong to this class. See Sketch of Life, vol. i. p. cxxviii.; Grote, H. G. x. 91.
limb, and well versed in the lore of Spartan chivalry. The ranks of this invading force were further swelled by volunteers from the allied states, the Thessalians notably contributing a corps of cavalry. All were animated by the desire of becoming known to Agesipolis, so that even Amyntas and Derdas in zeal of service outdid themselves. With this promise of success Agesipolis marched forward against Olynthus.

Meanwhile the state of Phlius, complimented by Agesipolis on the amount of the funds contributed by them to his expedition and the celerity with which the money had been raised, and in full belief that while the one king was in the field they were secure against the hostile attack of the other (since it was hardly to be expected that both kings should be absent from Sparta at one moment), boldly desisted from doing justice by her lately reinstated citizens. On the one hand, these exiles claimed that points in dispute should be determined before an impartial court of justice; the citizens, on the other, insisted on the claimants submitting the cases for trial in the city itself. And when the latter demurred to that solution, asking "What sort of trial that would be where the offenders were also the judges?" they appealed, to deaf ears. Consequently the restored party appeared at Sparta, to prefer a complaint against their city. They were accompanied by other members of the community, who stated that many of the Phliansians themselves besides the appellants recognised the injustice of their treatment. The state of Phlius was indignant at this manœuvre, and retaliated by imposing a fine on all who had betaken themselves to Lacedaemon without a mandate from the state. Those who incurred the fine hesitated to return home; they preferred to stay where they were and enforce their views: "It is quite plain now who were the perpetrators of all the violence—the very people who originally drove us into exile, and shut their gates upon Lacedaemon; the confiscators of our property one day, the ruthless opponents of its restoration the next. Who else but they have now brought it about that we should be fined for appearing at Lacedaemon? and for what purpose but to deter any one else for the future from venturing to expose the proceedings at Phlius?" Thus far the appellants. And in good sooth the conduct of the men
of Phlius did seem to savour of insolence; so much so that
the ephors called out the ban against them.

B.C. 380.—Nor was Agesilaus otherwise than well satisfied
with this decision, not only on the ground of old relations of
friendly hospitality between his father Archidamus and the party
of Podanemus, who were numbered among the restored exiles
at this time, but because personally he was bound by similar
ties himself towards the adherents of Procles, son of Hip-
ponicus. The border sacrifices proving favourable, the march
commenced at once. As he advanced, embassy after embassy
met him, and would fain by presents of money avert invasion.
But the king answered that the object of his march was not to
commit wrongdoing, but to protect the victims of injustice.
Then the petitioners offered to do anything, only they begged
him to forgo invasion. Again he replied—How could he
trust to their words when they had lied to him already? He
must have the warrant of acts, not promises. And being
asked, “What act (would satisfy him)?” he answered once
more, saying, “The same which you performed aforetime,
and suffered no wrong at our hands”—in other words, the
surrender of the acropolis. But to this they could not bring
themselves. Whereupon he invaded the territory of Phlius,
and promptly drawing lines of circumvallation, commenced
the siege. Many of the Lacedaemonians objected, for the
sake of a mere handful of wretched people, so to embroil
themselves with a state of over five thousand men. For,
indeed, to leave no doubt on this score, the men of Phlius
met regularly in assembly in full view of those outside. But
Agesilaus was not to be beaten by this move. Whenever
any of the townsmen came out, drawn by friendship or kin-
ship with the exiles, in every case the king's instructions were
to place the public messes at the service of the visitors,
and, if they were willing to go through the course of gymnastic
training, to give them enough to procure necessaries. All
members of these classes were, by the general's strict injunctions,
further to be provided with arms, and loans were to be raised

1 See above, IV. iv. 15, p. 63.
2 See Grote, H. G. x. 45, note 4; and below, V. iv. 13, p. 123.
3 See below, Pol. Lac. v. p. 305.
for the purpose without delay. Presently the superintendents of this branch of the service were able to turn out a detachment of over a thousand men, in the prime of bodily perfection, well disciplined and splendidly armed, so that in the end the Lacedaemonians affirmed: "Fellow-soldiers of this stamp are too good to lose." Such were the concerns of Agesilaus.

Meanwhile Agesipolis on leaving Macedonia advanced straight upon Olynthus and took up a strategical position in front of the town. Finding that no one came out to oppose him, he occupied himself for the present with pillaging any remnant of the district still intact, and with marching into the territory allied with the enemy, where he destroyed the corn. The town of Torone he attacked and took by storm. But while he was so engaged, in the height of midsummer he was attacked by a burning fever. In this condition his mind reverted to a scene once visited, the temple of Dionysus at Aphytis, and a longing for its cool and sparkling waters and embowered shades\(^1\) seized him. To this spot accordingly he was carried, still living, but only to breathe his last outside the sacred shrine, within a week of the day on which he sickened. His body was laid in honey and conveyed home to Sparta, where he obtained royal sepulture.

When the news reached Agesilaus he displayed none of the satisfaction which might possibly have been expected at the removal of an antagonist. On the contrary, he wept and pined for the companionship so severed, it being the fashion at Sparta for the kings when at home to mess together and to share the same quarters. Moreover, Agesipolis was admirably suited to Agesilaus, sharing with the merriment of youth in tales of the chase and horsemanship and boyish loves;\(^2\) while, to crown all, the touch of reverence due from younger to elder was not wanting in their common life. In place of Agesipolis, the Lacedaemonians despatched Polybiades as governor to Olynthus.

B.C. 379.—Agesilaus had already exceeded the time during which the supplies of food in Phlius were expected to last. The difference, in fact, between self-command and mere appetite is so great that the men of Phlius had only to pass a resolution to cut down the food expenditure by one half, and by doing so were able to prolong the siege for twice the calcu-

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1 Lit. "shady tabernacles."
2 See Ages. viii. 2, p. 263.
lated period. But if the contrast between self-restraint and appetite is so great, no less startling is that between self-restraint and faint-heartedness. A Phliasian named Delphion, a real hero, it would seem, took to himself three hundred Phliasians, and not only succeeded in preventing the peace-party from carrying out their wishes, but was equal to the task of incarcerating and keeping safely under lock and key those whom he mistrusted. Nor did his ability end here. He succeeded in forcing the mob of citizens to perform garrison duty, and by vigorous patrolling kept them constant to the work. Over and over again, accompanied by his personal attendants, he would dash out of the walls and drive in the enemy's outposts, first at one point and then at another of the beleaguer ing circle. But the time eventually came when, search as they might by every means, these picked defenders\(^1\) could find no further store of food within the walls, and they were forced to send to Agesilaus, requesting a truce for an embassy to visit Sparta, adding that they were resolved to leave it to the discretion of the authorities at Lacedaemon to do with their city what they liked. Agesilaus granted a pass to the embassy, but, at the same time, he was so angry at their setting his personal authority aside, that he sent to his friends at home and arranged that the fate of Phlius should be left to his discretion. Meanwhile he proceeded to tighten the cordon of investment, so as to render it impossible that a single soul inside the city should escape. In spite of this, however, Delphion, with one comrade, a branded dare-devil, who had shown great dexterity in relieving the besieging parties of their arms, escaped by night. Presently the deputation returned with the answer from Lacedaemon that the state left it entirely to the discretion of Agesilaus to decide the fate of Phlius as seemed to him best. Then Agesilaus pronounced his verdict. A board of one hundred—fifty taken from the restored exiles, fifty from those within the city—were in the first place to make inquisition as to who deserved to live and who to die, after which they were to lay down laws as the basis of a new constitution. Pending the carrying out of these transactions, he left a

\(^1\) See below, *Hell.* VII. i. 19, p. 191.
detachment of troops to garrison the place for six months, with pay for that period. After this he dismissed the allied forces, and led the state division home. Thus the transactions concerning Phlius were brought to a conclusion, having occupied altogether one year and eight months.

Meanwhile Polybiades had reduced the citizens of Olynthus to the last stage of misery through famine. Unable to supply themselves with corn from their own land, or to import it by sea, they were forced to send an embassy to Lacedaemon to sue for peace. The plenipotentiaries on their arrival accepted articles of agreement by which they bound themselves to have the same friends and the same foes as Lacedaemon, to follow her lead, and to be enrolled among her allies; and so, having taken an oath to abide by these terms, they returned home.

On every side the affairs of Lacedaemon had signally prospered:—Thebes and the rest of the Boeotian states lay absolutely at her feet; Corinth had become her most faithful ally; Argos, unable longer to avail herself of the subterfuge of a movable calendar, was humbled to the dust; Athens was isolated; and, lastly, those of her own allies who displayed a hostile feeling towards her had been punished; so that, to all outward appearance, the foundations of her empire were at length absolutely well and firmly laid.

iv.—Abundant examples might be found, alike in Hellenic and in foreign history, to prove that the Divine powers mark what is done amiss, winking neither at impiety nor at the commission of unhallowed acts; but at present I confine myself to the facts before me. The Lacedaemonians, who had pledged themselves by oath to leave the states independent; had laid violent hands on the acropolis of Thebes, and were eventually punished by the victims of that iniquity single-handed,—the Lacedaemonians, be it noted, who had never before been mastered by living man; and not they alone, but those citizens

1 τὸ πολιτικόν, the citizen army. See above, IV. iv. 19, p. 64; below, Pol. Lac. xi. p. 314.

2 Or, "it is of my own subject that I must now speak." For the peripety, or sudden reversal of circumstances, on which the plot of the Hellenica hinges, see Grote, H. G. x. ioo-108. Cf. Soph. Oed. Tyr. 450; Antig. 1066; Thuc. v. 116; also some remarks in Trans. vol. i. pp. lxii. lxiii.; Hellenica Essays, "Xenophon," p. 382 foll. This passage is perhaps the key to the historian's position.
of Thebes who introduced them into their acropolis, and who wished to enslave their city to Lacedaemon, that they might play the tyrant themselves—how fared it with them? A bare score of the fugitives were sufficient to destroy their government. How this happened I will now narrate in detail.

There was a man named Phyllidas—he was secretary to Archias, that is, to the polemarchs. Beyond his official duties, he had rendered his chief other services, and all apparently in an exemplary fashion. A visit to Athens in pursuance of some business brought this man into contact with a former acquaintance of his own, Melon, one of the exiles who had fled for safety to Athens. Melon had various questions to ask touching the sort of tyranny practised by Archias in the exercise of the polemarchy, and by Philip. He soon discovered that affairs at home were still more detestable to Phyllidas than to himself. It only remained to exchange pledges, and to arrange the details of what was to be done. After a certain interval Melon, accompanied by six of the trustiest comrades he could find among his fellow-exiles, set off for Thebes. They were armed with nothing but daggers, and first of all crept into the neighbourhood under cover of night. The whole of the next day they lay concealed in a desert place, and drew near to the city gates in the guise of labourers returning home with the latest comers from the fields. Having got safely within the city, they spent the whole of that night at the house of a man named Charon, and again the next day in the same fashion. Phyllidas meanwhile was busily taken up with the concerns of the polemarchs, who were to celebrate a feast of Aphroditè on going out of office. Amongst other things, the secretary was to take this opportunity of fulfilling an old undertaking, which was the introduction of certain women to the polemarchs. They were to be the most majestic and the most beautiful to be found in Thebes. The polemarchs, on their side (and the character of the men is sufficiently marked), were looking forward to the pleasures of the night with joyful anticipation.

1 Lit. "to Archias and his (polemarchs)"; but the Greek phrase does not, as the English would, imply that there were actually more than two polemarchs, viz. Archias and Philippus. Hypates and Leontiades belonged to the faction, but were neither of them polemarchs.
Supper was over, and, thanks to the zeal with which the master of the ceremonies responded to their mood, they were speedily intoxicated. To their oft-repeated orders to introduce their mistresses, he went out and fetched Melon and the rest, three of them dressed up as ladies and the rest as their attendant maidens. Having brought them into the treasury of the polemarchs' residence,¹ he returned himself and announced to Archias and his friends that the women would not present themselves as long as any of the attendants remained in the room; whereupon they promptly bade all withdraw, and Phyllidas, furnishing the servants with a stoup of wine, sent them off to the house of one of them. And now at last he introduced the mistresses, and led them to their seats beside their respective lords. It was preconcerted that as soon as they were seated they were to throw aside their veils and strike home. That is one version of the death of the polemarchs.² According to another, Melon and his friends came in as revellers, and so despatched their victims.

That over, Phyllidas, with three of the band, set off to the house of Leontiades. Arrived there, he knocked at the door, and sent in word that he had a message from the polemarchs. Leontiades, as chance befell, was still reclining in privacy after dinner, and his wife was seated beside him working wools. The fidelity of Phyllidas was well known to him, and he gave orders to admit him at once. They entered, slew Leontiades, and with threats silenced his wife. As they went out they ordered the door to be shut, threatening that if they found it open they would kill every one in the house. And now that this deed was done, Phyllidas, with two of the band, presented himself at the prison, telling the gaoler he had brought a man from the polemarchs to be locked up. The gaoler opened the door, and was at once despatched, and the prisoners were released. These they speedily supplied with arms taken from the armoury in the stoa, and then led them to the Amphieion,³ and bade them take up a position there, after which they at once made a proclamation calling on all

¹ Lit. "Polemarcheion."
² Or, "and so, according to the prevalent version of the matter, the polemarchs were slain. But some say that . . . ."
³ See plan of Thebes, Dict. Geog.; Arrian, Anab. i. 8; Aesch. Sept. c. Theb. 528.
Thebans to come out, horse and foot, seeing that the tyrants were dead. The citizens, indeed, as long as it was night, not knowing whom or what to trust, kept quiet, but when day dawned and revealed what had occurred, the summons was responded to with alacrity, heavy infantry and cavalry under arms alike sallying forth. Horsemen were also despatched by the now restored exiles to the two Athenian generals on the frontier; and they, being aware of the object of the message [promptly responded].

On the other hand, the Lacedaemonian governor in the citadel, as soon as that night's proclamation reached his ears, was not slow to send to Plataeae and Thespiae for reinforcements. The approach of the Plataeans was perceived by the Theban cavalry, who met them and killed a score of them and more, and after that achievement returned to the city, to find the Athenians from the frontier already arrived. Then they assaulted the acropolis. The troops within recognised the paucity of their own numbers, whilst the zeal of their opponents (one and all advancing to the attack) was plainly visible, and loud were the proclamations, promising rewards to those who should be first to scale the walls. All this so worked upon their fears that they agreed to evacuate the place if the citizens would allow them a safe-conduct to retire with their arms. To this request the others gladly yielded, and they made a truce. Oaths were taken on the terms aforesaid, and the citizens dismissed their adversaries. For all that, as the garrison retired, those of them who were recognised as personal foes were seized and put to death. Some were rescued through the good offices of the Athenian reinforcements from the frontier, who smuggled them across and saved them. The Thebans were not content with putting the men to death; if any of them had children, these also were sacrificed to their vengeance.

B.C. 378.—When the news of these proceedings reached Sparta the first thing the Lacedaemonians did was to put to

1 Supply ἑκιβοζηθήσαν. There is a lacuna in the MSS. at this point.
2 This city had been refounded in B.C. 386 (Isocr. Plat. 20, 21). See Freeman, op. cit. ch. iv. p. 170: "Its restoration implied not only a loss of Theban supremacy, but the actual loss of that portion of the existing Theban territory which had formerly formed the Plataian district."
death the governor, who had abandoned the Cadmeia instead of awaiting reinforcements, and the next was to call out the ban against Thebes. Agesilaus had little taste to head the expedition; he pointed out that he had seen more than forty years' service, and that the exemption from foreign duty applicable to others at that age was applicable on the same principle to the king. Such were the ostensible grounds on which he excused himself from the present expedition, but his real objections lay deeper. He felt certain that if he led the expedition his fellow-citizens would say: "Agesilaus caused all this trouble to the state in order to aid and abet tyrants." Therefore he preferred to leave his countrymen to settle the matter themselves as they liked. Accordingly the ephors, instructed by the Theban exiles who had escaped the late massacres, despatched Cleombrotus. He had not commanded before, and it was the depth of winter.

Now while Chabrias, with a body of Athenian peltasts, kept watch and ward over the road through Eleutherae, Cleombrotus made his way up by the direct route to Plataeae. His column of light infantry, pushing forward in advance, fell upon the men who had been released from the Theban prison, guarding the summit, to the number of about one hundred and fifty. These, with the exception of one or two who escaped, were cut down by the peltasts, and Cleombrotus descended in person upon Plataeae, which was still friendly to Sparta. Presently he reached Thespiae, and that was the base for an advance upon Cynoscephalae, where he encamped on Theban territory. Here he halted sixteen days, and then again fell back upon Thespiae. At this latter place he now left Sphodrias as governor, with a third portion of each of the contingents of the allies, handing over to him all the moneys he had brought with him from home, with directions to supplement his force with a contingent of mercenaries.

Whilst Sphodrias was so employed, Cleombrotus himself commenced his homeward march, following the road through Creusis at the head of his own moiety of the troops, who indeed were in considerable perplexity to discover whether they were at war with the Thebans or at peace, seeing that the general had

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1 And was therefore more than fifty-eight years old at this date. See below, Ages. i. 6, p. 238.
led his army into Theban territory, had inflicted the minimum of mischief, and again retired. No sooner, however, was his back turned than a violent wind storm assailed him in his rear, which some construed as an omen clearly significant of what was about to take place. Many a blow this assailant dealt them, and as the general and his army, crossing from Creusis, scaled that face of the mountain \(^1\) which stretches seaward, the blast hurled headlong from the precipices a string of asses, baggage and all; countless arms were wrested from the bearers' grasp and whirled into the sea; finally, numbers of the men, unable to march with their arms, deposited them at different points of the pass, first filling the hollow of their shields with stones. For the moment, then, they halted at Aegosthena, on Megarian soil, and supped as best they could. Next day they returned and recovered their arms. After this adventure the contingents lost no time in returning to their several homes, as Cleombrotus disbanded them.

Meanwhile at Athens and Thebes alike fear reigned. To the Athenians the strength of the Lacedaemonians was unmistakable: the war was plainly no longer confined to Corinth; on the contrary, the Lacedaemonians had ventured to skirt Athenian territory and to invade Thebes. They were so worked upon by their alarm that the two generals who had been privy to the insurrection of Melon against Leontiades and his party had to suffer: the one was formally tried and put to death; the other, refusing to abide his trial, was banished.

The apprehensions of the Thbans were of a different sort: their fear was rather lest they should find themselves in single-handed war with Lacedaemon. To prevent this they hit upon the following expedient. They worked upon Sphodrias,\(^2\) the Spartan governor left in Thespiae, by offering him, as at least was suspected, a substantial sum, in return for which he was to make an incursion into Attica; their great object being to involve Athens and Lacedaemon in hostilities. Sphodrias lent a willing ear, and, pretending that he could easily capture Piraeus in its present gateless condition, gave his troops an early evening meal and marched out of Thespiae, saying that he would reach Piraeus before daybreak. As a matter of fact

\(^1\) I.e. "Cithaeron." For the position of Creusis, Aegosthena, Thria, etc., see map, p. xlii. Trans. vol. i.

day overtook him at Thria, nor did he take any pains even to draw a veil over his intentions; on the contrary, being forced to turn aside, he amused himself by recklessly lifting cattle and sacking houses. Meanwhile some who chanced upon him in the night had fled to the city and brought news to the men of Athens that a large body of troops was approaching. It needs no saying with what speed the cavalry and heavy infantry armed themselves and stood on guard to protect the city. As chance befell, there were some Lacedaemonian ambassadors in Athens at the moment, at the house of Callias their proxenos; their names were Etymocles, Aristolochus, and Ocyllus. Immediately on receipt of the news the Athenians seized these three and imprisoned them, as not improbably concerned in the plot. Utterly taken aback by the affair themselves, the ambassadors pleaded that, had they been aware of an attempt to seize Piraeus, they would hardly have been so foolish as to put themselves into the power of the Athenians, or have selected the house of their proxenos for protection, where they were so easily to be found. It would, they further urged, soon be plain to the Athenians themselves that the state of Lacedaemon was quite as little cognisant of these proceedings as they. "You will hear before long"—such was their confident prediction—"that Sphodrias has paid for his behaviour by his life." On this wise the ambassadors were acquitted of all concern in the matter and dismissed. Sphodrias himself was recalled and indicted by the ephors on the capital charge, and, in spite of his refusal to face the trial, he was acquitted. This miscarriage of justice, as it seemed to many, who described it as unprecedented in Lacedaemon, has an explanation.

Sphodrias had a son named Cleonymus. He was just at the age when youth emerges from boyhood, very handsome and of high repute among his fellows. To this youth Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, was passionately attached. Now the friends of Cleombrotus, as comrades of Sphodrias, were disposed to acquit him; but they feared Agesilaus and his friends, not to mention the intermediate party, for the enormity of his proceeding was clear. So then Sphodrias addressed his son Cleonymus: "You have it in your power,
my son, to save your father, if you will, by begging Archidamus to dispose Agesilaus favourably to me at my trial." Thus instructed, the youth did not shrink from visiting Archidamus, and implored him for his sake to save his father. Now when Archidamus saw how Cleonymus wept, he too was melted to tears as he stood beside him, but to his petition he made answer thus: "Nay, Cleonymus, it is the bare truth I tell you, I cannot so much as look my father in the face;¹ if I wished anything transacted for me in the city I would beg assistance from the whole world sooner than from my father. Still, since it is you who bid me, rest assured I will do my best to bring this about for you as you desire." He then left the common hall ² and retired home to rest, but with dawn he arose and kept watch that his father might not go out without his knowledge. Presently, when he saw him ready to go forth, first some citizen was present, and then another and another; and in each case he stepped aside, while they held his father in conversation. ³ By and by a stranger would come, and then another; and so it went on until he even found himself making way for a string of petitioning attendants. At last, when his father had turned his back on the Eurotas, and was entering his house again, he was fain to turn his back also and be gone without so much as accosting him. The next day he fared no better: all happened as on the previous day. Now Agesilaus, although he had his suspicions why his son went to and fro in this way, asked no questions, but left him to take his own course. Archidamus, on his side, was longing, as was natural, to see his friend Cleonymus; but how he was to visit him, without having held the desired conversation with his father, he knew not. The friends of Sphodrias, observing that he who was once so frequent a visitor had ceased coming, were in agony; he must surely have been deterred by the reproaches of his father. At last, however, Archidamus dared to go to his father, and said, "Father, Cleonymus bids me ask you to save his father; grant me this boon, if possible, I beg you." He answered: "For yourself, my son, I can make excuse, but how shall my city make excuse for me if I fail to condemn that man

¹ See Cyrop. I. iv. 12.
² Lit. "the Philiton." See below, Pol. Lac. iii. 6, p. 303.
who, for his own base purpose, traffics to the injury of the state?" For the moment the other made no reply, but re-
tired crestfallen before the verdict of justice. Afterwards, whether the thought was his own or that he was prompted by some other, he came and said, "Father, if Sphodrias had done no wrong you would have released him, that I know; but now, if he has done something wrong, may he not be excused by you for our sakes?" And the father answered: "If it can be done without loss of honour on our parts, so shall it be." At that word the young man, in deep despondency, turned and went. Now one of the friends of Sphodrias, conversing with Etymocles, remarked to him: "You are all bent on putting Sphodrias to death, I take it, you friends of Agesilaus?" And Etymocles replied: "If that be so, we all are bent upon one thing, and Agesilaus on another, since in all his conversations he still harps upon one string: that Sphodrias has done a wrong there is no denying, yet Sphodrias is a man who, from boyhood to ripe manhood,¹ was ever constant to the call of honour. To put such a man as that to death is hard; nay, Sparta needs such soldiers." The other accordingly went off and reported what he had just heard to Cleonymus; and he in the joy of his heart went straightway to Archidamus and said: "Now we know that you care for us; rest assured, Archidamus, that we in turn will take great pains that you shall never have cause to blush for our friend-
ship." Nor did his acts belie his words; but so long as he lived he was ever faithful to the code of Spartan chivalry; and at Leuctra, fighting in front of the king side by side with Deinon the polemarch, thrice fell or ever he yielded up his breath — foremost of the citizens amidst the foe. And so, albeit he caused his friend the bitterest sorrow, yet to that which he had promised he was faithful, seeing he wrought Archidamus no shame, but contrariwise shed lustre on him.² In this way Sphodrias obtained his acquittal.

At Athens the friends of Boeotia were not slow to in-
struct the people that his countrymen, so far from punishing Sphodrias, had even applauded him for his designs on Athens;

¹ Lit. "who, whether as child, boy, or young man"; and for the three stages of growth, see Pol. Lac. ii. iii. iv. ² I.e. both in life and in death.
and in consequence of this the Athenians not only furnished Piraeus with gates, but set to work to build a fleet, and displayed great zeal in sending aid to the Boeotians. The Lacedaemonians, on their side, called out the ban against the Thebans; and being persuaded that in Agesilaus they would find a more prudent general than Cleombrotus had proved, they begged the former to undertake the expedition. He, replying that the wish of the state was for him law, began making preparations to take the field.

Now he had come to the conclusion that without the occupation of Mount Cithaeron any attack on Thebes would be difficult. Learning then that the men of Cleitor were just now at war with the men of Orchomenus, and were maintaining a foreign brigade, he came to an understanding with the Cleitorians that in the event of his needing it, this force would be at his service; and as soon as the sacrifices for crossing the frontier proved favourable, he sent to the commander of the Cleitorian mercenaries, and handing him a month's pay, ordered him to occupy Cithaeron with his men. This was before he himself reached Tegea. Meanwhile he sent a message to the men of Orchomenus that so long as the campaign lasted they must cease from war. If any city during his campaign abroad took on itself to march against another city, his first duty, he declared, would be to march against such offending city in accordance with a decree of the allies.

Thus crossing Cithaeron he reached Thespiae, and from that base made the territory of Thebes his objective. Finding the great plain fenced round with ditch and palisade, as also the most valuable portions of the country, he adopted the plan of shifting his encampment from one place to another. Regularly each day, after the morning meal, he marched out his troops and ravaged the territory, confining himself to his own side of the palisadings and trench. The appearance

1 For the new Athenian confederacy of Delos of this year, B.C. 378, see below, Pol. Lact. xiv. 6; Rev. v. 6 (pp. 323, 346); Diod. xv. 28-30; Plut. Pelop. xv.; Hicks, 78, 87; and for an alliance between Athens and Chalcis in Euboea, see Hicks, 79; and for a treaty with Chios, Hicks, 80.

2 See below, Ages. ii. 22, p. 251.

3 In Arcadia. See Busolt, Die Lak. 120 foll.

4 By Cynoscephalae. See Ages. ii. 22.
of Agesilaus at any point whatever was a signal to the enemy, who within the circuit of his entrenchment kept moving in parallel line to the invader, and was ever ready to defend the threatened point. On one occasion, the Spartan king having retired and being well on the road back to camp, the Theban cavalry, hitherto invisible, suddenly dashed out, following one of the regularly constructed roads out of the entrenchment. Taking advantage of the enemy's position—his light troops breaking off to supper or busily preparing the meal, and the cavalry, some of them on their legs just¹ dismounted, and others in the act of mounting,—on they rode, pressing the charge home. Man after man of the light troops was cut down; and three cavalry troopers besides—two Spartans, Cleas and Epicydidas by name, and the third a provincial² named Budicus, who had not had time to mount their horses, and whose fate was shared by some Theban³ exiles. But presently Agesilaus wheeled about and advanced with his heavy infantry to the succour; his cavalry dashed at the enemy's cavalry, and the flower of the heavy infantry, the ten-years-service men, charged by their side. The Theban cavalry at that instant looked like men who had been imbibing too freely in the noontide heat—that is to say, they awaited the charge long enough to hurl their spears; but the volley sped without effect, and wheeling about within that distance they left twelve of their number dead upon the field.

Agesilaus had not failed to note with what regularity the enemy presented himself after the morning meal. Turning the observation to account, he offered sacrifice with day's dawn, and marched with all possible speed, and so crossed within the palisadings, through what might have been a desert, as far as defence or sign of living being went. Once well inside, he proceeded to cut down and set on fire everything up to the city gates. After this exploit he beat a retreat, retiring into Thespiae, where he fortified their citadel for them. Here he left Phoebidas as governor, while he himself crossed the

¹ Read, after Courier, ἀπετι for the vulg. ἀπετι; or, better still, adopt Hartman's emendation (op. cit. p. 379), τῶν μὲν ἡδή καταβασθηκὼν τῶν δὲ καταβασθηκὼν, and translate "some—already dismounted, and others dismounting."
² Lit. "one of the perioeci."
³ Reading Θηβαῖων after Dind. for Ἀθηναίων.
passes back into Megara. Arrived here he disbanded the allies, and led the city troops homewards.

After the departure of Agesilaus, Phoebidas devoted himself to harrying the Thebans by sending out robber bands, and laid waste their land by a system of regular incursions. The Thebans, on their side, desiring to retaliate, marched out with their whole force into the territory of Thespiae. But once well inside the district they found themselves closely beset by Phoebidas and his light troops, who would not give them the slightest chance to scatter from their main body, so that the Thebans, heartily vexed at the turn their foray had taken, beat a retreat quicker than they had come. The muleteers threw away with their own hands the fruits they had captured, in their anxiety to get home as quickly as possible; so dire a dread had fallen upon the invading army. This was the chance for the Spartan to press home his attack boldly, keeping his light division in close attendance on himself, and leaving the heavy infantry under orders to follow him in battle order. He was in hopes even that he might put the enemy to complete rout, so valiantly did he lead the advance, encouraging the light troops to "come to a close grip with the invaders," or summoning the heavy infantry of the Thespiaeans to "bring up their supports." Presently the Theban cavalry as they retired found themselves face to face with an impassable glen or ravine, where in the first instance they collected in a mob, and next wheeled right-about-face in sheer resourcelessness where to cross. The handful of light troops who formed the Spartan vanguard took fright at the Thebans and fled, and the Theban horsemen seeing this put in practice the lesson of attack which the fugitives taught them. As for Phoebidas himself, he and two or three with him fell sword in hand, whereupon his mercenary troops all took to their heels.

When the stream of fugitives reached the Thespian heavy infantry reserves, they too, in spite of much boasting beforehand that they would never yield to Thebans, took to flight, though there was absolutely no pursuit whatever, for it was now late. The number slain was not large, but, for all that, the men of Thespiae did not come to a standstill until they found themselves safe inside their walls. As a
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sequel, the hopes and spirit of the Thebans were again kindled into new life, and they made campaigns against Thespiae and the other provincial cities of Böeotia. It must be admitted that in each case the democratical party retired from these cities to Thebes; since absolute governments had been established in all of them on the pattern previously adopted at Thebes; and the result was that the friends of Lacedaemon in these cities also needed her assistance. After the death of Phoebidas the Lacedaemonians despatched a polemarch with a division by sea to form the garrison of Thespiae.

B.C. 377.—With the advent of spring the ephors again called out the ban against Thebes, and requested Agesilaus to lead the expedition, as on the former campaign. He, holding to his former theory with regard to the invasion, even before sacrificing the customary frontier sacrifice, sent a despatch to the polemarch at Thespiae, with orders to seize the pass which commands the road over Cithaeron, and to guard it against his arrival. Then, having once more crossed the pass and reached Plataeae, he again made a feint of marching first into Thespiae, and so sent a despatch ordering supplies to be in readiness, and all embassies to be waiting his arrival there; so that the Thebans concentrated their attention on the approaches from Thespiae, which they strongly guarded.

Next morning, however, Agesilaus sacrificed at daybreak and set out on the road to Erythrae, and completing in one day what was a good two days' march for an army, gave the Thebans the slip, and crossed their palisade-work at Scolus before the enemy had arrived from the closely-guarded point at which he had effected his entrance formerly. This done he proceeded to ravage the eastward-facing districts of the city of Thebes as far as the territory of Tanagra, for at that

1 Lit. "their other perioecid cities." For the significance of this title as applied by the Thebans (and perhaps commonly) to the other cities of Boeotia, see Freeman, op. cit. ch. iv. pp. 157, 173 foll.
2 See Grote, H. G. x. 174; Freeman, op. cit. iv. 171, 172.
3 See for affairs of Delos, never actually named by Xenophon, between B.C. 377 and 374, the Sandwich Marble in Trinity College, Cambridge; Boeckh, C. I. G. 158, and P. E. A. ii. p. 78 foll.; Hicks, 82.
4 Erythrae (Redlands) stands between Hysiae and Scolus, east of Katzíla. —Leake, N. Gr. ii. 329. See Herod. ix. 15, 25; Thuc. iii. 24; Paus. IX. ii. 1; Strab. IX. ii.
date Tanagra was still in the hands of Hypatodorus and his party, who were friends of the Lacedaemonians. After that he turned to retire, keeping the walls of Thebes on his left. But the Thebans, who had stolen, as it were, upon the scene, drew up at the spot called "The Old Wife's Breast," 1 keeping the trench and palisading in their rear: they were persuaded that here, if anywhere, lay their chance to risk a decisive engagement, the ground at this point being somewhat narrow and difficult to traverse. Agesilaus, however, in view of the situation, refused to accept the challenge. Instead of marching upon them he turned sharp off in the direction of the city; and the Thebans, in alarm for the city in its undefended state, abandoned the favourable ground on which they were drawn up in battle line and retired at the double towards the city along the road to Potniae, which seemed the safer route. This last move of Agesilaus may be described as a stroke of genius: 2 while it allowed him to retire to a distance, it forced the enemy themselves to retreat at the double. In spite of this, however, one or two of the polemarchs, with their divisions, charged the foe as he raced past. But again the Thebans, from the vantage-ground of their heights, sent volleys of spears upon the assailants, which cost one of the polemarchs, Alypētus, his life. He fell pierced by a spear. But again from this particular crest the Thebans on their side were forced to turn in flight; so much so that the Sciritae, with some of the cavalry, scaled up and speedily cut down the rearmost ranks of the Thebans as they galloped past into the city. When, however, they were close under cover of their walls the Thebans turned, and the Sciritae seeing them retreated at more than a steady walking pace. No one, it is true, was slain; but the Thebans all the same set up a trophy in record of the incident at the point where the scaling party had been forced to retreat.

And now, since the hour was come, Agesilaus fell back and encamped on the very site on which he had seen the enemy drawn up in battle array. Next day he retired by the road to Thespiae. The light troops, who formed a free corps in the pay of the Thebans, hung audaciously on his heels. Their

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1 Lit. "Graos Stethos."

2 Or, "and this move of Agesilaus was regarded as a very pretty one."
shouts could be heard calling out to Chabrias\(^1\) for not bringing up his supports; when the cavalry of the Olynthians (who now contributed a contingent in accordance with their oaths)\(^2\) wheeled round on them, caught the pursuers in the heat of their pursuit, and drove them uphill, putting large numbers of them to the sword,—so quickly are infantry overhauled by cavalry on steep ground which can be ridden over. Being arrived within the walls of Thespiae, Agesilaus found the citizens in a state of party feud, the men of Lacedaemonian proclivities desiring to put their political opponents, one of whom was Menon, to death\(^3\)—a proceeding which Agesilaus would not sanction. After having healed their differences and bound them over by solemn oath to keep the peace with one another, he at once retired, taking his old route across Cithaeron to Megara. Here once more he disbanded the allies, and at the head of the city troops himself marched back to Sparta.

The Thebans had not gathered in the fruits of their soil for two years now, and began to be sorely pinched for want of corn; they therefore sent a body of men on board a couple of triremes to Pagasae, with ten talents\(^4\) in hand for the purchase of corn. But while these commissioners were engaged in effecting their purchases, Alcetas, the Lacedaemonian who was garrisoning Oreus,\(^5\) fitted out three triremes, taking precautions that no rumour of his proceedings should leak out. As soon as the corn was shipped and the vessels under weigh, he captured not only the corn but the triremes, escort and all, numbering no less than three hundred men. This done he locked up his prisoners in the citadel, where he himself was also quartered. Now there was a youth, the son of a native of Oreus, fair of

\(^1\) For the exploits of Chabrias, who commanded a division of mixed Athenians and mercenaries (see above, § 14), see Dcm. c. Lepid. 479; Polyae. ii. i, 2; Diod. xv. 32, 33, who gives interesting details; Grote, H. G. x. 172 foll.  
\(^2\) See above, Hist. v. iii. 26.  
\(^3\) Or, "under the pretext of furthering Laconian interests there was a desire to put political opponents to death." For "Menon," Dind. conj. "Melon."  
\(^4\) = £2437:10s.  
\(^5\) Oreus, formerly called Histiaea, in the north of Euboea. See Thuc. vii. 57, viii. 95; Diod. xv. 30; Grote, H. G. ix. 263. For Pagasae at the north extremity of the Pagasaean Gulf, "the cradle of Greek navigation," see Tozer, Geog. Gr. vi. p. 124; Strab. IX. v. 15.
mien and of gentle breeding,\(^1\) who danced attendance on the commandant: and the latter must needs leave the citadel and go down to busy himself with this youth. This was a piece of carelessness which the prisoners did not fail to observe, and turned to good account by seizing the citadel, whereupon the town revolted, and the Thebans experienced no further difficulty in obtaining corn supplies.

B.C. 376.—At the return of spring Agesilaus lay sick—a bedridden invalid. The history of the case is this: During the withdrawal of his army from Thebes the year before, when at Megara, while mounting from the Aphrodision\(^2\) to the Government house he ruptured a vein or other vessel of the body. This was followed by a rush of blood to his sound leg. The knee was much swelled, and the pain intolerable, until a Syracusan surgeon made an incision in the vein near the ankle. The blood thus let flowed night and day; do what they could to stop the discharge, all failed, till the patient fainted away; then it ceased. In this plight Agesilaus was conveyed home on a litter to Lacedaemon, and remained an invalid the rest of that summer and throughout the winter.

But to resume: at the first burst of spring the Lacedaemonians again called out the ban, and gave orders to Cleombrotus to lead the expedition. The king found himself presently with his troops at the foot of Cithaeron, and his light infantry advanced to occupy the pass which commands the road. But here they found a detachment of Thebans and Athenians already in occupation of the desired height, who for a while suffered them to approach; but when they were close upon them, sprang from their position and charged, putting about forty to the sword. This incident was sufficient to convince Cleombrotus that to invade Thebes by this mountain passage was out of the question, and in this faith he led back and disbanded his troops.

The allies met in Lacedaemon, and arguments were adduced on the part of the allies to show that faintheartedness would very soon lead to their being absolutely worn out by the war. They had got it in their power, it was urged, to fit

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\(^1\) Or, "beautiful and brave if ever youth was."

\(^2\) Pausanias (I. xi. 6) mentions a temple of Aphrodite 'Επιστροφία (Verticordia), on the way up to the Carian Acropolis of Megara.
out a fleet far outnumbering that of Athens, and to reduce that city by starvation; it was open to them, in the self-same ships, to carry an army across into Theban territory, and they had a choice of routes—the road into Phocis, or, if they preferred, by Creusis. After thus carefully considering the matter they manned a fleet of sixty triremes, and Pollis was appointed admiral in command. Nor indeed were their expectations altogether belied. The Athenians were soon so closely blockaded that their corn vessels could get no farther than Geraestus;¹ there was no inducing them to coast down farther south, with a Lacedaemonian navy hovering about Ægina and Ceos and Andros. The Athenians, making a virtue of necessity, manned their ships in person, gave battle to Pollis under the leadership of Chabrias, and came out of the sea-fight ² victorious.

B.C. 375.—Then the corn supplies flowed freely into Athens. The Lacedaemonians, on their side, were preparing to transport an army across the water into Boeotia, when the Thebans sent a request to the Athenians urging them to despatch an armament round Peloponnesus, under the persuasion that if this were done the Lacedaemonians would find it impossible at once to guard their own or the allied territory in that part of the world, and at the same time to convey an army of any size to operate against Thebes. The proposals fell in with the present temper of the Athenians, irritated with Lacedaemon on account of the exploit of Sphodrias. Accordingly they eagerly manned a fleet of sixty vessels, appointing Timotheus as admiral in command, and despatched it on a cruise round Peloponnesus.

The Thebans, seeing that there had been no hostile invasion of their territory for so long (neither during the campaign of Cleombrotus nor now,³ whilst Timotheus prose-

¹ The promontory at the southern extremity of Euboea.
² Battle of Naxos, B.C. 376. For interesting details, see Diod. xv. 34, 35.
³ Lit. "nor at the date of Timotheus's periplus." To the historian writing of the events of this period several years later, the coasting voyage of Timotheus is a single incident (περιέπλευσον), and as Grote (H. G. x. 185, note 3) observes, the words may "include not simply the time which Timotheus took in actually circumnavigating Peloponnesos, but the year which he spent afterwards in the Ionian sea, and the time which he occupied in performing his exploits near Korkyra, Leukas, and the neighbourhood generally." For
cuted his coasting voyage), felt emboldened to carry out a campaign on their own account against the provincial cities; and one by one they again recovered them.

Timotheus in his cruise reached Corcyra, and reduced it at a blow. That done, he neither enslaved the inhabitants nor drove them into exile, nor changed their laws. And of this conduct he reaped the benefit in the increased cordiality of all the cities of those parts. The Lacedaemonians thereupon fitted out and despatched a counter fleet, with Nicolochus in command, an officer of consummate boldness. This admiral no sooner caught sight of Timotheus’s fleet than without hesitation, and in spite of the absence of six Ambraciot vessels which formed part of his squadron, he gave battle, with fifty-five ships to the enemy’s sixty. The result was a defeat at the moment, and Timotheus set up a trophy at Alyzia. But as soon as the six missing Ambraciot vessels had reinforced him—the ships of Timotheus meanwhile being docked and undergoing repairs—he bore down upon Alyzia in search of the Athenian, and as Timotheus refused to put out to meet him, the Lacedaemonian in his turn set up a trophy on the nearest group of islands.

B.C. 374.—Timotheus, after repairing his original squadron and manning more vessels from Corcyra, found himself at the head of more than seventy ships. His naval superiority was undisputed, but he was forced to send to Athens for moneys, seeing his fleet was large and his wants not trifling.


2 The Corcyraeans, Acarnanians, and Cephallenians join the alliance B.C. 375; see Hicks, 83. "This decree dates from the autumn of B.C. 375, immediately after Timotheos’s visit to Korkyra (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 64). The result was that the names of Korkyra, Kephallenia, and Akarnania were inscribed upon the list (No. 81), and an alliance was made with them." See C. I. A. ii. p. 399 foll.; Hicks, loc. cit.; see below, p. 176 (Hell. VI. v. 23); C. I. A. ii. 14. The tablet is in the Asclepeian collection at the entrance of the Acropolis at Athens. See Milchöfer, Die Museen Athens, 1881, p. 45.
1. B.C. 374.—The Athenians and Lacedaemonians were thus engaged. But to return to the Thebans. After the subjugation of the cities in Boeotia, they extended the area of aggression and marched into Phocis. The Phocians, on their side, sent an embassy to Lacedaemon, and pleaded that without assistance from that power they must inevitably yield to Thebes. The Lacedaemonians in response conveyed by sea into the territory of Phocis their king Cleombrotus, at the head of four regiments and the contingents of the allies.

About the same time Polydamas of Pharsalus arrived from Thessaly to address the general assembly of Lacedaemon. He was a man of high repute throughout the whole of Thessaly, while in his native city he was regarded as so true a gentleman that the faction-ridden Pharsalians were content to entrust the citadel to his keeping, and to allow their revenues to pass through his hands. It was his privilege to disburse the money needed for sacred rites or other expenditure, within the limits of their written law and constitution. Out of these moneys this faithful steward of the state was able to garrison and guard in safety for the citizens their capital. Every year he rendered an account of his administration in general. If there was a deficit he made it up out of his own pocket, and when the revenues expanded he paid himself back. For the rest, his hospitality to foreigners and his magnificence were on a true Thessalian scale. Such was the style and character

\[ \pi\rho\delta\sigma\tau\circ \kappa \omega\nu\nu, \ "h.e. vel ad senatum vel ad ephoros vel ad concionem." \]
Sturz, Lex. Xen. s.v.
of the man who now arrived in Lacedaemon and spoke as follows:

"Men of Lacedaemon, it is in my capacity as 'proxenos' and 'benefactor' (titles borne by my ancestry from time immemorial) that I claim, or rather am bound, in case of any difficulty to come to you, and, in case of any complication dangerous to your interests in Thessaly, to give you warning. The name of Jason, I feel sure, is not unknown to Lacedaemonian ears. His power as a prince is sufficiently large, and his fame widespread. It is of Jason I have to speak. Under cover of a treaty of peace he has lately conferred with me, and this is the substance of what he urged: 'Polydamas,' he said, 'if I chose I could lay your city at my feet, even against its will, as the following considerations will prove to you. See,' he went on, 'the majority and the most important of the states of Thessaly are my allies. I subdued them in campaigns in which you took their side in opposition to myself. Again, you do not need to be told that I have six thousand mercenaries who are a match in themselves, I take it, for any single state. It is not the mere numbers on which I insist. No doubt as large an army could be raised in other quarters; but these citizen armies have this defect—they include men who are already advanced in years, with others whose beards are scarcely grown. Again, it is only a fraction of the citizens who attend to bodily training in a state, whereas with me no one takes mercenary service who is not as capable of endurance as myself.'

"And here, Lacedaemonians, I must tell you what is the bare truth. This Jason is a man stout of limb and robust of body, with an insatiable appetite for toil. Equally true is it that he tests the mettle of those with him day by day. He is always at their head, whether on a field-day under arms, or in the gymnasium, or on some military expedition. The weak members of the corps he weeds out, but those whom he sees bear themselves stout-heartedly in the face of war, like true lovers of danger and of toil, he honours with double, treble, and quadruple pay, or with other gifts. On the bed of sickness they will not lack attendance, nor honour in their graves. Thus every foreigner in his service knows that his valour in
war may obtain for him a livelihood—a life replete at once with honour and abundance. 1

"Then with some parade he pointed out to me what I knew before, that the Maracians, and the Dolopians, and Alcetas the hyparch 2 in Epirus, were already subject to his sway; 'so that I may fairly ask you, Polydamas,' he proceeded, 'what I have to apprehend that I should not look on your future subjugation as mere child's play. Perhaps some one who did not know me, and what manner of man I am, might put it to me: "Well! Jason, if all you say be true, why do you hesitate? why do you not march at once against Pharsalia?" For the good reason, I reply, that it suits me better to win you voluntarily than to annex you against your wills. Since, if you are forced, you will always be planning all the mischief you can against me, and I on my side shall be striving to diminish your power; whereas if you throw in your lot with mine trustfully and willingly, it is certain we shall do what we can to help each other. I see and know, Polydamas, that your country fixes her eyes on one man only, and that is yourself: what I guarantee you, therefore, is that, if you will dispose her lovingly to myself, I on my side will raise you up to be the greatest man in Hellas next to me. Listen, while I tell you what it is in which I offer you the second prize. Listen, and accept nothing which does not approve itself as true to your own reasoning. First, is it not plain to us both, that with the adhesion of Pharsalus and the swarm of pettier states dependent on yourselves, I shall with infinite ease become Tagos 3 of all the Thessalians; and then

1 Or, "a life satisfying at once to soul and body."
2 Or, "his underlord in Epirus." By hyparch, I suppose, is implied that Alcetas regarded Jason as his suzerain. Diodorus (xv. 13, 36) speaks of him as king of the Molossians.
3 Or, "Prince," and below, "Thessaly so converted into a Principality," "The Tagos of Thessaly was not a King, because his office was not hereditary or even permanent; neither was he exactly a Tyrant, because his office had some sort of legal sanction. But he came much nearer to the character either of a King or of a Tyrant than to that of a Federal President like the General of the Achaian. . . . Jason of Pherai acts throughout like a King, and his will seems at least as uncontrolled as that of his brother sovereign beyond the Kambunian hills. Even Jason seems to have been looked upon as a Tyrant (see below, Hist. VI. iv. 32); possibly, like the Athenian Démos, he himself did not refuse the name" (cf. Arist. Pol. iii. 4, 9).—Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov.
the corollary—Thessaly so united—sixteen thousand cavalry
and more than ten thousand heavy infantry leap into life.
Indeed, when I contemplate the physique and proud carriage
of these men, I cannot but persuade myself that, with proper
handling, there is not a nation or tribe of men to which
Thessalians would deign to yield submission. Look at the
broad expanse of Thessaly and consider: when once a Tagos is
established here, all the tribes in a circle round will lie stilled
in subjection; and almost every member of each of these
tribes is an archer born, so that in the light infantry division of
the service our power must needs excel. Furthermore, the
Boeotians and all the rest of the world in arms against Lac-
daemon are my allies; they clamour to follow my banner, if only
I will free them from Sparta’s yoke. So again the Athenians,
I make sure, will do all they can to gain our alliance; but with
them I do not think we will make friends, for my persuasion is
that empire by sea will be even easier to acquire than empire
by land; and to show you the justice of this reasoning I would
have you weigh the following considerations. With Macedonia,
which is the timber-yard of the Athenian navy, in our hands
we shall be able to construct a far larger fleet than theirs.
That stands to reason. And as to men, which will be the
better able to man vessels, think you—Athens, or ourselves
with our stalwart and numerous Penestae? Which will better
support mariners—a nation which, like our own, out of her
abundance exports her corn to foreign parts, or Athens,
which, but for foreign purchases, has not enough to support
herself? And so as to wealth in general it is only natural, is
it not, that we, who do not look to a string of little islands
for supplies, but gather the fruits of continental peoples, should
find our resources more copious? As soon as the scattered
powers of Thessaly are gathered into a principality, all the
tribes around, I repeat, will become our tributaries. I need
not tell you that the king of Persia reaps the fruits, not of
islands, but of a continent, and he is the wealthiest of men!
But the reduction of Persia will be still more practicable, I

1 See above, p. 105; and Hicks, 74.
2 Or, “peasantry.” See Trans. vol. i. p. 57, note 2, as to the villeins of
Thessaly.
imagine, than that of Hellas, for there the men, save one, are better versed in slavery than in prowess. Nor have I forgotten, during the advance of Cyrus,¹ and afterwards under Agesilaus, how scant the force was before which the Persian quailed.'

"Such, Lacedaemonians, were the glowing arguments of Jason. In answer I told him that what he urged was well worth weighing, but that we, the friends of Lacedaemon, should so, without a quarrel, desert her and rush into the arms of her opponents, seemed to me sheer madness. Whereat he praised me, and said that now must he needs cling all the closer to me if that were my disposition, and so charged me to come to you and tell you the plain truth, which is, that he is minded to march against Pharsalus if we will not hearken to him. Accordingly he bade me demand assistance from you; 'and if they suffer you,'² he added, 'so to work upon them that they will send you a force sufficient to do battle with me, it is well: we will abide by war's arbitrament, nor quarrel with the consequence; but if in your eyes that aid is insufficient, look to yourself. How shall you longer be held blameless before that fatherland which honours you and in which you fare so well?'³

"These are the matters," Polydamas continued, "which have brought me to Lacedaemon. I have told you the whole story; it is based partly on what I see to be the case, and partly on what I have heard from yonder man. My firm belief is, men of Lacedaemon, that if you are likely to despatch a force sufficient, not in my eyes only, but in the eyes of all the rest of Thessaly, to cope with Jason in war, the states will revolt from him, for they are all in alarm as to the future development of the man's power; but if you

¹ See Trans. vol. i. p. cxxii.
² Or, reading ϑεολ, after Cobet; translate "if providentially they should send you."
³ Reading καὶ ἂν πράττεις, after Cobet. The chief MSS. give ὁν ἂν ἄγερχητος ἄν δικαίων ἐλθῃ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι ἢ σε τιμᾷ καὶ ἂν πράττεις τὰ κράτιστα, which might be rendered either, 'and how being best for yourself? ' [lit. "and you would not be doing best for yourself," ὁν ἄν carried on from previous clause], or (taking πράττεις as pure optative), 'may you be guided to adopt the course best for yourself! ' 'may the best fortune attend you! Farewell." See Otto Keller, op. cit. ad loc. for various emendations.
think a company of newly-enfranchised slaves and any amateur general will suffice, I advise you to rest in peace. You may take my word for it, you will have a great power to contend against, and a man who is so prudent a general that, in all he essays to do, be it an affair of secrecy, or speed, or force, he is wont to hit the mark of his endeavours: one who is skilled, should occasion serve, to make the night of equal service to him with the day; or, if speed be needful, will labour on while breakfasting or taking an evening meal. And as for repose, he thinks that the time for it has come when the goal is reached or the business on hand accomplished. And to this same practice he has habituated those about him. Right well he knows how to reward the expectations of his soldiers, when by the extra toil which makes the difference they have achieved success; so that in his school all have laid to heart that maxim, 'Pain first and pleasure after.' And in regard to pleasure of the senses, of all the men I know, he is the most continent; so that these also are powerless to make him idle at the expense of duty. You must consider the matter then and tell me, as befits you, what you can and will do."

Such were the representations of Polydamas. The Lacedaemonians, for the time being, deferred their answer; but after calculating the next day and the day following how many divisions they had on foreign service, and how many ships on the coast of Laconia to deal with the foreign squadron of the Athenians, and taking also into account the war with their neighbours, they gave their answer to Polydamas: "For the present they would not be able to send him a sufficient aid: under the circumstances they advised him to go back and make the best settlement he could of his own affairs and those of his city." He, thanking the Lacedaemonians for their straightforwardness, withdrew.

The citadel of Pharsalus he begged Jason not to force him to give up: his desire was to preserve it for those who had entrusted it to his safe keeping; his own sons Jason

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1 See Cyrop. III. i. 19.
2 For this sentiment, see Mem. II. i. 20 et passim.
3 Lit. "morai."
was free to take as hostages, and he would do his best to procure for him the voluntary adhesion of his city by persuasion, and in every way to further his appointment as Tagos of Thessaly. Accordingly, after interchange of solemn assurances between the pair, the Pharsalians were let alone in peace, and ere long Jason was, by general consent, appointed Tagos of all the Thessalians. Once fairly vested with that authority, he drew up a list of the cavalry and heavy infantry which the several states were capable of furnishing as their quota, with the result that his cavalry, inclusive of allies, numbered more than eight thousand, while his infantry force was computed at not less than twenty thousand; and his light troops would have been a match for those of the whole world—the mere enumeration of their cities would be a labour in itself.\(^1\) His next act was a summons to all the dwellers round\(^2\) to pay as tribute exactly the amount imposed in the days of Scopas.\(^3\) And here in this state of accomplishment we may leave these matters. I return to the point reached when this digression into the affairs of Jason began.

\(^1\) See \textit{Cyrop.} I. i. 5.

\(^2\) \textit{Lit.} perioeci.

\(^3\) It is conjectured that the Scopadae ruled at Pherae and Cranusa in the earlier half of the fifth century B.C.; see, for a change of dynasty, what is said of Lycophron of Pherae in \textit{Hell.} II. iii. 4 (Trans. vol. i. p. 49). There was a famous Scopas, son of Creon, to whom Simonides addressed his poem—

\begin{quote}
"Ανδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἄλαθέως γενέθαι
χαλέπτων χερόν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νῦν τετράγυνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυμικέον,
\end{quote}

a sentiment criticised by Plato, \textit{Protag.} 339 A. "Now Simonides says to Scopas, the son of Creon, the Thessalian:

"Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good; built four-square in hands and feet and mind, a work without a flaw."

Do you know the poem?"—Jo"wett, \textit{Plat.} i. 153. But whether this Scopas is the Scopas of our text and a hero of Jason's is not clear.
conceived a desire to cease from war. In this mood they sent an embassy to Lacedaemon and concluded peace.¹

B.C. 374-373.—This done, two of the ambassadors, in obedience to a decree of the state, set sail at once from Laconian territory, bearing orders to Timotheus to sail home, since peace was established. That officer, while obeying his orders, availed himself of the homeward voyage to land certain Zacynthian exiles² on their native soil, whereupon the Zacynthian city party sent to Lacedaemon and complained of the treatment they had received from Timotheus; and the Lacedaemonians, without further consideration, decided that the Athenians were in the wrong, and proceeded to equip another navy, and at length collected from Laconia itself, from Corinth, Leucas,³ Ambracia, Elis, Zacynthus, Achaia, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, and Halieis, a force amounting to sixty sail. In command of this squadron they appointed Mnasippus admiral, with orders to attack Corcyra, and in general to look after their interests in those seas. They, moreover, sent an embassy to Dionysius, instructing him that his interests would be advanced by the withdrawal of Corcyra from Athenian hands.

B.C. 373.—Accordingly Mnasippus set sail, as soon as his squadron was ready, direct to Corcyra; he took with him, besides his troops from Lacedaemon, a body of mercenaries, making a total in all of no less than fifteen hundred men. He disembarked, and soon became master of the island, the country district falling a prey to the spoiler. It was in a high state of cultivation, and rich with fruit-trees, not to speak of magnificent dwelling-houses and wine-cellars fitted up on the farms: so that, it was said, the soldiers reached such a pitch of luxury that they refused to drink wine which had not a fine bouquet. A crowd of slaves, too, and fat beasts were captured on the estates.

The general’s next move was to encamp with his land forces about three-quarters of a mile⁴ from the city, on rising ground, which commanded the rural district, so that any Corcyraean who attempted to leave the city to go into the

¹ See Curtius, H. G. vol. iv. p. 376 (Eng. trans.).
² See Hicks, 81, p. 142.
³ Ibid. 81, 86.
⁴ Lit. "five stades."
country would be certainly cut off on that side. The fleet he stationed on the other side of the city, at a point where he calculated on detecting and preventing the approach of convoys. Besides which he established a blockade in front of the harbour when the weather permitted. In this way the city was completely invested.

The Corcyraeans, on their side, were in the sorest straits. They could get nothing from their soil owing to the vice in which they were gripped by land, whilst owing to the predominance of the enemy at sea nothing could be imported. Accordingly they sent to the Athenians and begged for their assistance. They urged upon them that it would be a great mistake if they suffered themselves to be robbed of Corcyra. If they did so, they would not only throw away a great advantage to themselves, but add a considerable strength to their enemy; since, with the exception of Athens, no state was capable of furnishing a larger fleet or revenue. Moreover, Corcyra lay favourably for commanding the Corinthian gulf and the cities which line its shores; it was splendidly situated for injuring the rural districts of Laconia, and still more splendidly in relation to the opposite shores of the continent of Epirus, and the passage between Peloponnesus and Sicily.

This appeal did not fall on deaf ears. The Athenians were persuaded that the matter demanded their most serious attention, and they at once despatched Stesicles as general, with about six hundred peltasts. They also requested Alcetas to help them in getting their troops across. Thus under cover of night the whole body were conveyed across to a point in the open country, and found their way into the city. Nor was that all. The Athenians passed a decree to man sixty ships of war, and elected Timotheus admiral. The latter, being unable to man the fleet on the spot, set sail on a cruise to the islands and tried to make up the complements of his crews from those quarters. He evidently looked upon

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1 See Thuc. i. 36.
2 The name of the general was Ctesicles, according to Diod. xv. 47. Read στραγγίδων for ταγών, with Breitenbach, Cobet, etc. For Alcetas, see above, Hell. VI. i. 7, p. 139.
3 I.e. by show of hands, ἕχειρονον.
it as no light matter to sail round Peloponnesus as if on a voyage of pleasure, and to attack a fleet in the perfection of training. To the Athenians, however, it seemed that he was wasting the precious time seasonable for the coasting voyage, and they were not disposed to condone such an error, but deposed him, appointing Iphicrates in his stead. The new general was no sooner appointed than he set about getting his vessels manned with the utmost activity, putting pressure on the trierarchs. He further procured from the Athenians for his use not only any vessels cruising on the coast of Attica, but the Paralus and Salaminia also, remarking that, if things turned out well yonder, he would soon send them back plenty of ships. Thus his numbers grew to something like seventy sail.

Meanwhile the Corcyraeans were sore beset with famine: desertion became every day more frequent, so much so that Mnasippus caused proclamation to be made by herald that all deserters would be sold there and then; and when that had no effect in lessening the stream of runaways, he ended by driving them back with the lash. Those within the walls, however, were not disposed to receive these miserable slaves within the lines, and numbers died outside. Mnasippus, not blind to what was happening, soon persuaded himself that he had as good as got the city into his possession: and he began to try experiments on his mercenaries. Some of them he had already paid off; others still in his service had as much as two months' pay owing to them by the general, who, if report spoke true, had no lack of money, since the majority of the states, not caring for a campaign across the seas, sent him hard cash instead of men. But now the beleaguered citizens, who could espy from their towers that the outposts were less carefully guarded than formerly, and the men scattered about the rural districts, made a sortie, capturing some and cutting down others. Mnasippus, perceiving the attack, donned his armour, and, with all the heavy troops

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1 See Jowett, note to Thuc. VIII. xcv. 2, ii. p. 525.
2 The two sacred galleys. See Trans. vol. i. p. 43; Thuc. iii. 33; Aristoph. Birds, 147 foll.
3 Or, "he would knock them all down to the hammer."
4 Or, "cut off from their pay."
he had, rushed to the rescue, giving orders to the captains and brigadiers\(^1\) to lead out the mercenaries. Some of the captains answered that it was not so easy to command obedience when the necessaries of life were lacking; whereat the Spartan struck one man with his staff, and another with the butt of his spear. Without spirit and full of resentment against their general, the men mustered—a condition very unfavourable to success in battle. Having drawn up the troops, the general in person repulsed the division of the enemy which was opposite the gates, and pursued them closely; but these, rallying close under their walls, turned right about, and from under cover of the tombs kept up a continuous discharge of darts and other missiles; other detachments, dashing out at other gates, meanwhile fell heavily on the flanks of the enemy. The Lacedaemonians, being drawn up eight deep, and thinking that the wing of their phalanx was of inadequate strength, essayed to wheel round; but as soon as they began the movement the Corcyraeans attacked them as if they were fleeing, and they were then unable to recover themselves,\(^2\) while the troops next in position abandoned themselves to flight. Mnasippus, unable to succour those who were being pressed owing to the attack of the enemy immediately in front, found himself left from moment to moment with decreasing numbers. At last the Corcyraeans collected, and with one united effort made a final rush upon Mnasippus and his men, whose numbers were now considerably reduced. At the same instant the townsmen,\(^3\) eagerly noticing the posture of affairs, rushed out to play their part. First Mnasippus was slain, and then the pursuit became general; nor could the pursuers well have failed to capture the camp, barricade and all, had they not caught sight of the mob of traffickers with a long array of attendants and slaves, and thinking that here was a prize indeed, desisted from further chase.

The Corcyraeans were well content for the moment to set up a trophy and to give back the enemy’s dead under a flag

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1. Lit. "lochagoi and taxiarchs."
2. Or, "to retaliate"; or, "to complete the movement."
3. Reading, after Dindorf, οἱ πολίται, or, if with the MSS., οἱ ὄμπληται; translate "the heavy-armed among the assailants saw their advantage and pressed on."
of truce; but the after-consequences were even more important to them in the revival of strength and spirits which the citizens experienced, in proportion as the foreign invaders were sunk in despondency. The rumour spread that Iphicrates would soon be there—he was even at the doors; and in fact the Corcyraeans themselves were manning a fleet. So Hypermenes, who was second in command to Mnasippus and the bearer of his despatches, manned every vessel of the fleet as full as it would hold, and then sailing round to the entrenched camp, filled all the transports with prisoners and valuables and other stock, and sent them off. He himself, with his marines and the survivors of the troops, kept watch over the entrenchments; but at last even this remnant in the excess of panic and confusion got on board the men-of-war and sailed off, leaving behind them vast quantities of corn and wine, with numerous prisoners and invalided soldiers. The fact was, they were sorely afraid of being caught by the Athenians in the island, and so they made safely off to Leucas.

Meanwhile Iphicrates had commenced his voyage of circumnavigation, partly voyaging and partly making every preparation for an engagement. He at once left his large sails behind him, as the voyage was only to be the prelude of a battle; his flying jibs, even if there was a good breeze, were but little used, since by making his progress depend on sheer rowing he hoped at once to improve the physique of his men and the speed of his attack. Often when the squadron was about to put into shore for the purpose of breakfast or supper, he would seize the moment, and draw back the leading wing of the column from the land off the point in question; and then facing round again with the triremes posted well in line, prow for prow, at a given signal let loose the whole fleet in a stoutly contested race for the shore. Great was the triumph in being the first to take in water or whatever else they might need, or the first to breakfast; just as it was a heavy penalty on the last-comers, not only to come short in all these objects of desire, but to have to put out to sea with the rest as soon as the

1 For the import of the official title ἐπιστολαφόρος in reference to the composition of the Hellenica, see Trans. vol. i. p. lxiii.
signal was given; since the first-comers had altogether a quiet time of it, whilst the hindmost must get through the whole business in hot haste. So again, in the matter of outposts, if he chanced to be getting the morning meal on hostile territory, pickets would be posted, as was right and proper, on the land; but, apart from these, he would raise his masts and keep look-out men on the maintops. These commanded of course a far wider prospect from their lofty perches than the outposts on the level ground. So too, when he dined or slept he had no fires burning in the camp at night, but only a beacon kindled in front of the encampment to prevent any unseen approach; and frequently in fine weather he put out to sea immediately after the evening meal, when, if the breeze favoured, they ran along and took their rest simultaneously, or if they depended on oars he gave his mariners repose by turns. During the voyage in daytime he would at one time signal to "sail in column," and at another signal "abreast in line." So that whilst they prosecuted the voyage they at the same time became (both as to theory and practice) well versed in all the details of an engagement before they reached the open sea—a sea, as they imagined, occupied by their foes. For the most part they breakfasted and dined on hostile territory; but as he confined himself to bare necessaries he was always too quick for the enemy. Before the hostile reinforcement would come up he had finished his business and was out to sea again.

At the date of Mnasippus's death he chanced to be off Sphagiae in Laconian territory. Reaching Elis, and coasting past the mouth of the Alpheus, he came to moorings under Cape Ichthus,¹ as it is called. The next day he put out from that port for Cephallenia, so drawing up his line and conducting the voyage that he might be prepared in every detail to engage if necessary. The tale about Mnasippus and his demise had reached him, but he had not heard it from an eye-witness, and suspected that it might have been invented to deceive him and throw him off his guard. He was therefore on the look-out. It was, in fact, only on arrival in Cephallenia that

¹ Cape Fish, mod. Cape Katákolon, protecting harbour of Pyrgos in Elis. See map to face p. 218 of Trans. vol. i.
he learned the news in an explicit form, and gave his troops rest.

I am well aware that all these details of practice and manœuvreuring are customary in anticipation of a sea-fight, but what I single out for praise in the case before us is the skill with which the Athenian admiral attained a twofold object. Bearing in mind that it was his duty to reach a certain point at which he expected to fight a naval battle without delay, it was a happy discovery on his part not to allow tactical skill, on the one hand, to be sacrificed to the pace of sailing, nor, on the other, the need of training to interfere with the date of arrival.

After reducing the towns of Cephallenia, Iphicrates sailed to Corcyra. There the first news he heard was that the triremes sent by Dionysius were expected to relieve the Lacedaemonians. On receipt of this information he set off in person and surveyed the country, in order to find a spot from which it would be possible to see the vessels approaching and to signal to the city. Here he stationed his look-out men. A code of signals was agreed upon to signify "vessels in sight," "mooring," etc.; which done he gave his orders to twenty of his captains of men-of-war who were to follow him at a given word of command. Any one who failed to follow him must not grumble at the penalty; that he warned them. Presently the vessels were signalled approaching; the word of command was given, and then the enthusiasm was a sight to see—every man of the crews told off for the expedition racing to join his ship and embark. Sailing to the point where the enemy's vessels lay, he had no difficulty in capturing the crews, who had disembarked from all the ships with one exception. The exception was that of Melanippus the Rhodian, who had advised the other captains not to stop at this point, and had then manned his own vessel and sailed off. Thus he encountered the ships of Iphicrates, but contrived to slip through his fingers, while the whole of the Syracusan vessels were captured, crews and all.

Having cut the beaks off the prows, Iphicrates bore down into the harbour of Corcyra with the captured triremes in tow. With the captive crews themselves he came to an agreement that each should pay a fixed sum as ransom, with

1 Lit. "the voyage."
one exception, that of Crinippus, their commander. Him he kept under guard, with the intention apparently of exacting a handsome sum in his case or else of selling him. The prisoner, however, from vexation of spirit, put an end to his own life. The rest were sent about their business by Iphicrates, who accepted the Corcyraeans as sureties for the money. His own sailors he supported for the most part as labourers on the lands of the Corcyraeans, while at the head of his light infantry and the hoplites of the contingent he crossed over into Acarnania, and there lent his aid to any friendly state that needed his services; besides which he went to war with the Thyrians, a sturdy race of warriors in possession of a strong fortress.

B.C. 372.—Having attached to his squadron the navy also of Corcyra, with a fleet numbering now about ninety ships he set sail, in the first instance to Cephallenia, where he exacted money—which was in some cases voluntarily paid, in others forcibly extorted. In the next place he began making preparations partly to harass the territory of the Lacedaemonians, and partly to win over voluntarily the other states in that quarter which were hostile to Athens; or in case of refusal to go to war with them.

The whole conduct of the campaign reflects, I think, the highest credit on Iphicrates. If his strategy was admirable, so too was the instinct which led him to advise the association with himself of two such colleagues as Callistatus and Chabrias—the former a popular orator but no great friend of himself politically, the other a man of high military reputa-

1 Thyreum (or Thyrium), in Acarnania, a chief city at the time of the Roman wars in Greece; and according to Polybius (xxxviii. 5), a meeting-place of the League on one occasion. See Dict. Anct. Geog. s.v.; Freeman, op. cit. iv. 148; cf. Paus. IV. xxvi. 3, in reference to the Messenians and Naupactus; Grote, H. G. x. 212.

2 Reading, with the MSS., ὀῦ μᾶλα ἐπιτήδειον δῦτα. See Grote, H. G. x. 206. Boeckh (P. E. A., trans. Cornwall Lewis, p. 419) wished to read ἐὸ μᾶλα for ὀῦ μᾶλα κ.τ.λ., in which case translate "the former a popular orator, and a man of singular capacity"; and for ἐπιτήδειον in that sense, see Hippiarch. i. 8; for ἐὸ μᾶλα, see Hippiarch. i. 25. For details concerning Callistatus, see Dindorf, op. cit. note ad loc.; Curtius, H. G. iv. 367, 381 foll., ν. 90. For Chabrias, Rehdantz, op. cit. In the next sentence I have again adhered to the reading of the MSS., but the passage is commonly regarded as corrupt; see Otto Keller, op. cit. p. 215 for various emendations.
tion. Either he looked upon them as men of unusual sagacity, and wished to profit by their advice, in which case I commend the good sense of the arrangement, or they were, in his belief, antagonists, in which case the determination to approve himself a consummate general, neither indolent nor incautious, was bold, I admit, but indicative of a laudable self-confidence. Here, however, we must part with Iphicrates and his achievements, to return to Athens.

III.—The Athenians, forced to witness the expatriation from Boeotia of their friends the Plataeans (who had sought an asylum with themselves), forced also to listen to the supplications of the Thespiaeans (who begged them not to suffer them to be robbed of their city), could no longer regard the Thebans with favour; though, when it came to a direct declaration of war, they were checked in part by a feeling of shame, and partly by considerations of expediency. Still, to go hand in hand with them, to be a party to their proceedings, this they absolutely refused, now that they saw them marching against time-honoured friends of the city like the Phocians, and blotting out states whose loyalty in the great Persian war was conspicuous no less than their friendship to Athens. Accordingly the People passed a decree to make peace; but in the first instance they sent an embassy to Thebes, inviting that state to join them if it pleased them on an embassy which they proposed to send to Lacedaemon to treat of peace. In the next place they despatched such an embassy on their own account. Among the commissioners appointed were Callias the son of Hipponicus, Autocles the son of Strombichides, Demostratus the son of Aristophon, Aristocles, Cephisodotus, Melanopus, and Lycaethus.

B.C. 371.—[These were formally introduced to the Deputies of the Lacedaemonians and the allies.] Nor ought the name of Callistratus to be omitted. That statesman and orator was present. He had obtained furlough from Iphicrates on an undertaking either to send money for the fleet or to arrange a peace. Hence his arrival in Athens and transactions in behalf

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1 Plataeae destroyed in B.C. 373. See Jowett, Thuc. ii. 397.
2 See below, Hell. VII. i. 12, p. 188; Hicks, 87.
3 The bracketed words read like an annotator’s comment, or possibly they are a note by the author.
of peace. After being introduced to the assembly 1 of the Lacedaemonians and to the allies, Callias, 2 who was the dadouchos (or torch-holder) in the mysteries, made the first speech. He was a man just as well pleased to praise himself as to hear himself praised by others. He opened the proceedings as follows:

"Lacedaemonians, the duty of representing you as proxenos at Athens is a privilege which I am not the first member of my family to enjoy; my father's father held it as an heirloom of our family and handed it down as a heritage to his descendants. If you will permit me, I should like to show you the disposition of my fatherland towards yourselves. If in times of war she chooses us as her generals, so when her heart is set upon quiet she sends us out as her messengers of peace. I myself have twice already 3 stood here to treat for the conclusion of war, and on both embassies succeeded in arranging a mutually agreeable peace. Now for the third time I am come, and I flatter myself that to-day again I shall obtain a reconciliation, and on grounds exceptionally just. My eyes bear witness that our hearts are in accord; you and we alike are pained at the effacement of Plataeae and Thespiae. Is it not then reasonable that out of agreement should spring concord rather than discord? It is never the part, I take it, of wise men to raise the standard of war for the sake of petty differences; but where there is nothing but unanimity they must be marvellous folk who refuse the bond of peace. But I go further. It were just and right on our parts even to refuse to bear arms against each other; since, as the story runs, the first strangers to whom our forefather Triptolemus showed the unspeakable mystic rites of Demeter and Corè, the mother and the maiden, were your ancestors; —I speak of Heracles, the first founder of your state, and of your two citizens, the great twin sons of Zeus— and to Peloponnesus first he gave as a gift the seed of Demeter's corn-fruits. How, then, can it be just or

1 See above, Hell. II. iv. 38 (vol. i. p. 73).
2 See above, Hell. IV. v. 13; Cobet, Prosp. Xen. p. 67 foll.; Xen. Symp.; Plat. Protag.; Andoc. de Myst. If this is one and the same person he must have been an elderly man at this date, 371 B.C.
3 B.C. 387 and 374; see Curtius, H. G. vol. iv. p. 376 (Eng. ed.).
right either that you should come and ravage the corn crops of those from whom you got the sacred seed of corn, or that we should not desire that they to whom the gift was given should share abundantly of this boon? But if, as it would seem, it is a fixed decree of heaven that war shall never cease among men, yet ought we—your people and our people—to be as slow as possible to begin it, and being in it, as swift as possible to bring it to an end."

After him Autocles¹ spoke: he was of repute as a versatile lawyer and orator, and addressed the meeting as follows: "Lacedaemonians, I do not conceal from myself that what I am about to say is not calculated to please you, but it seems to me that, if you wish the friendship which we are cementing to last as long as possible, we are wise to show each other the underlying causes of our wars. Now, you are perpetually saying that the states ought to be independent; but it is you yourselves who most of all stand in the way of independence,—your first and last stipulation with the allied states being that they should follow you whithersoever you choose to lead; and yet what has this principle of follow-my-leader got to do with independent action?² Again, you pick quarrels without consulting your allies, and lead them against those whom you account enemies; so that in many cases, with all their vaunted independence, they are forced to march against their greatest friends; and, what is still more opposed to independence than all else, you are for ever setting up here your decarchies and there your thirty commissioners, and your chief aim in appointing these officers and governors seems to be, not that they should fulfil their office and govern legally, but that they should be able to keep the cities under their heels by sheer force. So that it looks as if you delighted in despotisms rather than free constitutions. Let us go back to the date³ at which the Persian king enjoined the independence of the states. At that time you made no secret of your conviction that the Thebans, if they did not suffer each state to

¹ For the political views of Autocles, see Curtius, H. G. iv. 387, v. 94 (Eng. tr.); see also Grote, H. G. x, 225.
² Or, "what consistency is there between these precepts of yours and political independence?"
³ Sixteen years before—B.C. 387. See below, Pol. Lac. xiv. 5, p. 322.
govern itself and to use the laws of its own choice, would be failing to act in the spirit of the king's rescript. But no sooner had you got hold of the Cadmeia than you would not suffer the Thebans themselves to be independent. Now, if the maintenance of friendship be an object, it is no use for people to claim justice from others while they themselves are doing all they can to prove the selfishness of their aims."

These remarks were received in absolute silence, yet in the hearts of those who were annoyed with Lacedaemon they stirred pleasure. After Autocles spoke Callistratus: "Trespasses, men of Lacedaemon, have been committed on both sides, yours and ours, I am free to confess; but still it is not my view that because a man has done wrong we can never again have dealings with him. Experience tells me that no man can go very far without a slip, and it seems to me that sometimes the transgressor by reason of his transgression becomes more tractable, especially if he be chastened through the error he has committed, as has been the case with us. And so in your own case I see that ungenerous acts have sometimes reaped their own proper reward: blow has been met by counter-blown; and as a specimen I take the seizure of the Cadmeia in Thebes. To-day, at any rate, the very cities whose independence you strive for have, since your unrighteous treatment of Thebes, fallen one and all of them again into her power.\(^1\) We are schooled now, both of us, to know that grasping brings not gain. We are prepared, I hope, to be once more moderate under the influence of a mutual friendship. Some, I know, in their desire to render our peace\(^2\) abortive accuse us falsely, as though we were come hither, not seeking friendship, but because we dread the arrival of some\(^3\) Antalcidas with moneys from the king. But consider, what arrant nonsense they talk! Was it not, pray, the great king who demanded that all the states in Hellas should be independent? and what have we Athenians, who are in full agree-

\(^1\) Reading, with Breitenbach and Hartman, ἂς instead of ὧς ἐποδιδόσατε κ.τ.λ.

\(^2\) Or, more lit. "to avert the peace" as an ill-omened thing.

\(^3\) Without inserting τίς, as Hartman proposes (An. Xen. p. 387), that, I think, is the sense. Antalcidas is the arch-diplomat—a name to conjure with, like that of Bismarck in modern European politics. But see Grote, H. G. x. 213, note 2.
ment with the king, both in word and deed, to fear from him? Or is it conceivable that he prefers spending money in making others great to finding his favourite projects realised without expense?

"Well! what is it really that has brought us here? No especial need or difficulty in our affairs. That you may discover by a glance at our maritime condition, or, if you prefer, at the present posture of our affairs on land. Well, then, how does the matter stand? It is obvious that some of our allies please us no better than they please you; and, possibly, in return for your former preservation of us, we may be credited with a desire to point out to you the soundness of our policy.

"But, to revert once more to the topic of expediency and common interests. It is admitted, I presume, that, looking at the states collectively, half support your views, half ours; and in every single state one party is for Sparta and another for Athens. Suppose, then, we were to shake hands, from what quarter can we reasonably anticipate danger and trouble? To put the case in so many words, so long as you are our friends no one can vex us by land; no one, whilst we are your supporters, can injure you by sea. Wars like tempests gather and grow to a head from time to time, and again they are dispersed. That we all know. Some future day, if not to-day, we shall crave, both of us, for peace. Why, then, need we wait for that moment, holding on until we expire under the multitude of our ills, rather than take time by the forelock and, before some irremediable mischief betide, make peace? I cannot admire the man who, because he has entered the lists and has scored many a victory and obtained to himself renown, is so eaten up with the spirit of rivalry that he must needs go on until he is beaten and all his training is made futile. Nor again do I praise the gambler who, if he makes one good stroke of luck, insists on doubling the stakes. Such

1 See, for this corrupt passage, Otto Keller, op. cit. p. 219; Hartman, op. cit. p. 387; and Breitenbach, n. ad loc. In the next sentence I should like to adopt Hartman's emendation (ib.) ἄν ὅπως ἐγγευσθε for the MSS. ἄν ὅπως ἐγγυσμένον, and translate "we may like to prove to you the soundness of your policy at the time." For the "preservation" referred to, see below, VI. v. 35, p. 180; and Hell. II. ii. 20 (Trans. vol. i. p. 48).
conduct in the majority of cases must end in absolute collapse. Let us lay the lesson of these to heart, and forbear to enter into any such lists as theirs for life or death; but, while we are yet in the heyday of our strength and fortune, shake hands in mutual amity. So assuredly shall we through you and you through us attain to an unprecedented pinnacle of glory throughout Hellas.”

The arguments of the speakers were approved, and the Lacedaemonians passed a resolution to accept peace on a threefold basis: the withdrawal of the governors from the cities,¹ the disbanding of armaments naval and military, and the guarantee of independence to the states. “If any state transgressed these stipulations, it lay at the option of any power whatsoever to aid the states so injured, while, conversely, to bring such aid was not compulsory on any power against its will.” On these terms the oaths were administered and accepted by the Lacedaemonians on behalf of themselves and their allies, and by the Athenians and their allies separately by state. The Thebans had entered their individual name among the states which accepted the oaths, but their ambas-
sadors came the next day with instructions to alter the name of the signatories, substituting for Thebans Boeotians.² But Agesilaus answered to this demand that he would alter nothing of what they had in the first instance sworn to and sub-
scribed. If they did not wish to be included in the treaty, he was willing to erase their name at their bidding. So it came to pass that the rest of the world made peace, the sole point of dispute being confined to the Thebans; and the Athenians came to the conclusion that there was a fair prospect of the Thebans being now literally decimated.³ As to the Thebans themselves, they retired from Sparta in utter despondency.

iv.—In consequence of the peace the Athenians proceeded to withdraw their garrisons from the different states, and sent to

¹ Grote (H. G. x. 236) thinks that Diod. xv. 38 (ἐκαγωγεῖς) belongs to this time, not to the peace between Athens and Sparta in 374 B.C.
² See, for a clear explanation of the matter, Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. iv. p. 175, note 3, in reference to Grote, ib. x. 231 note, and Paus. IX. xiii. 2; Plut. Ages. 28; Thirlwall, H. G. v. p. 69 note.
³ Or, “as the saying is, taken and tithed.” See below, VI. v. 35, p. 180, and for the origin of the saying, Herod. vii. r32.
recall Iphicrates with his fleet; besides which they forced him to restore everything captured subsequently to the late solemn undertaking at Lacedaemon. The Lacedaemonians acted differently. Although they withdrew their governors and garrisons from the other states, in Phocis they did not do so. Here Cleombrotus was quartered with his army, and had sent to ask directions from the home authorities. A speaker, Prothous, maintained that their business was to disband the army in accordance with their oaths, and then to send round invitations to the states to contribute what each felt individually disposed, and lay such sum in the temple of Apollo; after which, if any attempt to hinder the independence of the states on any side were manifested, it would be time enough then again to invite all who cared to protect the principle of autonomy to march against its opponents. "In this way," he added, "I think the goodwill of heaven will be secured, and the states will suffer least annoyance." But the Assembly, on hearing these views, agreed that this man was talking nonsense. Puppets in the hand of fate! An unseen power, as it would seem, was already driving them onwards; so they sent instructions to Cleombrotus not to disband the army, but to march straight against the Thebans if they refused to recognise the autonomy of the states. [Cleombrotus, it is understood, had, on hearing the news of the establishment of peace, sent to the ephorate to ask for guidance; and then they sent him the above instructions, bidding him under the circumstances named to march upon Thebes.]

The Spartan king soon perceived that, so far from leaving the Boeotian states their autonomy, the Thebans were not even preparing to disband their army, clearly in view of a general engagement; he therefore felt justified in marching his troops into Boeotia. The point of ingress which he adopted was not that which the Thebans anticipated from Phocis, and where they were keeping guard at a defile;

1 See Grote, H. G. x. 237: "The miso-Theban impulse now drove them on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts, ... a misguiding inspiration sent by the gods—like that of the Homeric Até."

2 This passage reads like an earlier version for which the above was substituted by the author.
but, marching through Thisbae by a mountainous and unsuspected route, he arrived before Creusis, taking that fortress and capturing twelve Theban war-vessels besides. After this achievement he advanced from the seaboard and encamped in Leuctra on Thespian territory. The Thebans encamped on a rising ground immediately opposite at no great distance, and were supported by no allies except the Boeotians.

At this juncture the friends of Cleombrotus came to him and urged upon him strong reasons for delivering battle. "If you let the Thebans escape without a battle," they said, "you will run great risks of suffering the extreme penalty at the hands of the state. People will call to mind against you the time when you reached Cynoscephalae and did not ravage a square foot of Theban territory; and again, a subsequent expedition when you were driven back foiled in your attempt to make an entry into the enemy's country—while Agesilaus on each occasion found his entry by Mount Cithaeron. If then you have any care for yourself, or any attachment to your fatherland, march you must against the enemy." That was what his friends urged. As to his opponents, what they said was, "Now our fine friend will show whether he really is so concerned on behalf of the Thebans as he is said to be."

Cleombrotus, with these words ringing in his ears, felt driven\(^1\) to join battle. On their side the leaders of Thebes calculated that, if they did not fight, their provincial cities\(^2\) would hold aloof from them and Thebes itself would be besieged; while, if the commonalty of Thebes failed to get supplies, there was every prospect that the city itself would turn against them; and, seeing that many of them had already tasted the bitterness of exile, they came to the conclusion that it was better for them to die on the field of battle than to renew that experience. Besides this they were somewhat encouraged by the recital of an oracle which predicted that the Lacedaemonians would be defeated on the spot where the monument of the maidens stood, who, as the story goes, being

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\(^1\) Or, "was provoked."

violated by certain Lacedaemonians, had slain themselves.¹ This sepulchral monument the Thebans decked with ornaments before the battle. Furthermore, tidings were brought them from the city that all the temples had opened of their own accord; and the priestesses asserted that the gods revealed victory. Again, from the Heracleion men said that the arms had disappeared, as though Heracles himself had sallied forth to battle. It is true that another interpretation² of these marvels made them out to be one and all the artifices of the leaders of Thebes. However this may be, everything in the battle turned out adverse to the Lacedaemonians; while fortune herself lent aid to the Thebans and crowned their efforts with success. Cleombrotus held his last council "whether to fight or not," after the morning meal. In the heat of noon a little wine goes a long way; and people said that it took a somewhat provocative effect on their spirits.*

Both sides were now arming, and there were the unmistakable signs of approaching battle, when, as the first incident, there issued from the Boeotian lines a long train bent on departure—these were the furnishers of the market, a detachment of baggage bearers, and in general such people as had no inclination to join in the fight. These were met on their retreat and attacked by the mercenary troops under Hiero, who got round them by a circular movement.* The mercenaries were supported by the Phocian light infantry and some squadrons of Heracleot and Phliasian cavalry, who fell upon the retiring train and turned them back, pursuing them and driving them into the camp of the Boeotians. The immediate effect was to make the Boeotian portion of the army more numerous and closer packed than before. The next feature of the combat was that in consequence of the flat space of plain⁵ between the opposing armies, the Lacedaemonians posted their cavalry in front of their squares of infantry, and the Thebans followed suit. Only there was this difference,—the Theban cavalry was in a high state of training and efficiency, owing to their war with the Orcho-

¹ See Diod. xv. 54; Paus. IX. xiii. 3; Plut. Pelop. xx.
² Or, "it is true that some people made out these marvels."
³ Or, "they were somewhat excited by it."
⁴ Or, "surrounded them." ⁵ See Rüstow and Köchly, op. cit. p. 173.
menians and again their war with Thespiae, whilst the cavalry of the Lacedaemonians was at its worst at this period. The horses were reared and kept by the wealthiest members of the state; but whenever the ban was called out, an appointed trooper appeared who took the horse with any sort of arms which might be presented to him, and set off on the expedition at a moment's notice. Moreover, these troopers were the least able-bodied of the men: raw recruits set simply astride their horses, and devoid of soldierly ambition. Such was the cavalry of either antagonist.

The heavy infantry of the Lacedaemonians, it is said, advanced by sections three files abreast, allowing a total depth to the whole line of not more than twelve. The Thebans were formed in close order of not less than fifty shields deep, calculating that victory gained over the king's division of the army implied the easy conquest of the rest.

Cleombrotus had hardly begun to lead his division against the foe when, before in fact the troops with him were aware of his advance, the cavalry had already come into collision, and that of the Lacedaemonians was speedily worsted. In their flight they became involved with their own heavy infantry; and to make matters worse, the Theban regiments were already attacking vigorously. Still strong evidence exists for supposing that Cleombrotus and his division were, in the first instance, victorious in the battle, if we consider the fact that they could never have picked him up and brought him back alive unless his vanguard had been masters of the situation for the moment.

When, however, Deinon the polemarch and Sphodrias, a member of the king's council, with his son Cleonymus, had fallen, then it was that the cavalry and the polemarch's adjuants, as they are called, with the rest, under pressure of the mass against them, began retreating; and the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, seeing the right borne down in this way,

1 See Hipparch. ix. 4; also Cyrop. VIII. viii.
2 It would appear that the "enomoty" (section) numbered thirty-six files. See Pol. Lac. xi. 4; xiii. 4. For further details as to the tactical order of the Thebans, see Diod. xv. 55; Plut. Pelop. xxiii.
3 See above, V. iv. 33, p. 127.
4 συμφόρεις. For the readings of this corrupt passage see Otto Keller.
also swerved. Still, in spite of the numbers slain, and broken as they were, as soon as they had crossed the trench which protected their camp in front, they grounded arms on the spot\(^1\) whence they had rushed to battle. This camp, it must be borne in mind, did not lie at all on the level, but was pitched on a somewhat steep incline. At this juncture there were some of the Lacedaemonians who, looking upon such a disaster as intolerable, maintained that they ought to prevent the enemy from erecting a trophy, and try to recover the dead not under a flag of truce but by another battle. The polemarchs, however, seeing that nearly a thousand men of the total Lacedaemonian troops were slain; seeing also that of the seven hundred Spartans themselves who were on the field something like four hundred lay dead;\(^2\) aware, further, of the despondency which reigned among the allies, and the general disinclination on their parts to fight longer (a frame of mind not far removed in some instances from positive satisfaction at what had taken place)—under the circumstances, I say, the polemarchs called a council of the ablest representatives of the shattered army\(^3\) and deliberated as to what should be done. Finally the unanimous opinion was to pick up the dead under a flag of truce, and they sent a herald to treat for terms. The Thebans after that set up a trophy and gave back the bodies under a truce.

After these events, a messenger was despatched to Lacedaemon with news of the calamity. He reached his destination on the last day of the gymnopaediae,\(^4\) just when the chorus of grown men had entered the theatre. The ephors heard the mournful tidings not without grief and pain, as needs they must, I take it; but for all that they did not dismiss the chorus, but allowed the contest to run out its natural course. What they did was to deliver the names of those who had fallen to their friends and families, with a word of warning to the women not to make any loud lamenta-

\(^1\) Or, "in orderly way." See Curt. H. G. iv. 400.

\(^2\) See Ages. ii. 24.

\(^3\) τοὺς ἐπικαμριστάους. See above, III. iii. 10, p. 23; Cyrop. VII. iv. 4; VIII. iv. 32, vi. 2.

\(^4\) The festival was celebrated annually about midsummer. See Herod. vi. 67; Thuc. v. 82, and Arnold’s note; Pollux, iv. 105; Athen. xiv. 30, xv. 22; Müller, Dorians, ii. 389.
tion but to bear their sorrow in silence; and the next day it was a striking spectacle to see those who had relations among the slain moving to and fro in public with bright and radiant looks, whilst of those whose friends were reported to be living barely a man was to be seen, and these flitted by with lowered heads and scowling brows, as if in humiliation.

After this the ephors proceeded to call out the ban, including the forty-years-service men of the two remaining regiments;¹ and they proceeded further to despatch the reserves of the same age belonging to the six regiments already on foreign service. Hitherto the Phocian campaign had only drawn upon the thirty-five-years-service list. Besides these they now ordered out on active service the troops retained at the beginning of the campaign in attendance on the magistrates at the government offices. Agesilaus being still disabled by his infirmity, the city imposed the duty of command upon his son Archidamus. The new general found eager co-operators in the men of Tegea. The friends of Stasippus at this date were still living,² and they were stanch in their Lacedaemonian proclivities, and wielded considerable power in their state. Not less stoutly did the Mantineans from their villages under their aristocratic form of government flock to the Spartan standard. Besides Tegea and Mantinea, the Corinthians and Sicyonians, the Phliasians and Achaean were equally enthusiastic in joining the campaign, whilst other states sent out soldiers. Then came the fitting out and manning of ships of war on the part of the Lacedaemonians themselves and of the Corinthians, whilst the Sicyonians were requested to furnish a supply of vessels on board of which it was proposed to transport the army across the gulf. And so, finally, Archidamus was able to offer the sacrifices usual at the moment of crossing the frontier. But to return to Thebes.

Immediately after the battle the Thebans sent a messenger to Athens wearing a chaplet. Whilst insisting on the magnitude of the victory they at the same time called upon the Athenians to send them aid, for now the opportunity had come to wreak vengeance on the Lacedaemonians for all the

¹ *I.e.* every one up to fifty-eight years of age. See above, p. 69.
² See below, VI. v. 9, p. 171.
evil they had done to Athens. As it chanced, the senate of the Athenians was holding a session on the Acropolis. As soon as the news was reported, the annoyance caused by its announcement was unmistakable. They neither invited the herald to accept of hospitality nor sent back one word in reply to the request for assistance. And so the herald turned his back on Athens and departed.

But there was Jason still to look to, and he was their ally. To him then the Thebans sent, and earnestly besought his aid, their thoughts running on the possible turn which events might take. Jason on his side at once proceeded to man a fleet, with the apparent intention of sending assistance by sea, besides which he got together his foreign brigade and his own cavalry; and although the Phocians and he were implacable enemies,¹ he marched through their territory to Boeotia. Appearing like a vision to many of the states before his approach was even announced—at any rate before levies could be mustered from a dozen different points—he had stolen a march upon them and was a long way ahead, giving proof that expedition is sometimes a better tool to work with than sheer force.

When he arrived in Boeotia the Thebans urged upon him that now was the right moment to attack the Lacedaemonians: he with his foreign brigade from the upper ground, they face to face in front; but Jason dissuaded them from their intention. He reminded them that after a noble achievement won it was not worth their while to play for so high a stake, involving a still higher achievement or else the loss of victory already gained. "Do you not see," he urged, "that your success followed close on the heels of necessity? You ought then to reflect that the Lacedaemonians in their distress, with a choice between life and death, will fight it out with reckless desperation. Providence, as it seems, oftentimes delights to make the little ones great and the great ones small."²

By such arguments he diverted the Thebans from the desperate adventure. But for the Lacedaemonians also he had words of advice, insisting on the difference between an

¹ Or, "though the Phocians maintained a war à outrance with him."
² Cf. Anab. III. ii. 10 (Trans. vol. i. p. 154).
army defeated and an army flushed with victory. "If you are minded," he said, "to forget this disaster, my advice to you is to take time to recover breath and recruit your energies. When you have grown stronger then give battle to these unconquered veterans." At present," he continued, "you know without my telling you that among your own allies there are some who are already discussing terms of friendship with your foes. My advice is: by all means endeavour to obtain a truce. This," he added, "is my own ambition: I want to save you, on the ground of my father's friendship with yourselves, and as being myself your representative." Such was the tenor of his speech, but the secret of action was perhaps to be found in a desire to make these mutual antagonists put their dependence on himself alone. Whatever his motive, the Lacedaemonians took his advice, and commissioned him to procure a truce.

As soon as the news arrived that the terms were arranged, the polemarchs passed an order round: the troops were to take their evening meal, get their kit together, and be ready to set off that night, so as to scale the passes of Cithaeron by next morning. After supper, before the hour of sleep, the order to march was given, and with the generals at their head the troops advanced as the shades of evening fell, along the road to Creusis, trusting rather to the chance of their escaping notice, than to the truce itself. It was weary marching in the dead of night, making their retreat in fear, and along a difficult road, until at length they reached Aegosthena in the Megaris. Here they fell in with Archidamus's army of relief. At this point, then, Archidamus waited till all the allies had arrived, and so led the whole of the united armies back to Corinth, from which point he dismissed the allies and led his fellow-citizens home.

Jason took his departure from Boeotia through Phocis, where he captured the suburbs of Hyampolis and ravaged the country districts, putting many to the sword. Content with this, he traversed the rest of Phocis without meddling or

1 Or, "the invincibles."  
2 Lit. "your proxenos."  
3 An ancient town of Phocis (see Hom. Il. ii. 521) on the road leading from Orchomenus to Opus, and commanding a pass from Locris into Phocis and Boeotia. See Herod. viii. 28; Paus. ix. 35, § 5; Strab. ix. 424; Dict. of Geog. s.v.
making. Arrived at Heraclea,\(^1\) he knocked down the fortress of the Heracleots, showing that he was not troubled by any apprehension lest when the pass was thrown open somebody or other might march against his own power at some future date. Rather was he haunted by the notion that some one or other might one day seize Heraclea, which commanded the pass, and bar his passage into Hellas—should Hellas ever be his goal.\(^2\) At the moment of his return to Thessaly he had reached the zenith of his greatness. He was the lawfully constituted Prince\(^3\) of Thessaly, and he had under him a large mercenary force of infantry and cavalry, and all in the highest perfection of training. For this twofold reason he might claim the title great. But he was still greater as the head of a vast alliance. Those who were prepared to fight his battles were numerous, and he might still count upon the help of many more eager to do so; but I call Jason greatest among his contemporaries, because not one among them could afford to look down upon him.\(^4\)

B.C. 370.—The Pythian games were now approaching, and an order went round the cities from Jason to make preparation for the solemn sacrifice of oxen, sheep and goats, and swine. It was reported that although the requisitions upon the several cities were moderate, the number of beeves did not fall short of a thousand, while the rest of the sacrificial beasts exceeded ten times that number. He issued a proclamation also to this effect: a golden wreath of victory should be given to whichever city could produce the best-bred bull to head the procession in honour of the god. And lastly there was an order issued to all the Thessalians to be ready for a campaign at the date of the Pythian games. His intention, as people said, was to act as manager of the solemn assembly and games in person. What the thought was that passed through his mind with

\(^1\) Or, "Heracleia Trachinio," a fortress city founded (as a colony) by the Lacedaemonians in B.C. 426, to command the approach to Thermopylae from Thessaly, and to protect the Trachinians and the neighbouring Dorians from the Oecean mountaineers. See Dict. of Geog. "Trachis"; Thuc. iii. 92, 93, v. 51, 52; Diod. xii. 59.

\(^2\) B.C. 370.—The following sections 28-37 form an episode concerning Thessalian affairs between B.C. 370 and B.C. 359. See Trans. vol. i. p. lxiii.

\(^3\) Lit. "Tagos."

\(^4\) For a similar verbal climax see below, VI. v. 47, p. 183.
reference to the sacred money, remains to this day uncertain; only, a tale is rife to the effect that in answer to an inquiry of the Delphians, "What ought we to do, if he takes any of the treasures of the god?" the god made answer, "He would see to that himself." This great man, his brain teeming with vast designs of this high sort, came now to his end. He had ordered a military inspection. The cavalry of the Pheraeans were to pass muster before him. He was already seated, delivering answers to all petitioners, when seven striplings approached, quarrelling, as it seemed, about some matter. Suddenly by these seven the Prince was despatched; his throat gashed, his body gored with wounds. Stoutly the guard rushed to the rescue with their long spears, and one of the seven, while still in the act of aiming a blow at Jason, was thrust through with a lance and died; a second, in the act of mounting his horse, was caught, and dropped dead, the recipient of many wounds. The rest leaped on the horses which they had ready waiting and escaped. To whatever city of Hellas they came honours were almost universally accorded them. The whole incident proves clearly that the Hellenes stood in much alarm of Jason. They looked upon him as a tyrant in embryo.

So Jason was dead; and his brothers Polydorus and Polyphron were appointed princes\(^1\) in his place. But of these twain, as they journeyed together to Larissa, Polydorus was slain in the night, as he slept, by his brother Polyphron, it was thought; since a death so sudden, without obvious cause, could hardly be otherwise accounted for.

Polyphron governed for a year, and by the year's end he had refashioned his princedom into the likeness of a tyranny. In Pharsalus he put to death Polydamas\(^2\) and eight other of the best citizens; and from Larissa he drove many into exile. But while he was thus employed, he, in his turn, was done to death by Alexander, who slew him to avenge Polydorus and to destroy the tyranny. This man now assumed the reins of office, and had no sooner done so than he showed himself a harsh prince to the Thessalians:

\(^1\) Lit. "Tagoi." \(^2\) See above, VI. i. 2 foll. p. 137 foll.
harsh too and hostile to the Thebans and Athenians, and an unprincipled freebooter everywhere by land and by sea. But if that was his character, he too was doomed to perish shortly. The perpetrators of the deed were his wife's brothers. The counsellor of it and the inspiring soul was the wife herself. She it was who reported to them that Alexander had designs against them; who hid them within the house a whole day; who welcomed home her husband deep in his cups and laid him to rest, and then while the lamp still burned brought out the prince's sword. It was she also who, perceiving that her brothers shrank back, fearing to go in and attack Alexander, said to them, "If you do not be quick and do the deed, I will wake him up!" After they had gone in, she, too, it was who caught and pulled to the door, clinging fast to the knocker till the breath was out of her husband's body. Her fierce hatred against the man is variously explained. By some it was said to date from the day when Alexander, having imprisoned his own favourite—who was a fair young stripling—when his wife supplicated him to release the boy, brought him forth and stabbed him in the throat. Others say it originated through his sending to Thebes and seeking the hand of the wife of Jason in marriage, because his own wife bore him no children. These are the various causes assigned to explain the treason of his wife against him. Of the brothers who executed it, the eldest, Tisiphonus, in virtue of his seniority accepted, and up to the date of this history succeeded in holding, the government.

v.—The above is a sketch of Thessalian affairs, including the incidents connected with Jason, and those subsequent to his death, down to the government of Tisiphonus. I now return to the point at which we digressed.

B.C. 371.—Archidamus, after the relief of the army defeated at Leuctra, had led back the united forces. When he was gone, the Athenians, impressed by the fact that the

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1 See Dem. c. Aristocr. 120; Diod. xv. 60 foll.
2 B.C. 359 or 358.
3 The woman's name was Thebē. See Diod. xvi. 14; Cicero, de Inven. II. xlix. 144; de Div. I. xxv. 52; de Off. II. vii. 25; Ovid, Ibis, iii. 21 foll.
4 Or, "portion of my work," lit. "argument," λόγος. See Κυρπλαυς, Πεπλ των Τῆλε: p. 111. For the importance of this remark in reference to the composition of the Hellenica, see Trans. vol. i. pp. ivii. ixii. ixiii.
Peloponnesians still felt under an obligation to follow the Lacedaemonians to the field, whilst Sparta herself was by no means as yet reduced to a condition resembling that to which she had reduced Athens, sent invitations to those states which cared to participate in the peace authorised by the great king. A congress met, and they passed a resolution in conjunction with those who wished to make common cause with them to bind themselves by oath as follows: “I will abide by the treaty terms as conveyed in the king’s rescript, as also by the decrees of the Athenians and the allies. If any one marches against any city among those which have accepted this oath, I will render assistance to that city with all my strength.” The oath gave general satisfaction, the Eleians alone gainsaying its terms and protesting that it was not right to make either the Marganians or the Scilluntians or the Triphylians independent, since these cities belonged to them, and were a part of Elis. The Athenians, however, and the others passed the decree in the precise language of the king’s rescript: that all states—great and small alike—were to be independent; and they sent out administrators of the oath, and enjoined upon them to administer it to the highest authorities in each state. This oath they all, with the exception of the Eleians, swore to.

B.C. 371-370.—As an immediate consequence of this agreement, the Mantineans, on the assumption that they were now absolutely independent, met in a body and passed a decree to make Mantinea into a single state and to fortify the town. The proceeding was not overlooked by the Lacedaemonians, who thought it would be hard if this were done without their consent. Accordingly they despatched Agesilaus as ambassador to the Mantineans, choosing him as the recognised ancestral friend of that people. When the ambassador arrived, however, the chief magistrates had no inclination to summon a meeting of the commons to listen to him, but urged him to make a statement of his wishes to themselves. He, on his side, was ready to undertake for himself and in their interests that, if

1 *I.e.* in B.C. 387, the peace “of” Antalcidas. See Grote, *H. G.* x. 274.
2 See Busolt, *op. cit.* p. 186.
3 For the restoration of Mantinea, see Freeman, *Fed. Gov.* iv. p. 198; Grote, *H. G.* x. 283 foll.
they would at present desist from their fortification work, he would bring it about that the defensive walls should be built with the sanction of Lacedaemon and without cost. Their answer was, that it was impossible to hold back, since a decree had been passed by the whole state of Mantinea to build at once. Whereupon Agesilaus went off in high dudgeon; though as to sending troops to stop them, the idea seemed impracticable, as the peace was based upon the principle of autonomy. Meanwhile the Mantineans received help from several of the Arcadian states in the building of their walls; and the Eleians contributed actually three talents of silver to cover the expense of their construction. And here leaving the Mantineans thus engaged, we will turn to the men of Tegea.

There were in Tegea two political parties. The one was the party of Callibius and Proxenus, who were for drawing together the whole Arcadian population in a confederacy, in which all measures carried in the common assembly should be held valid for the individual component states. The programme of the other (Stasippus’s) party was to leave Tegea undisturbed and in the enjoyment of the old national laws. Perpetually defeated in the Sacred College, the party of Callibius and Proxenus were persuaded that if only the commons met they would gain an easy victory by an appeal to the multitude; and in this faith they proceeded to march out the citizen soldiers. At sight of this Stasippus and his friends on their side armed in opposition, and proved not inferior in numbers. The result was a collision and battle, in which Proxenus and some few others with him were slain and the

1 See above, V. ii. 1, sub anno B.C. 386.
2 = £731. 5s. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 199.
3 Although the historian does not recount the foundation of Megalopolis (see Pausanias and Diodorus), the mention of the common assembly of the League (ἐν τῷ κοινῷ) in this passage and, still more, of the Ten Thousand (below, Hell. VII. i. 38), implies it. See Freeman, op. cit. iv. 197 foll.; Grote, H. G. x. 306 foll., il. 599; Dict. of Geog. “Megalopolis.” As to the date of its foundation Pausanias (VIII. xxvii. 8) says “a few months after the battle of Leuctra,” before midsummer B.C. 370; Diodorus (xv. 72) says B.C. 368. The great city was not built in a day. Messene, according to Paus. iv. xxvii. 5, was founded between the midsummers of B.C. 370 and B.C. 369.
4 Lit. “in the Theo roi.” For the Theo ri, see Thuc. v. 47, Arnold’s note; and C. I. G. 1756 foll.; and for the revolution at Tegea here recounted, see Grote, H. G. x. 285 foll.
5 Or, “they mustered under arms.”
rest put to flight; though the conquerors did not pursue, for Stasippus was a man who did not care to stain his hands with the blood of his fellow-citizens.  

Callibius and his friends had retired under the fortification walls and gates facing Mantinea; but, as their opponents made no further attempts against them, they here collected together and remained quiet. Some while ago they had sent messages to the Mantineans demanding assistance, but now they were ready to discuss terms of reconciliation with the party of Stasippus. Presently they saw the Mantineans advancing; whereupon some of them sprang to the walls, and began calling to them to bring succour with all speed. With shouts they urged upon them to make haste, whilst others threw open wide the gates to them. Stasippus and his party, perceiving what was happening, poured out by the gates leading to Pallantium, and, outspeeding their pursuers, succeeded in reaching the temple of Artemis, where they found shelter, and, shutting to the doors, kept quiet. Following close upon their heels, however, their foes scaled the temple, tore off the roof, and began striking them down with the tiles. They, recognising that there was no choice, called upon their assailants to desist, and undertook to come forth. Then their opponents, capturing them like birds in a fowler's hand, bound them with chains, threw them on to the prisoners' van, and led them off to Tegea. Here with the Mantineans they sentenced and put them to death.

The outcome of these proceedings was the banishment to Lacedaemon of the Tegeans who formed the party of Stasippus, numbering eight hundred; but as a sequel to what had taken place, the Lacedaemonians determined that they were bound by their oaths to aid the banished Tegeans and to avenge the slain. With this purpose they marched against the Mantineans, on the ground that they had violated their

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1 Or, "opposed to a wholesale slaughter of the citizens."

2 Pallantium, one of the most ancient towns of Arcadia, in the Maenalia (Paus. VIII. xliv. 5; Livy, i. 5), situated somewhat south of the modern Tripolitza (see Dict. of Anc. Geog.); like Asea and Eutaea it helped to found Megalopolis (Paus. VIII. xxvii. 3, where for 'Iasala read 'Aσελα); below, VII. v. 5, p. 227; Busolt, op. cit. p. 125.

3 For the sequel of the matter, see above, Hell. VI. iv. 18, p. 163; Busolt, op. cit. p. 134.
oaths in marching against Tegea with an armed force. The ephors called out the ban and the state commanded Agesilaus to head the expedition.

Meanwhile most of the Arcadian contingents were mustering at Asea.\(^1\) The Orchomenians not only refused to take part in the Arcadian league, on account of their personal hatred to Mantinea, but had actually welcomed within their city a mercenary force under Polytropus, which had been collected at Corinth. The Mantineans themselves were forced to stay at home to keep an eye on these. The men of Heraea and Lepreum made common cause with the Lacdaemonians in a campaign against Mantinea.

Finding the frontier sacrifices favourable, Agesilaus began his march at once upon Arcadia. He began by occupying the border city of Eutaea, where he found the old men, women, and children dwelling in their houses, while the rest of the population of a military age were off to join the Arcadian league. In spite of this he did not stir a finger unjustly against the city, but suffered the inhabitants to continue in their homes undisturbed. The troops took all they needed, and paid for it in return; if any pillage had occurred on his first entrance into the town, the property was hunted up and restored by the Spartan king. Whilst awaiting the arrival of Polytropus’s mercenaries, he amused himself by repairing such portions of their walls as necessity demanded.

Meanwhile the Mantineans had taken the field against Orchomenus; but from the walls of that city the invaders had some difficulty in retiring, and lost some of their men. On their retreat they found themselves in Elymia;\(^2\) here the

\(^1\) Asea is placed by Leake (Travels in Morea, i. 84; iii. 34) near Frangóvrysl, a little south of Pallantium.

\(^2\) Elymia, mentioned only by Xenophon, must have been on the confines of the Mantineic and Orchomenus, probably at Levidhi.—Leake, Morea, iii. 75; Peloponn. p. 229.
heavy infantry of the Orchomenians ceased to follow them; but Polytropus and his troops continued to assail their rear with much audacity. At this conjuncture, seeing at a glance that either they must beat back the foe or suffer their own men to be shot down, the Mantineans turned right about and met the assailant in a hand-to-hand encounter. Polytropus fell fighting on that battlefield; and of the rest who took to flight, many would have shared his fate, but for the opportune arrival of the Phliasian cavalry, who swooped round to the conqueror's rear and checked him in his pursuit.1

Content with this achievement, the Mantineans retired homewards; while Agesilaus, to whom the news was brought, no longer expecting that the Orchomenian mercenaries could effect a junction with himself, determined to advance without further delay.2 On the first day he encamped for the evening meal in the open country of Tegea, and the day following crossed into Mantinean territory. Here he encamped under the westward-facing3 mountains of Mantinea, and employed himself in ravaging the country district and sacking the farmsteads; while the troops of the Arcadians who were mustered in Asea stole by night into Tegea. The next day Agesilaus shifted his position, encamping about two miles'4 distance from Mantinea; and the Arcadians, issuing from Tegea and clinging to the mountains between Mantinea and that city, appeared with large bodies of heavy infantry, wishing to effect a junction with the Mantineans. The Argives, it is true, supported them, but they were not in full force. And here counsellors were to be found who urged on Agesilaus to attack these troops separately; but fearing lest, in proportion as he pressed on to engage them, the Mantineans might issue from the city behind and attack him on flank and rear, he decided it was best to let the two bodies coalesce, and then, if they would accept battle, to engage them on an open and fair field.

And so ere long the Arcadians had effected their object and were united with the Mantineans. The next incident was

1 See Cyrop. VII. i. 36.  
2 See below, Ages. ii. 23, p. 252.  
3 See Leake, Morea, iii. 73.  
4 Lit. "twenty stades."
the sudden apparition at break of day, as Agesilaus was sacrificing in front of the camp, of a body of troops. These proved to be the light infantry from Orchomenus, who in company with the Phliasian cavalry had during the night made their way across past the town of Mantinea; and so caused the mass of the army to rush to their ranks, and Agesilaus himself to retire within the lines. Presently, however, the newcomers were recognised as friends; and as the sacrifices were favourable, Agesilaus led his army forward a stage farther after breakfast. As the shades of evening descended he encamped unobserved within the fold of the hills behind the Mantinean territory, with mountains in close proximity all round.¹

On the next morning, as day broke, he sacrificed in front of the army; and observing a mustering of men from the city of Mantinea on the hills which overhung the rear of his army, he decided that he must lead his troops out of the hollow by the quickest route. But he feared lest, if he himself led off, the enemy might fall upon his rear. In this dilemma he kept quiet; presenting a hostile front to the enemy, he sent orders to his rear to face about to the right,² and so getting into line behind his main body, to move forward upon him; and in this way he at once extricated his troops from their cramped position and kept continually adding to the weight and solidity of his line. As soon as the phalanx was doubled in depth he emerged upon the level ground, with his heavy infantry battalions in this order, and then again extended his line till the troops were once more nine or ten shields deep. But the Mantineans were no longer so ready to come out. The arguments of the Eleians who had lent them their co-operation had prevailed: that it was better not to engage until the arrival of the Thebans. The Thebans,

¹ Lit. "within the hindmost bosom of the Mantinicē." In reference to the position, Leake (Morea, iii. 75) says: "The northern bay [of the Mantinian plain between Mantinea and the Argon] corresponds better by its proximity to Mantinea; by Mount Alesium it was equally hidden from the city, while its small dimensions, and the nearness of the incumbent mountains, rendered it a more hazardous position to an army under the circumstances of that of Agesilaus" [than had he encamped in the Argon itself]. For the Argon (or Inert Plain), see Leake, ib. 54 foll.

² See Anab. IV. iii. 29 (Trans. vol. i. p. 187); Pol. Lac., xi. 10, p. 317.
it was certain, would soon be with them; for had they not borrowed ten talents\(^1\) from Elis in order to be able to send aid? The Arcadians with this information before them kept quiet inside Mantinea. On his side Agesilaus was anxious to lead off his troops, seeing it was midwinter; but, to avoid seeming to hurry his departure out of fear, he preferred to remain three days longer at no great distance from Mantinea. On the fourth day, after an early morning meal, the retreat commenced. His intention was to encamp on the same ground which he had made his starting-point on leaving Eutaea. But as none of the Arcadians appeared, he marched with all speed and reached Eutaea itself, although very late, that day; being anxious to lead off his heavy troops without catching a glimpse of the enemy's watch-fires, so as to silence the tongues of any one pretending that he withdrew in flight. His main object was in fact achieved. To some extent he had recovered the state from its late despondency, since he had invaded Arcadia and ravaged the country without any one caring to offer him battle. But, once arrived on Laconian soil, he dismissed the Spartan troops to their homes and disbanded the provincials\(^2\) to their several cities.

B.C. 370-369.—The Arcadians, now that Agesilaus had retired, realising that he had disbanded his troops, while they themselves were fully mustered, marched upon Heraea, the citizens of which town had not only refused to join the Arcadian league, but had joined the Lacedaemonians in their invasion of Arcadia. For this reason they entered the country, burning the homesteads and cutting down the fruit-trees.

Meanwhile news came of the arrival of the Theban reinforcements at Mantinea, on the strength of which they left Heraea and hastened to fraternise\(^3\) with their Theban friends. When they were met together, the Thebans, on their side, were well content with the posture of affairs: they had duly brought their succour, and no enemy was any longer to be discovered

\(^1\) See Busolt, \textit{op. cit.} p. 199.
\(^2\) Lit. "perioeci"; and below, §§ 25, 32.
\(^3\) Or, "effect a junction with."
in the country; so they made preparations to return home. But the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleians were eager in urging them to lead the united forces forthwith into Laconia: they dwelt proudly on their own numbers, extolling above measure the armament of Thebes. And, indeed, the Boeotians one and all were resolute in their military manœuvres and devotion to arms,\(^1\) exulting in the victory of Leuctra. In the wake of Thebes followed the Phocians, who were now their subjects, Euboeans from all the townships of the island, both sections of the Locrians, the Acarnanians,\(^2\) and the men of Heraclea and of Melis; while their force was further swelled by Thessalian cavalry and light infantry. With the full consciousness of facts like these, and further justifying their appeal by dwelling on the desolate condition of Lacedaemon, deserted by her troops, they entreated them not to turn back without invading the territory of Laconia. But the Thebans, albeit they listened to their prayers, urged arguments on the other side. In the first place, Laconia was by all accounts most difficult to invade; and their belief was that garrisons were posted at all the points most easily approached. (As a matter of fact, Ischolaus was posted at Oeum in the Sciritid, with a garrison of neodamodes and about four hundred of the youngest of the Tegean exiles; and there was a second outpost on Leuctrum above the Maleatid.\(^3\) Again it occurred to the Thebans

\(^1\) Or, "in practising gymnastics about the place of arms." See Pol. Lac. xii. 5, p. 318.

\(^2\) See Hell. IV. vii. 1; Ages. ii. 20. For a sketch of the relations of Acarnania to Athens and Sparta, see Hicks, No. 83, p. 150; and above, Hell. V. iv. 64 (p. 136).

\(^3\) Leuctrum, a fortress of the district Aegytis on the confines of Arcadia and Laconia ("in the direction of Mount Lycaeum," Thuc. v. 54). See Leake, Morea, ii. 322; also Peloponn. p. 248, in which place he corrects his former view as to the situation of Leuctrum and the Maleatid.

Oeum or Ium, the chief town of the Sciritis, probably stood in the Klistára or series of narrow passes through the watershed of the mountains forming the natural boundary between Laconia and Arcadia (in the direct line north from Sparta to Tegea), Dict. of Anc. Geog. s.v. Leake says (Morea, iii. 19, 30 foll.) near the modern village of Kólinha; Baedeker (Greece, p. 269) says perhaps at Palaeogoulás.

Caryæ. This frontier town was apparently (near Aráchova) on the road from Thyrea (in the direction of the Argolid) to Sparta (Thuc. v. 55; Paus. III. x. 7; Livy, xxxiv. 26, but see Leake, Morea, iii. 30; Peloponn. p. 342).

Sellasia, probably rightly placed "half an hour above Vourlia" (Baedeker,
that the Lacedaemonian forces, though disbanded, would not take long to muster, and once collected they would fight nowhere better than on their own native soil. Putting all these considerations together, they were not by any means impatient to march upon Lacedaemon. A strong counter-impulse, however, was presently given by the arrival of messengers from Caryae, giving positive information as to the defenceless condition of the country, and offering to act as guides themselves; they were ready to lose their lives if they were convicted of perfidy. A further impulse in the same direction was given by the presence of some of the provincials, with invitations and promises of revolt, if only they would appear in the country. These people further stated that even at the present moment, on a summons of the Spartans proper, the provincials did not care to render them assistance. With all these arguments and persuasions echoing from all sides, the Thebans at last yielded, and invaded. They chose the Caryan route themselves, while the Arcadians entered by Oeum in the Sciritid.

By all accounts Ischolaus made a mistake in not advancing to meet them on the difficult ground above Oeum. Had he done so, not a man, it is believed, would have scaled the passes there. But for the present, wishing to turn the help of the men of Oeum to good account, he waited down in the village; and so the invading Arcadians scaled the heights in a body. At this crisis Ischolaus and his men, as long as they fought face to face with their foes, held the superiority; but, presently, when the enemy, from rear and flank, and even from the dwelling-houses up which they scaled, rained blows and missiles upon them, then and there Ischolaus met his end, and every man besides, save only one or two who, failing to be recognised, effected their escape.

After these achievements the Arcadians marched to join

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1 "Perioeci."

2 Diodorus (xv. 64) gives more details; he makes the invaders converge upon Sellasia by four separate routes. See Leake, Morea, iii. 29 foll.
the Thebans at Caryae, and the Thebans, hearing what wonders the Arcadians had performed, commenced their descent with far greater confidence. Their first exploit was to burn and ravage the district of Sellasia, but finding themselves ere long in the flat land within the sacred enclosure of Apollo, they encamped for the night, and the next day continued their march along the Eurotas. When they came to the bridge they made no attempt to cross it to attack the city, for they caught sight of the heavy infantry in the temple of Alea ready to meet them. So, keeping the Eurotas on their right, they tramped along, burning and pillaging homesteads stocked with numerous stores. The feelings of the citizens may well be imagined. The women who had never set eyes upon a foe could scarcely contain themselves as they beheld the cloud of smoke. The Spartan warriors, inhabiting a city without fortifications, posted at intervals, here one and there another, were in truth what they appeared to be—the veriest handful. And these kept watch and ward. The authorities passed a resolution to announce to the helots that whosoever among them chose to take arms and join a regiment should have his freedom guaranteed to him by solemn pledges in return for assistance in the common war. More than six thousand helots, it is said, enrolled themselves, so that a new terror was excited by the very incorporation of these men, whose numbers seemed to be excessive. But when it was found that the mercenaries from Orchomenus remained faithful, and reinforcements came to Lacedaemon from Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, and Pellene, and some other states, the dread of these new levies was speedily diminished.

The enemy in his advance came to Amyclae. Here he crossed the Eurotas. The Thebans wherever they encamped at once formed a stockade of the fruit-trees they had felled, as thickly piled as possible, and so kept ever on their guard. The Arcadians did nothing of the sort. They

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1 See Pausanias, III. xix. 7.
2 See Plutarch, Ages. xxxi. 3 (Clough, vol. iv. p. 38); Aristot. Pol. ii. 9-10.
3 See below, VII. ii. 2, p. 201.
4 For this ancient (Achaean) town, see Paus. III. ii. 6; Polyb. v. 19; and for its site the references given above, note 1, p. 68, Hell. IV. v. 11. It lay only twenty stades (a little more than two miles) from the city of Sparta.
left their camping-ground and took themselves off to attack the homesteads and loot. On the third or fourth day after their arrival the cavalry advanced, squadron by squadron, as far as the racecourse, within the sacred enclosure of Gaiaochos. These consisted of the entire Theban cavalry and the Eleians, with as many of the Phocian or Thessalian or Locrian cavalry as were present. The cavalry of the Lacedaemonians, looking a mere handful, were drawn up to meet them. They had posted an ambuscade chosen from their heavy infantry, the younger men, about three hundred in number, in the house of the Tyndarids; and while the cavalry charged, out rushed the three hundred at the same instant at full pace. The enemy did not wait to receive the double charge, but swerved, and at sight of that many also of the infantry took to headlong flight. But the pursuers presently paused; the Theban army remained motionless; and both parties returned to their camps. And now the hope, the confidence strengthened that an attack upon the city itself would never come; nor did it. The invading army broke up from their ground, and marched off on the road to Helos and Gytheum. The unwalled cities were consigned to the flames, but Gytheum, where the Lacedaemonians had their naval arsenal, was subjected to assault for three days. Certain of the provincials also joined in this attack, and shared the campaign with the Thebans and their friends.

The news of these proceedings set the Athenians deeply pondering what they ought to do concerning the Lacedaemonians, and they held an assembly in accordance with a resolution of the senate. It chanced that the ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians and the allies still faithful to Lacedaemon were present. The Lacedaemonian ambassadors were Aracus, Ocyllus, Pharax, Etymocles, and Olontheus, and from the nature of the case they all used, roughly speaking, similar

1 Or, "hippodrome." See Paus. III. ii. 6.
2 Paus. III. xvi. 2.
4 "Perioeci." See above, III. iii. 6; VI. v. 25; below, VII. ii. 2; Grote, H. G. x. 301. It is a pity that the historian should hurry us off to Athens just at this point. The style here is suggestive of notes (ὑπομνήματα) unexpanded.
arguments. They reminded the Athenians how they had often in old days stood happily together, shoulder to shoulder, in more than one great crisis. They (the Lacedaemonians), on their side, had helped to expel the tyrant from Athens, and the Athenians, when Lacedaemon was besieged by the Messenians, had heartily lent her a helping hand. Then they fell to enumerating all the blessings that marked the season when the two states shared a common policy, hinting how in common they had warred against the barbarians, and more boldly recalling how the Athenians with the full consent and advice of the Lacedaemonians were chosen by united Hellas leaders of the common navy and guardians of the common treasure, while they themselves were selected by all the Hellenes as confessedly the rightful leaders on land; and this also not without the full consent and concurrence of the Athenians.

One of the speakers ventured on a remark somewhat in this strain: "If you and we, sirs, can only agree, there is hope to-day that the old saying may be fulfilled, and Thebes be 'taken and tithed.'" The Athenians, however, were not in the humour to listen to that style of argument. A sort of suppressed murmur ran through the assembly, which seemed to say, "That language may be well enough now; but when they were well off they pressed hard enough on us." But of all the pleas put forward by the Lacedaemonians, the weightiest appeared to be this: that when they had reduced the Athenians by war, and the Thebans wished to wipe Athens off the face of the earth, they (the Lacedaemonians) themselves had opposed the measure. If that was the argument of most weight, the reasoning which was most commonly urged was to the effect that "the solemn oaths necessitated the aid demanded. Sparta had done no wrong to justify this invasion on the part of the Arcadians and their allies. All she had done was to assist the men of Tegea when the Man-
Mantineans had marched against that township contrary to their solemn oaths.” Again, for the second time, at these expressions a confused din ran through the assembly, half the audience maintaining that the Mantineans were justified in supporting Proxenus and his friends, who were put to death by the party with Stasippus; the other half that they were wrong in bringing an armed force against the men of Tegea.

Whilst these distinctions were being drawn by the assembly itself, Cleiteles the Corinthian got up and spoke as follows: “I daresay, men of Athens, there is a double answer to the question, Who began the wrongdoing? But take the case of ourselves. Since peace began, no one can accuse us either of wantonly attacking any city, or of seizing the wealth of any, or of ravaging a foreign territory. In spite of which the Thebans have come into our country and cut down our fruit-trees, burnt to the ground our houses, filched and torn to pieces our cattle and our goods. How then, I put it to you, will you not be acting contrary to your solemn oaths if you refuse your aid to us, who are so manifestly the victims of wrongdoing? | Yes; and when I say solemn oaths, I speak of oaths and undertakings which you yourselves took great pains to exact from all of us.” At that point a murmur of applause greeted Cleiteles, the Athenians feeling the truth and justice of the speaker’s language.

He sat down, and then Procles of Phlius got up and spoke as follows: “What would happen, men of Athens, if the Lacedaemonians were well out of the way? The answer to that question is obvious. You would be the first object of Theban invasion. Clearly; for they must feel that you and you alone stand in the path between them and empire over Hellas. If this be so, I do not consider that you are more supporting Lacedaemon by a campaign in her behalf than you are helping yourselves. For imagine the Thebans, your own sworn foes and next-door neighbours, masters of Hellas! You will find it a painful and onerous exchange indeed for the distant antagonism of Sparta. As a mere matter of self-interest, now is the time to help yourselves, while you may still reckon upon allies, instead of waiting until they are lost, and you are forced to fight a life-
and-death battle with the Thebans single-handed. But the fear suggests itself, that should the Lacedaemonians escape now, they will live to cause you trouble at some future date. Lay this maxim to heart, then, that it is not the potential greatness of those we benefit, but of those we injure, which causes apprehension. And this other also, that it behaves individuals and states alike so to better their position while yet in the zenith of their strength that, in the day of weakness, when it comes, they may find some succour and support in what their former labours have achieved. To you now, at this time, a heaven-sent opportunity is presented. In return for assistance to the Lacedaemonians in their need, you may win their sincere, unhesitating friendship for all time. Yes, I say it deliberately, for the acceptance of these benefits at your hands will not be in the presence of one or two chance witnesses. The all-seeing gods, in whose sight to-morrow is even as to-day, will be cognisant of these things. The knowledge of them will be jointly attested by allies and enemies; nay, by Hellenes and barbarians alike, since to not one of them is what we are doing a matter of unconcern. If, then, in the presence of these witnesses, the Lacedaemonians should prove base towards you, no one will ever again be eager in their cause. But our hope, our expectation should rather be that they will prove themselves good men and not base; since they beyond all others would seem persistently to have cherished a high endeavour, reaching forth after true praise, and holding aloof from ugly deeds.

"But there are further considerations which it were well you should lay to heart. If danger were ever again to visit Hellas from the barbarian world outside, in whom would you place your confidence if not in the Lacedaemonians? Whom would you choose to stand at your right hand in battle if not these, whose soldiers at Thermopylae to a man preferred to fall at their posts rather than save their lives by giving the barbarian free passage into Hellas? Is it not right, then, considering for what thing's sake they displayed that bravery in your companionship, considering also the good hope there is that they will prove the like again—is it not just that you

1 Lit. "'to acquire some good.'"  
2 Or, "'for what,'" etc.
and we should lend them all countenance and goodwill? Nay, even for us their allies' sake, who are present, it would be worth your while to manifest this goodwill. Need you be assured that precisely those who continue faithful to them in their misfortunes would in like manner be ashamed not to requite you with gratitude? And if we seem to be but small states, who are willing to share their dangers with them, lay to heart that there is a speedy cure for this defect: with the accession of your city the reproach that, in spite of all our assistance, we are but small cities, will cease to be.

"For my part, men of Athens, I have hitherto on hearsay admired and envied this great state, whither, I was told, every one who was wronged or stood in terror of aught needed only to betake himself and he would obtain assistance. To-day I no longer hear, I am present myself and see these famous citizens of Lacedaemon here, and by their side their trustiest friends, who have come to you, and ask you in their day of need to give them help. I see Thebans also, the same who in days bygone failed to persuade the Lacedaemonians to reduce you to absolute slavery, to-day asking you to suffer those who saved you to be destroyed.

"That was a great deed and of fair renown, attributed in old story to your ancestors, that they did not suffer those Argives who died on the Cadmeia to lie unburied; but a fairer wreath of glory would you weave for your own brows if you suffer not these still living Lacedaemonians to be trampled under the heel of insolence and destroyed. Fair, also, was that achievement when you stayed the insolence of Eurystheus and saved the sons of Heracles; but fairer still than that will your deed be if you rescue from destruction, not the primal authors merely, but the whole city which they

1 See Hell. II. ii. 19; III. v. 8, in reference to B.C. 405.
2 In reference to the Seven against Thebes, see Herod. IX. xxvii. 4; Isoc. Paneg. 55.
3 Herod. IX. xxvii. 3; see Isoc. Paneg. 56. "The greatness of Sparta was founded by the succour which Athens lent to the Heraklid invaders of the Peloponnese—a recollection which ought to restrain Sparta from injuring or claiming to rule Athens. Argos, Thebes, Sparta were in early times, as they are now, the foremost cities of Hellas; but Athens was greater than them all—the avenger of Argos, the chastiser of Thebes, the patron of those who founded Sparta."—Jebb, Att. Or. ii. 154.
4 Plut. Lyc. vi.
founded; fairest of all, if because yesterday the Lacedaemonians won you your preservation by a vote which cost them nothing, you to-day shall bring them help with arms, and at the price of peril. It is a proud day for some of us to stand here and give what aid we can in pleading for assistance to brave men. What, then, must you feel, who in very deed are able to render that assistance! How generous on your parts, who have been so often the friends and foes of Lacedaemon, to forget the injury and remember only the good they have done! How noble of you to repay, not for yourselves only, but for the sake of Hellas, the debt due to those who proved themselves good men and true in her behalf!"

After these speeches the Athenians deliberated, and though there was opposition, the arguments of gainsayers fell upon deaf ears. The assembly finally passed a decree to send assistance to Lacedaemon in force, and they chose Iphicrates general. Then followed the preliminary sacrifices, and then the general’s order to his troops to take the evening meal in the grove of the Academy. But the general himself, it is said, was in no hurry to leave the city; many were found at their posts before him. Presently, however, he put himself at the head of his troops, and the men followed cheerily, in firm persuasion that he was about to lead them to some noble exploit. On arrival at Corinth he frittered away some days, and there was a momentary outburst of discontent at so much waste of precious time; but as soon as he led the troops out of Corinth there was an obvious rebound. The men responded to all orders with enthusiasm, heartily following their general’s lead, and attacking whatever fortified place he might confront them with.

And now reverting to the hostile forces on Laconian territory, we find that the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleians had retired in large numbers. They had every inducement so to do since their homes bordered on Laconia; and off they went, driving or carrying whatever they had looted. The Thebans and the rest were no less anxious to get out of the country,

1 As to the anti-Laconian or Boeotian party at Athens, see Curtius, *H. G.* vol. v. ch. ii. (Eng. tr.).
2 See Trans. vol. i. note 1, p. 46; Baedeker, *Greece*, p. 103.
though for other reasons, partly because the army was melting away under their eyes day by day, partly because the necessaries of life were growing daily scantier, so much had been either fairly eaten up and pillaged or else recklessly squandered and reduced to ashes. Besides this, it was winter; so that on every ground there was a general desire by this time to get away home.

As soon as the enemy began his retreat from Laconian soil, Iphicrates imitated his movement, and began leading back his troops out of Arcadia into Corinthia. Iphicrates exhibited much good generalship, no doubt, with which I have no sort of fault to find. But it is not so with that final feature of the campaign to which we are now come. Here I find his strategy either meaningless in intent or inadequate in execution. He made an attempt to keep guard at Oneion, in order to prevent the Boeotians making their way out homewards; but left meanwhile far the best passage through Cenchreae unguarded. Again, when he wished to discover whether or not the Thebans had passed Oneion, he sent out on a reconnaissance the whole of the Athenian and Corinthian cavalry; whereas, for the object in view, the eyes of a small detachment would have been as useful as a whole regiment;¹ and when it came to falling back, clearly the smaller number had a better chance of hitting on a traversable road, and so effecting the desired movement quietly. But the height of folly seems to have been reached when he threw into the path of the enemy a large body of troops which were still too weak to cope with him. As a matter of fact, this body of cavalry, owing to their very numbers, could not help covering a large space of ground; and when it became necessary to retire, had to cling to a series of difficult positions in succession, so that they lost not fewer than twenty horsemen.² It was thus the Thebans effected their object and retired from Peloponnese.

¹ See Hipparch. viii. 10 foll., and Sketch of Life (Trans. vol. i. p. cxxxix).
² See Diod. xv. 63; Plut. Pelop. 24.
I. B.C. 369.—In the following year plenipotentiary ambassadors from the Lacedaemonians and the allies arrived at Athens to consider and take counsel in what way the alliance between Athens and Lacedaemon might be best cemented. It was urged by many speakers, foreigners and Athenians also, that the alliance ought to be based on the principle of absolute equality, “share and share alike,” when Procles of Phlius put forward the following argument:

“Since you have decided, men of Athens, that it is good to secure the friendship of Lacedaemon, the point, as it appears to me, which you ought now to consider is, by what means this friendship may be made to last as long as possible. The probability is, that we shall hold together best by making a treaty which shall suit the best interests of both parties. On most points we have, I believe, a tolerable unanimity, but there remains the question of leadership. The preliminary decree of your senate anticipates a division of the hegemony, crediting you with the chief maritime power, Lacedaemon with the chief power on land; and to me, personally, I confess, that seems a division not more established by human invention than preordained by some divine naturalness or happy fortune. For, in the first place, you have a geographical position pre-eminently adapted for naval supremacy; most of the states to whom the sea is important are massed round your own, and all of these are inferior to you in strength. Besides, you have harbours

1 *i.e.* the official year from spring to spring. See Peter, *Chron. Table* 95, note 215; see Grote, *H. G.* x. 346, note 1.
2 See Hicks, 89.
3 For the phrase *ἐντὶ τῶν τῶν καὶ ὑμοίων* implying “share and share alike,” see Thuc. i. 145, etc.
and roadsteads, without which it is not possible to turn a naval power to account. Again, you have many ships of war. To extend your naval empire is a traditional policy; all the arts and sciences connected with these matters you possess as home products, and, what is more, in skill and experience of nautical affairs you are far ahead of the rest of the world. The majority of you derive your livelihood from the sea, or things connected with it; so that in the very act of minding your own affairs you are training yourselves to enter the lists of naval combat.¹ Again, no other power in the world can send out a larger collective fleet, and that is no insignificant point in reference to the question of leadership. The nucleus of strength first gained becomes a rallying-point, round which the rest of the world will gladly congregate. Furthermore, your good fortune in this department must be looked upon as a definite gift of God: for, consider among the numberless great sea-fights which you have fought how few you have lost, how many you have won. It is only rational, then, that your allies should much prefer to share this particular risk with you. Indeed, to show you how natural and vital to you is this maritime study, the following reflection may serve. For several years the Lacedaemonians, when at war with you in old days, dominated your territory, but they made no progress towards destroying you. At last God granted them one day to push forward their dominion on the sea, and then in an instant you completely succumbed to them.² Is it not self-evident that your safety altogether depends upon the sea? The sea is your natural element—your birthright; it would be base indeed to entrust the hegemony of it to the Lacedaemonians, and the more so, since, as they themselves admit, they are far less acquainted with this business than yourselves; and, secondly, your risk in naval battles would not be for equal stakes—theirs involving only the loss of the men on board their ships, but yours, that of your children and your wives and the entire state.

¹ See below, Pol. Ath. i. 19 foll. p. 282.
² See Hell. II. i. (Trans. vol. i. p. 40 foll.).
point to notice is, that they are an inland power; as long as they are dominant on land it does not matter how much they are cut off from the sea—they can carry on existence happily enough. This they so fully recognise, that from boyhood they devote themselves to training for a soldier's life. The keystone of this training is obedience to command,\(^1\) and in this they hold the same pre-eminence on land which you hold on the sea. Just as you with your fleets, so they on land can, at a moment's notice, put the largest army in the field; and with the like consequence, that their allies, as is only rational, attach themselves to them with undying courage.\(^2\) Further, God has granted them to enjoy on land a like good fortune to that vouchsafed to you on sea. Among all the many contests they have entered into, it is surprising in how few they have failed, in how many they have been successful. The same unflagging attention which you pay to maritime affairs is required from them on land, and, as the facts of history reveal, it is no less indispensable to them. Thus, although you were at war with them for several years and gained many a naval victory over them, you never advanced a step nearer reducing them. But once worsted on land, in an instant they were confronted with a danger affecting the very lives of child and wife, and vital to the interests of the entire state. We may very well understand, then, the strangeness, not to say monstrosity, in their eyes, of surrendering to others the military leadership on land, in matters which they have made their special study for so long and with such eminent success. I end where I began. I agree absolutely with the preliminary decree of your own senate, which I consider the solution most advantageous to both parties. My prayer\(^3\) is that you may be guided in your deliberations to that conclusion which is best for each and all of us.”

Such were the words of the orator, and the sentiments of his speech were vehemently applauded by the Athenians no less than by the Lacedaemonians who were present. Then

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\(^1\) Or, “the spirit of discipline.” See *Mem. III. v. 16; IV. iv. 15; Thuc. ii. 39; *Pol. Lac. viii.*

\(^2\) Or, “with unlimited confidence.”

\(^3\) See above, *Hell. VI. i. 13, καὶ σὺ πράττοις τὰ κράτιστα, ‘‘and so may the best fortune attend you!’’—if that reading and rendering be adopted.
Cephisodotus stepped forward and addressed the assembly. He said: "Men of Athens, do you not see how you are being deluded? Lend me your ears, and I will prove it to you in a moment. There is no doubt about your leadership by sea: it is already secured. But suppose the Lacedaemonians in alliance with you: it is plain they will send you admirals and captains, and possibly marines, of Laconian breed; but who will the sailors be? Helots obviously, or mercenaries of some sort. These are the folk over whom you will exercise your leadership. Reverse the case. The Lacedaemonians have issued a general order summoning you to join them in the field; it is plain again, you will be sending your heavy infantry and your cavalry. You see what follows. You have invented a pretty machine, by which they become leaders of your very selves, and you become the leaders either of their slaves or of the dregs of their state. I should like to put a question to the Lacedaemonian Timocrates seated yonder. Did you not say just now, Sir, that you came to make an alliance on terms of absolute equality, 'share and share alike'? Answer me." "I did say so." "Well, then, here is a plan by which you get the perfection of equality. I cannot conceive anything more fair and impartial than that 'turn and turn about' each of us should command the navy, each the army; whereby whatever advantage there may be in maritime or military command we may each of us share."

These arguments were successful. The Athenians were converted, and passed a decree vesting the command in either state for periods of five days alternately.

B.C. 369.—The campaign was commenced by both Athenians and Lacedaemonians with their allies, marching upon Corinth, where it was resolved to keep watch and ward over Oneion jointly. On the advance of the Thebans and their allies the troops were drawn out to defend the pass. They were posted in detachments at different points, the most assailable of which was assigned to the Lacedaemonians and the men of Pellene.¹

¹ See above, Hell. VI. iii. x, p. 152; Hicks, 87.
² See below, Revenues, v. 7, p. 346.
³ See Grote, H. G. x. 349 foll.; aL. B.C. 368.
⁴ "During the wars of Epameinôndas Pellênê adhered firmly to her
The Thebans and their allies, finding themselves within three or four miles\(^1\) of the troops guarding the pass, encamped on the flat ground below; but presently, after a careful calculation of the time it would take to start and reach the goal in the gloaming, they advanced against the Lacedaemonian outposts. In spite of the difficulty they timed their movements to a nicety, and fell upon the Lacedaemonians and Pellenians just at the interval when the night pickets were turning in and the men were leaving their shake-downs and retiring for necessary purposes.\(^2\) This was the instant for the Thebans to fling themselves upon them; they plied their weapons with good effect, blow upon blow. Order was pitted against disorder, preparation against disarray. When, however, those who escaped from the thick of the business had retired to the nearest rising ground, the Lacedaemonian polemarch, who might have taken as many heavy, or light, infantry of the allies as he wanted, and thus have held the position (no bad one, since it enabled him to get his supplies safely enough from Cenchreae), failed to do so. On the contrary, and in spite of the great perplexity of the Thebans as to how they were to get down from the high level facing Sicyon or else retire the way they came, the Spartan general made a truce, which, in the opinion of the majority, seemed more in favour of the Thebans than himself, and so he withdrew his division and fell back.

The Thebans were now free to descend without hindrance, which they did; and, effecting a junction with their allies the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleians, at once attacked\(^3\) Sicyon and Pellene, and, marching on Epidaurus, laid waste the whole territory of that people. Returning from that exploit with a consummate disdain for all their opponents, when they found themselves near the city of Corinth they advanced at the double against the gate facing towards Phlius; intending if they found it open to rush in. However, a body of light Spartan policy, at a time when the other cities were, to say the least, less strenuous in the Spartan cause."—Freeman, *Hist. Fed. Gov.* p. 241. Afterwards Pellene is found temporarily on the Theban side (*Hell. VII. ii. 11*).

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1 Lit. "thirty stades."

2 Or, "intent on their personal concerns." See *Hell. II. iv. 6* (Trans. vol. i. p. 64); *Hipparch.* vii. 12.

3 And took (apparently); see below, p. 192; Diod. xv. 69.
troops sallied out of the city to the rescue, and met the advance of the Theban picked corps\(^1\) not one hundred and fifty yards\(^2\) from the walls. Mounting on the monuments and commanding eminences, with volleys of sling stones and arrows they laid low a pretty large number in the van of the attack, and routing them, gave chase for three or four furlongs'\(^3\) distance. After this incident the Corinthians dragged the corpses of the slain to the wall, and finally gave them up under a flag of truce, erecting a trophy to record the victory. As a result of this occurrence the allies of the Lacedaemonians took fresh heart.

At the date of the above transactions the Lacedaemonians were cheered by the arrival of a naval reinforcement from Dionysius, consisting of more than twenty warships, which conveyed a body of Celts and Iberians and about fifty cavalry. The day following, the Thebans and the rest of the allies, posted, at intervals, in battle order, and completely filling the flat land down to the sea on one side, and up to the knolls on the other which form the buttresses of the city, proceeded to destroy everything precious they could lay their hands on in the plain. The Athenian and Corinthian cavalry, eyeing the strength, physical and numerical, of their antagonists, kept at a safe distance from their armament. But the little body of cavalry lately arrived from Dionysius spread out in a long thin line, and one at one point and one at another galloped along the front, discharging their missiles as they dashed forward, and when the enemy rushed against them, retired, and again wheeling about, showered another volley. Even while so engaged they would dismount from their horses and take breath; and if their foemen galloped up while they were so dismounted, in an instant they had leapt on their horses' backs and were in full retreat. Or if, again, a party pursued them some distance from the main body, as soon as they turned to retire, they would press upon them, and discharging volleys of missiles, made terrible work, forcing the whole army to advance and retire, merely to keep pace with the movements of fifty horsemen.

\(^1\) See *Anab.* III. iv. 43 (Trans. vol. i. p. 170); and above, *Hell.* V. iii. 23, p. 118.  
\(^2\) Lit. "four plethra."  
\(^3\) Lit. "three or four stades."
b.c. 369-368.—After this the Thebans remained only a few more days and then turned back homewards; and the rest likewise to their several homes. Thereupon the troops sent by Dionysius attacked Sicyon. Engaging the Sicyonians in the flat country, they defeated them, killing about seventy men and capturing by assault the fortress of Derae.\(^1\) After these achievements this first reinforcement from Dionysius re-embarked and set sail for Syracuse.

Up to this time the Thebans and all the states which had revolted from Lacedaemon had acted together in perfect harmony, and were content to campaign under the leadership of Thebes; but now a certain Lycomedes,\(^2\) a Mantinean, broke the spell. Inferior in birth and position to none, while in wealth superior, he was for the rest a man of high ambition. This man was able to inspire the Arcadians with high thoughts by reminding them that to Arcadians alone the Peloponnese was in a literal sense a fatherland; since they and they alone were the indigenous inhabitants of its sacred soil, and the Arcadian stock the largest among the Hellenic tribes—a good stock, moreover, and of incomparable physique. And then he set himself to panegyrise them as the bravest of the brave, adducing as evidence, if evidence were needed, the patent fact, that every one in need of help invariably turned to the Arcadians.\(^3\) Never in old days had the Lacedaemonians yet invaded Athens without their help; nor could the Thebans nowadays approach Lacedaemon without the Arcadians. “If then,” he added, “you are wise, you will be somewhat chary of following at the beck and call of anybody, or it will be the old story again. As when you marched in the train of Sparta you only enhanced her power, so to-day, if you follow Theban guidance without thought or purpose instead of claiming a

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\(^1\) "East of Sicyon was Epieceia (see above, Hell. IV. ii. 14. iv. 13) on the river Nemea. In the same direction was the fortress Derae" (Dict. Anci. Geog. "Topography of Sicyonia."), al. Gerae. So Leake (Morea, iii. 376), who conjectures that this fortress was in the maritime plain.

\(^2\) For the plan of an Arcadian Federation and the part played by Lycomedes, its true author, "who certainly merits thereby a high place among the statesmen of Greece," see Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. ch. iv. p. 199 foll.

\(^3\) For this claim on the part of the Arcadians, see Anab. VI. ii. 10 foll. (Trans. vol. i. p. 253).
division of the headship, you will speedily find, perhaps, in her only a second edition of Lacedaemon."¹

These words, uttered in the ears of the Arcadians, were sufficient to puff them up with pride. They were lavish in their love of Lycomedes, and thought there was no one his equal. He became their hero; he had only to give his orders, and they appointed their magistrates ² at his bidding. But, indeed, a series of brilliant exploits entitled the Arcadians to magnify themselves. The first of these arose out of an invasion of Epidaurus by the Argives, which seemed likely to end in their finding their escape barred by Chabrias and his foreign brigade with the Athenians and Corinthians. Only, at the critical moment the Arcadians came to the rescue and extricated the Argives, who were closely besieged, and this in spite not only of the enemy, but of the savage nature of the ground itself. Again, they marched on Asinè ³ in Laconian territory, and defeated the Lacedaemonian garrison, putting the polemarch Geranor, who was a Spartan, to the sword, and sacking the suburbs of the town. Indeed, whenever or wherever they had a mind to send an invading force, neither night nor wintry weather, nor length of road nor mountain barrier could stay their march. So that at this date they regarded their prowess as invincible.⁴ The Thebans, it will be understood, could not but feel a touch of jealousy at these pretensions, and their former friendship to the Arcadians had lost its ardour. With the Eleians, indeed, matters were worse. The revelation came to them when they demanded back from the Arcadians certain cities ⁵ of which the Lacedaemonians had deprived them. They discovered that their views were held of no account, but that the Triphylians and the rest who had revolted from them were to be made much of, because they claimed to be Arcadians.⁶ Hence, as contrasted

¹ Or, "Lacedaemonians under another name."

² ἀρχιυφαντέσ, see below, Hell. VII. iv. 33. The formal title of these Federal magistrates may or may not have been ἀρχιυφαντέσ; Freeman, H. F. G. 203, note 6.

³ See Grote, H. G. x. 356.

⁴ Or, "regarded themselves as the very perfection of soldierly."

⁵ In reference to Hell. III. ii. 25 foll. (p. 17 above), see Freeman, op. cit. p. 201, and below, Hell. VII. iv. 12 (B.C. 365); Busolt, op. cit. p. 186 foll., in reference to Lasion.

⁶ Busolt, p. 150.
with the Thebans, the Eleians cherished feelings towards their late friends which were positively hostile.

B.C. 368.—Self-esteem amounting to arrogance—such was the spirit which animated each section of the allies, when a new phase was introduced by the arrival of Philiscus\(^1\) of Abydos on an embassy from Ariobarzanes\(^2\) with large sums of money. This agent’s first step was to assemble a congress of Thebans, allies, and Lacedaemonians at Delphi to treat of peace. On their arrival, without attempting to communicate or take counsel with the god as to how peace might be re-established, they fell to deliberating unassisted; and when the Thebans refused to acquiesce in the dependency of Messene\(^3\) upon Lacedaemon, Philiscus set about collecting a large foreign brigade to side with Lacedaemon and to prosecute the war.

Whilst these matters were still pending, the second reinforcement from Dionysius\(^4\) arrived. There was a difference of opinion as to where the troops should be employed, the Athenians insisting that they ought to march into Thessaly to oppose the Thebans, the Lacedaemonians being in favour of Laconia; and among the allies this latter opinion carried the day. The reinforcement from Dionysius accordingly sailed round to Laconia, where Archidamus incorporated them with the state troops and opened the campaign. Caryae he took by storm, and put every one captured to the sword, and from this point marching straight upon the Parrhasians of Arcadia, he set about ravaging the country along with his Syracusan supporters.

Presently, when the Arcadians and Argives arrived with succours, he retreated, and encamped on the knolls above Medea.\(^5\) While he was here, Cissidas, the officer in charge of the reinforcement from Dionysius, made the announcement

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\(^{1}\) See Hicks, 84, p. 152; Köhler, C. I. A. ii. 51; Grote, H. G. x. 357; Curtius, H. G. (Eng. tr.) iv. 458; Diod. xv. 90.

\(^{2}\) See above, V. i. 28; Ages. ii. 26.

\(^{3}\) See Hicks, 86.

\(^{4}\) See above, §§ 20, 22, p. 191 foll. The date is B.C. 368 according to Grote, H. G. x. 362 foll.; al. B.C. 367.

\(^{5}\) Or, “Melea" or “Malea.” E. Curtius conjectures Μηλέας for Μηδέας of the MSS., and probably the place referred to is the township of Malea in the Aegytis (Pausan. VIII. xxvii. 4); see above, Hell. VI. v. 24, “the Maleatid.” See Dind. Hist. Gr., Ox. MDCCLIII., note ad loc.; Curtius, H. G. iv. 459; Grote, H. G. x. 362.
that the period for his stay abroad had elapsed; and the words were no sooner out of his lips than off he set on the road to Sparta. The march itself, however, was not effected without delays, for he was met and cut off by a body of Messenians at a narrow pass, and was forced in these straits to send to Archidamus and beg for assistance, which the latter tendered. When they had got as far as the bend on the road to Eutresia, there were the Arcadians and Argives advancing upon Laconia and apparently intending, like the Messenians, to shut the Spartan off from the homeward road.

Archidamus, debouching upon a flat space of ground where the roads to Eutresia and Medea converge, drew up his troops and offered battle. What happened then is thus told:—He passed in front of the regiments and addressed them in terms of encouragement thus: "Fellow-citizens, the day has come which calls upon us to prove ourselves brave men and look the world in the face with level eyes." Now are we to deliver to those who come after us our fatherland intact as we received it from our fathers; now will we cease hanging our heads in shame before our children and wives, our old men and our foreign friends, in sight of whom in days of old we shone forth conspicuous beyond all other Hellenes."

The words were scarcely uttered (so runs the tale), when out of the clear sky came lightnings and thunderings, with propitious manifestation to him; and it so happened that on his right wing there stood a sacred enclosure and a statue of Heracles, his great ancestor. As the result of all these things, so deep a strength and courage came into the hearts of his soldiers, as they tell, that the generals had hard work to restrain their men as they pushed forward to the front. Presently, when Archidamus led the advance, a few only of the enemy cared to await them at the spear's point, and were slain; the mass of them fled, and fleeing fell. Many were cut down by the cavalry, many by the Celts. When the battle ceased and a trophy had been erected, the Spartan at once despatched

3 See Xen. Apolog. 12; Homer, II. ii. 353; Od. xx. 113 foll.
home Demoteles, the herald, with the news. He had to announce not only the greatness of the victory, but the startling fact that, while the enemy’s dead were numerous, not one single Lacedaemonian had been slain.\(^1\) Those in Sparta to whom the news was brought, as says the story, when they heard it, one and all, beginning with Agesilaus, and, after him, the elders and the ephors, wept for joy—so close akin are tears to joy and pain alike. There were others hardly less pleased than the Lacedaemonians themselves at the misfortune which had overtaken the Arcadians: these were the Thebans and Eleians—so offensive to them had the boastful behaviour of these men become.

The problem perpetually working in the minds of the Thebans was how they were to compass the headship of Hellas; and they persuaded themselves that, if they sent an embassy to the King of Persia, they could not but gain some advantage by his help. Accordingly they did not delay, but called together the allies, on the plea that Euthycles the Lacedaemonian was already at the Persian court. The commissioners sent up were, on the part of the Thebans, Pelopidas;\(^2\) on the part of the Arcadians, Antiochus, the pancratist; and on that of the Eleians, Archidamus. There was also an Argive in attendance. The Athenians on their side, getting wind of the matter, sent up two commissioners, Timagoras and Leon.

When they arrived at the Persian court the influence of Pelopidas was preponderant with the Persian. He could point out that, besides the fact that the Thebans alone among all the Hellenes had fought on the king’s side at Plataeae,\(^3\) they had never subsequently engaged in military service against the Persians; nay, the very ground of Lacedaemonian hostility to them was that they had refused to march against the Persian king with Agesilau\(\text{s,}\) and would not even suffer him to sacrifice to Artemis at Aulis (where Agamemnon sacrificed before he set sail for Asia and captured Troy). In addition, there were two things which contributed to raise the prestige of

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1 According to Diod. xv. 72, ten thousand of the enemy fell.


3 See Thuc. iii. 58, 59, 60.

Thebes, and redounded to the honour of Pelopidas. These
were the victory of the Thebans at Leuctra, and the indisputable
fact that they had invaded and laid waste the territory of
Laconia. Pelopidas went on to point out that the Argives
and Arcadians had lately been defeated in battle by the
Lacedaemonians, when his own countrymen were not there
to assist. The Athenian Timagoras supported all these state-
ments of the Theban by independent testimony, and stood
second in honour after Pelopidas.

At this point of the proceedings Pelopidas was asked by
the king, what special clause he desired inserted in the royal
rescript. He replied as follows: "Messenè to be independent
of Lacedaemon, and the Athenians to lay up their ships of
war. Should either power refuse compliance in these respects,
such refusal to be a casus belli; and any state refusing to take
part in the military proceedings consequent, to be herself the
first object of attack." These clauses were drawn up and read
to the ambassadors, when Leon, in the hearing of the king,
exclaimed: "Upon my word! Athenians, it strikes me it is
high time you looked for some other friend than the great
king." The secretary reported the comment of the Athenian
envoy, and produced presently an altered copy of the document,
with a clause inserted: "If the Athenians have any better and
juster views to propound, let them come to the Persian court
and explain them."¹

Thus the ambassadors returned each to his own home and
were variously received. Timagoras, on the indictment of
Leon, who proved that his fellow-commissioner not only re-
fused to lodge with him at the king's court, but in every way
played into the hands of Pelopidas, was put to death. Of the
other joint commissioners, the Eleian, Archidamus, was loud
in his praises of the king and his policy, because he had shown
a preference to Elis over the Arcadians; while for a converse
reason, because the Arcadian league was slighted, Antiochus
not only refused to accept any gift, but brought back as his
report to the general assembly of the Ten Thousand,² that

¹ See Grote, H. G. x. 402; and below, Ages. viii. 3, p. 263.
² See above, VI. v. 6; Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. 202; Demosth. F. L.
220, etc.
the king appeared to have a large army of confectioners and pastry-cooks, butlers and doorkeepers; but as for men capable of doing battle with Hellenes, he had looked carefully, and could not discover any. Besides all which, even the report of his wealth seemed to him, he said, bombastic nonsense. "Why, the golden plane-tree that is so belauded is not big enough to furnish shade to a single grasshopper." ¹

At Thebes a conference of the states had been convened to listen to the great king's letter. The Persian who bore the missive merely pointed to the royal seal, and read the document; whereupon the Thebans invited all, who wished to be their friends, to take an oath to what they had just heard, as binding on the king and on themselves. To which the ambassadors from the states replied that they had been sent to listen to a report, not to take oaths; if oaths were wanted, they recommended the Thebans to send ambassadors to the several states. The Arcadian Lycomedes, moreover, added that the congress ought not to be held at Thebes at all, but at the seat of war, wherever that might be. This remark brought down the wrath of the Thebans on the speaker; they exclaimed that he was bent on breaking up the alliance. Whereupon the Arcadian refused to take a seat in the congress at all, and got up and betook himself off there and then, accompanied by all the Arcadian envoys. Since, therefore, the assembled representatives refused to take the oath at Thebes, the Thebans sent to the different states, one by one in turn, urging each to undertake solemnly to act in accordance with the great king's rescript. They were persuaded that no individual state would venture to quarrel with themselves and the Persian monarch at once. As a matter of fact, however, when they arrived at Corinth—which was the first state visited—the Corinthians stood out and gave as their answer, that they had no desire for any common oath or undertaking with the king. The rest of the states followed suit, giving answers of a similar tenor, so that this striving after empire on the part of Pelopidas and the Thebans melted like a cloud-castle into air.

B.C. 367.²—But Epaminondas was bent on one more effort.

¹ Or, "the golden plane-tree they romance about would not suffice to," etc. ² B.C. 367, according to Grote, H. G. x. 365, note 1; al. B.C. 366.
With a view to forcing the Arcadians and the rest of the allies to pay better heed to Thebes, he desired first to secure the adhesion of the Achaeans, and decided to march an army into Achaea. Accordingly, he persuaded the Argive Peisias, who was at the head of military affairs in Argos, to seize and occupy Oneion in advance. Peisias, having ascertained that only a sorry guard was maintained over Oneion by Naucles, the general commanding the Lacedaemonian foreign brigade, and by Timomachus the Athenian, under cover of night seized and occupied with two thousand heavy infantry the rising ground above Cenchreae, taking with him provisions for seven days. Within the interval the Thebans arrived and surmounted the pass of Oneion; whereupon the allied troops, with Epaminondas at their head, advanced into Achaea. The result of the campaign was that the better classes of Achaea gave in their adhesion to him; and on his personal authority Epaminondas insisted that there should be no driving of the aristocrats into exile, nor any modification of the constitution. He was content to take a pledge of fealty from the Achaeans to this effect: "Verily and indeed we will be your allies, and follow whithersoever the Thebans lead."¹

So he departed home. The Arcadians, however, and the partisans of the opposite faction in Thebes were ready with an indictment against him: "Epaminondas," they said, "had merely swept and garnished Achaea for the Lacedaemonians, and then gone off." The Thebans accordingly resolved to send governors² into the states of Achaea; and those officers on arrival joined with the commonalty and drove out the better folk, and set up democracies throughout Achaea. On their side, these exiles coalesced, and, marching upon each separate state in turn, for they were pretty numerous, speedily won their restoration and dominated the states. As the party thus reinstated no longer steered a middle course, but

¹ See Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. p. 241: "We read of local oligarchies (in the several cities of Achaia) which Epameinōndas found and left in possession, but which the home government of Thebes thought good to expel, and to substitute democracies under the protection of Theban harmosts. This policy did not answer, as the large bodies of exiles thus formed contrived to recover the cities, and to bring them to a far more decided Spartan partisanship than before."

² Lit. "harmosts."
went heart and soul into an alliance with Lacedaemon, the Arcadians found themselves between the upper and the nether millstone—that is to say, the Lacedaemonians and the Achaeans.

At Sicyon, hitherto, the constitution was based on the ancient laws; but at this date Euphron (who during the Lacedaemonian days had been the greatest man in Sicyon, and whose ambition it was to hold a like pre-eminence under their opponents) addressed himself to the Argives and Arcadians as follows: "If the wealthiest classes should ever come into power in Sicyon, without a doubt the city would take the first opportunity of readopting a Laconian policy; whereas, if a democracy be set up," he added, "you may rest assured Sicyon will hold fast by you. All I ask you is to stand by me; I will do the rest. It is I who will call a meeting of the people; and by that selfsame act I shall give you a pledge of my good faith and present you with a state firm in its alliance. All this, be assured," he added, "I do because, like yourselves, I have long ill brooked the pride of Lacedaemon, and shall be glad to escape the yoke of bondage."

These proposals found favour with the Arcadians and the Argives, who gladly gave the assistance demanded. Euphron straightway, in the market-place, in the presence of the two powers concerned, proceeded to convene the Demos, as if there were to be a new constitution, based on the principle of equality. When the convention met, he bade them appoint generals: they might choose whom they liked. Whereupon they elected Euphron himself, Hippodamus, Cleander, Acrisius, and Lysander. When these matters were arranged he appointed Adeas, his own son, over the foreign brigade, in place of the former commander, Lysimenes, whom he removed. His next step was promptly to secure the fidelity of the foreign mercenaries by various acts of kindness, and to attach others; and he spared neither the public nor the sacred moneys for this object. He had, to aid him, further, the property of all the citizens whom he exiled on the ground of Laconism, and

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1 See Grote, H. G. x. 379.

2 Lit. "the Argives and the Arcadians."

3 Lit. "on fair and equal terms." See Thuc. v. 79.
of this without scruple he in every case availed himself. As for his colleagues in office, some he treacherously put to death, others he exiled, by which means he got everything under his own power, and was now a tyrant without disguise. The method by which he got the allies to connive at his doings was twofold. Partly he worked on them by pecuniary aid, partly by the readiness with which he lent the support of his foreign troops on any campaign to which they might invite him.

II. B.C. 366.—Matters had so far progressed that the Argives had already fortified the Trikaranon above the Heraion as an outpost to threaten Phlius, while the Sicyonians were engaged in fortifying Thyamia¹ on their frontier; and between the two the Phliasians were severely pinched. They began to suffer from dearth of necessaries; but, in spite of all, remained unshaken in their alliance. It is the habit of historians, I know, to record with admiration each noble achievement of the larger powers, but to me it seems a still more worthy task to bring to light the great exploits of even a little state found faithful in the performance of fair deeds.

B.C. 370-369.—Now these Phliasians were friends of Lacedaemon while at the zenith of her power. After her disaster on the field of Leuctra, when many of the Perioeci, and the helots to a man, revolted; when, more than that, the allies, save only quite a few, forsook her;² and when united Hellas, so to speak, was marching on her, —these Phliasians remained stanch in their allegiance; and, in spite of the hostility of the most powerful states of Peloponnese, to wit the Arcadians and the Argives, they insisted on coming to her aid. It fell to their lot to cross into Prasiae as the rearguard of the reinforcements, which consisted of the men of Corinth, of Epidaurus and of Troezen, of Hermione, Halieis, and Sicyon and Pellenê, in the days before any of these had revolted.³ Not even when the commander of the foreign brigade, picking up the divisions already across, left them behind and was gone — not even so did they flinch or turn back,

¹ "Thyamia is placed by Ross on the lofty hill of Spiria, the northern prolongation of Tricaranum, between the villages Stimanga and Skrapâni."—Dict. Anc. Geog. "Phlius." ² See above, VI. v. 29, p. 178. ³ See Hell. VII. i. 18 (above, p. 190).
but hired a guide from Prasiae, and though the enemy was massed round Amyclae, slipped through his ranks, as best they could, and so reached Sparta. It was then that the Lacedaemonians, besides other honours conferred upon them, sent them an ox as a gift of hospitality.

B.C. 369.—Later on, when the enemy had retired from Laconia, the Argives, ill brooking so much zeal for Lacedaemon on the part of Phlius, marched in full force against the little state, and fell to ravaging their territory. Even then they remained undaunted; and when the enemy turned to retire, destroying all that he could lay hands upon, out dashed the cavalry of the Phliasians and dogged his retreat. And notwithstanding that the Argive's rear consisted of the whole of his cavalry, with some companies of infantry to support them, they attacked him, sixty in number, and routed his whole rear-guard. They slew, indeed, but a few of them; but, having so slain that handful, they paused and erected a trophy in full sight of the Argive army with as little concern as if they had cut down their enemies to a man.

Once again the Lacedaemonians and their allies were guarding Oneion,¹ and the Thebans were threatening to scale the pass. The Arcadians and Eleians² were moving forwards through Nemea to effect a junction with the Thebans, when a hint was conveyed to them by some Phliasian exiles, "Only show yourselves before Phlius and the town is yours." An agreement was made, and in the dead of night a party consisting of the exiles themselves and others with them, about six hundred in number, planted themselves close under the walls with scaling-ladders. Presently the scouts from the Trikaranon signalled to the city that the enemy was advancing. The citizens were all attention; their eyes were fixed upon their scouts. Meanwhile the traitors within were likewise signalling to those seated under lee of the walls "to scale"; and these, scaling up, seized the arms of the guards, which they found abandoned, and fell to pursuing the day sentinels, ten in number (one out of each squad of five being always left on day duty).³ One of these was put

¹ B.C. 369? al. B.C. 368. See above, Hell. VII. i. 15 (p. 189); Grote, H. G. x. 346.
² See above, Hell. VII. i. 18, and below, § 8.
³ Or, "one member of both the squads of five was left behind"—i.e. two
to the sword as he lay asleep, and a second as he was escaping to the Heraion; but the other eight day-pickets leapt down the wall on the side towards the city, one after another. The scaling party now found themselves in undisputed possession of the citadel. But the shouting had reached the city below: the citizens rallied to the rescue; and the enemy began by sallying forth from the citadel, and did battle in the forefront of the gate leading down to the city. By and by, being strongly beleaguered by the ever-increasing reinforcements of the citizens, they retired, falling back upon the citadel; and the citizens along with the enemy forced their way in. The centre of the citadel was speedily deserted; for the enemy scaled the walls and towers, and showered blows and missiles upon the citizens below. These defended themselves from the ground, or pressed the encounter home by climbing the ladders which led to the walls. Once masters of certain towers on this side and the other of the invaders, the citizens came to close quarters with them with reckless desperation. The invaders, pushed and pommelled by dint of such audacity and hard hitting, were cooped up like sheep into narrower and narrower space. But at that critical moment the Arcadians and the Argives were circling round the city, and had begun to dig through the walls of the citadel from its upper side.\(^1\)

Of the citizens inside some were beating down their assailants on the wall;\(^2\) others, those of them who were climbing up from outside and were still on the scaling-ladders; whilst a third set were delivering battle against those who had mounted the towers. These last had found fire in the men's quarters, and were engaged in setting the towers and all ablaze, bringing up sheaves of corn and grass—an ample harvesting, as luck would have it, garnered off the citadel itself. Thereupon the occupants of the towers, in terror of the flames, leapt down one by one, while those on the walls, under the blows of the defenders, tumbled off with similar expedition; and as soon as they had once begun to yield, the whole citadel, in

\(^1\) Or, "downwards" (L. and S.); or, "in front," "von vorn" (Büchs).

\(^2\) Reading, τοῦς ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους. See Otto Keller for various emendations of the passage.
almost less time than it takes to tell, was cleared of the enemy. In an instant out dashed the cavalry, and the enemy, seeing them, beat a hasty retreat, leaving behind scaling-ladders and dead, besides some comrades hopelessly maimed. In fact, the enemy, what between those who were slain inside and those who leapt from the walls, lost not less than eighty men. And now it was a goodly sight to see the brave men grasp one another by the hand and pledge each other on their preservation, whilst the women brought them drink and cried for joy. Not one there present but in very sooth was overcome by laughter mixed with tears.¹

Next year also ² Phlius was invaded by the Argives and all the Arcadians. The reason of this perpetually-renewed attack on Phlius is not far to seek: partly it was the result of spleen, partly the little township stood midway between them, and they cherished the hope that through want of the necessaries of life they would bring it over. During this invasion the cavalry and the picked troop of the Phliasians, assisted by some Athenian knights, made another famous charge at the crossing of the river.³ They made it so hot for the enemy that for the rest of that day he was forced to retire under the mountain ridges, and to hold aloof as if afraid to trample down the corn-crops of a friendly people on the flat below.

Again another time ⁴ the Theban commander in Sicyon marched out against Phlius, taking with him the garrison under his personal command, with the Sicyonians and Pellenians (for at the date of the incident these states followed in the wake of Thebes). Euphron was there also with his mercenaries, about two thousand in number, to share the fortunes of the field. The mass of the troops began their descent on the Heraion by the Trikaranon, intending to ravage the flat bottom below. At the gate leading to Corinth the Theban general left his Sicyonians and Pellenians on the height, to prevent the Phliasians getting

¹ In true Homeric fashion, as Pollux (ii. 64) observes. See Homer, II. vi. 484. See above, VII. i. 32 (p. 196); Cyrop. VII. v. 32; Hiero, iii. 5; Sym. ii. 24; Antony and Cleopatra, III. ii. 43. ² B.C. 368 (or 367). ³ The Asopus. ⁴ B.C. 367 (or 366).
behind him at this point and so over the heads of his troops as they lay at the Heraion beneath.\(^1\) As soon as the citizens of Phlius found that hostile troops were advancing on their corn-land, out dashed the cavalry with the chosen band of the Phliasians and gave battle, not suffering the enemy to penetrate into the plain. The best part of the day was spent in taking long shots at one another on that field; Euphron pushing his attack down to the point where cavalry could operate, the citizens retaliating as far as the Heraion. Presently the time to withdraw had come, and the enemy began to retire, following the circle of the Trikaranon; the short cut to reach the Pellenians being barred by the ravine which runs in front of the walls. The Phliasians escorted their retreating foes a little way up the steep, and then turning off dashed along the road beside the walls, making for the Pellenians and those with them; whereupon the Theban, perceiving the haste of the Phliasians, began racing with his infantry to outspeed them and bring succour to the Pellenians. The cavalry, however, arrived first and fell to attacking the Pellenians, who received and withstood the shock, and the cavalry drew back. A second time they charged, and were supported by some infantry detachments which had now come up. It ended in a hand-to-hand fight; and eventually the enemy gave way. On the field lay dead some Sicyonians, and of the Pellenians many a good man. In record of the feat the Phliasians began to raise a trophy, as well they might; and loud and clear the paean rang. As to the Theban and Euphron, they and all their men stood by and stared at the proceedings, like men who had raced to see a sight. After all was over the one party retired to Sicyon and the other withdrew into their city.

That too was another noble exploit of the Phliasians, when they took the Pellenian Proxenus prisoner and, although suffering from scarcity at the time, sent him back without a ransom. "As generous as brave," such is their well-earned title who were capable of such performance.

The heroic resolution with which these men maintained their loyalty to their friends is manifest. When excluded from

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\(^1\) Lit. "above the Heraion" (where his main body lay).
the fruits of their own soil, they contrived to live, partly by helping themselves from the enemy's territory, partly by purchasing from Corinth, though to reach that market they must run the gauntlet of a hundred risks; and having reached it their troubles began afresh. There were difficulties in providing the requisite sum, difficulties in arranging with the purveyors, and it was barely possible to find sureties for the very beasts which should carry home their marketing. They had reached the depth of despair, and were absolutely at a loss what to do, when they arranged with Chares to escort their convoy. Once safe inside Phlius, they begged him to help them to convey their useless and sick folk to Pellene. These they left at that place; and after making purchases and packing as many beasts of burthen as they could, they set off to return in the night, not in ignorance that they would be laid in wait for by the enemy, but persuaded that the want of provisions was a worse evil than mere fighting.

The men of Phlius pushed forward with Chares; presently they stumbled on the enemy and at once grappled to their work. Pressing hard on the foe, they called cheerily to one another, and shouted at the same time to Chares to bring up his aid. In short, the victory was theirs; and the enemy was driven off the road; and so they got themselves and their supplies safely home. The long night-watching superinduced sleep which lasted well into the next day. But Chares was no sooner out of bed than he was accosted by the cavalry and the pick of the heavy infantry with the following appeal: "Chares, to-day you have it in your power to perform the noblest deed of arms. The Sicyonians are fortifying an outpost on our borders, they have plenty of stone-masons but a mere handful of hoplites. We the knights of Phlius and we the flower of our infantry force will lead the way; and you shall follow after with your mercenaries. Perhaps when you appear on the scene you will find the whole thing finished, or perhaps your coming will send the enemy flying, as happened at Pellene. If you do not like the sound of these proposals, sacrifice and take counsel of the gods. Our belief is that the

1 What is the date of this incident? See above, Hell. VII. ii. 3, p. 201; below, VII. iv. 17, p. 217.
gods will bid you yet more emphatically than we to take this step. Only this, Chares, you must well consider, that if you do take it you will have established an outpost on the enemy's frontier; you will have saved from perdition a friendly city; you will win eternal glory in your own fatherland; and among friends and foes alike no name will be heralded with louder praise than that of Chares."

Chares was persuaded, and proceeded to offer sacrifice. Meanwhile the Phliasian cavalry were donning their breastplates and bridling their horses, and the heavy infantry made every preparation for the march. Then they took their arms, fell into line, and tramped off to the place of sacrifice. Chares with the soothsayer stepped forward to meet them, announcing that the victims were favourable. "Only wait for us," they exclaimed; "we will sally forth with you at once." The heralds' cry "To arms!" was sounded, and with a zeal which was almost miraculous the mercenaries themselves rushed out. As soon as Chares began the march, the Phliasian cavalry and infantry got in front of him. At first they led off at a smart pace; presently they began to bowl along more quickly, and finally the cavalry were tearing over the ground might and main, whilst the infantry, at the greatest pace compatible with keeping their ranks, tore after them; and behind them, again, came Chares zealously following up in their rear. There only remained a brief interval of daylight before the sun went down, and they came upon the enemy in the fortress, some washing, some cooking a savoury meal, others kneading their bread, others making their beds. These, when they saw the vehemence of the attack, at once, in utter panic, took to flight, leaving behind all their provisions for the brave fellows who took their place. They, as their reward, made a fine supper off these stores and others which had come from home, pouring out libations for their good fortune and chanting the battle-hymn; after which they posted pickets for the night and slumbered well. The messenger with the news of their success at Thyamia arrived at Corinth in the night. The citizens of that state with hearty friendship at once ordered out by herald all the oxen and beasts of burthen,

1 See Anab. VII. iii. 46 (Trans. vol. i. p. 293).
which they loaded with food and brought to Phlius; and all the while the fortress was building day by day these convoys of food were duly despatched.

III.—But on this topic enough, perhaps, has been said to demonstrate the loyalty of the men of Phlius to their friends, their bravery in war, and, lastly, their steadfastness in maintaining their alliance in spite of famine.

B.C. 367-366.—It seems to have been somewhere about this date that Aeneas the Stymphalian, who had become general of the Arcadians, finding that the state of affairs in Sicyon was intolerable, marched up with his army into the acropolis. Here he summoned a meeting of the Sicyonian aristocrats already within the walls, and sent to fetch those others who had been banished without a decree of the people. Euphron, taking fright at these proceedings, fled for safety to the harbour-town of Sicyon. Hither he summoned Pasimelus from Corinth, and by his instrumentality handed over the harbour to the Lacedaemonians. Once more reappearing in his old character, he began to pose as an ally of Sparta. He asserted that his fidelity to Lacedaemon had never been interrupted; for when the votes were given in the city whether Sicyon should give up her allegiance to Lacedaemon, "I, with one or two others," said he, "voted against the measure; but afterwards these people betrayed me, and in my desire to avenge myself on them I set up a democracy. At present all traitors to yourselves are banished—I have seen to that. If only I could get the power into my own hands, I would go over to you, city and all, at once. All that I can do at present, I have done; I have surrendered to you this harbour." That was what Euphron said to his audience there, but of the many who heard his words, how many really believed him is by no means

1 Is this man the famous writer ὁ τακτικὸς, a portion of whose works, the Treatise on Siege Operations, has been preserved [recently re-edited by Arnold Hug — Commentarius Poliorceticus, Lips. Trübner, 1884]? So Casaubon supposed. Cf. Com. Pol. 27, where the writer mentions πάνεια as the Arcadian term for "panics." Readers of the Anabasis will recollect the tragic end of another Aeneas, also of Stymphalus, an Arcadian officer (see Trans. vol. i. p. 202). On the official title στρατηγὸς (general), Freeman (Hist. Fed. Gov. 204) notes that "at the head of the whole League there seems to have been, as in so many other cases, a single Federal general." Cf. Diod. xv. 62.

2 See above, VII. i. 46, p. 200.
evident. However, since I have begun the story of Euphron, I desire to bring it to its close.

Faction and party strife ran high in Sicyon between the better classes and the people, when Euphron, getting a body of foreign troops from Athens, once more obtained his restoration. The city, with the help of the commons, he was master of, but the Theban governor held the citadel. Euphron, perceiving that he would never be able to dominate the state whilst the Thebans held the acropolis, collected money and set off to Thebes, intending to persuade the Thebans to expel the aristocrats and once again to hand over the city to himself. But the former exiles, having got wind of this journey of his, and of the whole intrigue, set off themselves to Thebes in front of him. When, however, they saw the terms of intimacy on which he associated with the Theban authorities, in terror of his succeeding in his mission some of them staked their lives on the attempt and stabbed Euphron in the Cadmeia, where the magistrates and senate were seated. The magistrates, indeed, could not but indict the perpetrators of the deed before the senate, and spoke as follows:

"Fellow-citizens, it is our duty to arraign these murderers of Euphron, the men before you, on the capital charge. Mankind may be said to fall into two classes: there are the wise and temperate, who are incapable of any wrong and unhallowed deed; and there are the base, the bad, who do indeed such things, but try to escape the notice of their fellows. The men before you are exceptional. They have so far exceeded all the rest of men in audacity and foul villainy that, in the very presence of the magistrates and of yourselves, who alone have power of life and death, they have taken the law into their own hands, and have slain this man. But they stand now before the bar of justice, and they must needs pay the extreme penalty; for, if you spare them, what visitor will have courage to approach the city? Nay, what will become of the city itself, if license is to be given to any one who chooses to murder those who come here, before they have even explained the object of their visit? It is

1 Or, "on an opposition journey."  
2 Lit. "the sound of soul."  
3 Or, "they have been judge and jury both, and executioners to boot."

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our part, then, to prosecute these men as arch-villains and miscreants, whose contempt for law and justice is only matched by the supreme indifference with which they treat this city. It is your part, now that you have heard the charges, to impose upon them that penalty which seems to be the measure of their guilt."

Such were the words of the magistrates. Among the men thus accused, all save one denied immediate participation in the act. It was not their hands had dealt the blow. This one not only confessed the deed, but made a defence in words somewhat as follows:

"As to treating you with indifference, men of Thebes, that is not possible for a man who knows that with you lies the power to deal with him as you list. Ask rather on what I based my confidence when I slew the man; and be well assured that, in the first place, I based it on the conviction that I was doing right; next, that your verdict also will be right and just. I knew assuredly how you dealt with Archias¹ and Hypates and that company whom you detected in conduct similar to that of Euphron: you did not stay for formal voting, but at the first opportunity within your reach you guided the sword of vengeance, believing that by the verdict of mankind a sentence of death has already been passed against the conspicuously profane person, the manifest traitor, and him who lays to his hand to become a tyrant. See, then, what follows. Euphron was liable on each of these several counts: he was a conspicuously profane person, who took into his keeping temples rich in votive offerings of gold and silver, and swept them bare of their sacred treasures; he was an arrant traitor—for what treason could be more manifest than Euphron's? First he was the bosom friend of Lacedaemon, but presently chose you in their stead; and, after exchange of solemn pledges between yourselves and him, once more turned round and played the traitor to you, and delivered up the harbour to your enemies. Lastly, he was most undisguisedly a tyrant, who made not free men only, but free fellow-citizens his slaves; who put to death, or drove into exile, or robbed of their wealth and property, not malefactors, note you, but the mere victims of his whim and fancy; and these were ever the

¹ See above, V. iv. 2, p. 120.
better folk. Once again restored by the help of your sworn foes and antagonists, the Athenians, to his native town of Sicyon, the first thing he did was to take up arms against the governor from Thebes; but, finding himself powerless to drive him from the acropolis, he collected money and betook himself hither. Now, if it were proved that he had mustered armed bands to attack you, I venture to say, you would have thanked me that I slew him. What then, when he came furnished with vile moneys, to corrupt you therewith, to bribe you to make him once more lord and master of the state? How shall I, who dealt justice upon him, justly suffer death at your hands? For to be worsted in arms implies injury certainly, but of the body only: the defeated man is not proved to be dishonest by his loss of victory. But he who is corrupted by filthy lucre, contrary to the standard of what is best, is at once injured and involved in shame.

"Now if he had been your friend, however much he was my national foe, I do confess it had been scarce honourable of me to have stabbed him to death in your presence: but why, I should like to ask, should the man who betrayed you be less your enemy than mine? 'Ah, but;' I hear some one retort, 'he came of his own accord.' I presume, sir, you mean that had he chanced to be slain by somebody at a distance from your state, that somebody would have won your praise; but now, on the ground that he came back here to work mischief on the top of mischief, 'he had the right to live'! In what part of Hellas, tell me, sir, do Hellenes keep a truce with traitors, double-dyed deserters, and tyrants? Moreover, I must remind you that you passed a resolution—if I mistake not, it stands recorded in your parliamentary minutes—that 'renegades are liable to be apprehended in any of the allied cities.' Now, here is a renegade restoring himself without any common decree of the allied states: will any one tell me on what ground this person did not deserve to die? What I maintain, sirs, is that if you put me to death, by so doing you will be aiding and abetting your bitterest foe; while, by a

1 Or, as we should say, 'in violation of conscience.'
2 Or, 'he was wrongfully slain.'
3 For this right of extradition see Plut. Lys. xxvii.
verdict sanctioning the justice of my conduct, you will prove your willingness to protect the interests not of yourselves only, but of the whole body of your allies.”

The Thebans on hearing these pleadings decided that Euphron had only suffered the fate which he deserved. His own countrymen, however, conveyed away the body with the honours due to a brave and good man, and buried him in the market-place, where they still pay pious reverence to his memory as “a founder of the state.” So strictly, it would seem, do the mass of mankind confine the term brave and good to those who are the benefactors of themselves.

IV. B.C. 366.—And so ends the history of Euphron. I return to the point reached at the commencement of this digression.¹ The Phliasians were still fortifying Thyamia, and Chares was still with them, when Oropus² was seized by the banished citizens of that place. The Athenians in consequence despatched an expedition in full force to the point of danger, and recalled Chares from Thyamia; whereupon the Sicyonians and the Arcadians seized the opportunity to recapture the harbour of Sicyon. Meanwhile the Athenians, forced to act single-handed, with none of their allies to assist them, retired from Oropus, leaving that town in the hands of the Thebans as a deposit till the case at issue could be formally adjudicated.

Now Lycomedes³ had discovered that the Athenians were harbouring a grievance against their allies, as follows:—They felt it hard that, while Athens was put to vast trouble on their account, yet in her need not a man among them stepped forward to render help. Accordingly he persuaded the assembly of Ten Thousand to open negotiations with Athens for the purpose of forming an alliance.⁴ At first some of the Athenians were vexed that they, being friends of Lacedaemon,

¹ See above, VII. ii. 23; iii. 3. p. 208; Diod. xv. 76.
² See Thuc. viii. 60; Trans. vol. i. p. cxlii. note 2.
³ See above, VII. i. 23.
⁴ This proves that “the Ten Thousand made war and peace in the name of all Arkadia”; cf. Hell. VII. i. 38; Diod. xv. 59. “They received and listened to the ambassadors of other Greek states”; Demosth. F. L. 220. “They regulated and paid the standing army of the Federation”; Hell. VII. iv. 22, 23; Diod. xv. 62. “They sat in judgment on political offenders against the collective majority of the Arkadian League”; Hell. VII. iv. 33; Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. 203, note 1.
should become allied to her opponents; but on further reflection they discovered it was no less desirable for the Lacedaemonians than for themselves that the Arcadians should become independent of Thebes. That being so, they were quite ready to accept an Arcadian alliance. Lycomedes himself was still engaged on this transaction when, taking his departure from Athens, he died, in a manner which looked like a divine intervention.

Out of the many vessels at his service he had chosen the one he liked best, and by the terms of contract was entitled to land at any point he might desire; but, for some reason, selected the exact spot where a body of Mantinean exiles lay. Thus he died; but the alliance on which he had set his heart was already consummated.

Now an argument was advanced by Demotion¹ in the Assembly of Athens, approving highly of the friendship with the Arcadians, which to his mind was an excellent thing, but arguing that the generals should be instructed to see that Corinth was kept safe for the Athenian people. The Corinthians, hearing this, lost no time in despatching garrisons of their own large enough to take the place of the Athenian garrisons at any point where they might have them, with orders to these latter to retire: "We have no further need of foreign garrisons," they said. The garrisons did as they were bid.

As soon as the Athenian garrison troops were met together in the city of Corinth, the Corinthian authorities caused proclamation to be made inviting all Athenians who felt themselves wronged to enter their names and cases upon a list, and they would recover their dues. While things were in this state, Chares arrived at Cenchreae with a fleet. Learning what had been done, he told them that he had heard there were designs against the state of Corinth, and had come to render assistance. The authorities, while thanking him politely for his zeal, were not any the more ready to admit the vessels into the harbour,

¹ Of Demotion nothing more, I think, is known. Grote (H. G. x. 397) says: "The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not favourable to the success of a scheme like that proposed by Demotion, to which secrecy was indispensable. Compare another scheme" (the attempted surprise of Mitylene, B.C. 428), "divulged in like manner, in Thuc. iii. 3."
but bade him sail away; and after rendering justice to the infantry troops, they sent them away likewise. Thus the Athenians were quit of Corinth. To the Arcadians, to be sure, they were forced by the terms of their alliance to send an auxiliary force of cavalry, "in case of any foreign attack upon Arcadia." At the same time they were careful not to set foot on Laconian soil for the purposes of war.

The Corinthians had begun to realise on how slender a thread their political existence hung. They were overmastered by land still as ever, with the further difficulty of Athenian hostility, or quasi-hostility, now added. They resolved to collect bodies of mercenary troops, both infantry and horse. At the head of these they were able at once to guard their state and to inflict much injury on their neighbouring foes. To Thebes, indeed, they sent ambassadors to ascertain whether they would have any prospect of peace if they came to seek it. The Thebans bade them come: "Peace they should have." Whereupon the Corinthians asked that they might be allowed to visit their allies; in making peace they would like to share it with those who cared for it, and would leave those who preferred war to war. This course also the Thebans sanctioned; and so the Corinthians came to Lacedaemon and said:

"Men of Lacedaemon, we, your friends, are here to present a petition, and on this wise. If you can discover any safety for us whilst we persist in warlike courses, we beg that you will show it us; but if you recognise the hopelessness of our affairs, we would, in that case, proffer this alternative: if peace is alike conducive to your interests, we beg that you would join us in making peace, since there is no one with whom we would more gladly share our safety than with you; if, on the other hand, you are persuaded that war is more to your interest, permit us at any rate to make peace for ourselves. So saved to-day, perhaps we may live to help you in days to come; whereas, if to-day we be destroyed, plainly we shall never at any time be serviceable again."

The Lacedaemonians, on hearing these proposals, counselled the Corinthians to arrange a peace on their own account; and as for the rest of their allies, they permitted
any who did not care to continue the war along with them to take a respite and recruit themselves. "As for ourselves," they said, "we will go on fighting and accept whatever Heaven has in store for us,"—adding, "never will we submit to be deprived of the territory of Messene, which we received as an heirloom from our fathers." ¹

Satisfied with this answer, the Corinthians set off to Thebes in quest of peace. The Thebans, indeed, asked them to agree on oath, not to peace only but an alliance; to which they answered: "An alliance meant, not peace, but merely an exchange of war. If they liked, they were ready there and then," they repeated, "to establish a just and equitable peace." And the Thebans, admiring the manner in which, albeit in danger, they refused to undertake war against their benefactors, conceded to them and the Phliasians and the rest who came with them to Thebes, peace on the principle that each should hold their own territory. On these terms the oaths were taken.

Thereupon the Phliasians, in obedience to the compact, at once retired from Thyamia; but the Argives, who had taken the oath of peace on precisely the same terms, finding that they were unable to procure the continuance of the Phlian exiles in the Trikaranon as a point held within the limits of Argos, ² took over and garrisoned the place, asserting now that this land was theirs—land which only a little while before they were ravaging as hostile territory. Further, they refused to submit the case to arbitration in answer to the challenge of the Phliasians.

It was nearly at the same date that the son of Dionysius ³ (his father, Dionysius the first, being already dead) sent a reinforcement to Lacedaemon of twelve triremes under Timocrates, who on his arrival helped the Lacedaemonians to recover Sellasia, and after that exploit sailed away home.

B.C. 366-365.—Not long after this the Eleians seized Lasion, ⁴

¹ See Isocr. Or. vi. "'Archidamos,' § 70; Jebb, Attic Or. ii. 193; Trans. vol. i. p. cxliii.

² Or, "as a post held by them within the territory of the state." The passage is perhaps corrupt.

³ Concerning Dionysius the first, see above, VII. i. 20 foll. 28.

⁴ See above, VII. i. 26; Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. p. 201.
a place which in old days was theirs, but at present was attached to the Arcadian league. The Arcadians did not make light of the matter, but immediately summoned their troops and rallied to the rescue. Counter-reliefs came also on the side of Elis—their Three Hundred, and again their Four Hundred.\(^1\) The Eleians lay encamped during the day face to face with the invader, but on a somewhat more level position. The Arcadians were thereby induced under cover of night to mount on to the summit of the hill overhanging the Eleians, and at day-dawn they began their descent upon the enemy. The Eleians soon caught sight of the enemy advancing from the vantage-ground above them, many times their number; but a sense of shame forbade retreat at such a distance. Presently they came to close quarters; there was a hand-to-hand encounter; the Eleians turned and fled; and in retiring down the difficult ground lost many men and many arms.

Flushed with this achievement the Arcadians began marching on the cities of the Acroreia,\(^2\) which, with the exception of Thraustus, they captured, and so reached Olympia. There they made an entrenched camp on the hill of Kronos, established a garrison, and held control over the Olympian hill-country. Margana also, by help of a party inside who gave it up, next fell into their hands.

These successive advantages gained by their opponents reacted on the Eleians, and threw them altogether into despair. Meanwhile the Arcadians were steadily advancing upon their capital.\(^3\) At length they arrived, and penetrated into the market-place. Here, however, the cavalry and the rest of the Eleians made a stand, drove the enemy out with some loss, and set up a trophy.

It should be mentioned that the city of Elis had pre-

\(^1\) From the sequel it would appear that the former were a picked corps of infantry and the latter of cavalry. See Thuc. ii. 25; Busolt, \textit{op. cit.} p. 175 foll.

\(^2\) The mountainous district of Elis on the borders of Arcadia, in which the rivers Peneius and Ladon take their rise; see \textit{Dict. of Ant. Geog.} s.v.; above, III. ii. 30, IV. ii. 16 (pp. 18, 50). \textit{Thraustus} was one of the four chief townships of the district. For the topography of Olympia, see map, \textit{Trans.} vol. i. For \textit{Margana}, see above, III. ii. 25, 30, IV. ii. 16, VI. v. 2 (pp. 17, 18, 50, 169).

\(^3\) \textit{i.e.} Elis.
viously been in a state of disruption. The party of Charopus, Thrasonidas, and Argeius were for converting the state into a democracy; the party of Eualcas, Hippias, and Stratolas were for oligarchy. When the Arcadians, backed by a large force, appeared as allies of those who favoured a democratic constitution, the party of Charopus were at once emboldened; and, having obtained the promise of assistance from the Arcadians, they seized the acropolis. The Knights and the Three Hundred did not hesitate, but at once marched up and dislodged them; with the result that about four hundred citizens, with Argeius and Charopus, were banished. Not long afterwards these exiles, with the help of some Arcadians, seized and occupied Pylus; where many of the commons withdrew from the capital to join them, attracted not only by the beauty of the position, but by the great power of the Arcadians, in alliance with them.

There was subsequently another invasion of the territory of the Eleians on the part of the Arcadians, who were influenced by the representations of the exiles that the city would come over to them. But the attempt proved abortive. The Achaeans, who had now become friends with the Eleians, kept firm guard on the capital, so that the Arcadians had to retire without further exploit than that of ravaging the country. Immediately, however, on marching out of Eleian territory they were informed that the men of Pellene were in Elis; whereupon they executed a marvellously long night march and seized the Pellenian township of Olurus (the Pellenians at the date in question having already reverted to their old alliance with Lacedaemon). And now the men of Pellene, in their turn getting wind of what had happened at Olurus, made their way round as best they could, and got into their own city of Pellene; after which there

1 See below, VII. iv. 31, p. 222; Busolt, op. cit. p. 175.
2 Pylus, a town in “hollow” Elis, upon the mountain road from Elis to Olympia, at the place where the Ladon flows into the Peneius (Paus. VI. xxii. 5), near the modern village of Agrápidokhóri.—Baedeker, Greece, p. 320. See Busolt, p. 179.
3 This fortress (placed by Leake at modern Xylókastro) lay at the entrance of the gorge of the Sys, leading from the Aigialos or coast-land into the territory of Pellene, which itself lay about sixty stades from the sea at modern Zougra. For the part played by Pellene as one of the twelve Achaean states at this period, see above, p. 189, note 4, and p. 201, note 3.
was nothing for it but to carry on war with the Arcadians in Olurus and the whole body of their own commons; and in spite of their small numbers they did not cease till they had reduced Olurus by siege.

B.C. 365.—The Arcadians were presently engaged on another campaign against Elis. While they were encamped between Cyllene and the capital the Eleians attacked them, but the Arcadians made a stand and won the battle. Andromachus, the Eleian cavalry general, who was regarded as responsible for the engagement, made an end of himself; and the rest withdrew into the city. This battle cost the life also of another there present—the Spartan Socleides; since, it will be understood, the Lacedaemonians had by this time become allies of the Eleians. Consequently the Eleians, being sore pressed on their own territory, sent an embassy and begged the Lacedaemonians to organise an expedition against the Arcadians. They were persuaded that in this way they would best arrest the progress of the Arcadians, who would thus be placed between two foes. In accordance with the suggestion Archidamus marched out with a body of the city troops and seized Cromnus. Here he left a garrison—three out of the twelve regiments—and so withdrew homewards. The Arcadians had just ended their Eleian campaign, and, without disbanding their levies, hastened to the rescue, surrounded Cromnus with a double line of trenches, and having so secured their position, proceeded to lay siege to those inside the place. The city of Lacedaemon, annoyed at the siege of their citizens, sent out an army, again under the command of Archidamus, who, when he had come, set about ravaging Arcadia to the best of his power, as also the Sciritid, and did all he could to draw off, if possible, the besieging army. The Arcadians, for all that, were not one whit the more to be stirred: they seemed callous to all his proceedings.

Presently espying a certain rising ground, across which the Arcadians had drawn their outer line of circumvallation,

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1 See Grote, *H. C. x. 429 foli.; al. B.C. 364.*
2 The port town of Elis. See above, p. 18.
3 *Cromnus,* a township near Megalopolis. See Callisthenes, ap. Athen.
10, p. 452 A. See Schneider’s note ad loc.
4 Lit. "lochi." See Arnold’s note to Thuc. v. 68; below, VII. v. 10.
Archidamus proposed to himself to take it. If he were once in command of that knoll, the besiegers at its foot would be forced to retire. Accordingly he set about leading a body of troops round to the point in question, and during this movement the light infantry in advance of Archidamus, advancing at the double, caught sight of the Arcadian Eparitoi outside the stockade and attacked them, while the cavalry made an attempt to enforce their attack simultaneously. The Arcadians did not swerve: in compact order they waited impassively. The Lacedaemonians charged a second time: a second time they swerved not, but on the contrary began advancing. Then, as the hoarse roar and shouting deepened, Archidamus himself advanced in support of his troops. To do so he turned aside along the carriage-road leading to Cromnus, and moved onward in column two abreast, which was his natural order. When they came into close proximity to one another—Archidamus’s troops in column, seeing they were marching along a road; the Arcadians in compact order with shields interlinked—at this conjuncture the Lacedaemonians were not able to hold out for any length of time against the numbers of the Arcadians. Before long Archidamus had received a wound which pierced through his thigh, whilst death was busy with those who fought in front of him, Polyaenidas and Chilon, who was wedded to the sister of Archidamus, included. The whole of these, numbering no less than thirty, perished in this action. Presently, falling back along the road, they emerged into the open ground, and now with a sense of relief the Lacedaemonians got themselves into battle order, facing the foe. The Arcadians, without altering their position, stood in compact line, and though falling short in actual numbers, were in far better heart—the moral result of an attack on a retreating enemy and the severe loss inflicted on him. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, were sorely down-hearted: Archidamus lay wounded before their eyes; in their ears rang the names of those who had died, the fallen being not only brave men, but, one may say, the

1 So the troops of the Arcadian Federation were named. Diodorus (xv. 62) calls them "the select troops," τοὺς καλομένους ἐπιλέκτους.
2 See above, III. i. 22.
flower of Spartan chivalry. The two armies were now close together, when one of the elder men lifted up his voice and cried: "Why need we fight, sirs? Why not rather make truce and part friends?" Joyously the words fell on the ears of either host, and they made a truce. The Lacedaemonians picked up their dead and retired; the Arcadians withdrew to the point where their advance originally began, and set up a trophy of victory.

Now, as the Arcadians lay at Cromnus, the Eleians from the capital, advancing in the first instance upon Pylus, fell in with the men of that place, who had been beaten back from Thalameae. Galloping along the road, the cavalry of the Eleians, when they caught sight of them, did not hesitate, but dashed at them at once, and put some to the sword, while others of them fled for safety to a rising knoll. Ere long the Eleian infantry arrived, and succeeded in dislodging this remnant on the hillock also; some they slew, and others, nearly two hundred in number, they took alive, all of whom were either sold, if foreigners, or, if Eleian exiles, put to death. After this the Eleians captured the men of Pylus and the place itself, as no one came to their rescue, and recovered the Marganians.

The Lacedaemonians presently made a second attempt upon Cromnus by a night attack, got possession of the part of the palisading facing the Argives, and at once began summoning their besieged fellow-citizens to come out. Out accordingly came all who happened to be within easy distance, and who took time by the forelock. The rest were not quick enough; a strong Arcadian reinforcement cut them off, and they remained shut up inside, and were eventually taken prisoners and distributed. One portion of them fell to the lot of the Argives, one to the Thebans, one to the Arcadians, and one to the Messenians. The whole number taken, whether true-born Spartans or Perioeci, amounted to more than one hundred.

1 A strong fortress in an unfrequented situation, defended by narrow passes (Leake, Morea, ii. 204); it lay probably in the rocky recesses of Mount Scollis (modern Santaméri), on the frontier of Achaia, near the modern village of Santaméri. See Polyb. iv. 75. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 179.

2 "The Thebans must have been soldiers in garrison at Tegea, Megalopolis, or Messene."—Grote, H. G. x. 433.
B.C. 364.—And now that the Arcadians had leisure on the side of Cromnus, they were again able to occupy themselves with the Eleians, and to keep Olympia still more strongly garrisoned. In anticipation of the approaching Olympic year, they began preparations to celebrate the Olympian games in conjunction with the men of Pisa, who claim to be the original presidents of the Temple. Now, when the month of the Olympic Festival—and not the month only, but the very days, during which the solemn assembly is wont to meet, were come, the Eleians, in pursuance of preparations and invitations to the Achaeans, of which they made no secret, at length proceeded to march along the road to Olympia. The Arcadians had never imagined that they would really attack them; and they were themselves just now engaged with the men of Pisa in carrying out the details of the solemn assembly. They had already completed the chariot-race, and the foot-race of the pentathlon. The competitors entitled to enter for the wrestling match had left the racecourse, and were getting through their bouts in the space between the racecourse and the great altar.

It must be understood that the Eleians under arms were already close at hand within the sacred enclosure. The Arcadians, without advancing farther to meet them, drew up their troops on the river Cladäus, which flows past the Altis and discharges itself into the Alpheüs. Their allies, consisting of two hundred Argive hoplites and about four hundred Athenian cavalry, were there to support them. Presently the

1 *I.e.* "Ol. 104. ι" (July B.C. 364).
2 For this claim on the part of the Pisatans (as the old inhabitants), see above, III. ii. 31; Paus. VI. xxii. 2; Diod. xv. 78; Busolt, *op. cit.* p. 154.
3 As to the *pentathlon*, see above, IV. vii. 5 (p. 76, note 3). Whether the preceding *ἱπποδρομία* was, at this date, a horse or chariot race, or both, I am unable to say.
4 "The *τέμενος* must here be distinguished from the Altis, as meaning the entire breadth of consecrated ground at Olympia, of which the Altis formed a smaller interior portion enclosed with a wall. The Eleians entered into the *τέμενος* before they crossed the river Kladeus, which flowed *through* the *τέμενος*, but *alongside* the Altis. The tomb of Oenomaus, which was doubtless included in the *τέμενος*, was on the right bank of the Kladeus (Paus. VI. xxi. 3); while the Altis was on the left bank of the river."—Grote, *H. G.* x. 438, note 1. For the position of the Altis (Paus. V. x. 1) and several of the buildings here mentioned, and the topography of Olympia in general, see Baedeker's *Greece*, p. 322 foll.; and Dörpfeld's Plan ("Olympia und Umgegend," Berlin, 1882), there reproduced.
Eleians formed into line on the opposite side of the stream, and, having sacrificed, at once began advancing. Though heretofore in matters of war despised by Arcadians and Argives, by Achaeans and Athenians alike, still on this day they led the van of the allied force like the bravest of the brave. Coming into collision with the Arcadians first, they at once put them to flight, and next receiving the attack of the Argive supports, mastered these also. Then having pursued them into the space between the senate-house, the temple of Hestia, and the theatre thereto adjoining, they still kept up the fighting as fiercely as ever, pushing the retreating foe towards the great altar. But now being exposed to missiles from the porticoes and the senate-house and the great temple, while battling with their opponents on the level, some of the Eleians were slain, and amongst others the commander of the Three Hundred himself, Stratolas. At this stage of the proceedings they retired to their camp.

The Arcadians and those with them were so terrified at the thought of the coming day that they gave themselves neither respite nor repose that night, but fell to chopping up the carefully-compacted booths and constructing them into palisades; so that when the Eleians did again advance the next day and saw the strength of the barriers and the number mounted on the temples, they withdrew to their city. They had proved themselves to be warriors of such mettle as a god indeed by the breath of his spirit may raise up and bring to perfection in a single day, but into which it were impossible for mortal men to convert a coward even in a lifetime.

B.C. 363.—The employment of the sacred treasures of the temple by the Arcadian magistrates as a means of maintaining the Eparitoi aroused protest. The Mantineans were the first to pass a resolution forbidding such use of the sacred property. They set the example themselves of providing the necessary quota for the Troop in question from their state exchequer, and this sum they sent to the federal government. The latter,

1 Or, "from the porticoes of the senate-house and the great temple."
2 See above, VII. i. 24 (p. 193, note 2). "Were these magistrates, or merely popular leaders?"—Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. p. 203, note 3.
3 Or, "Select Troop." See above, VII. iv. 22, p. 219, note i.
affirming that the Mantineans were undermining the Arcadian league, retaliated by citing their leading statesmen to appear before the assembly of Ten Thousand; and on their refusal to obey the summons, passed sentence upon them, and sent the Eparitoi to apprehend them as convicted persons. The Mantineans, however, closed their gates, and would not admit the Troop within their walls. Their example was speedily followed: others among the Ten Thousand began to protest against the enormity of so applying the sacred treasures; it was doubly wrong to leave as a perpetual heirloom to their children the imputation of a crime so heinous against the gods. But no sooner was a resolution passed in the general assembly forbidding the use of the sacred moneys for profane purposes than those (members of the league) who could not have afforded to serve as Eparitoi without pay began speedily to melt away; while those of more independent means, with mutual encouragement, began to enrol themselves in the ranks of the Eparitoi—the feeling being that they ought not to be a mere tool in the hands of the corps, but rather that the corps itself should be their instrument. Those members of the government who had manipulated the sacred money soon saw that when they came to render an account of their stewardship, in all likelihood they would lose their heads. They therefore sent an embassy to Thebes, with instructions to the Theban authorities warning them that, if they did not open a campaign, the Arcadians would in all probability again veer round to Lacedaemon.

The Thebans, therefore, began making preparations for opening a campaign, but the party who consulted the best interests of Peloponnese persuaded the general assembly of the Arcadians to send an embassy and tell the Thebans not to advance with an army into Arcadia, unless they sent for them; and whilst this was the language they addressed to Thebes, they reasoned among themselves that they could dispense with war altogether. The presidency over the temple

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1 The common formula for a Greek confederation, τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκαδῶν, is used as an equivalent of οἱ μύρωσι (here and below, §§ 35, 38).—Freeman, op. cit. 202, note 4.

2 See below, VII. v. i, οἱ κηδικευον τῆς Πελοποννήσου. I regard these phrases as self-laudatory political catchwords.
of Zeus, they were persuaded, they might easily dispense with; indeed, it would at once be a more upright and a holier proceeding on their parts to give it back, and with such conduct the god, they thought, would be better pleased. As these were also the views and wishes of the Eleians, both parties agreed to make peace, and a truce was established.

B.C. 362.—The oaths were ratified; and amongst those who swore to them were included not only the parties immediately concerned, but the men of Tegea, and the Theban general himself, who was inside Tegea with three hundred heavy infantry of the Boeotians. Under these circumstances the Arcadians in Tegea remained behind feasting and keeping holy day, with outpouring of libations and songs of victory, to celebrate the establishment of peace. Here was an opportunity for the Theban and those of the government who regarded the forthcoming inquiry with apprehension. Aided by the Boeotians and those of the Eparitoi who shared their sentiments, they first closed the gates of the fortress of Tegea, and then set about sending to the various quarters to apprehend those of the better class. But, inasmuch as there were Arcadians present from all the cities, and there was a general desire for peace, those apprehended must needs be many. So much so, that the prison-house was presently full to overflowing, and the town-hall was full also. Besides the number lodged in prison, a number had escaped by leaping down the walls, and there were others who were suffered to pass through the gates (a laxity easily explained, since no one, excepting those who were anticipating their own downfall, cherished any wrathful feeling against anybody). But what was a source of still graver perplexity to the Theban commander and those acting with him,—of the Mantineans, the very people whom they had set their hearts on catching, they had got but very few. Nearly all of them, owing to the proximity of their city, had, in fact, betaken themselves home. Now, when day came and the Mantineans learned what had happened, they immediately sent and forewarned the other Arcadian states to be ready in arms, and to guard the passes; and they set the example themselves by so doing. They sent at the same time to

1 Or, "government house."
Tegea and demanded the release of all Mantineans there detained. With regard to the rest of the Arcadians they further claimed that no one should be imprisoned or put to death without trial. If any one had any accusation to bring against any, then by the mouth of their messengers there present they gave notice that the state of Mantinea was ready to offer bail, "Verily and indeed to produce before the general assembly of the Arcadians all who might be summoned into court." The Theban accordingly, on hearing this, was at a loss what to make of the affair, and released his prisoners. Next day, summoning a congress of all the Arcadians who chose to come, he explained, with some show of apology, that he had been altogether deceived; he had heard, he said, that "the Lacedaemonians were under arms on the frontier, and that some of the Arcadians were about to betray Tegea into their hands." His auditors acquitted him for the moment, albeit they knew that as touching themselves he was lying. They sent, however, an embassy to Thebes and there accused him as deserving of death. Epaminondas (who was at that time the general at the head of the war department) is reported to have maintained that the Theban commander had acted far more rightly when he seized than when he let go the prisoners. "Thanks to you," he argued, "we have been brought into a state of war, and then you, without our advice or opinion asked, make peace on your own account; would it not be reasonable to retort upon you the charge of treason in such conduct? Anyhow, be assured," he added, "we shall bring an army into Arcadia, and along with those who share our views carry on the war which we have undertaken."

V. B.C. 362.—This answer was duly reported to the general assembly of the Arcadians, and throughout the several states of the league. Consequently the Mantineans, along with those of the Arcadians who had the interests of Peloponnesus at heart,¹ as also the Eleians and the Achaeans, came to the conclusion that the policy of the Thebans was plain. They wished Peloponnesus to be reduced to such an extremity of weakness that it might fall an easy prey into their hands who were minded to enslave it. "Why else," they asked, "should

¹ See note above, VII. iv. 35, p. 223.
they wish us to fight, except that we may tear each other to pieces, and both sides be driven to look to them for support? or why, when we tell them that we have no need of them at present, do they insist on preparing for a foreign campaign? Is it not plain that these preparations are for an expedition which will do us some mischief?"

In this mood they sent to Athens, calling on the Athenians for military aid. Ambassadors went also to Lacedaemon on behalf of the Eparitoi, summoning the Lacedaemonians, if they wished to give a helping hand, to put a stop to the proceedings of any power approaching to enslave Peloponnesus. As regards the headship, they came to an arrangement at once, on the principle that each of the allied states should exercise the generalship within its own territory.

While these matters were in progress, Epaminondas was prosecuting his march at the head of all the Boeotians, with the Euboeans, and a large body of Thessalians, furnished both by Alexander and by his opponents. The Phocians were not represented. Their special agreement only required them to render assistance in case of an attack on Thebes; to assist in a hostile expedition against others was not in the bond. Epaminondas, however, reflected that inside Peloponnesus itself they might count upon the Argives and the

1 For a treaty of alliance between Athens, the Arkadians, Achaeans, Eleians, and Philiasians, immediately before Mantinea, B.C. 362, ετεί Μάλωνος ἄρχοντος, see Hicks, 94; Köhler, C. I. A. ii. p. 405. It is preserved on a stelē ("broken at bottom; but the top is surmounted by a relief representing Zeus enthroned, with thunderbolt; a female figure [= the Συμμαχία?] approaches lifting her veil, while Athena stands by") now standing among the sculptures from the Asklepieion on the Acropolis at Athens. See Milchhöfer, p. 47, no. 7, Die Museen, Athens, 1881. For the date, see Demosth. c. Polyecl. 1207.

2 For Alexander of Pherae, see above, VI. iv. 34 (p. 168). In B.C. 363 the Thebans had sent an army under Pelopidas into Thessaly to assist their allies among the Thessalians with the Phthiot Achaeans and the Magnesians against Alexander. At Kynos Kephalae Alexander was defeated, but Pelopidas was slain (see Grote, H. G. x. 420 foll.). "'His death, as it brought grief, so likewise it produced advantage to the allies; for the Thebans, as soon as they heard of his fall, delayed not their revenge, but presently sent seven thousand foot and seven hundred horse, under the command of Malcitas and Diogiton. And they, finding Alexander weak and without forces, compelled him to restore the cities he had taken, to withdraw his garrisons from the Magnesians and Achaeans of Phthiotis and swear to assist the Thebans against whatsoever enemies they should require,"—Plut. Pelop. 35 (Clough, ii. 236).
Messenians, with that section of the Arcadians which shared their views. These latter were the men of Tegea and Megalopolis, of Asea and Pallantium, with any townships which owing to their small size or their position in the midst of these larger cities were forced to follow their lead.

Epaminondas advanced with rapid strides; but on reaching Nemea he slackened speed, hoping to catch the Athenians as they passed, and reflecting on the magnitude of such an achievement, whether in stimulating the courage of his own allies, or in plunging his foes into despondency; since, to state the matter concisely, any blow to Athens would be a gain to Thebes. But during his pause at Nemea those who shared the opposite policy had time to converge on Mantinea. Presently the news reached Epaminondas that the Athenians had abandoned the idea of marching by land, and were preparing to bring their supports to Arcadia by sea through Lacedaemon. This being so, he abandoned his base of Nemea and pushed on to Tegea.

That the strategy of the Theban general was fortunate I will not pretend to assert, but in the particular combination of prudence and daring which stamps these exploits, I look upon him as consummate. In the first place, I cannot but admire the sagacity which led him to form his camp within the walls of Tegea, where he was in greater security than he would have been if entrenched outside, and where his future movements were more completely concealed from the enemy. Again, the means to collect material and furnish himself with other necessaries were readier to his hand inside the city; while, thirdly, he was able to keep an eye on the movements of his opponents marching outside, and to watch their successful dispositions as well as their mistakes. More than this: in spite of his sense of superiority to his antagonists, over and over again, when he saw them gaining some advantage in position, he refused to be drawn out to attack them. It was only when he saw plainly that no city was going to give him its adhesion, and that time was slipping by, that he made up his mind that a blow must be struck, failing which, he had nothing to expect save a vast ingloriousness, in place of his former fame.¹ He had ascertained that his antagonists held a strong position.

¹ Or, "dull obscurity in place of renown."
round Mantinea, and that they had sent to fetch Agesilaus and the whole Lacedaemonian army. He was further aware that Agesilaus had commenced his advance and was already at Pellene. Accordingly he passed the word of command to his troops to take their evening meal, put himself at their head and advanced straight upon Sparta. Had it not been for the arrival (by some providential chance) of a Cretan, who brought the news to Agesilaus of the enemy's advance, he would have captured the city of Sparta like a nest of young birds absolutely bereft of its natural defenders. As it was, Agesilaus, being forewarned, had time to return to the city before the Thebans came, and here the Spartans made distribution of their scanty force and maintained watch and ward, albeit few enough in numbers, since the whole of their cavalry were away in Arcadia, and so was their foreign brigade, and so were three out of their twelve regiments.

Arrived within the city of Sparta, Epaminondas abstained from gaining an entry at a point where his troops would have to fight on level ground and under attack from the houses above; where also their large numbers would give them no superiority over the small numbers of the foemen. But, singling out a position which he conceived would give him the advantage, he occupied it and began his advance against the city upon a downward instead of an upward incline.

With regard to what subsequently took place, two possible explanations suggest themselves: either it was miraculous, or it may be maintained that there is no resisting the fury of desperation. Archidamus, advancing at the head of but a hundred men, and crossing the one thing which might have been expected to form an obstacle to the enemy, began marching

1 Pellene (or Pellana), a town of Laconia on the Eurotas, and on the road from Sparta to Arcadia; in fact the frontier fortress on the Eurotas, as Sellasia on the Oenus; *Dict. of Anc. Geog.* s.v.; see Paus. iii. 20, § 2; Strab. viii. 386; Polyb. iv. 81, xvi. 37; Plut. *Agis*, 8; Leake, *Morea*, iii. 14 foll.


3 Lit. "lochi." See above, VII. iv. 20 (p. 218); *Pol. Lac*. xi. 4; below, p. 315.

4 Grote (*H. G.* x. 455) says: "Though he crossed the Eurotas and actually entered into the city of Sparta," as the words ἐπελ δὲ ἔγεντο ἐν τῇ Πόλει τῶν Σπάρτιων certainly seem to me to imply. Others interpret "in the close neighbourhood of."

5 Or, "to serve as his defence"; or, "the one obstacle to his progress,"
uphill against his antagonists. At this crisis these fire-breathing warriors, these victorious heroes of Leuctra, with their superiority at every point, aided, moreover, by the advantage of their position, did not withstand the attack of Archidamus and those with him, but swerved in flight.

The vanguard of Epaminondas's troops was cut down; when, however, flushed with the glory of their victory, the citizens followed up their pursuit beyond the right point, they in turn were cut down,—so plainly was the demarking line of victory drawn by the finger of God. So then Archidamus set up a trophy to note the limit of his success, and gave back those who had there fallen of the enemy under a truce. Epaminondas, on his side, reflecting that the Arcadians must already be hastening to the relief of Lacedaemon, and being unwilling to engage them in conjunction with the whole of the Lacedaemonian force, especially now that the star of Sparta's fortune shone, whilst theirs had suffered some eclipse, turned and marched back the way he came with all speed possible into Tegea. There he gave his heavy infantry pause and refreshment, but his cavalry he sent on to Mantinea; he begged them to "have courage and hold on," instructing them that in all likelihood they would find the flocks and herds of the Mantineans and the entire population itself outside their walls, especially as it was the moment for carrying the corn. So they set off.

The Athenian cavalry, starting from Eleusis, had made their evening meal at the Isthmus, and passing through Cleonae, as chance befell, had arrived at Mantinea and had encamped within the walls in the houses. As soon as the enemy were seen galloping on with evidently hostile intent, the Mantineans fell to praying the Athenian knights to lend them all the succour they could, and they showed them all their cattle outside, and all their labourers, and among them were many children and graybeards who were free-born citizens. The Athenians were touched by this appeal, and, though they had not yet broken fast, neither the men themselves nor their i.e. Archidamus's. It was a miraculous thing that the Thebans did not stop him.

horses, went out eagerly to the rescue. And here we must needs pause to admire the valour of these men also. The enemy whom they had to cope with far outnumbered them, as was plain to see, and the former misadventure of the cavalry in Corinth was not forgotten. But none of these things entered into their calculations now—nor yet the fact that they were on the point of engaging Thebans and Thessalians, the finest cavalry in the world by all repute. The only thing they thought of was the shame and the dishonour, if, being there, they did not lend a helping hand to their allies. In this mood, so soon as they caught sight of the enemy, they fell with a crash upon him in passionate longing to recover the old ancestral glory. Nor did they fight in vain—the blows they struck enabled the Mantineans to recover all their property outside, but among those who dealt them died some brave heroes; brave heroes also, it is evident, were those whom they slew, since on either side the weapons wielded were not so short but that they could lunge at one another with effect. The dead bodies of their own men they refused to abandon; and there were some of the enemy's slain whom they restored to him under a flag of truce.

The thoughts now working in the mind of Epaminondas were such as these: that within a few days he would be forced to retire, as the period of the campaign was drawing to a close; if it ended in his leaving in the lurch those allies whom he came out to assist, they would be besieged by their antagonists. What a blow would that be to his own fair fame, already somewhat tarnished! Had he not been defeated in Lacedaemon, with a large body of heavy infantry, by a handful of men? defeated again at Mantinea, in the cavalry engagement, and himself the main cause finally of a coalition between five great powers—that is to say, the Lacedaemonians, the Arcadians, the Achaeans, the Eleians, and the Athenians? On all grounds it seemed to him impossible to steal past without a battle. And the more so as he computed the alternatives of victory or

1 Or, "and in Corinth an untoward incident had been experienced by the cavalry." See Grote, H. G. x. 458, note 2. Possibly in reference to Hell. VI. v. 51, 52.

2 Probably Xenophon's own son Gryllus was among them; see Trans. vol. i. p. cxiii.
death. If the former were his fortune, it would resolve all his perplexities; if death, his end would be noble. How glorious a thing to die in the endeavour to leave behind him, as his last legacy to his fatherland, the empire of Peloponnesus! That such thoughts should pass through his brain strikes me as by no means wonderful, since these are thoughts distinctive of all men of high ambition. Far more wonderful to my mind was the pitch of perfection to which he had brought his army. There was no labour which his troops would shrink from, either by night or by day; there was no danger they would flinch from; and, with the scantiest provisions, their discipline never failed them.

And so, when he gave his last orders to them to prepare for impending battle, they obeyed with alacrity. He gave the word; the cavalry fell to whitening their helmets, the heavy infantry of the Arcadians began inscribing clubs as the crest on their shields, as though they were Thebans, and all were engaged in sharpening their lances and swords and polishing their heavy shields. When the preparations were complete and he had led them out, his next movement is worthy of attention. First, as was natural, he paid heed to their formation, and in so doing seemed to give clear evidence that he intended battle; but no sooner was the army drawn up in the formation which he preferred, than he advanced, not by the shortest route to meet the enemy, but towards the westward-lying mountains which face Tegea, and by this movement created in the enemy an expectation that he would not do battle on that day. In keeping with this expectation, as soon as he arrived at the mountain-region, he extended his phalanx in long line and piled arms under the high cliffs; and to all appearance he was there encamping. The effect of this manoeuvre on the enemy in general was to relax the prepared bent of their souls for battle, and to weaken their tactical arrangements. Presently, however, wheeling his regiments (which were marching in column) to the front, with the effect of strengthening the beak-like attack which he proposed to

1 Grote (H. G. x. 463) has another interpretation.
2 Or, "the wedge-like attack of his own division"; see Grote, H. G. x. 469 foll. I do not, however, think that the attacking column was actually wedge-shaped like the acies cuneata of the Romans. It was the unusual depth
lead himself, at the same instant he gave the order, "Shoulder arms, forward," and led the way, the troops following.

When the enemy saw them so unexpectedly approaching, not one of them was able to maintain tranquillity: some began running to their divisions, some fell into line, some might be seen bitting and bridling their horses, some donning their cuirasses, and one and all were like men about to receive rather than to inflict a blow. He, the while, with steady impetus pushed forward his armament, like a ship-of-war prow forward. Wherever he brought his solid wedge to bear, he meant to cleave through the opposing mass, and crumble his adversary's host to pieces. With this design he prepared to throw the brunt of the fighting on the strongest half of his army, while he kept the weaker portion of it in the background, knowing certainly that if worsted it would only cause discouragement to his own division and add force to the foe. The cavalry on the side of his opponents were disposed like an ordinary phalanx of heavy infantry, regular in depth and unsupported by foot-soldiers interspersed among the horses.\(^1\) Epaminondas again differed in strengthening the attacking point of his cavalry, besides which he interspersed footmen between their lines in the belief that, when he had once cut through the cavalry, he would have wrested victory from the antagonist along his whole line; so hard is it to find troops who will care to keep their ground when once they see any of their own side flying. Lastly, to prevent any attempt on the part of the Athenians, who were on the enemy's left wing, to bring up their reliefs in support of the portion next them, he posted bodies of cavalry and heavy infantry on certain hillocks in front of them, intending to create in their minds an apprehension that, in case they offered such assistance, they would be attacked on their own rear by these detachments. Such was the plan of encounter which he formed and executed; nor was he cheated in his hopes. He had so much the mastery at his point of attack that he caused the whole of the enemy's troops to take to flight.

of the column which gave it the force of an ironclad's ram. Cf. Cyrop. II. iv. for els μετωπων.

\(^1\) See Rustow and Köchly, p. 176; and for the ἰματιασια Harpocratus, s.v.; Pollux, i. 131; Hipharch. v. 13; Thuc. v. 58; Herod. vii. 158; Cæs. B. G. i. 48; B. Civ. iii. 84.
But after he himself had fallen, the rest of the Thebans were not able any longer to turn their victory rightly to account. Though the main battle line of their opponents had given way, not a single man afterwards did the victorious hoplites slay, not an inch forward did they advance from the ground on which the collision took place. Though the cavalry had fled before them, there was no pursuit; not a man, horseman or hoplite, did the conquering cavalry cut down; but, like men who have suffered a defeat, as if panic-stricken they slipped back through the ranks of the fleeing foemen. Only the footmen fighting amongst the cavalry and the light infantry, who had together shared in the victory of the cavalry, found their way round to the left wing as masters of the field, but it cost them dear; here they encountered the Athenians, and most of them were cut down.

The effective result of these achievements was the very opposite of that which the world at large anticipated. Here, where well-nigh the whole of Hellas was met together in one field, and the combatants stood rank against rank confronted, there was no one who doubted that, in the event of battle, the conquerors this day would rule; and that those who lost would be their subjects. But God so ordered it that both belligerents alike set up trophies as claiming victory, and neither interfered with the other in the act. Both parties alike gave back their enemy's dead under a truce, and in right of victory; both alike, in symbol of defeat, under a truce took back their dead. And though both claimed to have won the day; neither could show that he had thereby gained any accession of territory, or state, or empire, or was better situated than before the battle. Uncertainty and confusion, indeed, had gained ground, being tenfold greater throughout the length and breadth of Hellas after the battle than before.

At this point I lay aside my pen: the sequel of the story may haply commend itself to another.

1 Or, "they timorously slipped back."

2 Or, "win the attention of some other writer."
AGESILAUS:

AN ENCOMIUM
To write the praises of Agesilaus in language equalling his virtue and renown is, I know, no easy task; yet must it be essayed; since it were but an ill requital of pre-eminence, that, on the ground of his perfection, a good man should forfeit the tribute even of imperfect praise.

As touching, therefore, the excellency of his birth, what weightier, what nobler testimony can be adduced than this one fact? To the commemorative list of famous ancestry is added to-day the name Agesilaus as holding this or that numerical descent from Heracles, and these ancestors no private persons, but kings sprung from the loins of kings. Nor is it open to the gainsayer to contend that they were kings indeed but of some chance city. Not so, but even as their family holds highest honour in their fatherland, so too is their city the most glorious in Hellas, whereby they hold, not primacy over the second best, but among leaders they have leadership.

And herein it is open to us to praise both his fatherland and his family. It is notable that never throughout these ages has Lacedaemon, out of envy of the privilege accorded to her kings, tried to dissolve their rule; nor ever yet throughout these ages have her kings strained after greater powers than

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1 Or, "even to-day, in the proud bead-roll of his ancestry he stands commemorated, in numerical descent from Heracles."
those which limited their heritage of kingship from the first. Wherefore, while all other forms of government, democracies and oligarchies, tyrannies and monarchies, alike have failed to maintain their continuity unbroken, here, as the sole exception, endures indissolubly their kingship.¹

And next in token of an aptitude for kingship seen in Agesilaus, before even he entered upon office, I note these signs. On the death of Agis, king of Lacedaemon, there were rival claimants to the throne. Leotychides claimed the succession as being the son of Agis, and Agesilaus as the son of Archidamus. But the verdict of Lacedaemon favoured Agesilaus as being in point of family and virtue unimpeachable, ² and so they set him on the throne. And yet, in this princeliest of cities so to be selected by the noblest citizens as worthy of highest privilege, argues, methinks conclusively, an excellence forerunning exercise of rule.³

And so I pass on at once to narrate the chief achievements of his reign, since by the light of deeds the character of him who wrought them will, if I mistake not, best shine forth.

Agesilaus was still a youth ⁴ when he obtained the kingdom, and he was still but a novice in his office when the news came that the king of Persia was collecting a mighty armament by sea and land for the invasion of Hellas. The Lacedaemonians and their allies sat debating these matters, when Agesilaus undertook to cross over into Asia. He only asked for thirty Spartans and two thousand New Citizens,⁵ besides a contingent of the allies six thousand strong; with these he would cross over into Asia and endeavour to effect a peace; or, if the barbarian preferred war, he would leave him little leisure to invade Hellas.

The proposal was welcomed with enthusiasm on the part

¹ See Cyrop. I. i. 1.
² For this matter see above, Hell. III. iii. 1-6; V. iv. 13 (pp. 19, 123); Plut. Ages. iii. 3 (Clough, iv. 3 foll.); Paus. iii. 3.
³ See Aristides (Rhet. 776), who quotes the passage for its measured cadence.
⁴ B.C. 399; according to Plut. (Ages. ad fin.) he was forty-three, and therefore still "not old." See Hell. III. iv. 1 for the startling news, B.C. 396.
⁵ For the class of Neodamodes, see Arnold's note to Thuc. v. 34 (Jowett, Thuc. ii. 307); also Thuc. vii. 58; Hell. I. iii. 15 (Trans. vol. i. p. 13); and above, p. 21.
of many. They could not but admire the eagerness of their king to retaliate upon the Persian for his former invasions of Hellas by counter-invasion on his own soil. They liked the preference also which he showed for attacking rather than awaiting his enemy’s attack, and his intention to carry on the war at the expense of Persia rather than that of Hellas; but it was the perfection of policy, they felt, so to change the arena of battle, with Asia as the prize of victory instead of Hellas. If we pass on to the moment when he had received his army and set sail, I can conceive no clearer exposition of his generalship than the bare narration of his exploits.

The scene is Asia, and this his first achievement. Tissaphernes had sworn an oath to Agesilaus on this wise: if Agesilaus would grant him an armistice until the return of certain ambassadors whom he would send to the king, he (Tissaphernes) would do his utmost to procure the independence of the Hellenic cities in Asia. And Agesilaus took a counter oath: without fraud or covin to observe the armistice during the three months¹ necessary to that transaction. But the compact was scarcely made when Tissaphernes gave the lie to the solemn undertaking he had sworn to. So far from effecting peace, he begged the King to send him a large armament in addition to that which he already had. As to Agesilaus, though he was well aware of these proceedings, he adhered loyally to the armistice.

And for myself, I look upon this as the first glorious achievement of the Spartan. By displaying the perjury of Tissaphernes he robbed him of his credit with all the world; by the exhibition of himself in contrast as a man who ratified his oath and would not gainsay an article of his agreement, he gave all men, Hellenes and barbarians alike, encouragement to make covenant with him to the full extent of his desire.

When Tissaphernes, priding himself on the strength of that army which had come down to aid him, bade Agesilaus to be gone from Asia or to prepare for war,² deep was the vexation depicted on the faces of the Lacedaemonians there

¹ See Grote, H. G. x. 359; Hell. III. iv. 5 (above, p. 25).
² Lit. "When Tissaphernes, priding himself . . . bade Agesilaus be gone . . . deep was the annoyance felt."
present and their allies, as they realised that the scanty force of Agesilaus was all too small to cope with the armaments of Persia. But the brow of their general was lit with joy as gaily he bade the ambassadors take back this answer to Tissaphernes: “I hold myself indebted to your master for the perjury whereby he has obtained to himself the hostility of heaven, and made the gods themselves allies of Hellas.” And so without further pause he published a general order to his soldiers to pack their baggage and prepare for active service; and to the several cities which lay on the line of march to Caria, the order sped to have their markets in readiness; while to the men of Ionia and the Aeolid and the Hellespont he sent despatches bidding them send their contingents to Ephesus to join in the campaign.

Tissaphernes meanwhile was influenced by the fact that Agesilaus had no cavalry, and that Caria was a hilly district unsuited for that arm. Moreover, as he further betought him, Agesilaus must needs be wroth with him for his deceit. What could be clearer, therefore, than that he was about to make a dash at the satrap’s home in Caria? Accordingly he transported the whole of his infantry into Caria and marched his cavalry round the while into the plain of the Maeander, persuaded that he would trample the Hellenes under the hoofs of his horses long before they reached the district where no cavalry could operate.

But Agesilaus, instead of advancing upon Caria, turned right about and marched in the direction of Phrygia. Picking up the various forces that met him on his progress, he passed onwards, laying city after city at his feet, and by the suddenness of his incursion capturing enormous wealth.

Here was an achievement which showed the genius of a general, as all agreed. When once war was declared, and the arts of circumvention and deceit were thereby justified, he had proved Tissaphernes to be a very babé in subtilty;¹ and with what sagacity again did he turn the circumstances to account for the enrichment of his friends. Owing to the quantity of wealth captured, precious things were selling for a mere song. Thereupon he gave his friends warning to

¹ See below, xi. 4; Mem. III. i. 6; IV. ii. 15; Cyrop. I. vi. 31; Plut. Ages. xi. (Clough, iv. 10).
make their purchases, adding that he should at once march down to the sea-coast at the head of his troops. The quartermasters meanwhile received orders to make a note of the purchasers with the prices of the articles, and to consign the goods. The result was that, without prior disbursement on their part, or detriment to the public treasury, his friends reaped an enormous harvest. Moreover, when deserters came with offers to disclose hidden treasures, and naturally enough laid their proposal before the king himself, he took care to have the capture of these treasures effected by his friends, which would enable them to do a stroke of business, and at the same time redound to their prestige. For this reason he was not long in discovering many an eager aspirant to his friendship.

But a country pillaged and denuded of inhabitants would not long support an army. That he felt. A more perennial source of supply was surely to be found in waving cornfields and thickly clustering homesteads. So with infinite pains he set himself not merely to crush his foes by force, but also to win them to his side by gentleness. In this spirit he often enjoined upon his soldiers to guard their captives as fellow-men rather than take vengeance on them as evildoers; or, on a change of quarters, if aware of little children left behind by the dealers (since the men often sold them in the belief that it would be impossible to carry them away and rear them), he would show concern in behalf of these poor waifs and have them conveyed to some place of safety; or he would entrust them to the care of fellow-prisoners also left behind on account of old age; in no case must they be left to ravening dogs and wolves. In this way he won the goodwill not only of those who heard tell of these doings but of the prisoners themselves. And whenever he brought over a city to his side, he set the citizens free from the harsher service of a bondsman to his lord, imposing the gentler obedience of a freeman to his ruler. Indeed, there were fortresses impregnable to assault which he brought under his power by the subtler force of human kindness.

But when, in Phrygia even, the freedom of his march along the

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flats was hampered by the cavalry of Pharnabazus, he saw that if he wished to avoid a skulking warfare under cover, a force of cavalry was indispensable. Accordingly he enlisted the wealthiest members of every city in those parts to breed and furnish horses; with this saving clause, however: that the individual who furnished a horse and arms with a good rider should be exempt from service himself. By this means he engendered an eagerness to discharge the obligation, not unlike that of the condemned man, casting about to discover some one to die in his place.¹ He further ordered some of the states themselves to furnish contingents of mounted troopers, and this in the conviction that from such training-centres he would presently get a pick of cavaliers proud of their horsemanship. And thus once more he won golden opinions by the skill with which he provided himself with a body of cavalry in the plenitude of strength and ripe for active service.

On the approach of early spring² he collected his whole armament at Ephesus, and set himself to the work of training it. With that object he proposed a series of prizes: one set for the cavalry squadron which rode best, another for the heavy infantry divisions which presented the best physique, another again for various light troops, peltasts, and bowmen, which showed themselves most efficient in their respective duties.

Thereupon it was a sight to see the gymnasiaumis thronged with warriors going through their exercises, the racecourses crowded with troopers on prancing steeds, the archers and the javelin men shooting at the butts. Nay, the whole city in which he lay was transformed into a spectacle itself, so filled to overflowing was the market-place with arms and armour of every sort, and horses, all for sale. Here were coppersmiths and carpenters, ironfounders and cobblers, painters and decorators—one and all busily engaged in fabricating the implements of war; so that an onlooker might have thought the city of Ephesus itself a gigantic arsenal. It would have kindled courage in the breast of a coward to see the long

¹ Instead of the plain ἔνχρωλή of the parallel passage (Hell. III. iv. 15) the encomiast prefers the poetical μαστέβων.
² B.C. 395; see Hell. III. iv. 16 (above, p. 29); Plut. Marcel. (Clough, ii. 262); Polyb. xii. 20, 7.
lines of soldiers, with Agesilaus at their head, all garlanded as they marched in proud procession from the gymnasiaums and dedicated their wreaths to our Lady Artemis. Since, where these three elements exist—reverence towards heaven, practice in military affairs, and obedience to command—all else must needs be full of happy promise.

But seeing that contempt for the foe is calculated to infuse a certain strength in face of battle, he ordered his criers to strip naked the barbarians captured by his foraging parties, and so to sell them. The soldiers who saw the white skins of these folk, unused to strip for toil, soft and sleek and lazy-looking, as of people who could only stir abroad in carriages, concluded that a war with women would scarcely be more formidable. Then he published a further order to the soldiers:

"I shall lead you at once by the shortest route to the stronghold of the enemy's territory. Your general asks you to keep yourselves on the alert in mind and body, as men about to enter the lists of battle on the instant."

But Tissaphernes was persuaded that this was all talk on his part for the purpose of outwitting him a second time: now certainly Agesilaus would make an incursion into Caria. So once again the satrap transported his infantry over into that country just as he had done before, and as before he posted his cavalry in the plain of the Maeander.

This time, however, Agesilaus was true to his word. In accordance with his published order he advanced straight upon the region of Sardis, and, during a three days' march through a country where not an enemy was to be seen, provided his army with abundant supplies. On the fourth day the enemy's cavalry came up. The Persian general ordered the commandant of his baggage train to cross the Pactolus and encamp, whilst his troopers, who had caught sight of the camp followers of the Hellenes scattered in search of booty, put many of them to the sword. Agesilaus, aware how matters were going, ordered his cavalry to the rescue, and the Persians on their side, seeing the enemy's supports approaching, collected and formed up in line to receive them with the serried squadrons of their cavalry. And now Agesilaus, conscious that

1 Or, "the richest parts of the country," viz. Lydia; Plut. Ages. x.
his enemy's infantry had not as yet arrived, whilst on his own side no element in his preparation was lacking, felt that the moment was come to join battle if he could. Accordingly he sacrificed and advanced against the opposing lines of cavalry. A detachment of heavy infantry, the ten-years-service men, had orders to close with them at the run, while the light infantry division were told to show them the way at a swinging pace. At the same time he passed the order along the line of his cavalry to charge in reliance on the support of himself and the main body in their rear. Charge they did, these troopers, and the pick of Persian cavalry received them bravely, but in face of the conjoint horror of the attack they swerved, and some were cut down at once in the river-bed, while others sought safety in flight. The Hellenes followed close on the heels of the flying foe and captured his camp. Here the peltasts, not unnaturally, fell to pillaging, whereupon Agesilaus formed a cordon of troops, round the property of friends and foes alike, and so encamped.

Presently hearing that the enemy were in a state of disorder, the result of every one holding his fellow responsible for what had happened, he advanced without further stay on Sardis. Having arrived, he fell to burning and ravaging the suburbs, while at the same time he did not fail to make it known by proclamation that those who asked for freedom should join his standard; or if there were any who claimed a right of property in Asia he challenged them to come out and meet her liberators in fair fight and let the sword decide between them. Finding that no one ventured to come out to meet him, his march became for the future a peaceful progress. All around him he beheld Hellenes who formerly were forced to bow the knee to brutal governors now honoured by their former tyrants, while those who had claimed to enjoy divine honours were so humbled by him that they scarce dared to look a Hellene in the face. Everywhere he saved the territory of his friends from devastation, and reaped the fruit of the enemy's soil to such good effect that within two years he was able to dedicate as a tithe to the god at Delphi more than one hundred talents.¹

¹ = £25,000 nearly.
It was then that the Persian king, believing that Tissaphernes was to blame for the ill success of his affairs, sent down Tithraustes and cut off the satrap's head. After this the fortunes of the barbarians grew still more desperate, whilst those of Agesilaus assumed a bolder front. On all sides embassies from the surrounding nations came to make terms of friendship, and numbers even came over to him, stretching out eager arms to grasp at freedom. So that Agesilaus was now no longer the chosen captain of the Hellenes only, but of many Asiatics.

And here we may pause and consider what a weight of admiration is due to one who, being now ruler over countless cities of the continent, and islands also (since the state had further entrusted her navy to his hands), just when he had reached this pinnacle of renown and power, and might look to turn to account his thronging fortunes; when, too, which overtops all else, he was cherishing fond hopes to dissolve that empire which in former days had dared to march on Hellas;—at such a moment suffered himself not to be overmastered by these promptings, but on receipt of a summons of the home authorities to come to the assistance of the fatherland, obeyed the mandate of his state as readily\(^1\) as though he had stood confronted face to face with the Five in the hall of ephors; and thus gave clear proof that he would not accept the whole earth in exchange for the land of his fathers, nor newly-acquired in place of ancient friends, nor base gains ingloriously purchased rather than the perilous pursuit of honour and uprightness.\(^2\)

And, indeed, glancing back at the whole period during which he remained in the exercise of his authority, no act of deeper significance in proof of his kingly qualities need be named than this. He found the cities which he was sent out to govern each and all a prey to factions, the result of constitutional disturbances consequent on the cessation of the Athenian empire, and without resort to exile or sanguinary measures he so disposed them by his healing presence that civil concord and material prosperity were permanently maintained. Therefore it was that the Hellenes in Asia deplored

\(^1\) Cf. Hor. *Od.* III. v. 50.  
his departure\(^1\) as though they had lost, not simply a ruler, but a father or bosom friend, and in the end they showed that their friendship was of no fictitious character. At any rate, they voluntarily helped him to succour Lacedaemon, though it involved, as they knew, the need of doing battle with combatants of equal prowess with themselves. So the tale of his achievements in Asia has an end.

II

He crossed the Hellespont and made his way through the very tribes traversed by the Persian\(^2\) with his multitudinous equipment in former days, and the march which cost the barbarian a year was accomplished by Agesilaus in less than a single month. He did not want to arrive a day too late to serve his fatherland. And so passing through Macedonia he arrived in Thessaly, and here the men of Larissa, Crannon, Scotussa, and Pharsalus, who were allies of the Boeotians, and indeed all the Thessalians, with the exception of those who were in exile at the time, combined to dog his steps and do him damage. For a while he led his troops in a hollow square, posting one half of his cavalry in the van and the other half on his rear, but finding his march hindered by frequent attacks of the Thessalians on his hindmost divisions, he sent round the mass of his cavalry from the vanguard to support his rear, reserving only his personal escort.\(^3\) And now in battle order the rival squadrons faced each other; when the Thessalians, not liking a cavalry engagement in face of heavy infantry, wheeled and step by step retreated; their opponents with much demureness following. Then Agesilaus, detecting the common error under which both parties laboured, sent round his own bodyguard of stalwart troopers with orders to their predecessors (an order they would act upon themselves) to charge the enemy at full gallop and not give him a chance to rally. The Thessalians, in face of this unexpected charge, either could not so much as rally, or in the attempt to do so were caught with their horses' flanks exposed to the enemy's

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attack. Polycharmus, the Pharsalian, a commandant of cavalry, did indeed succeed in wheeling, but was cut down with those about him sword in hand. This was the signal for a flight so extraordinary that dead and dying lined the road, and the living were captured wholesale, nor was a halt made until the pursuers reached Mount Narthacius. Here, midway between Pras and Narthacius, Agesilaus erected a trophy, and here for the moment he halted in unfeigned satisfaction at his exploit, since it was from an antagonist boasting the finest cavalry in the world that he had wrested victory with a body of cavalry organised by himself.

Next day, crossing the mountain barrier of Achaea Phthiotis, his march lay through friendly territory for the rest of the way as far as the frontiers of Boeotia. Here he found the confederates drawn up in battle line. They consisted of the Thebans, the Athenians, the Argives, the Corinthians, the Aenianians, the Euboeans, and both divisions of the Locrians. He did not hesitate, but openly before their eyes drew out his lines to give them battle. He had with him a division and a half of Lacedaemonians, and from the seat of war itself the allied troops of the Phocians and the men of Orchomenus only, besides the armament which he had brought with him from Asia.

I am not going to maintain that he ventured on the engagement in spite of having far fewer and inferior forces. Such an assertion would only reveal the senselessness of the general and the folly of the writer who should select as praiseworthy the reckless imperilling of mighty interests. On the contrary, what I admire is the fact that he had taken care to provide himself with an army not inferior to that of his enemy, and had so equipped them that his cohorts literally gleamed with purple and bronze. He had taken pains to enable his soldiers to undergo the fatigue of war, he had filled their breasts with a proud consciousness that they were equal to do battle with any combatants in the world, and what was more, he had infused a wholesome rivalry in those about him to prove themselves each better than the rest. He had filled

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1 See Hell. IV. ii. 7.  
2 Lit. "mora."

3 Lit. "'Agesilaus.'"  
4 See Cyrop. VI. iv. 1.
all hearts with sanguine expectation of great blessings to
descend on all, if they proved themselves good men. Such
incentives, he thought, were best calculated to arouse en-
thusiasm in men’s souls to engage in battle with the enemy.
And in this expectation he was not deceived.

I proceed to describe the battle, for in certain distinctive
features it differed from all the battles of our day. The con-
tending forces met on the plain of Coronea, Agesilaus and
his troops approaching from the Cephisus, the Thebans and
their allies from the slopes of Helicon. These masses of
infantry, as any eye might see, were of duly balanced strength,
while as near as could be the cavalry on either side was
numerically the same. Agesilaus held the right of his own
army, and on his extreme left lay the men of Orchomenus.
On the opposite side the Thebans themselves formed their
own right and the Argives held their left. While the two
armies approached a deep silence prevailed on either side,
but when they were now a single furlong’s space apart the
Thebans quickened to a run, and, with a loud hurrah, dashed
forward to close quarters. And now there was barely a
hundred yards between them, when Herippidas, with his
foreign brigade, rushed forward from the Spartan’s battle lines
to meet them. This brigade consisted partly of troops which
had served with Agesilaus ever since he left home, with a
portion of the Cyreians, besides Ionians, Aeolians, and their
neighbours on the Hellespont. All these took part in the
forward rush of the attack just mentioned, and coming within
spear-thrust they routed that portion of the enemy in front of
them. The Argives did not even wait for Agesilaus and his
division, but fled towards Helicon, and at that moment some of
his foreign friends were on the point of crowning Agesilaus with
the wreath of victory, when some one brought him word that
the Thebans had cut through the division from Orchomenus
and were busy with the baggage-train. Accordingly he at
once deployed his division and advanced by counter-march
against them. The Thebans on their side, seeing that their
allies had scattered on Helicon, and eager to make their way
back to join their friends, began advancing sturdily.

1 Lit. “a stade.”
2 Lit. “three plethra.”
To assert that Agesilaus at this crisis displayed real valour is to assert a thing indisputable, but for all that the course he adopted was not the safest. It was open to him to let the enemy pass in their effort to rejoin their friends, and that done to have hung upon their heels and overmastered their rear ranks, but he did nothing of the sort: what he did was, to crash front to front against the Thebans. And so with shields interlocked they shoved and fought and fought and shoved, dealing death and yielding life. There was no shouting, nor yet was there even silence, but a strange and smothered utterance, such as rage and battle vent. At last a portion of the Thebans forced their way through towards Helicon, but many were slain in that departure.

Victory remained with Agesilaus. Wounded himself, they bore him back to his own lines, when some of his troopers came galloping up to tell him that eighty of the enemy had taken refuge with their arms under cover of the Temple, and they asked what they ought to do. He, albeit he had received wounds all over him, having been the mark of divers weapons, did not even so forget his duty to God, and gave orders to let them go whithersoever they chose, nor suffered them to be ill-treated, but ordered his bodyguard of cavalry to escort them out of reach of danger.

And now that the battle had ceased, it was a sight to see where the encounter took place, the earth bedabbled with gore, the dead lying cheek by jowl, friend and foe together, and the great shields hacked and broken to pieces, and the spears snapped asunder, the daggers lying bare of sheaths, some on the ground, some buried in the bodies, some still clutched in the dead men's hands. For the moment then, seeing that it was already late in the day, they dragged together the corpses of their slain apart from those of the enemy and laid them within the lines, and took their evening meal and slept; but early next morning Agesilaus ordered Gylis, the polemarch, to marshal the troops in battle order and

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1 Or, "as the rage and fury of battle may give vent to." See Cyrop. VII. i. 38-40. A graphic touch omitted in Hell. IV. iii. 19.
2 i.e. "they had kept their arms."
3 See Plut. Ages. xix. ; Paus. ix. 34.
4 Reading, τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων νεκροὺς, after Weiske.
to set up a trophy, while each man donned a wreath in honour of the god, and the pipers piped. So they busied themselves, but the Thebans sent a herald asking leave to bury their dead under cover of a truce. And so it came to pass that a truce was made, and Agesilaus departed homewards, having chosen, in lieu of supreme greatness in Asia, to rule, and to be ruled, in obedience to the laws at home.

It was after this that his attention was drawn to the men of Argos. They had appropriated Corinth, and were reaping the fruits of their fields at home. The war to them was a merry jest. Accordingly he marched against them; and having ravaged their territory throughout, he crossed over by the pass and captured the long walls leading to Lechaeum. And so having thrown open the gates of Peloponnese he returned home in time for the Hyacinthia, where, in the post assigned him by the master of the chorus, he shared in the performance of the paean in honour of the god.

Later on, it being brought to his notice that the Corinthians were keeping all their cattle safely housed in the Peiraeum, sowing the whole of that district, and gathering in their crops; and, which was a matter of the greatest moment, that the Boeotians, with Creusis as their base of operations, could pour their succours into Corinth by this route,—he marched against Peiraeum. Finding it strongly guarded, he made as if the city of Corinth were about to capitulate, and immediately after the morning meal shifted his ground and encamped against the capital. Under cover of night there was a rush from Peiraeum to protect the city, which he was well aware of, and with break of day he turned right about and took Peiraeum, defenceless as it lay, capturing all that it contained, with the various fortresses within; and having so done retired homewards.

After these exploits the Achaeans were urgent for an alliance, and begged him to join them in an expedition against Acarnania. In the course of this the Acarnanians attacked

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1 B.C. 393.  
2 katâ τὰ στενὰ. See Hell. IV. iv. 19. katâ Tevēav, according to Köppen's emendation.  
3 See Grote, H. G. v. 208; Herod. ix. 7; Hell. IV. v. 10 (above, p. 63).  
4 B.C. 390-389?
him in a defile. Storming the heights above his head with his light troops,¹ he gave them battle, and slew many of them, and set up a trophy, nor stayed his hand until he had united the Acarnanians, the Aetolians, and the Argives,² in friendship with the Achaeans and alliance with himself.

When the enemy, being desirous of peace, sent an embassy, it was Agesilaus who spoke against the peace,³ until he had forced the states of Corinth and of Thebes to welcome back those of them who, for Lacedaemon's sake, had suffered banishment.

And still later,⁴ again, he restored the exiles of the Phliasians, who had suffered in the same cause, and with that object marched in person against Phlius, a proceeding which, however liable to censure on other grounds, showed unmistakable attachment to his party.⁵

Thus, when the adverse faction had put to death those of the Lacedaemonians then in Thebes, he brought succour to his friends, and marched upon Thebes.⁶ Finding the entire country fenced with ditch and palisading, he crossed Cynoscephalae⁷ and ravaged the district right up to the city itself, giving the Thebans an opportunity of engaging him in the plain or upon the hills, as they preferred. And once more, in the ensuing year,⁸ he marched against Thebes, and now surmounting these palisades and entrenchments at Scolus,⁹ he ravaged the remainder of Boeotia.

Hitherto fortune had smiled in common upon the king himself and upon his city. And as for the disasters which presently befell, no one can maintain that they were brought about under the leadership of Agesilaus. But the day came when, after the disaster which had occurred at Leuctra, the rival powers in conjunction with the Mantinaeans fell to massacring his friends and adherents¹⁰ in Tegea (the con-

¹ See Hell. IV. vi. 9-11, where it is expressly stated that the action was won by the Spartan hoplites. See Hartman, An. Xen. (cap. xi. De Agesilao libello), p. 263, for other discrepancies between the historian and the encomiast.
² See perhaps Hell. IV. iv. 19; vii. 2 foll.
⁴ B.C. 383 and 380; see Hell. V. ii. 10; iii. 10.
⁵ See Hell. V. iii. 16.
⁶ B.C. 378.
⁷ See Hell. V. iv. 34 foll.; for the site see Breitenbach, ad loc.
⁸ B.C. 377.
⁹ See Hell. V. iv. 47.
¹⁰ Or intimates.
federacy between all the states of Boeotia, the Arcadians, and the Eleians being already an accomplished fact). Thereupon, with the forces of Lacedaemon alone,¹ he took the field, and thus belied the current opinion that it would be a long while before the Lacedaemonians ventured to leave their own territory again. Having ravaged the country of those who had done his friends to death, he was content, and returned home.

After this Lacedaemon was invaded by the united Arcadians, Argives, Eleians, and Boeotians, who were assisted by the Phocians, both sections of the Locrians, the Thessalians, Aenianians, Acarnanians, and Euboeans; moreover, the slaves had revolted and several of the provincial cities;² while of the Spartans themselves as many had fallen on the field of Leuctra as survived. But in spite of all, he safely guarded the city, and that too a city without walls and bulwarks. Forbearing to engage in the open field, where the gain would lie wholly with the enemy, he lay stoutly embattled on ground where the citizens must reap advantage; since, as he doggedly persisted, to march out meant to be surrounded on every side; whereas to stand at bay where every defile gave a coign of vantage, would give him mastery complete.³

After the invading army had retired, no one will gainsay the sound sense of his behaviour. Old age debarrèd him from active service on foot or horse, and what the city chiefly needed now, he saw, was money, if she looked to gain allies. To the task therefore of providing that he set himself. Everything that could be done by stopping at home he deftly turned his hand to; or when the call arose and he could better help his country by departure he had no false pride; he set off on foreign service, not as general, but as ambassador. Yet on such embassy he achieved acts worthy of the greatest general.

¹ B.C. 370. See Hell. VI. v. 21, p. 173.
² Lit. "perioecid"; see Plut. Ages. xxxii. (Clough, iv. 39); Hell. VI. v. 32.
³ Is this parallel to Hell. VII. v. 10, or Hell. VI. v. 28? According to the historian, Agesilaus adopted similar tactics on both occasions (in B.C. 369 and B.C. 362 alike). The encomiast after his manner appears to treat them as one. Once and again his hero cunctando restituit rem, but it was by the same strategy.
Autophradates was besieging Ariobarzanes, who was an ally of Sparta, in Assos; but before the face of Agesilaus he fled in terror and was gone. Cotys, besieging Sestos, which still adhered to Ariobarzanes, broke up the siege anddeparted crestfallen. Well might the ambassador have set up a trophy in commemoration of two bloodless victories. Once more, Mausolus was besieging both the above-named places with a squadron of one hundred sail. He too, like, and yet unlike, the former two, yielded not to terror but to persuasion, and withdrew his fleet. These, then, were surely admirable achievements, since those who looked upon him as a benefactor and those who fled from before him both alike made him the richer by their gifts.

Tachos, indeed, and Mausolus gave him a magnificent escort; and, for the sake of his former friendship with Agesilaus, the latter contributed also money for the state of Lacedaemon; and so they sped him home.

And now the weight of, may be, fourscore years was laid upon him, when it came under his observation that the king of Egypt, with his hosts of foot and horse and stores of wealth, had set his heart upon a war with Persia. Joyfully he learned that he himself was summoned by King Tachos, and that the command-in-chief of all the forces was promised to him. By this one venture he would achieve three objects, which were to requite the Egyptian for the benefits conferred on Lacedaemon; to liberate the Hellenes in Asia once again; and to inflict on the Persian a just recompense, not only for the old offences, but for this which was of to-day; seeing that, while boasting alliance with Sparta, he had dictatorially enjoined the emancipation of Messene. But when the man who had summoned him refused to confer the proffered generalship, Agesilaus, like one on whom a flagrant deception has been practised, began to

1 Satrap of Lydia. 2 Satrap of Propontis or Helleespontine Phrygia. See Grote, H. G. x. 404, 408. 3 Satrap of Paphlagonia, king of Thrace. Iphicrates married his daughter. See Grote, H. G. x. 410. 4 Satrap of Caria. 5 King of Egypt. 6 Or, 'But to pass on, he was already, may be, eighty years of age, when it came under his observation. . . .'' 7 This same Tachos. 8 See Hell. VII. i. 36; iv. 9.
consider the part he had to play. Meanwhile a separate
division\(^1\) of the Egyptian armies held aloof from their king.
Then, the disaffection spreading, all the rest of his troops
deserted him; whereat the monarch took flight and retired in
exile to Sidon in Phoenicia, leaving the Egyptians, split in
faction, to choose to themselves a pair of kings.\(^2\) Thereupon
Agesilaus took his decision. If he helped neither, it meant
that neither would pay the service-money due to his Hellenes,
that neither would provide a market, and that, whichever of the
two conquered in the end, Sparta would be equally detested.
But if he threw in his lot with one of them, that one would
in all likelihood in return for the kindness prove a friend.
Accordingly he chose between the two that one who seemed
to be the truer partisan of Hellas, and with him marched
against the enemy of Hellas and conquered him in a battle,
crushing him. His rival he helped to establish on the throne,
and having made him a friend to Lacedaemon, and having
acquired vast sums besides, he turned and set sail homewards,
even in mid-winter, hastening so that Sparta might not lie
inactive, but against the coming summer be on the alert to
confront the foe.

\section*{III}

Such, then, is the chronicle of this man's achievements, or
of such of them as were wrought in the presence of a thousand
witnesses. Being of this sort they have no need of further
testimony; the mere recital of them is sufficient, and they at
once win credence. But now I will endeavour to reveal the
excellence indwelling in his soul, the motive power of his acts,
in virtue of which he clung to all things honourable and thrust
aside all baseness.

Agesilaus showed such reverence for things divine that
even his enemies regarded his oaths and solemn treaties as
more to be relied on than the tie of friendship amongst them-
selves. These same men, who would shrink from too close
intercourse with one another, delivered themselves into the

\footnote{\textit{I.e.} "the army under Nectanebos." See Diod. xv. 92; Plut. \textit{Ages.}
xxxvii. (Clough, iv. 44 foll.).}

\footnote{\textit{I.e.} "Nectanebos and a certain Mendesian."}
hands of Agesilaus without fear. And lest the assertion should excite discredit, I may name some illustrious examples. Such was Spithridates the Persian, who knew that Pharnabazus, whilst negotiating to marry the daughter of the great king, was minded to seize his own daughter unwedded. Resenting such brutality, Spithridates delivered up himself, his wife, his children, and his whole power, into the hands of Agesilaus. Cotys also, the ruler of Paphlagonia, had refused to obey a summons from the king, although he sent him the warrant of his right hand; then fear came upon him lest he should be seized, and either be heavily fined or die the death; yet he too, simply trusting to an armistice, came to the camp of Agesilaus and made alliance, and of his own accord chose to take the field with Agesilaus, bringing a thousand horsemen and two thousand targeteers. Lastly, Pharnabazus himself came and held colloquy with Agesilaus, and openly agreed that if he were not himself appointed general-in-chief of the royal forces he would revolt from the king. "Whereas, if I do become general," he added, "I mean to make war upon you, Agesilaus, might and main," thus revealing his confidence that, say what he might, nothing would befall him contrary to the terms of truce. Of so intrinsic a value to all, and not least to a general in the field, is the proud possession of an honest and God-fearing character, known and recognised. Thus far, as touching the quality of piety.

IV

To speak next of his justice in affairs of money. As to this, what testimony can be more conclusive than the following? During the whole of his career no charge of fraudulent dealing was ever lodged against Agesilaus; against which set the many-voiced acknowledgment of countless benefits received from him. A man who found pleasure in giving away his own for the benefit of others was not the man to rob another of his goods at the price of infamy. Had he suffered from

1 See Hell. III. iv. 10 (above, p. 26); Plut. Ages. xi. (Clough, iv. 9).
2 See Hell. IV. i. 3 (above, p. 40); Plut. Ages. xi. (Clough, iv. 13).
3 Diod. xvi. 34.
4 See Hell. IV. i. 37 (above, p. 45).
this thirst for riches it would have been easier to cling to what belonged to him than to take that to which he had no just title. This man, who was so careful to repay debts of gratitude, where\(^1\) the law knows no remedy against defaulters, was not likely to commit acts of robbery which the law regards as criminal. And as a matter of fact Agesilaus judged it not only wrong to forgo repayment of a deed of kindness, but, where the means were ample, wrong also not to repay such debts with ample interest.

The charge of embezzlement, could it be alleged, would no less outrage all reason in the case of one who made over to his country the benefit in full of grateful offerings owed solely to himself. Indeed the very fact that, when he wished to help the city or his friends with money, he might have done so by the aid of others, goes a long way to prove his indifference to the lure of riches; since, had he been in the habit of selling his favour, or of playing the part of benefactor for pay, there had been no room for a sense of indebtedness.\(^2\) It is only the recipient of gratuitous kindness who is ever ready to minister to his benefactor, both in return for the kindness itself and for the confidence implied in his selection as the fitting guardian of a good deed on deposit.\(^3\)

Again, who more likely to put a gulf impassable between himself and sordid love of gain\(^4\) than he, who nobly preferred to be stunted of his dues\(^5\) rather than snatch at the lion’s share unjustly? It is a case in point that, being pronounced by the state to be the rightful heir to his brother’s\(^6\) wealth, he made over one half to his maternal relatives because he saw that they were in need; and to the truth of this assertion all Lacedaemon is witness. What, too, was his answer to Tithraustes when the satrap offered him countless gifts if he would but quit the country? “Tithraustes,

\(^1\) Or, “a state of indebtedness beyond the reach of a tribunal.” See *Cyrop.* I. ii. 7.
\(^2\) Or, “no one would have felt to owe him anything.”
\(^3\) See *Cyrop.* VI. i. 35; Rutherford, *New Phrynichus*, p. 312.
\(^4\) Or, “base covetousness.”
\(^5\) Or reading, σὺν αὐτῷ τῷ γενναίῳ (with Breitenbach), “in obedience to pure generosity.” See *Cyrop.* VIII. iii. 38.
with us it is deemed nobler for a ruler to enrich his army than himself; it is expected of him to wrest spoils from the enemy rather than take gifts.”

Or again, reviewing the divers pleasures which master human beings, I defy any one to name a single one to which Agesilaus was enslaved: Agesilaus, who regarded drunkenness as a thing to hold aloof from like madness, and immoderate eating like the snare of indolence. Even the double portion allotted to him at the banquet was not spent on his own appetite; rather would he make distribution of the whole, retaining neither portion for himself. In his view of the matter this doubling of the king’s share was not for the sake of surfeiting, but that the king might have wherewithal to honour whom he wished. And so, too, sleep he treated not as a master, but as a slave, subservient to higher concerns. The very couch he lay upon must be sorrier than that of any of his company or he would have blushed for shame, since in his opinion it was the duty of a leader to excel all ordinary mortals in hardihood, not in effeminacy. Yet there were things in which he was not ashamed to take the lion’s share, as, for example, the sun’s heat in summer, or winter’s cold. Did occasion ever demand of his army moil and toil, he laboured beyond all others as a thing of course, believing that such ensamples are a consolation to the rank and file. Or, to put the matter compendiously, Agesilaus exulted in hard work: indolence he utterly repudiated.

And, as touching the things of Aphrodite, if for nothing else, at any rate for the marvel of it, the self-restraint of the man deserves to be put on record. It is easy to say that to abstain from that which excites no desire is but human; yet in the case of Megabates, the son of Spithridates, he was moved by as genuine a love as any passionate soul may feel for what is lovely. Now, it being a national custom among

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2 See Hom. Il. ii. 24, ὁδ χρῆ παννόχιον εἴδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα, “to sleep all night through beseebeth not one that is a counsellor.”—W. Leaf.
the Persians to salute those whom they honour with a kiss, Megabates endeavoured so to salute Agesilaus, but the latter, with much show of battle, resisted—"No kiss might he accept."\(^1\) I ask whether such an incident does not reveal on the face of it the self-respect of the man, and that of no vulgar order.\(^2\) Megabates, who looked upon himself as in some sense dishonoured, for the future endeavoured not to offend in like sort again.\(^3\) Whereupon Agesilaus appealed to one who was his comrade to persuade Megabates again to honour him with his regard; and the comrade, so appealed to, demanding, "If I persuade him, will you bestow on him a kiss?" Agesilaus fell into a silence, but presently exclaimed: "No, by the Twins, not if I might this very instant become the swiftest-footed, strongest, and handsomest of men."\(^4\) And as to that battle I swear by all the gods I would far rather fight it over again than that everything on which I set my eyes might turn to gold."\(^5\)

What construction some will put upon the story I am well aware, but for myself I am persuaded that many more people can master their enemies than the foes we speak of.\(^6\) Doubtless such incidents when known to but few may well be discredited by many, but here we are in the region of established facts, seeing that the more illustrious a man is the less can his every act escape notice. As to Agesilaus no eye-witness has ever reported any unworthy behaviour, nor, had he invented it, would his tale have found credence, since it was not the habit of the king, when abroad, to lodge apart in private houses. He always lay in some sacred place, where behaviour of the sort was out of question, or else in public, with the eyes of all men liable to be called as witnesses to his sobriety. For myself, if I make these statements falsely against the knowledge of Hellas, this were not in any sense to praise my hero, but to dispraise myself.

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\(^1\) See Plut. *Ages.* (Clough, iv. p. 13 foll.).

\(^2\) Reading, καλ λαν γεννεϊον; or, "a refinement of self-respect," "a self-respect perhaps even over-sensitive."

\(^3\) Lit. "made no further attempt to offer kisses."

\(^4\) See Plut. *Ages.* ii. (Clough, iv. p. 2): "He is said to have been a little man of a contemptible presence."


\(^6\) Or, "than the seductions in question."
VI

Nor, in my opinion, were those obscure proofs of courage and true manliness which he furnished by his readiness ever to wage war against the strongest enemies, whether of Sparta or of Hellas, placing himself in the forefront of the contests decided on. If the enemy cared to join issue in fair field he would not chance upon a victory won by panic, but in stubborn battle, blow for blow, he mastered him; and set up trophies worthy the name, seeing that he left behind him imperishable monuments of prowess, and bore away on his own body indelible marks of the fury with which he fought; so that, apart from hearsay, by the evidence of men’s eyes his valour stood approved.

And amongst these we must not deem them trophies alone which he actually set up, but reckon the many campaigns which he undertook, since they were victories truly, even when the enemy refused to encounter him, victories devoid of danger, yet fraught with even more solid advantage to the state of Sparta and her fellow-combatants; just as in our games we crown as victor him who walks over the field no less than him who conquers by dint of battle.

And to speak next of his wisdom, I suppose there is not one of all his doings but must illustrate it;—this man whose bearing towards his fatherland was such that by dint of implicit obedience [he grew to so great a height of power], whose zeal in the service of his comrades won for him the unhesitating attachment of his friends, who infused into the hearts of his soldiers a spirit, not of discipline only, but of self-devotion to their chief. And yet surely that is the

1 Or, “visible signs of the spirit,” etc. See Plut. Ages. xxxvi.
2 Or, “without striking a blow.” Lit. “without the dust of the arena, sine pulvere.” See Thuc. iv. 73, ἄκοιντς.
3 Or, “his sagacity.”
4 The words πλείστου τοχυτε are supplied from Plutarch (Ages. iv.), who quotes the passage, “What Xenophon tells us of him, that by complying with, and, as it were, being ruled by his country, he grew into such great power with them, that he could do what he pleased, is meant,” etc. (Clough, iv. p. 4). The lacuna in the MS. was first noted, I believe, by Weiske. See Breitenbach’s note ad loc.
strongest of all battle-lines¹ in which obedience creates tactical efficiency, and alacrity in the field springs out of loyal affection for the general.

Enemies he had to cope with, who had little excuse to disparage, however much they might be compelled to hate their opponent, seeing that he was for ever contriving to give his allies some advantage over them,—by sheer deception, if occasion offered; now anticipating them if speed were requisite; now skulking in corners if concealment served; in all points observing one rule of behaviour to his friends and another towards his foes. By turning night into day and day into night² he drew so close a veil of mystery over his movements that frequently there was no saying where he was, or whither he would go, or what he might do next. The fastnesses of the enemy he transformed into so many weaknesses,³ passing this one by, and scaling that, and stealing like a thief into a third.

When he was on the march, and was well aware that an enemy might, if he chose, deliver battle, his habit was to lead his troops in compact order ready to confront emergencies, with soft, slow step, advancing, as it were, with maidenly demureness,⁴ for in such procedure, as he believed, lay the secret of true calm, engendering a dauntless self-assurance, imperturbable, unerring, impervious to treacherous assault. Therefore by such behaviour he was a terror to the enemy, whilst he infused courage and strength in the hearts of his friends, so that throughout his life he continued to be a man whom his foes dared not despise, whom his fellow-citizens cared not to arraign, within the circle of his friends held blameless, the idol and the admiration of the outer world.⁵

VII

To describe his patriotism⁶ point by point in detail were a tedious story, since, as I suppose, there is not one of his

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¹ See Cyrop. VII. i. 30; Econ. xxi. 7.
² See Hell. VI. i. 15 (above, p. 142); Pol. Lac. v. 7; Cyrop. I. v. 12.
³ Or, "the strongholds of the enemy might to all intents and purposes have been open places."
⁴ See above, ii. 3; Pol. Lac. iii. 5.
⁵ Cf. Tacitus's phrase concerning Titus, "deliciae humani generis."
⁶ Lit. "'love for his own city.'"
several achievements but must finally resolve itself into that. For, to put it briefly, we all know well that where Agesilaus expected in any way to benefit his country there was no toil he shrank from, no danger he avoided, no money he stinted, no excuse whether of age or body he admitted, but deemed it ever the true function of a good king to shower blessings to the utmost on the subjects of his rule.

And for my part I hold it as chief among the magnificent benefits so conferred by him upon his country that, being the most powerful member of the state, he made no secret of his absolute submission to the laws, since what lesser man, seeing the king's obedience, would take on himself to disobey? Who, in discontentment at his own poor lot, would venture on revolution, knowing that the king himself could condescend to constitutional control? And that, too, a king who bore himself towards political opponents with a paternal mildness.

If he rebuked them sharply for their misdemeanours, he none the less honoured their high endeavours, and proved himself a present help to them in time of trouble. No citizen could be his personal foe; of that he was assured. His desire was to commend them one and all alike, counting the common salvation of all a gain, and reckoning it as a loss if even a mean man perished. For thus he reasoned, nor made a secret of the conclusion he had come to: so long as her citizens continued tranquilly adherent to the laws the happiness of Sparta was secure. And for the rest Sparta would once again be strong on that day when the states of Hellas should learn wisdom.

And if, by admission, it is noble for every Hellene to be a lover of his fellow-Hellenes, yet we must fare far afield

1 Or, "regarded it as the cardinal virtue of a real prince." See Mem. III. ii. 3.
2 Or, "he was at the same time the most obvious in his allegiance to the laws."
3 Lit. "would have taken on himself ... would have ventured on revolution."
4 Or, "as a father to his children."
5 Or, "and was ready to stand by their side in time of trouble."
6 Or, "For this was the clear tenor of his thought, that by tranquil continuance within the laws the citizens of Sparta might secure her happiness. And as to power, Sparta, etc." See Mem. II. vi. 27.
to find another instance of a general who, expecting to sack some city, would have refused to seize the prize; or who regarded victory in a war waged against fellow-Hellenes as a species of calamity. Yet this man when a message was brought him concerning the battle at Corinth, in which but eight Lacedaemonians had fallen, but of their opponents ten thousand nearly, showed no sign of exultation, but sighed, saying, "Alas for Hellas! since those who now lie in their graves were able, had they lived, to conquer in battle the hosts of Asia." Again, when some Corinthian exiles informed him that their city was ripe for surrender, and showed him the engines by which they were confident they would take the walls, he refused to make the assault, saying that Hellene cities ought not to be reduced to slavery, but brought back to a better mind, and added, "For if we lop off our offending members, haply we may deprive ourselves of the means to master the barbarian."

Again, if it is a sacred duty to hate the Persian, who of old set out on a campaign to enslave Hellas; the Persian, who to-day makes alliance with these (no matter to him which the party, provided it will help him to work the greater mischief); or gives presents to those (who will take them and do the greatest harm to his foes the Hellenes); or else concocts a peace that shall presently involve us in internecine war, as he anticipates:—but why dwell on facts so patent?—I ask, did ever Hellene before Agesilaus so enter heart and soul upon his duty; whether it were to help some tribe to throw off the Persian yoke, or to save from destruction a revolted district, or if nothing else, at any rate to saddle the Persian with such troubles of his own that he should cease to trouble Hellas? An ardent hater of Persia surely was he, who, when his own country was at war with Hellenes, did not neglect the common good of Hellas, but set sail to wreak what harm he might upon the barbarian.  

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1 B.C. 394. See Hell. IV. ii. 9-23; Diod. xiv. 83; Grote, H. G. ix. 429.  
2 Lit. "all the barbarians."  
3 See Econ. i. 23.  
4 Or, "the worse the mischief he can work, the better the side."  
VIII

To turn to another side, that grace of manner which was his, claims more than passing recognition. Here was a man to whom honour was vouchsafed and power present, and who, to crown all else, held in his hands the sceptre of sovereignty—a kingship not plotted against, but respected and beloved. Yet there was no trace of arrogance to be seen in him, but of tender affection and courteous service to his friends proof in abundance without seeking. Witness the zest with which he shared in the round of lovers' talk;¹ the zeal with which he threw himself into the serious concerns² of friends. By dint of a hopeful and cheery disposition and unflagging gaiety of heart he attracted to his side a throng of visitors, who came, not simply for the transaction of some private interest, but rather to pass away the day in pleasant sort. Though little apt himself to use high-swelling words, it did not annoy him to hear others sounding their own praises, which he regarded as a harmless weakness, the pledge at least of high endeavour³ in the future.

But that he was capable of lofty sentiment and at the right season must not be overlooked. Thus when a letter reached him from the king (I speak of that which was brought by the Persian agent in company with Calleas⁴ of Lacedaemon, proposing terms of hospitality and friendship with the Persian monarch), he disdained to accept it, telling the bearer to take back to the king this answer: "He need not be at pains to send him letters in private, but if he could prove himself a friend to Lacedaemon and the well-wisher of Hellas he should have no cause to blame the ardour of his friendship," but added, "if your king be detected plotting, let him not think to find a friend in me. No, not if he sends me a thousand letters." For my part, then, I hold it praiseworthy that, by comparison with pleasing his fellow-Hellenes, Agesilaus scorned

¹ See Hell. V. iii. 20; Cyrop. I. iv. 27; Econ. ii. 7; Plut. Ages. ii.; xx.; Lyce. xx.
² Or, "he would discuss graver matters, according to the humour of his friends."
³ Or, "of courageous conduct," "noble manhood."
⁴ See Hell. IV. i. 15; Plut. Apophth. Lac. p. 777; Grote, H. G. x. 402.
such friendship. And this, too, among his tenets I find admirable: the truer title to self-congratulation belonged not to the millionaire, the master of many legions, but to him rather, who, being himself a better man, commanded the allegiance of better followers.

And this, in proof of mental forecast, I must needs praise in him. Holding to the belief that the more satraps there were who revolted from the king the surer the gain to Hellas, he did not suffer himself to be seduced, either by gifts or by the mightiness of his power, to be drawn into bonds of friendship with the king, but took precaution rather not to abuse their confidence who were willing to revolt.

And lastly, as beyond all controversy admirable, note this contrast: First, the Persian, who, believing that in the multitude of his riches he had power to lay all things under his feet, would fain have swept into his coffers all the gold and all the silver of mankind: for him, and him alone, the costliest and most precious things of earth. And then this other, who contrariwise so furnished his establishment as to be totally independent of every adventitious aid. And if any one doubts the statement, let him look and see with what manner of dwelling-place he was contented; let him view the palace doors: these are the selfsame doors, he might well imagine, which Aristodemus, the great-great-grandson of Heracles, took and set up in the days of the return. Let him endeavour to view the furniture inside; there he will perceive how the king feasted on high holy days; and he will hear how the king's own daughter was wont to drive to Amyclae in a public basket-carriage. Thus it was that by the adjustment of expenditure to income he was never driven to the commission of any unjust deed for money's sake. And yet if it be a fine thing to hold a fortress impregnable to attack, I count it a greater glory that a man should hold the fortress of his soul inviolable against the assaults of riches, pleasures, fears.

1 Or, "of all such external needs."
2 See Herod. vi. 52.
3 See Plut. Ages. xix. (Clough, iv. p. 23); the words ἡ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ were supplied from this passage by Casaubon.
IX

I will here state to what extent the style of living which he presented stands out in striking contrast to the ostentatious manner of the Persian. In the first place, if the latter made a solemn affectation of being but seldom seen, Agesilaus delighted to live in the eye of day, believing that seclusion might accord well enough as a screen for shameless conduct, but to a life of nobleness and beauty heaven's light added new ornament. And next, if the one prided himself on being unapproachable, the other rejoiced in being accessible to all the world; the one, with his airs and graces, was pleased to transact business slowly, the other was never so happy as when he could satisfy the demands of a petitioner without waste of time.

Again, it is worthy of observation how much easier and simpler to satisfy was the standard of comfort which the Spartan aimed at. For the Persian, men must compass sea and land to discover some beverage which he will care to drink; he needs ten thousand pastrycooks to supply the kickshaws he will deign to eat; and to procure him the blessing of sleep no tongue can describe what a world of trouble must be taken. But Agesilaus was a lover of toil, and therefore not so dainty; the meanest beverage was sweet to his lips, and pleasant enough to his taste was the chance fare of the moment; and for the purpose of refreshing slumber every place alike conducive. It was not merely that to fare thus gave him pure pleasure, but in the sense of contrast lay a double satisfaction. Here was he roaming earth freely in the midst of a world of delight, and there lay the Persian, under his eyes, who to escape a life of pain must drag together from the uttermost parts of earth the separate ingredients for his

1 Or, "how he presented his own manner in antithesis to the false pretences of the Persian." For ἀναστόλεια see Mem. I. vii. x; Aristot. N. E. iv. 7; Theophr. Char. vi.
2 Lit. "a life striving towards beauteousness."
3 Or, "added but greater lustre."
4 Lit. "could satisfy and dismiss his petitioners without delay."
5 See Herod. i. 135, for the luxury of the Persians and for the refinements of civilisation. See Mem. II. i. 10; Cyrop. VIII. i. 40.
6 Or, "in a round of festivity." See Anab. (Trans, vol. i. p. cxx.).
pleasure. It was another source of joy that to himself it was given to confront the appointed order of the universe\(^1\) without pain; while through weakness of soul his rival, it was plain to see, was driven to flee away from heat and cold, and to shape his life, not by the pattern of brave men, but of some mean and defenceless animal.\(^2\)

And what a fine trait was this in him, and betokening how lofty a sentiment, that, being content to adorn his own house with works and possessions suited to a man, and being devoted to the breeding of dogs and horses in large numbers for the chase and warfare, he persuaded his sister Cynisca to rear chariot horses,\(^3\) and thus by her victory\(^4\) showed that to keep a stud of that sort, however much it might be a mark of wealth, was hardly a proof of manly virtue. And surely in the following opinion we may discern plainly the generosity of him who entertained it. To win victories over private persons in a chariot race does not add one tittle to a man's renown. He, rather, who holds his city dear beyond all things else, who has himself sunk deep into the heart of her affections, who has obtained to himself all over the world a host of friends and those the noblest, who can outdo his country and comrades alike in the race of kindliness, and his antagonists in vengeance—such a man may, in a true sense, be said to bear away the palm of victory in conquests noble and magnificent; living and in death to him belongs transcendent fame.

\[x\]

It is as possessing qualities such as these that I praise Agesilalus. And in these matters he was not like a man who chances upon a treasure and thereby becomes wealthier,

\(^1\) See Plut. Ages. xiv. (Clough, iv. p. 17); Ἀφοθιθ. Lac. p. 102; Eur. Supp. 214, 215,
\[άρ' οὐ τρυφώμεν, θεοὶ κατασκευὴν βλώ
dόντος τοιαύτην, οἷον οὐκ ἄρκει τάδε;\]

\(^2\) Or, "the most defenceless of God's creatures." Lit. "the weakest of animals."

\(^3\) I.e. "for the games."

\(^4\) I.e. "at Olympia." Cynisca, according to Pausanias (iii. 8), was the first woman who won a prize at Olympia. See also Plut. Ages. xx. (Clough, iv. p. 23).
albeit none the more skilful in economy; nor yet like him who, when a plague has fallen upon an enemy, wrests a victory, whereby he may add to his reputation for success, but not for strategy. Rather was his example that of one who in each emergency will take the lead; at a crisis where toil is needful, by endurance; or in the battle-lists of bravery by prowess; or when the function of the counsellor is uppermost, by the soundness of his judgment. Of such a man I say, he has obtained by warrant indefeasible the title peerless.

And if, as a means towards good workmanship, we count among the noble inventions of mankind the rule and the plummet,¹ no less happily shall we, who desire to attain to manly excellence, find in the virtue of Agesilaus a pattern and example. He was God-fearing, he was just in all his dealings, sound of soul and self-controlled. How then shall we who imitate him become his opposite, unholy, unjust, tyrannical, licentious? And, truth to say, this man prided himself not so much on being a king over others as on ruling himself;² not so much on leading his citizens to attack the enemy as on guiding them to embrace all virtue.

Yet let it not be supposed, because he whom we praise has finished life, that our discourse must therefore be regarded as a funeral hymn.³ Far rather let it be named a hymn of praise, since in the first place it is only the repetition, now that he is dead, of a tale familiar to his ears when living. And in the next place, what is more remote from dirge and lamentation than a life of glory crowned by seasonable death? What more deserving of song and eulogy than resplendent victories and deeds of highest note? Surely if one man rather than another may be accounted truly blest, it is he who, from his boyhood upwards, thirsted for glory, and beyond all contemporary names won what he desired; who, being gifted with a nature most emulous of honour, remained from the moment he was king unconquered; who attained the fullest term of mortal life and died without offence.⁴

¹ See Aeschin. c. Ctes. p. 52, 25; Plat. Phileb. 56 B.
³ See Symonds' Greek Poets, ch. v.
⁴ As to the word ἀναμάρτητος so translated, see Breitenbach, Exc. ad x. 4 of his edition.
whether as concerning those at whose head he marched, or as towards those others against whom he fought in war.

XI

It only remains for me, under the form of headings,\textsuperscript{1} to review the topic of this great man's virtue, in hopes that thus his eulogy may cling to the memory more lastingly.

Agesilaus reverenced the shrines and sacred places even of the enemy. We ought, he said, to make the gods our allies on hostile no less than on friendly soil.

He would do no violence to a suppliant, no, not even if he were his own foe; since how irrational must it be to stigmatise robbers of temples as sacrilegious and yet to regard him who tears the suppliant from the altar as a pious person.

One tenet he never wearied of repeating: the gods, he said, are not less pleased with holy deeds than with pure victims.

In the day of his prosperity his thoughts were not raised higher than befits a man; he gave thanks to the gods; and offered more victims when he had nothing to fear than he registered vows in time of apprehension.

He was accustomed in the midst of anxiety to wear an aspect of gaiety, but, when the victory was won, of gentleness.

Amongst friends his warmest greeting was reserved, not for the most powerful, but for the most ardent; and if he hated, it was not him who, being evil entreated, retaliated, but one who, having had kindness done to him, seemed incapable of gratitude.

He rejoiced when sordid greed was rewarded with poverty; and still more if he might himself enrich a righteous man, since his wish was to render uprightness more profitable than iniquity.

He made it a practice to associate with all kinds of people, but to be intimate only with the best.

As he listened to the praise of this man, or the censure of another, he felt that he learnt quite as much about the char-

\textsuperscript{1} Or, as others think, "in a summary." I have stated my own views about this chapter above.
acter of the speakers themselves as of those whom they discussed.

To be cheated by a friend was scarcely censurable, but he could find no condemnation strong enough for him who was outwitted by a foe. Or again, to dupe the incredulous might argue wit, but to take in the unsuspecting was veritably a crime.

The praise of a critic who had courage to point out his defects pleased him; and plainness of speech excited in him no hostility. It was against the cunning rather of the secretive person that he guarded himself, as against a hidden snare.

The calumniator he detested more than the robber or the thief, in proportion as the loss of friends is greater than the loss of money.¹

The errors of private persons he bore with gently, but those of rulers he looked upon as grave; since the mischief wrought in the one case was so small, and so large in the other. The proper attribute of royalty was, he maintained, not an avoidance of responsibility, but a constant striving after nobleness.²

Whilst he would not suffer any image³ of his bodily form to be set up (though many wished to present him with a statue), he never ceased elaborating what should prove the monument of his spirit, holding that the former is the business of a statuary, the latter of one's self. Wealth might procure the one, he said, but only a good man could produce the other.

As for riches, he employed them not with justice merely, but with liberality, holding that for a just man it is sufficient if he let alone the things of others, but of a liberal man it is

¹ Mr. R. W. Taylor aptly quotes Othello, III. iii. 157—

“Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robbs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.”

² On the word καλόκαγαθία so translated, see Demosth. 777, 5.

required that he should take of his own and give to supply another's needs.

He was ever subject to religious fear, believing that no man during his lifetime, however well he lives, can be counted happy; it is only he who has ended his days with glory of whom it can be said that he has attained at last to blessedness.²

In his judgment it was a greater misfortune to neglect things good and virtuous, knowing them to be so, than in ignorance. Nor was he enamoured of any reputation, the essentials of which he had not laboriously achieved.³

He was one of the small band, as it seemed to me, who regard virtue, not as a thing to be patiently endured,⁴ but as a supreme enjoyment. At any rate, to win the praise of mankind gave him a deeper pleasure than the acquisition of wealth; and he preferred to display courage far rather in conjunction with prudence than with unnecessary risks, and to cultivate wisdom in action more than by verbal discussion.

Very gentle to his friends, to his enemies he was most terrible. Whilst he could hold out against toil and trouble with the best, nothing pleased him better than yielding to his comrades. But passion was kindled in him by beauty of deed rather than of person.⁵

Skilled to the exercise of self-command in the midst of external welfare, he could be stout of heart enough in stress of danger.

Urbanity he practised, not with jest and witticism, but by the courtesy of his demeanour.

In spite of a certain haughtiness, he was never overbearing, but rich in saving common sense. At any rate, while pouring contempt upon arrogance, he bore himself more humbly than the most ordinary man. In fact, what he truly

¹ See Cyr. III. iii. 58, and for the word ἰεροκαλούμην, see Jebb, Theophr. Char. p. 263 fol.; Mr. Ruskin, Preface to Bibli. Past. vol. i. p. xxv.
² See Herod. i. 34; Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1529; and Prof. Jebb's note ad loc.
³ Or, "for which he did not qualify himself by the appropriate labour."
⁴ Or, "as a system of stoical endurance," "a kind of stoicism." But we must not let Xenophon, who is a Socratic, talk of the Stoa. If we knew certainly that the chapter was a much later production, the language would be appropriate enough.
⁵ Or, "beauteous deeds rather than bodily splendour."
took a pride in was the simplicity of his own attire, in contrast with the splendid adornment of his troops; or, again, in the paucity of his own wants, combined with a bountiful liberality towards his friends.

Besides all this, as an antagonist he could hit hard enough, but no one ever bore a lighter hand when the victory was won.  

The same man, whom an enemy would have found it hard to deceive, was pliability itself in the concerns of his friends. Whilst for ever occupied in laying these on a secure foundation, he made it a ceaseless task to baffle the projects of the national foe.

The epithets applied to him are significant. His relatives found in him a kinsman who was more than kind. To his intimates he appeared as the friend in need who is a friend indeed. To the man who had done him some service, of tenacious memory. To the victim of injustice, a knight-errant. And to those who had incurred danger by his side, a saviour second only to the gods.

It was given to this man, as it appears to me, to prove exceptionally that though strength of body may wax old the vigour of a man’s soul is exempt from eld. Of him, at any rate, it is true that he never shrank from the pursuit of great and noble objects, so long as his body was able to support the vigour of his soul. Therefore his old age appeared mightier than the youth of other people. It would be hard to discover, I imagine, any one who in the prime of manhood was as formidable to his foes as Agesilaus when he had reached the limit of mortal life. Never, I suppose, was there a foeman whose removal came with a greater sense of relief to the enemy than that of Agesilaus, though a veteran when he died. Never was there a leader who inspired stouter courage in the hearts of fellow-combatants than this man with one foot planted in the grave. Never was a young man snatched from a circle of loving friends with tenderer regret than this old graybeard.

1 Lit. "he was the heaviest of antagonists and the lightest of conquerors."
2 Reading, μεγαλὼν καὶ καλῶν ἐφιέμενος, ἑως καὶ τὸ σῶμα, κ.τ.λ. See Breitenbach.
The benefactor of his fatherland, absolutely to the very end; with bounteous hand, even in the arms of death, dealing out largesse\(^1\) to the city which he loved. And so they bore him home to his eternal resting-place;\(^2\) this hero, who, having raised to himself many a monument of his valour over the broad earth, came back to find in the land of his fathers a sepulture worthy of a king.\(^3\)

\(^1\) See above, ii. 31.  
\(^2\) See for this remarkable phrase, Diod. i. 51.  
\(^3\) See Pol. Lac. xv. 9.  

The date of Agesilaus's death is uncertain—360 B.C. (Grote, H. G. ix. 336); 358 B.C. (Curt. iv. 196, Eng. tr.).
THE

POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS
THE POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS

1. 1, 2

Now, as concerning the Polity of the Athenians,¹ and the type or manner of constitution which they have chosen,² I praise it not, in so far as the very choice involves the welfare of the baser folk as opposed to that of the better class. I repeat, I withhold my praise so far; but, given the fact that this is the type agreed upon, I propose to show that they set about its preservation in the right way; and that those other transactions in connection with it, which are looked upon as blunders by the rest of the Hellenic world, are the reverse.

In the first place, I maintain, it is only just that the poorer classes³ and the People of Athens should be better off than the men of birth and wealth, seeing that it is the people who man the fleet,⁴ and put round the city her girdle of power. The steersman,⁵ the boatswain, the lieutenant,⁶ the look-out-man at the prow, the shipwright—these are the people who engird the city with power far rather than her heavy infantry⁷ and men of birth and quality. This being the case, it seems only just

² Lit. "I do not praise their choice of the (particular) type, in so far as . . ."
³ Cf. Mem. I. ii. 58 foll. ⁴ Lit. "ply the oar and propel the galleys."
⁵ See Econ. viii. 14; Pollux, i. 96; Arist. Knights, 543 foll.; Plat. Laws, v. 707 A; Jowett, Plat. v. 278 foll.; Boeckh, P. E. A. bk. ii. ch. xxi.
that offices of state should be thrown open to every one both in the ballot and the show of hands, and that the right of speech should belong to any one who likes, without restriction. For, observe, there are many of these offices which, according as they are in good or in bad hands, are a source of safety or of danger to the People, and in these the People prudently abstains from sharing; as, for instance, it does not think it incumbent on itself to share in the functions of the general or of the commander of cavalry. The sovereign People recognises the fact that in forgoing the personal exercise of these offices, and leaving them to the control of the more powerful citizens, it secures the balance of advantage to itself. It is only those departments of government which bring emolument and assist the private estate that the People cares to keep in its own hands.

In the next place, in regard to what some people are puzzled to explain—the fact that everywhere greater considera-
tion is shown to the base, to poor people and to common folk, than to persons of good quality,—so far from being a matter of surprise, this, as can be shown, is the keystone of the preservation of the democracy. It is these poor people, this common folk, this riff-raff, whose prosperity, combined with the growth of their numbers, enhances the democracy. Whereas, a shift-
ing of fortune to the advantage of the wealthy and the better classes implies the establishment on the part of the commonalty of a strong power in opposition to itself. In fact, all the world over, the cream of society is in opposition to the democracy. Naturally, since the smallest amount of intemperance and in-
justice, together with the highest scrupulousness in the pursuit of excellence, is to be found in the ranks of the better class, while within the ranks of the People will be found the greatest amount of ignorance, disorderliness, rascality,—poverty acting as a stronger incentive to base conduct, not to speak of lack of education and ignorance, traceable to the lack of means which afflicts the average of mankind.

1 κληρωτολ, αλπερολ.
2 Reading with Kirchhoff, ἐπει τοι, or if ἐπειτα, "in the next place."
3 Hipparch. 4 Cf. Hipparch. i. 9; Econ. ii. 8. 5 E.g. the δικαστήρια.
6 Or, "these inferiors," "these good-for-nothings."
7 Or, "some of these folk." The passage is corrupt.
NOT IDEAL BUT CONSISTENT

The objection may be raised that it was a mistake to allow the universal right of speech\(^1\) and a seat in council. These should have been reserved for the cleverest, the flower of the community. But here, again, it will be found that they are acting with wise deliberation in granting to\(^2\) even the baser sort the right of speech, for supposing only the better people might speak, or sit in council, blessings would fall to the lot of those like themselves, but to the commonalty the reverse of blessings. Whereas now, any one who likes, any base fellow, may get up and discover something to the advantage of himself and his equals. It may be retorted: "And what sort of advantage either for himself or for the People can such a fellow be expected to hit upon?" The answer to which is, that in their judgment the ignorance and the baseness of this fellow, together with his goodwill, are worth a great deal more to them than your superior person’s virtue and wisdom, coupled with animosity. What it comes to, therefore, is that a state founded upon such institutions will not be the best state;\(^3\) but, given a democracy, these are the right means to secure its preservation. The People, it must be borne in mind, does not demand that the city should be well governed and itself a slave. It desires to be free and to be master.\(^4\) As to bad legislation it does not concern itself about that.\(^5\) In fact, what you believe to be bad legislation is the very source of the People’s strength and freedom. But if you seek for good legislation, in the first place you will see the cleverest members of the community laying down the laws for the rest. And in the next place, the better class will curb and chastise the lower orders; the better class will deliberate in behalf of the state, and not suffer crack-brained fellows to sit in council, or to speak or vote in Parliament.\(^6\) No doubt; but under the weight of such blessings the People will in a very short time be reduced to slavery.

Another point is the extraordinary amount of license\(^7\)

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1 Lit. "everybody to speak in turn."
2 Or, "it is a counsel of perfection on their part to grant to," etc.
3 Or, "the ideal state."
4 Or, "and to govern and hold office."
5 Or, "it will take the risk of that."
7 See Aristot. Pol. v. 11 and vi. 4; Jowett, op. cit. vol. i. pp. 179, 196;
granted to slaves and resident aliens at Athens, where a blow is illegal, and a slave will not step aside to let you pass him in the street. I will explain the reason of this peculiar custom. Supposing it were legal for a slave to be beaten by a free citizen, or for a resident alien or freedman to be beaten by a citizen, it would frequently happen that an Athenian might be mistaken for a slave or an alien and receive a beating; since the Athenian People is not better clothed than the slave or alien, nor in personal appearance is there any superiority. Or if the fact itself that slaves in Athens are allowed to indulge in luxury, and indeed in some cases to live magnificently, be found astonishing, this too, it can be shown, is done of set purpose. Where you have a naval power\(^1\) dependent upon wealth\(^2\) we must perforce be slaves to our slaves, in order that we may get in our slave-rents,\(^3\) and let the real slave go free. Where you have wealthy slaves it ceases to be advantageous that my slave should stand in awe of you. In Lacedaemon my slave stands in awe of you.\(^4\) But if your slave is in awe of me there will be a risk of his giving away his own moneys to avoid running a risk in his own person. It is for this reason then that we have established an equality between our slaves and free men; and again between our resident aliens and full citizens,\(^5\) because the city stands in


1 See Diod. xi. 43.

2 Reading, απὸ χρημάτων, ἀνάγκη, or (reading, ἀπὸ χρημάτων ἀνάγκη) "considerations of money force us to be slaves."

3 See Boeckh, P. E. A. I. xiii. (Eng. trans. p. 72). "The rights of property with regard to slaves in no way differed from any other chattel; they could be given or taken as pledges. They laboured either on their master's account or their own, in consideration of a certain sum to be paid to the master, or they were let out on hire either for the mines or any other kind of labour, and even for other persons' workshops, or as hired servants for wages (ἀποφορὰ): a similar payment was also exacted by the masters for their slaves serving in the fleet." ib. "Dissertation on the Silver Mines of Laurion," p. 659 (Eng. trans.).

4 See Pol. Lac. vi. 3 (below, p. 307).

5 Or, "we have given to our slaves the right to talk like equals with free men, just as to resident aliens the right of so talking with citizens." See Jebb, Theophr. Char. xiv. 4, note, p. 221. See Demosth. against Midias, 529, where the law is cited. "If any one commit a personal outrage upon man, woman, or child, whether free-born or slave, or commit any illegal act against any such person, let any Athenian that chooses" (not being under disability)
need of her resident aliens to meet the requirements of such a multiplicity of arts and for the purposes of her navy. That is, I repeat, the justification of the equality conferred upon our resident aliens.

Citizens devoting their time to gymnastics and to the cultivation of music are not to be found in Athens; the sovereign People has disestablished them, not from any disbelief in the beauty and honour of such training, but recognising the fact that these are things the cultivation of which is beyond its power. On the same principle, in the case of the choregia, the gymnasiarchy, and the triarchy, the fact is recognised that it is the rich man who trains the chorus, and the People for whom the chorus is trained; it is the rich man who is trierarch or gymnasiarch, and the People that profits by their labours. In fact, what the People looks upon as its right is to pocket the money. To sing and run and dance and man the vessels is well enough, but only in order that the People may be the gainer, while the rich are made poorer. And so in the courts of justice, justice is not more an object of concern to the jurymen than what touches personal advantage.

To speak next of the allies, and in reference to the point that emissaries from Athens come out, and, according to common opinion, calumniate and vent their hatred upon the

"indict him before the judges," etc.; and the orator exclaims: "You know, O Athenians, the humanity of the law, which allows not even slaves to be insulted in their persons." — C. R. Kennedy.

1 For μουσική and γυμναστική, see Becker's Charicles, Exc. "Education."
2 See Revenues, iv. 52 (below, p. 345); Arist. Frogs, 1069, ἧς ἐκείνωσεν τὰς τε παλαϊστράς, "and the places of exercise vacant and bare." — Frere.
3 "The duties of the choregia consisted in finding maintenance and instruction for the chorus" (in tragedy, usually of fifteen persons) "as long as they were in training; and in providing the dresses and equipments for the performance." — Jebb, Theophr. Char. xxv. 3. For those of the gymnasiarchy, see Dict. of Antiq. "Gymnasion." For that of the triarchy, see Jebb, op. cit. xxv. 9; xxix. 16; Boeckh, P. E. A. iv. xi.
4 See Econ. ii. 6; Thuc. vi. 31.
6 For the system of judicature, the δικαστήρια, and the boards of jurymen or judges, see Aristot. Constitution of Athens, ch. lxiii.; Dict. of Antiq. s.v.; Trans. vol. i. p. 30, note x.
7 For oi ἐκπλέουντες, see Grote, H. G. vi. p. 41.
8 Reading μισοῦσι; or, if with Kirchhoff, μειοῦσι, "in every way humiliate."
better sort of people, this is done on the principle that the
ruler cannot help being hated by those whom he rules; but that
if wealth and respectability are to wield power in the subject
cities the empire of the Athenian People has but a short lease
of existence. This explains why the better people are punished
with infamy, robbed of their money, driven from their homes,
and put to death, while the baser sort are promoted to honour.
On the other hand, the better Athenians throw their aegis over
the better class in the allied cities. And why? Because they
recognise that it is to the interest of their own class at all
times to protect the best element in the cities. It may be
urged that if it comes to strength and power the real strength
of Athens lies in the capacity of her allies to contribute their
money quota. But to the democratic mind it appears a
higher advantage still for the individual Athenian to get hold
of the wealth of the allies, leaving them only enough to live
upon and to cultivate their estates, but powerless to harbour
treacherous designs.

Again, it is looked upon as a mistaken policy on the part
of the Athenian democracy to compel her allies to voyage to
Athens in order to have their cases tried. On the other hand,
it is easy to reckon up what a number of advantages the
Athenian People derives from the practice impugned. In
the first place, there is the steady receipt of salaries throughout
the year derived from the court fees. Next, it enables them

1 Or, "[they do so] as recognising the fact."
2 ἀρνίλα = the loss of civil rights, either total or partial. See C. R.
   Kennedy, Select Speeches of Demosthenes, Note 13, Disfranchisement.
3 See Thuc. viii. 48.
4 See Grote, H. G. vi. 53.
5 Or, "to a thorough democrat."
7 See Isocr. Panath. 245 D.
8 See Arist. Clouds, 1196; Demosth. c. Timoc. 730.
9 For the "Prytanœa," see Aristot. Pol. ii. 12, 4. "Ephialtes and Pericles
curtailed the privileges of the Areopagus, Pericles converted the Courts of
Law into salaried bodies, and so each succeeding demagogue outdid his pre-
deressor in the privileges he conferred upon the commons, until the present
democracy was the result" (Welldon). "The writer of this passage clearly
intended to class Pericles among the demagogues. He judges him in the
same depreciatory spirit as Plato in the Gorgias, pp. 515, 516."—Jowett, Pol.
portion of the newly-discovered treatise, which throws light on an obscure
period in the history of Athens; and Mr. Kenyon's note ad loc.; and Mr.
to manage the affairs of the allied states while seated at home without the expense of naval expeditions. Thirdly, they thus preserve the partisans of the democracy, and ruin her opponents in the law courts. Whereas, supposing the several allied states tried their cases at home, being inspired by hostility to Athens, they would destroy those of their own citizens whose friendship to the Athenian People was most marked. But besides all this the democracy derives the following advantages from hearing the cases of her allies in Athens. In the first place, the one per cent 1 levied in Piraeus is increased to the profit of the state; again, the owner of a lodging-house 2 does better, and so, too, the owner of a pair of beasts, or of slaves to be let out on hire; 3 again, heralds andcriers 4 are a class of people who fare better owing to the sojourn of foreigners at Athens. Further still, supposing the allies had not to resort to Athens for the hearing of cases, only the official representative of the imperial state would be held in honour, such as the general, or trierarch, or ambassador. Whereas now every single individual among the allies is forced to pay flattery to the People of Athens because he knows that he must betake himself to Athens and win or lose 5 his case at the bar, not of any stray set of judges, but of the sovereign People itself, such being the law and custom at Athens. He is compelled to behave as a suppli ant 6 in the courts of justice, and when some juryman comes into court, to grasp his hand. For this reason, therefore, the allies find themselves more and more in the position of slaves to the people of Athens.

Furthermore, owing to the possession of property beyond the limits of Attica, 7 and the exercise of magistracies which take them into regions beyond the frontier, they and their attendants have insensibly acquired the art of navigation. 8 A man who is perpetually voyaging is forced to handle the

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1 For the ἐκατοστή, see Thuc. vii. 28, in reference to the year B.C. 416; Arist. Wasps, 658; Frogs, 363.
3 See note 3, above, p. 278; Revenues, iv. 20, p. 338; Jebb, Theophr. Char. xxvi. 16.
4 For these functionaries, see Jebb, op. cit. xvi. 10.
5 Lit. "pay or get justice."
7 See Mem. II. viii. 1.
8 See Hell. VII. i. 4 (above, p. 187).
oar, he and his domestic alike, and to learn the terms familiar in seamanship. Hence a stock of skilful mariners is produced, bred upon a wide experience of voyaging and practice. They have learnt their business, some in piloting a small craft, others a merchant vessel, whilst others have been drafted off from these for service on a ship-of-war. So that the majority of them are able to row the moment they set foot on board a vessel, having been in a state of preliminary practice all their lives.

II

As to the heavy infantry, an arm the deficiency of which at Athens is well recognised, this is how the matter stands. They recognise the fact that, in reference to the hostile power, they are themselves inferior, and must be, even if their heavy infantry were more numerous. But relatively to the allies, who bring in the tribute, their strength even on land is enormous. And they are persuaded that their heavy infantry is sufficient for all purposes, provided they retain this superiority. Apart from all else, to a certain extent fortune must be held responsible for the actual condition. The subjects of a power which is dominant by land have it open to them to form contingents from several small states and to muster in force for battle. But with the subjects of a naval power it is different. As far as they are groups of islanders it is impossible for their states to meet together for united action, for the sea lies between them, and the dominant power is master of the sea. And even if it were possible for them to assemble in some single island unobserved, they would only do so to perish by famine. And as to the states subject to Athens which are not islanders, but situated on the continent, the larger are held in check by need and the small ones absolutely by fear, since there is no state in existence which does not depend upon imports and exports, and these she will forfeit if she does not lend a willing ear to those who are masters by sea. In

1 Reading after Kirchhoff, ἢπτος ἔς... κἀν εἰ μείζον ἦν, τῶν διὰ κ.τ.λ. See Thuc. i. 143; Isocr. de Pace, 169 A; Plut. Them. 4 (Clough, i. 235).
2 Lit. "they are superior to their allies."
3 Reading with Kirchhoff, διὰ χρήσεω... διὰ δέος.
the next place, a power dominant by sea can do certain things which a land power is debarred from doing; as, for instance, ravage the territory of a superior, since it is always possible to coast along to some point, where either there is no hostile force to deal with or merely a small body; and in case of an advance in force on the part of the enemy they can take to their ships and sail away. Such a performance is attended with less difficulty than that experienced by the relieving force on land. Again, it is open to a power so dominating by sea to leave its own territory and sail off on as long a voyage as you please. Whereas the land power cannot place more than a few days' journey between itself and its own territory, for marches are slow affairs; and it is not possible for an army on the march to have food supplies to last for any great length of time. Such an army must either march through friendly territory or it must force a way by victory in battle. The voyager meanwhile has it in his power to disembark at any point where he finds himself in superior force, or, at the worst, to coast by until he reaches either a friendly district or an enemy too weak to resist. Again, those diseases to which the fruits of the earth are liable as visitations from heaven fall severely on a land power, but are scarcely felt by the naval power, for such sicknesses do not visit the whole earth everywhere at once. So that the ruler of the sea can get in supplies from a thriving district. And if one may descend to more trifling particulars, it is to this same lordship of the sea that the Athenians owe the discovery, in the first place, of many of the luxuries of life through intercourse with other countries. So that the choice things of Sicily and Italy, of Cyprus and Egypt and Lydia, of Pontus or Peloponnese, or wheresoever else it be, are all swept, as it were, into one centre, and all owing, as I say, to their maritime empire. And again, in process of listening to every form of speech, they have selected this from one place and that from another—for themselves. So much so that while the rest of the Hellenes employ each pretty much their own peculiar mode of speech, habit of life,

1 Or, "the army marching along the seaboard to the rescue."
2 Or, "a variety of dialects."
3 Or, "maintain somewhat more."
and style of dress, the Athenians have adopted a composite
type,\(^1\) to which all sections of Hellas, and the foreigner alike,
have contributed.

As regards sacrifices and temples and festivals and sacred
enclosures, the People sees that it is not possible for every
poor citizen to do sacrifice and hold festival, or to set up\(^2\)
temples and to inhabit a large and beautiful city. But it has
hit upon a means of meeting the difficulty. They sacrifice—
that is, the whole state sacrifices—at the public cost a large
number of victims; but it is the People that keeps holiday
and distributes the victims by lot amongst its members. Rich
men have in some cases private gymnasias and baths with
dressing-rooms,\(^3\) but the People takes care to have built at
the public cost\(^4\) a number of palaestras, dressing-rooms, and
bathing establishments for its own special use, and the mob
gets the benefit of the majority of these, rather than the select
few or the well-to-do.

As to wealth, the Athenians are exceptionally placed with
regard to Hellenic and foreign communities alike,\(^5\) in their
ability to hold it. For, given that some state or other is rich
in timber for shipbuilding, where is it to find a market\(^6\) for
the product except by persuading the ruler of the sea? Or,
suppose the wealth of some state or other to consist of bronze,
or may be of bronze,\(^7\) or of linen yarn, where will it find a
market except by permission of the supreme maritime power?
Yet these are the very things, you see, which I need for my
ships. Timber I must have from one, and from another iron,
from a third bronze, from a fourth linen yarn, from a fifth wax,

\(^1\) Or, "have contracted a mixed style, bearing traces of Hellenic and
257 (1st ed.); cf. Walt Whitman, *Preface to original edition of Leaves of
Grass*, p. 29—"The English language befriends the grand American expres-
sion: it is brawny enough and limber and full enough, on the tough stock of
a race, who through all change of circumstances was never without the idea of
political liberty, which is the animus of all liberty; it has attracted the terms
of daintier and gayer and subtler and more elegant tongues."

\(^2\) Reading with Kirchhoff, ἱστασθαι.


\(^4\) Reading with Kirchhoff, δημοσία.

\(^5\) Or, "they have a practical monopoly."

\(^6\) Or, "how is it to dispose of the product?"

\(^7\) Or, "coppert."
Moreover, we word abundant, present or, they will cease to use the sea. Accordingly I, without one stroke of labour, extract from the land and possess all these good things, thanks to my supremacy on the sea; whilst not a single other state possesses the two of them. Not timber, for instance, and yarn together, the same city. But where yarn is abundant, the soil will be light and devoid of timber. And in the same way bronze and iron will not be products of the same city. And so for the rest, never two, or at best three, in one state, but one thing here and another thing there. Moreover, above and beyond what has been said, the coast-line of every mainland presents, either some jutting promontory, or adjacent island, or narrow strait of some sort, so that those who are masters of the sea can come to moorings at one of these points and wreak vengeance on the inhabitants of the mainland.

There is just one thing which the Athenians lack. Supposing they were the inhabitants of an island, and were still, as now, rulers of the sea, they would have had it in their power to work whatever mischief they liked, and to suffer no evil in return (as long as they kept command of the sea), neither the ravaging of their territory nor the expectation of an enemy’s approach. Whereas at present the farming portion of the community and the wealthy landowners are ready to cringe before the enemy overmuch, whilst the People, knowing full well that, come what may, not one stock or stone of their property will suffer, nothing will be cut down, nothing burnt, lives in freedom from alarm, without fawning at the enemy’s approach. Besides this, there is another fear from which they

1 Reading ἔκει. For this corrupt passage see L. Dindorf, *ad loc.*; also Boeckh, *P. E. A.*. I. ix. p. 55. Perhaps (as my friend Mr. J. R. Mozley suggests) the simplest supposition is to suppose that there is an ellipsis before ἢ τὸ χρῆσοντα τῇ βαλάντῃ: thus, “Besides which they will not suffer their antagonists to transport goods to countries outside Attica; they must yield, or they shall not have the use of the sea.”

2 λωβάσσαναι. This ‘poetical’ word comes to mean ‘‘harry,’’ ‘‘pillage,’’ in the common dialect.

3 See Thuc. i. 143. Pericles says: “Reflect, if we were islanders, who would be more invulnerable? Let us imagine that we are.”

4 Or, “are the more ready to cringe.” See, for the word ὑπέρχοντας, *Pol. Lac.* viii. 2; Plat. *Crit.* 53 e; Rutherford, *New Phrynichus*, p. 110.
would have been exempt in an island home—the apprehension of the city being at any time betrayed by their oligarchs¹ and the gates thrown open, and an enemy bursting suddenly in. How could incidents like these have taken place if an island had been their home? Again, had they inhabited an island there would have been no stirring of sedition against the people; whereas at present, in the event of faction, those who set it on foot base their hopes of success on the introduction of an enemy by land. But a people inhabiting an island would be free from all anxiety on that score. Since, however, they did not chance to inhabit an island from the first, what they now do is this—they deposit their property in the islands,² trusting to their command of the sea, and they suffer the soil of Attica to be ravaged without a sigh. To expend pity on that, they know, would be to deprive themselves of other blessings still more precious.³

Further, states oligarchically governed are forced to ratify their alliances and solemn oaths, and if they fail to abide by their contracts, the offence, by whomsoever committed,⁴ lies nominally at the door of the oligarchs who entered upon the contract. But in the case of engagements entered into by a democracy it is open to the People to throw the blame on the single individual who spoke in favour of some measure, or put it to the vote, and to maintain to the rest of the world, “I was not present, nor do I approve of the terms of the agreement.” Inquiries are made in a full meeting of the People, and should any of these things be disapproved of, it can at once discover ten thousand excuses to avoid doing whatever they do not wish. And if any mischief should spring out of any resolutions which the People has passed in council, the People can readily shift the blame from its own shoulders. “A handful of oligarchs⁵ acting against the interests of the People have ruined us.”

¹ Or, “by the minority”; or, “by a handful of people.”
² As they did during the Peloponnesian war; and earlier still, before the battle of Salamis, in the case of that one island.
³ Or, “but mean the forfeiture of others.”
⁴ Reading ὅφ' ὅτων ἄδικεται ἄνομεται ἀπὸ τῶν ὀλίγων, which I suggest as a less violent emendation of this corrupt passage than any I have seen; or, reading with Sauppe, ὅφ' ὅτων ἄδικε ἄνομεται ἀπὸ τῶν ὀλίγων, “the illegality lies at the door of.”
⁵ Or, “a few insignificant fellows.”
But if any good result ensue, they, the People, at once take the credit of that to themselves.

In the same spirit it is not allowed to caricature on the comic stage\(^1\) or otherwise libel the People, because\(^2\) they do not care to hear themselves ill spoken of. But if any one has a desire to satirise his neighbour he has full leave to do so. And this because they are well aware that, as a general rule, the person caricatured\(^3\) does not belong to the People, or the masses. He is more likely to be some wealthy or well-born person, or man of means and influence. In fact, but few poor people and of the popular stamp incur the comic lash, or if they do they have brought it on themselves by excessive love of meddling or some covetous self-seeking at the expense of the People, so that no particular annoyance is felt at seeing such folk satirised.

What, then, I venture to assert is, that the People of Athens has no difficulty in recognising which of its citizens are of the better sort and which the opposite.\(^4\) And so recognising those who are serviceable and advantageous\(^5\) to itself, even though they be base, the People loves them; but the good folk they are disposed the rather to hate. This virtue of theirs, the People holds, is not engrained in their nature for any good to itself, but rather for its injury. In direct opposition to this, there are some persons who, being\(^6\) born of the People, are yet by natural instinct not commoners. For my part I pardon the People its own democracy, as, indeed, it is pardonable in any one to do good to himself.\(^7\) But the man who, not being himself one of the People, prefers to live in a state democratically governed rather than in an oligarchical state may be said to smooth his own path towards iniquity. He knows that a bad man has a better chance of slipping

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\(^2\) Or, more lit. "it would not do for the People to hear," etc.

\(^3\) Or, "the butt of comedy."

\(^4\) Or, "and which are good for nothing."

\(^5\) Or, "its own friends and supporters."

\(^6\) Reading ὑπερ, or (if γενόμενοι), "who, recognising the nature of the People, have no popular leaning." Gutschmidt conj. ἐν οἷς ὑπερ εἰς τοὺς ὑπερ, i.e. Pericles.

\(^7\) On the principle that "the knee is nearer than the shin-bone," γόνυ κνήμης, or, as we say, "charity begins at home."
through the fingers of justice in a democratic than in an oligarchical state.

III

I repeat that my position concerning the polity of the Athenians is this: the type\(^1\) of polity is not to my taste, but given that a democratic form of government has been agreed upon, they do seem to me to go the right way to preserve the democracy by the adoption of the particular type\(^2\) which I have set forth.

But there are other objections brought, as I am aware, against the Athenians, by certain people, and to this effect. It not seldom happens, they tell us, that a man is unable to transact a piece of business with the senate or the People, even if he sit waiting a whole year. Now this does happen at Athens, and for no other reason save that, owing to the immense mass of affairs they are unable to work off all the business on hand and dismiss the applicants. And how in the world should they be able, considering in the first place, that they, the Athenians, have more festivals\(^3\) to celebrate than any other state throughout the length and breadth of Hellas? [During these festivals, of course, the transaction of any sort of affairs of state is still more out of the question.\(^4\)]

In the next place, only consider the number of cases they have to decide,—what with private suits and public causes and scrutinies of accounts, etc., more than the whole of the rest of mankind put together; while the senate has multifarious points to advise upon concerning peace and war,\(^5\) concerning ways and means, concerning the framing and passing of laws,\(^6\) and concerning the thousand and one matters affecting the state perpetually occurring, and endless questions touching the allies; besides the receipt of the tribute, the superintendence of dockyards and temples, etc. Can, I ask again, any one find it at all surprising that, with all these affairs on their hands, they are unequal to doing business with all the world?

But some people tell us that if the applicant will only address himself to the senate or the People with a \(\text{see in his}\)

\(^1\) Or, "manner."  
\(^2\) Or, "manner."  
\(^3\) See Arist. \textit{Wasp}, 661.  
\(^4\) This sentence is perhaps a gloss.  
\(^5\) Or, "about the war," \(\text{περί τοῦ πολέμου}.\)  
\(^6\) See Thirlwall, ch. xxxii. vol. iv. p. 221, note 3.
hand he will do a good stroke of business. And for my part I am free to confess to these gainsayers that a good many things may be done at Athens by dint of money; and I will add, that a good many more still might be done, if the money flowed still more freely and from more pockets. One thing, however, I know full well, that as to transacting with every one of these applicants all he wants, the state could not do it, not even if all the gold and silver in the world were the inducement offered.

Here are some of the cases which have to be decided on. Some one fails to fit out a ship: judgment must be given. Another puts up a building on a piece of public land: again judgment must be given. Or, to take another class of cases: adjudication has to be made between the choragi for the Dionysia, the Thargelia, the Panathenaea, year after year. [1 And again in behalf of the gymnasiarchs a similar adjudication for the Panathenaea, the Prometheia, and the Hephaestia, also year after year.] Also as between the trierarchs, four hundred of whom are appointed each year, of these, too, any who choose must have their cases adjudicated on, year after year. But that is not all. There are various magistrates to examine and approve [2 and decide between; there are orphans [3 whose status must be examined; and guardians of prisoners to appoint. These, be it borne in mind, are all matters of yearly occurrence; while at intervals there are exemptions and abstentions from military service [4 which call for adjudication, or in connection with some other extraordinary misdemeanour, some case of outrage and violence of an exceptional character, or some charge of impiety. A whole string of others I simply omit; I am content to have named the most important part with the exception of the assessments of tribute which occur, as a rule, at intervals of five years. [5

1 Adopting the emendation of Kirchhoff, who inserts the sentence in brackets. For the festivals in question, see Dict. of Antiq. "Lampadephoria"; C. R. Kennedy, Demosth. against Leptines, etc., App. vi.
2 For the institution called the δοκυαδοκυαδα, see Aristot. Constitution of Athens, ch. iv.
3 See Dem. against Midias, 565, 17; against Aphobus (1), 814, 20.
4 See Lys. Or. xiv. and xv.
I put it to you, then: can any one suppose that all, or any, of these may dispense with adjudication? 1 If so, will any one say which ought, and which ought not, to be adjudicated on, there and then? If, on the other hand, we are forced to admit that these are all fair cases for adjudication, it follows of necessity that they should be decided during the twelve-month; since even now the boards of judges sitting right through the year are powerless to stay the tide of evildoing by reason of the multitude of the people.

So far so good. 2 "But," some one will say, "try the cases you certainly must, but lessen the number of the judges." But if so, it follows of necessity that unless the number of courts themselves are diminished in number there will only be a few judges sitting in each court, 3 with the further consequence that in dealing with so small a body of judges it will be easier for a litigant to present an invulnerable front 4 to the court, and to bribe 5 the whole body, to the great detriment of justice. 6

But besides this we cannot escape the conclusion that the Athenians have their festivals to keep, during which the courts cannot sit. 7 As a matter of fact these festivals are twice as numerous as those of any other people. But I will reckon them as merely equal to those of the state which has the fewest.

This being so, I maintain that it is not possible for business affairs at Athens to stand on any very different footing from the present, except to some slight extent, by adding here and deducting there. Any large modification is out of the question, short of damaging the democracy itself. No doubt

1 Reading with Kirchhoff. Cf. for ὁλεθραὶ χρη, Hell. VI. iv. 23; Cyr. IV. ii. 28.
2 See Grote, H. G. v. 514, 520; Machiavelli, Disc. s, Livio, i. 7.
3 Reading with Sauppe, ἀνάγκη τοῦν, ἐὰν μὴ [for the vulgate ἐὰν μὴν ἀλγα κ.τ.λ.] ἀλγα ποιῶνται δικαστήρια, ἀλγα ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἐσωτὲν τῷ δικαστήριῳ. Or, adopting Weiske's emendation, ἐὰν μὲν πολλὰ ποιῶνται δικαστήρια κ.τ.λ. Translate: "Then, if by so doing they manage to multiply the law courts, there will be only a few judges sitting," etc.
4 Or, as Liddell and Scott, "to prepare all his tricks."
5 συνδικόδαι, "to bribe in the lump." This is Schneider's happy emendation of the MS. συνδικόδαι; see Demosthenes, 1137, i.
6 Reading ὅστε, lit. "so as to get a far less just judgment."
7 Lit. "it is not possible to give judgment"; or, "for juries to sit."
many expedients might be discovered for improving the constitution, but if the problem be to discover some adequate means of improving the constitution, while at the same time the democracy is to remain intact, I say it is not easy to do this, except, as I have just stated, to the extent of some trifling addition here or deduction there.

There is another point in which it is sometimes felt that the Athenians are ill advised, in their adoption, namely, of the less respectable party, in a state divided by faction. But if so, they do it advisedly. If they chose the more respectable, they would be adopting those whose views and interests differ from their own, for there is no state in which the best element is friendly to the people. It is the worst element which in every state favours the democracy—on the principle that like favours like.\(^1\) It is simple enough then. The Athenians choose what is most akin to themselves. Also on every occasion on which they have attempted to side with the better classes, it has not fared well with them, but within a short interval the democratic party has been enslaved, as for instance in Boeotia;\(^2\) or, as when they chose the aristocrats of the Milesians, and within a short time these revolted and cut the people to pieces; or, as when they chose the Lacedaemonians as against the Messenians, and within a short time the Lacedaemonians subjugated the Messenians and went to war against Athens.

I seem to overhear a retort, "No one, of course, is deprived of his civil rights at Athens unjustly." My answer is, that there are some who are unjustly deprived of their civil rights, though the cases are certainly rare. But it will take more than a few to attack the democracy at Athens, since you may take it as an established fact, it is not the man who has lost his civil rights justly that takes the matter to heart, but the victims, if any, of injustice. But how in the world can any one imagine that many are in a state of civil disability at Athens, where the People and the holders of office are one and

\(^1\) *I.e.* "birds of a feather."

\(^2\) The references are perhaps (1) to the events of the year 447 B.C., see Thuc. i. 113; cf. Aristot. *Pol.* v. 3, 5; (2) to 440 B.C., Thuc. i. 115; Diod. xii. 27, 28; Plut. *Perik.* c. 24; (3) to those of 464 B.C., followed by 457 B.C., Thuc. i. 102; Plut. *Cimon.* c. 16; and Thuc. i. 108.
the same? It is from iniquitous exercise of office, from iniquity exhibited either in speech or action, and the like circumstances, that citizens are punished with deprivation of civil rights in Athens. Due reflection on these matters will serve to dispel the notion that there is any danger at Athens from persons visited with disfranchisement.
THE POLITY
OF THE LACEDÆMONIANS
I RECALL the astonishment with which I first noted the unique position of Sparta amongst the states of Hellas, the relatively sparse population, and at the same time the extraordinary power and prestige of the community. I was puzzled to account for the fact. It was only when I came to consider the peculiar institutions of the Spartans that my wonderment ceased. Or rather, it is transferred to the legislator who gave them those laws, obedience to which has been the secret of their prosperity. This legislator, Lycurgus, I must needs admire, and hold him to have been one of the wisest of mankind. Certainly he was no servile imitator of other states. It was by a stroke of invention rather, and on a pattern much in opposition to the commonly-accepted one, that he brought his fatherland to this pinnacle of prosperity.

Take for example—and it is well to begin at the beginning—the whole topic of the begetting and rearing of children. Throughout the rest of the world the young girl, who will one day become a mother (and I speak of those who may be held...

1 See the opening words of the Cyrop. and of the Symp.
3 See Herod. vii. 234; Aristot. Pol. ii. 9, 14 foll.; Müller, Dorians, iii. 10 (vol. ii. p. 203, Eng. tr.).
4 Cf. a fragment of Critias cited by Clement, Stromata, vi. p. 741, 6; Athen. x. 432, 433; see A Fragment of Xenophon (?), ap. Stob. Flor. 88, 14, translated by J. Hookham Frere, Theognis Restitutus, vol. i. 333; G. Sauppe, Append. de Frag. Xen. p. 293; probably by Antisthenes (Bergk. ii. 497).
to be well brought up), is nurtured on the plainest food attainable, with the scantiest addition of meat or other condiments; whilst as to wine they train them either to total abstinence or to take it highly diluted with water. And in imitation, as it were, of the handicraft type, since the majority of artificers are sedentary,¹ we, the rest of the Hellenes, are content that our girls should sit quietly and work wools. That is all we demand of them. But how are we to expect that women nurtured in this fashion should produce a splendid offspring?

Lycurgus pursued a different path. Clothes were things, he held, the furnishing of which might well enough be left to female slaves. And, believing that the highest function of a free woman was the bearing of children, in the first place he insisted on the training of the body as incumbent no less on the female than the male; and in pursuit of the same idea instituted rival contests in running and feats of strength for women as for men. His belief was that where both parents were strong their progeny would be found to be more vigorous.

And so again after marriage. In view of the fact that immoderate intercourse is elsewhere permitted during the earlier period of matrimony, he adopted a principle directly opposite. He laid it down as an ordinance that a man should be ashamed to be seen visiting the chamber of his wife, whether going in or coming out. When they did meet under such restraint the mutual longing of these lovers could not but be increased, and the fruit which might spring from such intercourse would tend to be more robust than theirs whose affections are cloyed by satiety. By a farther step in the same direction he refused to allow marriages to be contracted² at any period of life according to the fancy of the parties concerned. Marriage, as he ordained it, must only take place in the prime of bodily vigour,³ this too being, as he believed, a condition conducive to the production of healthy offspring.

¹ Or, "such technical work is for the most part sedentary."
² "The bride to be wooed and won." The phrase ἀγορασθεῖν perhaps points to some primitive custom of capturing and carrying off the bride, but it had probably become conventional.
³ Cf. Plut. Lycurg. 15 (Clough, i. 101). "In their marriages the husband carried off his bride by a sort of force; nor were their brides ever small and of tender years, but in their full bloom and ripeness."
Or again, to meet the case which might occur of an old man \(^1\) wedded to a young wife. Considering the jealous watch which such husbands are apt to keep over their wives, he introduced a directly opposite custom; that is to say, he made it incumbent on the aged husband to introduce some one whose qualities, physical and moral, he admired, to play the husband’s part and to beget him children. Or again, in the case of a man who might not desire to live with a wife permanently, but yet might still be anxious to have children of his own worthy the name, the lawgiver laid down a law \(^2\) in his behalf. Such an one might select some woman, the wife of some man, well born herself and blest with fair offspring, and, the sanction and consent of her husband first obtained, raise up children for himself through her.

These and many other adaptations of a like sort the lawgiver sanctioned. As, for instance, at Sparta a wife will not object to bear the burden of a double establishment, \(^3\) or a husband to adopt sons as foster-brothers of his own children, with a full share in his family and position, but possessing no claim to his wealth and property.

So opposed to those of the rest of the world are the principles which Lycurgus devised in reference to the production of children. Whether they enabled him to provide Sparta with a race of men superior to all in size and strength I leave to the judgment of whomsoever it may concern.

II

With this exposition of the customs in connection with the birth of children, I wish now to explain the systems of education in fashion here and elsewhere. Throughout the rest of Hellas the custom on the part of those who claim to educate their sons in the best way is as follows. As soon as the children are of an age to understand what is said to them they are immediately placed under the charge of Paidagógoi \(^4\)

\(^1\) Cf. Plut. *Lycurg.* 15 (Clough, i. 103).
\(^2\) Or, “established a custom to suit the case.”
\(^3\) Cf. Plut. *Comp. of Numa with Lycurgus,* 4; Cato mi. 25 (Clough, i. 163; iv. 395).
(or tutors), who are also attendants, and sent off to the school of some teacher to be taught "grammar," "music," and the concerns of the palestra.\(^1\) Besides this they are given shoes\(^2\) to wear which tend to make their feet tender, and their bodies are enervated by various changes of clothing. And as for food, the only measure recognised is that which is fixed by appetite.

But when we turn to Lycurgus, instead of leaving it to each member of the state privately to appoint a slave to be his son's tutor, he set over the young Spartans a public guardian, the Paidonomos\(^3\) or "pastor," to give him his proper title,\(^4\) with complete authority over them. This guardian was selected from those who filled the highest magistracies. He had authority to hold musters of the boys,\(^5\) and as their overseer, in case of any misbehaviour, to chastise severely. The legislator further provided the pastor with a body of youths in the prime of life, and bearing whips,\(^6\) to inflict punishment when necessary, with this happy result that in Sparta modesty and obedience ever go hand in hand, nor is there lack of either.

Instead of softening their feet with shoe or sandal, his rule was to make them hardy through going barefoot.\(^7\) This habit, if practised, would, as he believed, enable them to scale heights more easily and clamber down precipices with less danger. In fact, with his feet so trained the young Spartan would leap and spring and run faster unshod than another shod in the ordinary way.

Instead of making them effeminate with a variety of clothes, his rule was to habituate them to a single garment the whole year through, thinking that so they would be better prepared to withstand the variations of heat and cold.

Again, as regards food, according to his regulation the Eiren,\(^8\) or head of the flock, must see that his messmates

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2 Or, "sandals."
3 = "boyherd."
5 Or, "assemble the boys in flocks."
6 μαστίγοφροι = "flagellants."
7 Cf. Plut. *Lycurg.* 16 (Clough, i. 106).
8 For the Eiren, see Plut. *Lycurg.* (Clough, i. 107).
gathered to the club meal, with such moderate food as to avoid that heaviness which is engendered by repletion, and yet not to remain altogether unacquainted with the pains of penurious living. His belief was that by such training in boyhood they would be better able when occasion demanded to continue toiling on an empty stomach. They would be all the fitter, if the word of command were given, to remain on the stretch for a long time without extra dieting. The craving for luxuries would be less, the readiness to take any victual set before them greater, and, in general, the regime would be found more healthy. Under it he thought the lads would increase in stature and shape into finer men, since, as he maintained, a dietary which gave suppleness to the limbs must be more conducive to both ends than one which added thickness to the bodily parts by feeding.

On the other hand, in order to guard against a too great pinch of starvation, though he did not actually allow the boys to help themselves without further trouble to what they needed more, he did give them permission to steal this thing or that in the effort to alleviate their hunger. It was not of course from any real difficulty how else to supply them with nutriment that he left it to them to provide themselves by this crafty method. Nor can I conceive that any one will so misinterpret the custom. Clearly its explanation lies in the fact that he who would live the life of a robber must forgo sleep by night, and in the daytime he must employ shifts and lie in ambushcde; he must prepare and make

1 Reading συμβολε̄ε̄ων (for the vulg. συμβουλε̄ε̄ων). The emendation is now commonly adopted. For the word itself, see L. Dindorf, n. ad loc., and Schneider. σύμβολον = ἔρανος or club meal. Perhaps we ought to read ἔχοντας instead of ἔχοντα.

2 See Plut. Lycurg. 17 (Clough, i. 108).

3 Lit. "condiments," such as "meat," "fish," etc. See Cyrop. I. ii. 8.

4 Or, "and in general they would live more healthily and increase in stature."

5 See L. Dindorf's emendation of this corrupt passage, n. ad loc. (based upon Plut. Lycurg. 17 and Ps. Plut. Moral. 237), καὶ εἰς μὴ καὶ ἄν αὐξάνεσθαι φέτος καὶ ενειδεσθέντως ἐκάλλοι γίγνεσθαι, πρὸς αμφότερα τὴν βαδίαν τὰ σώματα ποιοῦσαν τροφὴν μᾶλλον συλλαμβάνειν ἥγησάμενος ἢ τὴν δια-πλατύνουσαν. Otherwise I would suggest to read καὶ εἰς μὴ καὶ ἄν αὐξάνεσθαι τὴν [γάρ] ῥαδιν. . . ἡγήσατο κ. τ. λ., which is closer to the vulgate, and gives nearly the same sense.

6 See Anab. IV. vi. 14 (Trans. vol. i. p. 198).
ready his scouts, and so forth, if he is to succeed in capturing the quarry.\(^1\)

It is obvious, I say, that the whole of this education tended, and was intended, to make the boys craftier and more inventive in getting in supplies, whilst at the same time it cultivated their warlike instincts. An objector may retort: "But if he thought it so fine a feat to steal, why did he inflict all those blows on the unfortunate who was caught?" My answer is: for the self-same reason which induces people, in other matters which are taught, to punish the mal-performance of a service. So they, the Lacedaemonians, visit penalties on the boy who is detected thieving as being but a sorry bungler in the art. So to steal as many cheeses as possible [off the shrine of Orthia\(^2\)] was a feat to be encouraged; but, at the same moment, others were enjoined to scourge the thief, which would point a moral not obscurely, that by pain endured for a brief season a man may earn the joyous reward of lasting glory.\(^3\) Herein, too, it is plainly shown that where speed is requisite the sluggard will win for himself much trouble and scant good.

Furthermore, and in order that the boys should not want a ruler, even in case the pastor\(^4\) himself were absent, he gave to any citizen who chanced to be present authority to lay upon them injunctions for their good, and to chastise them for any trespass committed. By so doing he created in the boys of Sparta a most rare modesty and reverence. And indeed there is nothing which, whether as boys or men, they respect more highly than the ruler. Lastly, and with the same intention, that the boys must never be rent of a ruler, even if by chance there were no grown man present, he laid down the rule that in such a case the most active of the Leaders or Prefects\(^5\) was to become ruler for the nonce, each of his own

\(^1\) For the institution named the \(\kappa\rhoυπ\tau\rho\ell\alpha\), see Plut. \(\text{Lycurg.}\) 28 (Clough, i. 120); Plato, \(\text{Laws, i. 633 B}\); for the \(\kappa\lambdaω\rho\ell\alpha\), \(\text{ib. vii. 823 E}\); Isocr. \(\text{Panathen.}\) 277 B.

\(^2\) \(\text{i.e. "Artemis of the Steep"—a title connecting the goddess with Mount Orthion or Orthosion. See Pausan. VIII. xxiii. 1; and for the custom, see Themistius, \(\text{Or.}\) 21, p. 250 A. The words have perhaps got out of their right place. See Schneider's Index, s.v.}\)

\(^3\) See Plut. \(\text{Lycurg.}\) 18; \(\text{Morals, 239 C}\); \(\text{Aristid. 17}\); Cic. \(\text{Tusc. ii. 14.}\)

\(^4\) Lit. "\(\text{Paidonomos.}\)"

\(^5\) Lit. "\(\text{Eirens.}\)"
division. The conclusion being that under no circumstances whatever are the boys of Sparta destitute of one to rule them.

I ought, as it seems to me, not to omit some remark on the subject of boy attachments, it being a topic in close connection with that of boyhood and the training of boys.

We know that the rest of the Hellenes deal with this relationship in different ways, either after the manner of the Boeotians, where man and boy are intimately united by a bond like that of wedlock, or after the manner of the Eleians, where the fruition of beauty is an act of grace; whilst there are others who would absolutely debar the lover from all conversation and discourse with the beloved.

Lycurgus adopted a system opposed to all of these alike. Given that some one, himself being all that a man ought to be, should in admiration of a boy's soul endeavour to discover in him a true friend without reproach, and to consort with him—this was a relationship which Lycurgus commended, and indeed regarded as the noblest type of bringing up. But if, as was evident, it was not an attachment to the soul, but a yearning merely towards the body, he stamped this thing as foul and horrible; and with this result, to the credit of Lycurgus be it said, that in Lacedaemon the relationship of lover and beloved is like that of parent and child or brother and brother where carnal appetite is in abeyance.

That this, however, which is the fact, should be scarcely credited in some quarters does not surprise me, seeing that in many states the laws do not oppose the desires in question.

I have now described the two chief methods of education in vogue; that is to say, the Lacedaemonian as contrasted with that of the rest of Hellas, and I leave it to the judgment of him whom it may concern, which of the two has produced the finer type of men. And by finer I mean the better disciplined, the more modest and reverential, and, in matters where self-restraint is a virtue, the more continent.

1 See Plut. Lycurg. 17 (Clough, i. 109).
2 See Xen. Symp. viii. 34; Plato, Symp. 182 b (Jowett, II. p. 33).
3 διάλεγονται came to mean philosophic discussion and debate. Is the author thinking of Socrates? See Mem. I. ii. 35; IV. v. 12.
4 See Xen. Symp. viii. 35; Plut. Lycurg. 18.
5 I.e. "law and custom."
Coming to the critical period at which a boy ceases to be a boy and becomes a youth,\(^1\) we find that it is just then that the rest of the world proceed to emancipate their children from the private tutor and the schoolmaster, and, without substituting any further ruler, are content to launch them into absolute independence.

Here, again, Lycurgus took an entirely opposite view of the matter. This, if observation might be trusted, was the season when the tide of animal spirits flows fast, and the froth of insolence rises to the surface; when, too, the most violent appetites for divers pleasures, in serried ranks, invade\(^2\) the mind. This, then, was the right moment at which to impose tenfold labours upon the growing youth, and to devise for him a subtle system of absorbing occupation. And by a crowning enactment, which said that “he who shrank from the duties imposed on him would forfeit henceforth all claim to the glorious honours of the state,” he caused, not only the public authorities, but those personally interested\(^3\) in the several companies of youths to take serious pains so that no single individual of them should by an act of craven cowardice find himself utterly rejected and reprobate within the body politic.

Furthermore, in his desire firmly to implant in their youthful souls a root of modesty he imposed upon these bigger boys a special rule. In the very streets they were to keep their two hands\(^4\) within the folds of the cloak; they were to walk in silence and without turning their heads to gaze, now here, now there, but rather to keep their eyes fixed upon the ground before them. And hereby it would seem to be proved conclusively that, even in the matter of quiet bearing and sobriety,\(^5\) the masculine type may claim greater strength than that which

\(^1\) els τὸ μειρακιωνόθαι, “with reference to hobbledehoy-hood.” Cobet erases the phrase as post-Xenophontine.

\(^2\) Lit. “range themselves.” For the idea, see Mem. I. ii. 23; Swinburne, \textit{Songs before Sunrise} : Prelude, “Past youth where shoreward shallows are.”

\(^3\) Or, “the friends and connections.”


we attribute to the nature of women. At any rate, you might sooner expect a stone image to find voice than one of those Spartan youths; to divert the eyes of some bronze statue were less difficult. And as to quiet bearing, no bride ever stepped in bridal bower\(^1\) with more natural modesty. Note them when they have reached the public table.\(^2\) The plainest answer to the question asked,—that is all you need expect to hear from their lips.

IV

But if he was thus careful in the education of the stripling,\(^3\) the Spartan lawgiver showed a still greater anxiety in dealing with those who had reached the prime of opening manhood; considering their immense importance to the city in the scale of good, if only they proved themselves the men they should be. He had only to look around to see that wherever the spirit of emulation \(^4\) is most deeply seated, there, too, their choruses and gymnastic contests will present alike a far higher charm to eye and ear. And on the same principle he persuaded himself that he needed only to confront \(^5\) his youthful warriors in the strife of valour, and with like result. They also, in their degree, might be expected to attain to some unknown height of manly virtue.

What method he adopted to engage these combatants I will now explain. It is on this wise. Their ephors select three men out of the whole body of the citizens in the prime of life. These three are named Hippagretai, or masters of the horse. Each of these selects one hundred others, being

\(^1\) Longinus, \(\pi ελ \, \psi\), iv. 4, reading \(δφαλω\) \(ισ for \, \delta \, \alphaλ\, \muο\, \iota\, \varsigma\), says: 'Yet why speak of Timaeus, when even men like Xenophon and Plato, the very demigods of literature, though they had sat at the feet of Socrates, sometimes forget themselves in the pursuit of such pretty conceits? The former in his account of the Spartan Polity has these words: 'Their voice you would no more hear, than if they were of marble, their gaze is as immovable as if they were cast in bronze. You would deem them more modest than the very maidens in their eyes.' To speak of the pupils of the eye as modest maidens was a piece of absurdity becoming Amphicrates rather than Xenophon; and then what a strange notion to suppose that modesty is always without exception expressed in the eye!"—H. L. Howell, \textit{Longinus}, p. 8. See \textit{Spectator}, No. 354.

\(^2\) See Paus. VII. i. 8, the \(\phiι\, \delta\, \iota\, \ri\, \nu\, \iota\) or \(\phi\, \iota\, \ri\, \nu\, \iota\, \nu\); above, \textit{Hell.} V. iv. 28, p. 126.

\(^3\) See \textit{Hell.} V. iv. 32 (above, p. 127).

\(^4\) Cf. \textit{Cyrop.} II. i. 22.

\(^5\) Or, "pit face to face."
bound to explain for what reason he prefers in honour these and disapproves of those. The result is that those who fail to obtain the distinction are now at open war, not only with those who rejected them, but with those who were chosen in their stead; and they keep ever a jealous eye on one another to detect some slip of conduct contrary to the high code of honour there held customary. And so is set on foot that strife, in truest sense acceptable to heaven, and for the purposes of state most politic. It is a strife in which not only is the pattern of a brave man's conduct fully set forth, but where, too, each against other and in separate camps, the rival parties train for victory. One day the superiority shall be theirs; or, in the day of need, one and all to the last man, they will be ready to aid the fatherland with all their strength.

Necessity, moreover, is laid upon them to study a good habit of the body, coming as they do to blows with their fists for very strife's sake wherever they meet. Albeit, any one present has a right to separate the combatants, and, if obedience is not shown to the peacemaker, the Pastor of youth\(^1\) hales the delinquent before the ephors, and the ephors inflict heavy damages, since they will have it plainly understood that rage must never override obedience to law.

With regard to those who have already passed\(^2\) the vigour of early manhood, and on whom the highest magistracies henceforth devolve, there is a like contrast. In Hellas generally we find that at this age the need of further attention to physical strength is removed, although the imposition of military service continues. But Lycurgus made it customary for that section of his citizens to regard hunting as the highest honour suited to their age; albeit, not to the exclusion of any public duty.\(^3\) And his aim was that they might be equally able to undergo the fatigues of war with those in the prime of early manhood.

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1 Lit. "the Paidonomos."
2 Probably the ἀγαθόεργος, technically so called. See Herod. i. 67; Schneider, ap. Dindorf.
3 Lit. "save only if some public duty intervened." See Cyrop. i. ii.
The above is a fairly exhaustive statement of the institutions traceable to the legislation of Lycurgus in connection with the successive stages\(^1\) of a citizen's life. It remains that I should endeavour to describe the style of living which he established for the whole body, irrespectively of age. It will be understood that, when Lycurgus first came to deal with the question, the Spartans, like the rest of the Hellenes, used to mess privately at home. Tracing more than half the current misdemeanours to this custom,\(^2\) he was determined to drag his people out of holes and corners into the broad daylight, and so he invented the public mess-rooms. Whereby he expected at any rate to minimise the transgression of orders.

As to food,\(^3\) his ordinance allowed them so much as, while not inducing repletion, should guard them from actual want. And, in fact, there are many exceptional\(^4\) dishes in the shape of game supplied from the hunting field. Or, as a substitute for these, rich men will occasionally garnish the feast with wheaten loaves. So that from beginning to end, till the mess breaks up, the common board is never stinted for viands, nor yet extravagantly furnished.

So also in the matter of drink. Whilst putting a stop to all unnecessary potations, detrimental alike to a firm brain and a steady gait,\(^5\) he left them free to quench thirst when nature dictated;\(^6\) a method which would at once add to the pleasure whilst it diminished the danger of drinking. And indeed one may fairly ask how, on such a system of common meals, it would be possible for any one to ruin either himself or his family through either gluttony or wine-bibbing.

This too must be borne in mind, that in other states equals

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\(^1\) Lit. "'with each age'; see Plut. Lycurg. 25; Hesychius, s.v. ἱππες; Hell. VI. iv. 17; V. iv. 13 (above, pp. 123, 163).

\(^2\) Reading after Cobet, ἐν τοῖς ἀνυπόκτοις.

\(^3\) See Plut. Lycurg. 12 (Clough, i. 97).

\(^4\) παράλογα, i.e. unexpected dishes, technically named ἐπαυκλα (hors d'œuvre), as we learn from Athenaeus, iv. 140, 141.

\(^5\) Or, "apt to render brain and body alike unsteady."

\(^6\) See Agesilaus (above, p. 265); also Mem. and Cyrop.
in age,\(^1\) for the most part, associate together, and such an atmosphere is little conducive to modesty.\(^2\) Whereas in Sparta Lycurgus was careful so to blend the ages\(^8\) that the younger men must benefit largely by the experience of the elder—an education in itself, and the more so since by custom of the country conversation at the common meal has reference to the honourable acts which this man or that man may have performed in relation to the state. The scene, in fact, but little lends itself to the intrusion of violence or drunken riot; ugly speech and ugly deeds alike are out of place. Amongst other good results obtained through this out-door system of meals may be mentioned these: There is the necessity of walking home when the meal is over, and a consequent anxiety not to be caught tripping under the influence of wine, since they all know of course that the supper-table must be presently abandoned,\(^4\) and that they must move as freely in the dark as in the day, even the help of a torch\(^5\) to guide the steps being forbidden to all on active service.

In connection with this matter, Lycurgus had not failed to observe the effect of equal amounts of food on different persons. The hardworking man has a good complexion, his muscles are well fed, he is robust and strong. The man who abstains from work, on the other hand, may be detected by his miserable appearance; he is blotched and puffy, and devoid of strength. This observation, I say, was not wasted on him. On the contrary, turning it over in his mind that any one who chooses, as a matter of private judgment, to devote himself to toil may hope to present a very creditable appearance physically, he enjoined upon the eldest for the time being in every gymnasium to see to it that the labours of the class were proportional to the meats.\(^6\) And to my mind

\(^1\) Cf. Plat. *Phaedr.* 240 C; ἡ̣λιξ ἡ̣λικα τέρπει, "Equals delight in equals."

\(^2\) Or, "these gatherings for the most part consist of equals in age (young fellows), in whose society the virtue of modesty is least likely to display itself."

\(^3\) See Plut. *Lycurg.* 12 (Clough, i. 98).

\(^4\) Or, "that they are not going to stay all night where they have supped."


\(^6\) I.e. "not inferior in excellence to the diet which they enjoyed." The reading here adopted I owe to Dr. Arnold Hug, ὃς μὴ πόνους αὐτῶν ἔλαττον τῶν αὐτῶν γλυκοῖς τῶν αὐτῶν γλυκεῖσθαι.
he was not out of his reckoning in this matter more than elsewhere. At any rate, it would be hard to discover a healthier or more completely developed human being, physically speaking, than the Spartan. Their gymnastic training, in fact, makes demands alike on the legs and arms and neck,¹ etc., simultaneously.

VI

There are other points in which this legislator's views run counter to those commonly accepted. Thus: in other states the individual citizen is master over his own children, domestics,² goods and chattels, and belongings generally; but Lycurgus, whose aim was to secure to all the citizens a considerable share in one another's goods without mutual injury, enacted that each one should have an equal power over his neighbour's children as over his own.³ The principle is this. When a man knows that this, that, and the other person are fathers of children subject to his own authority, he must perforce deal by them even as he desires his own children to be dealt by. And, if a boy chance to have received a whipping, not from his own father but some other, and goes and complains to his own father, it would be thought wrong on the part of that father if he did not inflict a second whipping on his son. A striking proof, in its way, how completely they trust each other not to impose dishonourable commands upon their children.⁴

In the same way he empowered them to use their neighbour's domestics in case of need. This communism he applied also to dogs used for the chase; in so far that a party in need of dogs will invite the owner to the chase, and if he is not at leisure to attend himself, at any rate he is happy to let his dogs go. The same applies to the use of horses. Some one has fallen sick perhaps, or is in want of a carriage,⁵ or is anxious to reach some point or other quickly—in any case he

² Or rather, "members of his household."
³ See Plut. Lycurg. 15 (Clough, i. 104).
⁴ See Plut. Moral. 237 D.
⁵ See Aristot. Pol. ii. 5 (Jowett, i. pp. xxxi. and 34; ii. p. 53); Plat. Laws, viii. 845 A; Newman, Pol. Aristot. ii. 249 foll.
⁶ "Has not a carriage of his own."
has a right, if he sees a horse anywhere, to take and use it, and restores it safe and sound when he has done with it.

And here is another institution attributed to Lycurgus which scarcely coincides with the customs elsewhere in vogue. A hunting party returns from the chase, belated. They want provisions—they have nothing prepared themselves. To meet this contingency he made it a rule that owners\(^1\) are to leave behind the food that has been dressed; and the party in need will open the seals, take out what they want, seal up the remainder, and leave it. Accordingly, by his system of give-and-take even those with next to nothing\(^2\) have a share in all that the country can supply, if ever they stand in need of anything.

VII

There are yet other customs in Sparta which Lycurgus instituted in opposition to those of the rest of Hellas, and the following among them. We all know that in the generality of states every one devotes his full energy to the business of making money: one man as a tiller of the soil, another as a mariner, a third as a merchant, whilst others depend on various arts to earn a living. But at Sparta Lycurgus forbade his freeborn citizens to have anything whatsoever to do with the concerns of money-making. As freemen, he enjoined upon them to regard as their concern exclusively those activities upon which the foundations of civic liberty are based.

And indeed, one may well ask, for what reason should wealth be regarded as a matter for serious pursuit\(^8\) in a community where, partly by a system of equal contributions to the necessaries of life, and partly by the maintenance of a common standard of living, the lawgiver placed so effectual a check upon the desire for riches for the sake of

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\(^1\) Reading πεπαμένους, or if πεπασμένους, "who have already finished their repasts."

\(^2\) See Aristot. Pol. ii. 9 (Jowett, i. pp. xlii. and 52); Müller, Dorians, iii. 10, 1 (vol. ii. 197, Eng. tr.).

\(^8\) See Plut. Lycurg. 10 (Clough, i. 96).
luxury? What inducement, for instance, would there be to make money, even for the sake of wearing apparel, in a state where personal adornment is held to lie not in the costliness of the clothes they wear, but in the healthy condition of the body to be clothed? Nor again could there be much inducement to amass wealth, in order to be able to expend it on the members of a common mess, where the legislator had made it seem far more glorious that a man should help his fellows by the labour of his body than by costly outlay. The latter being, as he finely phrased it, the function of wealth, the former an activity of the soul.

He went a step farther, and set up a strong barrier (even in a society such as I have described) against the pursuance of money-making by wrongful means. In the first place, he established a coinage of so extraordinary a sort, that even a single sum of ten minas could not come into a house without attracting the notice, either of the master himself, or of some member of his household. In fact, it would occupy a considerable space, and need a waggon to carry it. Gold and silver themselves, moreover, are liable to search, and in case of detection, the possessor subjected to a penalty. In fact, to repeat the question asked above, for what reason should money-making become an earnest pursuit in a community where the possession of wealth entails more pain than its employment brings satisfaction?

But to proceed. We are all aware that there is no state in the world in which greater obedience is shown to magistrates, and to the laws themselves, than Sparta. But, for my part, I am disposed to think that Lycurgus could never have attempted to establish this healthy condition, until he

1 Or, "against illegitimate commerce."
2 See Plut. Lycurg. 9 (Clough, i. 94).
3 See Grote, H. G. ix. 320; Aristot. Pol. ii. 9, 37.
4 See Grote, H. G. v. 516; Mem. III. v. 18.
5 See Grote, H. G. v. 516; Mem. III. v. 18.
6 Or, reading after L. Dindorf, évrâξav, "this world-renowned orderliness."
had first secured the unanimity of the most powerful members of the state. I infer this for the following reasons.\(^1\) In other states the leaders in rank and influence do not even desire to be thought to fear the magistrates. Such a thing they would regard as in itself a symbol of servility. In Sparta, on the contrary, the stronger a man is the more readily does he bow before constituted authority. And indeed, they magnify themselves on their humility,\(^2\) and on a prompt obedience, running, or at any rate not crawling with laggard step, at the word of command. Such an example of eager discipline, they are persuaded, set by themselves, will not fail to be followed by the rest. And this is precisely what has taken place. It\(^3\) is reasonable to suppose that it was these same noblest members of the state who combined\(^4\) to lay the foundation of the ephorate, after they had come to the conclusion themselves, that of all the blessings which a state, or an army, or a household can enjoy, obedience is the greatest. Since, as they could not but reason, the greater the power with which men fence about authority, the greater the fascination it will exercise upon the mind of the citizen, to the enforcement of obedience.

Accordingly the ephors are competent to punish whomsoever they choose; they have power to exact fines on the spur of the moment; they have power to depose magistrates in mid career,\(^5\)—nay, actually to imprison and bring them to trial on the capital charge. Entrusted with these vast powers, they do not, as do the rest of states, allow the magistrates elected to exercise authority as they like, right through the year of office; but, in the style rather of despotic monarchs, or presidents of the games, at the first symptom of an offence against the law they inflict chastisement without warning and without hesitation.

But of all the many beautiful contrivances invented by

\(^{1}\) Or, "from these facts."  
\(^{2}\) See Trans. vol. i. p. cxxvii.  
\(^{3}\) Or, "It was only natural that these same ..."  
\(^{4}\) Or, "helped." See Aristot. Pol. v. 11, 3; ii. 9, 1 (Jowett, ii. 224); Plut. Lycurg. 7, 29; Herod. i. 65; Müller, Dorians, iii. 7, 5 (vol. ii. p. 125, Eng. tr.).  
\(^{5}\) Or, "before the expiration of their term of office." See Plut. Agis, 18 (Clough, iv. 464); Cic. de Leg. iii. 7; de Rep. ii. 33.
Lycurgus to kindle a willing obedience to the laws in the hearts of the citizens, none, to my mind, was happier or more excellent than his unwillingness to deliver his code to the people at large, until, attended by the most powerful members of the state, he had betaken himself to Delphi, and there made inquiry of the god whether it were better for Sparta, and conducive to her interests, to obey the laws which he had framed. And not until the divine answer came: “Better will it be in every way,” did he deliver them, laying it down as a last ordinance that to refuse obedience to a code which had the sanction of the Pythian god himself was a thing not illegal only, but profane.

The following too may well excite our admiration for Lycurgus. I speak of the consummate skill with which he induced the whole state of Sparta to regard an honourable death as preferable to an ignoble life. And indeed if any one will investigate the matter, he will find that by comparison with those who make it a principle to retreat in face of danger, actually fewer of these Spartans die in battle, since, to speak truth, salvation, it would seem, attends on virtue far more frequently than on cowardice—virtue, which is at once easier and sweeter, richer in resource and stronger of arm, than her opposite. And that virtue has another familiar attendant—to wit, glory—needs no showing, since the whole world would fain ally themselves after some sort in battle with the good.

Yet the actual means by which he gave currency to these principles is a point which it were well not to overlook. It is clear that the lawgiver set himself deliberately to provide all the blessings of heaven for the good man, and a sorry and ill-starred existence for the coward.

In other states the man who shows himself base and cowardly wins to himself an evil reputation and the nickname of a coward, but that is all. For the rest he buys and sells in

1 See Plut. Lycurg. 5, 6, 29 (Clough, i. 89, 122); Polyb. x. 2, 9.
2 Or, “a code delivered in Pytho, spoken by the god himself.”
3 See Homer, Ili. v. 532; Tyrtaeus, 11, 14, τρεσσάντων δ’ ἄνδρων πᾶο ἀπόλωλ’ ἄρετή.
the same market-place with the good man; he sits beside him at the play; he exercises with him in the same gymnasium, and all as suits his humour. But at Lacedaemon there is not one man who would not feel ashamed to welcome the coward at the common mess-table, or to try conclusions with such an antagonist in a wrestling bout. Consider the day's round of his existence. The sides are being picked up in a football match, but he is left out as the odd man: there is no place for him. During the choric dance he is driven away into ignominious quarters. Nay, in the very streets it is he who must step aside for others to pass, or, being seated, he must rise and make room, even for a younger man. At home he will have his maiden relatives to support in their isolation (and they will hold him to blame for their unwedded lives). A hearth with no wife to bless it—that is a condition he must face, and yet he will have to pay damages to the last farthing for incurring it. Let him not roam abroad with a smooth and smiling countenance; let him not imitate men whose fame is irreproachable, or he shall feel on his back the blows of his superiors. Such being the weight of infamy which is laid upon all cowards, I, for my part, am not surprised if in Sparta they deem death preferable to a life so steeped in dishonour and reproach.

That too was a happy enactment, in my opinion, by which Lycurgus provided for the continual cultivation of virtue, even to old age. By fixing the election to the council of elders as a last ordeal at the goal of life, he made it impossible for a
high standard of virtuous living to be disregarded even in old age. (So, too, it is worthy of admiration in him that he lent his helping hand to virtuous old age. Thus, by making the elders sole arbitrers in the trial for life, he contrived to charge old age with a greater weight of honour than that which is accorded to the strength of mature manhood.) And assuredly such a contest as this must appeal to the zeal of mortal man beyond all others in a supreme degree. Fair, doubtless, are contests of gymnastic skill, yet are they but trials of bodily excellence, but this contest for the seniory is of a higher sort—it is an ordeal of the soul itself. In proportion, therefore, as the soul is worthier than the body, so must these contests of the soul appeal to a stronger enthusiasm than their bodily antitypes.

And yet another point may well excite our admiration for Lycurgus largely. It had not escaped his observation that communities exist where those who are willing to make virtue their study and delight fail somehow in ability to add to the glory of their fatherland. That lesson the legislator laid to heart, and in Sparta he enforced, as a matter of public duty, the practice of every virtue by every citizen. And so it is that, just as man differs from man in some excellence, according as he cultivates or neglects to cultivate it, this city of Sparta, with good reason, outshines all other states in virtue; since she, and she alone, has made the attainment of a high standard of noble living a public duty.

And was not this a noble enactment, that whereas other states are content to inflict punishment only in cases where a man does wrong against his neighbour, Lycurgus imposed penalties no less severe on him who openly neglected to make himself as good as possible? For this, it seems, was his principle: in the one case, where a man is robbed, or defrauded, or kidnapped, and made a slave of, the injury of the misdeed, whatever it be, is personal to the individual so maltreated; but in the other case whole communities suffer foul treason at the hands of the base man and the coward. So that it was only reasonable, in my opinion, that he should visit the heaviest penalty upon these latter.

1 Or, "the old age of the good. Yet this he did when he made . . . since he contrived," etc.
2 Is this an autobiographic touch?
Moreover, he laid upon them, like some irresistible necessity, the obligation to cultivate the whole virtue of a citizen. Provided they duly performed the injunctions of the law, the city belonged to them, each and all, in absolute possession and on an equal footing. Weakness of limb or want of wealth was no drawback in his eyes. But as for him who, out of the cowardice of his heart, shrank from the painful performance of the law's injunction, the finger of the legislator pointed him out as there and then disqualified to be regarded longer as a member of the brotherhood of peers.

It may be added, that there is no doubt as to the great antiquity of this code of laws. The point is clear so far, that Lycurgus himself is said to have lived in the days of the Heracleidae. But being of so long standing, these laws, even at this day, still are stamped in the eyes of other men with all the novelty of youth. And the most marvellous thing of all is that, while everybody is agreed to praise these remarkable institutions, there is not a single state which cares to imitate them.

The above form a common stock of blessings, open to every Spartan to enjoy, alike in peace and in war. But if any one desires to be informed in what way the legislator improved upon the ordinary machinery of warfare and in reference to an army in the field, it is easy to satisfy his curiosity.

In the first instance, the ephors announce by proclamation the limit of age to which the service applies for cavalry and heavy infantry; and in the next place, for the various handicraftsmen. So that, even on active service, the Lacedaemonians are well supplied with all the conveniences enjoyed by people living as citizens at home. All implements and

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1 But see Aristot. Pol. ii. 9, 32.
2 Grote, H. G. viii. 81; Hell, III. iii. 5 (above, p. 20 foll.).
3 See Plut. Lycurg. 1.
4 i.e. "in the particular case." See Hell. VI. iv. 17 (above, p. 163); Müller, Dorians, iii. 12 (vol. ii. 242 foll., Eng. tr.).
5 Or, "the conveniences of civil life at home."
instruments whatsoever, which an army may need in common, are ordered to be in readiness,¹ some on waggons and others on baggage animals. In this way anything omitted can hardly escape detection.

For the actual encounter under arms, the following inventions are attributed to him. The soldier has a crimson-coloured uniform and a heavy shield of bronze; his theory being that such an equipment has no sort of feminine association, and is altogether most warrior-like.² It is most quickly burnished; it is least readily soiled.³

He further permitted those who were above the age of early manhood to wear their hair long.⁴ For so, he conceived, they would appear of larger stature, more free and indomitable, and of a more terrible aspect.

So furnished and accoutred, he divided his citizen soldiers into six morai⁵ (or regimental divisions) of cavalry⁶ and heavy infantry. Each of these citizen regiments (political divisions) has one polemarch ⁷ (or colonel), four lochagoi (or captains of companies), eight penteconters (or lieutenants, each in command of a half company), and sixteen enomotarchs (or commanders of sections). At the word of command any such regimental division can be formed readily either into enomoties (i.e. single file) or into threes (i.e. three files abreast), or into sixes (i.e. six files abreast).⁸

As to the idea, commonly entertained, that the tactical arrangement of the Laconian heavy infantry is highly complicated, no conception could be more opposed to fact. For in the Laconian order the front rank men are all leaders,⁹ so that each file has everything necessary to play its part efficiently. In fact, this disposition is so easy to understand that no one

¹ Reading παρέχειν, or if παράγειν, “to be conveyed.” Cf. Pausan. I. xix. 1. See Cyrop. VI. ii. 34.
³ See Ps. Plut. Moral. 238 F.
⁴ See Plut. Lycurg. 22 (Clough, i. 114).
⁵ The μῆχρα. Jowett, Thuc. ii. 320, note to Thuc. v. 68, 3.
⁶ See Plut. Lycurg. 23 (Clough, i. 115); Hell. VI. iv. 11 (above, p. 161); Thuc. v. 67; Paus. IV. viii. 12. See Thuc. v. 66, 71.
⁷ See Thuc. v. 68, and Arnold’s note ad loc.; Hell. VI. iv. 12 (above, p. 161); Anab. II. iv. 26 (Trans. vol. i. p. 132); Rüstow and Köchly, op. cit. p. 117.
⁸ See Anab. IV. iii. 26; Cyrop. III. iii. 59; VI. iii. 22.
who can distinguish one human being from another could fail to follow it. One set have the privilege of leaders, the other the duty of followers. The evolutinal orders,\(^1\) by which greater depth or shallowness is given to the battle line, are given by word of mouth by the enomotarch (or commander of the section), who plays the part of the herald, and they cannot be mistaken. None of these manoeuvres presents any difficulty whatsoever to the understanding.

But when it comes to their ability to do battle equally well in spite of some confusion which has been set up, and whatever the chapter of accidents may confront them with,\(^2\) I admit that the tactics here are not so easy to understand, except for people trained under the laws of Lycurgus. Even movements which an instructor in heavy-armed warfare\(^3\) might look upon as difficult are performed by the Lacedaemonians with the utmost ease.\(^4\) Thus, the troops, we will suppose, are marching in column; one section of a company is of course stepping up behind another from the rear.\(^5\) Now, if at such a moment a hostile force appears in front in battle order, the word is passed down to the commander of each section, "Deploy (into line) to the left." And so throughout the whole length of the column, until the line is formed facing the enemy. Or supposing while in this position an enemy appears in the rear. Each file performs a counter-march\(^6\) with the effect of bringing the best men face to face with the enemy all along the line.\(^7\) As to the point that the leader previously on the right finds himself now on the left,\(^8\) they do not consider that they are necessarily losers thereby, but, as it may turn out, even gainers. If, for instance, the enemy attempted to turn their flank, he would find himself wrapping round, not their exposed, but their shielded flank.\(^9\) Or if, for any reason, it

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\(^1\) *i.e.* "for doubling depth"; *e.g.* anglicé, "form two deep," etc., when marching to a flank. Grote, *H. G.* vii. 108; Thuc. v. 66; also Rüstow and Köchly, *op. cit.* p. 111, § 8, *note* 19; p. 121, § 17, *note* 41.

\(^2\) Or, "alongside of any comrade who may have fallen in their way." See Plut. *Pelop.* 23 (Clough, ii. 222); Thuc. v. 72.

\(^3\) Or, "drill sergeant."

\(^4\) See Jebb, note to *Theophr.* viii. 3.

\(^5\) Or, "marching in rear of another."

\(^6\) See Rüstow and Köchly, p. 127.

\(^7\) Or, "every time."

\(^8\) See Thuc. v. 67, 71.

\(^9\) See Rüstow and Köchly, p. 127.
be thought advisable for the general to keep the right wing, they turn the corps about, and counter-march by ranks, until the leader is on the right, and the rear rank on the left. Or again, supposing a division of the enemy appears on the right whilst they are marching in column, they have nothing further to do but to wheel each company to the right, like a trireme, prow forwards, to meet the enemy, and thus the rear company again finds itself on the right. If, however, the enemy should attack on the left, either they will not allow of that and push him aside, or else they wheel their companies to the left to face the antagonist, and thus the rear company once more falls into position on the left.

XII

I will now speak of the mode of encampment sanctioned by the regulation of Lycurgus. To avoid the waste incidental to the angles of a square, the encampment, according to him, should be circular, except where there was the security of a hill, or fortification, or where they had a river in their rear. He had sentinels posted during the day along the place of arms and facing inwards; since they are appointed not so much for the sake of the enemy as to keep an eye on friends. The enemy is sufficiently watched by mounted

1 For these movements, see Dict. of Antig. "Exercitus"; Grote, H. G. vii. 11.
2 See Hell. VII. v. 23 (above, p. 232).
3 I am indebted to Professor Jebb for the following suggestions with regard to this passage: "The words οὐδὲ τούτο ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ἀπωθοῦσαν ἦ, etc., contain some corruption. The sense ought clearly to be roughly parallel with that of the phrase used a little before, οὐδὲν ἀλλο πραγματεύονται ἦ, etc. Perhaps ἀπωθοῦσαν is a corruption of ἀποθεῖν ὅσων, and this corruption occasioned the insertion of ἦ. Probably Xenophon wrote οὐδὲ τούτο ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ἀποθεῖν ὅσων ἀντιπάλους, etc.: 'while the enemy is still some way off, they turn their companies so as to face him.' The words ἀποθεῖν ὅσων indirectly suggest the celerity of the Spartan movement."
4 Or, "Regarding the angles of a square as a useless inconvenience, he arranged that an encampment should be circular," etc. See Polyb. vi. 31, 42.
5 Cf. Hell. VI. iv. 14 (above, p. 162); Polyauen. II. iii. 11, ap. Schneider.
6 Lit. "these," τὰς μὲν. Or, "He had lines of sentinels posted throughout the day; one line facing inwards towards the place of arms (and these were appointed, etc.); while observation of the enemy was secured by mounted troopers," etc.
troopers perched on various points commanding the widest prospect.

To guard against hostile approach by night, sentinel duty according to the ordinance was performed by the Sciritae outside the main body. At the present time the rule is so far modified that the duty is entrusted to foreigners, if there be a foreign contingent present, with a leaven of Spartans themselves to keep them company.

The custom of always taking their spears with them when they go their rounds must certainly be attributed to the same cause which makes them exclude their slaves from the place of arms. Nor need we be surprised if, when retiring for necessary purposes, they only withdraw just far enough from one another, or from the place of arms itself, not to create annoyance. The need of precaution is the whole explanation.

The frequency with which they change their encampments is another point. It is done quite as much for the sake of benefiting their friends as of annoying their enemies.

Further, the law enjoins upon all Lacedaemonians, during the whole period of an expedition, the constant practice of gymnastic exercises, whereby their pride in themselves is increased, and they appear freer and of a more liberal aspect than the rest of the world. The walk and the running ground must not exceed in length the space covered by a regimental division, so that no one may find himself far from his own stand of arms. After the gymnastic exercises the senior polemarch gives the order (by herald) to be seated. This serves all the purposes of an inspection. After this the order is given

1 See Müller's Dorians, ii. 253; Hell. VI. v. 24 (above, p. 176); Cyrop. IV. ii. 1; Thuc. v. 67, 71; Grote, H. G. vii. 110.
2 See Hipparch. ix. 4.
3 Reading αὔτῶν δὲ. The passage is probably corrupt. See L. Dindorf ad loc.
4 See Critias, ap. Schneider ad loc.
5 Cf. Herod. vii. 208; Plut. Lycurg. 22 (Clough, i. 113 foll.).
6 Reading μεγαλοφρονετέρους (L. Dindorf's emendation) for the vulg. μεγαλοφρονετέρους. Xen. Oph. polit. OX. MDCCCLVI.
7 Or, "the proud self-consciousness of their own splendour is increased, and by comparison with others they bear more notably the impress of freemen."
8 The word μᾶσσω is 'poetical' (old Attic?). See Cyrop. II. iv. 27, and L. Dindorf ad loc.
9 A single mora, or an army corps.
"to get breakfast," and for "the outposts\(^1\) to be relieved." After this, again, come pastimes and relaxations before the evening exercises, after which the herald's cry is heard "to take the evening meal." When they have sung a hymn to the gods to whom the offerings of happy omen have been performed, the final order, "Retire to rest at the place of arms,"\(^2\) is given.

If the story is a little long the reader must not be surprised, since it would be difficult to find any point in military matters omitted by the Lacedaemonians which seems to demand attention.

XIII

I will now give a detailed account of the power and privilege assigned by Lycurgus to the king during a campaign. To begin with, so long as he is on active service, the state maintains the king and those with him.\(^3\) The polemarchs mess with him and share his quarters, so that by dint of constant intercourse they may be all the better able to consult in common in case of need. Besides the polemarch three other members of the peers\(^4\) share the royal quarters, mess, etc. The duty of these is to attend to all matters of commissariat,\(^5\) in order that the king and the rest may have unbroken leisure to attend to affairs of actual warfare.

But I will resume at a somewhat higher point and describe the manner in which the king sets out on an expedition. As a preliminary step, before leaving home he offers sacrifice (in company with\(^6\) his staff) to Zeus Agētor (the Leader), and if the victims prove favourable then and there the priest,\(^7\) who bears the sacred fire, takes thereof from off the altar and leads the way to the boundaries of the land. Here for the

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\(^1\) Or; "vedettes," προσκοποί. See Cyrop. V. ii. 6.

\(^2\) Or; "on your arms." See Sturz. Lex. Xen. s.v.

\(^3\) I.e. "the Thirty." See Ages. i. 7; Hell. III. iv. 2 (above, pp. 238, 24); Plut. Ages. 6 (Clough, iv. 6); Aristot. Pol. ii. 9, 29.

\(^4\) For these αἱ πρωταί, see Cyrop. I. v. 5; and above, Hell. III. iii. 5, p. 20.

\(^5\) Lit. "supplies and necessaries."

\(^6\) Lit. reading καὶ τῶν οἰκομενών, after L. Dindorf, "he and those with him."

\(^7\) Lit. "the Purphoros." See Nic. Damasc. ap. Stob. Fl. 44, 4x; Hesych. ap. Schneider, ν. ad loc.
second time the king does sacrifice\(^1\) to Zeus and Athena; and as soon as the offerings are accepted by those two divinities he steps across the boundaries of the land. And all the while the fire from those sacrifices leads the way, and is never suffered to go out. Behind follow beasts for sacrifice of every sort.

Invariably when he offers sacrifice the king begins the work in the gloaming ere the day has broken, being minded to anticipate the goodwill of the god. And round about the place of sacrifice are present the polemarchs and captains, the lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, with the commandants of the baggage train, and any general of the states\(^2\) who may care to assist. There, too, are to be seen two of the ephors, who neither meddle nor make, save only at the summons of the king, yet have they their eyes fixed on the proceedings of each one there and keep all in order,\(^3\) as may well be guessed. When the sacrifices are accomplished the king summons all and issues his orders\(^4\) as to what has to be done. And all with such method that, to witness the proceedings, you might fairly suppose the rest of the world to be but bungling experimenters,\(^5\) and the Lacedaemonians alone true handicraftsmen in the art of soldiering.

Anon the king puts himself at the head of the troops, and if no enemy appears he heads the line of march, no one preceding him except the Sciritae, and the mounted troopers exploring in front.\(^6\) If, however, there is any reason to anticipate a battle, the king takes the leading column of the first army corps\(^7\) and wheels to the right until he has got into position with two army corps and two generals of division on either flank. The disposition of the supports is assigned to the eldest of the royal council\(^8\) (or staff corps) acting as brigadier,—the staff consisting of all peers who share the

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\(^1\) These are the διαβατήρια, so often mentioned in the Hellenica. See above, pp. 24, 34, 75, 166.

\(^2\) *I.e.* "allied"? or "perioecid"?

\(^3\) αὐτοψηφοφόριον, "keep every one in his sober senses."

\(^4\) See Thuc. v. 66.

\(^5\) αὐτογραφειατικα, τεχνώτα. See Jebb, *Theophr.* x. 3.

\(^6\) Or, "who are on scouting duty. If, however, they expect a battle," etc.

\(^7\) Technically "*mora.*"

\(^8\) τῶν περὶ δαμοσίαν. See *Hell.* IV. v. 8; vii. 4 (above, pp. 67, 75).
royal mess and quarters, with the soothsayers, surgeons, and pipers, whose place is in the front of the troops, with, finally, any volunteers who happen to be present. So that there is no check or hesitation in anything to be done; every contingency is provided for.

The following details also seem to me of high utility among the inventions of Lycurgus with a view to the final arbitrament of battle. Whenesoever, the enemy being now close enough to watch the proceedings, the goat is sacrificed; then, says the law, let all the pipers, in their places, play upon the pipes, and let every Lacedaemonian don a wreath. Then, too, so runs the order, let the shields be brightly polished. The privilege is accorded to the young man to enter battle with his long locks combed. To be of a cheery countenance—that, too, is of good repute. Onwards they pass the word of command to the subaltern in command of his section, since it is impossible to hear along the whole of each section from the particular subaltern posted on the outside. It devolves, finally, on the polemarch to see that all goes well.

When the right moment for encamping has come, the king is responsible for that, and has to point out the proper place. The despatch of embassies, however, whether to friends or to foes, is [not] the king’s affair. Petitioners in general wishing to transact anything treat, in the first instance, with the king. If the case concerns some point of justice, the king despatches the petitioner to the Hellanodikai (who form the court-martial);

1 See Anab. III. iv. 30 (Trans. vol. i. p. 168); Cyrop. I. vi. 15; L. Dindorf, n. ad loc.
2 Schneider refers to Polyaenus, i. 10.
3 See Plut. Lycurg. 22 (Clough, i. 114); and for the goat sacrificed to Artemis Agrotera, see Hell. IV. ii. 20 (above, p. 51); Paus. IX. xiii. 4; Plut. Marcell. 22 (Clough, ii. 264).
4 See Plut. Lycurg. 22 (Clough, i. 114). The passage is corrupt, and possibly out of its place. I cite the words as they run in the MS. with various proposed emendations. See Schneider, n. ad loc. ἐξεταί δὲ τῷ νέῳ καὶ κεκριμένῳ εἰς μάχην συνύναι καὶ φαίνοντα εἶναι καὶ εὐδόκιμον. καὶ παρακελεύουσαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Ζευς, κεκριμένῳ κόμην, after Plut. Lycurg. 22. Weiske, καὶ κόμην διακεκριμένη. Cochet, ἐξεταί δὲ τῷ νέῳ λιπάρῳ καὶ τὰς κόμας διακεκριμένης εἰς μάχην εἶναι.
5 Lit. “to the enomotarch.”
6 The MSS. give αὖ, “is again,” but the word μέντοι, “however,” and certain passages in Hell. II. ii. 12, 13; II. iv. 38 (Trans. vol. i. pp. 46, 47, 73) suggest the negative 🇧.github.com in place of αὖ. If αὖ he right, then we should read ἐφόρων in place of βασιλέως, “belongs to the ephors.”

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if of money, to the paymasters. If the petitioner brings booty, he is sent off to the Laphuropolai (or sellers of spoil). This being the mode of procedure, no other duty is left to the king, whilst he is on active service, except to play the part of priest in matters concerning the gods and of commander-in-chief in his relationship to men.

XIV

Now, if the question be put to me, Do you maintain that the laws of Lycurgus remain still to this day unchanged? that indeed is an assertion which I should no longer venture to maintain; knowing, as I do, that in former times the Lacedaemonians preferred to live at home on moderate means, content to associate exclusively with themselves rather than to play the part of governor-general in foreign states and to be corrupted by flattery; knowing further, as I do, that formerly they dreaded to be detected in the possession of gold, whereas nowadays there are not a few who make it their glory and their boast to be possessed of it. I am very well aware that in former days alien acts were put in force for this very object. To live abroad was not allowed. And why? Simply in order that the citizens of Sparta might not take the infection of dishonesty and light-living from foreigners; whereas now I am very well aware that those who are reputed to be leading citizens have but one ambition, and that is to live to the end of their days as governors-general on a foreign soil. The days were when their sole anxiety was to fit themselves to lead the rest of Hellas. But nowadays they concern themselves

1 Technically the ταυλαι.
2 See Aristot, Pol. iii. 14.
3 For the relation of this chapter to the rest of the treatise, see Grote, ix. 325; Ern. Naumann, de Xen. libro qui ΛΑΚ. ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ inscribitur, p. 18 foll.; Newman, Pol. Aristot. ii. 326.
4 Harmosts.
5 "Xenelasies," ξηναλεια; technically called. See Plut. Lycurg. 27; Agis, 10; Thuc. ii. 39, where Pericles contrasts the liberal spirit of the democracy with Spartan exclusiveness: "Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never expel a foreigner or prevent him from seeing or learning anything of which the secret, if revealed to an enemy, might profit him."—Jowett, i. 118.
6 Lit. "harmosts"; and for the taste for living abroad, see what is said of Dercylidas, Hell. IV. iii. 2 (above, p. 52). The harmosts were not removed till just before Leuctra (371 B.C.), Hell. VI. iv. 1 (above, p. 158), and after, see Paus. VII. i. 4; IX. lxiv.
much more to wield command than to be fit themselves to rule. And so it has come to pass that whereas in old days the states of Hellas flocked to Lacedaemon seeking her leadership against the supposed wrongdoer, now numbers are inviting one another to prevent the Lacedaemonians again recovering their empire. Yet, if they have incurred all these reproaches, we need not wonder, seeing that they are so plainly disobedient to the god himself and to the laws of their own lawgiver Lycurgus.

XV

I wish to explain with sufficient detail the nature of the covenant between king and state as instituted by Lycurgus; for this, I take it, is the sole type of rule which still preserves the original form in which it was first established; whereas other constitutions will be found either to have been already modified or else to be still undergoing modifications at this moment.

Lycurgus laid it down as law that the king shall offer in behalf of the state all public sacrifices, as being himself of divine descent, and whithersoever the state shall despatch her armies the king shall take the lead. He granted him to receive honorary gifts of the things offered in sacrifice, and he appointed him choice land in many of the provincial cities, enough to satisfy moderate needs without excess of wealth. And in order that the kings also might camp and mess in public he appointed them public quarters; and he honoured them with a double portion each at the evening meal, not in order that they might actually eat twice as much as others, but

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1 See Plut. Lycurg. 30 (Clough, i. 124).
2 This passage would seem to fix the date of the chapter xiv. as about the time of the Athenian confederacy of 378 B.C. ; Hell. V. iv. 34; Rev. v. 6. See also Isocr. Panegyr. 380 B.C. ; Grote, H. G. ix. 325. See the text of a treaty between Athens, Chios, Mytilene, and Byzantium; Köhler, Herm. v. 10; Rangabé, Antiq. Hellén. ii. 40, 373; Naumann, op. cit. 26.
3 Or, "magistracy"; the word ἀρχή at once signifies rule and governmental office.
4 I. e. a Heracleid, in whichever line descended, and, through Heracles, from Zeus himself. The kings are therefore "heroes," i.e. demigods. See below; and for their privileges, see Herod. vi. 56, 57.
5 See Ages. v. i (above, p. 257).
that the king might have wherewithal to honour whomsoever he desired. He also granted as a gift to each of the two kings to choose two mess-fellows, which same are called Puthioi. He also granted them to receive out of every litter of swine one pig, so that the king might never be at a loss for victims if in aught he wished to consult the gods.

Close by the palace a lake affords an unrestricted supply of water; and how useful that is for various purposes they best can tell who lack the luxury. Moreover, all rise from their seats to give place to the king, save only that the ephors rise not from their thrones of office. Monthly they exchange oaths, the ephors in behalf of the state, the king himself in his own behalf. And this is the oath on the king’s part: “I will exercise my kingship in accordance with the established laws of the state.” And on the part of the state the oath runs: “So long as he (who exercises kingship) shall abide by his oath we will not suffer his kingdom to be shaken.”

These then are the honours bestowed upon the king during his lifetime [at home],—honours by no means much exceeding those of private citizens, since the lawgiver was minded neither to suggest to the kings the pride of the despotic monarch, nor, on the other hand, to engender in the heart of the citizen envy of their power. As to those other honours which are given to the king at his death, the laws of Lycurgus would seem plainly to signify hereby that these kings of Lacedaemon are not mere mortals but heroic beings, and that is why they are preferred in honour.

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2 Lit. “he yonder.”
3 Lit. “we will keep it for him unshaken.” See L. Dindorf, n. ad loc.
4 The words “at home” look like an insertion.
5 Lit. “the tyrant’s pride.”
6 See Hell. III. iii. 1 (above, p. 19); Ages. xi. 16; Herod. vi. 58.
7 Intentionally or not on the part of the writer, the concluding words, in which the intention of the Laws is conveyed, assume a metrical form:

{o}χ ως ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ’ ως ἡρωας
tοῦς Λακεδαμιοῦν καὶ βασιλεῖς προτετιμήκαςν.

See Em. Naumann, op. cit. p. 18.
WAYS AND MEANS:

A PAMPHLET ON REVENUES
WAYS AND MEANS:

A PAMPHLET ON REVENUES

1. I–3

For myself I hold to the opinion that the qualities of the leading statesmen in a state, whatever they be, are reproduced in the character of the constitution itself.¹

As, however, it has been maintained by certain leading statesmen in Athens that the recognised standard of right and wrong is as high at Athens as elsewhere, but that, owing to the pressure of poverty on the masses, a certain measure of injustice in their dealing with the allied states ² could not be avoided; I set myself to discover whether by any manner of means it were possible for the citizens of Athens to be supported solely from the soil of Attica itself, which was obviously the most equitable solution. For if so, herein lay, as I believed, the antidote at once to their own poverty and to the feeling of suspicion with which they are regarded by the rest of Hellas.

I had no sooner begun my investigation than one fact presented itself clearly to my mind, which is that the country itself is made by nature to provide the ampest resources. And with a view to establishing the truth of this initial proposition I will describe the physical features of Attica.

In the first place, the extraordinary mildness of the climate is proved by the actual products of the soil. Numerous

¹ "Like minister, like government." For the same idea more fully expressed, see Cyrop. VIII. i. 8; viii. 5.
² Lit. "the cities," i.e. of the alliance, τὰς συμμαχιὰς.
plants which in many parts of the world appear as stunted leafless growths are here fruit-bearing. And as with the soil so with the sea indenting our coasts, the varied productivity of which is exceptionally great. Again with regard to those kindly fruits of earth\(^1\) which Providence bestows on man season by season, one and all they commence earlier and end later in this land. Nor is the supremacy of Attica shown only in those products which year after year flourish and grow old, but the land contains treasures of a more perennial kind. Within its folds lies imbedded by nature an unstinted store of marble, out of which are chiselled\(^2\) temples and altars of rarest beauty and the glittering splendour of images sacred to the gods. This marble, moreover, is an object of desire to many foreigners, Hellenes and barbarians alike. Then there is land which, although it yields no fruit to the sower, needs only to be quarried in order to feed many times more mouths than it could as corn-land. Doubtless we owe it to a divine dispensation that our land is veined with silver; if we consider how many neighbouring states lie round us by land and sea and yet into none of them does a single thinnest vein of silver penetrate.

Indeed it would be scarcely irrational to maintain that the city of Athens lies at the navel, not of Hellas merely, but of the habitable world. So true is it, that the farther we remove from Athens the greater the extreme of heat or cold to be encountered; or to use another illustration, the traveller who desires to traverse the confines of Hellas from end to end will find that, whether he voyages by sea or by land, he is describing a circle, the centre of which is Athens.\(^3\)

Once more, this land though not literally sea-girt has all the advantages of an island, being accessible to every wind that blows, and can invite to its bosom or waft from its shore all

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\(^1\) Lit. "those good things which the gods afford in their seasons."

\(^2\) Or, "arise," or "are fashioned."

\(^3\) See Geog. of Brit. Isles, J. R. and A. S. Green, ch. i. p. 7: "London, in fact, is placed at what is very nearly the geometrical centre of those masses of land which make up the earth surface of the globe, and is thus more than any city of the world the natural point of convergence for its different lines of navigation," etc. The natural advantages of Boeotia are similarly set forth by Ephorus. Cf. Strab. ix. 2, p. 400.
products, since it is peninsular; whilst by land it is the
emporium of many markets, as being a portion of the
continent.

Lastly, whilst the majority of states have barbarian neigh-
bours, the source of many troubles, Athens has as her next-door
neighbours civilised states which are themselves far remote
from the barbarians.

II

All these advantages, to repeat what I have said, may, I
believe, be traced primarily to the soil and position of Attica
itself. But these natural blessings may be added to: in the
first place, by a careful handling of our resident alien\(^1\) popula-
tion. And, for my part, I can hardly conceive of a more
splendid source of revenue than lies open in this direction. Here
you have a self-supporting class of residents conferring
large benefits upon the state, and instead of receiving pay-
ment\(^2\) themselves, contributing on the contrary to the gain of
the exchequer by the sojourners’ tax.\(^3\) Nor, under the term
careful handling, do I demand more than the removal of
obligations which, whilst they confer no benefit on the state,
have an air of inflicting various disabilities on the resident
aliens.\(^4\) And I would further relieve them from the obligation
of serving as hoplites side by side with the citizen proper;
since, beside the personal risk, which is great, the trouble of
quitting trades and homesteads is no trifle.\(^5\) Incidentally the

\(^1\) Lit. "‘metics’ or ‘metoecs’,”

\(^2\) \(μετοθέος\), e.g. of the assembly, the senate, and the dicasts.

\(^3\) The \(μετολίκων\). See Plat. Laws, 850 B; according to Isaens, ap.
Harpocr. \(s.v.,\) it was 12 drachmae per annum for a male and 6 drachmae for
a female.

\(^4\) Or, ‘‘the class in question.’’ According to Schneider (who cites the
\(άτλητους\) \(μετανάστης\) of Homer, \(I.\) ix. 648), the reference is not to disabilities
in the technical sense, but to humiliating duties, such as the \(σκαφήορα\) im-
posed on the men, or the \(θριαμβίοι\) and \(σκαθήορα\) imposed on their wives
and daughters in attendance on the \(καυνήφοροι\) at the Panathenaic and other
festival processions. See Arist. \(Eccles.\) 730 foll.; Boeckh, \(P. E. A.\) IV. \(x.\)
(Eng. tr., G. Cornewall Lewis, p. 538).

\(^5\) Or, reading μέγας \(μέν\) γάρ \(ο\) \(άγιων\), \(μέγα\) \(δὲ\) \(καὶ\) \(τὸ\) \(άπό\) \(τῶν\) \(τεχνῶν\) \(καὶ\)
\(τῶν\) \(αὐλοίλων\) \(ἀπίθευ\), after Zurborg (\(Xen.\) de Reditibus Libellus, Berolini,
\(MDCCLXXVI.\)), transl. ‘‘since it is severe enough to enter the arena of war,
but all the worse when that implies the abandonment of your trade and your
domestic concerns.’’
state itself would be benefited by this exemption, if the citizens were more in the habit of campaigning with one another, rather than 1 shoulder to shoulder with Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, and barbarians from all quarters of the world, who form the staple of our resident alien class. Besides the advantage [of so weeding the ranks], 2 it would add a positive lustre to our city, were it admitted that the men of Athens, her sons, have reliance on themselves rather than on foreigners to fight her battles. And further, supposing we offered our resident aliens a share in various other honourable duties, including the cavalry service, 3 I shall be surprised if we do not increase the goodwill of the aliens themselves, whilst at the same time we add distinctly to the strength and grandeur of our city.

In the next place, seeing that there are at present numerous building sites within the city walls as yet devoid of houses, supposing the state were to make free grants of such land 4 to foreigners for building purposes in cases where there could be no doubt as to the respectability of the applicant, if I am not mistaken, the result of such a measure will be that a larger number of persons, and of a better class, will be attracted to Athens as a place of residence.

Lastly, if we could bring ourselves to appoint, as a new government office, a board of guardians of foreign residents like our Guardians of Orphans, 5 with special privileges assigned to those guardians who should show on their books the greatest number of resident aliens,—such a measure would tend to improve the goodwill of the class in question, and in all probability all people without a city of their own would aspire to the status of foreign residents in Athens, and so further increase the revenues of the city. 6

1 Or, "instead of finding themselves brigaded as nowadays with a motley crew of Lydians," etc.
2 Zurborg, after Cobet, omits the words so rendered.
3 See Hippiarch. ix. 3, where Xenophon in almost identical words recommends that reform.
4 Or, "offer the fee simple of such property to."
5 "The Archon was the legal protector of all orphans. It was his duty to appoint guardians, if none were named in the father's will."—C. R. Kennedy, Note to Select Speeches of Demosthenes. The orphans of those who had fallen in the war (Thuc. ii. 46) were specially cared for.
6 Or, "help to swell the state exchequer."
At this point I propose to offer some remarks in proof of the attractions and advantages of Athens as a centre of commercial enterprise. In the first place, it will hardly be denied that we possess the finest and safest harbourage for shipping, where vessels of all sorts can come to moorings and be laid up in absolute security as far as stress of weather is concerned. But further than that, in most states the trader is under the necessity of lading his vessel with some merchandise or other in exchange for his cargo, since the current coin has no circulation beyond the frontier. But at Athens he has a choice: he can either in return for his wares export a variety of goods, such as human beings seek after, or, if he does not desire to take goods in exchange for goods, he has simply to export silver, and he cannot have a more excellent freight to export, since wherever he likes to sell it he may look to realise a large percentage on his capital.

Or again, supposing prizes were offered to the magistrates in charge of the market for equitable and speedy settlements of points in dispute to enable any one so wishing to proceed on his voyage without hindrance, the result would be that far more traders would trade with us and with greater satisfaction.

It would indeed be a good and noble institution to pay special marks of honour, such as the privilege of the front seat, to merchants and shipowners, and on occasion to invite to hospitable entertainment those who, through something notable in the quality of ship or merchandise, may claim to have done the state a service. The recipients of these honours

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1 Reading ἀθάνατος after Cobet, or if ἀθανατός, transl. "in perfect comfort."
2 Or, "of exchanging cargo for cargo to the exclusion of specie."
3 I.e. of the particular locality. See The Types of Greek Coins, Percy Gardner, ch. ii. "International Currencies among the Greeks."
4 Or, "on the original outlay."
5 Cf. Hiero, ix. 6, 7, 11; Hippiarch. i. 26.
6 τῶν ἐπιμαχητῶν ἀρχαί. Probably he is referring to the ἐπιμαχηταῖς ἐπιμαχητῆν (overseers of the market). See Harpocr. s.v.; Aristot. Athenian Polity, 51.
7 For the sort of case, see Demosth. (or Deinarch.) κ. Theocr. 1324; Zurborg ad loc.; Boeckh, I. ix. xv. (pp. 48, 81, Eng. tr.).
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CH. III. § 4-9

will rush into our arms as friends, not only under the incentive of gain, but of distinction also.

Now the greater the number of people attracted to Athens either as visitors or as residents, clearly the greater the development of imports and exports. More goods will be sent out of the country, there will be more buying and selling, with a consequent influx of money in the shape of rents to individuals and dues and customs to the state exchequer. And to secure this augmentation of the revenues, mark you, not the outlay of one single penny; nothing needed beyond one or two philanthropic measures and certain details of supervision.

With regard to the other sources of revenue which I contemplate, I admit, it is different. For these I recognise the necessity of a capital to begin with. I am not, however, without good hope that the citizens of this state will contribute heartily to such an object, when I reflect on the large sums subscribed by the state on various late occasions, as, for instance, when reinforcements were sent to the Arcadians under the command of Lysistratus, and again at the date of the generalship of Hugesileos. I am well aware that ships of war are frequently despatched and that too although it is uncertain whether the venture will be for the better or for the worse, and the only certainty is that the contributor will not recover the sum subscribed nor have any further share in the object for which he gave his contribution.

But for a sound investment I know of nothing comparable with the initial outlay to form this fund. Any one

2 See Aristot. Pol. iv. 15, 3.  
3 "A starting-point."  
4 b.c. 366; cf. Hell. VII. iv. 3 (above, p. 213).  
5 b.c. 362; cf. Hell. VII. v. 15 (above, p. 230). See Grote, H. G. x. 459; Ephor. ap. Diog. Laert. ii. 54; Diod. Sic. xv. 84; Boeckh, ap. L. Dindorf. Xenophon’s son Gryllus served under him and was slain (see Trans. vol. i. p. clxiii.).  
6 Reading καὶ ταῦτα τούτου μὲν ἄδηλου δυνατός, after Zurborg.  
7 Reading [ὑπήρ] δὲν ἔλευσεν κεκωλιθεῖν with Zurborg. See his note, Comm. p. 25.  
8 "A good substantial property."  
9 Or, "on the other hand, I affirm that the outlay necessary to form the capital for my present project will be more remunerative than any other that can be named." As to the scheme itself see Grote, Plato, III. ch. xxxix.; Boeckh, op. cit. (pp. 4, 37, 136, 600 seq. Eng. tr.). Cf. Demosth. de Sym. for another scheme, 354 b.c., which shows the "sound administrative and
whose contribution amounts to ten minae\(^1\) may look forward to a return as high as he would get on bottomry, of nearly one-fifth,\(^2\) as the recipient of three obols a day. The contributor of five minae\(^3\) will on the same principle get more than a third,\(^4\) while the majority of Athenians will get more than cent per cent on their contribution. That is to say, a subscription of one mina\(^5\) will put the subscriber in possession of nearly double that sum,\(^6\) and that, moreover, without setting foot outside Athens, which, as far as human affairs go, is as sound and durable a security as possible.

Moreover, I am of opinion that if the names of contributors were to be inscribed as benefactors for all time, many foreigners would be induced to contribute, and possibly not a few states, in their desire to obtain the right of inscription; indeed I anticipate that some kings,\(^7\) tyrants,\(^8\) and satraps will display a keen desire to share in such a favour.

To come to the point. Were such a capital once furnished, it would be a magnificent plan to build lodging-houses for the

practical judgment’’ of the youthful orator as compared with ‘’the benevolent dreams and ample public largess in which Xenophon here indulges.’’—Grote, *op. cit.* p. 601.

\(^1\) \(\frac{4}{15} : 12 : 4 = 1000\) drachmae.

\(^2\) *I.e.* exactly \(18\) or nearly \(20\) per cent. The following table will make the arithmetic clear:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution (per day)</th>
<th>Result (per annum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 ob. = 1 drachma</td>
<td>10 minae = 6000 ob.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 dr. = 1 mina</td>
<td>= 1000 dr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600 ob. = 1 mina</td>
<td>1000 dr. : 180 dr. : : 100 : 18 : . nearly (\frac{1}{6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 ob. (a day) (\times 360 = 1080) ob. p.a.</td>
<td>= nearly (20) per cent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As to the 3 obols a day (=180 dr. p.a.) which as an Athenian citizen he is entitled to, see Grote, *op. cit.* p. 597: ‘’There will be a regular distribution among all citizens, per head and equally. Three oboli, or half a drachma, will be allotted daily to each, to poor and rich alike’’ [on the principle of the Theôrikon]. ‘’For the poor citizens this will provide a comfortable subsistence, without any contribution on their part; the poverty now prevailing will thus be alleviated. The rich, like the poor, receive the daily triobolon as a free gift; but if they compute it as interest for their investments, they will find that the rate of interest is full and satisfactory, like the rate on bottomry.’’


\(^4\) *I.e.* 36 per cent.

\(^5\) \(\frac{4}{15} : 12 : 4 = 500\) drachmae.

\(^6\) \(\frac{4}{15} : 1 : 3 = 100\) drachmae.

\(^7\) Zurborg suggests (p. 5) ‘’Philip or Cersobleptes.’’ Cf. Isocr. *On the Peace*, § 23.

\(^8\) *I.e.* despotic monarchs.
benefit of shipmasters in the neighbourhood of the harbours, in addition to those which exist; and again, on the same principle, suitable places of meeting for merchants, for the purposes\(^1\) of buying and selling; and thirdly, public lodging-houses for persons visiting the city. Again, supposing dwelling-houses and stores for vending goods were fitted up for retail dealers in Piraeus and the city, they would at once be an ornament to the state and a fertile source of revenue. Also it seems to me it would be a good thing to try to see if, on the principle on which at present the state possesses public warships, it would not be possible to secure public merchant vessels, to be let out on the security of guarantors just like any other public property. If the plan were found feasible this public merchant navy would be a large source of extra revenue.

\[\text{IV}\]

I come to a new topic. I am persuaded that the establishment of the silver mines on a proper footing\(^2\) would be followed by a large increase of wealth apart from the other sources of revenue. And I would like, for the benefit of those who may be ignorant, to point out what the capacity of these mines really is. You will then be in a position to decide how to turn them to better account. It is clear, I presume, to every one that these mines have for a very long time been in active operation; at any rate no one will venture to fix the date at which they first began to be worked.\(^3\) Now in spite of the fact that the silver ore has been dug and carried out for so long a time, I would ask you to note that the mounds of rubbish so shovelled out are but a fractional portion of the series of hillocks containing veins of silver, and as yet unquarried. Nor is the silver-bearing region gradually becoming circumscribed. On the contrary it is evidently extending in wider area from year to year. That is to say, during the period in which thousands of workers\(^4\) have been employed within the mines no hand was ever stopped for

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\(^1\) Reading, with Zurborg, ἕτοι ἄνθρωπος.  
\(^2\) Or, "on a sound basis."  
\(^3\) "Exploited."  
\(^4\) Or, "at the date when the maximum of hands was employed."
want of work to do. Rather, at any given moment, the work
to be done was more than enough for the hands employed.
And so it is to-day with the owners of slaves working in the
mines; no one dreams of reducing the number of his hands.
On the contrary, the object is perpetually to acquire as many
additional hands as the owner possibly can. The fact is that
with few hands to dig and search, the find of treasure will be
small, but with an increase of labour the discovery of the ore
itself is more than proportionally increased. So much so,
that of all operations with which I am acquainted, this is the
only one in which no sort of jealousy is felt at a further
development of the industry.\footnote{Reading ἐπικατωσκευασμένοι, or, if ἐπισκευασμένοι, transl. "at the
rehabilitation of old works."} I may go a step farther; every
proprietor of a farm will be able to tell you exactly how many
yoke of oxen are sufficient for the estate, and how many farm
hands. To send into the field more than the exact number
requisite every farmer would consider a dead loss.\footnote{Cf. Oecon. xvii. 12.} But in
silver mining [operations] the universal complaint is the want
of hands. Indeed there is no analogy between this and other
industries. With an increase in the number of bronze-workers
articles of bronze may become so cheap that the bronze-worker
has to retire from the field. And so again with ironfounders.
Or again, in a plethoric condition of the corn and wine market
these fruits of the soil will be so depreciated in value that the
particular husbandries cease to be remunerative, and many a
farmer will give up his tillage of the soil and betake himself to
the business of a merchant, or of a shopkeeper, to banking or
money-lending. But the converse is the case in the working
of silver; there the larger the quantity of ore discovered and
the greater the amount of silver extracted, the greater the
number of persons ready to engage in the operation. One
more illustration: take the case of movable property. No
one when he has got sufficient furniture for his house dreams
of making further purchases on this head, but of silver no one
ever yet possessed so much that he was forced to cry "enough."
On the contrary, if ever anybody does become possessed of
an immoderate amount he finds as much pleasure in digging
a hole in the ground and hoarding it as in the actual employ-
ment of it. And from a wider point of view: when a state is prosperous there is nothing which people so much desire as silver. The men want money to expend on beautiful armour and fine horses, and houses, and sumptuous paraphernalia\(^1\) of all sorts. The women betake themselves to expensive apparel and ornaments of gold. Or when states are sick,\(^2\) either through barrenness of corn and other fruits, or through war, the demand for current coin is even more imperative (whilst the ground lies unproductive), to pay for necessaries or military aid.

And if it be asserted that gold is after all just as useful as silver, without gainsaying the proposition I may note this fact\(^3\) about gold, that, with a sudden influx of this metal, it is the gold itself which is depreciated whilst causing at the same time a rise in the value of silver.

The above facts are, I think, conclusive. They encourage us not only to introduce as much human labour as possible into the mines, but to extend the scale of operations within, by increase of plant, etc., in full assurance that there is no danger either of the ore itself being exhausted or of silver becoming depreciated. And in advancing these views I am merely following a precedent set me by the state herself. So it seems to me, since the state permits any foreigner who desires it to undertake mining operations on a footing of equality\(^4\) with her own citizens.

But, to make my meaning clearer on the question of maintenance, I will at this point explain in detail how the silver mines may be furnished and extended so as to render them much more useful to the state. Only I would premise that I claim no sort of admiration for anything which I am about to say, as though I had hit upon some recondite discovery. Since half of what I have to say is at the present moment still patent to the eyes of all of us, and as to what belongs to past history, if we are to believe the testimony of our fathers,\(^5\) things were then much of a piece with what is

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1 "The thousand and one embellishments of civil life."
2 "When a state is struck down with barrenness," etc. See Mem. II. vii.
3 Lit. "I know, however."
4 Or, "at an equal rent with that which she imposes on her own citizens."
5 Reading παρὰ τῶν πατέρων, with Zurborg, after Wilamowitz-Möllendorf."
going on now. No, what is really marvellous is that the state, with the fact of so many private persons growing wealthy at her expense, and under her very eyes, should have failed to imitate them. It is an old story, trite enough to those of us who have cared to attend to it, how once on a time Nicias, the son of Niceratus, owned a thousand men in the silver mines,1 whom he let out to Sosias, a Thracian, on the following terms. Sosias was to pay him a net obol a day, without charge or deduction, for every slave of the thousand, and be2 responsible for keeping up the number perpetually at that figure. So again Hipponicus3 had six hundred slaves let out on the same principle, which brought him in a net mina4 a day without charge or deduction. Then there was Philemonides, with three hundred, bringing him in half a mina, and others, I make no doubt there were, making profits in proportion to their respective resources and capital.5 But there is no need to revert to ancient history. At the present moment there are hundreds of human beings in the mines let out on the same principle.6 And given that my proposal were carried into effect, the only novelty in it is that, just as the individual in acquiring the ownership of a gang of slaves finds himself at once provided with a permanent source of income, so the state, in like fashion, should possess herself of a body of public slaves, to the number, say, of three for every Athenian citizen.7 As to the feasibility of our proposals, I challenge any one whom it may concern to test the scheme point by point, and to give his verdict.

With regard to the price then of the men themselves, it is

1 See Mem. II. v. 2; Plut. Nicias, 4; Athen. vi. 272. See an important criticism of Boeckb's view by Cornewall Lewis, translation of P. E. A. p. 675 foll.
2 Reading παρέχειν, or if παρειχεν, transl. 'whilst he himself kept up the number.' See H. Hagen in Journ. Philol. x. 19, pp. 34-36; also Zurborg, Comm. p. 28.
3 Son of Callias.
4 \[\frac{6}{4} : 1 : 3 = 600\] ob.
5 Or, 'whose incomes would vary in proportion to their working capital.'
6 See Jebb, Theophr. xxvi. 21.
7 According to the ancient authorities the citizens of Athens numbered about 21,000 at this date, which would give about 63,000 as the number of state-slaves contemplated for the purposes of the scheme. See Zurborg, Comm. p. 29. 'At a census taken in B.C. 309 the number of slaves was returned at 400,000, and it does not seem likely that there were fewer at any time during the classical period.'—A Companion to School Classics (James Gow), p. 101. xiii. 'Population of Attica.'
obvious that the public treasury is in a better position to provide funds than any private individuals. What can be easier than for the Council to invite by public proclamation all whom it may concern to bring their slaves, and to buy up those produced? Assuming the purchase to be effected, is it credible that people will hesitate to hire from the state rather than from the private owner, and actually on the same terms? People have at all events no hesitation at present in hiring consecrated grounds, sacred victims, houses, etc., or in purchasing the right of farming taxes from the state. To ensure the preservation of the purchased property, the treasury can take the same securities precisely from the lessee as it does from those who purchase the right of farming its taxes. Indeed, fraudulent dealing is easier on the part of the man who has purchased such a right than of the man who hires slaves. Since it is not easy to see how the exportation of public money is to be detected, when it differs in no way from private money. Whereas it will take a clever thief to make off with these slaves, marked as they will be with the public stamp, and in face of a heavy penalty attached at once to the sale and exportation of them. Up to this point then it would appear feasible enough for the state to acquire property in men and to keep a safe watch over them.

But with reference to an opposite objection which may present itself to the mind of some one: what guarantee is there that, along with the increase in the supply of labourers, there will be a corresponding demand for their services on the part of contractors? It may be reassuring to note, first of all, that many of those who have already embarked on mining operations will be anxious to increase their staff of labourers by hiring some of these public slaves (remember, they have a

1 Or, "senate." See Aristot. Athen. Pol. for the functions of the Boulid.
2 So Zurborg. See Demosth. in Mid. 570; Boeckh, P. E. A. II. xii. (p. 222, Eng. tr.). See Arnold's note to Thuc. iii. 50, 7.
3 Or, "diversion," "defalcation."
4 Or, "as far as that goes, then, there is nothing apparently to prevent the state from acquiring property in slaves, and safeguarding the property so acquired."
5 Or, "with this influx (multiplying) of labourers there will be a corresponding increase in the demand for labour on the part of the lessees."
6 Or, "got their mining establishments started."
large capital at stake;\textsuperscript{1} and again, many of the actual labourers now engaged are growing old); and secondly, there are many others, Athenians and foreigners alike, who, though unwilling and indeed incapable of working physically in the mines, will be glad enough to earn a livelihood by their wits as superintendents.\textsuperscript{2}

Let it be granted, however, that at first a nucleus of twelve hundred slaves is formed. It is hardly too sanguine a supposition that out of the profits alone,\textsuperscript{3} within five or six years this number may be increased to at least six thousand. Again, out of that number of six thousand—supposing each slave to bring in an obol a day clear of all expenses—we get a revenue of sixty talents a year. And supposing twenty talents out of this sum laid out on the purchase of more slaves, there will be forty talents left for the state to apply to any other purpose it may find advisable. By the time the round number\textsuperscript{4} of ten thousand is reached the yearly income will amount to a hundred talents.

As a matter of fact, the state will receive much more than these figures represent,\textsuperscript{5} as any one here will bear me witness who can remember what the dues\textsuperscript{6} derived from slaves realised before the troubles at Decelea.\textsuperscript{7} Testimony to the same effect is borne by the fact, that in spite of the countless number of human beings employed in the silver mines within the whole period,\textsuperscript{8} the mines present exactly the same appearance to-day as they did within the recollection of our forefathers.\textsuperscript{9} And

\textsuperscript{1} Or, "of course they will, considering the amount of \textit{fixed capital at stake}," or, "since they have large resources at their back." I have adopted Zurborg's stopping of this sentence.

\textsuperscript{2} See \textit{Mem.} II. viii. 1, for an illustrative case.

\textsuperscript{3} "Out of the income so derived."

\textsuperscript{4} Or, "full complement."

\textsuperscript{5} Or, "a very much larger sum than we have calculated on." Lit. "many times over that sum."

\textsuperscript{6} Or, "tax." See below, § 49; for the whole matter see Thuc. vii. 27, vi. 91; Xen. \textit{Mem.} III. vi. 12, in reference to B.C. 413, when Decelea had been fortified. As to the wholesale desertion of slaves, "more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, many of them artisans," according to Thucydides.

\textsuperscript{7} Or, "the days of Decelea." Lit. "the incidents of Decelea."

\textsuperscript{8} I.e. "of their working since mining began."

\textsuperscript{9} Lit. "are just the same to-day as our forefathers recollected them to be in their time."
once more everything that is taking place to-day tends to prove that, whatever the number of slaves employed, you will never have more than the works can easily absorb. The miners find no limit of depth in sinking shafts or laterally in piercing galleries. To open cuttings in new directions to-day is just as possible as it was in former times. In fact no one can take on himself to say whether there is more ore in the regions already cut into, or in those where the pick has not yet struck.\(^1\) Well then, it may be asked, why is it that there is not the same rush to make new cuttings now as in former times? The answer is, because the people concerned with the mines are poorer nowadays. The attempt to restart operations, renew plant, etc., is of recent date, and any one who ventures to open up a new area runs a considerable risk. Supposing he hits upon a productive field, he becomes a rich man, but supposing he draws a blank, he loses the whole of his outlay; and that is a danger which people of the present time are shy of facing.

It is a difficulty, but it is one on which, I believe, I can offer some practical advice. I have a plan to suggest which will reduce the risk of opening up new cuttings to a minimum.\(^2\)

The citizens of Athens are divided, as we all know, into ten tribes. Let the state then assign to each of these ten tribes an equal number of slaves, and let the tribes agree to associate their fortunes and proceed to open new cuttings. What will happen? Any single tribe hitting upon a productive lode will be the means of discovering what is advantageous to all. Or, supposing two or three, or possibly the half of them, hit upon a lode, clearly these several operations will proportionally be more remunerative still. That the whole ten will fail is not at all in accordance with what we should expect from the history of the past. It is possible, of course, for private persons to combine in the same way,\(^3\) and share their fortunes and minimise their risks. Nor need you appre-

\(^1\) Or, "whether the tracts already explored or those not yet opened are the more prolific."

\(^2\) Or, "I have a plan to make the opening of new cuttings as safe as possible."

\(^3\) "To form similar joint-stock companies."
hend, sirs, that a state mining company, established on this principle, will prove a thorn in the side\(^1\) of the private owner, or the private owner prove injurious to the state. But rather like allies who render each other stronger the more they combine,\(^2\) so in these silver mines, the greater number of companies at work\(^3\) the larger the riches they will discover and disinter.\(^4\)

This then is a statement, as far as I can make it clear, of the method by which, with the proper state organisation, every Athenian may be supplied with ample maintenance at the public expense. Possibly some of you may be calculating that the capital\(^5\) requisite will be enormous. They may doubt if a sufficient sum will ever be subscribed to meet all the needs. All I can say is, even so, do not despond. It is not as if it were necessary that every feature of the scheme should be carried out at once, or else there is to be no advantage in it at all. On the contrary, whatever number of houses are erected, or ships built, or slaves purchased, etc., these portions will begin to pay at once. In fact, the bit-by-bit method of proceeding will be more advantageous than a simultaneous carrying into effect of the whole plan, to this extent: if we set about erecting buildings wholesale\(^6\) we shall make a more expensive and worse job of it than if we finish them off gradually. Again, if we set about bidding for hundreds of slaves at once we shall be forced to purchase an inferior type at a higher cost. Whereas, if we proceed tentatively, as we find ourselves able,\(^7\) we can complete any well-devised attempt at our leisure,\(^8\) and, in case of any obvious failure, take warning and not repeat it. Again, if everything were to be carried out at once, it is we, sirs, who must make the whole provision at our

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1 See *Cyneg. v. 5.*  
2 Or, '' deriving strength from combination.''
3 Co-operators.
4 Reading ἐκφορῆσον, after Cobet.
5 Or, 'sinking fund.'
6 ἄθροισι — 'in a body.' It is a military phrase, I think. In close order, as it were, not in detachments.
7 ''According to our ability,'' a favourite Socratic phrase. See Trans. vol. i. pp. lxxix. 154.
8 *ἀδθίς.* See for this corrupt passage Zurborg, *Comm.* p. 31. He would insert, '' and a little delay will not be prejudicial to our interests, but rather the contrary,'' or to that effect, thus: καὶ ἀδθίς ὃν [ἀνύτομον] οὗ γὰρ τοιαύτη την ἀναβολὴν βλασθὴν γενέσθαι ὅν ἡμῖν αἴόμεθα ' 'vel simile aliquid.'
expense.\(^1\) Whereas, if part were proceeded with and part stood over, the portion of revenue in hand will help to furnish what is necessary to go on with. But to come now to what every one probably will regard as a really grave danger, lest the state may become possessed of an over large number of slaves, with the result that the works will be overstocked. That again is an apprehension which we may escape if we are careful not to put into the works more hands from year to year than the works themselves demand. Thus\(^2\) I am persuaded that the easiest method of carrying out this scheme, as a whole, is also the best. If, however, you are persuaded that, owing to the extraordinary property taxes\(^3\) to which you have been subjected during the present war, you will not be equal to any further contributions at present,\(^4\) what you should do is this:\(^5\) during the current year resolve to carry on the financial administration of the state within the limits of a sum equivalent to that which your dues\(^6\) realised before the peace. That done, you are at liberty to take any surplus sum, whether directly traceable to the peace itself, or to the more courteous treatment of our resident aliens and traders, or to the growth of the imports and exports, coincident with the collecting together of larger masses of human beings, or to an augmentation of harbour\(^7\) and market dues: this surplus, I say, however derived, you should take and invest\(^8\) so as to bring in the greatest revenue.\(^9\)

Again, if there is an apprehension on the part of any that the whole scheme\(^10\) will crumble into nothing on the first outbreak of war, I would only beg these alarmists to note that,

\(^1\) Or, "it is we who must bear the whole burthen of the outlay."

\(^2\) \textit{oibros}, "so far, unless I am mistaken, the easiest method is the best."

\(^3\) Or, "heavy contributions, subscriptions incidental to," but the word \textit{elosphopas} is technical. For the exhaustion of the treasury see Dem. \textit{Lept.} 464; Grote, \textit{H. G.} xi. 326.

\(^4\) Or, "you will not be able to subscribe a single penny more."

\(^5\) \textit{dmeis de}, you are masters of the situation. It lies with you to carry on, etc.; \textit{dioukeite} is of course \textit{imperative.}

\(^6\) Or, "taxes."

\(^7\) Reading, after Zurborg, \textit{di}a t\(\alpha\) \textit{e}l\textit{ll}m\textit{e}nia. Or, if the vulg. \textit{dia t\(\alpha\) \(\epsilon\)v \(\lambda\)m\(\acute{e}\)n\(\acute{e}\)}

\(^8\) transl. "an augmentation of market dues at Piraeus."

\(^9\) \textit{I.e.} as fixed capital, or, "you should expend on plant."

\(^10\) Or, "the proposed organisation."
under the condition of things which we propose to bring about, war will have more terrors for the attacking party than for this state. Since what possession I should like to know can be more serviceable for war than that of men? Think of the many ships which they will be capable of manning on public service. Think of the number who will serve on land as infantry [in the public service] and will bear hard upon the enemy. Only we must treat them with courtesy. For myself, my calculation is, that even in the event of war we shall be quite able to keep a firm hold of the silver mines. I may take it, we have in the neighbourhood of the mines certain fortresses—one on the southern slope in Anaphylstus; and we have another on the northern side in Thoricus, the two being about seven and a half miles apart. Suppose then a third breastwork were to be placed between these, on the highest point of Besa, that would enable the operatives to collect into one out of all the fortresses, and at the first perception of a hostile movement it would only be a short distance for each to retire into safety. In the event of an enemy advancing in large numbers they might certainly make off with whatever corn or wine or cattle they found outside. But even if they did get hold of the silver ore, it would be little better to them than a heap of stones. But how is an enemy ever to march upon the mines in force? The nearest state, Megara, is distant, I take it, a good deal over sixty miles; and the next closest, Thebes, a good deal nearer seventy. Supposing then an enemy to advance from some such point to attack the mines, he cannot avoid passing Athens; and presuming his force to be small, we may expect him to be annihi-

1 See ch. ii. above.

2 Or, reading έν τῇ πρὸς μεσημβρίαν θαλάττη, "on the southern Sea." For Anaphylstus see Hell. i. ii. i; Mem. III. v. 25. It was Eubulus's deme, the leading statesman at this date. For topography see map to face p. xli. of Trans. vol. i.

3 Lit. "60 stades."

4 The passage συνήκοι τ& 

5 I.e. "they might as well try to carry off so many tons of stone."

6 Lit. "500 stades."

7 Lit. "more than 600 stades."
lated by our cavalry and frontier police.\(^1\) I say, presuming his force to be small, since to march with anything like a large force, and thereby leave his own territory denuded of troops, would be a startling achievement. Why, the fortified city of Athens will be much closer the states of the attacking parties than they themselves will be by the time they have got to the mines. But, for the sake of argument, let us suppose an enemy to have arrived in the neighbourhood of Laurium; how is he going to stop there without provisions? To go out in search of supplies with a detachment of his force would imply risk, both for the foraging party and for those who have to do the fighting;\(^2\) whilst, if they are driven to do so in force each time, they may call themselves besiegers, but they will be practically in a state of siege themselves.

But it is not the income\(^3\) derived from the slaves alone to which we look to help the state towards the effective maintenance of her citizens, but with the growth and concentration of a thick population in the mining district various sources of revenue will accrue, whether from the market at Sunium, or from the various state buildings in connection with the silver mines, from furnaces and all the rest. Since we must expect a thickly populated city to spring up here, if organised in the way proposed, and plots of land will become as valuable to owners out there as they are to those who possess them in the neighbourhood of the capital.

If, at this point, I may assume my proposals to have been carried into effect, I think I can promise, not only that our city shall be relieved from a financial strain, but that she shall make a great stride in orderliness and in tactical organisation, she shall grow in martial spirit and readiness for war. I anticipate that those who are under orders to go through

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\(^1\) The \textit{περιπολοι}, or horse patrol to guard the frontier. See Thuc. iv. 57, viii. 92; Arist. \textit{Birds}, ii. 76. Young Athenians between eighteen and twenty were eligible for the service.

\(^2\) Or, "for the very object of the contest." The construction is in any case unusual. \textit{περὶ δὲ ἀγωνιζόντας = περὶ τοῦτων τῶν ἀγωνιζόμενων.} Zurborg suggests \textit{περὶ τῶν ἀγωνιζόμενων.}

\(^3\) I adopt Zurborg’s correction, \textit{προσφορά} for \textit{εἰσφορά}, as obviously right. See above, iv. 23, p. 339.
gymnastic training will devote themselves with a new zeal to the details of the training school, now that they will receive a larger maintenance whilst under the orders of the trainer in the torch race. So again those on garrison duty in the various fortresses, those enrolled as peltasts, or again as frontier police to protect the rural districts, one and all will carry out their respective duties more ardently when the maintenance appropriate to these several functions is duly forthcoming.

But now, if it is evident that, in order to get the full benefit of all these sources of revenue, peace is an indispensable condition,—if that is plain, I say, the question suggests itself, would it not be worth while to appoint a board to act as guardians of peace? Since no doubt the election of such a magistracy would enhance the charm of this city in the eyes of the whole world, and add largely to the number of our visitors. But if any one is disposed to take the view, that by adopting a persistent peace policy, this city will be shorn of her power, that her glory will dwindle and her good name be forgotten throughout the length and breadth of Hellas, the view so taken by our friends here is in my poor judgment somewhat unreasonable. For they are surely the happy states, they, in popular language, are most fortune-favoured, which endure in peace the longest season. And of all states Athens is pre-eminently adapted by nature to flourish and wax strong in peace. The while she abides in peace she cannot fail to exercise an attractive force on all. From the mariner and the merchant upwards, all seek her, flocking they come; the
wealthy dealers in corn and wine\(^1\) and oil, the owner of many cattle. And not these only, but the man who depends upon his wits, whose skill is to do business and make gain out of money\(^2\) and its employment. And here another crowd, artificers of all sorts, artists and artisans, professors of wisdom,\(^3\) philosophers, and poets, with those who exhibit and popularise their works.\(^4\) And next a new train of pleasure-seekers, eager to feast on everything sacred or secular,\(^5\) which may captivate and charm eye and ear. Or once again, where are all those who seek to effect a rapid sale or purchase of a thousand commodities, to find what they want, if not at Athens?

But if there is no desire to gainsay these views—only that certain people, in their wish to recover that headship\(^6\) which was once the pride of our city, are persuaded that the accomplishment of their hopes is to be found, not in peace but in war, I beg them to reflect on some matters of history, and to begin at the beginning,\(^7\) the Median war. Was it by high-handed violence, or as benefactors of Hellenes, that we obtained the headship of the naval forces, and the trusteeship of the treasury of Hellas?\(^8\) Again, when through the too cruel exercise of her presidency, as men thought, Athens was deprived of her empire, is it not the case that even in those days,\(^9\) as soon as we held aloof from injustice we were once more reinstated by the islanders, of their own free will, as presidents of the naval force? Nay, did not the very Thebans, in return for certain benefits, grant to us Athenians to exercise leadership over them?\(^10\) And at another date the Lacedaemonians suffered us Athenians to arrange the terms of hegemony\(^11\) at our discretion, not as driven to such submission,

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\(^{1}\) After Zurborg, I omit οὐχ οἱ ἵθαλεν.

\(^{2}\) Reading καὶ ἀπο τὰ ἀργυρία, with Zurborg.


\(^{4}\) E.g. chorus-trainers, musicians, grammarians, rhapsodists, and actors.

\(^{5}\) Or, "sacred and profane."

\(^{6}\) Lit. "her hegemony for the city," b.c. 476.

\(^{7}\) "And first of all."

\(^{8}\) See Thuc. i. 96.


\(^{10}\) B.C. 375. Cf. Hell. V. iv. 62 (above, p. 135); Grote, H. G. x. 139; Isocr. Or. xiv. 20; Diod. Sic. xv. 29.

\(^{11}\) B.C. 369 (al. b.c. 368). Cf. Hell. VII. i. 14 (above, p. 189).
but in requital of kindly treatment. And to-day, owing to the chaos which reigns in Hellas, if I mistake not, an opportunity has fallen to this city of winning back our fellow-Hellenes without pain or peril or expense of any sort. It is given to us to try to harmonise states which are at war with one another: it is given to us to reconcile the differences of rival factions within those states themselves, wherever existing.

Make it but evident that we are minded to preserve the independence of the Delphic shrine in its primitive integrity, not by joining in any war but by the moral force of embassies throughout the length and breadth of Hellas,—and I for one shall not be astonished if you find our brother Hellenes of one sentiment and eager under seal of solemn oaths to proceed against those, whoever they may be, who shall seek to step into the place vacated by the Phocians and to occupy the sacred shrine. Make it but evident that you intend to establish a general peace by land and sea, and, if I mistake not, your efforts will find a response in the hearts of all. There is no man but will pray for the salvation of Athens next to that of his own fatherland.

Again, is any one persuaded that, looking solely to riches and money-making, the state may find war more profitable than peace? If so, I cannot conceive a better method to decide that question than to allow the mind to revert to the past history of the state and to note well the sequence of events. He will discover that in times long gone by during a period of peace vast wealth was stored up in the acropolis, the whole of which was lavishly expended during a subsequent period of war. He will perceive, if he examines closely, that even at the present time we are suffering from its ill effects. Countless sources of revenues have failed, or if they have still flowed in, been lavishly expended on a multiplicity of things. Whereas, now that peace is established by sea, our revenues have expanded and the citizens of Athens

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1 See Hell. VII. v. 27 (above, p. 233).
2 "Autonomy."
3 See Thuc. v. 18, clause 2 of the Treaty of Peace, B.C. 422-421.
4 Reading, with Zurborg, πειρῶτα. Or, if the vulgate επειρῶτα, transl. "against those who sought to step." For the date of the pamphlet itself see on the minor works, Trans. vol. i. p. lviii. note i.
5 Reading επανασκοπη.
6 Or, "But the moment peace has been restored."
have it in their power to turn these to account as they like best.

But if you turn on me with the question, “Do you really mean that even in the event of unjust attacks upon our city on the part of any, we are still resolutely to observe peace towards that offender?” I answer distinctly, No! But, on the contrary, I maintain that we shall all the more promptly retaliate on such aggression in proportion as we have done no wrong to any one ourselves. Since that will be to rob the aggressor of his allies.¹

VI

But now if none of these proposals be impracticable or even difficult of execution; if rather by giving them effect we may conciliate further the friendship of Hellas, whilst we strengthen our own administration and increase our fame; if by the same means the people shall be provided with the necessaries of life, and our rich men be relieved of expenditure on war; if with the large surplus to be counted on, we are in a position to conduct our festivals on an even grander scale than heretofore, to restore our temples, to rebuild our forts and docks, and to reinstate in their ancient privileges our priests, our senators, our magistrates, and our knights—surely it were but reasonable to enter upon this project speedily, so that we too, even in our own day, may witness the unclouded dawn of prosperity in store for our city.

But if you are agreed to carry out this plan, there is one further counsel which I would urge upon you. Send to Dodona and to Delphi, I would beg you, and consult the will of Heaven whether such provision and such a policy on our part be truly to the interest of Athens both for the present and for the time to come. If the consent of Heaven be thus obtained, we ought then, I say, to put a further question: whose special favour among the gods shall we seek to secure with a view to the happier execution of these measures?

¹ Reading, after Cobet, el μηδένα υπάρχομεν ἄδικοιντες. Or, if the vulgate el μηδένα παρέχομεν ἄδικοιντα, transl. “if we can show complete innocence on our own side.”
And in accordance with that answer, let us offer a sacrifice of happy omen to the deities so named, and commence the work; since if these transactions be so carried out with the will of God, have we not the right to prognosticate some further advance in the path of political progress for this whole state? ¹

¹ See Trans. vol. i. p. cxlvii, for some remarks on this writing in reference to Xenophon's biography.
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* * The Roman numerals, etc., refer to the "Hellenica" when the title of the work is not given.

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