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In this edition we have sought to avoid the incon- veniences which &te apt to attend commentaries on philosophical writers, by the plan of putting together, in the form of continuotis. introductions, such explanation and criticism as we had to offer, and confinmg the foot- notes almost entirely to references, which have been carefully distinguished from Hume's own notes. For the mtroductions to the first and second volumes Mr. Green alone is responsible. The introduction to the third is the work of Mr. Grose, who also has undertaken the revision of Hume's text.

Throughout the introductions to Volumes I. and 11., except where the contrary is stated, 'Hume' must be understood to mean Hume as represented by the * Treatise on Human Nature.' In taking this as intrinsically the best representation of his philosophy, we may be thought to have overlooked the well-known advertisement which (in an edition posthumously published) he prefixed to the volume containing his * Inquiries concerning the Human Understanding and the Principles of Morals.' In it, after stating that the volume is mainly a reproduction of what he had previously published in the * Treatise,' he expresses a hope that *some negligences in his former reasoning, and more in the expression,' have been cor-


reeled, and desires * that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles.' Was not Hume himself then, it may be asked, the best judge of what was an adequate expression of his thoughts, and is there not an imbecoming assurance in disregarding such a voice from his tomb ?

Our answer is that if we had been treating of Hume as a great hterary character, or exhibiting the history of his individual mind, due account must have been taken of it. Such, however, has not been the object which, in the Introductions to Volumes I. and H., we have presented to ourselves. (See Introd. to Vol. I. § 4.) Our concern has been with him as the exponent of a philosophical system, and therefore specially with that statement of his system which alone purports to be complete, and which was written when philosophy was still his chief interest, without alloy from the disappointment of literary am- bition. Anyone who will be at the pains to read the

* Inquiries ' alongside of the original * Treatise ' will find that their only essential difference from it is in the way of omission. They consist in the main of excerpts from the

* Treatise,' re-written in a lighter style, and with the more difficult parts of it left out. It is not that the difficulties which logically arise out of Hume's system are met, but that the passages which most obviously suggest them have disappeared without anything to take their place. Thus in the ' Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding ' there is nothing whatever corresponding to Parts II. and IV. of the first Book of the ' Treatise.' The effect of this omission on a hasty reader is, no doubt, a feeling of great relief. Common-sense is no longer actively repelled by a doctrine which seems to imdermine the real world, and


can more easily put a construction on the iaccount of the law of causation, which remains, compatible with the * objective vahdity ' of the law such a construction as in fact forms the basis of Mr. Mill's Logic. How inconsistent this construction is with the principles from which Hume started, and which he never gave up ; how impossible it would be to anyone who had assimilated his system as a whole ; how close is the organic connection between all the parts of this as he originally conceived it we must trust to the following introductions to show. (See, in particular, Introd. to Vol. L §§ 301 and 321.)

The only discussion in the ' Inquiry concerning Human Understanding,' to which nothing in his earlier publica- tion corresponds, is that on Miracles. On the relation in which this stands to his general theory some remarks will be found in the Introduction to Vol. L 324, note). The chief variations, other than in the way of omis- sion, between the later redaction of his ethical doctrine and the earlier, are noticed in the Introduction to Vol. 11. (^^ 31, 43, and 46, and notes).





[^ GsirsRALlirrRODVcmoK 1

Introdugtioh to TRSAnsB OF HincAN Natubb 306






IX I. Of the Origin of our Ideas 311

I, II. IHyisioii of the Subject 316

ill. Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination . . 317

IV. Of the Connexion or Association of Ideas .... 319

V. Of Relations 322

VI. Of Modes and Substances 324

VIL Of Abstract Ideas 325


8«Grr. FAOB

l/L Of the Infinite Divisibility of our Ideas of Space and Time . 334

v4L Of the Infinite Divisibility of Space and Time ... 336

ni. Of the other Qualities of our Ideas of Space and Time . . 340

IV. Objections answered 346



V. The same subject continu'd 358

VI. Of the Idea of Existence and of External Existence . . .360




t^ I. Of Knowledge 372

UII. Of Probability ; and of the Idea of Cause and Effect . . 375

^m. Why a Cause is always Necessary 380

l^rV. Of the Component Parts of ourHeasonings Concerning Cause

and Effect 384

V. Of the Impressions of the Senses and Memory . . 385

VL Of the Inference from the Impression to the Idea . . . 388

VIL Of the Nature of the Idea, or Belief 394

VIIL Of the Causes of Belief 399

IX. Of the Effects of other Relations, and other Habits . . 406

X. Of the Influence of Belief 416

XI. Of the Probability of Chances 423

XII. Of the Probability of Causes 428

Xm. Of Unphilosophical Probability 439

XIV. Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion 450

XV. Rules by which to judge of Causes and Effects 466

XVL Of the Reason of Animals 469



(/ L Of Scepticism with regard to Reason 472

n. Of Sceptidsm with regard to the Senses . . 478

III. Of the Antient Philosophy 505

f IV. Of the Modem Philosophy 610

l/* V. Of the Immateriality of the Soul 616

i/VI. Of Personal Identity 533

VII. Conclusion of this Book 544

\/Appekdix 555

Ihdbx 661


or TEM



How the history of philosophy should be studied I

Hiune the last great English philosopher 2

Kant his true successor 2

Distinction between literary history and the history of philo- sophical systems 8

Object of the present enquiry 5

Locke's problem and method «••••• 5

His notion of the ' thinking thing *•••••• 6

'Phis he will passively observe .••••• 6

Is such observation possible 7 7

Whv it seems so ...•••• 8

Locke's account of origin of ideas •••••• 8

Its ambiguities (a) In regard to sensation . 8

(b) In r^ard to ideas of reflection 9

What is the ' tablet' impressed? 10

Does the mind make impressions on itself 7 .11

Source of these difficulties 11

The ' simple ' idea, as Locke describes it, is a ' complex ' idea of

substance and relation 12

How this contradiction is disguised 12

Locke's way of interchanging ' idea ' and ' quality ' and its

effects 13

Primary and secondary qualities of bodies .... 14

' Simple idea ' represented as involving a theory of its own cause 15

Phrases in which this is implied 15

Feeling and felt thing confused 16

The simple idea as ' ectype ' other than mere sensation . . 17 It involves a judgment in which mind and thing are distin- guished .... 19

And is equivalent to what he afterwards calls 'knowledge of

identity' 20



Only aa such can it be named

The aame implied in calling it nn idea of an object .

Made /or, not by, ua, and therdbre according to Locke really

existent 22

What did be mean by this 7 32

Existence as the mere presence of a feeling .... 33

Existence aa reality 21

By confumon of these CTro meanings, reality and its condittona

are represented aa given in simple feeling .... 25

Yet reality involves complex ideas which are made by the mind 25 Such are Bubatance and relation which must be found Id every

object of knonledge . ...... 27

^^At'stract idea of sulwlance and complex ideaa of particular sorts

of substance ......... 28

The abstract idea according to Locke at once precedes and fal-

lows the complex 29

Keferenoe of ideas to nature or God, the sMne as reference to

substance 30

But it is explicitly to substance that Locke makes them refer

themselves ..........

In the process by which we ate supposed to arrive at complex

ideas of Bubetances the b^;inntng is the same as the end . 81*]

Doctrine of abstraction inconsistent with doctrine of com]ilex

The confiiaoa covered by use of ' particulura ' . , .

Lockc'a account of abstract general ideas

Things' not general ........

Generality an invention of the mind .....

Tlie result is, that tLe feeling of each moment is alone roal .

How Locke avoids this result .......

The ' particular ' was to him the individual qualified by general relations .........

This is the real thing from which abstraction is supposed to start

Yet, according to the doctrine of relation, a creation of thought . (8um:aary of the above contradictions .....

They cannot be overcome without violence lo Locke's funda- mental principles ........

As real existence, the simple idea carries with it ' invented ' re- lation of cause ........

Correlativity of cause and substance. .....

How do we know that ideas correspond to reality of things ? .

Locke's answer .

U assumea that umplc ideas are consciously referred to things that cause them

Lively ideas real, because they must be efiecta of things .

Present sensation gives knowledge of existeace





Reasons why its testimony must be trusted . ... 47

How does this account fit Locke's definition of knowledge . 48 Locke's account of the testimony of sense renders his question as

to its veracity superfluous 49

Confirmations of the testimony turn upon the distinction be- tween ' impression' and ' idea ' 50

They depend on language which pre-supposes the ascription of

sensation to an outward cause 50

This ascription means the clothing of sensation with invented

relations 51

What is meant by restricting the testimony of sense to present

existence? 52

Such restriction, if maintained, would render the testimony un- meaning ... 53

But it is not maintained : the testimony is to operation of per- manent identical things 54

Locke's treatment of relations of cause and identity . . 55 That from which he derives idea of cause pre-supposes it . .55

Rationale of this ' petitio prindpii ' 56

Relation of cause has to be put into sensitive experience in

order to be got from it 57

Origin of the idea of identity according to Locke ... 58

Relation of identity not to be distinguished from idea of it . 58

This ' invented ' relation forms the ^ very being of things ' . 59

Locke &il8 to distinguish between identity and mere unity . 60 Feelings are the real, and do not admit of identity. How then

can identity be real ? 61.

Tet it is from reality that the idea of it is derived ... 62

Transition to Locke's doctrine of essence .... 62

This repeats the inconsistency found in his doctrine of substance 63

Plan to be followed 63

What Locke understood by ' essence ' 64

Only to nominal essences that general propositions relate, i.e. only

to abstract ideas having no real existence . . . 65

An abstract idea may be a simple one 66

How then is science of nature possible 7 . . . 67

No ' uniformities of phenomena ' can be known ... 68

Locke not aware of the full effect of his own doctrine, which is

to make the real an abstract residuum of consciousness . 68 Ground of distinction between actual sensation and ideas in the

mind is itself a thing of the mind 71

Two meanings of real essence 72

According to one, it is a collection of ideas as qualities of a thing : about real essence in this sense there may be general know- ledge 72

But such real essence a creature of thought . 75


Hence another view of real essence as unknown qualittea of un- known body . ... .... 75

How Locke mixes up thefle two meaningB in ambiguity about

body 73

Body as * parcel of matter ' without eeaence .... 76

In this sense body is the mere individnum .... 77

Body aa qualified by circomstances of time and place . . 77

Sucb body Iiocke held ki be subject: of ' primary qualities ' : but

are then compatible with particularity in time ? . . 78

How Locke avoids this question ...... 79

Body and its qunlltiea supposed to be outside conaciouaness . 80

Iluw can primary qt^alitieit be outside consciouacess, and yet

knowable? 81

Locke answers that they copy themselves in ideas Berkeley's rejoinder. Locke gets out of tiic difficulty by his doctrine of

solidity 81

In which he equivocates between body ne unknown opposite of mind and body as a ' nominal essence ' . . . .82

Rationale of these coDtradictions ...... 83

What knowledge can feeling, even as referred to a ' solid ' body,

convey ? 84

Only the knowledge that something is, not what it is . . 86

How it is that the real essence of Utiugs, according to Locke,

perishes with them, yet is immutable ..... 86 Only about qualities of matter, as distinct firom matter itself, that

Locke feels any difficulty 87

These, as kttowable, must bo our ideas, and therefore not a ' real

Are the 'primary qualities' then, a 'nootinid caaeace'?

According to Locke's account they are relations, and thus inven- tions of the mind ........

'Body is the complex in which they are found ■Do we derive the idea of body from primary qualities, or the primary qualities from idea of body?

Mathematical ideas, though ideas of ' primary qualities of body,' have ' barely an ideal existence '.....

Summaiy view of Locke's difficultiee in regard to the real.

Why they do not trouble him more

They re-appear in his doctrine of propoations ....

The knowledge expressed by a proposition, though certain, may not be real, when the knowledge concerns substances. . 99

lo this case general truth must be merely verbal ... 97

Mathematical truths, since they concern not Buhstances, may be

both geneial and real 98"" i

Significance of thia doctrine 9&^MH


TAom Fatal to the notion that mathematical truths, though general, are

got from experience : and to received views of natural science :

but Locke not so clear about this 99^

Ambiguity as to real essence causes like ambiguity as to science of nature .......... 101

Particular experiment cannot afford general knowledge . . 102 What knowledge it can afford, according to Locke . . .102 Not the knowledge which is now supposed to be got by induc- tion 103

Tft more than Locke was entitled to suppose it could give . 104

With Locke mathematical truths, though ideal, true also of

nature 105*^

Two lines of thought in Locke, between which a follower would

have to choose 106

Transition to doctrine of God and the soul . . . . 107

Thinking sub:5taoce source of the same ideas as outer substance.

Of which substance is perception the effect ? . . . .108 That which is the source of substantiation cannot be itself a sub-

stfmce . . . . 109

To get rid of the inner source of ideas in &vour of the outer

would be false to Locke 110

The mind, which Locke opposes to matter, perpetually shifting 111

Two ways out of such difficulties 112

* Matter ' and ' mind * have the same soivce in self-consciousness 113 Difficulties in the way of ascribing reality to substance as matter, re-appear in regard to substance as mind . . . . 113

We think not always, yet thought constitutes the self . .114 Locke neither disguises these contradictions, nor attempts to overcome them ........ 115

Is the idea of God possible to a consciousness given in time? . 116

Locke's account of this idea 116

' Infinity/ according to Locke's account of it, only applicable to

God, if God has parts 117

Can it be applied to him * figuratively ' in virtue of the indefi- nite number of His acts ? . . . . . 118 An act, finite in its nature, remains so, however often repeated 119 God only infinite in a sense in which time is not infinite, and which Locke could not recognize— the same sense in which

the self is infinite 120

How do I know my own real existence? Locke's answer . 122

It cannot be known consistently with Locke's doctrine of real

existence 123

But he ignores this in treating of the self . 123

Sense in which the self is truly real •••••• 124

Locke's proof of the real existence of Grod 125

VOL. I. a



There must have been someihiDg from eternity to cause what

now is 120

How * eternity ' must be understood if this argument is to be

valid: and how ' cause ' 126

The world which is to prove an eternal God must be itself

eternal . . •. 129

But will the God, whose existence is so proven, be a thinking

being? 129

Tes, according to the true notion of the relation between thought

and matter 130

(Locke's antinomies Hume takes one side of them as true . 131 Hume*s scepticism fatal to his own premises . . . .132

This derived from Berkeley 133

Berkeley's religious interest in making Locke consistent . 1 33

What is meant by relation of mind and matter ? . . . 134 Confusions involved in Locke's materialism . . .134 Two ways of dealing with it. Berkeley chooses the most

obvious 135

His account of the relation between visible and tangible ex-

tenuon 136

We do not see bodies without the mind, nor yet feel them 137

The *es8e' of body is the *percipi' ...... 138

What then becomes of distinction between reality and fancy 7 138

The real=ideas that God causes ...... 131)

Is it then a succession of feelings 7 139

Berkeley goes wrong from confusion between thought and feeling 140 For Locke's ' idea of a thing' he substitutes ' idea ' simply . 141 Which, if ideassfeeling, does away with space and body . 142 He does not even retain them as ' abstract ideas' . . .142 On the same principle all permanent relations should disappear 143 By making colour=relation8 of coloured points, Berkeley repre- sents relation as seen 144

Still he admits that space is constituted by a succession of feel- ings ........... 145

If so, it is not space at all ; but Berkeley thinks it is only not

pure space 145

Space and pure space stand or fall together . . .146

Berkeley disposes of space for fear of limiting God . . 147 How he deals with possibility of general knowledge . . .147 His theory of universals of value, as implying that universality

of ideas lies in relation ....... 148

But he tancies that each idea has a positive nature apart from

relation 150

Traces of progress in his idealism 151

His way of dealing with physical truths * . .152



If thej imply permanent relations, his theory properly excludes

them 152

He supposes a divine decree that one feeling shall follow another 153 Locke had explained reality by relation of ideas to outward

body 153

Liveliness in the idea evidence of this relation . . . 154

Berkeley retains this notion, only substituting ' God ' for ' body ' 154 Not regarding the world as a system of intelligible relations, he

could not regard God as the subject of it . . . .155

His view of the soul as ' naturally immortal ' . . 156

Endless succession of feelings is not immortality in true sense . 156 Berkeley's doctrine of matter fatal to a true spiritualism : as

well as to a true Theism 157

His inference to God from necessity of a power to produce ideas ;

a necessity which Hume does not see 1 5d

A different turn should have been given to hi» idealism, if it was

to serve his purpose .'...•. 160

Hume's mission 161

His account of impressions and ideas 161

Ideas are fainter impressions .162

' Ideas ' that cannot be so represented must be explained as mere

words 162

Hume, taken strictly, leaves no distinction between impressions

of reflection and of sensation 163

Jxx:ke's theory of sensation disappears 1 63

Physiology won't answer the question that Locke asked . . 1 64

Those who think it will don't understand the question . . 1 64 /llume's psychology will not answer it either . . . .'165 lit only seems to do so by assuming the ' fiction ' it has to accoimt

for ; by assuming that impression represents a real world . 166

(So the ' Positivist' juggles with ' phenomena' . . . .168

Essential difference, however, between Hume and the ' Positivist ' 1 68 He adopts Berkeley's doctrine of ideas, but without Berkeley's

saving suppositions in r^ard to ' spirit ' and relations . 169

His account of these 171

It corresponds to Locke's accoimt of the sorts of agreement be-

^ tween ideas 171

f Could Hume conmstently admit idea of relation at all ? . . 172 yOnly in regard to identity and causation that he sees any diffi- culty 174

These he treats as fictions resulting from ' natural relations ' of ideas : i.e. firom resemblance and contiguity . . . .174

Is resemblance then an impression ? 175

Distinction between resembling feelings and idea of resemblance. 176

Substance8:=collection8 of ideas 177

How can ideas * in flux ' be collected ? 177




Are there general ideas 7 Berkeley said, ' yes and no * . 17<5

Hiime * no ' simply 179

How he accounts for the appearance of there being such . 179 His account implies that ' ideas ' are conceptions, not feelings . 180 He virtually yields the point in regard to the predicate of pro- positions . 181

As to the subject, he equivocates between singleness of feeling

and individuality of conception 182

Kesult is a theory which admits predication, but only as sin- gular 183

All propositions restricted in same way as Locke's propositions

about real existence 184

The question, how the singular proposition is possible, the vital

one 185

Not relations of resemblance only, but those of quantity also,

treated by Hume as feelings 186

He draws the line between certainty and probability at the same point as Locke ; but is more definite as to probability, and does not admit opposition of mathematical to physical cer- tainty— here following Berkeley 187

His criticisms of the doctrine of primary qualities . . . 189 It will not do to oppose bodies to our feeling when only feeling

can give idea of body 189

Locke's shuffle of * body,' * solidity,' and * touch,' fairly exposed . 190

True rationale of Locke's doctrine 192

With Hume * body ' logically disappears 192

What then? 193

Can space survive body ? Hume derives idea of it from sight

and feeling 193

Significance with him of such derivation . . . 194

It means, in effect, that colour and space are the same, and that

feeling may be extended . 194

The parts of space are parts of a perception . . . . 195

Yet die parts of space are CO- existent not successive . . .196 Hume cannot make space a * perception ' without being false to his own account of perception ; as appears if we put ' feeling ' for ' perception ' in the passages in question . . . 197

To make sense of them, we must take perception to mean per- ceived thing, which it can only mean as the result of certain

'fictions' 198

If felt thing is no more than feeling, how can it have qualities? 200 The thing will have ceased before the quality begins to be . 201

Hume equivocates by putting 'coloured points ' for colour. . 201 Can a ' disposition of coloured points ' be an inipresHion ? . 202

The points must be themselves impressions, and therefore not co-existent 203



A ' compound impression ' excluded bj Hume's doctrine of

time * . . . . 204

The &ct that colours mix, not to the purpose .... 206 How Hume avoids appearance of identifying space with colour,

and accounts for the abstraction of space .... 206

In so doing, he implies that space is a relation, and a relation

which is not a possible impression 207

No logical alternative between identifying space with colour, and

admitting an idea not copied from an impression . . 209

In his account of the idea as abstract, Hume really introduces distinction between feeling and conception; jet avoids ap* pearance of doing so, by treating ' consideration * of the rela- tions of a felt thing as if it were itself the feeling . . .210 Summary of contradictions in his account of extension . . 212

He gives no account of quantity as such 213

His accoxmt of the relation between Time and Number . . 214

What does it come to ? . . "^ 214

Unites alone really exist: number a 'fictitious denomination* 215 Yet * unites ' and ' number ' are correlative ; and the supposed

fiction unaccountable 216

Idea of time even more unaccountable on Hume's principles . 217

His ostensible explanation of it 218

It turns upon equivocation between feeling and conception of

relations between felt things 219

He M\b to assign any impression or compoimd of impressions

from which idea of time is copied 220

How can he adjust the exact sciences to his theory of space and

. time? 221

lln order to seem to do so, he must get rid of 'Infinite Divisi-

Vbility' 222

Quantity made up of impressions, and there must be a least possible impression ........ 223

Tet it is admitted that there is an idea of number not made up of impressions ........ 224

A finite division into impressions no more possible than an in- finite one . 225

In Hume's instances it is not really a feeling, but a conceived thing, that appears as finitely divisible .... 225

Upon true notion of quantity infinite divisibility follows of course .......... 226

What are the ultimate elements of extencdon ? If not extended,

what are they? 227

Colours or coloured points ? What is the difierence ? . . 228 True way of dealing with the question . . . . 228

' If the point were divisible, it would be no termination of a line.' Answer to this ••••••••• 229


What becomes of the exactness of mathematics according to Hume? 230

The miiversal propositions of geometry either imtrue or immean- ing 231

Distinction between Hume^s doctrine and that of the hypothetical nature of mathematics 232

The admission that no relations of quantity are data of sense re- moves difficulty as to general propositions about them . . 233

Hume does virtually admit this in regard to numbers . . 234

With Hume idea of vacuum impossible, but logically not more so than that of space 235

How it is that we talk as if we had idea of vacuum according to Hume 237

His explanation implies that we have an idea virtually the same 238

By a like device that he is able to explain the appearance of our having such ideas as Causation and Identity . . . 238

Knowledge of relation in way of Identity and Causation excluded by Lockers definition of knowledge 240

Inference a transition from an object perceived or remembered to one that is not so 24 1

Relation of cause and effect the same as this transition . . 242

Yet seems other than this. How this appearance is to be ex- plained 243

Inference, resting on supposition of necessary connection, to be explained before that connection 243

Account of the inference given by Locke and Clarke rejected . 244

Three points to be explained in the inference according to Hume 244

a. The ori^al impression from which the transition is made 245

b. The transition to inferred idea 245

c. The qualities of this idea 246

It results that necessary connection is an impression of refiection,

i.e., a propensity to the transition described . . . . 24G

The transition not to anything beyond sense . . . 247 Nor determined by any objective relation . . . .248

/'Definitions of cause 248

I a. As a ' philosophical * relation ..;... 249 vIs Hume entitled to retain ' philosophical ' relations as distinct

from * natural ' ? 249

Examination of Hume's language about them .... 2r)0 Philosophical relation consists in a comparison, but no compari- son between cause and effect 250

The comparison is between present and past experience of suc- cession of objects 251

Observation of succession already goes beyond sense . . 252 As also does the ' observation concerning identity,* which the

comparison involves 253




Identity of objects an unayoidable crux for Home . . 25-4

His account of it . . . ' 254

Properly with bim it is a fiction, in the sense that we have no

such idea . . 255

Yet he implies that we have such idea, in saying that we mis- take something else for it 255

Succession of like feelings mistaken for an identical object : but the feelings, as described, are already such objects . . 256

fiction of identity thus implied as source of the propensity which is to account for it 257

With Hume continued existence of perceptions a fiction different

from their identity 258

Can perceptions exist when not perceived? . . . .259 Existence of objects, distinct from perceptions, a further fiction still 259 Are these several ' fictions ' really different fiN)m each other ? .260 Are they not all involved in the simplest perception 7 . . 261 Tet they are not possible ideas, because copied firom no impres- sions 262

Comparison of present experience with past, which yields rela- tion of cause and effect, pre-supposes judgment of identity ; without which there could be no recognition of an object as

one observed before 263

Hume makes conceptions of identity and cause each come before

the other 265

Their true correlativity 266

eume quite right in saying that we do not go more beyond sense in reasoning than in perception 267

How his doctrine might have been developed . 267

Its actual outcome 268

No philosophical relation admissible with Hume that is not " derived fix)m a natural one 269

Examination of his account of cause and effect as ' natural rela- tion' 270

Double meaning of natural relation. How Hume turns it to

account 271

r If an effect is merely a constantly observed sequence, how can V <ui event be an effect the first time it is observed ? . . . 271

Hume evades this question ; still, he is a long way off the Induc- tive Logic, which supposes an objective sequence . . 272

Can the principle of uniformity of nature be derived fi-om se- quence of feelings 7 273

With Hume the only uniformity is in expectation, as determined by habit ; but strength of such expectation must vary in- definitely 274

It could not serve the same purpose as the conception of imi- formity of nature 27&



Hume changes the meaning of this expectation by his account of the ' remembrance ' which determines it . . . .276

Bearing of his doctrine of necessary connexion upon his argument against miracles 276

This remembrance, as he describes it, supposes conception of a system of nature . . 277

This explains his occasional inconsistent ascription of an objec- tive character to causation .... . 278

Reality of remembered * system ' transferred to * system of judg- ment' 279

Reality of the former * system ' other than vivacity of impressions 280

It is constituted by relations, which are not impressions at all ; and in this lies explanation of the inference from it to ' sys- tem of judgment ' 281

Not seeing this, Hume has to explain inference to latter system as something forced upon us by habit 282

But if 80, * system of judgment' must consist of feelings con- stantly experienced which only differ from remembered feel- ings inasmuch as their liveliness has faded. . . . 283

But how can it have faded, if they have been constantly repeated ? 284

Inference then can give no new knowledge .... 285

Nor does this merely mean that it cannot constitute new pheno- mena, wliile it can prove relations, previously imknown, be- tween phenomena ........ 286

Such a distinction inadmissible with Hume .... 286

His distinction of probability of causes from that of chances might seem to imply conception of nature, as determining inference 287

But this distinction he only professes to adopt in order to explain it away 288

(Laws of nature are unqualified habits of expectation . . 289

Experience, according to his accoimt of it, cannot be a parent of knowledge 290

His attitude towards doctrine of thinking substance . . 291

As to Immateriality of the Soul, he plays off Locke and Berkeley

against each other, and proves Berkeley a Spinozist . . 292 Causality of spirit treated in the same way . . . . 293

Disposes of ^ personal ' identity by showing contradictions in

Locke's account of it 295

Yet can only accoimt for it as a ' fiction ' by supposing ideas

which with him are impossible 295

In origin this ' fiction ' the same as that of * Body ' . . . 296 Possibility of such fictitious ideas implies refutation of Hume's doctrine 297

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Thekb is a view of the history of mankind, by this time How tLo :/•