In the name of Allah the most Compassionate and Merciful
TO
AMERICAN LEGATION
TO THE DEPARTMENT

ATTACHMENT NUMBER

FROM
Department of State (S/R:ORM)

TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE

ATTACHMENT TO:

FILE NO.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

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ATTACHMENTS:

1. CA-3252, dated October 14, 1959.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION
1959
SECRET

No.: CA-3252, October 11, 1959,

SUBJECT: DCID No. 4/2

Do not retain
Keep in current file

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TAMPA, TEL AVIV, TOKYO, TRISTE, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, UBUD, VIENNA,
VIETNAM, WELLINGTON

With reference to CA-1694 of August 19, 1958, a revision of
Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) No. 4/2, "The
Defector Program Abroad," is enclosed.

The revised Directive, effective 26 June 1959, reflects the
change in the name of the Intelligence Advisory Committee to the
United States Intelligence Board.

ENCLOSURE:

DCID No. 4/2

(See attached
distribution list.)

WHEN THE ENCLOSED IS DETAINED,
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[Date: OCT 14 1953]
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DOCS No. 4-2

(Row 36-54)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4-2

THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM ABROAD

(Effective 26 June 1959)

1. SCOPE

Pursuant to the provisions of DCID No. 4, this directive establishes procedures for the inducement, expansion, resettlement, and further handling of defectors outside the geographical limits of the United States and its possessions. This directive does not apply to active theaters of war where U.S. forces are engaged or where the President so directs.

2. DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this directive, the terms listed below shall have the meanings indicated:

a. Defector: A defector is defined as an individual of the USSR or any country in the Non-Communist Bloc who has escaped from the control of any such country, or who, being outside such jurisdiction and control, are able to escape and who are of special value to the U.S. Government. Inducement:

(1) They are able to add valuable new or confirmatory information to existing U.S. knowledge of the Soviet Union;

(2) They are of operational value to a U.S. department or agency;

(3) They will provide information on the political situation in the world.

b. Inducement: Inducement is an act committed or manifestly instigated by a U.S. official and demonstrably intended to bring about the defection of which the U.S. government might, if the act were discovered, be called upon to account.

b. Potential Defector: A potential defector is a person of the USSR or a country of the Non-Communist Bloc who has shown a desire to leave or escape from Communist control and who has indicated willingness or desire to defect.

b. Walk-In: A walk-in is a defector who presents himself voluntarily to U.S. authorities in a foreign country and requests asylum in escaping from Communist control.

b. Refugee: A refugee is a national or former national of a Communist-dominated country, who has fled from and/or is unable to return to his home country.

3. NON-SOVIEET BLOC NATIONALS

The provisions of this directive may be applied in whole or in part to cases of nationals of countries other than the USSR or the Non-Communist Bloc, where otherwise the definition of defectors in para. 2a. above, when such action is approved by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the United States intelligence community. Such action is normally recommended by the Interagency Defector Committee (IDC), Washington.

4. SUMMARY OF U.S. POLICY CONCERNING THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM

a. Defection, particularly from the USSR, should be encouraged and induced, employing both conventional and unconventional means, whenever there is a net advantage to U.S. interests. Accordingly, the United States should:

(1) Encourage and induce the defection of the maximum number of persons from the USSR and of Soviet nationals outside the USSR;

(2) Continue, and if possible expand, efforts to encourage and induce the defection of key members of existing groups of countries other than the USSR who qualify as defectors.

b. To encourage defection and discourage defection, the United States should ensure that defectors receive adequate care, assistance, and resettlement assistance not only during, but also after their exploitation or utilization.

b. The United States should take no action to encourage the departure of large numbers of defectors from countries in the Non-Communist Bloc other than the USSR.

b. Prior to initiation by any U.S. department or agency of action to induce defection of a potential defector or defected person, the possible value of recruitment in place will be considered carefully. Where the best interest of the United States would be served by such recruitment of the individual concerned, the provisions of DCID No. 5/1 shall apply.

b. It shall be the general policy that no bona fide defector will be returned without his consent.

f. Intelligence considerations and objectives shall take priority and shall be satisfied prior to psychological exploitation of defectors. Psychological exploitation will be restricted to specific cases where a net advantage to the United States can be expected. These policies shall be implemented to the extent practical to cases where a defector is under the control of another government outside the Non-Communist Bloc.
3. Implementation of overt publicity concerning defectors shall be coordinated with the Department of State.

4. Coordinating, as provided herein, shall respect the interests, capabilities, and responsibilities of all departments and agencies to insure full use of such capabilities in support of the defection program.

5. LOCAL DEFECTOR COMMITTEES

A local Defector Committee shall be established under the general supervision of the Senior U.S. Representative in appropriate countries. The Committee shall consist of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Chairman, Department of State, and Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Committee may invite representatives of other departments and agencies to attend its meetings on an ad hoc basis. The local Defector Committee shall:

a. Meet periodically, normally at least once quarterly, to coordinate emergency aspects of the defection program in the area concerned and to promote the full use of the resources and capabilities of the U.S. Government in support of this program. Copies of minutes of all local Defector Committee meetings shall be forwarded through CIA channels to IDC/Washington.

b. Consider and resolve mutual problems including initial consideration of defectors believed to meet the criteria established in para. 2a above who are nominated by a member. When such problems cannot be resolved by the local committee, the matter shall be referred through CIA channels to IDC/Washington. In such cases representatives of other departments and agencies may be called to the principals in Washington on the subjects involved. If time does not permit referral to IDC/Washington, the matter shall be submitted for decision to the Senior U.S. Representative in the area.

c. Keep IDC/Washington informed concerning each defector, including status of utilization and termination of the case. Appropriate reports on defected persons will be made to IDC/Washington, except when recruitment in place or other operational use is contemplated.

d. Recommend supplemental procedures in compliance with this directive for approval by IDC/Washington as may be required for implementation of the defection program in the area concerned. Such procedures shall (1) provide for appropriate security measures for the personnel and facilities involved in the program, and (2) ensure that: (a) at the earliest possible time, information related to imminent or immediate threat to the security of any U.S. installation is brought to the defectors' attention; (b) such information is given immediate dissemination in the field and at the national level with appropriate source attribution and evaluation, and (c) the defectors' personnel security is transferred to CIA control at the earliest possible time, together with the clothing, documents, and other possessions and the full results of any preliminary debriefing of the individual.

e. Establish local operating procedures to insure that walk-in cases are promptly referred to the proper official of the U.S. installation involved and handled under conditions insuring the maximum possible security for both the individual concerned and local U.S. installations.

6. OPERATING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

a. The treatment of defectors and defectors is a matter of many factors. Appropriate policies should be tailored to each case. The following guidelines shall be adhered to in most cases:

b. The creation of any defectors or defectors in the hands of a non-Communist government that becomes known to any U.S. Government official should be reported promptly to the Chairman of the local Defector Committee who will consult with appropriate members of the Committee and be responsible for taking and coordinating action in the interest of the United States. To the extent feasible, defectors under the control of another government will be exploited in the interest of the U.S. Government as provided herein. It is recognized, however, that the political considerations of such agreements with a host government may affect operations under the control.

c. When a defector is to be used for operational purposes and when his identity should be concealed, the Chairman of the local Defector Committee will inform the Committee of the existence — but not the identity — of the defector together with a general statement of his background, area knowledge and field of relative competence. IDC No. 5/1 shall apply to such cases. Efforts shall be made to satisfy intelligence requirements as promptly and completely as possible.

d. Information related to imminent or immediate threat to the security of a U.S. installation shall be sought at the earliest possible time from defected persons.

e. The establishment of bona fides of defected persons will be given particular attention because of the demonstrated use of defector channels by hostile sources to penetrate and convey false or deceptive information to U.S. intelligence services

7. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIELD REPRESENTATIVE OF CIA

The Field Representative of CIA has primary responsibility for the conduct of the defection program abroad and for providing certain services of common concern. He shall:

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(1) Brief the Defector Committee in consultation with the appropriate representatives of the departments and agencies concerned in cases of disaffected persons or for other reasons that may have participated in the identification or delivery of the disaffected person, or for other reasons may have a special interest or capability in the area.

(2) Information indicating immunity of facilities or other high value items would be provided to the Defector Committee in a timely manner. The Defector Committee shall be informed of any special operational issues and the availability of operational resources to support other operations.

(3) The Departmental and Agency representatives of the Defector Committee shall be notified of any changes in the status or condition of a defector, including any changes in status that may affect the availability of operational resources.

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n. Determining, with the advice and recommendation of the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence, the nature and degree to which actions, contrived toward the defection or disruption may affect the political and diplomatic interests of the U.S.

6. Informing the appropriate U.S. officials, not covered by para. 5a, who are likely to be in contact with disaffected persons, are given limited briefing concerning defection matters, as provided in par. 6.

c. Coordinating with the representatives of interested U.S. departments and agencies and, to the degree necessary, with appropriate foreign governmental agencies, any publicity or psychological exploitation of a defector.

d. Providing assistance to the CIA representative in carrying out his responsibilities under this directive.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Protection of Defectors in Foreign Countries

To: All American Diplomatic Missions (except Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw), and Alexandria, Algiers, Berlin, Bonn, Brussels, Casablanca, Hanoi, Dakar, Frankfurt, Geneva, Hong Kong, Jakarta, Jakarta, Lagos, Lausanne, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Milan, Nairobi, Salzburg, Singapore, Tbilisi, Tanger, Tunis, Ushuaia

BACKGROUND

Increased travel and the establishment of diplomatic missions between Sino-Soviet block countries and the free world is likely to involve a larger number of Foreign Service posts in the handling of defectors, as prescribed by current intelligence directives. These directives provide general guidance on many of the detailed steps involved in defection procedures. Nevertheless, recent experience suggests the timeliness of reviewing some of the principles affecting the status and welfare of individual defectors, the traditional American attitude in this field, and particularly the commanding position of the host countries in which defection occurs.

CONCEPT OF POLITICAL ASYLUM

A defector who is not facing a charge of illegal action on the part of the host country may properly apply to American representatives for territorial asylum in the United States. Two paragraphs of ODTD 4/5/59 (transmitted to most posts with CA-325 of October 18, 1959) refer to "asylum" as follows:

Paragraph 2(a): "Walk-in: A walk-in is a disaffected person who presents himself to a United States installation in a foreign country and requests asylum or assistance in escaping from Communist control."

Paragraph 6(a): "... as early as feasible, each disaffected person shall be required to sign a statement indicating that his defection was purely voluntary and that he desires..."
political asylum."

The Department considers that the word "asylum" in the context of the paragraph quoted above should be interpreted as meaning territorial asylum in the United States rather than diplomatic asylum in an American official establishment.

In extending protection to a defector, the sovereign rights of the host government (as well as its political orientation) must necessarily be kept in mind. Finally, American officials must take all feasible steps to prevent the involuntary return of defectors to their countries of origin. It may be advisable to call the attention of local officials to Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (General Assembly Resolution of December 10, 1948) as one of the reasons which they might use in resisting demands for the return of the defector to his country of origin. Article 14 of the Declaration states that "everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution".

Possible Procedures for Protecting Defectors

Attachment 2 outlines a recent case in which the rights of the defector, of the United States, and of the host country, were successfully protected and reconciled. It is therefore recommended that when similar cases arise, posts make every effort to carry out the following procedures:

1. Qualified Foreign Service representatives shall accompany the defector in carrying out any essential legal activities (registration, documentation, interrogation, etc.) which may be required to comply with the laws or regulations of the host country.

2. If confrontation with his former principals cannot be avoided, a Foreign Service officer should be present during such confrontation, which should be held in a language understandable to the two principals as well as to the U.S. representative. Local officials should be persuaded that any deviation from normal confrontation procedures (see Attachment 3) should constitute grounds for immediate termination of the proceedings.

Possible Procedure in Case of Redefection

If the defector executed a statement requesting U.S. asylum at the time of his defection, every effort should be made during (and after) a confrontation that leads to his redetention to have the defector execute a final statement in which he declares that: a) the return to his country of origin is of his own free will, without duress or coercion; b) he was not deprived of his legal rights at any time while in U.S. custody; and (c) he regards his original request for U.S. asylum as being no longer valid.

Problems Peculiar to West Germany Including Berlin

In Germany, U.S. military commands are in direct contact with Soviet military missions and headquarters and are responsible for arranging confrontations of military defectors. This instruction is not intended to alter existing arrangements in this regard. Posts in Germany, however, may wish to suggest such alterations, either through the channels of the Defector Committee (Germany) or directly to the Department, for consideration by the Interagency Defector Committee in Washington.

This instruction should be shown to all members of the local defector committee at each addressee post.

Enclosures:

1. The Kaznacheev Case
2. Guidance for the Conduct of Confrontations
The Kasamaeev Case

June 23, 1959: The Soviet Information Officer, Kasamaeev, visited the Burmese Library in Rangoon and asked the Librarian if he could see an American Embassy official. The request was transmitted to CAS and a CAS representative came over from the Embassy a few blocks away to interview him. Kasamaeev gave the officer a general account of himself and his motives and requested safe exit from Burma. A further meeting was arranged for 9.00 a.m. the next day (June 24) and Kasamaeev returned to his home for the night.

The case was discussed on the afternoon of June 23 with the local Defector Committee in Rangoon, the Ambassador and the USIS representative. The consensus was that Kasamaeev would be accepted as a defector subject to the establishment of bona fides.

June 24 and 25: Kasamaeev appeared as scheduled at 9.00 a.m. and signed a simple asylum request. He was taken to the residence of the American Embassy for preliminary interrogation and at 3.00 p.m. was transferred to the American Embassy.

June 24: Efforts were made to obtain Burmese permission to surface the defector locally and remove him on a ship from Burma. There were several meetings between US Embassy personnel and officials of the Government of Burma during this time.

June 25: With the Department's approval, CIA instructed CAS Rangoon that while surfaced in Burma would be preferable, if such were not possible, unilateral control of the case should be maintained, including black removal to Bangkok.

June 26: In the morning the Embassy received permission from the Government of Burma to surface Kasamaeev the next day with the understanding that he was to be removed from Burma as soon as possible thereafter. The Air Attache made the necessary arrangements for air transportation out of Burma and a USAF C-130 aircraft arrived in Rangoon on the afternoon of the 27th.

At noon on June 26, the Ambassador called on the Burmese Foreign Minister to inform him of the circumstances and arrangements made through Burmese security and intelligence officials for the safeguarding, surfaced, timing of publicity and removal of Kasamaeev by plane. The Foreign Minister had already been briefed on the case by Burmese sources.

In the afternoon of the 26th the Foreign Office notified the Ambassador that the Soviet Embassy had inquired about Kasamaeev and had been informed that the latter was in the custody of the US Embassy. Later the same evening the Burmese Foreign Office notified the Ambassador that the Burmese Government permission to remove Kasamaeev from the country had been withdrawn.

The story was released by the US Embassy to the local press and wire services at 8.00 p.m. local time June 26th as the Embassy was anxious to beat the Soviets on any news release.

June 27: A press conference was held at the US Embassy. Kasamaeev was interviewed and pictures taken.

Several meetings were held between US Embassy personnel and officials of the Burmese Foreign Office and Military Intelligence when culminated in a meeting between the Ambassador and the Burmese Prime Minister, who discussed the legal aspects of the case. They agreed that, prior to being removed from Burma, Kasamaeev would be turned over to the Burmese Foreign Minister and thus technically be in Burmese custody for a short while. He would then be asked whether he was assisting of his own free will and offered Burmese asylum. If he stated that he preferred asylum in the US, he would be returned to the custody of the Embassy. Prior to turning him over to the US, the Burmese would give the Soviet Ambassador an opportunity to speak to Kasamaeev in the presence of Burmese officials. The US Ambassador accepted these conditions, but further stipulated that the American representatives must be present when the Soviet Ambassador spoke with Kasamaeev and that the conversation must be entirely in English.

June 29: Embassy officers introduced Kasamaeev to the US Ambassador at 10.15 a.m. The Ambassador took him to the Burmese National Defense College at noon where he met the Foreign Minister. The Ambassador left him there, returned to the Embassy (as a token gesture) and went back to the Defense College at 12.30 p.m. The Burmese talked to Kasamaeev for about four hours. The Soviet Ambassador had been offered the opportunity to talk to Kasamaeev, but rejected it on grounds of insufficient time to obtain instructions from Moscow.

The US Ambassador personally took Kasamaeev to the airport where he left in the USAF plane at 4.47 p.m. Burmese time (details of the trip to the airport are given in Rangoon dispatch No. 6 of July 2, 1959).

Some weeks...
SOME weeks later, the US Ambassador summarized the case as follows:

"The Burmese correctly perceived that they needed access to Kaznacheev to ascertain the actual facts of the case and to protect themselves against criticism by the Soviet Embassy. They had received allegations from the Soviet Embassy that Kaznacheev had been enticed, entrapped, or otherwise improperly induced to go to the American Embassy. They needed to satisfy themselves that no Burmese law had been broken by Kaznacheev or by the Americans, that Kaznacheev had acted of his own volition, and that their responsibilities to the Soviet Embassy and its personnel had been properly discharged.

"My conclusion is that the Burmese Foreign Office originally was somewhat confused as to what constitutes diplomatic asylum as to our intentions to give the Government of Burma access to Kaznacheev. At first they erroneously felt that they could properly treat him more or less as a prisoner, even compelling him to face the Soviet Ambassador against his wishes, and without an American being present. They eventually abandoned this position under pressure from me, and fully recognized his full rights as a free man under Burmese law.

"This Embassy handled the case in accordance with standing instructions for the treatment of defector cases. It neither claimed nor exercised any privilege of extending diplomatic asylum and never maintained that Kaznacheev was exempt from Burmese jurisdiction. The Embassy in no wise departed from the American position against the use of its diplomatic missions for purposes of diplomatic asylum."

GUIDANCE FOR THE CONDUCT OF CONFRONTATIONS WITH DEFECTORS

The confrontation usually begins by having an official of the local Foreign Ministry introduce the participants to each other. The Soviet Bloc representatives are entitled to ask the following types of questions:

1. Is it true that the defector has requested political asylum from the US or the local government?

2. Is this a voluntary act on his part?

3. Does he realize the seriousness of his decision? Is he prepared to give up his family, his friends, his rights and privileges, and to cut himself off from the life he has known?

4. Has he made any attempt to inform his relatives of his decision?

5. Will he accept communications from his relatives and friends? (If he agrees, the text of such communications may be read to him.) In spite of pleas by his associates to reconsider his decision, is he still sure he wishes to defect?

6. Is his health good?

7. Is he employed?

8. Has he applied for another citizenship? Has he surrendered his identity documents to local or U.S. authorities? (If so, these documents can later be claimed through normal channels by the issuing government.)

The confrontation should be terminated at once if the Bloc representatives begin to use a language which is not understood by the U.S. representatives or if any threats are made against the defector's relatives or friends (or, of course, against himself). Tape recording of the confrontation should not be allowed in view of the case with which the record might be falsified for propaganda and other purposes.
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In every effort to obtain the guidance of the Ambassador. Until instructions are received from the Department, Embassies and Consulates should answer any queries from the refugee or the host government concerning the refugee’s presence by stating that they are awaiting instructions from Washington.

Refuge will normally continue until such time as the appropriate authorities of the established national government give satisfactory assurances that the refugee's personal safety will be ensured against lawless or arbitrary actions and that he will be accorded due process of law. Any questions as to the satisfactory nature of the assurances should be referred to the Department.

BAIL, ACTING

Revision of 2 PAM 225.2

Attachment:

Revision of 2 PAM 225.2

As can be seen from the retention of the first sentence of the previous 2 PAM 225.2, it remains the policy of the United States not to grant refuge in any except extraordinary cases.

At the same time experience has indicated that there are cases, other than those where an individual is in imminent danger of physical harm from mob violence, in which refuge should be granted. Illustrative of such cases are instances where imminent danger comes from wanton or reckless acts of government authorities. In order to clarify the situation the insertion of "as" before "from mob violence" in the regulation explicitly renders the phrase illustrative rather than apparently limiting.

The grant of this authority does not of course mean that refuge should be granted to a person subject to regular and orderly legal procedures of the host government. You will recognize that any grant of refuge can be construed as an interference with the sovereignty of the host government. It is apparent, therefore, that you must exercise extreme caution before invoking your discretion to grant refuge.

Immediately upon granting refuge, the Embassy or Consulate should urgently contact the Department for instructions, giving all relevant information. Consulates in addition should...
"Restrictions on Extending Asylum.

As a rule, a diplomatic or consular officer shall not extend asylum to persons outside of his official or personal household. Refuge may be afforded to uninvited persons who are in danger of serious harm, as from mob violence, but only for the period during which active danger continues. Refuge shall be terminated on receipt of satisfactory assurances from the established national government that the refugee's personal safety is guaranteed against lawless or arbitrary actions and that he will be accorded due process of law." (2 FAM 225, 2)
4. If the intelligence community considers that the circumstances of a particular defection case are such that notification and/or confrontation may jeopardize intelligence objectives, the facts should be brought to the attention of the Department for consideration in reaching a decision.

5. The Department recognizes that defection cases occurring abroad sometimes present sensitive problems of relations with third countries and that decisions regarding notice and/or confrontation in these situations must continue to be based on the facts of the particular case. In certain instances, it may be necessary to defer any decision concerning notice and/or confrontation until such time as the defector may enter the United States. However, when feasible, it would be desirable for posts to arrange confrontation or to encourage friendly host governments to do so before onward movement of the defector under US auspices.

6. Under this general policy, the US Government will retain that measure of flexibility that may be considered desirable in some cases for humanitarian or political reasons and that may be required in other cases to serve intelligence interests. However, it is intended that the option on the question of notice and confrontation rest with the US Government, not the defector.

7. It should be noted that this general policy is applicable only to defection cases processed under special procedures, not refugee type cases with which the intelligence community has no direct responsibility or concern.

8. This message, coordinated with ICC Washington, should be brought to the attention of all personnel concerned with the handling of defectors, including members of all local defector committees.

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C. CAS will arrange with the Embassy Security Officer to have the Marine Guards and appropriate indigenous personnel briefed on the above responsibilities to the extent that they may be involved in the handling of a Walk-In.

4. Inducement. If a member of the Committee is apprised of a defection, potential defection, or operationally interests social or business contacts, he will at once report the situation and circumstances to the Chairman of the Committee. Such a lead should normally be regarded as operationally sensitive, and will remain a matter of bilateral concern between the reporting agency and CAS, in accordance with DCIS 6/1, until determination has been made that long term recruitment and/or short term defection in place is impossible.

5. When such a situation (as described above in paragraph 4) arises, the Chairman - subject to the conditions stated above - may call a meeting of the Committee to determine (a) what action the U.S. Government has with which or through which it could attempt to handle the defection; (b) which member of the Committee can act appropriately and efficiently handle the case; (c) the approach should be taken, and (d) what offer might be made to the individual under consideration and the intermediaries, if any.

A. The member who it is determined can best handle the case will then do so in close liaison with and under the operational guidance of the CAS member. Both members will report at agreed intervals to the Committee.

B. The CAS representative will report to Washington in accordance with DCIS 6/2.

6. Exception. The reception of any defector will necessarily vary with the circumstances surrounding his defection. In order to cope most effectively with such situations, an separate document, PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING WALK-INS, has been prepared and is attached herewith as recommended operating procedure. This document contains in detail the procedure for handling a Walk-In or defector from the point he or she enters the American Embassy until CAS has assumed responsibility for the defector's disposal.
NORMALLY, THE AMERICAN OFFICER WILL ATTEMPT TO PUT
SUBJECT AT HIS EASE; AND AT THE SAME TIME NOTIFY THE SECURITY
OFFICER OR THE EMBASSY DUTY OFFICER THAT A PACKAGE HAS COME IN
WHICH Requires DISCUSSION. THIS WILL SIGNAL THE SECURITY OFFICER
OR THE DUTY OFFICER TO NOTIFY CAS INCLUDING THE LOCATION OF THE
SUBJECT.

F. REQUESTED RENDEZVOUS. AN AMERICAN OFFICER RECEIVING
A TELEPHONE CALL FROM A SUBJECT NATIONAL KNOWN TO HIM AND
REQUESTING A MEETING AT A SPECIFIC TIME AND PLACE "ON AN
EMERGENCY AND DELICATE" BASIS SHOULD:

1. Attempt to set the rendezvous at a
   restaurant or other public meeting
   place far removed from any of the
   Soviet bloc official installations.
   Also the meeting place should be one
   of the recommended locations in Tehran,
   list of which will be published as an
   attachment to this instruction,

   attempt to set the time, on any pretext,
   at not less than two hours later.

3. During duty hours, report immediately
to the Embassy Security Officer and
issue instructions. During off-duty
hours notify the Security Officer or
the Embassy Duty Officer giving him the
details as clearly but securely as pos-
sible. The latter should immediately
arrange direct contact between the
American Officer and CAS.

2. Operational direction will pass to CAS.

C. CAS is responsible for the briefing of the Embassy
Security Officer, who in turn will brief each new Embassy Duty
Officer as to the identity of the CAS officials and where they
may be contacted during off-duty hours.

D. CAS is responsible for the management of a subject
after initial contact, and for all further arrangements.

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ACTION: Read and Retain for Reference

1. In recent months a number of REDTOP nationals have walked into LNUBUZ installations seeking political asylum. Most have eventually been processed as refugees or defectors and many of the latter have provided useful information. A substantial number have been persuaded to return to their homelands to work on our behalf and most of these are now of very great value as long-term in-place agents. In some cases, Stations have handled REDTOP walk-ins very well, but generally, extremely valuable opportunities have been lost. These losses have generally resulted from misunderstandings with field Stations about whom, who, priorities and capabilities and from difficulties in communicating the walk-in. This dispatch and its attachments clarify our aims, to acquaint field Stations with REDTOP abilities to exploit REDTOP walk-ins, and to enable officers to obtain essential information from REDTOP nationals with whom they have no common language.

2. Putting aside the question of LNUBUZ responsibilities for asylum seekers and for assistance to refugees, which have been covered elsewhere in dispatches and airgrams, we remain concerned only with individuals of intelligence interest. While defectors can and do provide critical information, there are very few cases in which the same individual would not have been of greater value if he had returned to his post and remained in place, at least for a reasonable period. Therefore, Headquarters guidance, an attempt should sometimes be made to turn around an individual who appears to be promising

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 sewn-around therefore should remain the first goal in handling a well-placed walk-in. In addition, normally with Headquarters guidance, an attempt should sometimes be made to turn around an individual who appears to be promising
securely in his own country by a (name of person) officer) containing an encoded message written on the front approximately two to three months after his return.

d. Headquarters then assembles a package containing covert communications materials, reporting requirements and other essential items, which is delivered securely to the agent in his own country.

e. An SM message is subsequently mailed internally within the Unit and the directions on how to retrieve the ops package.

The precise operational planning will vary, of course, with the situation, e.g., are the identity and access to the walk-in established, or is it an unknown quantity? This is a crash operation in which our time with the walk-in is severely limited. Is there sufficient time to evolve a more sophisticated and efficient operational plan? The answers to these questions will help determine the actions to take to handle him initially, non-personal communications, or whether to move him immediately into a communications plan involving more risk than our CID/TA area. It is time permits, the replies to our questions so indicate, some turn-arounds may even be issued materials for preparing SM messages before they return to their homeland.

7. The most important single requirement is to keep it mind in the crash situation is that we must have the walk-in's mailing address in his homeland. By that I mean an address at which he can receive, internally posted mail; i.e., a post office box within his country. This might be his home address or the address of a friend or relative who will not be made suspicious by the arrival of mail for him. The most efficient method of acquiring this information is to have an address sample envelope to himself in his own language, assuring him that this is merely an exemplar which will not itself be used. We also need to establish that the walk-in has an SM indicator, perhaps a name or a phrase within the body of the open text, which will tell him that the letter contains SW instructions. Headquarters will normally indicate if SW is authorized, and which of the SM receiving systems is to be issued. If there is insufficient time for comms planning, Headquarters, do not hesitate to issue the monochrome or water-developed system to any promising walk-in. Under such circumstances, the walk-in should be willing to accept either of these two systems, or if for any other reason they are not suitable, the agent may also permit the monochrome or water-developed system without prior approval from Headquarters.

8. In the case of the walk-in where circumstances give Headquarters more time to provide guidance and expertise, the handling will be somewhat different. If we have enough time and the individual has sufficient promise, we will probably dispatch a staff officer experienced in the communications system/data use in the REDETOP area to train him directly for these highly disciplined communications. In this case, we might do away completely with the initial letter mailed inside the REDETOP area to the agent and put him directly on personal communications. Where we have enough time, but are dealing with an unknown quantity, we would probably be forced to take that time to prove his motivations and his suitability before we send him material. This could be done through coded communications with Headquarters, or might be handled through a dispatch of a TDI officer from Headquarters.

9. To facilitate walk-in debriefing in both the crash and non-crash/mixed situations, the various REDETOP languages. A walk-in should be asked to complete this questionnaire in the presence of authorized personnel. The answers in capital letters are provided for the benefit of Headquarters. The walk-in should be asked to complete this questionnaire if desired, cards can be kept referring to this questionnaire in Section IV of the QAR. Section II relates to the walk-in's current situation, status and biographical history. Section II requests information concerning the walk-in's giving in which would assist in clandestine communications planning. If time is short, stations are authorized to proceed with Section II on their own initiative. The volume of these questionnaires is that all necessary information may be obtained by an officer not fluent in the walk-in's native language. Further, it assures that the most pertinent questions will be asked even if the available time is limited and that, by virtue of the walk-in providing written answers to the questions, ambiguities and inaccuracies are considerably reduced.

10. Attachment "B" contains forms in English and the REDETOP languages, to assist in the establishment of communica- tion with the walk-in. Included are questions concerning the individual's mailing address in his homeland and the type of codes he receives there, the establishment of an indicator, sets of instructions for the development or reading of several different agent SW receiving systems (including microdot) which develop on a specific agent, and SW carbon writing instructions. The agent-receiving instructions are accompanied by developed forms and messages and prepared for use by Headquarters. These forms will enable the walk-in to practice developing time and circumstances permit. Microdot receiving instructions include both the carbon records and exampies of buried microdots. All carbon forms are provided with the SW carbon writing instructions. The foreign language versions are provided in two forms: on standard stationery, and in reduced format on water soluble paper. The latter may be given the walk-in for subsequent study. If time permits, however, in no instance should he attempt to return to his country with these instructions.

11. The Attachment "B" instructions are more detailed than the standard WOLOCX forms intended for use primarily in conjunction with actual training by an SW technician. These instructions presuppose situations in which the attending case officer can provide little or no instructional assistance to the walk-in. However, it should be clearly understood that while these instructions are as comprehensive as possible, the agent cannot approach the effectiveness of training by a qualified SW technician. In most cases where time and circumstances permit, we would prefer that the WOLOCX technician be called in to train the individual. By the same token, Chiefs of Station or Base shall avail themselves of the opportunity, when WOLOCX/CBR technician visits, to have the technician train completely with the use of the system involved so that they can competeably perform training if the need arises. As a minimum, all officers who might handle walk-ins should experiment with exemplars provided in Attachment "B". Additional copies for this purpose will be provided upon request. All other officers should be completely familiar with these basic techniques.
12. Analysis of REDTOP walk-ins in recent years clearly indicates that REDTOP services have never been using sophisticated and serious walk-ins as a provocation technique. However, fear of provocation has been more responsible for bad handling of walk-ins than any other cause. We have concluded that we do ourselves a real disservice if we shy away from promising cases because of fear of provocation. We are willing to run any apparently useful case for a reasonable period and can do so in such a way that little or no harm will be done if the case should turn out to be controlled. We are confident that we are capable of determining whether or not a producing agent is supplying bona fide information.

13. A legal matter involving "turn-around" inducement requires special comment. Many walk-ins and defectors appear to be adamant in their insistence on guaranteed resettlement in WODUAL; Stations are not authorized to make such promises on their own; and Headquarters is traditionally reluctant to grant such authority. In fact this problem is more apparent than real. An agent who serves us loyally "inside" for a reasonable period of time (normally several years) will obviously be well taken care of when he wishes to "retire" and competent field operations officers will normally be able to make this clear without specific promise of resettlement in WODUAL. "The West" or "a friendly country" are acceptable. As a last resort, however, Headquarters will consider making a commitment to WODUAL resettlement when a walk-in's value appears to justify it. However, Stations should make every possible effort to turn around all walk-ins without such a commitment.

14. One final problem which has caused some difficulty is the fact that traffic relating to a walk-in is not always received by interested Headquarters elements on a timely basis. To expedite handling, as well as to ensure security, cable traffic should be slugged "RYBAT PLAERONAUT" and sent by at least immediate precedence. Use of a higher precedence may be dictated by time considerations. At least during the initial exchanges, the cable should not carry the indicator nor should there be any formal involvement with MONICK until approved by Headquarters. The PLAERONAUT slug will usually be used at least until all reasonable hope of turn-around is abandoned.

Robert P. Tacey

Robert P. TACEY

Attachments:
As stated
S-E-C-R-E-T

designated as secure enough for the initial debriefings. If, after meeting with the Walk-In, you determine that you and he have no common language, we have language material in the various Bloc, Russian and Chinese languages which includes the initial greeting in the individual's native tongue, debriefing material, and political asylum requests (these packets are kept in Chief, Branch I's safe in the top drawer and in DCoS' safe.). We also have a list of the DCoS Embassy officials who have language capabilities related to our needs.

Obviously one cannot predict nor list all the various difficulties and problems you might confront in your dealings with a Walk-In, such as the method used by which he contacts you or his mental and physical condition at the time he walks in. However, the attached list will give you some guidelines and represents the minimal data you must acquire from the Walk-In.

A primary objective of the Station is recruitment in-place even if it is for a short period of time. This objective would perhaps if the Walk-In is an intelligence officer or if he can be useful to the Agency as a source of information. Therefore:

A. Urge him to return to his Embassy or office (if he is a PCS Officer). A useful justification is that you need time to move him out of the country. If he is agreeable, give him re-contact instructions (including time, meeting site and alternates) and specific requirements he should fulfill for the next meeting. Every officer should be thinking of a secure area or site for this specific eventuality.

B. If he agrees to working in-place but is here TDY and will soon be moving on, the following are imperative:

1) Determine his address in his homeland where he can receive mail and have him address an envelope himself, letter to be mailed in his country.
2) Establish with the Walk-In an SW indicator, perhaps a name or phrase within the body of the open text of the letter which will tell him that the letter contains SW.

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3) He must also be informed as to the method used in developing SW (scorch or water developed system instructions are attached). If there is insufficient time for consulations with Headquarters regarding SW issuance, do not hesitate to give scorch or water developed system instructions to any promising Walk-In.

4) Determine if he has American or Western friends or relatives with whom he corresponds in the West or any friends or relatives traveling in the West or who are likely to travel.

If he does not agree to work in-place or circumstances preclude the possibility of this, place him in an area where locals do not have access until a determination can be made of his case (possibilities include the small room with toilet facilities next to the photo lab on the Embassy compound or as a last resort, one of the Embassy apartments). The Walk-In must have a Station officer with him at all times.

Send immediate cable to Headquarters with all pertinent data. If the Walk-In is from a local Embassy, check to see if Station has a 201 file and if so, forward information from it to Headquarters. Follow this up with whatever information becomes available from the debriefing.

If the Walk-In does want to defect, you cannot promise him anything but you can assure him that his case will be sympathetically handled. You should at that time obtain a asylum request from him, preferably in his own words and handwriting (the outline of these requests in the various languages are available in the Chief, Branch I's safe and DCoS' safe).

If the Walk-In falls under defector status, is an intelligence officer or of specific interest to Headquarters we may prepare to move him out of the country as soon as is possible. If the Walk-In does not fit this status and can not be used operationally, the Embassy Defector Committee will be convened at COS direction to determine whether to grant defector status. If the walk-In is an intelligence officer or can be used operationally, the Defector Committee will not be convened or informed.

S-E-C-R-E-T
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE OF A SECRET WRITING (SW) CARBON

(READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS VERY CAREFULLY)

1. The Secret Writing (SW) Carbon

A secret writing (SW) carbon appears to be ordinary writing paper. However, this special paper works exactly like a carbon paper used in a typewriter in that under the pressure of a pencil, an invisible ink is transferred from the carbon to the paper on which it rests. There are four main differences between the typewriter carbon and the SW carbon: 1) the special ink in the SW carbon is invisible and there is only a very small amount of it, 2) both sides of the carbon are impregnated with this special ink so you may use either side, 3) with proper timing and careful handling, the SW carbon can be used for as many as 30 messages, and 4) only you will be able to read what you have written. By using this SW carbon to write messages, you will have a very secure means of communicating with us.

You must ensure that the SW carbon does not become soiled or confused with other pieces of paper. When you handle the carbon, be sure that your hands are clean and hold it only by the edges. Store the carbon in a safe place where you can find it and where it will not become dirty. To more easily recognize the carbon, you might write something innocent such as notes, telephone numbers, addresses, etc., on one side of it.

2. Preparation of the Open Letter

Almost any normal writing stationery on which you would consider writing a personal letter can be used. The best type is the white non-glazed variety which is neither too thick nor too thin. Place the sheet of paper on which you will write the letter on a clean surface. With a clean soft cloth such as a handkerchief, gently wipe the paper from left to right across the paper making overlapping wipes until you have completely wiped the paper left to right from the top to bottom. Then rotate the paper 90° and wipe in the same manner. Continue wiping and rotating the paper until it has been completely wiped in all four directions. Then turn the paper over and wipe the back of the sheet in the same way. This wiping will raise the paper fibres and make the paper more receptive to the secret ink.

Compose a letter similar in style and form to that of any letter you would write to a relative or friend. This letter should only concern affairs which would be of no interest to outsiders and should not contain topics which would arouse the curiosity or suspicion on the part of any persons who might read the letter. However, the letter must be of substance. The best way to judge whether or not the letter you have written is good is to ask yourself, "Is this letter worth the postage and the SW to send it?" If the answer is "yes" it is a good letter. Write the letter with a ballpoint pen on a clean sheet of paper such as a writing pad.

IMPORTANT

A. Do not write anything in the letter which would identify you as the sender.

B. Do not sign your real name. Instead use a fictitious name and continue to use the same fictitious name on all future letters to the same address.

C. Do not use a return name or address on the envelope.

D. Do not mail the letter in the same postal district or zone that you normally send your mail.

E. Do not mail the letter in a post office. Instead use a street mailbox, preferably at a time when no one else can see you do it.

3. Preparation of the Secret Message

Wash your hands thoroughly before beginning. You are to write your secret message across the front of the letter in the same direction as the visible text. The visible text will interfere with reading the message.

The writing of the SW message must be done in the following manner (please note the corresponding illustration):

A. Place a piece of clean white paper (A) on a clean hard surface (preferably glass).

B. Place the letter (B) on this paper with the front side facing up.

C. Place the SW carbon (C) on the letter. If you have written anything on one side of the SW carbon to disguise it, be sure to place the clean side of the carbon without writing against the letter.

D. On top of the carbon place one more piece of clean white paper (D). This is the sheet on which you will write.

E. Align (trim up) all four pieces of paper along the bottom and along the left hand side. Prevent the pieces of paper from moving while you are writing the message by lightly pressing them down in the margins of the paper. Do not press down in the area in which you will write the secret message.

F. For writing, use a blunt pencil with a medium soft lead (a pencil with a hard lead will leave noticeable impressions). While writing the SW message do not press down with such force that you will make impressions on the letter. Use a firm, uniform pressure. Leave a margin of about 2 cm on all sides. The SW message should be written in block letters about 5 mm high. In place of a period, make a small "X" where the period would normally be. If a word is particularly important, such as a name or number, you should write it twice. Write it the first time followed by the word "REPEAT" then write it a second time. At the end of the SW message, write "END".

G. After finishing the SW message, destroy the top sheet of paper (D) and conceal the SW carbon (C) in a secure place for future use. Very carefully inspect both sides of the letter (B) for any impressions from the writing of the SW message. To do this, hold the letter above eye level at an angle to a light (please note the corresponding illustration) and rotate the letter slightly to side to side and up and down. If you find impressions of the SW message, you must destroy the letter and begin again using lighter pressure.

H. Since you must destroy any letters on which you make visible impressions when writing the SW message, before writing each message please practice in the following manner: assemble our sheets of paper as shown in the illustration, but instead of using an actual letter and the SW carbon, use clean sheets of paper. Write a sentence exactly as you would when preparing a secret message but with lighter pressure, then another with slightly heavier pressure. Continue to write sentences increasing the pressure with each. Examine sheet "B" in the light. You should use the heaviest pressure possible which does not leave impressions. This is because the SW carbon is somewhat less sensitive than the normal typewriter carbon.

I. When you are completely satisfied that there are no impressions of the pencil writing on the actual letter, again wash your hands and then carefully fold the letter in the normal fashion and put it into an envelope. You must be careful not to directly touch any portion of the letter which contains the secret message with your fingers or the secret writing might smear. You may place a clean piece of paper between your fingers and the secret message when folding the letter, but do not accidentally enclose this blank piece of paper in the envelope.

4. Precautionary Measures

A. Never put the open letter in contact with the SW carbon until you are ready to write the actual secret message. Handle the SW carbon and the letters only by the edges and do not fold or handle them unnecessarily.

B. Do not make corrections or try to erase mistakes in the SW message. Instead write "MISTAKE" after the incorrect word and then write the correct word.

C. Prepare a complete draft of your message in exactly the same format as the secret message. In this way you will be able to make any necessary corrections in advance, before writing the actual secret message. Also, by having a draft to copy from you will be able to pay more attention to your writing technique and thus make no mistakes.
DEVELOPMENT OF SECRET MESSAGES WITH WATER

The secret messages we will send you will be on the back side of the letter and written right angles to the open text. This message will contain additional instructions for you.

Development of the secret messages can be accomplished in a number of ways. The most practical is to place the letter in a clean tray free of soap, oil or grease of ordinary water until the message appears as transparent letters on an opaque background. If the letter is left in the water for too long a time the secret message will become blurred. Remove it from the water as soon as the secret message is completely legible. Place it face up on a clean piece of white paper and read the message.

Messages developed with ordinary water are legible only while wet and will disappear as the paper dries. However, the messages can be redeveloped a minimum of four times without loss of legibility.

If fountain pen ink is added to the water in the tray, the developed secret message will be permanent and not fade when the paper has dried. In this case the secret message will appear in dark letters on a lighter background.

After you have read the secret message and made necessary notes, be sure to destroy it completely.

PRECAUTION: Wet paper tears very easily. Exercise great care when handling the message.

DEVELOPMENT OF SECRET MESSAGES BY SCORCH

The secret messages we will send you will be repeated at least once. The front and back side of the letter will each have at least one copy of the entire secret message. Thus you will have at least two chances to read the entire message if you encounter any difficulty. The secret message will be at right angles to the open text. It will contain additional instructions for you.

The secret message will develop slowly under the influence of high heat. The message will darken faster than the paper background. Heating must be continued until the message is completely legible. Suggested techniques are as follows:

1. Do not use direct flames as the source of heat because of the danger of the paper igniting. If a gas stove is to be used, it is suggested that a clean frying pan be placed over the open flame to provide a surface similar to a hot plate. The message can probably be most easily developed over an electric hot plate or stove. When the unit is at its hottest, the message sheet should be held above the heating surface until the paper turns brown and the message appears.

2. A flat iron or an electric iron may also be used conveniently as the source of heat. In this case the message is pressed with a very hot iron. The iron should be moved very slowly back and forth over the message sheet until the secret writing appears.

After you have read the secret message and made necessary notes, be sure to completely destroy it.
SECRET COMMUNICATIONS

About two to three months after you return to your country you will receive a letter written in your native language mailed within your country. Please write your mailing address in the space below in the same manner as you would address an envelope to you.

What kinds of letter or written material can you normally receive at this mailing address?

This letter will have an indicator which means that the letter contains a secret message for you. The indicator could be the name of the person who signs the letter, a phrase or sentence in the text of the letter, the way in which the letter is dated, etc. The indicator must be something that you can easily remember and recognize but which would be innocent to anyone else who might read it. Please write the indicator you want to use for this purpose in the space below.

SECRET COMMUNICATIONS

В этом получатель из Москвы письмо будет иметь индикатор объясняющий Вам что в нем находится сокрытое сообщение для Вас. Этот индикатор может быть любой фразой или фразой, написанной в тексте письма, и т.д. Этот индикатор должен быть легко запоминаемый и узнаваемый Вами, но также должен быть не обращающимся на себя внимание если бы кто-нибудь другой читал его. Пожалуйста, в данном внизу месте введите индикатор которым мы могли бы пользоваться в письмах к Вам.
WALK-IN CHECK LIST

1. Determine full name, including patronymic (Note: If Walk-In is initially reluctant to give name, come back to it after establishing some rapport).

2. Date, place of birth; immediate family - names, DPOB.

3. His exact position.

4. Local address and telephone number.

5. Address and telephone number in native country.

6. Obtain any documents or identification papers he might have with him in order to determine bona fides (photograph if possible).

7. How long can he remain before he will be missed.

8. Determine if he is an Intelligence Officer. If so, determine his alias, basic information on the residency, knowledge of operations against American target in area and elsewhere, other Intelligence Officers and Agents in the area and elsewhere.

9. Debrief him for indications intelligence: early warning information on imminent hostilities against the U.S., its installations, and Allies.

10. Determine membership in Communist Party.

11. Determine exact motivation for coming to us: asylum, working-in-place, assistance, protection, or in fact is he here for some completely innocent purpose?

12. Determine if he has told anyone of his plans for coming to us, whether his family is with him, and whether he has made any such approaches elsewhere.

13. If Walk-In is a PCs Intelligence Officer or government official, aim immediately for recruitment-in-place, and urge him to return to his Embassy or office (a useful justification is that the USG needs time to decide his case or to move him out of the country). If he is agreeable to recruitment-in-place, provide requirements.

14. If Walk-In is TDYer and agrees to working-in-place:

   (a) have him print his address in his homeland where he can receive mail, and then have him address an envelope himself;

   (b) establish an SW indicator (name or phrase);

   (c) issue and explain carefully scorch or water-developed SW system, and explain that a letter with further instructions in SW will be mailed to him from inside his country;

   (d) determine if he has any American or Western friends/relatives living or travelling in the West now or in the future, and whether he knows anyone in the West who can vouch for him.
15. Re-contact:
   (a) For asylum-seekers: return to Embassy in 2 day's time, if possible; if not, arrange outside meeting.
   (b) For recruitment-in-place: arrange outside meeting in public place (site, date, time, alternates, and recognition signals).
   (c) For TIBer: attempt to arrange outside meeting-in-place.

16. Description: height, weight, apparent age, eyes, hair, complexion, teeth, clothes, posture, speech.

17. Money: if Walk-In is in need of money, issue a reasonable amount for sustenance until re-contact.

The information that you provide about yourself on this questionnaire will be seen only by appropriate U.S. Government officials and will be handled most discreetly as confidential information.

At this time there is no officer present who speaks your language fluently. Please show any documents you have with you which would establish your identity to the person who has given you these instructions. This person may wish to keep your documents for a short time for the usual verification, but they will be returned to you before you leave today.

Please write (in numbers) the time you must leave here today: _________ hrs. If it is possible for you to come here again, give in numbers, the date and time you expect to return here:

Please fill out the following questionnaire so that we may be able to better assist you. Please print your answers in capital letters. If you need more space, write on the back of the page.
SECTION 1

1. Your full name:

2. Place and date of birth:

3. Citizenship:

4. Occupation:

5. Complete permanent address and home telephone number:

6. What is your address in the city/country where we now are?

7. If it is necessary for us to contact you during the next few days, how can this be done?

8. If you travelling, when will you leave this city? Give dates and places you plan to visit next. When do you plan to return to your country?

9. What languages do you speak, read and write? Please list your languages in order of fluency: your most fluent first, least fluent last:

10. To whom do you wish to speak and what is it that you wish to discuss? How may we help you?

11. Give the full name and address of your place of work. Explain the functions, production of the enterprise, and its relationship to higher organizations.

12. Describe your current work. What is your job title? Who is the head of your enterprise/plant/ministry?

13. In your work do you have access to secret information or documents? If so, what? Describe any access you have had to secret information before your present job.

14. Briefly, what is the level of your education and in what field?

15. If you have had military service during the past 10 years, give rank, branch of service, unit designation and duties performed.

16. Are you a member of a Communist Party or related organization? Give dates of membership and positions held.
17. If you have ever worked for or had any contacts with any intelligence service, describe circumstances, dates, names of persons and places, and the exact nature of activity.

18. What is your present status? Are you travelling as a tourist alone or in a group? Are you on an official trip? If you have a passport for foreign travel, what visa or travel permits do you have and for what period of time and countries are they valid?

19. Are any members of your family with you in this country? If so, give names, dates of birth and relationship to you.
1. Имя, отчество, и фамилия:

2. Место и дата рождения:

3. Гражданство:

4. Профессия/занимаете:

5. Полный домашний адрес и номер телефона:

6. Ваш адрес в этом городе или в этой стране:

7. Если будет необходимо связаться с вами в ближайшие несколько дней, как можно с вами связаться?

8. Если вы сейчас находится в пути, когда вам нужно выехать из этого города? Укажите даты и места ваших следующих остановок. Когда вы возвращетесь в вашу страну?

9. На каких языках вы говорите, читаете, и пишете? Пожалуйста, перечислите ваши языки в порядке вашего наилучшего знания—ваш лучший язык первый, последним напишите ваш самый слабый язык.

Русский — Basic Questionnaire, Part I

10. С кем бы вы хотели говорить и о чем? Чем можем помочь вам?

11. Укажите полностью название и адрес вашего места работы. Опишите функции и продукцию вашего предприятия и его тесную или связь с вышестоящими организациями.

12. Опишите вашу работу. Как называется ваша работа? Кто является начальником вашего предприятия? Фирмы/министерства?

13. В вашей работе, имеется ли у вас доступ к секретным сведениям или документам? Если ответ утвердительный, то к каким именно? Опишите если у вас был такой доступ в прошлом, до текущей работы.

14. Сообщите кратко о ваших образованиях и специализациях.

15. Если вы были на военной службе в течение последних 10-ти лет, то сообщите ваше звание, род войска, наименование части и служебные обязанности за время вашей службы.

16. Состоите ли вы в каком-либо коммунистической партии или ее какой-либо родственной организации? Укажите даты и должности за период когда состояли членом.
SECTION II

1. Do you expect to travel outside your country within the next year or two? Where? When? For what purpose?

2. If you do not live in your capital city, how frequently could you travel there?

3. Do you have relatives or friends living outside the Socialist countries? Give names, addresses and relationship to you.

4. Please write your mailing address in the same manner as you would address an envelope to yourself.

5. Describe the kinds of personal mail you receive at your mailing address. About how many letters per month do you receive from within your country? From outside your country? Do you receive magazines, books, or newspapers through the mail?

6. Do you receive mail via general delivery? If so, write out your mailing address.

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17. Если вы когда-либо работали или имели связь с любой разведочной службой/организацией, то опишите при каких условиях, когда (даты), имена и фамилии лиц и назначение мест с которыми имели связь и аккуратное описание того, что вы делали.

18. Какое ваше положение в настоящее время — вы путешествуете как турист самостоятельно или с группой? Нахождитесь вы сейчас в официальной/служебной поездке? Если у вас имеется паспорт для поездки за границу, какие визы разрешения у вас есть и на какой срок и для каких стран они действительны?

19. Кто из членов вашей семьи находится с вами здесь в этой стране? Также укажите и имена, даты рождения и их родство с вами.
7. What Western publications, newspapers or magazines can you read regularly in your country?

8. Regarding your residence in your country, who lives with you and what is their relationship to you? Describe briefly your residence and number of rooms. On what floor of the building is it located? Is there an address label on your unit or mail box in your building? If so, where is the box located? Is your name or apartment number written on the box?

9. Do you have an automobile? Give the model, color and license number.

10. Please give the name, model and year of manufacture of any short wave radio and television set you have.

11. What photographic equipment do you have? Do you develop film at home?

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1. Ожидаете-ли вы возможность путешествия за пределы вашей страны, в следующие годы или лет? Куда? Когда? За какой целью?

2. Если вы не живете в вашей столице, то как часто у вас бывает возможность ездить туда?

3. Есть ли у вас родственники или знакомые вне социалистических стран? Укажите их имена и фамилии, адреса и родство или отношения к вам.

4. Пожалуйста, напишите ваш почтовый адрес так, как вы адресовали бы конверт письма к себе.

5. Опишите род/тип писем которые вы получаете по вашему почтовому адресу. Приблизительно сколько писем вы получаете в месяц, внутри вашей страны? А из мест вне пределов вашей страны? Получаете-ли вы журналы, книги, или деловую литературу по почте и откуда?

6. Получаете-ли вы письма до востребования? Если ответ утвердительный, то напишите полностью этот адрес.

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Russian — Basic Questionnaire, Part II
7. Какие из западных изданий, газет или журналов вы читаете регулярно в вашей стране?

8. О вашем проживании в вашей стране: кто живет с вами и какое у них родство с вами? Опишите квартиру и количество комнат. На каком этаже она находится? Кладете ли почту в ящик для почты в вашем доме? Если да, то где этот ящик расположен? Напишите ваши фамилию и номер квартиры на этом ящике?

9. Имеется ли у вас автомобиль? Укажите модель, цвет и номер вашей машины.

10. Пожалуйста, укажите марку, модель и год выпуска коротковолнового радиоприемника и телевизора, которые у вас могут быть имеются.

11. Какое фото-оборудование есть у вас? Проявляете ли вы пленки дома?
**Form VI**

It is our understanding that you differ political reasons in the United States. We are unwilling to have this information. We will accept your decision to return to your country. However, we cannot accept your claim.

During the next week, please write a letter outlining your reasons for requesting asylum. The nature of your claim will be reviewed by our officials. We will then determine your eligibility for asylum.

Your presence in China is not legal, and we expect you to leave.
Are you a member of the PLA/Intelligence Department in the Embassy?
Yes  No

Do you know the members of the PLA/Intelligence Department in the Embassy?
Yes  No

Do you work for the International Liaison Department?
Yes  No

Are you a Chinese Communist Party member?
Yes  No

Do you attend briefings given by the Ambassador or the Political Counselor?
Yes  No

Can you go into the Code Room (or Secret Room) to read documents and telegrams?
Yes  No

When were you scheduled to return to China for home leave or reassignment?
This month  Next month  Later this year  Next year

Have you recently been criticized by your superiors in the Embassy?
Yes  No

For what reason were you criticized?
Unsatisfactory political attitude?  Yes  No
Bourgeois tendencies or behavior?  Yes  No
Mistakes in your work?  Yes  No

Now that you are more relaxed will you begin writing a resume of your personal history. In this statement you should include all details of your education, work experience, CCP experience. Also include the same, locations, and occupations of all of your family members. In a second statement write a complete report of all of your duties at the Chinese Peoples Embassy since you arrived there.

Since it will be very useful for you to learn the English language, this person will begin to teach you. We have no teaching materials in Chinese so you will be taught by the direct method.

Do you feel ill? Do you want to see a doctor?
Yes  No
Form VII

Other useful phrases and instructions.

Please sit in this chair. We are going to photograph you.

We are going to take you to a safe place where you will remain for several days while arrangements are being made to take you out of this country. The house is safe and you will be protected. An American will remain with you at all times and will help you if you need help. Follow his instructions and do not try to leave the building without his permission. You will be supplied with things to make your stay as comfortable as possible. After several days an American who speaks Chinese will come here to help you and to escort you out of this country. We want you to have a safe and comfortable time and to be protected.

We are going to disguise you so that you will not be recognized when you go outside of this building. After we have finished the disguise and are leaving the building, follow closely the instructions of the person who is escorting you.

Do not try to take your suitcase with you. Take only the essential things which you can carry in your pockets and leave the remainder of your possessions here. They will be safeguarded for you.

Hello. I am an official at this American Embassy. I regret that neither I nor anyone presently in this Embassy speaks Chinese, but we have anticipated this problem and will try to communicate with you using these cards, written in your language.

Next: 2

您好！我是领事馆的职员，很对不起，馆内现在没有能讲中国话的。可是，为了解决这个问题，我们特地准备了一套中文卡片，来跟您谈谈。

请坐在这里，我们给你拍一张相。

我们需要带你到一个安全的地方，并且在那个地方有一些美国人在保护你。你将在这里待上几天，几天后，一位会说中国话的美国将会来帮助你离开这个地方。

我们会给你化妆，让你在外面不会被认出来。在我们完成化妆并离开大楼时，请按照陪伴的指示行事。

不要尝试带走你的手提箱。仅带必需的物品在口袋里，其余的物品将由我们替你保管。
Please write your surname and given names here.

Directions: If name is written in romanized form, go to card 3. If name is written in Chinese characters, go to card 4.

Please write your name in Chinese.

Directions: Go to card 4.

请用中文写您的姓名：
Are you a citizen of the People's Republic of China?

YES. NO

If yes, go to card 5. If no, stop

I will need some information about you. Be assured that your information will be treated confidentially and will be held within this Embassy.

Next: 6

您是中华人民共和国的人民吗

如是请指明「是」. 是 YES. 

如不是请指明「不是」. 不是 NO.
Please show me any documents you have with you that identify you.

Directions: If you want to leave the room with the documents, use card. Otherwise, go to 8.

Please wait. I have to show these documents to my superior, and I will bring them back to you immediately.

Next: 8
Are you a member of the PRC Embassy?

YES

If yes, use card 9

NO

If no, use card 11

Are you stationed in this city?

YES

If yes, go to card 10

NO

If no, go to card 15

您是不是驻在本城的？

如是请指明是，

是 YES

如不是请指明「不是」，

不是 NO
Please write down approximately when your tour of duty is scheduled to end.
Year_________ Month_________ Day_______

Next: 12

Are you a member of a Chinese trade delegation visiting this country?

YES

NO

If yes, go to 16

If no, go to 12

请您注明您的任期到何时为止：

YEAR _______ MONTH _______ DAY _______

是 YES

不是 NO
Are you a member of a Chinese cultural delegation visiting this country?

YES NO
If yes, go to 16 If no, go to 13

Are you travelling here as a PRC official?

YES NO
If yes, go to 16 If no, go to 14
Please write your occupation and your address below.

Next: 15 or 16

Please indicate on this map where you are stationed.

Next: 17

请您在这地图上指出您派驻的地点。

请您将您的职务，住址写明在这里。
Please indicate on this map your entire travel route.

Next: 17

Please use this calendar and the timepiece (clock or watch) to indicate the time and date you must leave this city.

请您在这地图上，注明您旅行全程路线。

请您用这日历和钟表，指出您必须离开本城的日期及时间。
Please indicate your official position from this list. If your position is not on this list, please write it below.

Next: Use LIST After LIST, go to card 19.

If "other" go to 20, otherwise go to 23.

Please indicate why you have come here.

商务问题 Commercial matter
文化方面 Cultural matter
签证问题 Visa matter
私人访问 Personal visit
意外协助 Accident assistance
其他问题 Other
20

Seeking help of a political nature?

YES  NO

If yes, go to 22  If no, go to 21

21

Please indicate what you want in your own writing.

Next: 23

请您写下来您所需要的是什么？

您是不是想寻求政治上的帮助？

是  不是

YES  NO
I admire your courage in coming here and I agree that you have made a wise decision. We are going to help you to the limits of possibility. I represent our Government when I assure you that we will assist you.

Next: 21

We have no American officials here now who can speak Chinese. We will have an American official who speaks Chinese come here. This will take, at most, two days. As soon as he arrives, we will discuss what you want with you.

If you want him to return to the Embassy use 24. If not, use 25 plus your own recontact plan.

我佩服您有勇气到这里来。我认为您的决定是很明智的。我们一定会尽量地帮助您。我代表我们政府向您保证，我们会帮助您的。

目前我们使馆里没有人能说中国话，不过我们在两天以内，就可以调来一位会说中国话的官员，等他一到，我们就能和您详谈了。
You should return to your place and continue your work.

We need two days to have a Chinese-speaking American officer transferred here. In 3 to 5 days you may return here, during the hours between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. If you find this difficult, please come here at your convenience. After you return here we can discuss the details of your request for assistance.

If not "political assistance," end with 27. If "political assistance" go to 26.

what you must do now is to return to your place and perform your normal duties.

We need two full days to bring a Chinese-speaking American official here.

We must do not come here to the American Embassy. Follow directions.

Next: 26.
Please come with me. I will take you to an exit.

We will not report this visit to your government or to the local government. Please do not tell anyone about your visit to us.

Return to your place quickly, do your work calmly, and come again after two days have passed.

Next: end with 27

LAST CARD

Make sure you have collected all the cards.
Get up to leave.

我现在送您出去，请您跟我来。

我们不会报告你们政府和当地政府，说您来过这里，请您也不要告诉任何人您来过这里。

请您赶快回去，镇定地工作，两天以后，再来这里。
November 10, 1973

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Handling of Asylum Requests by Citizens of Communist Countries (USSR, People's Republic of China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany, Albania, Yugoslavia, Cuba, N. Korea, N. Vietnam)

1. Our country is by tradition sympathetic to those who seek to escape from tyranny, and it is the express policy of the U.S. Government to give prompt and full consideration to requests for asylum wherever they may be made. Moreover, persons asking for asylum or seeking to establish a secret connection with the U.S. Government are often able to provide information of great value. Accordingly, both humanitarian considerations and the interests of the Government require the Embassy and the other elements of the official American Community in Iran to be prepared to handle requests for asylum efficiently and securely.

2. This memorandum (which supersedes the memorandum of December 31, 1972 on the same subject) explains what to do when a citizen of one of the communist countries turns to any U.S. Government employee in Iran with a request that the U.S. Government give him refuge, help, or protection from his own authorities. It also explains how to handle persons who approach official Americans to say, for example, that they have "important information for the U.S. Government" or that they have a "confidential matter" that they wish to discuss with the Ambassador or some other American official.

3. Of course, some requests for asylum and stories about "important information" are fraudulent; they may be made by pranksters or cranks; or they may be the work of con men or even of the agents of hostile intelligence services who want to discover our procedures and the way our own intelligence people are. But it is better to accept several phony requests than to turn down a single genuine one. No one must be sent away just because he behaves oddly or his story sounds improbable. Many stories which initially sounded implausible have proven true.

4. There are a number of ways in which a person seeking asylum or assistance may get in touch with the American authorities, and they will be taken up below. In all cases, however, it is the duty of the American to whom the asylum or assistance request is first made to receive it with courtesy and sympathy, to give the requestor protection or whatever immediate help the circumstances may warrant. Above all, it is the American's responsibility, as explained below, to alert the proper authorities without delay, regardless of when the asylum request may be made. This means that even if the request is received after duty hours or on a holiday, action must still be taken on it at once, and not put off till the next working day. A further point: the person seeking asylum or a confidential interview may indeed have classified information of great value to the Government. To protect him and his information, therefore, his identity and the fact of his asylum or assistance request must, to the extent possible, be revealed to no one other than the proper U.S. Government authorities, as set forth below.

5. Someone seeking asylum or assistance is most likely to come in person to the Embassy or the Consulate, either during duty hours or afterwards. But there are other possibilities, he may apply to some other American installation, or, if it is dangerous for him to be seen going into any American installation, he may send someone else to speak for him. Another possibility is that the person seeking asylum will approach an American in his home or elsewhere. This is a method of making initial contact that has been chosen by some Soviets who wanted to make contact with the U.S. Government. A further possibility is that the asylum request will be made by telephone, either to the Embassy or some other official installation, or to an American's home. Again, such calls may very well not be made during working hours.

SECRET/NOFORN
Asylum Requests Made in Person at the Embassy During Duty Hours

6. Someone seeking asylum may get as far as the Marine Security Guard (MSG) on duty, or he may make his first substantive contact with the Iranian guard at the main gate of the Chancery. When a non-Iranian applies to the gate guard with a request for asylum, or a request to see the Ambassador or some other officer on business that he will not reveal, or makes any similarly unusual request, the guard should refer him to the MSG on duty.

7. If the MSG on duty receives a request of the sort noted in the preceding paragraph either directly or through the gate guard, he should put the visitor in the Guard Room as above, and then summon the Security Officer. If the latter is not present, the MSG should discreetly alert the SRF Chief or any other SRF Officer known to him. Out of the visitor's hearing (and of the receptionist's, too) he should telephone and say, "I have a message from Mr. MAYDAY." This arbitrary phrase is the signal that someone has asked for asylum or has an unusual request of the sort noted in Paragraph 6.

8. If summoned as above, the Security Officer, or any other Embassy Officer,
(a) will at once alert SRF by the use of the MAYDAY phrase as above;
(b) should see to the visitor's comfort while awaiting the arrival of the SRF representative.

Note that someone seeking asylum or clandestine contact with the U.S. Government is likely to be under considerable stress. The officer receiving him, therefore, should not leave him alone, if possible, and should do what he can to put him at ease. To the extent that he and the visitor have a common language, he should try to elicit the visitor's basic personal information (i.e., name, citizenship, occupation), and what it is that he wants. He should make no attempt to interrogate him, however. The officer should listen sympathetically and courteously to the visitor's story and should assure him that someone is coming to talk to him right away, and that his request will be given speedy and secure consideration at the appropriate level. Naturally, the officer must be particularly careful to say nothing that might be interpreted as a promise of asylum in the United States or, indeed, of any other form of U.S. Government assistance — for example, in leaving Iran and resettling elsewhere.

If the visitor has a passport and other identity documents, and if the circumstances permit it, the receiving officer should make xerox copies of them.

9. Upon his arrival, the SRF representative will take responsibility for further handling.

10. If the visitor cannot wait for the arrival of the SRF Officer, the officer should tell the visitor to come back at a clearly specified time, preferably the same day or as soon afterwards as possible. If, however, the visitor states he cannot risk returning to an American installation, the officer should arrange a meeting for him in a public place which is easily found and to which he can gain access, such as the bar of a local hotel. The visitor should be told to have a newspaper in hand so that the SRF Officer can recognize him. The agreement as to place, time, date and means of recognition should be specific and clearly understood. Before the visitor leaves, be sure to elicit the following information from him:

A. His name, nationality, date and place of birth, local address (residence or hotel) and local telephone number.

B. Physical description as exactly as possible, including clothes he is wearing.
C. Obtain any notes or papers he wishes to leave.

D. Ask him to write out his request if he has sufficient time.

Requests made at the Chancery after Hours or on Holidays

11. If, after hours or on a holiday, the MSG on duty at the Chancery (Post No. 4) receives a visitor with what appears to be an asylum request or an unusual request of the sort noted in Paragraph 6 above:

(a) he will install the visitor in the Guard Room as in Paragraphs 6 and 7 above,

(b) he will check his log book to see whether any SRF officer known to him is in the Chancery at the time (on a Friday or Sunday morning, for example). If so, he will alert him to the presence of the visitor by phoning him and using the Mr. HIRAY phase as in Paragraph 7.

(c) If no SRF Officer is actually present in the Chancery, the MSG should alert the Security Officer and one of the SRF Officers on his list by telephone. Again he should use the Mr. HIRAY phase as in Paragraph 7.

(d) Pending the arrival of the SRF Representative, the MSG will proceed as in Paragraph 8.

(e) If the visitor cannot wait, the MSG should try to arrange an alternate meeting as in Paragraph 10.

Requests made at the Embassy Annex (Consulate)

12. If an asylum or similar request is made at the Consulate during duty hours, the Iranian receptionist should refer the request to the officer designated by the Chief of the Consular Section. The latter should put the visitor in Room 211 or Room 404 of the Consulate, and then proceed as in Paragraph 8 above. If the request is made after hours or on a holiday, the MSG on duty should put the visitor in the Visa Applicants' Waiting Room, and then proceed as in Paragraph 11 (b), 11 (c), 11 (d), and 11 (e) above.

Requests made at other American Installations

13. Should asylum or similar requests be received at the USIS building, the receiving officer should notify the Embassy Security Officer, who in turn, will notify SRF.

14. If, during duty hours, someone presents himself at an Armish/Maag or Embassid installation with an asylum or similar request, he should be referred to the unit Security Officer. The latter will alert the Embassy Security Officer, who, in turn, will alert SRF. In alerting the Embassy Security Officer, the unit Security Officer will likewise use the Mr. HIRAY phase. After hours or on holidays the unit Security Officer should alert the MSG at the Chancery, who, in turn, will alert the Embassy Security Officer and SRF.

Requests made Elsewhere

15. It is possible that a person seeking asylum or clandestine contact will try to get in touch with an official American at the latter's residence. This is especially possible when they already know each other. Should this happen, the same basic notification and handling procedure is to be followed.

Telephone Messages or Requests

16. A person seeking asylum or contact may think it unwise or even dangerous to come to the Embassy. In such a case he may telephone and
17. The same basic procedure is to be followed when asylum requests or requests for contact are made through intermediaries. Whoever receives the request should urge the intermediary to bring the requester to the chancery. If this is not possible, an outside meeting should be arranged as in Paragraph 10 above. In either case the personalia of both the intermediary and the requester should be noted.

Requests received at Khorramshahr and Tabriz

18. With appropriate changes, the same procedures are to be followed when someone applies for asylum or contact to the consulates in Khorramshahr or Tabriz. The personalia of the requester (including the languages he speaks) should be noted, and he should be held at the consulate if possible. If he cannot stay, he should be asked to come back no less than 10 days later. If this is not possible either, an outside meeting in a public place should be arranged for two days later. The two-day delay is to permit a SRF representative to come from Tehran. The consul will alert the Embassy Security Officer or a senior SRF officer, or any other Embassy officer in Tehran by telephone, using the KFC, PIF phrase as above. A SRF officer will then come from Tehran at the earliest opportunity.

Briefing Responsibilities

19. SRF is responsible for briefing the Embassy Security Officer, and, jointly with him, for briefing the Marine Security Guards.
TELEPHONE SUBSTITUTION CODE FOR REPORTING WALK-IN

This code is for use by the consulates in Tabriz, and Isfahan in reporting to the Embassy the arrival of a Walk-In with whom re-contact has been arranged.

In handling a Walk-In, proceed to debrief him according to the standing Embassy Walk-In instructions. Then arrange to re-contact, either in your city or in Tehran, you arrange a follow-up meeting in your city, set it up within 24 hours, and preferably 48-72 hours, in such a way as to allow time for an SRF officer to arrive from Iran. If you arrange for re-contact in Tehran, select one of the two sites listed below, and allow adequate time for the Walk-In to arrive in Tehran. Call the Embassy and use the appropriate substitutions to signal the Walk-In's status and the time. The telephone conversation need not be verbatim as such, but should contain the essential elements necessary to describe the situation:

"This is (caller's name) in (location). I have received a message for (one of the SRF officers listed in the list of Walk-In instructions). Mr. Mayday, an American businessman (occupation: use city/state code), needs some assistance with an export contract involving (nationality: commodity code). He is particularly interested in (or leave appropriate query).

"Can you send us some materials by (latest date and time by which an SRF officer should arrive in your city) (Use this if local re-contact has been arranged.)

"He is coming to Tehran, and I've told him to contact the (place of contact in Tehran: "Embassy" or "Commercial Library") on (date/time of contact in Tehran). (Use 'contact has been arranged for Tehran.)

"Mr. Mayday also would like to discuss trade (indicate languages in which the Walk-In can communicate, listing appropriate countries, e.g., English for English, USSR for Russian, ain for Spanish, etc.)"
I. Nationality
   a. Soviet Union.....Silver
   b. Chinese Peoples Republic.....Chinaware
   c. Poland.....Paper
   d. Czechoslovakia.....Crystal
   e. German Democratic Republic.....Gold
   f. Hungary.....Hemp
   g. Yugoslavia.....Yarn
   h. Albania.....Asphalt
   i. Romania.....Rubber
   j. Bulgaria.....Brick
   k. Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea.....Kaolin clay
   l. North Vietnam.....Vinyl plastic
   m. Cuba.....Cigars
   n. Iraq.....Iron
   o. Syria.....Soda
   p. Libya.....Lead
   q. Palestinian, or terrorist of any nationality.....Tin

II. Occupation Code
   a. Intelligence/Security officer.....Indiana
   b. Diplomat.....Denver
   c. Trade Representative.....Texas
   d. Communist party official.....Connecticut
   e. Technician.....Tennessee

f. Military officer.....Maine
   g. Soldier, enlisted man.....San Francisco
   h. Other.....Omaha

III. Status Code
   a. Has information for the USG....."information on U.S. customs regulations."
   b. Wishes to work secretly for the USG....."information on work permits in the U.S."
   c. Seeks asylum or defection, but might be able to return to his country and work for the USG....."discussing alternative routing."
   d. Seeks asylum, cannot return to his country....."discussing Iranian export permits."
   e. Is intermediary for someone else....."talking to a local broker."
   f. Is illegal border crosser....."discussing possibility of border closures."
   g. Other....."talking to someone in the Embassy instead of a Consulate."