STALEMATE
U.S. Marines from Bunker Hill to the Hook
by Bernard C. Nalty

Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series
in a typical night during 1952, a Marine patrol set out from the very center of a company position on the Jamestown Line in west-central Korea. The group was following the trace of an abandoned trench-line when a Chinese machine gun cut loose, killing the leader, wounding some of his men, and forcing the patrol to return without completing its mission of setting an ambush.

Shortly afterward, about two hours before midnight, Second Lieutenant William A. Watson, who had recently joined the 1st Marine Division, received orders to move out with a squad from his platoon and set up the ambush, finishing what the ill-fated patrol had begun. The powerful searchlight aimed skyward to warn airmen of the location of Panmunjom, where the United Nations forces were conducting truce talks with the North Korean and Chinese, reflected from the clouds creating the impression that Watson's patrol was “walking in bright moonlight.”

The lieutenant and his men moved between the spine of a ridgeline and the trench they were following, watching carefully for signs of a Chinese ambush and maintaining enough space between Marines to minimize the effect of a sudden burst of fire. “Creep, sit, wait,” Watson told his men. “Move on my order. A few feet and be still.” The Marines were confident that their cautious advance, the 50 or so yards separating their route from the nearest concealment the enemy could use, the artificial moonlight, and the trench itself, which provided ready cover in case of an attack, would combine to prevent the Chinese from surprising them.

While two Marines provide protection by watching for enemy snipers, two other members of a patrol probe for mines. The Marines in the foreground wear armored vests. By November 1952 delivery of the new vests to the division was completed, including more than 400 sets of lower torso armor.

ON THE COVER: A Marine sentry looks out from his position along the 1st Marine Division's front in western Korea. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A166024

AT LEFT: The 1st Marine Division engaged in static warfare during 1952 from typical segments of trench-line on the Jamestown Line. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A167091
The patrol drew no fire as it made its way to the objective, where the trench the two patrols had followed intersected with another shallower trench. Watson deployed the fire teams in a perimeter. The Marines strained their eyes and ears to detect movement over sandy soil that gleamed almost white in the cloud-reflected light. Nothing moved; Chinese mortars and machine guns remained silent.

At 0300 Watson’s patrol started back, the fire team that had led the way out was now at the rear. The return, as cautious and methodical as the advance, took roughly two hours. When the lieutenant at last came through the wire, he realized he was soaking wet from perspiration, more from tension, he believed, than from exertion.

Fighting took place by day as well as by night, but an early morning attack often depended on preparations made under cover of darkness. For example, before Lieutenant Watson’s platoon took part in an early morning attack on a Chinese outpost, Marine engineers moved out shortly after midnight to mark a path through the minefields protecting the Jamestown Line. This work took them past marshy ground inhabited by frogs that fell silent at the approach of the Marines, only to resume their croaking at about 0300 when the passage had been marked and the engineers returned to the main line of resistance. After daylight, Watson’s platoon advanced, staying between the lines of white-tape Xs that marked the presence of mines.

The night patrol by Watson’s Marines was one in a succession of probes and patrols—interspersed with attacks and counterattacks—that occurred during 1952 after the 1st Marine Division moved onto the Jamestown Line. The move there in March 1952 confirmed a shift to position warfare. Instead of making amphibious landings as at Inchon or Wonsan or seizing ground either to break out of encirclement or to advance, the division had the mission of defending its portion of the Jamestown Line and preparing to counterattack as ordered to contain or eliminate any Chinese penetration.

The enemy maintained pressure on the United Nations forces. He probed the line of combat outposts, which provided warning of attacks and disrupted or delayed them until the troops posted there could withdraw, and also tested at times the defenses of the main line
and 83 railroad cars, along with 14 Loading Ships Dock and Landing Ships Tank that sailed from Sokohoro-ri and unloaded at Inchon. Two transport aircraft also figured in the move. By the time the division took over its segment of the Jamestown Line on 25 March, completing the relief of a Korean division, the officers who directed the move realized all too well how much excess equipment the unit had accumulated during the period of comparative stability that followed the capture of the Punchbowl in the summer of 1951.

Area of Operations

The segment of the Jamestown Line assigned to the 1st Marine Division extended southwest from the Samichon River and the left flank of the British 1st Commonwealth Division, crossed the 38th Parallel (the original demarcation between North and South Korea), shifted to the south bank of the Imjin in the vicinity of Munsan-ni,
continued to the conflux of the Imjin and Han, and then followed the south bank of the Han past the Kimpo Peninsula. Initially, the 1st Marines, under Colonel Sidney S. Wade, held the right of the main line of resistance, the regiment's right flank on the heights beyond the Imjin River, some 1,100 yards north of the 38th Parallel. The 5th Marines, commanded by Colonel Thomas A. Culhane, Jr., held the center of the new line, with a regiment of Korean Marines on the left. Colonel Russell E. Honslowetz' 7th Marines served as division reserve. An adjustment in April resulted in the insertion of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion on the left of the Korean Marines.

The Kimpo Peninsula, bounded by the Han and Yom Rivers, complicated the defense of the 1st Marine Division's segment of the Jamestown Line, even though an attack there would require the Chinese to cross the broad and sometimes raging Han. Defending the peninsula became the mission of the Kimpo Provisional Regiment, led by Colonel Edward M. Staab, Jr., an improvised force made up of American and South Korean soldiers and Marines from a variety of combat and service units, with the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion providing artillery support (thirty-six 75mm guns) and a battalion of the division reserve, at this time the 7th Marines, serving as a maneuver force.

The 1st Marine Division—including the Kimpo Provisional Regiment, the amphibian tractor battalion, the Korean Marines, and the two Marine regiments on line—defended some 60,000 yards, two to four times that normally assigned to a similarly reinforced division. Within the division, a battalion, one third of the infantry strength of a regiment, held a frontage of from 3,500 to 5,000 yards, while a rifle company, one third the infantry strength of a battalion, could man a sector as wide as 1,700 yards. A line of outposts of varying strength located on hills as far as 2,500 yards in front of the main line of resistance, improved the security of the Jamestown positions, but forced the Marines to spread themselves even thinner along the front. To defend the division's broad segment of the Jamestown Line, General Selden commanded a total of 1,364 Marine officers, 24,846 enlisted Marines, 1,100 naval officers and sailors—mostly doctors, dentists, and medical corpsmen—and 4,400 Korean Marines.

The Imjin River, flowing southwest from the division's right flank, lay behind the main line of resistance until the defenses crossed the river west of Munsan-ni. Since only three bridges—all of them vulnerable to damage from floods—spanned the Imjin, the stream, when in flood, posed a formidable obstacle to the movement of supplies and reinforcements. A single rail line to Munsan-ni served the region and the existing road net required extensive improvement to support military traffic. The terrain varied from mountainous, with
sharp-backed ridges delineating narrow valleys, to rice paddies and mud flats along the major rivers. West-central Korea promised to be a difficult place for the reinforced but widely spread 1st Marine Division to conduct sustained military operations.

General Selden's Marines took over their portion of the Jamestown Line from South Korean soldiers manning an area that had become something of a backwater, perhaps because of its proximity to Kaesong, where truce talks had begun, and Panmunjom where they were continuing. "It was quite apparent," Selden noted, "that the relieved ROK [Republic of Korea] Division had not been conducting an aggressive defense." As a result, the Marines inherited bunkers built to protect more against the elements than against enemy mortars and artillery. Korean noncombatants, taking advantage of the lull, had resumed farming in the area, moving about and creating concealment for possible Chinese infiltration.

To oppose the Marines on the Jamestown Line, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) had the 65th and 63d Armies, totaling 49,800 troops. Probing the Marine outposts and the main line of resistance were an estimated 15 infantry battalions, equipped with small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars, and supported by 10 battalions of artillery, totaling 106 guns ranging from 75mm to 155mm. Unlike the defenses the Marines had inherited, the solidly built Chinese bunkers were protected by barbed wire, minefields, and other obstacles, and organized to provide defense in depth. A variety of automatic weapons, including 37mm guns, provided antiaircraft protection.

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Under the command of Major General Christian F. Schilt, who had earned the Medal of Honor during the Nicaraguan campaign for a daring rescue in January 1928, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing consisted of land- and carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft plus helicopters. The land-based fighter and attack squadrons, whether flying jets or propeller aircraft, came under the operational control of the Fifth Air Force, which in early 1952 was attempting to direct Marine Corps and Air Force activity from a Joint Operations Center at Seoul. With the exception of Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12), the components of the wing based in eastern South Korea remained there when the division moved westward. MAG-12's night fighter squadron, VMF (N)-513, shifted to the airfield at Kunsan, and the rest of the group, including two fighter outfits, began flying from Pyongtaek, also in April. Unlike the land-based fighter-bombers and attack aircraft—and the new jet-equipped photographic squadron, VMJ-1—the wing's helicopters, light observation planes, and carrier-based fighter-bombers directly supported the 1st Marine Division.

The inventory of Marine rotary-wing aircraft included Bell HTL-4 and Sikorsky HOS-1 light helicopters and the larger Sikorsky HRS-1. The fixed-wing, piston-engine aircraft ranged in size from the unarmed, lightweight Cessna OE-1 to the Douglas AD-2 Skyraider the most powerful, heaviest, and deadliest single-engine attack plane of the era. Marines
Armistice Talks

During the summer of 1951, the succession of offensives and counteroffensives ended with the establishment of a line that stretched across the Korean peninsula generally along the 38th Parallel. The Chinese had suffered grievous losses after intervening in late 1950. Although they drove the United Nations forces out of North Korea, they failed to hold a bridgehead in the South that for a time included the capital city, Seoul. As the names of two United Nations counterattacks, Operations Killer and Ripper, indicated, the United States and its allies sought to inflict casualties rather than recapture ground. This strategy magnified the effect of the enemy’s earlier losses and succeeded so well that Communist Chinese Forces (CCF)—and Chinese society, as well—needed a respite from the cumulative attrition of late 1950 and early 1951.

An armistice also seemed attractive to the United States for reasons of both strategy and domestic politics. The lengthening list of American casualties, and the continuation into a second and third year of a war described in November 1950 as on the verge of being won, undermined public support for the conflict, derisively described as Mr. Truman’s war, as though the President had somehow started the fighting. In terms of strategy, Europe, where the Soviet Union and its satellites seemed ready to test the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), seemed more important than the Far East. Indeed, a ceasefire that would free American forces from their commitment in Korea, enabling them to strengthen NATO, should work to the long-term strategic advantage of the United States.

As a result, when the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, Jacob Malik, suggested discussing the possibility of negotiating an armistice in Korea, the United States and its allies agreed. The preliminary discussions began on 8 July 1951 at Kaesong, south of the 38th Parallel and some 35 miles northeast of Seoul. The Chinese and North Koreans showed little enthusiasm for negotiations until the United Nations, in July and August, mounted a limited offensive that resulted in the capture of the Punchbowl. On 25 October negotiations resumed at Pannunjom, a village just south of the 38th Parallel, which became a demilitarized island in a sea of fighting and was linked by a road to South Korean territory.

By the end of November, the negotiators had agreed that the battle line, rather than the 38th Parallel, would serve temporarily as the line of demarcation between the two Koreas, a boundary that became permanent, essentially by default as other issues took precedence in the negotiations. Military operations slowed, as did the pace of the talks, which, by the time the Marines entered the Jamestown Line, had encountered several obstacles, the most serious dealing with the repatriation of prisoners of war.
also flew the Vought F4U-4 Corsair, a piston-powered fighter-bomber, a dozen of which operated from the escort carriers Bataan (LHD 5) and Bairoko (AKV 15), and later the light carrier Badoeng Strait (CVE 116). A more heavily armored version of the Corsair, the AU, served as an attack aircraft. The Marine Corps jets were the Grumman F9F Panther fighter-bomber, the McDonnell F2H-2P photo plane, and the Douglas F3D Skyknight, a two-seat night fighter. The Skyknight by year’s end became the principal Marine night fighter, replacing the piston-engine Grumman F7F Tigercat, which continued until the spring of 1953 to fly interdiction and close air support during darkness.

Like their fellow Marines on the ground, the airmen operated under restrictions peculiar to a limited war. Air strikes were prohibited in the vicinity of Panmunjom to avoid jeopardizing the truce talks. Moreover, to ease the task of the Joint Operations Center in exercising centralized control over tactical aviation, the number of close-support sorties flown over the battlefront could not exceed 96 each day. In general, the allocation of air power proved flexible enough to satisfy General Schilt. Although conceding that Marines on the ground “did not always get all that they wanted” because the wing was “sometimes . . . tied up with the Air Force,” Schilt found that “if there was anything we particularly wanted to do and thought it necessary to support our ground forces, we’d go over and talk to them [representatives of the Fifth Air Force] and they’d go along with us.”

Besides affecting aerial operations, the neutral zone around Panmunjom influenced the mission of the Marine division. On 19 April, General Selden, reacting to orders from higher headquarters, directed the regiment with the best access to Panmunjom to draft a plan to rescue the United Nations Truce Team if it should be trapped there. The regiment that fit this description, initially the 5th Marines, organized a tank-infantry team from within its reserve battalion. Supported by tanks and fire from mortars and artillery, a covering force would advance along the demilitarized corridor leading to the negotiation site and seize the dominant ground beyond Panmunjom so that a second group could move in and pick up the negotiators. A third contingent would escort the pick-up force as it brought the truce team to a safe area behind the Jamestown Line.

Artillery and Air

During the spring of 1952, the fighting along the Jamestown Line gradually intensified, requiring the support of artillery and aircraft. The 105mm and 155mm howitzers of the 11th Marines joined tanks and other weapons in battering Chinese
Offshore Islands

Even before the Marines occupied positions on the Jamestown Line, they were involved in the defense of several offshore islands on the east and west coasts of Korea. The 1st Marine Division provided officers and enlisted men to direct the Korean Marines actually manning the defenses, but in January Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, took over, usually employing Marines who volunteered for this duty after recovering from wounds suffered while serving with the division. The West Coast Island Defense Unit bore responsibility for six islands astride the 38th Parallel, while the East Coast Defense Unit guarded nine islands, seven clustered around Wonsan, within artillery range of the mainland, and the other two near Songjin.

The eastern islands proved tempting to the Chinese, who occasionally took them under fire, and attacked the two Yang-do Islands, 160 miles northeast of Wonsan, where the South Korean defenders, backed by United Nations ships, beat off the invaders. In March, the United Nations Command sought to strengthen its hold on the western islands by seizing Ho-do, an unoccupied islet north of the 38th Parallel, even though it lay within range of enemy snipers on the mainland and might be attacked in winter by advancing across the ice. The occupation nevertheless went ahead, but a Chinese amphibious attack on the night of 25–26 March overwhelmed the South Korean platoon that held Ho-do. Only six members of the platoon survived, and the United Nations Command made no attempt to recapture the tiny island. The Chinese refrained from further amphibious activity, but instead struck back with a rare aerial attack, bombing Cho-do, one of the western islands, though ineffectually.
Marine 105mm howitzer crews of the 11th Marines prepare to fire in support of the Jamestown Line by “clobbering” Chinese command posts, bivouac areas, artillery and mortar positions, and observation outposts.

Division deployed to the Jamestown Line, the 11th Marines was firing flak suppression missions in support of close air strikes. The batteries tried to neutralize or destroy known antiaircraft positions, some of them discovered when aircraft began an attack only to break it off deliberately after forcing the Chinese guns to cut loose and reveal their locations.

Despite the doctrinal emphasis on close air support, in the summer of 1952 Marine pilots were attacking targets far beyond the battle line as a part of the Fifth Air Force’s Operation Pressure, designed to destroy important North Korean industrial facilities. During one such mission, Colonel Robert E. Galer, who commanded MAG-12 in Korea and had earned the Medal of Honor at Guadalcanal in World War II, led 31 attack aircraft against targets in the mountains southwest of Wonsan. His Vought AU Corsair sustained damage from antiaircraft fire that forced him to parachute. One foot became wedged in the cockpit, but he managed to kick free of the doomed airplane, which almost ran him down in its gyrations. He succeeded, however, in opening his chute and drifted to earth with 10 feet of his crashed aircraft. He got away from the wreckage, which was sure to attract the enemy, found concealment, and with his survival radio contacted a rescue force orbiting overhead. As a helicopter darted in his direction at treetop height, he ignited a smoke grenade to mark his position and enable the rescue craft to pick him up. The flight to a ship off the coast proved more dangerous than the actual pick up, for enroute to safety antiaircraft shells exploded so close that the concussion spun the helicopter around, fuel ran low, and patches of fog concealed landmarks making navigation difficult.

The Marines and the Chinese soon began clashing over the high ground between the frontlines that could accommodate combat.

Gen Holland M. Smith, a leader of the amphibious war against Japan and whose Marines fought their way from Tarawa to Okinawa, visits the Jamestown Line in Korea. From the left are: Col Russell E. Honsovetz, commander of the 7th Marines; Col Frederick P. Henderson, commander of the 11th Marines; Gen Smith; and MajGen John T. Selden, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division.
outposts or observation posts. A series of objectives that the Marines designated by letters of the alphabet became a bone of contention early in May. These were Objective S, a small outcropping northwest of the main line of resistance, and V, X, Y, and Z, three separate peaks on a ridge extending northeastward from S and forming an angle of roughly 45 degrees with the main line of resistance. As part of the continued probing that occurred almost every night, First Lieutenant Ernest S. Lee, commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, led his unit, reinforced with light and heavy .30-caliber machine guns, to occupy the high ground south of Objective Y, arriving there before sunrise on 4 May. The Chinese immediately opened fire with mortars, but an aerial observer spotted a half-dozen of the weapons and called in Marine F4U-4Bs that destroyed them. The enemy then attacked unsuccessfully, but since more powerful attacks seemed certain, the reinforced platoon pulled back.

Twice during the withdrawal, Chinese troops tried to ambush the patrol, which used its own weapons to beat off the first attempt and called down artillery fire to help frustrate the second. Forced from their route by the second ambush, Marines carrying the patrol's casualties, one dead and four wounded, entered an unmarked and uncharted minefield left behind by United Nations troops; two stretcher bearers were killed and three others wounded by the mines, which later were cleared.

Colonel Thomas A. Culhane, in command of the 5th Marines, directed the 1st Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Franklin B. Nihart, to drive the enemy from the vicinity of Objective Y, in the process taking prisoners and inflicting casualties, before seizing Objective Z. Nihart decided to capture Objectives S, V, and X before attacking Objective Y; if all went well, he could then move against Z.

Nihart used his battalion's Company C to feint toward Objective T, located between the ridge and the Marine division's main line of resistance, in an attempt to neutralize the Chinese there and prevent them from interfering with the attack, which began when Company A, the 1st Platoon leading the way, quickly overran Objective S. Fire from the Marine division's rocket battery shook the defenders of Objective V, enabling the attackers to capture it. Both Marine and Chinese artillery stepped up their firing as the Nihart's men reorganized to advance on Objective X. In preparation for that move, friendly fire from artillery, mortars, tanks, and even machine guns scoured the knob raising a cloud of dust that enveloped it and blinded the attacking Marines, who encountered increasingly savage fire as they climbed the slope.

At this point, the Chinese counterattacked. Although the Marines beat back this thrust, other probes followed, as infiltrators tried to isolate the 1st Platoon from the rest of Company A. To maintain the integrity of his unit, the company commander, First Lieutenant Ernest S. Lee, pulled back the endangered platoon, while Chinese artillery rained fire on Objective X, some 400 rounds exploding in five minutes. The deadly fire forced Company A to abandon the toehold on X and then fall back to the main line of resistance under the cover of fire from the division's tanks. The Marines, however, set up a part-time outpost on

*Marines on patrol forward of the main line check out a cache of enemy ammunition found in an abandoned farmhouse. In addition to denying the enemy use of critical terrain, inflicting casualties and capturing prisoners were added tasks assigned to daily patrols.*

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-442340
Objective Y, at first manning it mostly during daylight. In the bloodiest single day of fighting since the capture of the Punchbowl, the Marines suffered seven killed and 66 wounded, perhaps one-fourth the number of the Chinese casualties.

The fighting now shifted eastward. After relieving the 5th Marines, the 7th Marines, commanded by Colonel Russell E. Honsonetz, attacked Hill 104 and the adjacent ridgeline, located on the regimental right. Advancing during darkness on the early morning of 28 May, Companies A and C of Lieutenant Colonel George W. E. Daughtry's 1st Battalion, seized their objectives but could not hold them against fierce Chinese reaction and fell back to the Jamestown Line. The fighting proved costlier than the struggle for Objectives S, T, V, W, and X, with seven Marines killed and 107 wounded. Two of those killed in action were honored posthumously with the Medal of Honor: Corporal David B. Champagne for throwing himself on a grenade to save the lives of other Marines; and Private First Class John D. Kelly for sacrificing his life while gallantly attacking enemy positions.

Despite the developing stalemate, the Marine division continued probing, sending out patrols as large as a company to raid Chinese positions, killing or wounding the defenders and keeping the enemy off balance. Both American and South Korean Marines conducted these actions, and the Chinese retaliated in kind, as on the night of 24 June, when they cut off the elements of the 5th Marines manning an outpost on Objective Y, now redesignated Hill 159. Hostile mortar and artillery fire prevented the Marines from withdrawing over the trails leading back to the Jamestown Line, but they were able to take cover in their bunkers while fire from the 11th Marines helped frustrate the attack. The Marines could not hold the hill against a determined enemy, and by the end of the month, a Chinese battalion occupied it.

The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, used its Company G to attack Hill 159, occupying an assault position on the night of 2 July and attacking at dawn of the following morning. The first phase went smoothly, and the assault began at 0630. Deadly fire from the battalion holding Hill 159 stalled the attack until the leader of a Marine machine gun squad, Staff Sergeant William E. Shuck, Jr., took over a rifle squad whose leader had been wounded. Shuck maneuvered the combined squads up the hill and clung to the exposed position until ordered to withdraw. While pulling his Marines back, the sergeant suffered a third and fatal wound. Shuck's daring and initiative earned him a posthumous Medal of Honor, but the hill remained in Chinese hands, even though the defenders may have suffered 200...
casualties compared to four Marines killed and 40 wounded.

On the right of the division’s line, the portion now held by the 5th Marines, Company A of the regiment’s 1st Battalion overran two unoccupied outposts on the night of 2-3 July before receiving orders to return to the main line of resistance. A patrol from the regiment’s 2d Battalion ambushed a Chinese patrol shortly before midnight on 2 July, suffering no casualties while killing six of the enemy and wounding eight. Another patrol from the same battalion set out shortly after dawn on 3 July and engaged in an hour-long fire-fight that killed or wounded an unknown number of Chinese at the cost of one Marine killed and 11 wounded.

Within the next few days, two ambitious operations would involve the 1st Marine Division. The first was Operation Firecracker, a fire mission planned for 4 July when I Corps would mass artillery fire on targets all along the battle line, timing the shoot so that all the shells would detonate within one minute, a technique known as time on target. The 11th Marines opened fire with its howitzers, and the 4.5-inch rocket battery joined in as did corps artillery, so that 3,202 shells detonated almost simultaneously on Chinese positions in front of the Marine division.

Besides thus helping celebrate Independence Day, the Marines took part, over General Selden’s objections, in large-scale raids, directed by Major General Paul W. Kendall, USA, I Corps commander, to gather additional intelligence on Chinese defenses. The division’s commanding general believed that his Marines were spread so thin that he could not pull together a force strong enough to conduct such a raid without jeopardizing the overall security of the Jamestown Line. Selden suggested that smaller patrols could obtain the necessary information with less risk. The Marine general also pointed out that 2,651 officers and enlisted men were in the process of returning to the United States and that their replacements would not be in place until 11 July. Although the British commander of the adjacent 1st Commonwealth Division, Brigadier C. N. Barclay, agreed that the more ambitious raids might well prove too costly for the results achieved, Selden’s
Corporal Duane E. Dewey

Born in 1931 in Grand Rapids, Michigan, he enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserves in 1951. In Korea, he served as a machine gun squad leader with Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, and was critically wounded near Panmunjom on 16 April 1952. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

When an enemy grenade landed close to this position, while he and his assistant gunner were receiving medical attention for their wounds during a fierce night attack by numerically superior hostile forces, Corporal Dewey, although suffering intense pain, immediately pulled the corpsman to the ground and, shouting a warning to the other Marines around him, bravely smothered the deadly missile with his body, personally absorbing the full force of the explosion to save his comrades from possible injury or death.

The survivors of his heroic self-sacrifice never forgot his remarkable shout, as he threw himself on the grenade, “Doc, I got it in my hip pocket!” After presenting the Medal on 12 March 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower told him: “You must have a body of steel.”

Corporal David B. Champagne

Born in Wakefield, Rhode Island, in 1932, Corporal Champagne enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1951. Serving as a fire team leader with Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, he was killed on 28 May 1952. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

Corporal Champagne skillfully led his fire team through a veritable hail of intense enemy machine-gun, small-arms and grenade fire, overrunning trenches and a series of almost impregnable bunker positions before reaching the crest of the hill and placing his men in defensive positions. Suffering a painful leg wound while assisting in repelling the ensuing hostile counterattack, which was launched under cover of a murderous hail of mortar and artillery fire, he steadfastly refused evacuation and fearlessly continued to control his fire team. When the enemy counterattack increased in intensity, and a hostile grenade landed in the midst of the fire team, Corporal Champagne unhesitatingly seized the deadly missile and hurled it in the direction of the approaching enemy. As the grenade left his hand, it exploded, blowing off his hand and throwing him out of the trench. [He was] mortally wounded by enemy mortar fire while in this exposed position.

Corporal Champagne’s Medal of Honor was presented to his younger brother during ceremonies held in July 1953 at the Old Mountain Baseball Field in Wakefield.

Private First Class John D. Kelly

A 23-year-old native of Youngstown, Ohio, he enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1951. As a radio operator in Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, he volunteered to join an assault and was killed on 28 May 1952. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

Fearlessly charging forward in the face of a murderous hail of machine-gun fire and hand grenades, he initiated a daring attack against a hostile strongpoint and personally neutralized the position, killing two of the enemy. Unyielding in the face of heavy odds, he continued forward and single-handedly assaulted a machine-gun bunker. Although painfully wounded, he bravely charged the bunker and destroyed it, killing three of the enemy. Courageously continuing his one-man assault, he again stormed forward in a valiant attempt to wipe out a third bunker and boldly delivered point-blank fire into the aperture of the hostile emplacement.

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)
The war on the Jamestown Line became a battle for the combat outposts that provided security for the main line of resistance. These Marines are preparing to join in the fighting on the outpost line.

A tank-infantry team made the Marine division's contribution to large-scale patrolling with Buckshot 2B, an operation launched on 6 July. At 2200, two companies of Lieutenant Colonel Daughtry's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, supported by elements of the 1st Tank Battalion, advanced against Hill 159. The assault force braved deadly fire to gain a lodgment on the hill. Because they were in danger of encirclement, the Marines had to pull back before daylight. General Selden had been correct; the intelligence gained did not justify the effort and the casualties—12 dead, 85 wounded, and five missing. Until the incorporation of
replacements had restored the strength of the division, emphasis shifted to smaller patrols with less ambitious objectives than raiding a stoutly defended hill.

**Siberia**

The bunker symbolized the fighting along the Jamestown Line and its combat outposts like Siberia. To build bunkers for future fighting, Marine engineers and truck drivers, and some 500 members of the Korean Service Corps, cut trees, shaped timbers, and hauled the rough-hewn beams some 50 miles to the sector held by the 1st Marine Division. When some 35,000 timbers proved insufficient, the Eighth Army made up the difference, and work went ahead on the Jamestown Line, its combat outposts, and the two back-up lines, Wyoming and Kansas. Although a company of Marine engineers, assisted as necessary by members of the 1st Shore Party Battalion, provided supervision, infantrymen did most of the work, following plans prepared by the Army for the assembly of the ready-cut timbers. The Marines set up each standard bunker in a hole 12-feet square and seven-foot deep, excavated using shovels, without the aid of earth-moving machinery. Once the timbers were in place, some of them shaped from tree trunks eight inches in diameter, and the basic structure finished, the Marines covered the roof, some four feet of timbers, with another three or four feet of earth, rock, and sandbags. If carefully built, the structure could withstand a direct hit from a 105mm shell, besides affording protection against shrapnel from time-fused shells exploding overhead. The living bunker provided sleeping quarters and the fighting bunker featured firing ports for machine guns and rifles.

Bunker construction failed, however, to keep pace with plans or achieve the desired degree of protection. Fatigue contributed to the shortcomings, since the infantrymen who by day dug holes and manhandled timbers into

*Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A164200*

Marine observers direct an air strike on Hill 122, later called Bunker Hill, a Communist position critical to the fighting.

*National Archives Photo (USA) 111-sc411556*

PFC, James McIntosh of Company H, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, aims a .50-caliber machine gun with mounted scope at Communist positions from Hill 229. The 750-foot-high Paekbak Hill, a mile east of the road leading to Panmunjom and Kaesong, was the goal of Communist forces who hoped to acquire the dominant terrain necessary for controlling access to Seoul.
Even as the 1st Marine Division became more heavily engaged along the Jamestown Line, replacements had to be absorbed, not only for the growing number of killed and wounded, but also for those whose tours of duty in Korea were ending. In the spring of 1952, for example, the division transferred elsewhere 433 officers and 6,280 enlisted Marines, while adding 506 officers and 7,359 men. The greater number of replacements kept the division slightly above authorized strength.

At this time, a normal tour of duty in Korea encompassed about 10 and one-half months. Infantry lieutenants and captains arrived in such large numbers, however, that a six-month tour became common for these officers, although those in other grades and specialties might continue to serve from nine to twelve months. The turnover among officers, plus reassignments within the division, had mixed results. Although changing assignments every three to five months reduced the effectiveness of the division, the policy broadened the experience of officers, individually and as a group. In the summer of 1952, however, the division chose efficiency over experience and reduced the frequency of reassignments among its officers.

Replacement drafts did not always fill existing vacancies. Indeed, for a time in 1952 the 11th Marines had to retrain infantry officers for artillery duty. Moreover, skilled drivers and gunners for the M-46 tank proved scarce until the training programs at Camp Pendleton, California, could be expanded.

Similar problems affected the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing where tours of duty averaged six to nine months for pilots and 10 to 12 months for non-fliers. As in the division, rotation between Korea and the United States and reassignment within the wing affected efficiency. The turnover in pilots got the blame for a series of accidents on the escort carrier Bataan, even though the new arrivals had requalified to fly from a carrier. Moreover, the wing's Marine Air Control Group 2 operated a formal course to train forward air controllers, and recently arrived pilots with rusty skills underwent informal refresher training. A scarcity of aircraft mechanics and electronics technicians persisted.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A170762
place had to guard against attack at any time and patrol aggressively by night. Another explanation of the lagging program of bunker construction blamed the training received by the Marines, who learned to emphasize the attack at the expense, perhaps, of defensive preparations. Whatever the reasons, Marine bunkers, as well as those manned by American soldiers, did not measure up to the standards of the Chinese, who provided as much as 35 feet of overhead cover for frontline positions, which usually were linked by tunnels rather than trenches.

The fighting along the Jamestown Line grew even deadlier. Shortly after midnight on 9 August, the Chinese seized Siberia (Hill 58A), the site of a squad-size outpost, and also probed the positions of the 1st Marines. Siberia lay midway between the Marine main line of resistance and the line of Chinese outposts. The enemy's possession of Siberia would provide observation posts to adjust artillery and mortar fire against the nearest segment of the Jamestown Line. As a result, Colonel Walter F. Layer's 1st Marines, on the right of the division's line, counterattacked at once, using the same unit, Company E, 2d Battalion, that had dispatched the squad driven from Siberia. Chinese artillery and mortar fire, directed from Hills 110 and 120, stopped the counterattack short of its objective.

The Marines called for air strikes and additional artillery fire before renewing the counterattack on Siberia. At 0650, four Grumman F9F jets from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing strafed, dropping napalm and 500-pound bombs. Shortly before 1000, Air Force F-80 jets dropped 1,000-pounders, and a platoon from Company A, 1st Battalion, the regimental reserve of the 1st Marines, immediately stormed the hill, with the support of a platoon from the 2d Battalion's Company E. The Chinese again cut loose with mortars and artillery but could not stop the assault, which seized the crest. The supporting platoon from Company E joined in organizing the defense of the recaptured outpost, which came under a deadly torrent of accurate fire that forced the Marines to seek the protection of the reverse slope, nearer their main line of resistance, where they held out until mid-afternoon before falling back. The enemy's artillery and mortars had fired an estimated 5,000 rounds, wounding or killing perhaps three-fourths of the Marines who had attacked Siberia on the morning of 9 August.

While Companies E and A reorganized, the task of recapturing Siberia fell to Company C, commanded by Captain Casimir C. Kscyewski, who attacked with two platoons starting uphill at 0116. A firefight erupted, lasting four
and an 18-inch searchlight fitted with shutter to highlight a target in a brief burst of illumination, and four M-4A3E8 tanks, each carrying both a flamethrower and a 105mm howitzer. While the 90mm weapons hammered Hill 110, the flame-throwing tanks climbed Siberia, using bursts of flame to light their way while demoralizing the defenders, and gained the crest before doubling back toward Marine lines. As the flame-throwing M-4s withdrew, the M-46s opened fire on both Siberia and Hill 110, illuminating targets with five-second bursts of light from their shuttered searchlights, and Captain George W. Campbell’s Company D overran Siberia, holding the crest until midnight when the diversionary attack ended.

The Bunker Hill assault force, Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines—commanded by Captain Sereno S. Scranton, Jr., and under the operational control of Batterton’s 2d Battalion—reached the crest by 2230 and began driving the enemy from the slope nearest the division’s main line of resistance. The defenders recovered from their initial surprise, but the bypassed pockets of Chinese soldiers, though they tried to resist, could not check the Marine advance. In the wake of the assault force, other Marines and members of the 1st Marines, 17 killed and 243 wounded within 30 hours, but the Marines gained the crest and held it until dawn, when driven from Siberia by a Chinese counterattack.

The losses suffered by the 1st Marines, 17 killed and 243 wounded within 30 hours, convinced Colonel Layer that his regiment could not hold Siberia if Hill 122, nicknamed Bunker Hill, remained in Chinese hands. He and his staff planned a sudden thrust at Bunker Hill, possession of which would enable his command to dominate Siberia and observe movement beyond the Chinese outpost line.

**Fight for Bunker Hill**

To disguise the true objective, Lieutenant Colonel Roy J. Batterton attacked Siberia at dusk on 11 August with one company from his 2d Battalion. The 1st Tank Battalion supported the maneuver with four M-46 tanks (M-26 tank with a new engine and transmission), each mounting a 90mm gun...
of the Korean Service Corps manhandled sandbags, wire, and shovels up the hill to help Company B organize the defenses of the objective against the counterattack that was certain to come.

Chinese mortars and artillery harassed the Marines on Bunker Hill until dawn on 12 August, but the counterattack did not come until mid-afternoon, after Company B passed under the operational control of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. The defense of Bunker Hill became the responsibility of Lieutenant Colonel Gerard T. Armitage, whose Marines faced a demanding test. The volume and accuracy of the shelling increased at about 1500, a barrage that lasted an hour and forced the Marines to seek the protection from direct fire afforded by the reverse slope.

Company 1, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, commanded by Captain Howard J. Connolly, reinforced Scranton's embattled Company B in time to help break up an attack by some 350 Chinese and hold the southern slope of Bunker Hill.

While the battle raged on Bunker Hill, General Selden moved his reserves closer to the fighting. Company 1, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, took the place of Connolly's company on the main line of resistance, and by the end of the day, all of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, had come under the operational control of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. Selden attached the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, to Layer's command to strengthen the reserve of the 1st Marines. Meanwhile, Layer moved two provisional Platoons from his reserve, the 1st Battalion, to reinforce the 3d Battalion, and the 3d Battalion's reconnaissance platoon established an outpost on Hill 124, linking Bunker Hill with the main line of resistance. This shuffling of units proved necessary because the 1st Marine Division was so thinly spread over an extended front. During the realignment, supporting weapons, ranging from machine guns through mortars and artillery to rocket batteries, prepared to box in the Marines holding the near slope of Bunker Hill, hammer the Chinese at the crest.
and beyond, protect the flanks, and harass movement on the routes enemy reinforcements would have to use.

As daylight faded into dusk on 12 August, the Marines defending the reverse slope of Bunker Hill struggled to improve their hurriedly prepared fortifications, for the Chinese preferred to counterattack under cover of darkness. Fortunately, the comparatively gentle incline of the reverse slope of the ridge that culminated in Bunker Hill reduced the amount of dead space that could not be covered by grazing fire from the Marine position. Moreover, weapons on the Jamestown Line could fire directly onto the crest, when the expected attack began. By 2000, all the supporting weapons had registered to help the two companies hold the position.

Just as the Marines had attacked Siberia on the evening of 11 August to divert attention from Bunker Hill, the Chinese sought to conceal the timing of their inevitable counterthrust. Shortly before midnight on the night of 12 August, the enemy probed the division’s sector at three points. While one Chinese patrol was stumbling into an ambush set by Korean Marines, another harried a Marine outpost east of Bunker Hill. The third and strongest blow, however, landed after midnight at Stromboli, a Marine outpost on Hill 48A at the far right of the sector held by Layer’s regiment, near the boundary with the 5th Marines.

In conjunction with the attack on Stromboli, launched in the early hours of August 13, the Chinese hit Company F on the right of the line held by the 1st Marines. The Chinese failed to crack the Jamestown defenses, but they inflicted so many casualties at Stromboli that reinforcements had to be sent. The reinforcing unit, a squad from Company F, came under mortar and machine gun fire from the Chinese probing Company F’s defenses and had to return to the main line of resistance. Pressure against Stromboli and its defenders continued until the commander of Company F, Captain Clarence G. Moody, Jr., sent a stronger force that fought its way to the outpost, breaking the Chinese encirclement. The 5th Marines moved one company into a blocking position behind the Jamestown Line near Stromboli in case the fighting again flared at that outpost.

Some 4,500 yards to the southwest, the Chinese attempted to seize Bunker Hill. At about 0100 on the morning of 13 August, savage Chinese artillery and mortar fire persuaded Captain Connolly of Company I to request box-me-in fires, which the 11th Marines provided immediately. Enemy infantry, supported by machine gun fire, advanced behind bursting shells, but the Marines fought back with every weapon they could bring to bear—artillery, mortars, tank guns, rockets, rifles, and automatic weapons. After almost four hours, the violence abated as the enemy relaxed his pressure on Bunker Hill.

Company G, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, under Captain William M. Vanzuyen, joined Connolly’s men before the Chinese broke off the action and withdrew behind a screen of artillery and mortar fire. Except for a determined few, whom the Marines killed, the enemy abandoned Bunker Hill. Colonel Layer took advantage of the lull to send Company H, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, to relieve the Marines holding the hill. He afterward withdrew all the other elements of the 7th Marines that had reinforced his regiment, but not until a patrol from Company I had reconnoitered the far slope of the hill.

In keeping with their usual tactics, the Chinese tried to divert attention from Bunker Hill before
Staff Sergeant William E. Shuck, Jr.

Born in 1926 in Cumberland, Maryland, he enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1947. Serving as a machine gun squad leader with Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, he was killed near Panmunjom on 3 July 1952. His Medal of Honor award bore a citation which reads, in part:

When his platoon was subjected to a devastating barrage of enemy small-arms, grenade, artillery, and mortar fire during an assault against strongly fortified hill positions well forward to the main line of resistance, Staff Sergeant Shuck, although painfully wounded, refused medical attention and continued to lead his machine-gun squad in the attack. Unhesitatingly assuming command of a rifle squad when the leader became a casualty, he skillfully organized the two squads into an attacking force and led two more daring assaults upon the hostile positions. Wounded a second time, he steadfastly refused evacuation and remained in the foremost position under heavy fire until assured that all dead and wounded were evacuated. [He was] mortally wounded by an enemy sniper bullet while voluntarily assisting in the removal of the last casualty.

After war, a mess hall at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia, was named in his honor.

Hospital Corpsman John E. Kilmer

A native of Highland Park, Illinois, 22-year-old Kilmer enlisted in the Navy from Texas in 1947. He was assigned to duty with 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in Korea and was killed on 13 August 1952. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

With his company engaged in defending a vitally important hill position, well forward of the main line of resistance, during an assault by large concentrations of hostile troops, HC Kilmer repeatedly braved intense enemy mortar, artillery, and sniper fire to move from one position to another, administering aid to the wounded and expediting their evacuation. Painfully wounded himself when struck by mortar fragments, while moving to the aid of a casualty, he persisted in his efforts and inched his way to the side of the stricken Marine through a hail of enemy shells falling around him. Undaunted by the devastating hostile fire, he skillfully administered first aid to his comrade and, as another mounting barrage of enemy fire shattered the immediate area, unhesitatingly shielded the wounded man with his body.

Private First Class Robert E. Simanek

Born in Detroit, Michigan, in 1930, he was inducted into the Marine Corps in 1951. For his bravery in Korea on 17 August 1952, while serving with Company F, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, he was awarded a Medal of Honor with a citation which reads, in part:

While accompanying a patrol en route to occupy a combat outpost forward of friendly lines, Private Class Simanek exhibited a high degree of courage and resolute spirit of self-sacrifice in protecting the lives of his fellow Marines. With his unit ambushed by an intense concentration of enemy mortar and small-arms fire, and suffering heavy casualties, he was forced to seek cover with the remaining members of the patrol in the near-by trench line. Determined to save his comrades when a hostile grenade was hurled into their midst, he unhesitatingly threw himself on the deadly missile, absorbing the shattering violence of the exploding charge in his own body and shielding his fellow Marines from serious injury or death.

He miraculously survived the explosion and was retired on disability in 1953. —Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)
attacking again. Mortars and artillery shelled Combat Outpost 2, overlooking the Panmunjom corridor on the left of the sector held by the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, and also harassed the main line of resistance nearby. The main Chinese thrust, directed as expected against Bunker Hill, began at about 2100 on the night of August 13. While shells still exploded on Combat Outpost 2, the enemy intensified his bombardment of Bunker Hill, which had been under sporadic fire throughout the afternoon. Chinese troops hit Company H, commanded by Captain John G. Demas, attacking simultaneously near the center of the position and on the right flank. (His was the only element of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, not yet pulled back to the Jamestown Line.) High explosive shells boxed in the Marines, and illuminating rounds helped them isolate and kill the few Chinese who had penetrated the position.

The Chinese battalion that attacked Bunker Hill on the night of August 13 again tested the Marine defenses at 0225 on the following morning. Before this unit's second attack, a Chinese machine gun on Siberia began firing onto Bunker Hill. Marine M-46s stabbed Siberia with brief shafts of illumination from their searchlights and silenced the weapon with 90mm fire, thus revealing the position of the tanks and enabling Chinese artillery fire to wound a crewman of one of them. The enemy may have initiated this flurry of action, which lasted only about four minutes, to protect the recovery of his soldiers wounded or killed in the earlier fighting rather than to challenge the hill's defenses.

The 1st Marines responded to the fighting of 13 and 14 August by reinforcing both Bunker Hill and the nearest segment of the Jamestown Line, the so-called Siberia Sector, in anticipation of further Chinese attacks. As part of the preparation, Captain Demas, whose Company H, 7th Marines, still held Bunker Hill, patrolled the slopes where the enemy had launched several attacks but found no Chinese, a situation that rapidly changed. At 0118 on 15 August, a deluge of hostile artillery began pummeling the Marine position, while Chinese infantry jabbed at the defenses. Once again, Marine-
The struggle for Bunker Hill cost the Marines 48 killed, 313 seriously wounded, and hundreds of others who suffered minor wounds. The number of known Chinese dead exceeded 400 and total casualties may have numbered 3,200. The month ended with Bunker Hill in Marine hands.

The capture of Bunker Hill by Colonel Layer’s Marines and its subsequent defense relied on the deadly use of supporting arms, ranging from the tanks that had spearheaded the diversion against Siberia, through mortars and artillery, to aircraft. The search-light-carrying M-46s, for example, helped illuminate Chinese troops massing to counterattack the hill and opened fire on them. Marine and Air Force fighter-bombers hit the enemy on Siberia, helped seize and hold Bunker Hill, and hammered the approaches to Stromboli, where F4Us dropped 1,000-pound bombs and napalm. Marine MPQ-14 radar directed nighttime strikes against Chinese artillery positions. In addition, Marine artillery played a critical role, especially the box-me-in fires planned for emergencies. The 11th Marines fired 10,652 shells in the 24 hours ending at 1800 on 13 August, a volume not exceeded until the final months of the war in 1953. Although supplies of explosive shells proved adequate at this time, illuminating rounds tended to be in short supply.

The Marines of 1952 were fighting a war of unceasing attrition far different from the succession of bloody campaigns, interspersed with time for incorporating replacements into units withdrawn from combat, that had characterized the war against Japan. Men and equipment had to be absorbed during sustained fighting to replace not only combat losses, but also administrative attrition.
Casualties and Courageous Hospital Corpsemen

The fighting at Bunker Hill would have been even deadlier for the Marines had it not been for their protective equipment and the excellent medical treatment available from battlefield first-aid stations to hospital ships off the coast. According to regimental surgeons, 17 wounded Marines would certainly have died had they not been wearing the new armored vest. Moreover, the steel helmet used in World War II had again proved its worth in deflecting or stopping shell fragments or nearly spent bullets. The heavy vest, though it undeniably saved lives, proved an enervating burden in the heat and humidity of the Korean summer and contributed to dehydration and heat exhaustion, but the advantage of increased safety—along with improved morale—more than outweighed the disadvantages.

The uniformly sloping terrain of Bunker Hill caused the Hospital Corpsmen assigned to the Marines to set up their forward aid stations on the reverse slope, overlooking the Jamestown Line, to obtain protection from flat trajectory fire and direct observation by the enemy. Wounded Marines being evacuated from the aid stations for further treatment ran the risk of mortar and artillery fire. A shortage of tracked armored personnel carriers, which would have provided a measure of protection from hostile fire and a less jolting ride than ordinary trucks, increased both the danger and the discomfort. Moreover, the stretcher rapidly became a precious item, since so many of the limited supply were being used for the time-consuming trip to surgical facilities some distance to the rear.

The 1st Medical Battalion had three collecting and clearing companies, two of which supported units committed on the division’s main line of resistance while the third supported units on the Kimpo Peninsula. Located about six miles behind the line was the division hospital, a 200-bed facility staffed and equipped to provide definitive care for all types of cases. Serious cases or cases requiring specialized care were evacuated by helicopter, ambulance, hospital train, rail bus, or plane to a hospital ship at Inchon, Army Mobile Surgical Hospitals, or to the Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan.

The Surgeon General of the Navy, Rear Admiral Herbert L. Pugh, evaluated the medical support that he observed during the Bunker Hill fighting. He declared that medical treatment had been successful for a variety of reasons: the armored vest and steel helmet, of course; skilled Navy surgeons with access to a reliable supply of blood for transfusions; evacuation by helicopter to surgical facilities ashore or, if necessary, to hospital ships; and the courageous effort of Navy Hospital Corpsman serving alongside the Marines.

Courtesy of Frank D. Praytor, USMC
caused by a fixed period of enlistment and a definite tour of duty in Korea. To help man his combat battalions, General Selden on 12 August directed rear-area units to provide replacements for the 1st Marines; within two days, some 200 men, most of them volunteers, joined the regiment’s infantry units. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., approved flying 500 infantry replacements to Korea. Lieutenant General Franklin A. Hart, in command of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, requested a delay to make sure he could assemble the necessary air transport; he could, and on 21 August the replacements arrived in Korea. The Commandant also approved

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Change of Command

On 29 August 1952, Major General John T. Selden, shown on the left in the accompanying photograph, relinquished command of the 1st Marine Division. His tenure as commanding general, which began in January 1952, earned him the U.S. Army’s Distinguished Service Medal for conducting “successful operations against the enemy.” During World War II, he had commanded the 5th Marines on New Britain and served as Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division, in the conquest of Peleliu in the Palau Islands. After leaving Korea, he served on the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Europe, until 1953 when he assumed command of Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California, from which post he retired in 1955. General Selden died in 1964 and was buried with full military honors in Arlington National Cemetery.

Born at Richmond, Virginia, in 1893, Selden enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1915 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in July 1918. Instead of being sent to France, he received orders to convoy duty in USS *Huntington*. Between the World Wars, he served in Haiti and China and at various posts in the United States. He attended the Senior Officers’ Course at Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, joined the 1st Brigade, which formed the nucleus of the 1st Marine Division, and participated in maneuvers at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When war came, he served in a variety of assignments in the Pacific before joining the 1st Marine Division in time for the New Britain campaign.

Command of the 1st Marine Division in Korea passed to Major General Edwin A. Pollock, a native of Georgia who graduated from The Citadel, South Carolina’s military college, in 1921. He promptly resigned his commission in the Army Reserve and on 1 July accepted an appointment as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve. His early career included service in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, on board ship, and with various installations and units in the United States.

Promoted to lieutenant colonel in April 1942, he commanded the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, at Guadalcanal, where on the night of 20-21 August, he earned the Navy Cross for his inspired leadership in repulsing a Japanese attack at the Tenaru River. He became a colonel in November 1943 and afterward saw action on New Britain and at Iwo Jima.

Following the war he served at Marine Corps Schools and Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, and at Headquarters Marine Corps. As a major general, he took over the 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, before being reassigned to Korea, where he succeeded General Selden in command of the 1st Marine Division. General Pollock led the division in Korea from August 1952 until June 1953, in the final weeks of the war.

After Korea, General Pollock returned to Quantico as director of the Marine Corps Education Center, and then was assigned as commander Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina, before coming back to Quantico as Commandant of Marine Corps Schools. In 1956, he was appointed Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, followed by a tour as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, from which post he retired in 1959. General Pollock served in several capacities on The Citadel’s Board of Visitors before his death in 1982.
Selden's request to increase by 500 men each of the next two scheduled replacement drafts.

**Fighting Elsewhere on the Outpost Line**

As the month of August wore on, any lull in the action around Bunker Hill usually coincided with a surge in the fighting elsewhere, usually on the right of the main line of resistance, the segment held by the 5th Marines, commanded after 16 August by Colonel Eustace R. Smoak. On 6 August, while Colonel Culhane still commanded the regiment, the Chinese began chipping away at the outpost line in front of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, which consisted of Outposts Elmer, Hilda, and Irene.

Because the battalion manned the outposts only in daylight, the Chinese simply occupied Elmer, farthest to the southwest, after dusk on 6 August and employed artillery fire to seal off the approaches and prevent the Marines from returning after daylight. The Chinese took over Outpost Hilda on the night of 11 August, driving back the Marines sent to reoccupy it the following morning. The Chinese began shelling the outpost and probing its right flank, but small arms fire forced the enemy to pull back.

Heavy rains comparable to the downpour of late July turned roads into swamps throughout the Marine sector, swept away a bridge over the Imjin River, and forced the closing of a ferry. Bunkers remained largely unaffected by flooding, but the deluge interfered with both air support and combat on the ground. Since the rain fell alike on the U.N. and Chinese forces, activity halted temporarily when nine inches fell between 23 and 25 August.

**Bunker Hill and Outpost Bruce**

The Chinese greeted the new division commander, Major General Edwin A. Pollock, by exerting new pressure against the Bunker Hill complex, now held by Captain Stanley T. Moak's Company E, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, attached temporarily to the regiment's 3d Battalion. On the night of 4 September, Chinese gunners began shelling the outpost and probing its right flank, but small arms fire forced the enemy to pull back.

The resulting lull lasted only until 0100 on 5 September, when Chinese mortars and artillery resumed firing, concentrating on Hill 122, Bunker Hill. Apparently confident that the barrage had neutralized the defenses, the attackers ignored cover and concealment and moved boldly into an unexpected hail of fire that drove them back. After regrouping, the enemy attacked once again, this time making use of every irregularity in the ground and employing the entire spectrum of weapons from hand grenades to artillery. The latest effort went badly awry when a force trying to outflank Bunker Hill lost its way and drew fire from Marines on the main line of resistance. The attackers tried to correct their mistake only to come under fire from their fellow Chinese who had penetrated the extreme right of Bunker Hill's defenses and may have mistaken their comrades for counterattacking Marines. Amid the confusion, Moak's company surged forward and drove the enemy from the outpost. The Marines of Company E suffered 12 killed and 40 wounded in routing a Chinese battalion while killing an estimated 335 of the enemy.

Yet another diversionary attack on Outpost Stromboli coincided with the thrust against Bunker Hill. The Marines defending Stromboli sustained no casualties in breaking up an attack by an enemy platoon supported by machine guns.

The 2d and 3d Battalions of Colonel Smoak's 5th Marines
Private First Class Alford L. McLaughlin

A 24-year-old native of Leeds, Alabama, he listed in the Marine Corps in 1945. Awarded a Purple Heart Medal in August 1952, his heroism again was recognized during the struggle on Bunker Hill on the night of 4-5 September 1952, while serving as a machine gunner with Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. His citation reads, in part:

When hostile forces attacked in battalion strength during the night, he maintained a constant flow of devastating fire upon the enemy, alternating employing two machine guns, a carbine and hand grenades. Although painfully wounded, he bravely fired the machine guns from the hip until his hands became blistered by the extreme heat from the weapons and, placing the guns on the ground to allow them to cool, continued to defend the position with his carbine and grenades. Standing up in full view, he shouted words of encouragement to his comrades above the din of battle and, throughout a series of fanatical enemy attacks, sprayed the surrounding area with deadly fire accounting for an estimated one hundred and fifty enemy dead and fifty wounded.

Remarkably, he survived this battle, made a continuing career in the Marine Corps, and eventually retired in 1977 as a master sergeant.

Hospital Corpsman Third Class Edward C. Benfold

Born in Staten Island, New York, in 1931, he enlisted in the Navy and was assigned in 1951 to the Marine Corps where he bore the designation of “medical field technician.” In Korea, while serving with 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, he was killed on 5 September 1952. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

Benfold resolutely moved from position to position in the face of intense hostile fire, treating the wounded and lending words of encouragement. Leaving the protection of his sheltered position to treat the wounded, when the platoon area in which he was working was attacked from both the front and rear, he moved forward to an exposed ridge line where he observed two Marines in a large crater. As he approached the two men to determine their condition, an enemy soldier threw two grenades into the crater while two other enemy charged the position. Picking up a grenade in each hand, HC3c Benfold leaped out of the crater and hurled himself against the onrushing hostile soldiers, pushing the grenades against their chests and killing both the attackers.

In 1994, the Navy named a guided missile destroyer, USS Benfold (DDG 65), in his honor.

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

Edward C. Benfold saw two wounded Marines in a shell hole on Outpost Bruce; as he prepared to attend to them, a pair of grenades thrown by two onrushing Chinese soldiers fell inside the crater. Benfold picked up one grenade in each hand, scrambled from the hole, and pressed a grenade against each of the two soldiers. The explosions killed both the Chinese, as Benfold sacrificed himself to save the two
wounded Marines, earning a posthumous Medal of Honor.

When dawn broke on 5 September, Holt’s Company I still clung to Outpost Bruce, even though only two bunkers, both on the slope nearest the Jamestown Line, survived destruction by mortar and artillery shells. The commander of the 3d Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Oscar T. Jensen, Jr., rushed reinforcements, construction and other supplies, and ammunition to the battered outpost despite harassing fire directed at the trails leading there.

The 1st Marine Division commander, MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, left, welcomes the United Nations commander, Gen Mark W. Clark, USA, to the division’s area. Gen Clark had succeeded Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, who took over as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, from General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Marine and Air Force pilots tried to suppress the hostile gunners with 10 air strikes that dropped napalm as well as high explosive.

On the morning of 6 September, the defenders of Outpost Bruce beat off another attack, finally calling for box-me-in fires that temporarily put an end to infantry assaults. At dusk, however, the Chinese again bombarded the outpost, this time for an hour, before attacking with infantry while directing long-range fire at neighboring Outpost Allen to the southwest. The Marines defending Outpost Bruce survived to undergo further attack on the early morning of 7 September. Two Chinese companies tried to envelop the hilltop, using demolitions in an attempt to destroy any bunkers not yet shattered by the latest shelling.

For a total of 51 hours, the enemy besieged Outpost Bruce before breaking off the action by sunrise on the 7th. At Bruce, the site of the deadliest fighting in this sector, the Marines suffered 19 killed and 38 wounded, 20 more than the combined casualties sustained defending all the other outposts manned by the 2d and 3d
Battalions, 5th Marines. Chinese killed and wounded at Outpost Bruce may have totaled 400.

**Pressure on Korean Marines**

At the left of the line held by the 1st Marine Division, the frontage of the Korean Marine Corps veered southward, roughly paralleling the Sachon River as it flowed toward the Imjin. The Korean Marines had established a series of combat outposts on the broken ground between the Sachon and the Jamestown Line. On the evening of 5 September, while the outposts manned by the 5th Marines were undergoing attack, Chinese artillery and mortars began pounding Outpost 37, a bombardment that soon included Outpost 36 to the southwest and an observation post on Hill 155 on the main line of resistance, roughly 1,000 yards from the boundary with the 1st Marines.

Chinese infantry, who had crossed the Sachon near Outposts 36 and 37, attacked both of them. Two assaults on Outpost 37, which began at 1910, may have been a diversion, for at the same time the enemy launched the first of three attacks on Outpost 36. The final effort, supported by fire from tanks and artillery, overran the hill, but the Chinese had lost too many men and too much equipment—at least 33 bodies littered the hill along with a hundred abandoned grenades and numerous automatic weapons—forcing the enemy to withdraw the survivors. The Korean Marines suffered 16 killed or wounded from the platoon at Outpost 36 and another four casualties in the platoon defending Outpost 37.

Clashes involving the outposts of the Korean Marine Corps continued. The South Koreans dispatched tank-infantry probes and set up ambushes. At first, the Chinese responded to this activity with mortars and artillery, firing a daily average of 339 rounds between 12 and 19 September, about one-third of the total directed against Outpost 36. An attack by infantry followed.

Before sunrise on the 19th, Chinese troops again infiltrated across the Sachon, as they had two weeks earlier. They hid in caves and ravines until evening, when they advanced on Outposts 36, their principal objective, and 37, along with Outposts 33 and 31 to the south. A savage barrage of more than 400 rounds tore up the defenses rebuilt after the 5 September attack and enabled the Chinese to overwhelm Outpost 36. Shortly after midnight, a South Korean counterattack seized a lodgment on the hill, but the Chinese retaliated immediately, driving off, killing, or capturing those who had regained the outpost.

With the coming of daylight, Marine aircraft joined in battering
enemy-held Outpost 36. Air strikes succeeded in hitting the far side of the hill, destroying mortars and killing troops massing in defilade to exploit the earlier success. Two platoons of Korean Marines—supported by fire from tanks, mortars, and artillery—followed up the deadly air attacks and regained Outpost 36, killing or wounding an estimated 150 of the enemy.

**Further Action Along the Line**

In late September, while fighting raged around Outpost 36 in the sector held by the Korean Marines, the Chinese attacked the combat outposts manned by Colonel Layer's 1st Marines, especially Hill 122 (Bunker Hill) and Hill 124 at the southwestern tip of the same ridge line. The enemy struck first at Hill 124, attacking by flare-light from four directions but failing to dislodge the squad dug in there, even though most of the Marines suffered at least minor wounds.

The entire ridge from Hill 124 to Hill 122 remained under recurring attack for the remainder of September, especially Bunker Hill itself, where the enemy clung to advance positions as close as 30 yards to Marine trenches. The Chinese frequently probed Bunker Hill's defenses by night, and the Marines took advantage of darkness to raid enemy positions, using portable flamethrowers and demolitions to destroy bunkers while fire from tanks and artillery discouraged counterattacks.

Tests earlier in the year had proved the theory that transport helicopters could resupply a battalion manning the main line of resistance. The next step was to determine if rotary wing aircraft could accomplish the logistical support of an entire frontline regiment. For the five-day period, 22-26 September, Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 successfully supplied the 7th Marines with ammunition, gasoline, rations, and mail a daily mail run. All but valuable cargo, such as mail, was carried externally in slings or wire baskets.

As October began, the Chinese saluted the new month with heavier shelling, the prelude to a series of attacks on outposts all across the division front from the Korean Marine Corps on the left, past the 1st Marines and Bunker Hill, to the far right, where the 7th Marines, commanded by Colonel Thomas C. Moore, Jr., had taken over from the 5th Marines, now in reserve. To make communications more secure, Colonel Moore's regiment redesignated Outposts Allen, Bruce, Clarence, Donald, Gary, and Jill, replacing proper names, in
Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., center, Commandant of the Marine Corps, looks at enemy positions while touring frontline Marine positions. LtCol Anthony J. Caputo, left, commanding officer of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, briefs the Commandant on the situation.

alphabetical order, with the randomly arranged names of cities: Carson, Reno, Vegas, Berlin, Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle.

On the left, Chinese loudspeakers announced on the night of 1 October that artillery would level the outpost on Hill 86, overlooking the Sachon River, and warned the defenders to flee. When the South Korean Marines remained in place, a comparatively light barrage of 145 rounds exploded on the hill and its approaches, too few to dislodge the defenders. On the following evening at 1830, the Chinese resumed firing, this time from the high ground beyond Hill 36, and extended the bombardment to all the outposts within range. The Korean Marines dispatched a platoon of tanks to silence the enemy's direct-fire weapons, but the unit returned without locating the source of the enemy fire. After the tanks pulled back, Chinese artillery fire intensified, battering all the outposts until one red and one green flare burst in the night sky. At that signal, the guns fell silent, and infantry attacked Outposts 36, 37, and 86.

Outpost 37, the northernmost of the three, resisted gallantly, forcing the Chinese to double the size of the assault force in order to overrun the position. On 3 October, the Korean Marines launched two counterattacks. The second of these recaptured the crest and held it until Chinese artillery and mortar fire forced a withdrawal. By late afternoon on 5 October, the Korean Marines twice regained the outpost, only to be hurled back each time, and finally had to call off the counterattacks, leaving the hill in enemy hands.

To the south, the Chinese also stormed Outpost 36 on 2 October. The defenders hurled back two nighttime attacks, but the cumulative casualties and damage to the fortifications forced the Korean Marines to withdraw. The enemy immediately occupied the hill and held it.

The most vulnerable of the three, Outpost 86, lay farthest from the main line of resistance and closest to the Sachon River. On the
night of 2 October, a Chinese assault overran the outpost, forcing the Korean Marines to find cover at the foot of the hill and regroup. At mid-morning on the 3d, artillery barrages and air strikes pounded the enemy at Outpost 86, scattering the Chinese there and enabling a South Korean counterattack to regain the objective. The Korean Marines dug in, but on 6 October the Chinese again prevailed, holding the outpost until a South Korean counterattack in the early hours of the 7th forced them down the slope. At about dawn on that same morning, the enemy mounted yet another counterattack, advancing behind a deadly artillery barrage, seizing and holding Outpost 86, and ending this flurry of action on the outpost line in front of the Korean Marine Corps.

Focus on 7th Marines

Although October passed rather quietly for the 1st Marines—except for recurring probes, patrols, and ambushes in the vicinity of Bunker Hill—violent clashes erupted along the line held by the 7th Marines. The enemy began stubborn efforts, which persisted into 1953, to gain control of some or all of the nine combat outposts that Colonel Moore’s regiment manned on the high ground to its front.

The 7th Marines took over seven outposts when it relieved the 5th Marines, renaming them, from left to right, Carson, Reno, Vegas, Berlin, Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle. At the point—later known as the Hook—where the frontline veered southward toward the boundary with the British Commonwealth Division—the 7th Marines set up Outpost Warsaw. A second new outpost, Verdun, guarded the boundary between the Marine and Commonwealth divisions. An average of 450 yards separated four of these outposts—Detroit, Frisco, Seattle, and Warsaw—which occupied hills lower than those on the left of the regimental line and therefore were more easily isolated and attacked.

As they did so often, the Chinese began with a diversionary thrust, jabbing at Detroit before throwing knockout blows—artillery and mortar fire preceding an infantry attack—at Seattle and Warsaw. An enemy company overwhelmed the reinforced platoon on Warsaw on 2 October, but the Marines fought stubbornly before falling back. Private Jack W. Kelso picked up a grenade thrown into a...
Private Jack W. Kelso

Born in 1934 in Madera, California, he enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1951. In Korea, he was awarded a Silver Star medal for heroism in August 1952. As a rifleman with Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, he was killed on 2 October 1952 near Sokchon. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

When both the platoon commander and the platoon sergeant became casualties during the defense of a vital outpost against a numerically superior enemy force attacking at night under cover of intense small-arms, grenade and mortar fire, Private Kelso bravely exposed himself to the hail of enemy fire in a determined effort to reorganize the unit and to repel the onrushing attackers. Forced to seek cover, along with four other Marines, in a near-by bunker which immediately came under attack, he unhesitatingly picked up an enemy grenade which landed in the shelter, rushed out into the open and hurled it back at the enemy.

Although painfully wounded when the grenade exploded as it left his hand, and again forced to seek the protection of the bunker when the hostile fire became more intensified, Private Kelso refused to remain in his position of comparative safety and moved out into the fire-swept area to return the enemy fire, thereby permitting the pinned-down Marines in the bunker to escape.

Staff Sergeant Lewis G. Watkins

Born in 1925 in Seneca, South Carolina, he enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1950. While serving as a platoon guide for Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, he gave his life on 7 October 1952. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

With his platoon assigned the mission or re-taking an outpost which had been overrun by the enemy earlier in the night, Staff Sergeant Watkins skillfully led his unit in the assault up the designated hill. Although painfully wounded when a well-entrenched hostile force at the crest of the hill engaged the platoon with intense small-arms and grenade fire, gallantly continued to lead his men. Obtaining an automatic rifle from one of the wounded men, he assisted in pinning down an enemy machine gun holding up the assault.

When an enemy grenade landed among Staff Sergeant Watkins and several other Marines while they were moving forward through a trench on the hill crest, he immediately pushed his companions aside, placed himself in position to shield them and picked up the deadly missile in an attempt to throw it outside the trench. Mortally wounded when the grenade exploded in his hand, Staff Sergeant Watkins, by his great personal valor in the face of almost certain death, saved the lives of several of his comrades.

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)
Second Lieutenant Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr.

Born in 1929 in Hartford, Connecticut, he was appointed a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1952 and then ordered to active duty. He died heroically at “The Hook” on 26 October 1952 while serving as an artillery forward observer of Battery F, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines. The citation for his Medal of Honor award reads, in part:

Skinner, in a determined effort to hold his position, immediately organized and directed the surviving personnel in the defense of the outpost, continuing to call down fire on the enemy by means of radio alone until this equipment became damaged beyond repair. Undaunted by the intense hostile barrage and the rapidly closing attackers, he twice left the protection of his bunker in order to direct accurate machine-gun fire and to replenish the depleted supply of ammunition and grenades. Although painfully wounded on each occasion, he steadfastly refused medical aid until the rest of the men received treatment.

As the ground attack reached its climax, he gallantly directed the final defense until the meager supply of ammunition was exhausted and the position overrun. During the three hours that the outpost was occupied by the enemy, several grenades were thrown into the bunker which served as protection for Second Lieutenant Skinner and his remaining comrades. Realizing that there was no chance for other than passive resistance, he directed his men to feign death even though the hostile troops entered the bunker and searched their persons. Later, when an enemy grenade was thrown between him and two other survivors, he immediately threw himself on the deadly missile in an effort to protect the others, absorbing the full force of the explosion and sacrificing his life for his comrades.

In 1991, Skinner Hall at Quantico, Virginia, was dedicated in his honor.

Second Lieutenant George H. O’Brien, Jr.

Born in Fort Worth, Texas, in 1926, he enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1949. Ordered to active duty in 1951, he entered Officer Candidate School and was commissioned in 1952. As a rifle platoon leader with Company H, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in the battle for the Hook on 27 October 1952, he was awarded a Medal of Honor with a citation, which reads, in part:

O’Brien leaped from his trench when the attack signal was given and, shouting for his men to follow raced across an exposed saddle and up the enemy-held hill through a virtual hail of deadly small-arms, artillery and mortar fire. Although shot through the arm and thrown to the ground by hostile automatic-weapons fire as he neared the well-entrenched enemy position, he bravely regained his feet, waved his men onward and continued to spearhead the assault, pausing only long enough to go to the aid of a wounded Marine. Encountering the enemy at close range, he proceeded to hurl hand grenades into the bunkers and, utilizing his carbine to best advantage in savage hand-to-hand combat, succeeded in killing at least three of the enemy.

Struck down by the concussion of grenades on three occasions during the subsequent action, he steadfastly refused to be evacuated for medical treatment and continued to lead his platoon in the assault for a period of nearly four hours, repeatedly encouraging his men and maintaining superb direction of the unit.

He received a second Purple Heart Medal in January 1953, and after the war, he joined the Reserves and was promoted to major.

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)
counterattack. While the Marines regrouped for another assault, the 11th Marines pounded the outpost with artillery fire. At 2225 on 3 October, the Marines again stormed the objective, but Chinese artillery prevailed, and Seattle remained in Chinese hands.

The loss of Outpost Seattle, the recapture of Warsaw, and a successful defense of Frisco against a Chinese probe on the night of 5 October did not mark the end of the effort to seize the outposts manned by the 7th Marines, but only a pause. The regiment’s casualties—13 killed and 88 wounded by 3 October when the Marines suspended the attempt to retake Seattle—caused the 7th Marines to shuffle units. The 3d Battalion, commanded until 13 October by Lieutenant Colonel Gerald F. Russell, had suffered most of the casualties. As a result, while Russell’s battalion reduced its frontage, the 1st Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Leo J. Dulacki, moved from the regimental reserve to take over the right-hand portion of the Jamestown Line. Dulacki’s Marines manned the main line of resistance from roughly 500 yards southwest of the Hook to the boundary shared with the Commonwealth Division, including Outposts Warsaw and Verdun. Colonel Moore thus placed all three battalions on line, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Caputo’s 2d Battalion on the left, Russell’s 3d Battalion in the center, and now Dulacki’s 1st Battalion on the right.

The 7th Marines completed its realignment just in time to meet a series of carefully planned and aggressively executed Chinese attacks delivered on 6 and 7 October against five combat outposts and two points on the main line of resistance. The Marines struck first, however, when a reinforced platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion, attacked toward Outpost Seattle at 0600 on 6 October. Mortar and artillery fire forced the platoon to take cover and regroup, even as the Chinese were reinforcing the outpost they now held. The attack resumed at 0900. Despite infantry reinforcements, air strikes, and artillery, the Marines could not crack Seattle’s defenses and broke off the attack at about 1100, after losing 12 killed and 44 wounded. The attackers estimated that they had killed or wounded 71 Chinese.

On the evening of the 6th, the Chinese took the initiative, by midnight firing some 4,400 artillery and mortar rounds against the outpost line and two points on the main line of resistance. On the left of Colonel Moore’s line, the enemy probed Outposts Carson and Reno, and on the right he stormed Warsaw, forcing the defenders to call for box-me-in fire that severed the telephone wire linking the outpost with the Jamestown Line. The first message from Warsaw when contact was restored requested more artillery fire, which by 2055 helped break the back of the Chinese assault, forcing the enemy to fall back.

The most determined attacks on the night of 6 October and early hours of the 7th hit Outposts Detroit and Frisco in the center of the regimental front. To divert attention from these objectives, each one manned by two squads, the Chinese probed two points on the main line of resistance that had already been subjected to artillery and mortar bombardment. At 1940 on the night of the 6th, an attacking company that had gained a foothold in the main trench on Detroit fell back after deadly fire stopped the enemy short of the bunkers. Two hours later, the Chinese again seized a segment of trench on Detroit and tried to exploit the lodgment. The Marines
reacted by calling on the 11th Marines to box in the outpost. Communications failed for a time, but at about 2115 the defenders of Detroit requested variable-time fire for airbursts over the bunkers, which would protect the Marines while the enemy outside remained exposed to a hail of shell fragments. The artillerymen fired as the Marines on Detroit asked, but the outpost again lost contact with headquarters of the 3d Battalion.

Two squads set out from the Jamestown Line to reinforce the Marines from Company G, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, manning Outpost Detroit. The Chinese frustrated this attempt with artillery fire but in the meantime again abandoned their foothold on Detroit, probably because of the shower of fragments from Marine shells bursting above them. The respite proved short-lived, however, for the enemy renewed the attack shortly after midnight and extended his control of the hill despite further scourging from the 11th Marines. A six-man Marine patrol reached the outpost, returning at 0355 to report that the Chinese now held the trenchline and bunkers; only two of the Marines who had manned Detroit escaped death or capture. The attempt to break through to the outpost ended, and by 0630, the Marines engaged in the effort had returned to the main line of resistance.

Meanwhile, at about 2000, a Chinese company hit the two squads from Company H that held Outpost Frisco, north of Detroit. The assault troops worked their way into the trenches, but airbursts from Marine artillery reinforced the small arms fire of the defenders in driving the enemy back. The Chinese renewed the attack just after midnight, and two Marine squads advanced from the main line of resistance to reinforce Frisco, only to be stopped short of their goal by fire from artillery and mortars. Companies H and I of Russell’s 3d Battalion made further attempts to reach Frisco during the early morning, but not until 0510 did a reinforced platoon from Company I arrive and take control.

During the final attack, Staff Sergeant Lewis G. Watkins, despite earlier wounds, took an automatic rifle from a more badly injured Marine and opened fire to keep the platoon moving forward. When a Chinese grenade landed near him, he seized it, but it exploded before he could throw it away, fatally wounding Watkins, whose leadership and self-sacrifice earned him a posthumous Medal of Honor. A second platoon from Company I joined the other unit atop the hill, and at 0715 Frisco was declared secure.

To keep Frisco firmly in Marine hands, however, would have invited attrition and ultimately required more men than General Pollock and Colonel Moore could spare from the main line of resistance. Consequently, the 7th Marines abandoned the outpost. The regiment had yielded three outposts—Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle—but forced the Chinese to pay a high price, estimated to include 200 killed. The losses suffered by the 7th Marines totaled 10 killed, 22 missing, and 128 wounded, 105 of them seriously enough to require evacuation.

Since the Chinese also wrested Outposts 37, 36, and 86 from the Korean Marine Corps, the 1st Marine Division had lost six combat outposts of varying tactical importance. The lost outposts and those that remained in Marine hands had no value except to the extent their possession affected the security of the Jamestown Line. As a result, the Marines remained wary of mounting major counterattacks; to provide continued protection for the main line of resistance, General Pollock would rely on nighttime patrols and listening posts to supplement the remaining outposts and replace the captured ones.

**During the battles of October 1952, a number of Marine bunkers on the Jamestown Line were severely damaged by Chinese mortar and artillery fire.**

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A167465
Unlike the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which experienced shortages of spare parts, especially for its newer planes and helicopters, the 1st Marine Division emerged from the outpost fighting with few supply problems except for communications gear. The Army helped with replenishment by releasing essential spare parts from stocks in Japan, and new radio, telephone, and teletype equipment also arrived from the United States. The Army, moreover, tapped its stocks for new trucks to replace the division's worn-out vehicles. To operate the logistics network more efficiently, the division placed the re-equipped truck units in direct support of the infantry regiments instead of keeping them in a centralized motor pool. The change reduced both the total mileage driven and vulnerability to artillery fire. In another attempt to improve logistics, the Marines increased from 500 to 800 the number of Korean laborers serving with each of the front-line regiments.

Chinese Attack the Hook

The fighting for the outposts that raged early in October died down, although the Chinese jabbed from time to time at Bunker Hill and continued their nighttime patrolling elsewhere along the Jamestown Line. During the lull, Colonel Smoak's 5th Marines took over the center of the division's line from the 1st Marines, which went into reserve, improving the fall-back defense lines, undergoing training, and patrolling to maintain security in the rear areas. As the division reserve, the 1st Marines prepared to counterattack if the enemy should penetrate the main line of resistance. Indeed, the regiment had to be ready to help block a Chinese breakthrough anywhere in I Corps, which held the western third of the United Nations line.

With the 1st Marines now in reserve, Colonel Moore's 7th Marines manned the right of the division's line placing all three battalions on line and keeping only one company from the 3d Battalion in reserve. To replace this company, Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Barrett, the 3d Battalion's new commander, organized a platoon of cooks, drivers, and other members of the headquarters into an improvised platoon that served as his unit's reserve. Barrett's thinly spread 3d Battalion manned two combat outposts—Berlin and East Berlin, the latter established on 13 October—besides defending the center of the regimental line.

To the left of Barrett's unit, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Caputo defended its portion of the regimental line and maintained three combat outposts, Carson, Reno, and Vegas. Like Barrett's battalion in the center, Caputo's Marines held a sector with few vulnerable salients that the aggressive Chinese might pinch off and capture.

On the far right of the regimental line, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki's 1st Battalion held the dominant terrain feature in the reg-
Distant Strikes to Close Air Support

During the struggle over the combat outpost line, from late July through early October, the 1st Marine Division benefited from a shift in aerial strategy. Long-range interdiction, an important element of U. S. Air Force doctrine, gave way to a policy of hitting the enemy wherever he might be, whether exercising control from the North Korean capital of Pyongyang or massing to attack Bunker Hill or some other outpost.

United Nations aircraft hit Pyongyang hard in July and again in August. The 11 July attack consisted of four separate raids, the last of them after dark. The operation, named Pressure Pump, blasted headquarters buildings, supply dumps, and the radio station, which was silenced for two days. Of 30 individual targets attacked on the 11th, three were obliterated, 25 damaged in varying degrees and only two survived intact. On 29 August, three daylight raids damaged 34 targets on a list of 45 that included government agencies—among them the resurrected Radio Pyongyang—factories, warehouses, and barracks.

According to Colonel Samuel S. Jack, chief of staff of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, a shift of emphasis away from long-range interdiction caused the Far East Air Forces to endorse the wing’s using its aircraft primarily to respond to requests for support from the 1st Marine Division. Even as the Air Force became more cooperative, Army commanders complained about the air support they received and began agitating for a more responsive system, like that of the Marine Corps, that would cover the entire battlefront. General Mark W. Clark, the United Nations commander since May 1952, refused, however, to tamper with the existing system that in effect gave the Far East Air Forces, an Air Force headquarters, “coordination control” over the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and channeled requests through a Joint Operations Center. Instead, he called for increasing the efficiency of the current arrangement to reduce reaction time.

During the defense of Bunker Hill in August, 1,000 sorties, most of them by Marines, bombed and strafed the attacking Chinese. In early October, when the fighting shifted eastward to the outposts manned by the 7th Marines, the wing flew 319 close air support sorties.

Besides coming to the aid of their fellow Marines on the ground, crews of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing supported the U. S. and South Korean armies. In July, for example, eight heavily-armed and armored AU-1 Corsairs from Marine Attack Squadron 323 attacked Chinese mortar positions, antitank weapons, and troop concentrations opposing the Republic of Korea’s I Corps. Rockets, 1,000-pound bombs, napalm, and 20mm fire killed an estimated 500 of the enemy. Similarly, four pilots from Marine Fighter Squadron 311 helped the U. S. Army’s 25th Infantry Division by destroying three bunkers and two artillery pieces while collapsing some 50 feet of trench.

In operations like these, weather could prove as deadly as antiaircraft fire. On 10 September, as 22 Panther jets were returning from a strike near Sariswon, fog settled over their base. Sixteen planes landed safely at an alternate airfield, but the others flew into a mountain as they approached the runway, killing all six pilots.

Marine helicopters continued to fly experimental missions, as when Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 deployed multiple-tube 4.5-inch rocket launchers from one position to another, thus preventing Chinese observers from using, as an aiming point for effective counterbattery fire, the dust cloud that arose when the rockets were launched. The same squadron, using 40 percent of its assigned helicopters for the purpose, delivered enough supplies to sustain the 7th Marines for five days. Problems continued to nag the helicopter program, however. The Sikorsky HOSS-1 light helicopter—used for liaison, observation, and casualty evacuation—had to be grounded in October to await spare parts.
imental sector, the Hook, where the high ground that defined the Jamestown Line veered sharply to the south. Outposts Seattle and Warsaw had protected the 1-Took, but only Warsaw remained in Marine hands. To restore the security of the 1-Took, Dulacki set up a new outpost, Ronson, some 200 yards southeast of enemy-held Seattle and 275 yards west of the Hook. Ronson guarded the western approaches to the Hook, while Warsaw commanded the lowlands east of the Hook and a narrow valley leading eastward toward the Samichon River.

If the Chinese should seize the Hook, disastrous results might follow, for the Hook held the key to controlling the Samichon and Imjin valleys. Its capture could expose the rear areas of the 1st Marine Division and force that unit and the adjacent Commonwealth Division to fall back two miles or more to find defensible terrain from which to protect the northeastern approaches to Seoul. Because of the Hook’s importance, Colonel Moore set up his headquarters on Hill 146 near the base of the salient.

Opposite the 7th Marines, the Chinese had massed two infantry regiments, totaling some 7,000 men, supported by 10 battalions of artillery ranging in size from 75mm to 122mm and later to 152mm. The enemy, moreover, had learned during the fighting at Bunker Hill and along the outpost line to make deadlier use of his artillery, massing fires and, when the Marines counterattacked, imitating the box-cornerin fires used by the 11th Marines. In preparation for an attack on the Hook, the Chinese massed their artillery batteries within range of the salient, stockpiled ammunition, and dug new trenches that reached like tentacles toward the various elements of the outpost line and afforded cover and concealment for attacking infantry.

Against the formidable concentration of Chinese troops and guns, Colonel Moore’s regiment could muster 3,844 Marines, officers and men, supported by 11 Navy medical officers and 133 Hospital Corpsmen, three Army communications specialists, and 746 Korean laborers with their 18 interpreters. As in the earlier fighting, the 7th Marines could call upon the 105mm and 155mm howitzers of the 11th Marines, and other Marine supporting weapons including rocket batteries, tanks, and aircraft. Army artillery and Air Force fighter-bombers reinforced the firepower of the division.

In the words of Staff Sergeant Christopher E. Sarno of the 1st Marine Division’s tank battalion: “Korea was an artilleryman’s paradise.” It seemed to him that the Chinese always fought by night, making effective use of an arsenal of weapons. The burp guns and mines were bad, Sarno said, but
the worst was the artillery, which "could blast a man's body to bits so that his remains were picked up in a shovel."

The static battle line obviously placed a premium on artillery, especially the 105mm and 155mm howitzers of the Army and Marine Corps. Indeed, by mid-October 1952 American batteries were firing these shells at a more rapid rate than during the bloody fighting in the early months of 1951, when United Nations forces advanced beyond the 38th Parallel and conducted offensive operations like Killer and Ripper. By the fall of 1952, firepower, especially artillery, dominated the battleground, as probes, patrols, ambushes, and attacks on outposts took the place of major offensives. Because of the demand of artillery support, the rationing of 105mm and 155mm shells became necessary. During the last 11 days of October, a quota prevailed, at least for purposes of planning. In support of the 7th Marines, each 105mm howitzer might fire a daily average of 20 rounds and each 155mm howitzer 4.3 rounds. The 81mm mortars located in each battalion also suffered from a shortage of shells, and even hand grenades were now scarce. To do the work of mortars and artillery, Colonel Moore employed tripod-mounted, water-cooled .30-caliber machine guns. These weapons employed the techniques of World War I, engaging targets like potential assembly areas with indirect fire based on map data and adjusted by forward observers, as well as aimed direct fire.

The enemy initiated his attack on the Hook by battering the salient and its combat outposts with mortar and artillery fire; an estimated 1,200 rounds exploded among the trenches and bunkers on the Hook and Outposts Ronson and Warsaw between dusk on 24 October and dawn on the 25th. The Marine defenders, aided by detachments from the Korean Service Corps, struggled to keep pace with the destruction, repairing damage as best they could during lulls in the bombardment only to face new damage when the shelling resumed.

While shoring up trenches and bunkers, the 7th Marines fought back. In the hardest hit area, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki's 1st Battalion returned fire with its own mortars, machine guns, and recoilless rifles, while the regimental mortars and tanks joined in. Despite the shortage of high-explosive shells, the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, fired some 400 105mm rounds in response to the first day's Chinese bombardment, 575 rounds on the 24 October, and 506 on the 25th, balancing the need to conserve ammunition against the worsening crisis. Air strikes also pounded the enemy massing near the Hook and the two nearby outposts, including attacks by four Panther jets from VMF-311 that dropped high explosives and napalm on Chinese troops massing some 750 yards east of the salient.

During the 24 hours beginning

Ammunition carriers step aside to let litter barriers pass with a wounded Marine during the battle for the Hook. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A166424
at 1800 on the 25th, Chinese gunners scourged Colonel Moore’s regiment with another 1,600 mortar and artillery shells, most of them exploding on the ground held by Dulacki’s battalion. The shelling abated briefly on the 25th but resumed, convincing the division’s intelligence officer, Colonel Clarence A. Barninger, that the enemy was planning a major attack to overwhelm the Hook and gain control of the Samichon Valley. Barninger warned the division’s commander, General Pollock, well in advance of the actual attack.

The Chinese fire diminished somewhat on the morning of 26 October, but the Hook remained a dangerous place. On that morning, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki took advantage of a lull to inspect the defenses, only to be knocked down by the concussion from an enemy shell. He escaped with bruises and abrasions and continued his rounds. The intensity of the bombardment increased later in the morning and continued after dark in preparation for attacks on Outposts Ronson and Warsaw and the Hook itself.

Chinese troops stormed Ronson at 1810 on 26 October after three days of preparatory fire that had collapsed trenches, shattered bunkers, and killed and wounded Marines at both outposts and on the Hook. At Ronson, 50 or more of the enemy penetrated the defensive artillery concentrations, overran the position, and killed or captured the members of the reinforced squad manning the outpost. At about the same time, a Chinese company split into two groups and attacked Outpost Warsaw simultaneously from the east and west. A box-me-in barrage fired by the 11th Marines could not prevent the assault troops for closing in on the defenders, led by Second Lieutenant John L. Babson, Jr. The Marines at Warsaw fought back with grenades, pistols, and rifles, using the latter as clubs when ammunition ran out. Taking cover in the wreckage of the bunkers, they called for variable-time fire directly overhead. Hope lingered that the rain of shell fragments had saved Warsaw, but after four hours of silence from the garrison, Colonel Moore reluctantly concluded that Warsaw was lost, its defenders either dead or captured. Lieutenant Babson was one of those killed.

While the fate of Warsaw still
remained in doubt and a platoon from Captain Paul B. Byrum's Company C was preparing to reinforce the outpost, a flurry of Chinese shells battered the Hook. Colonel Moore reacted by sending Captain Frederick C. McLaughlin's Company A, which Byrum's unit had just relieved, to help Company C defend the salient. Moore also directed that the 1st Battalion have first call on the regiment's supply of ammunition. In addition, the 1st Marine Division lifted the restrictions on artillery ammunition fired in support of the Hook's defenders.

Under cover of artillery and mortar fire, a Chinese battalion launched a three-pronged attack on Dulacki's 1st Battalion. By 1938 on the 26th, Chinese infantry first threatened the main line of resistance southwest of the Hook itself, to the left of the salient and roughly halfway to the boundary with the 3d Battalion. Within a few minutes, a second attack hit the very nose of the Hook, while a third struck its eastern face. Mingled with the assault troops were laborers carrying construction materials to fortify the Hook after the three prongs of the attack had isolated and overrun it.

The thrust along the ridge that formed the spine of the Hook continued until the Chinese encountered the observation post from which Second Lieutenant Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr., was directing the fire of the 11th Marines. The lieutenant organized the defense of this bunker, running from cover when necessary to replenish the supply of small arms ammunition. He was still calling down artillery fire when the attackers overran the Hook. He then told his men to play dead until other Marines counterattacked. For three hours, they fooled the Chinese who entered the bunker. Finally, an enemy soldier became suspicious and threw a grenade inside. Skinner rolled onto the grenade, absorbing the force of the explosion and saving the lives of two of his men. His sacrifice resulted in the posthumous award of the Medal of Honor.

To the left of the Hook, the assault force outflanked a platoon of Company C, led by Second Lieutenant John W. Meikle, but he succeeded in pulling back the flanks to form a perimeter. East of the Hook, on the 1st Battalion's right, other elements of Company C formed another perimeter. In the 400 yards separating the two, scattered groups from Byrum's company struggled to close the gap. Help for Company C began arriving at about 2330, after the Chinese had overrun the Hook, when the first elements of McLaughlin's Company A, sent to reinforce Byrum's Marines, made contact with Meikle's perimeter to the left rear of the captured salient. The arrival of reinforcements enabled the members of Company C, scattered between the two perimeters, to form a blocking position on a ridge running east and west a few hundred yards to the rear of the Hook. At 0300 on the 27th, Colonel Moore committed the regimental reserve, Company H, 3d Battalion. General Pollock ordered the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, from the division reserve into the sector held by Moore's 7th Marines.

The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, had the mission of counterattacking the Chinese who had seized the Hook and penetrated the Jamestown Line. Anticipating commitment in this critical sector, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sidney J. Altman, had already drawn up a basic plan for such a counterattack and personally reconnoitered the area. Now Altman's Marines prepared to exe-
cute that plan. Tank gunners, mortar crews, and artillerymen battered the recently captured Outpost Warsaw, other Chinese troop concentrations, firing batteries, and supply routes. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing also joined in, as Grumman Tigercat night fighters used the ground-based MPQ radar to hit the main Chinese supply route sustaining the attack, dropping their bombs less than a mile west of the Hook.

While the 3d Battalion prepared to counterattack the Hook, the enemy made a new thrust at the 7th Marines. Early on the morning of 27 October, the Chinese attacked Reno, one of the outposts manned by Lieutenant Colonel Caputo’s 2d Battalion. Some two miles west of the Hook, the battalion’s three outposts formed an arrowhead aimed at Chinese lines, with Reno at the point, Carson on the left, and Vegas on the right.

The pattern of hostile activity opposite the 7th Marines earlier in October persuaded General Pollock’s intelligence specialists that the enemy had given first priority to seizing Caputo’s three outposts. This estimate of Chinese intentions caused the 11th Marines to plan concentrations in front of the 2d Battalion, while Caputo set up strong ambush positions to protect the threatened outposts.

On the night before the assault on Reno, Captain James R. Flores led a reinforced platoon from Company E into the darkness. The patrol’s destination was a camouflaged ambush position about 300 yards south of Reno and halfway between Carson and Vegas. At midnight, noises to the front alerted Flores and his men that the enemy had infiltrated between them and the outpost and were preparing to attack Reno from the rear. The ambush force alerted the Marines defending the outpost of the danger behind them and opened fire when the force, estimated at two Chinese companies, seemed on the verge of attacking. Although raked by fire from the front and rear, the enemy fought back, holding the Marines in check until they could break off the action and make an orderly withdrawal to the main line of resistance.

Quiet enveloped Outpost Reno until 0400 on the 27th, when a Chinese platoon attacked from the northwest, assaulting in two waves. The Marines on Reno beat back this first attack, but a second thrust from the same direction broke through the perimeter. The defenders took cover so that variable-time artillery fire bursting overhead could maul the enemy. The tactics worked to perfection, forcing the Chinese to abandon their lodgment after some 40 minutes of fighting.

Counterattacking the Hook

After the ambush by Marines behind Reno, while the outpost’s defenders were fighting off the subsequent Chinese assaults, Captain McLaughlin’s Company A passed through the line established by Byrum’s Marines and began advancing toward the Hook. Enemy mortar and artillery fire stopped McLaughlin’s unit short of the objective, forcing him to order his Marines to dig in and hold the ground they had gained.

When McLaughlin’s counterattack stalled, Colonel Moore attached the last of the regimental reserve—Company H, 3d Battalion, under Captain Bernard B. Belant—to Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s 1st Battalion. At 0505, Belant reported to Dulacki, who directed him to renew the counterattack. Within three hours, Company H stood ready to attack.
Marines climb an improved trail to bring ammunition to machine gunners on the Hook.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A166423

the Chinese, whose bridgehead encompassed the Hook itself and a crescent of ridges and draws extending from the spine of that terrain feature and embracing a segment of the main line of resistance about a half-mile wide.

As Belant led his unit forward, it rapidly covered the first 200 yards before Chinese small arms, mortar, and artillery fire shifted to meet the threat. The company commander pressed the attack, however. Second Lieutenant George H. O'Brien, Jr., led his platoon over the ridge to his front, the men zigzagging as they ran toward the Chinese-held trenchline. A bullet struck O'Brien's armored vest, knocking him down, but he scrambled to his feet and continued toward the enemy, pausing only briefly to help a wounded man. Throwing grenades and firing his carbine, he silenced the Chinese weapons in a bunker and led his platoon toward the Hook itself. This headlong assault, which earned O'Brien the Medal of Honor, broke through the Chinese perimeter and approached the enemy-held bunkers on the Hook before being contained by hostile mortar and artillery fire. The remainder of Company H widened the crack that O'Brien's platoon had opened and captured three prisoners as it overran the southeastern portion of the Hook before a fierce shelling forced the advance elements to find cover and yield some of the ground they had taken.

Marine aircraft helped Company H advance onto the Hook, attacking reinforcements moving into battle and the positions from which the Chinese were firing or adjusting fire. Key targets included the former Marine outposts of Irene, Seattle, and Frisco, along with the frequently bombed main supply route and those enemy troops trying to dislodge the Marines who had gained a foothold on the Hook. Fire from Marine tanks and artillery engaged some of the same targets and proved deadly against trenches and bunkers that the Chinese had seized. The howitzers also joined mortars in counterbattery fire.

At midday on 27 October, after General Pollock had released Company I, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, to Colonel Moore's control, the counterattack to regain the Hook entered its final phase. Company I would drive the enemy onto the Hook, after which Company H, the unit that had penetrated the Chinese perimeter earlier in the day, was to take over the right of the 1st Battalion's line, relieving Company B, which would make a final assault on the Hook and recapture both the Hook and Outpost Warsaw.

Captain Murray V. Harlan, Jr., who commanded Company I, launched his attack early in the afternoon. The 1st Platoon, which led the way, seized the crest of the ridge to its front at 1350 and began advancing toward the Hook behind a barrage laid down by the 11th Marines. The Chinese reacted to the threat from Harlan's company with deadly artillery and mortar concentrations directed against not only the advancing Marines, but also Colonel Moore's command post and the weapons along the Jamestown Line that supported the assault.

Despite severe casualties, Harlan's Marines pushed ahead, at times crawling from one outcropping in the shell-torn earth to another. After pausing to reorganize at about 1635, the company moved, a few men at a time, onto the Hook, regaining the bunker where Lieutenant Skinner had sacrificed his life for his men and forcing ahead against die-hard Chinese in collapsed bunkers and trenches. The deadliest fire came, as always, from enemy mortars and artillery shells that plunged steeply onto the Hook before exploding. Company I took such cover as it could find, but terrain afforded concealment and greater protection from flat-trajectory than from high-angle-fire weapons.

By midnight on 28 October, Company B had threaded its way through a maze of shell craters and moved into position to the left of Company I. Shortly afterward Company B began what Dulacki had planned as the final assault on the Hook. Small arms fire and a shower of grenades from the Chinese positions stopped the Marines as they attacked with rifles and grenades of their own. After exchanging fire with the enemy for perhaps 90 minutes the company fell back to obtain cover and called for mortar and artillery fire. The shelling battered not only the strongpoints immediately to the
From the Hook, the fighting returned to the sector of the South Korean Marines on the left of the 5th Marines. The most vulnerable points along the segment of the Jamestown Line held by the Korean Marines were Combat Outposts 39, 33, 31, and 51. Outposts 39, 33, and 31 were located near the boundary with the 5th Marines and manned by the 5th Battalion, Korean Marine Corps, which had relieved the 3d Battalion on the afternoon of 31 October. The 2d Battalion of the Korean Marine Corps maintained Combat Outpost 51, in front of its lines.

An assault against these four hilltop outposts would represent an extension of the attacks in early October that had overrun three other South Korean outposts—86 to the south, 36, and 37. The dominant terrain feature in this area was Hill 155 on the main line of resistance in the sector of the 5th Battalion, a promontory that overlooked not only the Sachon Valley...
and the Chinese activity there, but also the Panmunjom corridor and its environs. The enemy made no attempt to disguise his designs on the outposts and ultimately the hill, unleashing a savage bombardment—more than 3,000 rounds during the 48 hours ending at 1800, 31 October—that rocked the South Korean positions, especially Outposts 39 and 33.

The anticipated Chinese attack began at 1830 on the 31st, when the Chinese probed Outposts 39 and 33, apparently in an attempt to exploit any confusion resulting from the 5th Battalion’s relief of the 3d. Artillery fire blocked these enemy jabs but did not end the night’s fighting. At 2200, an eight-minute bombardment struck the four outposts in preparation for infantry assaults against all of them.

On the right, a Chinese company pressured the platoon of South Korean Marines holding Outpost 31 until 0155, when defensive fire prevailed and the attack ended. At Outpost 33, another enemy company broke through a perimeter manned by only two South Korean squads, which clung to parts of the hill until 0515 when, with the help of artillery fire, they drove off the Chinese.

Two enemy companies attacked Outpost 39, the nearest of the four to Hill 155. The platoon of South Korean Marines deployed there yielded some ground before taking advantage of defensive artillery concentrations to eject the Chinese by 0410. The enemy again probed the outpost two hours later, but soon broke off the action on the right of the sector held by the South Korean Marines.

On the left, four Chinese companies attacked Combat Outpost 51, the most heavily defended of the four, since an entire company had dug in there. It was also the most remote of the outposts, 2,625 yards from the main line of resistance, and this vulnerable location may have persuaded the enemy to scrimp on shelling. Except for 20 rounds of 90mm fire from Soviet-built tanks, the bombardment here was lighter and less effective than at the other three outposts. Three Chinese companies attacked Outpost 51 from the southwest and another from the north. After some initial gains, the attack lost momentum and ended at 0330.

Period of Comparative Calm

Despite the clashes involving the Korean Marines, a lull settled over the division following the fierce action at the Hook. Elements of the Commonwealth Division assumed responsibility for the Hook itself on 3 November, but the 11th Marines continued to fire in support of the salient’s British defenders. On the night of 18-19 November, for example, Marine artillerymen fired some 2,000 rounds to help break up a Chinese attack.

Meanwhile, the 1st Marines replaced the 7th Marines in manning the right of the division’s main line of resistance. On 22 November, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, in regimental reserve, provided one company for Operation Wakeup, a raid on Chinese positions opposite Combat Outposts Reno and Vegas. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Warren, assigned the mission to Captain Jay V. Poage’s Company D, which attacked just before dawn. The operation succeeded mainly in demonstrating the strength of the Chinese, whose defensive fire stopped the attack short of the objective and frustrated the plan to seize and interrogate
Life in the Bunkers

Upon arriving on the Jamestown Line, the 1st Marine Division made use of log-and-sandbag bunkers, which Second Lieutenant William Watson, described as a simultaneous curse and blessing. Although the structures provided "places of some comfort to which Marines went to get dry and sleep and to escape incoming [fire]," the "sandbag castles" lured men out of their fighting positions. Once inside a bunker, the Marines could be killed or wounded not only by a direct hit by a heavy shell that collapsed the structure, but also by a grenade or explosive charge hurled inside.

Given the vulnerability of bunkers and their effect on aggressiveness, it was no wonder, said Watson, that he and his fellow junior officers had received no formal instruction in bunker placement or construction. "They didn't teach bunker building at Quantico," he recalled. "Who would have dared?" In a Marine Corps trained "to assault and dominate the enemy," anyone foolish enough to advocate the use of defensive bunkers would probably have been shipped to Korea where he might well have found himself building the very structures that had resulted in his being sent there.

Life in the bunkers gave rise to unique problems, not the least of which was trash disposal. As the bunkers and trenches proliferated on the main line of resistance and the outpost line, the troops manning them—whether American or South Korean Marines or Chinese soldiers—generated vast amount of refuse. Both sides, reported Second Lieutenant John M. Verdi, a Marine pilot who flew a hundred missions and for a time controlled air strikes from a bunker on the static battle line, did an adequate job of policing the main line of resistance, but the combat outposts posed a more difficult challenge. By day activity in a confined and exposed area could attract hostile fire, and by night policing up might interfere with planned fires, the movement of patrols, or the establishment of listening posts. As a result, trash accumulated around the outposts, especially those of the Marines who not only ate more than their enemy, but consumed food that came in cans or packages that could be more easily discarded than carried away, even with the help of Korean laborers.

Trash attracted rats, nicknamed "bunker bunnies" because of their size. The Marines waged war against them but with partial success at best. Verdi recalled that one Marine used his bayonet to pin a scurrying rat to a sandbag, but the screams of the dying varmint proved so unnerving that the hunter had to borrow a pistol to finish off his prey.

Mines planted by Marines could be as dangerous as those laid by the Chinese, or so Verdi believed. The Marines charted their minefields, selecting a starting point and an azimuth, then planting the mines at specific intervals to form rows a certain distance apart. An error with the compass or a mistake in recording the information would render the chart useless, and the map itself might disappear, destroyed as a result of enemy action or simply lost during the relief of a unit. A return to mobile warfare, or a truce that required removal of the old minefields, would increase the danger.

Life in the Bunkers

prisoners. Patrols, ambushes, and less ambitious raids continued for the balance of the year.

On the same day as Operation Wakeup, South Korean police captured two infiltrators in the rear area of the Kimpo Provisional Regiment. Although the Han River interposed a barrier to large-scale attacks, the occasional infiltrator managed to cross and lose themselves among the 80,000 civilians living on the Kimpo Peninsula. A few of these infiltrators struck on 1 December, ambushing a jeep driving on the main supply route. Some two-dozen bullets tore into the vehicle, but only one struck the lone occupant, wounding him in the knee.

Situation at Year's End

During 1952, the Korean fighting assumed a pattern far different from that for which the Marines sent to Korea in previous years had prepared. Mobility gave way to stalemate. The battlefield now resembled the trench warfare of World War I more than the sudden
In December, President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower made good his campaign promise to "go to Korea," but it was not yet possible to predict the consequences, if any, of his visit. The war remained unpopular with the American people, threats posed by the Soviet Union in Europe seemed more dangerous than the Chinese menace in the Far East, and the negotiations at Panmunjom had stalled over the question whether prisoners of war could refuse repatriation. The only hope, as yet a slim one, for resolving the issue of repatriation lay in the adoption by the United Nations of an Indian proposal to create a special commission to address the issue.

amphibious thrusts and rapid campaigns of World War II in the Pacific. If the amphibian tractor symbolized the role of Marines in the war against Japan, the bunker, built of logs and sandbags on both the main line of resistance and the line of outposts that protected it, represented the war along the Jamestown Line.

The final months of 1952 saw changes of leadership within the 1st Marine Division. On 5 November, Colonel Moore handed over the 7th Marines to Colonel Loren E. Haffner, and Colonel Hewitt D. Adams replaced Colonel Layer in command of the 1st Marines on the 22d. On 10 December, Colonel Lewis W. Walt assumed command of the 5th Marines from Colonel Smoak. Colonel Harvey C. Tschirgi took over the Kimpo Provisional Regiment on 1 December from Colonel Richard H. Crockett, who had replaced Colonel Staab, the unit's original commander, on 31 August. General Pollock remained in command of the division as the new year began and the stalemate continued.

Honors are rendered for President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower during his visit to the 1st Marine Division. Standing to Eisenhower's left are MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, the division commander, and Gen Mark W. Clark, USA, the United Nations commander.

Two 48-ton Patton tanks wait to receive firing orders before their Marine drivers wheel them up onto earthen ramps behind the main line of resistance where they would fire on enemy positions as artillery.


**About the Author**

Bernard C. Nalty was a civilian member of the Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, from October 1956 to September 1961. He collaborated with Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Edwin T. Turnbladh on Central Pacific Drive, a volume of the History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II series. He also completed more than 14 short historical studies, some of which appeared in Leatherneck or Marine Corps Gazette. He joined the history office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961, transferred in 1964 to the Air Force history program, and retired in 1994. Mr. Nalty has written or edited a number of publications, including Blacks in the Military: Essential Documents, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military, The Vietnam War, Tigers Over Asia, Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh, and Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the U.S. Air Force. In addition, he participated in the Marines in World War II commemorative series, writing Cape Gloucester: The Green Inferno and The Right to Fight: African-American Marines in World War II.

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**Sources**

Clay Blair Jr., has chosen The Forgotten War as the title of his account of the Korean conflict, the history of which tends to be overshadowed by World War II and the Vietnam War. Detailed though it is compared to other such histories, the Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987) tends to gloss over the final 18 months of the war, especially the battles fought by the United States Marines. The best account of Marine operations during 1952 and after remains Operations in West Korea, volume five of the series U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Korea, 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC, 1972), by LtCol Pat Meid, USMCR, and Maj James M. Yingling, USMC.

Although the official Marine Corps account is essential, Walter G. Hermes contributes valuable additional information on Marine Corps operations, as well as Army activity and the negotiation of a ceasefire, in Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1988), a volume of United States Army in the Korean War series.

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The Marine Corps Gazette covered the professional aspects of the war in a number of articles. Especially important are "Outpost Warfare," in the November 1953 issue, and "Back to the Trenches," (March 1955), both by Peter Braestrup, and LtCol Roy A. Batterton's "Random Notes on Korea," (November 1955).

The personal papers collected by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps proved extremely helpful. The material on file varies tremendously, including journals, photographs, letters, narrative memoirs, and at least one academic paper, a master's thesis on outpost warfare by Maj Norman W. Hicks, a Korean War veteran assigned to help write the history of that conflict. Among the most valuable of these were the submissions by John Minturn Verdi, William A. Watson, and Gen Christian F. Schilt.

With the exception of MajGen John T. Selden, the senior Marine officers serving in Korea at this time participated in the Marine Corps' oral history program. The interviews with Gen Christian F. Schilt and Gen Edwin A. Pollock proved especially valuable.