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BRITISH AMERICAN UNION.

A REVIEW

OF

HON. JOSEPH HOWE'S ESSAY,

ENTITLED

"CONFEDERATION CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THE INTERESTS OF THE EMPIRE."

BY P. S. HAMILTON.

HALIFAX, N. S.
PRINTED BY A. GRANT,
PRINTER TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
1866.
Mr. Howe has lately written and circulated in certain quarters a pamphlet bearing the title above set forth. The writer purposes briefly reviewing that Essay, a by no means easy task. In hinting at the difficulty of the task, it is not intended to be understood that the undeniable character of Mr. Howe's assertions, the deep and well-grounded meaning of his allusions, or the cogency of his arguments, presents the difficulty. Quite the contrary. It is to be found in the great scarcity, if not the entire absence, of anything tangible upon which to lay hold, in the whole mass of bitter verbiage which goes to make up Mr. Howe's pamphlet. So much "sound and fury meaning nothing," even in the shape of a political pamphlet, has seldom been projected upon the world, especially by a man who, like Mr. Howe, has occupied a somewhat eminent position in his own little sphere, and "whose opinion" therefore, as he, or some of his anonymous friends are fond of telling us, "is entitled to some consideration." It is only on the ground of Mr. Howe's former standing as a public man that this production of his can be considered entitled to any special notice at all. Let any reader, be he the most astute of logicians, analyze it as carefully as he may, from beginning to end, and he cannot find one clearly, openly, manfully expressed argument—an argument reasoned syllogistically from premises to conclusion, for or against anything whatever, throughout the whole of this mass of words. This is assertion. If proof is asked,—Lo, the pamphlet itself! Let that be put in evidence. There indeed we find numerous assumptions of what has never yet been proved—and never will be; there we see disreputable motives attributed to public men for which no grounds are shown; there we find high sounding paragraphs of truth mixed with its reverse, but having no necessary
connection with, or bearing upon, the subject under discussion; there sneers and innuendoes abound; but no dispassionate argument—no argument of any kind. Instead thereof we find the animus with which Mr. Howe has allowed himself and his effusions to be pervaded of late.

One thing is certain. Mr. Howe evidently intends his essay to have a prejudicial effect upon the pending negotiations for a Union of these Colonies. After wading through his pamphlet and carefully seeking to discover what he really means where so little is clearly enunciated, we find that there are three propositions to which he wishes his readers to accede: viz. — first, that the project of a Union of the Colonies of British North America emanated from Canadian politicians who, on behalf of their Province, are seeking to “swallow up” the Maritime Provinces; secondly, that he (Joseph Howe) is and always has been opposed to a Union of these Provinces; thirdly, that Nova Scotia, (Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island being incidentally added) is opposed to the projected Union. No one of these propositions is broadly enunciated. There is no one which he could not tomorrow, after all that has passed, deny with a bolder and more honest looking face than would be required to make his positive assertion of it “go down” well with the public. Yet no one will pretend to deny that these propositions comprise the drift of his whole essay.

Since Mr. Howe has not, except by implication, advanced anything against the proposed Union in itself, let us see what force there is in what he has advanced. Without following his Jack-o’-lantern imagination all over the globe in search of illustrations which illustrate nothing, let us look at the main conclusions, stated above, which Mr. Howe obviously intends to have deduced from his paper, and see what really are the grounds for such conclusions. Many of the facts which will have to be adduced bear with equal force upon all of the propositions already referred to, so that they can scarcely be dealt with seriatim.

First, then, Mr. Howe endeavours to impress upon those whom he has selected, as it appears, to read his pamphlet, that this projected Union is all a nefarious scheme of some Canadian politicians. We shall find, on reference to the facts, that the “measure of spoliation and appropriation,” as Mr. Howe is pleased to call this Union Scheme, is one which Canada cannot claim the honour of having even originated; but that, on the contrary, Nova Scotia has, by a long continuation of importunities, seduced Canada into the measure; and that Mr. Howe himself as a self-appointed agent for that purpose, has pre-eminently endeavoured to render his blandishments effective.
The first instance on record of a practical scheme for a Union of these Colonies being seriously offered to public consideration, was propounded by a member of the Executive Council of Nova Scotia, some sixty years since. That proposal seems to have met with no response from Canada. In May 1838,—months previous to the date of Earl Durham's famous Report, a scheme of Colonial Union was propounded by the Novascotian newspaper, of Halifax, of which Mr. Howe was at the time solely responsible editor and proprietor. The article in question advocates a Federal Union of "Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Lower and Upper Canada." After lamenting their existing disunion and indicating the evils arising from it, the editor goes on to discuss the several cures for those evils which have been proposed. He prefers—

"A Federal Union, which would admit of the present local assemblies, with one controlling Legislature common to all."

In advocacy of this scheme he says:

"The continuance of local legislatures for local matters, and a General Assembly of representatives, made up of members from all the Provinces, with its concomitant branches, of Legislative Council and Governor in Chief, for the purpose of arranging all general measures will, perhaps, finally have the greatest number of advocates. The local bodies, each performing the interesting local business of each Province, without being distracted by abstract politics, and general questions,—and the general body, for the consideration of questions involved in states of peace and war, and affecting commerce and general improvements, controlled only by the British Government, form an outline of a system, which, to the casual observer at least, recommends itself strongly. Too powerful to be effectually controlled when united on some object affecting the interests of the vast territory of their charge—and it would be difficult to imagine such a Union, except in cases when union should be power—they would at the same time have a wholesome check to dangerous disunion among themselves, in the preponderance which the British Government could at any time throw into the scale of order and general integrity."

"Short of a monarchy, or a republic in the Colonies, neither of which will be entertained by sane heads, for some centuries to come, and in place of the present disunion and continued and varied appeals across the Atlantic, some such measure as the Federal Union, with local Legislatures and in close connection with the Imperial Government, appears the most promising of all the schemes started."

This extract is a perfect epitome of the "Quebec Scheme" in all its essentials. But the force with which it was advocated seems to have made no mark upon the Canadian mind in 1838. In the following year, the Earl of Durham's Report, in which he strongly urged a Union of all the Colonies, was made public; but the Canadians re-
mained unimpressed by Lord DURHAM's arguments. Passing over a period of fifteen years, during which the British American press shows an occasional advocacy of the Union—always, so far as the writer can learn, the work of Nova Scotians—we come to the year 1854, when, for the first time, something practical was attempted towards effecting the desired Union. On the 10th of February of that year, Hon. JAMES W. JOHNSTON, now Judge in Equity, moved the following resolutions in the House of Assembly of Nova Scotia:

"Resolved—That the Union, or Confederation, of the British North American Provinces, on just principles, while calculated to perpetuate their connexion with the parent state, will promote their advancement and prosperity, increase their strength and influence, and elevate their position.

"Resolved.—That His Excellency the Lieutenant Governor by address be respectfully requested to make known to Her Majesty, and to the Governments of the sister Provinces of Canada, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, this opinion, and the desire of this House to promote the object; and that His Excellency, by correspondence with the Imperial and Provincial Governments, and by all means in His Excellency's power, urge and facilitate the consideration of a measure which, if matured on principles satisfactory to the several Provinces, and calculated to secure their harmony, and bring into action their consolidated strength, must result in lasting benefits of incalculable value."

These resolutions received the support of Mr. Howe, then leader of the Government of Nova Scotia; and that support was testified by what was certainly the most sounding speech he ever made in his life. To this speech we shall presently have occasion to refer again more particularly. Mr. Howe himself seems to have considered it a successful achievement; for he had it published, with some modifications, in pamphlet form, in London, in the course of the following year (1855). Still, Canada testified not. It is true that, for some years subsequent to this Nova Scotian movement of 1854, the periodical press of Canada, as of New Brunswick—and in a less degree of the island Colonies, Prince Edward's and Newfoundland—spoke out unmistakably, from time to time, and in different quarters, in favor of a Union of the Colonies; but there is good reason to believe that their utterances were mainly the emanations of Nova Scotian pens. Those who know the Canadian Statesmen of that period, well know that, as a rule, they were very favorably disposed towards such a Union; but local questions of no inconsiderable magnitude were pressing upon and all but absorbing their attention.

In 1857, a further step was made Union-wards, but still by Nova- scotia, and by Novascotia alone. In the summer of that year, a
delegation consisting of Hon. Messrs. J. W. Johnston and A. G. Archibald, proceeded to England. A part of the duty enjoined upon them by the Novascotician Ministry was to bring the subject of a Union of the Colonies to the notice of the Colonial Secretary, with a view to effective action being taken thereon. They did confer with the Secretary of State for the Colonies upon that subject; but without any immediate, practical result.

In the following year (1858), after so many appeals, direct and indirect, from Novascotia, Canada, for the first time, appears upon the stage as an acting negotiator. The Ministry of that Province, through a delegation consisting of three of their own body, very mildly addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies a formal suggestion to authorize a meeting of delegates from the different Colonies to consider the subject; but the Colonial Secretary very mildly declined.

Thus matters remained, without any further, noteworthy, official action being taken until 1861. Whence comes the next move? From the spottor, Canada? No; but from Novascotia again; and, of all Novascotians, from Mr. Howe himself. On the 15th of April, 1861, Mr. Howe, being leader of the Government, moved in the House of Assembly the following resolution:

"Whereas, The subject of a Union of the North American Provinces, or of the Maritime Provinces of British America, has been from time to time mooted and discussed in all the Colonies.

And whereas, While many advantages may be secured by such a Union, either of all these Provinces, or of a portion of them, many and serious obstacles are presented, which can only be overcome by mutual consultation of the leading men of the Colonies, and by free communication with the Imperial Government.

Therefore Resolved, That His Excellency the Lieutenant Governor be respectfully requested to put himself in communication with His Grace the Colonial Secretary, and His Excellency the Governor General, and the Lieutenant Governors of the other North American Provinces, in order to ascertain the policy of Her Majesty’s Government, and the opinions of the other Colonies, with a view to an enlightened consideration of a question involving the highest interests, and upon which the public mind in all the Provinces ought to be set at rest."

This resolution of Mr. Howe’s passed, nem. con. More than a year elapsed before any arrangements were effected for acting upon it; but in 1862 Mr. Howe himself took two other members of his Ministry as delegates and went to Quebec, to meet delegations from the Canadian and New Brunswick Governments for the purpose of elaborating a scheme of Union of the Colonies. The mission became a failure.
In 1864, Canada appears, for the first time we may say, after so many long years of solicitation from Nova Scotia, as an earnest, ardent advocate of Colonial Union. The events of that year are fresh in the memories of most British American readers. The Canadian Parliament passed a measure in favor of a union of all the North American Colonies provided that could be arranged, and, failing that, providing for a dissolution of the existing Union of the two Canadas and their reunion upon a Federal basis. Almost simultaneous with this action on the part of Canada, the Legislature of Nova Scotia, disheartened it would appear, at the obstacles which had so repeatedly presented themselves when the more comprehensive measure was attempted, passed a resolution in favor of a Union of the Maritime Provinces alone and providing for a Conference upon the subject with representatives of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. The Legislatures of the two last named Colonies passed similar resolutions. It was, at the time, openly avowed by the advocates of this measure that if successful it would be, and was fully intended to be, the first step towards a Union with Canada and the rest of British America. Had the measure not been placed in this light, there is good reason to believe that it would have met with a fierce opposition—at least in the Legislature of Nova Scotia.

On the 1st of September 1864, the delegates of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, met at Charlottetown. On coming face to face and exchanging their candid sentiments, it was soon discovered that none of them really wanted a Union of the Maritime Colonies per se. In the meantime delegates from Canada had arrived and proposed to confer with their fellow-colonists upon the subject of a British American Union. Their proposal was, it seems, cordially and unanimously acceded to by the representatives of the Maritime Provinces, Newfoundland too volunteering to enter into the negotiations. Hence the Quebec Conference and the "Quebec Scheme" of Confederation. Here be it remarked that it is utterly impossible that any of the terms of that Scheme, or of any other that may have come under their consideration, could have been imposed upon the Conference by the Canadians. Of the thirty-three gentlemen who sat in that Conference, twenty-one were representatives of the Maritime Provinces: only twelve belonged to Canada. Nay, more: The Canadian delegates were all members of the Cabinet of that Province. Those of the Maritime Colonies comprised the leading minds of all parties; and, as politics run in British America, the party feelings and prejudices, so
farms they had any, of fully one half of them were rather hostile than otherwise towards that Canadian Ministry.

In the face of all these facts, with which nobody is more familiar than he is himself, Mr. Howe has the audacity to charge the Canadians with being the authors of the Union policy; calls the proposed scheme "a measure of spoliation and appropriation" on the part of Canada; for page after page, sneers at and reviles prominent Canadian statesmen as if they were the most black-hearted villains that ever Nature produced, lugging in far-fetched and overstrained tropes from the tower of Babel, Charlemagne, Napoleon, Bismark, Herod and Pilate, &c., to aid his vituperation. And here it may be remarked, by the way, that when Mr. Howe sneeringly compares Messrs. Galt and Brown, of Canada, to Herod and Pilate, and attempts to heap cajolery upon their heads, because "after years of personal bitterness, they consented to clasp hands," he is doing just what he is the last man in British America to attempt. Many a time and oft has Mr. Howe clasped the hands of men between whom and himself there have been "years of personal bitterness and malignant vituperation," and not a few times has he attempted it only to have his proposals indignantly spurned. And in his case it was not for any such worthy object as the carrying out of a great measure of national importance which could not otherwise be effected. When Mr. Galt and Mr. Brown consented to smother their personal feelings and sink their minor differences of opinion for the time, in order to bring about a Union of these Colonies, the act was a noble one, for which we ought to feel proud of them as British Americans. But it seems there are men amongst us who are incapable of appreciating such abnegation of self in a great cause—men, too, who would themselves like to be considered statesmen.

In reality it is of no consequence whatever whether this Union scheme which Mr. Howe gorges at so ferociously originated with Canadians, or not; nor does it matter by whom it was elaborated. Mr. Howe declines fairly discussing, whether, or not, that scheme is a good one. For certain reasons of his own, he assumes that Canada is at the bottom of it. It has been shown above that this assumption is utterly groundless. But, secondly, Mr. Howe labours to create in his readers' minds this inference, that he (Mr. Howe) is and always has been bitterly opposed to a Union of the Colonies. It will not be difficult to prove this assumption equally groundless.

We have already reiterated some of the strong Union sentiments expressed editorially by Mr. Howe's journal, the Novascotian, as long
ago as May, 1838. About the same time—i.e. April 1838—we find Mr. Howe thus expressing himself in the House of Assembly. It may be premised that "the honourable and learned member for Cape Breton" was the late James Boyle Uniacke, then acknowledged leader of the party whose general policy Mr. Howe was daily opposing:

"The honourable and learned member for Cape Breton seemed inclined to advocate the establishment of a Confederation of the Colonies. He (Mr. Howe) had been almost charged with rebellion for broaching such a doctrine some time ago. * * * The venerable parent of the honourable gentleman had also started such a proposition. In Parliament the scheme had not been considered dangerous by any party. * * * If he (Mr. Uniacke) sought to invite a discussion on the subject of Confederation, and to make approaches to such a state of things, he (Mr. Howe) was willing to second his views."

Reference has already been made to Mr. Howe’s speech in the House of Assembly, upon Mr. Johnston’s resolution, in 1854. Mark these few extracts from the grand opening of that harangue:

"Come from whose hand it may, the resolution before the Committee opens up for discussion the broadest field, the noblest subject, ever presented to the consideration of this Legislature. A day, or even a week, may be well spent upon such a theme. Sir, I regret the time which this question will engross, but my inability to do it justice. * * * * Risi with the magnitude of this great theme, I shall endeavor to catch its inspiration, remembering only that I am a Nova Scotian—the son of a loyalist—a North American—a true subject of the Queen, but one whose allegiance, to be perfect, must include every attribute of manhood, every privilege of the Empire. Sir, I wish that my leisure had been greater, that I might have brought before you the ripened fruits of meditation, the illustrative stores of history, which research can only accumulate. In no vain spirit do I wish also that the sentiments which I am about to utter might be heard and pondered, not only as they will be by those who inhabit half the continent, but by members of the British Parliament, by Imperial statesmen—by the Councillors who stand around, and by the gracious Sovereign who sits upon the throne. Perhaps this may not be. Yet I believe that the day is not distant when our sons, standing in our places, trained in the enjoyment of public liberty by those who have gone before them, and compelled to be statesmen by the throbbing of their British blood and the necessities of their possession, will be heard across the Atlantic, and will utter to each other, and to all the world, sentiments which, to-day, Mr. Chairman, may fall with an air of novelty upon your ear. I am not sure, Sir, that even out of this discussion may not arise a spirit of union and elevation of thought that may lead North America to cast aside her Colonial habiliments, to put on national aspects, to assert national claims, and prepare to assume national obligations. Come what may, I do not hesitate to express my hope that, from this day, she will aspire to consolidation as an integral portion of the Realm of England, or assert her claims to a national existence."

Thus commencing, Mr. Howe, on the occasion referred to, went on speaking for about four hours, in favor of a Union of the Colonies
Mark Mr. Howe's lofty aspirations, in 1854, towards a "national existence" for these United Colonies. In the pamphlet before us—that of 1866—Mr. Howe pounces upon the expression, a "new nationality," as having been applied by Lord Monck to British America in anticipation of the projected Confederation, and gibes over it as a precious morsel. He harps upon it, becomes witty at it, is indignant over it, and sneeringly makes the term, "new nationality," the burden of every paragraph through several pages of his brochure. He tells us, among other startling announcements, that the "dimensions" of the "new nationality" will certainly be formidable enough, seeing that it is to comprise a territory of 4,000,000 square miles, a larger territory, he informs us, than that of the United States, or of all Europe. As if utterly agast at the facts which grow upon him, he further assures us that "sixteen Sovereign States of Europe" occupy a smaller territory, and that British America has "a coast line on the North Atlantic of about five thousand miles"—a virtual misrepresentation, by-the-bye—"with a long seaboard on the Pacific side." And what of all this? In his speech of 1854, Mr. Howe cited all these facts, and many more to the same purpose, as reasons why the Colonies should be united.

"Sir," said he, "the great question which we men of the North must put to ourselves is—Have we a territory broad enough to make a nation of? I think it can be shown that we have. Beneath, around, and behind us, stretching away from the Atlantic to the Pacific, are 4,000,000 square miles of territory. All Europe, with its family of nations, contains but 3,708,000, or 292,000 miles less. The United States includes 3,330,572 square miles, or 769,128 less than British America. Sir, I often smile when I hear some vain-glorious Republican exclaiming:

'No pent-up Utica contracts our powers,  
The whole unbounded continent is ours,'

forgetting that the biggest half of the continent does not belong to them at all, but to us, the men of the North, whose descendants will control its destinies forever.'

Then went he on to remind his listeners that "the great province of Canada is equal in extent to Great Britain, France, and Prussia;' that the Maritime Provinces are "half as large again as England and Scotland together;' and "as large as Holland, Greece, Belgium, Portugal, and Switzerland, all put together;' that the great lakes of Canada are "larger in volume than the Caspian Sea;' that the Gulf of St. Lawrence is as large as the Black Sea, or the Baltic; and that if you "take the Italian's Po, the German's Rhine, the Frenchman's Rhône, the Englishman's Thames, and the Spaniard's Tagus, and roll them all into one channel, you then only have a stream equal to the St. Law-
rence." Does Mr. Howe now pretend to say that in giving utterance to the above facts he was only indulging in clap-trap, or treating "Her Majesty's loyal Commons" to a lecture on Comparative Geography?

But again, in the same speech, hear him on the defence question:

"Taking our population at two millions and a half, every fifth person should be able to draw a trigger, giving 500,000 men capable of bearing arms. Such a force would be powerless as an invading army; but in defence of these Provinces, *invincible by any force that could be sent from abroad.* Put into these men the spirit which animated the Greek, Roman, the Dutchman, or the Swiss—let them feel that they are to protect their own hearth-stones, and the heroic blood which beats in their veins will be true to its characteristics. How often have we heard that our Republican neighbors were going to overrun the Provinces? They have attempted it once, or twice, but have always been beaten out by the Provincial militia; and I do not hesitate to say that the British Americans over whom the old flag flies are able to defend every inch of their territory, even though Her Majesty's troops were withdrawn. Indeed, sir, if these 500,000 men are not able to defend our country, they deserve to be trodden down and made slaves for the rest of their natural lives."

From these grand epic sentiments of 1854, let us descend to the pitiful piping in Mr. Howe's pamphlet of 1866:

"The Northern States, with 24,000,000 of people [this is an overestimate of only about 5,000,000 of people], by great exertions and at enormous cost were at last able to put into the field a million of soldiers. With 4,000,000 of people this 'fresh power,' (British America) by exertions of the same character, after expending money in the like proportion, may be able to equip and pay an army of 166,000. * * * If massed on several points they certainly would not be much more than a match for the 200,000 men who marched past the White House at Washington in May 1865, and who numbered about one-fifth of the disciplined soldiers of the Republic. * * * When once organized" (i.e., the Colonial Confederation), "even if every man in the Provinces was a consenting party, it must be obvious that the New Nation could not stand alone; and it is equally certain that the people of England would expect to be relieved from the responsibility and burden of its defence. *Inevitably it must succumb to the growing power of the Republic.*"

Briefly, then, according to Mr. Howe, in 1854, British America, with its 4,000,000 of square miles of territory and 2½ millions of people, was quite capable of being consolidated into a great, glorious, and powerful State that "could have stood against the world." In 1866, British America, with 4 millions of inhabitants, must consider her territory to an absurd degree too large to be kept together, even as a unit among the dependencies of the British Empire. In 1854 our 2½ millions of population could furnish 500,000 soldiers for the defence of their country. In 1866, with 4 millions of population, we cannot possibly turn out more than 166,000 fighting men, even to prevent our political
annihilation. In 1854, when the United States were teeming with prosperity, had an overflowing treasury, and were free from any serious political troubles, either at home or abroad, the Colonists were able to defend every inch of their territory against an invasion of their republican neighbors. In 1866, we are told that the Colonies, having in the mean time nearly doubled their population, will, even if united and therefore materially strengthened, inevitably succumb to the Republic; although that Republic has, in 1866, just emerged from a long, sanguinary, and almost unprecedentedly expensive civil war; is more deeply involved in debt than any other State in the world; is crippled in its commerce; and has one-half of its people filled with bitterness and, we may suppose, with most bloody intentions towards the other half.

Mr. Howe's teachings are so diverse, that before he next rushes into print upon this subject, it is to be hoped that he will think it over seriously, so as to be able to inform us conclusively how many square miles “go” to make up a respectable dominion; what is the quantum sufficient of coast for a country; and just how many millions of people will “do” to start a “new nationality.” As for Mr. Howe's latest view on the territorial question,—just let the reader seriously think for a moment of the figure cut by a Colonial statesman going to a Cabinet Minister of the British Empire with the dolorous remonstrance that British America is too big!

But,—a few more references before leaving this question of defence on which Mr. Howe talks so much, but does not reason. On the 24th December 1862, Mr. Howe addressed a letter to the Right Honorable C. B. Adderley, M. P., of which little seems to be known in British America.* The object of this letter, which throughout treats British America as an undivided unit, is to defend this country against the aspersions which, about that time, were being cast upon it, in consequence of the then recent defeat of the Militia Bill in the Canadian Parliament. This it did with force and vigour. In that letter there was not one offensive allusion made to Canada, that fine Province towards which nearly every sentence of the Essay now under review, breathes an unnatural spitefulness which seems almost incredible and inexplicable.

In the work of 1866, Mr. Howe makes several warning allusions to the debt and extravagance of Canada. In 1862, he said with truth to

Mr. Adderley what may be reiterated of that Province with truth to
day:—

"It cannot be shown that there is much needless extravagance in the administration of the Government. With the single exception of the Governor's salary, regarded in this country as too low to secure the higher style of talent, no public officer in that Province receives a remuneration for his services that would not be regarded in England as inadequate, if not parsimonious.

"The debts of Canada were incurred for the construction of canals and railroads, of the highest Imperial and Provincial importance. They were designed to attract through British territory a large portion of the trade of the great West. When the Intercolonial Railway is finished we shall not only control the telegraphic and postal correspondance of the Western States, but secure to the people of Great Britain at all seasons a steady supply of breadstuffs; should unhappily the Atlantic ports of the United States, in war, be closed against them. Who then will venture to assert that these were not elevated objects of the highest national importance?"

This has the true ring of common sense and impartial manliness. In 1866 Mr. Howe can see in Canada only an impoverished, embarrassed country, inaccessible for half the year, a source of weakness to Great Britain and an easy prey to the Northern States. In 1862, he could represent her as a great, wisely governed, flourishing country, whose debts were a credit to her and not a reproach, occupying a highly influential position relative to the neighbouring republic, and who was not only capable of maintaining her own defence, but of being a right arm of strength to the Mother Country, as we shall further see. Mr. Adderley was shown that the untrained Militia of Canada had twice saved the Province; and assured that she was at that moment (the close of 1862) "much better prepared to resist attack than she ever was at any former period of her history."

"Under the law, as it stands," Mr. Howe went on to say, "at fifteen "days notice, 50,000 men, perfectly organized in companies and battalions, and with all their regimental officers, from a colonel to a "corporal, could be placed upon any point of the frontier.—And twenty "thousand British soldiers, judiciously distributed and skilfully led, "with this fine force at their back, or serving in the ranks beside them, "ought to be able to give a good account of any invading army which "the Northern States can send against them."

And then Mr. Howe went on, at great length, to show that the position of England, during the Spanish war of Queen Elizabeth's reign, and at various other periods, was, so far as defences were to be considered, much more precarious than that of British America in 1862. We all
know how much better a state of defence this country is in now (1866) than it was four years since. When Mr. Howe said, as he did, to Mr. Adderley, in 1862,—

"I would have one army that could be massed within a few days, or weeks, on any point of the frontier, moved by one head, animated by one spirit, paid from one treasury;"—

he expressed a wish which he is now querulously, but turbulently, scolding the British American Unionists for undertaking to practically carry out. And when Mr. Howe assumes that the Union of these Colonies would provoke an invasion from the United States, does he suppose his readers can be so blind as not to see the real drift of the implied argument? The consolidation of British America cannot possibly be regarded as a menace to the neighboring republic. The uniting and consequent strengthening of these Colonies as a whole, can only be a cause of irritation to the United States upon the ground that it will prevent the former becoming an easy prey to the latter. Therefore whatever Mr. Howe may say his sentiments are, according to his own showing he is really advocating that course which must ensure the Annexation of the Provinces to those States.

In the records of Mr. Howe's public acts down to 1865, we find that his expression of his sentiments upon the Union Question becomes more frequent, more definite, and more emphatic in favor of Union. Only a few more extracts from these records will be made. Addressing a large assemblage, in the County of Welland, Canada, in 1862, Mr. Howe said:

"He looked hopefully forward to the time when this great Province of Canada would be connected with the Provinces below, and when a man would feel that to be a British American was to be a citizen of a country which included all these fertile lands, all these inexhaustible fisheries, all this immense marine, carrying to all seas the flag of 'Old England,' if she would let us, and if she will not let us, the flag of British America, bearing to foreign countries the lineaments, the enterprise, and the spirit of Britons, and the civilization of British America, of which he trusted none of us need be much ashamed."

In the following year (1863), Hon. Thos. D'Arcy McGee delivered, at Halifax, a lecture upon a Union of the Colonies; and, on concluding, was followed by Mr. Howe, in a highly laudatory speech, in the course of which he said:

"He was for a Union of all the British North American Provinces. He thought a Union should not be delayed until we had drifted into difficulties. Talk of the fall of Quebec being a source of sorrow to the inhabitants of this Province. It would be more. If the St. Lawrence
were in the hands of our enemies, we should be compelled to beg permission to tear down the British flag. What he wished for in Nova Scotia was that she may be the frontage of a mighty Colony, upon which it may be truly said the sun never sets. No man can look upon Halifax and its environs, its harbors, its citadels, and say it was made for this Province alone."

In the summer of 1864, there was a public dinner in Halifax, in honor of a number of the public men of Canada who were, by special invitation, on a visit to the Maritime Provinces. This was only a few weeks before the first sitting of that Conference which commenced at Charlottetown and terminated at Quebec. At that dinner Mr. Howe made a speech. It teemed with love of Canada and the Canadians, and was most enthusiastic in the cause of Union. Among his remarks on that occasion, we find the following:—

"He was not one of those who thanked God that he was a Novascotian merely, for he was a Canadian as well. He had never thought he was a Novascotian but he had looked across the broad continent, at the great territory which the Almighty had given us for an inheritance, and studied the mode by which it could be consolidated, the mode by which it could be united, the mode by which it could be made strong and vigorous, while the old flag still floated over the soil. * * *

"With the territory of Canada, with the rivers of Novascotia, with the inexhaustible fisheries—what a country to live in! And why should Union not be brought about? Was it because we wished to live and die in our insignificance,—that we would sooner make money rather than that our country should grow? God forbid! He had always been in favor of uniting any two, three, four, or the whole five of the Provinces."

Then, referring to the course just resolved upon by the Canadian Parliament in the event of the Union negotiations ending in failure, he goes on, addressing the Canadian guests:—

"Oh, my friends, go back to your homes and say there is at least one Novascotian honest enough to say to you this,—that, if you do that, you will commit an act of political suicide, and although I ought not perhaps to give the advice, I would rather see every public man upon both sides of politics crucified, than I would divide Canada now that Canada is united. Join the Maritime Provinces if you can; but, at any rate, stick together—hold your own.—He was pleased to think the day was rapidly approaching when the Provinces would be united, with one flag above their heads, one thought in all their bosoms, with one sovereign, and one constitution."

What a commentary are Mr. Howe's past words upon his present acts!—As already mentioned, these fine sentiments were uttered on the eve of the Union Conference being entered into. And further, we have it on the authority of Hon. Wm. A. Henry, Attorney General of Novascotia, solemnly published under his own hand, that Mr. Howe
solicited a seat in this same Conference; although when it was formally offered him, he stated that his official duties as Fishery Commissioner prevented his accepting it. For some thirty years, as shown above, Mr. Howe has been enthusiastically striving, or pretending to strive, for the realization of "the dream of his childhood," as he has more than once designated a Union of these Colonies. Now, at the eleventh hour, he comes before the public with a work which, although as full of unreasoned conclusions and groundless assumptions as the pompous peurilities upon this same subject, which some of our readers may possibly have seen, lately got out by two young and uninformed artillerymen of the Halifax garrison, nevertheless breathes a spirit of bitter hatred towards the very name of Union, and of intense hostility towards those who advocate it. No one can deny that Mr. Howe may feel compelled to change his opinions sometimes, as well as other people; nor will it be denied that, having experienced such a change, he has a perfect right to express himself accordingly; but when a man has been diligently and publicly teaching certain principles for years, and then in the twinkling of an eye, turns about and ferociously assails his own previously avowed principles and the pupils into whom he has instilled them, the public have an undoubted right to expect from him the fullest, clearest, most convincing reasons for his recantation. Mr. Howe has not deigned to furnish any reason at all. On a careful view of the whole case the reader can scarcely fail to conclude either that Mr. Howe never was sincere in his advocacy of Union of the Colonies, or he is not sincere now in opposing it.

Thirdly. Mr. Howe assumes again—does not say so broadly and categorically, but assumes—that Novascotia, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island are implacably opposed to the projected union of them, with each other and with the other Colonies. He pretends to represent the feelings and opinions of Novascotia in particular, and his language would lead his readers to suppose that the people of this Province, en masse, were in an agony of grief and a phrenzy of indignation at the bare idea of being united with the other Provinces, and especially with-


The Union advocates are fortunate in their opponents. This harmless little work is the partnership production of two young gentlemen of remarkably limited powers of observation. It is characterized, however, to an amusing degree, by that air of self-admiration and lofty presumption which very often distinguishes young authorship. As the authors are obviously inexperienced, we may not unreasonably hope that their next literary effort will exhibit evidences of sounder judgment and improved taste.
Canada. Now, this is not merely disingenuous: it is a shameful attempt to deceive those who are not conversant with the facts. But let us see what all Mr. Howe’s assumptions on this point amount to.

Let us return to the period when the delegates of the several Provinces returned from the Quebec Conference in 1864. The New Brunswick Ministry—whether wisely, or not, it is needless here now to say—at that time determined upon the exceptional policy of dissolving the House of Assembly and appealing to the country on the Quebec Scheme of Confederation. The electors of that Province, taken by surprise and alarmed at the prospect of a political change of such magnitude as that proposed, which they had not yet had time to examine and clearly comprehend, rejected the union party at the polls, and an Anti-Confederate Ministry went into office. Such being the result of what was about the first constitutional move on this question after the breaking up of the Quebec Conference, what could Nova Scotia do in the matter? Nothing. She could but wait further developments in New Brunswick; for Nova Scotia could not unite and shake hands with Canada across the intervening Province. She had not long to wait. In one year’s time, the seats of the Anti-Confederate Ministers crumbled to dust beneath them, and another Parliamentary dissolution took place. By that time the people of that Province had learned what Union of the Colonies meant. Thirty-three members were returned to the new House in favor of Confederation, and only eight opposed to it; and subsequently, on the formation of a new Government and the assembling of the Legislature, the Union Scheme was carried in the Lower House by that majority; and in the Legislative Council by a majority of thirteen to five. Now, at length, was the time for Nova Scotia to take further action. Accordingly in the last session of the Legislature (1866) the leader of the Government brought in a Union measure, which was carried in the House of Assembly by a majority of thirty to eighteen, and in the Upper House by a majority of thirteen to five—the same as in that of New Brunswick. Yet Mr. Howe, who is not a member of Parliament at all, betakes himself to England as the self-elected representative of down-trodden Nova Scotia, to inform British statesmen and a British public that Nova Scotia is vehemently opposed to a Union with the sister Colonies!

And here, before proceeding further, a few words as to Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island. Mr. Howe assumes that they too are both opposed to Confederation. For either, or both, of these Islands to seek a political Union with Canada whilst New Brunswick...
and Novascotia still held aloof, would have been simply absurd. They did not seek it. When during their respective parliamentary sessions of 1866, the two last-named Provinces adopted the Union policy by such overwhelming majorities, the Legislatures of the Island Colonies had closed their sessions, or were just on the eve of prorogation; and they have not yet since. Therefore it yet remains to be seen what they will do. Their action for, or against, the proposed measure, cannot affect the question essentially, so far as a Union of the Continental Provinces is to be considered. This latter Union once effected, the disadvantageous circumstances of the Island Provinces would soon compel them to seek admission into the Confederation. But we probably need not look far into the future for that event. The prediction is here hazarded that, twelve months hence, Mr. Howe will be unable to find in either Newfoundland, or Prince Edward Island, an asylum of refuge from the "vale of tears" which, he would have us believe, all the British American Colonies are to become who enter this Confederation.

But, to return to Novascotia alone. Mr. Howe denies the right of Parliament to deal with this important question of Union. It would appear that in his long and frequent sojourns in the United States, of late, he has rapidly imbibed un-British principles of state-craft. He says in the pamphlet under review:—

"What the people of Nova Scotia think of the mission [of the Colonial Delegates] to this country, may be gathered from the addresses to the Queen, passed in eight of the most populous and wealthy counties, and by their petitions to the House of Commons. * * *

But it is said in the case of Nova Scotia, petitions cannot contravene a resolution of the Legislature. No, provided it be such a resolution as, uninstructed by the electors, the Legislature had a right to pass. In this case it strikes at the Constitution of the country, which the representatives were chosen to guard and not to violate; and besides, the present House are sitting upon a franchise which expired a year ago, and had not, according to British usage, the right to pass any resolution at all. Parliament in this country is invariably dissolved when a new franchise is adopted. That of Novascotia should and would have been, had the prerogative been exercised with firmness and impartiality."

Now there is a string of pearls to drop from the lips of one who boasts of having been thirty years in public life, dealing with Constitutional questions, in a dependency of the British Empire! It may not be possible to fix the exact moment of Mr. Howe's conversion to republican sentiments expressed in this last extract; but this much is certain: it took place some time between the issuing of this pamphlet of his and the
30th day of March, in the year of Grace 1861. The reasons for fixing it within that period are these.—In 1861, Mr. Howe was himself leader of the Government of Nova Scotia. During the Parliamentary session of that year, petitions to the Lieutenant Governor (Lord Mulgrave, now Marquis of Normanby) poured in from every County of the Province, praying his Excellency to dissolve the House of Assembly. Whether the petitioners were right or wrong, wise or unwise, are questions which will not here be re-opened; but let us recall the simple facts. The petitions comprised in the aggregate a clear majority of the Parliamentary electors of Nova Scotia. A part of their complaint was that a certain number of the members of that House, more than equivalent to the Ministerial majority, had taken their seats without being qualified by law to be elected at all. Another complaint was that certain of those members had been acting and voting in the House contrary to their own previously avowed principles and contrary to the well known wishes of their own particular constituents; and the petitioners comprised large majorities of those particular constituencies. In Lord Mulgrave's reply, of course prepared by, or under the eye of, his Prime Minister, Mr. Howe, to the gentleman through whom these petitions were presented to him, we find the following broad principles laid down:

"It is theundoubted principle of the British Constitution, that a member once returned by a constituency has to consider what he believes to be the interests of the whole country, and not the single wishes of his own constituency. He is elected a representative and not a delegate, and the constituency have given up to him for the limited period fixed by law for the duration of the Parliament the power which they possessed. They have a right to represent to him their views, and to refuse to re-elect him at the end of the Parliament if they are dissatisfied with his conduct, but they have no right during the duration of the Parliament, to coerce his actions, still less have they the right to expect that the Royal prerogative should be used because they are dissatisfied with the choice they have made."

It is questionable whether this was an answer to the petitioners, or not; for they contended that the House was not a legally constituted House at all, some of its members, as was alleged, not having been even eligible for election in the first instance; and that Lord Mulgrave had promised a dissolution upon certain conditions which they declared to be now fulfilled. But the principles laid down in this extract are sound, and will not be gainsaid by any one conversant with British Constitutional law. Yet here is Mr. Howe who is responsible for, and in all probability, himself penned that paragraph, going to England, with a
pocket full of petitions from constituents, who seek to "coerce the actions" of their representatives, pouring forth his jeremiads and loudly contending "that the Royal prerogative should be used" to reverse a decision of our Legislature which was carried by an overwhelming—by an almost unprecedentedly large majority. It would be easy to cite many other instances where—circumstances favouring—Mr. Howe has clearly and emphatically enunciated the Constitutional principles just referred to; but an accumulation of such cases is needless.

Yet Mr. Howe, as is obvious from the last above extract from the pamphlet under review, now in effect sets himself up as an advocate of the Republican, or, to speak more definitely, the Yankee principle, that our Constitution is a paper one; and that any change in it must be shaped in accordance with the decision of a popular Convention, outside of Parliament, and specially called to give such decision. Long may it be before any section of the British Empire practically commits itself to any such absurdity. Mr. Howe's curious complaint that the present House of Assembly of Nova Scotia have no "right to pass any resolution at all" because it is "sitting upon a franchise which expired a year ago," is such a meagre and inconsequential one that it really seems a waste of words to say much about it. It seems almost incredible that he can be so "rusty" in his recollections of his historical readings and in his own personal reminiscences as not to remember that the popular branch of Parliament in the United Kingdom, in Nova Scotia, and in other parts of the British dominions, has repeatedly sat upon a "franchise that has expired," and has, in such cases, assumed, and exercised too, "the right to pass any resolution," however momentous, which that body deemed proper.

Mr. Howe pretty clearly intimates that, whatever the Parliamentary representatives of the people of Nova Scotia may have done, or may feel disposed to do, the people themselves are opposed to the Union of the Colonies. This, of course, remains to be proved. It is to be hoped that Mr. Howe does not claim a monopoly of knowledge as to the feelings and sentiments of the people of Nova Scotia. At all events, the writer of these remarks has the presumption to assert emphatically that the sense of the people of Nova Scotia is not adverse to the proposed Union.

It may here be observed that Mr. Howe has striven hard for the past few months, to poison the minds of the people of this Province against Colonial Union. He spent the greater part of the past spring (1866) in an anti-union agitation tour, principally in the Western Coun-
ties of the Province, calling public meetings and addressing them in an inflammatory and *ad captandum* style, suited to the comprehension of the least intelligent portion of the populace. Mr. Howe openly turned the political summersault and commenced this crusade just on the eve of the Parliamentary elections in the adjoining Province of New Brunswick; and, considering all the circumstances, it is within the limits of probability that, as he wended his way through the Western Counties of Nova Scotia, he fondly hoped that the tones of his warning voice would be wafted across the Bay of Fundy; would electrify the Anti-Confederates of that Province to super-human exertions at the polls; and would strike terror into their opponents. The result of that election—thirty-three Confederates to eight Anti-Confederates—is a most meaning commentary upon Mr. Howe’s campaign. But it seems that, so far, at least, as the fate of Nova Scotia is concerned, it was not fruitless. Mr. Howe has succeeded in getting up petitions against Confederation in eight counties. The number of signatures to the eight-county-petitions is not made known; but it is notorious that, for weeks in succession, most diligent and pertinacious canvassers went about the highways and byways, “button-holing” people and earnestly soliciting the loan of their names. There may be found, too, among the signatures of those so-called petitioners the names of men who, not long ago, spontaneously came forward and signed a “Manifesto,” or Declaration of Union principles. It will be found that such parties happen to be “under the thumb” of prominent and determined anti-Unionists.—Whether their apparent change of sentiment is owing to this fact, or to sincere convictions, will be charitably left an open question.

This *brochure* of Mr. Howe’s “might,” to use an expression of his own, “be placed in many ludicrous points of view.” It is perhaps better to forbear. However ludicrous it may be, it is even more sad, to see any man, old or young, whatever his station in life, making such a spectacle of himself as Mr. Howe is now doing. As already intimated, he is in the habit of somewhat pretentiously contending that the opinion of a man of his vast experience in public life is “entitled to some weight.” In the foregoing pages will be found a record of Mr. Howe’s opinion upon the subject of Union of the Colonies for thirty years past. In the pamphlet under review are to be found his avowed opinions on that subject *just now*. Let the reader decide for himself which set is entitled to most weight—that is, if, in his amazement at the contrast, he can calmly weigh one against the other, or his sense of propriety is not too much outraged to attach any weight to either.
What Mr. Howe's motives may be in making this very demonstrative change, is a matter of little real moment; yet many persons will naturally enquire what these motives can be. There is more than one hypothesis that may be suggested; and one may be permitted to believe almost anything of a man who indulges in such erratic freaks as those above mentioned. Mr. Howe has spent much of his time in the United States of late, and, it is understood, has contracted very intimate relations with some of the public men and a portion of the press of that country. It is well known that the desire of the politicians of the Northern States to annex these Provinces has been rapidly intensifying for some time past. The views now advocated by Mr. Howe all favor annexation; and that would almost inevitably be the fate of British America if his policy were acted upon. A large proportion of the men, and a still larger proportion of the press that sustain Mr. Howe, openly advocate annexation. It may be that Mr. Howe has entered into engagements at Washington, from which he hopes to win the opulent and lofty infamy which would be the due of one who had been principal agent in detaching these Provinces from their allegiance and making them a part of Yankeeeland. How the success of such a venture would embalm his reputation for future time! We still know who burned the gorgeous temple of Diana at Ephesus; but history cannot furnish us with the names of those who built it.

Or, Mr. Howe's recent vagaries may be owing to a feeling of spite towards the Imperial Government. About the time of the Quebec Conference it was evident that the British Ministry of that day, and also the Provincial British statesmen of all parties, were very favourably disposed towards the project of uniting these Colonies. Mr. Howe at that time held office under the Imperial Government as Fishery Commissioner. It was obvious that in that capacity his occupation would soon be gone. The duties would soon cease and the office be abolished. The British Government would surely make further provision and perhaps give promotion to, one of such long and distinguished services; would it not? There appears to have been nothing forthcoming, however. Well, he would let that Government know that he could be mischievous; and that, if not provided for, he could thwart all their Union schemes. He gave a little taste of his quality. He made mischief, not openly, but yet in such a way that his handiwork could be recognized. Still Her Majesty's Ministers seem to have "made no sign." The Fishery Commission ended and Mr. Howe was not made a Governor of anything. Now he throws off the mask and rabidly devotes himself to the delightful task of "giving a lesson" to the British
Statesmen of the nineteenth century; for it is a delusion of this gentleman, which several pretty severe teachings to the contrary have not sufficed to eradicate, that his influence is paramount in these Maritime Provinces, and that, as for Novascotia, he just holds it in his fist.

Or again.—Mr. Howe possesses in a marked degree that characteristic of men of a certain mental calibre that need not be described, which prevents them taking part at all, or causes them to act reluctantly and sluggishly, in any undertaking which they did not themselves originate, or in which they cannot be pre-eminently distinguished. It is gall and wormwood to them to see another winning credit in a field where they think they might have monopolized the laurels. In expressive, but somewhat vulgar, parlance, they want to be "head and tail to everything" with which they have aught to do. It is quite within the bounds of probability that for many years past Mr. Howe has been flattering himself that he would one day, when the way was nicely prepared through the strenuous efforts of those who have been working practically to that end, step in and make a "great hit" in bringing to consummation this long-talked-of Union. We have seen that he wished to join the Union Conference of 1864; but circumstances prevented. It is probable that Mr. Howe, like many others, had no idea that this Conference would prove to be so fruitful in results. If so, his surprise and mortification may be imagined when he found that he had missed the golden opportunity to finish that "dream of his childhood" to his own satisfaction;—that thirty-three British Americans had actually succeeded in laying the foundations of a "new nationality" without even his assistance! Nay, the Articles of the Convention were not even submitted to him for approval before being put before the world! Well, if he could not be the leading Confederate, he would endeavor to become the first Anti-Confederate. He would be the head of something. In the pamphlet before us, behold one of the results! Reader, here is a choice of motives; make your own selection.

This latest production of Mr. Howe's seems scarcely worth much further consideration. Whatever may have been the motives of its author, his object in writing it is obvious enough. That object is twofold:—first, to deceive the statesmen of England; and, secondly, to mislead the populace of Novascotia.

What have the people of Novascotia to say to him and this lucubration of his reviewed in the foregoing pages? They see a man who, for thirty years, has been spasmodically inculcating upon them the necessity for uniting their Province with the neighboring Colonies, now, without a moment's warning, without a particle of pretext, without a syllable of
explanation, announcing himself a rabid opponent of that very policy, and arrogantly assuming that they are to follow at his heels in this madman-like gyration. Instead of offering them any glimmer of reason why they should follow him in this new-found policy, he makes inflammatory appeals to their passions and prejudices. To their passions and prejudices? No, but to passions and prejudices which, it is to be hoped, the meanest, the most ignorant, the most vicious of Novascotians have too much manliness to cherish. His only trump card in this new game, so far as relates to his own immediate countrymen, is the possibility of exciting among them a fiendish hatred towards Canadians—those very Canadians whom they have so often known him to take lovingly to his bosom, to land to the skies, and to “blarney” even to fulsomeness.

And what will the gentlemen of England say of this effusion of one who sets himself up as a Colonial statesman? What will they say when they learn, as all of them who take any interest in the matter will learn, that Mr. Howe has been trying to obtain their sympathies under false pretences; that the political treatise which he has been obtruding into their hands belies the professions of all his former life, and grossly misrepresents his native country; that he has been surreptitiously endeavoring to poison their minds against a measure upon which depends the welfare, if not the very existence, of a large and important section of the British Empire; that whilst this same brochure was, here in Novocotia, being strewn broadcast over the back country, among the least intelligent portion of the people, it was, in England, quietly slidden into the hands of members of Parliament and the editorial rooms of political periodicals, as a work printed “for private circulation only,” and carefully withheld from Colonial statesmen in that country, who could, and, if they had had the opportunity, would, have promptly and effectually exposed its falsities and fallacies? What will they say when he insults them with such a paltry, vulgar argumentum ad hominem as this:—“Of course no such people will be eligible [for Colonial Governorships] under Confederation. No nobleman or gentlewoman, who has served his Sovereign by land or sea, need apply. Even the Victoria Cross would be no recommendation”? Whatever they may say, we cannot but know too well what they will think.

But,—enough. A perusal of Mr Howe’s “Confederation considered in relation to the interests of the Empire,” is enough to make the cheeks of any British American, but especially of any Novascotian, tingle with the blush of shame.