AFME awards Iranian Congress Fellowship

American Friends of the Middle East (AFME) today announced award of the Congressional Fellowship to Mr. Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari. Mr. Matin-Daftari, Director of the Office of Information and Press Relations of the Ministry of Justice, will leave Iran next month for Washington, D.C. where he will spend three months working as an assistant to one or several of the members of the United States Congress and Senate. He is the first Iranian to be so honored by this grant which is worth $2,000.

The American Friends of the Middle East, which is sponsoring this fellowship, is a private, non-profit American organization dedicated to improving understanding between the peoples of America and the countries of the Middle East.

American Friends of the Middle East in Tehran operates a student counseling and orientation program to assist students going to America; another program called the Individual Resources Development Program to assist these students to obtain employment and re-adjust when they return to Iran; and John Briner Memorial Periodical Library of technical and scientific literature to help Iranian graduates of American Universities keep abreast of the latest developments in the field in which they studied while in the United States. AFME also sponsors People-to-People programs, of which this award is a typical one.

Mr. Matin-Daftari is son of Senator Dr. Ahmad Matin-Daftari, former Prime Minister. He was educated at Parish School in Iran and Holderness College and Cambridge University in England. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics and Law from Cambridge in 1956. Since his return to Iran, he has worked in the Ministry of Education and as a faculty assistant at the University of Tehran. He assumed his present position of Director of Information and Public Relations at the Ministry of Justice in 1968. Mr. Matin-Daftari also serves as Secretary to the Society for the Protection of Prisoners and their families, and is a member of the Executive Committee of the Iranian Association for the United Nations.

Mr. Matin-Daftari is married to the former Miss Marja Vaezi-Noori. She is planning to accompany him to the United States along with their small son. Together they will be received upon arrival in the United States by Harold Minor, former United States Ambassador to Lebanon and new President of American Friends of the Middle East in Washington, D.C. At this ceremony Mr. Matin-Daftari will meet the Congressman with whom he will be working.

The purpose of the Congressional Fellowship which Mr. Matin-Daftari has received, is to enable outstanding young men to gain experience in democratic government by working with a Senator or Representative throughout one complete session of Congress. In past years, persons from Malaysia, Norway, and Japan, as well as selected Americans, have been chosen to participate in this program.
The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must cite the control number and use CAS as the source. The source is a member (8) of the National Front with access to National Front leaders.

1. Hedayat Mattaftari, grandson of former Prime Minister Mosadeq, stated that he thought Allahyar Saleh, Dr. Karim Sanjabi and other former National Front (NF) leaders were being very uncooperative in the last few months. Hedayat Mattaftari thought that these leaders had given up because they were frightened. He stated that the NF is now doing nothing, and felt that the NF would need the assistance of these leaders if the NF is to do anything. He stated that the only thing the NF was doing was trying to keep the idea of the National Front alive and see what would happen in the future. Mattaftari stated that the NF had lost one of its mimeograph machines. SAVAK seizure within the past few days.

2. Dr. Karim Sanjabi openly criticized Hedayat Mattaftari, Darius Forouhar, and Keshavara-Sadr. For the first time Dr. Sanjabi stated that he thought that Keshavara-Sadr might be working for the Iranian Government and might have a mission the destruction of the National Front. Sanjabi stated that Forouhar is young, thoughtless, hot headed and not a leader. Sanjabi stated that Hedayat-Mattaftari is young, overly ambitious, and has been feeding false information to former Prime Minister Mosadeq. Sanjabi stated that the NF could not follow the plan of former Prime Minister Mosadeq as outlined in Mosadeq's recent letters. For this reason the National Front was doing nothing—"just sitting and waiting." Sanjabi stated that he personally was not engaged in any political activity.
State of the National Front

The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must cite the control N0-4F9 but need not cite CAS as the source. The source is a member (A) of the National Front with access to National Front leaders.

1. Hedayat Natin-Daftari, grandson of former Prime Minister Mosadeq, stated that he thought Allahyar Saleh, Dr. Karim Sanjabi and other former National Front (NF) leaders were being very uncooperative in the last few months. Hedayat Natin-Daftari thought that these leaders had given up because they were frightened. He stated that the NF is now doing nothing and felt that the NF would need the assistance of these former leaders if the NF is to do anything. He stated that the only thing the NF was doing was trying to keep the idea of the National Front alive and see what would happen in the future. Natin-Daftari stated that the NF had lost one of its mimeograph machines by SAVAK seizure within the past few days.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic<br>downgrading at<br>declassification.

SECRET
NDFOR/IP/EXTERNAL USE ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Hedayatollah MATIN-DAFTARI, Lawyer and National Front Member
Archie M. Culver, Second Secretary

Place: Capri Hotel for Lunch

Date: October 11, 196X

Allahyar Saleh

Matin-Daftari is obviously totally opposed to Saleh's leadership. Just as obviously he is loyal to his grandfather, Mosaddeq, and the influence Mosaddeq exerted on the National Front. He said that Saleh's greatest error was in urging the Front to become a political party and attempting to forge a unified political ideology from divergent political expressions of the member groups. Matin-Daftari insisted that Saleh has already lost whatever right to leadership he once had, and that after great forebearance Mosaddeq finally stepped in and gave orders that Saleh's leadership should no longer be recognized. When asked who leads the National Front today, he replied "Mosaddeq." When asked who, them, could be said to be the organizational leader on a day-to-day operational basis, he replied "the leaders of the groups which make up the National Front." Matin-Daftari went on to add that Saleh is not the leader of the Iranian Party as he once was, and thus should not even be included in this collective leadership group.

National Front Goals

Matin-Daftari viewed the goal of the National Front as the achievement of liberty for all Iranian citizens. As a corollary he added the goal of a return to constitutional government. He emphasized that the Front does not want to gain office, but only to influence the existing government or a successor government to allow more freedom and to honor the constitution. He expressed the organizational theory of the Front as that of a grouping of autonomous political organizations possessing heterogeneous political philosophies but cooperating in order to work toward the Front's common goals. When asked what programs the Front desired to put forth as its proposals for the future of Iran, Matin-Daftari answered that the Front could not afford to bid over the details of programs because of its wide spectrum of political philosophy and thus must avoid formulating specific political platforms and concentrate on the need for freedom and constitutional government.

Groups Within The National Front

Matin-Daftari pictured the Freedom Movement of Iran as a militantly Moslem group which has a substantial following because of its religious orientation. He referred in passing to the trial of its leader Mehdi Bazargan and stated that the Government has a policy of arresting all of the leaders of the various member groups of the National Front.

Deris FOROOZAN is another National Front member in prison, continued Matin-Daftari. His Mallet-e-Iran Party (Iranian Nation), which has been雍 defunct Pahl-Iran Party, is a well-organized, militant party.

Matin-Daftari stated that Khalil Maleki is only the titular head of the National Front; the real leaders of the group are Moustagh SAFAF and (fmr) Aghazadeh, who are both in prison and were secretly tried recently by a military court in what was nicely called a "public trial."

Although (fmr) Berelian is also a member of the Socialist League, he is primarily an organizer of student National Fronts at Tehran University, explained Matin-Daftari. Another student (fmr) Haraqi, has a much smaller following. Last year, when National Front students at Tehran University desired to commemorate the 1921 killing of three students by security forces during the Zahedi Government, Chancellor Javaher Shah RAHR offered them to be satisfied with a small ceremony and his brother Allahyar RAHR also used his influence to veto a large political demonstration. According to Matin-Daftari, both Berelian and Haraqi were arrested when they met at the home of a friend to plan such a small commemoration, and they are still in prison. Arrested along with them was a swan follower of Haraqi. Since Berelian's arrest, thirteen of his followers have been drafted into military service, not as officers or NCOs, but as common soldiers. One of them, Perizad Taqizadeh, is now serving as an orderly in the Army tuberculosis sanatorium east of Shiraz.

Shades Of Political Opinion

Matin-Daftari divided politically-aware Iranians into three groups: pro-government politicians who cooperate for personal reasons such as the procurement of better employment; National Fronters; and other non-violent oppositionists, and the Communists who would overthrow the government by violence if they were only prepared to do so. He placed Enshadad Pahlavfarniai in the first category, Cyrus Qani right between the first and second with friends in both, and Rezaei Madavi in the second category, for example. Predictably he charged that government persecution of the non-violent oppositionists plays into the hands of the Communists by removing the middle road and causing the non-violent oppositionists to cooperate with the Communists or at least move closer to them. Matin-Daftari placed himself, of course, in the second (non-violent oppositionist) category, but explained that, like many people who must think of their economic situation, he keeps in touch with the government in order to have work.

National Front Parties

The picture Matin-Daftari painted of the economic position of middle and lower class Iranians was bleak. Even as a lawyer, he said,
CONFIDENTIAL

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Participants: Hedayatollah MATIN-DAFTARI, Lawyer and National Front Member
Archie K. Beltzer, Second Secretary

Place: Caspian Hotel for Lunch
Date: October 11, 1964

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Matin-Daftari viewed the goal of the National Front as the achievement of liberty for all Iranian citizens. As a corollary he added the goal of a return to constitutional government. He emphatically stated that the Front does not want to gain office, but only influence to the existing government or a successor government to allow more freedom and to honor the constitution. He expressed the organizational theory of the Front in that of a group of autonomous political organizations possessing heterogeneous political philosophies but cooperating in order to work toward the Front's common goals. When asked what programs the Front desired to put forth as its proposals for the future of Iran, Matin-Daftari answered that the Front could not afford to bicker over the details of programs because of its wide spectrum of political philosophy and thus must avoid formulating specific political platforms and concentrate on the need for freedom and constitutional government.

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Darius FORQAN is another National Front member in prison, continued Matin-Daftari. His Melli-e-Eram Party (Iranian Nation), successor to the defunct Pan-Iran Party, is a well-organized, militant party.

Matin-Daftari stated that Khalil NAREGI is only the titular head of the Socialist League; the real leaders of that group are Masumeh SABA and (fmr) AGHILZADEH, who are both in prison and were secretly tried recently by a military court in what was nicely called a "public trial."

Although (fmr) BEREYLI is also a member of the Socialist League, he is primarily an organizer of student National Fronters at Tehran University, explained Matin-Daftari. Another student (fmr) NARAGI, has a much smaller student following. Last year, when National Front students at Tehran University desired to commemorate the 15th killing of three students by security forces during the Zahedan Government, Chancellor Rezaehab NAREGH urged them to be satisfied with a small ceremony and his brother Allahyar NAREGH also used his influence to vote a large political demonstration. According to Matin-Daftari, both Bereyli and Naregi were arrested when they sat at the home of a friend to plan such a small commemoration, and they are still in prison.

Arrested along with them were seven followers of Naregi. Since Bereyli's arrest, thirteen of his followers have been drafted into military service, not as officers or NCOs, but as common soldiers. One of them, Berdeyli PAZIHAD, is now serving as an orderly in the Army tuberculosis sanatorium east of Shahravan.

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The picture Matin-Daftari painted of the economic position of middle and lower class Iranians was bleak; lead. Even as a lawyer, he said,
he had to struggle to make ends meet, and he claimed that things are tougher now, due to inflation, than they were four or five years ago, despite increases in income. He concluded from this that dissatisfaction with the economy would play into the hands of the National Front in an ever-increasing extent. There were no further tactics mentioned, so the reporter assumed that “watch and wait” was the one and only tactic. Although non-violence was referred to, Mardin-Daftari cited no Front intentions to call strikes or demonstrations.

Suppression

Apart from the arrests of National Front Leaders which were mentioned earlier, Mardin-Daftari claimed that students at Tehran University and in other Iranian universities who had National Front sympathies were being persecuted. He said students with pro-National Front records had difficulty obtaining employment because of SAVAK harassment. Students were called in almost every week for questioning about Front activities, and many were told that the next time National Front activity breaks out they would be imprisoned. The Front is so closely watched, said Mardin-Daftari, that even printing activities are too dangerous to be carried on.

Comments

It is interesting that Mardin-Daftari made no references to American involvement in Iran during the interview, neither to criticize our support of Iran nor to urge support of opposition groups in any way. He was frank in his discussion of internal Front affairs, personalities, and policies. The reporter was left with the impression that the National Front is experiencing the lowest ebb of its influence since 1953. Despite his criticism of SAVAK for organizational errors and for falling to capitalize on alleged recent dissatisfaction with the government, it was obvious that Mardin-Daftari himself had no program worked out which would remedy these ills and make the Front more viable. Indeed, on the matter of Organization he seemed to advocate such a loose grouping of political parties that only such nebulous goals as freedom and constitutionality would serve as common denominators. Led by a free grouping of party leaders, many of them now in jail, racked by dissent over leadership and policies, constantly harassed by the government, and lacking commonly-shared plans of action, the National Front seems to be in danger of losing entirely its once formidable influence.

The Mazar Assassination

Mardin-Daftari said he had been surprised at how little public display of emotion there was over Mazar’s death. He had expected the announcement of some official mourning period. He said he was convinced that the three young men involved in the assassination were not directly linked with any religious or political group, although he thought it possible that the crime would be “planted on” one such group or another. Mardin-Daftari claimed that many bazaar merchants only vaguely connected with the three were picked up for interrogation, a development which was causing animosity in the bazaar, and he observed that the bazaar is an institution which it is difficult for the authorities to control.

Changes in Security Officials’ Assignments

Mardin-Daftari thought General Hasan Pakravan had a good deal of potential to be an effective Minister of Information. He interpreted Pakravan’s recent pledge to tell the people the truth as a frank admission that Pakravan’s predecessors had lied to the public. Mardin-Daftari respected Pakravan as an intellectual who gave some relief to SAVAK’s harsh reputation, and said that in the past opposition figures were better off in SAVAK hands than they were when they were sent over to the Police. Pakravan had occasionally ordered the release of people in the temporary custody of the Police only to find later that his orders had been disregarded. Mardin-Daftari said Pakravan headed a group of enlightened security types who were opposed by General Farshad and Colonel Hovani, the official who specializes in interrogating students and political opposition leaders.

Group 4

Downgraded at 3-year intervals. Declassified after 12 years.

CONFIDENTIAL

BIO

Mardin Daftari.

CONFIDENTIAL/SECRET

MICRORANDU OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS
Hedayatollah Mardin-Daftari, lawyer, grandson of Moea’ed,
member of the National Front
Arnie M. Bostic, Second Secretary

PLACE
Caspian Hotel

DATE
February 4, 1965

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ship and policies, constantly harassed by the government, and lacking
commonly-shared plans of action, the National Front seems to be in danger
of losing entirely its once formidable influence.
It was Matin-Daftari's opinion that General Nematollah NASIRI would be a ruthless SAVAK chief, but that Nasiri's replacement, General Mohsen MOBASSER, would be an even tougher Director of the National Police than Nasiri had been because Mobasser was both a trained policeman and a ruthless army officer.

Mellat-e-Iran Party

Darius FORUHAR is still in prison awaiting trial, according to Matin-Daftari. Since sometime in November he has not been allowed to visit. The militant Mellat-e-Iran (Iranian Nation) Party is still the most active group in the National Front and has not been incapacitated by Foruhar's arrest because there is a group leadership concept developing there. Although the plans for an Iranian Nation Party Congress were drawn up when Foruhar was arrested, Matin-Daftari said the party was continuing to hold meetings.

Freedom Movement of Iran

Matin-Daftari said General MEBAVI and Colonels ELHEDI, NASUDI, QAPARI, and RAHIMI (P-I/72/G4), who defended some FMI leaders at their trial and later spoke out against the treatment those leaders received in prison, were able to do so because they had already been retired from the army for having sentiments similar to the FMI members. Since their pensions cannot legally be withheld for political activity, those officers felt they could speak out without reprisal. (The four Colonels were arrested for their action in complaining on behalf of the FMI leaders - P-I/72/G4.)

The Socialist League

Despite the imprisonment of Manuchehr SABA and Abbas AQALIZADEH, the Socialist League, like the Iranian Nation Party, continues to function because it has a collective leadership. Matin-Daftari said the group leadership concept was being increasingly used to counter Government attempts to subdue opposition groups by arresting their principal leaders.

The Pan Iran Party

Matin-Daftari minimized the importance of Mohsen PESHEKHPOUR's Pan Iran Party. He said it counted no more than 20 members and had been disowned by the former Pan Iran Party in 1961 when that group formally met and changed its name to the Mellat-e-Iran Party. Matin-Daftari said Peshekhpour had little influence. He theorized that Colonel Molavi had tricked Peshekhpour into making a public statement against Nasser in return for a promise of increased freedom of operation to expand party activity and membership, a promise which was then not honored.

Berlian and National Front Students at Tehran University

Berlian and eleven other Tehran University students had been in prison for 13 months when they were finally tried in January. They were sentenced to 13 months imprisonment, which they had been already served, and were subsequently drafted into military service as privates despite the fact that Berlian lacked only four months of study of being a doctor and others were in a similar situation in other fields. Matin-Daftari attributed the Government's decision to try these students to articles by Bertrand Russell which called to the attention of the people of Britain, and of the readers of National Front literature in which the articles were reprinted, the shameful imprisonment without trial of opposition leaders in Iran.

Mosadeg

Matin-Daftari said his grandfather was well. Mosadeg is allowed to receive only immediate family members, and it was clear that Matin-Daftari made periodic visits to see his grandfather. According to him Mosadeg is unhappy about the tightening security situation, but optimistic about the National Front's future. Mosadeg is not visited by Government representatives interested in his thoughts about current events and trends, which Matin-Daftari thought unfortunate because he thought Mosadeg was eager to serve his country even if he did so at the request of those in power. Matin-Daftari pointed out that Mosadeg is a patriot and a constitutionalist, and was willing to work for his country if only the Government would strictly observe the constitution.

Amini

Matin-Daftari volunteered that he and the National Front members with whom he had contact were all agreed that the Front had made an error in opposing Amini during the early months of his tenure of office. Looking back on that period, Matin-Daftari thought Amini was the strongest Prime Minister since Qarib Sultanesh (who, he observed, solved the Azerbaijan question and then got no credit for it.)

He pointed out that Amini was handicapped by the Shah's control of the army, SAVAK, and the Police and was thus prevented from building up adequate support for his policies. He thought Amini should have organised free elections in the cities, and controlled elections in the rural areas, and thus gotten a Parliament elected which would have been loyal to him. A Parliament thus constituted, Matin-Daftari's reasoning ran, would have given Amini the support he needed to stand up to the Shah, who would have been reluctant to go against a popular parliament. As it was, Amini's agreement to dissolution of the Parliament left him with no support and forced the National Front to oppose him on constitutional grounds.
It was Matin-Daftari's opinion that General Nemastollah Masriri would be a ruthless SAVAK chief, but that Masriri's replacement, General Mohsen Mobasser, would be an even tougher Director of the National Police than Masriri had because Mobasser was both a trained police-man and a ruthless army officer.

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Berlian and eleven other Tehran University students had been in prison for 13 months when they were finally tried in January. They were sentenced to 13 months imprisonment, which they had been already served, and were subsequently drafted into military service as privates despite the fact that Berlian lacked only four months of study of being a doctor and others were in a similar situation in other fields. Matin-Daftari attributed the Government's decision to try these students to articles by Bertrand Russell which called to the attention of the people of Britain, and of the readers of National Front literature in which the articles were reprinted, the shameful imprisonment without trial of opposition leaders in Iran.

Monrad

Matin-Daftari said his grandfather was well. Mossadeg is allowed to receive only immediate family members, and it was clear that Matin-Daftari made periodic visits to see his grandfather. According to him Mossadeg is unhappy about the tightening security situation, but optimistic about the National Front's future. Mossadeg is not visited by Government representatives interested in his thoughts about current events and trends, which Matin-Daftari thought unfortunate because he thought Mossadeg was eager to serve his country even if he did so at the request of those in power. Matin-Daftari pointed out that Mossadeg is a patriot and a constitutionalist, and was willing to work for his country if only the Government would strictly observe the constitution.

Amini

Matin-Daftari volunteered that he and the National Front members with whom he had contact were all agreed that the Front had made an error in opposing Amini during the early months of his tenure of office. Looking back on that period, Matin-Daftari thought Amini was the strongest Prime Minister since Geroi Sultan (who, he observed, solved the Azerbaijani question and then got no credit for it.)

He pointed out that Amini was handicapped by the Shah's control of the Army, SAVAK, and the Police and was thus prevented from building up adequate support for his policies. He thought Amini should have organised free elections in the cities, and controlled elections in the rural areas, and thus gotten a Parliament elected which would have been loyal to him. A Parliament thus constituted, Matin-Daftari's reasoning ran, would have given Amini the support he needed to stand up to the Shah, who would have been reluctant to go against a popular parliament. As it was, Amini's agreement to dissolution of the Parliament left him with no support and forced the National Front to oppose him on constitutional grounds.
He said Amini was talking himself up as a potential Prime Minister even now, and was even now using a so-called "United Front" as a broadly-based political party to further his ambitions. Should Amini become Prime Minister, said Matin-Daftar, the National Front would at least support him initially until it had a chance to observe and analyse his actions as Prime Minister. Matin-Daftar would not say what he thought Amini's chances of becoming Prime Minister were.

Tightening Security

Matin-Daftar agreed that the security situation had tightened considerably during the last year and observed that there was no way for opposition groups to let off steam if the lid clamped on the boiling pot were simply reinforced from time to time against the growing pressure. He said Amini had in mind the use of a "United Front" as a safety valve to let some of the steam escape, but that Amini wanted more than just a re-named National Front, he wanted a complete spectrum of opposition groups. Matin Daftar thought that Mansur's assassination was an inevitable consequence of the increasing repression in Iran, and while he had not foreseen that particular action he was not surprised by it. Looking back to Mansur's unpopular prises increases, Matin-Daftar observed that if the taxi strike had continued for one or two more days, the National Front would have been able to capitalize on public unrest.

Comment

Matin-Daftar is a reliable source for information about opposition political activity. He talks freely and seems willing to discuss any aspect of opposition activity about which he is informed. He is short of stature, wears glasses, and has a moustache. A lawyer, he has a wide range of acquaintances and is rather well informed about events of the day. He is married to the former Miss Mariam VASEM-WIRT and has two children.

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Matin-Daftar told us at length about the recent arrests once the subject arose. He gave the names of those arrested as Sheik MANSER, Miss NADIA, Chishti NAZARI, and Alijeh JAMI of the Socialist League; Pahlevi NAJAFI, the former Prime Minister of Iran; Ali Asghar BAHNAM of the Opposition Movement of Iran; Ali Asghar BAHNAM of the Opposition Movement of Iran; Haghigh BAHNAM of the Opposition Movement of Iran; and Engineer KASRI, GIBARI of the Iranian Party. He said two, Nadib, had been released after one day; as far as he knew the others were still in detention. Matin-Daftar also listed three students as being among a group of students arrested at the same time: Taghavi BAYAT of the Agricultural Faculty, MAJIDZADEH of the Science Faculty, and SADCH of the Law Faculty. Last but not least, Matin-Daftar said he himself had been arrested and detained for a day.

Matin-Daftar said a SAVAK Colonel and four men arrived at his home at 4:00 a.m. and began a search of his apartment which lasted until about 9:00 a.m. Among the items seized were notes he had prepared on the legal aspects of loss of nationality which happened to show "political" headings, a copy of the book "New Iran" by the Iranian author Nezam ALAVI (a book which criticized Iran's autocratic methods and is well known among oppositionists in Iran), and an article by his father, former Matin-Daftar, entitled "Three Views in Three Communist Countries", a harmless travelogue of a brief visit to Russia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. During the remainder of the day he was questioned about his friends with opposition figures, his functions in the old National Front, and about his activities in National Front III. Matin-Daftar said he was visited during the day by Colonel Mollar, head of the Tehran Province SAVAK office, and others, and was told that he might be freed later in the day if he were cooperative. He said he replied to his questioner that those who had ordered his arrest would keep both him and his interrogator as long as direct, as rather than intimidated it might be more productive to try politeness. After answering some questions and parrying others, he was finally released about 7:00 p.m.

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GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

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He said Amini was talking himself up as a potential Prime Minister even now, and was using a so-called "United Front" to further his ambitions. Should Amini become Prime Minister, said Matlab-Dafaari, the National Front would at least support him initially until it had a chance to observe and analyse his actions as Prime Minister. Matlab-Dafaari would not say what he thought Amini's chances of becoming Prime Minister were.

Tightening Security

Matlab-Dafaari agreed that the security situation had tightened considerably during the last year and observed that there was no way for opposition groups to let off steam if the lid clamped on the boiling pot were simply tightened. He said Amini had in mind the use of a "United Front" as a safety valve to let some of the steam escape, but that Amini wanted more than just a re-named National Front, he wanted a complete spectrum of opposition groups. Matlab-Dafaari thought that Mansour's assassination was an inevitable consequence of the increasing repression in Iran, and while he had not foreseen this particular action, he was not surprised by it. Looking back to Mansour's unpopular prime years, Matlab-Dafaari observed that if the taxi strike had continued for one or two more days, the National Front would have been able to capitalize on public unrest.

Comment

Matlab-Dafaari is a reliable source for information about opposition political activity. He takes freely and willingly to discuss in any facet of opposition activity about which he is informed. He is short of stature, wears glasses, and has a moustache. A lawyer, he has a wide range of acquaintances and is rather well informed about events of the day. He is married to the former Miss Mariam Vasei-Nouri and has two children.

ASSOCIATION OF COUP SATUR

President

9. 15 September 29, 1965

PARTICIPANTS: Mohammad Ali Tabatabai, Lawyer and Young National Front Leader

Abeqel K. B. Karimi, Second Secretary

PLACE: Unspecified Restaurant

Recent Arrests of Oppositionists

Matlab-Dafaari talked at length about the recent arrests once the subject arose. He revealed the names arrested as Reza Khajeh, Reza Zarei, and Ali Arash of the Socialist League; Ihsan Saberi of the Freedom Movement of Iran; Ali Mosadiq of the Iraq National Front; and Arash Mosadiq of the National Front Party. He said they had been released three days after being arrested at the same time; Taqavat Bhat of the fax, Mina Ebrahimi of the Science Faculty; and Shahrak of the Law Faculty. Last but not least, Matlab-Dafaari said he himself had been arrested and detained for a day.

Matlab-Dafaari said a SAVAK Colonel and four men arrived at his house at 200 a.m. and began a search of his apartment which lasted until after 9:00 a.m. Among the items seized were notes he had prepared on the legal aspects of the law which he was told would be used by the Iranian authorities. He also said the four men who had searched his house were well known among oppositionists in Iran, and that an article by his father, Imad Matlab-Dafaari, entitled "Three Years in Three Communist Countries," a narrative travelogue of a brief visit to Russia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. During the remainder of the day he was questioned about his relationships with opposition figures, his functions in the old National Front, and about his activities in National Front III. Matlab-Dafaari said he was visited during the day by Colonel Khayari, head of the National Front SAVAK office, and others, and was told that he might be freed later in the day if he were cooperative. He said he replied to his interviewer that those who had ordered his arrest would keep both him and his interrogator as long as desired, so rather than intimidated as might be more productive to try politics. After answering some questions and permitting others, he was finally released about 7:00 p.m.
Mehdi Aftari stated that a friend of Nadali who had assisted in interpreting when Nadali met Mrs. Margaret McKay, a member of the Left Party in England and a delegate to the meeting of the UN Commission of the Status of Woman held in Tehran this past summer, was shown by SAVAK a paper allegedly given to McKay by Nadali. McKay printed the paper requested press the need for her in furthering the cause of Iran's socialist league by issuing small government support. McKay's appeal to the socialist international to publicize socialist activities in Iran, according to Mehdi Aftari, was then taken over to SAVAK. The paper McKay had given Nadali had been passed on to McKay's contact with Mrs. McKay and with a man named Marti of the Socialist International. The clipping also carried items about the expulsion of Kalbasi and the trial of the demonization of Iraq's politicians and about the exile from Tehran of two other political figures. In discussing Kalbashi's arrest, the clipping said that it had been allowed to appear in the Iranian press, which.Aftari had proposed the Government to print it in itself. In the case of Nadali, Mehdi Aftari said he had been picked up because it was rumored that the Iran Party planned to hold an annual meeting at his home, but after watching the house all day long, without result, SAVAK released him. Mehdi Aftari stated that it was more than coincidence that these various arrests took place just before the arrest list of the Iranian armed forces came out. It can be seen that the assumption that Colonel Kalbashi was more active than usual in an effort to keep the media and the public in the information campaign to be presented.

National Front III

When asked what the National Front III was doing these days, Mehdi Aftari stated that it was inactive in the wake of these new moves to suppress its activity. He was discouraged about the position of the nationalist opposition and remarked that these days there is barely breathing space for anyone not on the government's side.
Matin-Daftari stated that a friend of Maleki who had assisted him interpreted when Maleki met Mrs. Margaret McKay, a member of the Labor Party in England and a delegate to the meetings of the UN Commission of the Status of Women held in Tehran this past summer, was shown a paper allegedly given to McKay by Maleki. The paper requested Mrs. McKay’s services in furthering the cause of Iran’s Socialist League by enlisting labor government support for an appeal to the Socialists International to publicize socialist activities in Iran. According to Matin-Daftari’s sources, Mrs. McKay violated Maleki’s confidence and turned over to SAVAK the paper he had given her. (Matin-Daftari showed me a clipping from the London Daily Observer of August 28 or 29 which commented on Maleki’s arrest and described it to his contact with Mrs. McKay and with a man named Carty of the Socialist International. The clipping also carried items about the expulsion of Vidal and Roaz and about the exile from Tehran of two Female staffers. In discussing Maleki’s arrest the clipping said no more of it had been allowed to appear in the Iranian press, which Matin-Daftari assumed had prompted the government to belatedly plant the story in Rayhan on September 5.)

Matin-Daftari thought the main purpose of the arrest was to blunt recent efforts to rejuvenate the National Front. When asked why a recognized participant in such activities, Nader KASHMIRI, had not been arrested, he replied that there was no need to go after the older and less active National Fronters when you could be more effective by picking up the “younger bloods” who are providing what active force there is behind the movement. In the case of Maleki, Matin-Daftari said he had been picked up because it was rumored that the Iran Party planned to hold an annual meeting at his house, but after watching the house all day long without result, SAVAK released him. Matin-Daftari thought it was more than coincidental that these various arrests took place just before the promotion lists of the Iranian armed forces came out, his assumption being that Colonel KALANDI was more active than usual in an effort (unsuccessful) to keep his name in the spotlight so as to be promoted.

National Front III

When asked what the National Front was doing these days, Matin-Daftari answered that it was inactive in the wake of these new moves to suppress its activity. He was discouraged by the position of the nationalist opposition and remarked that these days there is barely breathing space for anyone not on the government’s side.
In reviewing my notes today I found one I made on Touregman's comment re Khalil Maleki, which had slipped my mind.

It seems that about nine months ago in a debate with Maleki and his associates who were ready to cooperate with the "religious extremists" the Israelis cautioned and advised against this. Rather they advised Maleki that continued intransigence opposition to the regime was useless and that they should realistically admit that the regime's reforms had some validity and that they should start thinking how they could cooperate with the regime rather than joining with supporters of Barzargan "or worse".

There was a split among the Socialist League and Maleki himself was undecided. A small group of young people who called themselves "Marxists" opposed such an accommodation and referred to Maleki and his collaborators as "poor" Marxists. This group of "extremists" felt that they preferred a complete reorganisation of the socialist movement into an "independent" revitalised group "liberated" from Soviet influence and taking its inspiration from the Chinese Communists.

This was the thinking among these groups nine months ago when Dorial decided to call off Touregman's contacts with them because "he felt it was becoming too dangerous."

COMMENT: It seems the regime took action to make up Maleki's mind, but apparently also took cognizance of his resistance to cooperate with the extremists of either the "left" or the "right."

POL:CHE/assiss/jas13/10/66

Distribution:
MH/POL Reading
JAB/POL Subject
BIO-2
GRH bunch.

CONFIDENTIAL

Israel

MARCH 17, 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

July 27, 1966

SUBJECT: National Front Reactions to Rumored GOI Arms Deal with USSR

PARTICIPANTS:
David Tornish, 1st Secretary Israeli Mission
William A. Holseth, First Secretary
Charles H. Reasor, Second Secretary

PLACE: American Embassy

CONFID: POL/DP
GR
BIO (2)
SA
GR/DP

During the course of a conversation devoted primarily to discussion of details on the GOI-US arms negotiations (reported separately previously), Tornish remarked that he was surprised and impressed by the reactions of the young National Fronters, such as the late Israeli Prime Minister, to the rumored GOI approach to the USSR for arms. Touregman said he was surprised that the National Fronters seemed concerned that a military relationship with the USSR would be against Iran's interests. Touregman had felt that the National Front would be pleased that the US military presence might be diluted by the influx of a Soviet military presence. They seemed to be quite worried that the Shah would regret making a fatal error if in fact he went ahead with any such deal with the USSR.

POL:CHE/assiss/jas13/10/66

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

MARCH 17, 1966

In reviewing my notes today I found one I made on Tourjeman's comment re Kelil Maleki, which had slipped my mind.

It seems that about nine months ago in a debate with Maleki and his associates who were ready to cooperate with the "religiously oriented" the Israelis cautioned and advised against this. Rather, they advised Maleki that continued irrevocable opposition to the regime was useless and that they should realistically admit that the regime's reforms had some validity and that they should start thinking how they could cooperate with the regime rather than joining with supporters of Bersarinov or worse.

There was a split among the Socialist League and Maleki himself was undecided. A small group of young people who called themselves "Marxists" opposed such an accommodation and referred to Maleki and his supporters as "poor Marxists." This group of "extremists" felt that they preferred a complete reorganization of the socialist movement into an "independent" revitalized group "liberated" from Soviet influence and taking its inspiration from the Chinese Communists.

This was the thinking among these groups nine months ago when Demail decided to call off Yaurgemen's contacts with them because "he felt it was becoming too dangerous."

Comment: It seems the regime took action to make up Maleki's mind, but apparently also took cognizance of his reluctance to cooperate with the extremists of either the "left" or the "right."

FO1:CHI/CHB/166

Distribution:
   MFO/SEC Reading
   1AB/SEC Subject
   BIO-2
   CHB/CHB

CONFIDENTIAL

JULY 27, 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: David Touregeman, First Secretary Israeli Mission
             William A. Holseth, First Secretary
             Charles H. Rosinski, Second Secretary

PLACE: American Embassy

DATE: FO1 166

SUBJECT: National Front Reactions to Rumored GOI Arms Deal with USSR

During the course of a conversation devoted primarily to his feeling for details on the GOI-US arms negotiations (reported separately previously), Touregeman remarked that he was surprised and impressed by the reactions of the young National Fronters, such as Hadiyallah GABAIF, to the rumored GOI approach to the USSR for arms. Touregeman said he was surprised that the National Fronters seemed concerned that a military relationship with the USSR would be against Iran's national interests. Touregeman had felt that the National Front would be pleased that the US military presence might be diluted by the influx of a Soviet military presence. They seemed to be quite worried that the Shah would perhaps make a fatal error if in fact he went ahead with any such deal with the USSR.

FO1/CHB/CHB/166
I ran into Hadi-Madari by accident and asked him about the health of his grandfather. He said that while Mossadeq is indeed receiving cobalt treatments, people have jumped to the conclusion that he has cancer. Actually the condition in his upper jaw (or lower sinus) was termed "latent-cancerous" by the doctors. It was at the point where it might have become a cancer, but it is believed that the treatment will prevent this. Mossadeq is ameliorate and, aside from the general debilitation that comes from his age and perhaps also the effects of the treatment, is just about as vigorous and healthy as might be expected.

I am not so grieved for losing a grandfather, as we are sad and heartbroken at loosing our Great Mossadeq, our National Leader. Dr. Mossadeq's death is indeed an irreparable loss for our nation as well as all lovers of liberty and freedom. Though gone from our midst his teachings and ideas will remain as a precious national heritage for us and generations to come.

Yours sincerely,

Hadi-Madari
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Herz,

My wife and I would like to express our deep appreciations for your condolences on the occasion of the passing away of my grandfather. He was indeed a great man and above all for those who were closely associated with him a super human — "his life was gentle and the element so mixed in him that the nature might stand up and say to all the world, this was a man."

We are not so grieved for losing a grandfather, as we are sad and heartbroken as Americans for having lost the Great Mossadegh — our National Leader. Dr. Mossadegh's death is indeed an irreplaceable loss for our nation as well as all lovers of liberty and freedom. Though gone from our midst his teachings and ideas will remain as a precious national heritage for us and generations to come.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Sharo Kh. Firus, Iranian Businessman
John A. Armitage, Counselor of Embassy

TIME & PLACE: April 11, 1968, Armitage's Residence

SUBJECT: Beating of Hedayatollah Matin-Daftary

DISTRIBUTION: POL/SP; POL/SP; BIC; MNA/IR; CHMK; CHU

Tehran, Iran
April 17, 1968

Mr. Firus, who said he had seen Matin-Daftary shortly before, gave me the following information:

Matin-Daftary was seized one evening (apparently during the first week of April) as he came from his law office on Lalehgar Street, had a sack thrown over his head and was thrown into a waiting automobile. He was taken to the Lashkar-e-Bargi area outside of Tehran and was soundly beaten by several men. No bones were broken but Matin-Daftary suffered multiple bruises and had a fever four days after the attack, when Mr. Firus saw him.

In response to my question Mr. Firus said that Matin-Daftary had almost certainly been associated with those at the University of Tehran who had circulated leaflets apparently of Chicom inspiration.

NOTE: John Chere's version of the incident varies somewhat from the above. Chere's informants indicate the incident occurred early in April but state that Matin-Daftary was seized outside Tehran University and had "something put over his eyes" before being thrown into the car. Chere's sources report that Matin-Daftary was driven around town, beaten, and thrown out of the car and made his way home. They suggest that there were three or four assailants, one of whom Matin-Daftary stated disguised his voice (apparently suggesting that he was a person known to Matin-Daftary). These sources also report that Matin-Daftary was badly bruised but not hospitalized and had no broken bones. They also report Matin-Daftary as desiring to publicize this incident, possibly through communicating this information to the United Nations.

Sincerely,

John A. Armitage

POL:JAArmitage:pc; sgl:4/17/68

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

THEODORE L. ELIOT, JR., ESQUIRE
MNA/IR
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ted:

Enclosed is a memo which contains what we know about the beating of young Matin-Daftary (your letter of April 11).

On general grounds, we would fervently hope that you would be able to tell Bill Miller only that we had heard that Matin-Daftary had been beaten up but that he had not been seriously hurt and is reportedly now married. Don't say Senator Cooper's assistant, I don't think we want to get in the business of confirming or commenting on Hossein Maimah's reports.

But more to the point right now, we have some indications that Matin-Daftary is hoping to get some public attention drawn to this incident and has muttered something about getting information about it to the UN. With the Human Rights Conference coming up in Tehran this very week and with Senator Matin-Daftary an active candidate (with possibly better than his personal chance) for the Presidency of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the possibility for a minor issue case could be considerable. We will want to avoid being involved, if we possibly can.

All best regards,

Sincerely,

John A. Armitage

POL:JAArmitage:pc

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:  Mr. Sharokh Pirus, Iranian Businessman
               John A. Armitage, Counselor of Embassy

TIME & PLACE:  April 11, 1968, Armitage's Residence

SUBJECT :  Beating of Hedayatollah Matin-Daftary

DISTRIBUTION:  FOL/RF; POL/RF; BIO; NREA/IR; CHNW; CHU

Tehran, Iran

April 17, 1968

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Theodore L. Elliot, Jr., Envoy
NREA/IR
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

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All best regards,

Sincerely,

John A. Armitage
In early April, Matin-Daftary was picked up in front of a Tehran University building by three men, blindfolded, tied, and driven to Lashkarab where a severe beating was administered. His assailants avoided bruising his face. After beating him they dumped him out of the car and he went tumbling down a steep incline. Tattered and bruised, he managed to get a lift home from a passing motorist. Matin-Daftary believes the men were SAVAK agents doing their "usual dirty work" against persons who disapproved of the Shah. Asked the reason for the beating, Matin-Daftary said that he had no idea what was behind it. He had not engaged in any political activities, nor had he been involved in any way with student disturbances at Tehran University.

Matin-Daftary's wife, Mariam, said that she had learned about Hedayatollah's seizure, almost immediately, from a witness who observed the men forcing Matin-Daftary into a car. She called persons with influence to work for his release. The Matin-Daftaries have been unable to learn for sure who was behind the action nor the reasons for the beating, but Iranian "sources" have told them that the US had put SAVAK up to the attack.

During the course of the evening, Matin-Daftary made some interesting remarks including the following:

1. There is an influential group of "freemasons" in Iran. These people, who are often the rising young members of Iran's new managerial class, are in close contact and assist each other in obtaining good jobs and influential positions. The "freemasons" have strong ties with the British.

2. Many members of the court rejoiced on hearing the news that Robert Kennedy had been shot. In this connection, Matin-Daftary observed that it was "well known" that the Shah had contributed heavily to Richard Nixon's Presidential campaign in 1960.

3. Many of the younger Ulema (e.g., those in theological studies at Qom) are "progressives," not reactionaries.

COMMENT: Daftary's views reflect certain continuing obsessions: the pervasive influence of the British, exercised through such puppets as Alan, Eqbal, and Hoveyda; the just cause of nationalism a la Messadecq; and the need for change because Iran is too "established" (when asked to identify the establishment, Matin-Daftary gave as examples the FarmanFarmania and certain rich contractors). One gets the feeling that Matin-Daftary resonates the fact that he is "out" while these other people are "in"; he noted that he and his wife are no longer invited to "establishment" parties.
In early April, Matin-Daftary was picked up in front of a Tehran University building by three men, blindfolded, tied, and driven to Kashkar, where a severe beating was administered. His assailants avoided bruising his face. After beating him they dumped him out of the car and he went tumbling down a steep incline. Tattered and bruised, he managed to get a lift home from a passing motorist. Matin-Daftary believes the men were SAVAK agents doing their "usual dirty work" against persons who disapproved of the Shah. Asked the reason for the beating, Matin-Daftary said that he had no idea what was behind it. He had not been involved in any political activities, nor had he been involved in any way with student disturbances at Tehran University.

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Hedayatollah MATIN-DAFTARI - Continued

Matin-Daftari is one of the Shah's most bitter critics. He is in active contact with other oppositionists, particularly Nation of Iran Party leader Dariusj PHOBAR, and is well known by dissident-minded students at Tehran University. Matin-Daftari still clings to the hope that a radical change will come about in Iran's domestic political picture and that he will be called upon to play a leading role in whatever forces emerge. He has nothing but contempt for those who he regards as having sacrificed their political ideas for the sake of a comfortable life within the establishment. His family's stature and connections, while insufficient to protect him from being the target of occasional government harassment (and a beating in April 1968) nevertheless are influential enough to keep his person relatively safe.

FOL: LMSemakis: sh 7/3/68
Hedayatollah MATIN-DAFTARI - Continued

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POL: LMBemakii:sh 7/3/68
Memorandum

TO: Bio Files  DATE: May 11, 1971
FROM: POL - Charles W. McCaskill

SUBJECT: Biographic Report on Hedayollah MOTINI-DAFTARI

MOTINI-DAFTARI continues his intense interest in politics, and presumably maintains his excellent contacts to various elements in the Iranian opposition. The thing that bothers me most about both Motini-Daftari and his lovely, charming and very bright wife is the fact that they tend to see everything in blacks and whites, to oppose the sake of opposing: nothing the Shah does is any good, while everything National Front or Mossadegh is good. His wife is inclined, at the slightest provocation, to become more passionate about the present political situation than her husband.

I have the feeling that Motini-Daftari and his wife want to maintain contact with Embassy officers. They have been to their house twice for dinner. They seem to move fairly widely in diplomatic circles, their closest friends apparently young liberal or young Turk types (Iskit of the Turkish Embassy, Weston of the British, Ravindranathan of the Indian, Yagi of the Japanese.)

While Motini-Daftari no doubt maintains good contacts in oppositionist circles, I have the decided impression that neither he nor his wife would tend to distort the facts for the sake of their listeners. While it is only an impression, I feel that he moves a bit more freely now, and perhaps is not watched as closely as he was at one time.

The Motini-Daftari’s have two children, a boy and a girl about 10 and 8 or 11 and 9. Mrs. Motini-Daftari had a third baby about two years ago but the baby developed a respiratory ailment of some kind soon after birth and died.

SECRET

Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

Classified By: U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

October 28, 1971

SUBJECT: Rights of Defendants Under Iranian Law

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Hedayollah A. -- Daftari
Attorney, Tehran

Mr. John L. Washburn
Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy

DISTRIBUTION: ADMIN (Mr. Hedberg)
POL - 2 (Mr. McCaskill, Mr. Rouse)
ECON - 2
CONS (Mr. Springer)

TIME & PLACE: Residence of Mr. Charles W. McCaskill,
First Secretary, U.S. Embassy - October 28, 1971.

Dr. -- Daftari is a leading lawyer in Tehran with an active criminal practice. From my own interest and in light of recent arrests of American citizens in Iran, when a natural opportunity came up in our conversation, I asked him to describe briefly the ostensible rights of an accused person under Iranian law.

He said that a person arrested by the regular police must be charged before a presiding magistrate (Iranian law uses the French term juge d'instruction) within 24 hours of his arrest. In a significant improvement over the civil law system as it still exists in most of Europe, under Iranian law the arrested person is entitled to consult with, and have the services of, an attorney immediately after he has been charged. This is important because the first period of interrogation which follows can last as long as 60 days before any petition to end it may be made. The interrogation is conducted by the police and supervised by the presiding magistrate. Although it is a matter of hot dispute between the police and the bar as to whether the right to counsel’s services includes the presence of counsel at interrogations, Dr. -- Daftari said that he believes the latter right is in fact included in the general right to counsel and that active and influential criminal lawyer do succeed in being present at their clients’ interrogations.
TO: Bio Files

DATE: May 11, 1971

FROM: POL - Charles W. McCaskill

SUBJECT: Biographic Report on Hedayollah MATIN-DAFTARI

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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- Dr. Hedayollah A. Daftari
  Attorney, Tehran
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The Matin-Daftari's have two children, a boy and a girl about 10 and 8 or 9. Mrs. Matin-Daftari had a third baby about three years ago but the baby developed a respiratory ailment of some kind soon after birth and died.
At the end of the first sixty days of interrogation, the accused’s counsel petitions the court of first instance which has jurisdiction over the case for a review. This court asks the presiding magistrate for the case file and a memorandum, and then decides whether the accused should be released or brought to trial, or the interrogation continued for another sixty days. Counsel may appeal a decision to extend the interrogation, especially in the case of second and subsequent extensions.

Dr. Attia-Daftari also pointed out that SAVAK and the military also have written regulations concerning the death of persons arrested under their authority. Where their regulations are silent on any matter affecting an accused the regular criminal procedure applies.

**COMMENT**

Dr. Attia-Daftari said any competent bi-lingual Tehran attorney with experience in criminal cases could prepare an English summary of the rights of defendants under Iranian law, with references, in a few hours. Since I understand that the Consular Section does not now have such a summary, it seems to me that the Embassy should consider having one prepared.

The names and biographic sketches given below are arranged by functional categories for easier reference. I readily acknowledge indebtedness to the excellent contact list compiled by Larry Semakis in 1969, from which I have extracted information on some of the contacts we have shed over the years since my Tehran tour of 1963-66.

**NATIONAL FRONTERS**

Dr. Ebedaytollahi Matin-Daftari is the grandson of National Front hero Mossedegh. At present he makes a living as a lawyer. His opposition background is well known but now generally ignored. On the other hand, he appears to be reluctant to maintain contact with the Embassy, as my efforts to follow up our chance meeting at an Indian Embassy party have come to naught. (He expressed willingness to meet, but every time I called there was some reason why it would not be possible just at the time I suggested.) Matin Daftari has had his share of interrogations and torture which, in part, accounts for his anti-regime views, but like so many Iranians he has been able to reach a comfortable accommodation to the existing power structure. Although his wife Mariam shares many of her husband’s anti-regime views, she has become more socially acceptable over the years and is now frequently referred to in the society columns. Home telephone: 311848.
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Dr. Arvin-Daftari also pointed out that SAVAK and the military also have written regulations concerning the status of persons arrested under their authority. Where their regulations are silent on any matter affecting an accused the regular criminal procedure applies.

**Comment**

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Dr. Neda Yatollah Matin-Daftari is the grandson of National Front hero Mossadegh. At present he makes a living as a lawyer. His opposition background is well known but now generally ignored. On the other hand, he appears to be reluctant to maintain contact with the Embassy, as my efforts to follow up our chance meeting at an Indian Embassy party have come to naught. (He expressed willingness to meet, but every time I called there was some reason why it would not be possible just at the time I suggested.) Matin Daftari has had his share of interrogations and torture which, in part, accounts for his anti-regime views, but like so many Iranians he has been able to reach a comfortable accommodation to the existing power structure. Although his wife Mariam shares many of her husband's anti-regime views, she has become more socially acceptable over the years and is now frequently referred to in the society columns.

Home telephone: 311848.
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, Prominent Dissident Lawyer (and grandson of former Prime Minister Mossadeq)
            George B. Lambrakis, Political Counselor
            American Embassy, Tehran

SUBJECT: Dissident's View of the Present Situation

DATE: December 12, 1977

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, POL/M, OR AMCONSULS
            SHIRAZ, ISFAHAN, TABRIZ, MAJNIN, INS/KNA, INS/OIL/B, AMBASSAY LONDON (KINOSVING)

Following a chance meeting at a diplomatic function, Matin-Daftari agreed to come to lunch and discuss his views with me. He did so on December 12, showing no particular nervousness and, as far as I could see, not being shadowed or harassed in any particular way even though we had set the appointment over his telephone which we assume is being listened to. Over three hours he commented on a number of things as reported below:

Oppositionist Meeting on Karaj Road

Matin-Daftari described the meeting of about a thousand people on Eid-e-Chorba holiday November 22 (See Tehran 10428). Invitations had been sent by the owner of a property where the two old roads from Tehran to Karaj meet, about one-half way to Karaj. The affair was partly social and the only man to speak was an Ayatollah, as it customary on that holy day. Matin-Daftari admitted the Ayatollah was likely to yield to other speakers who would have informally explained the present political situation as they saw it and what they might do about it. As he warmed up to his subject, Matin-Daftari also admitted the group consisted of a wide variety of old National Fronters, young followers (some with their wives or children) and others who were attracted by the presence of prominent National Front and other oppositionists. As the Ayatollah started speaking, a large number of men (he put the figure at over 300) broke into the garden and formed ranks. They smashed windows and doors and invaded the house. They threw furniture around at those gathered in the house and started beating them indiscriminately with clubs, chains, and similar weapons they were carrying. Some who stayed behind were badly beaten, but Matin-Daftari, accompanied by an older judge named "Banisadr" (phonetic) and another man named Tabini made their way out to the street. No one tried to stop them, but they had to run the gauntlet between orderly ranks of club-yielding men who hit at them. The same was true in the road until they got to the main highway where Gendarmes -- carrying machine guns were barring their way. They opened to allow Matin-Daftari and his companions through, but shortly after, further down the main road, they were accosted by a very rude-speaking man who asked where they had been, being so bedraggled and beaten. The elderly, distinguished judge protested they had been doing nothing illegal. The man then threatened his companions to attack the group at which point Matin-Daftari was badly beaten. He said he was hit on the spinal column and felt numb for about 10 seconds. He was also hit on the head and passed out for a few seconds on the ground. The judge was hurt much worse and is still in the hospital, as was their other companion.

Eventually, they were picked up and given a ride by another man who had been at the meeting and saw their condition. Matin-Daftari had not driven his own car, which he considered to be fortunate since all cars parked outside had systematically been smashed prior to the attack on the house. Matin-Daftari had no doubt the attackers were disciplined men, trained in beating without causing fatal injuries. He knew one man who had gotten off the bus and managed to take shelter in his car, though this probably was because he was accompanied by his 10-year-old son.

Lahegan Incident

Lahegan is a town on the Caspian where there is a small college. Students had invited well-known pathologist Manuchehr Kherazkhani to speak on the effects of radiation--his field. As Matin-Daftari heard the story (for he was not present on that occasion), there was an effort to break up the speech by hecklers, but the other students in the audience did not permit this to happen. When Kherazkhani and another man who had come with him (See Tehran 11098) left the college in the company of a few others, they came upon a group of about forty men armed with clubs, chains, etc. (the same situation as the Karaj incident) and were subsequently beaten. Matin-Daftari admitted that Kherazkhani was a well-known dissident, who had signed a variety of petitions and letters currently circulating in Tehran.

Anti-American Incident Involving Wrestlers

Matin-Daftari had run into a lawyer at court the day before who was waiting to defend a few of the young men arrested for the anti-American incident described in Tehran's 10815. As the lawyer told the story, group numbers were well over the 70 reported in the press. They were apolitical athletes who said they had been joined on that day by two or three unknown agitators. The agitators talked up an anti-American storm which involved blaming the Americans for pushing so many arms on the Pahlavis. The athletes then went out to tear down the American flag, etc. but were sorry about what they had done afterwards. In Matin-Daftari's opinion, the incident was instigated by
CONFIDENTIAL

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Savak for its own purposes.

Foruhar and the Moderates

Matin-Daftari readily answered questions about Foruhar, whom he identified as a colleague and friend. He described Foruhar as a very dignified, sturdy, energetic man who expresses his views directly and forthrightly on the need for more liberty, but is basically a moderate. On many occasions he has been to prison he has gained the respect of the guards by his demeanor and has berated those who are imprisoned for terrorism and extremist views. He has not been tortured, as far as Matin-Daftari knows, probably because he had no great secrets to impart and also perhaps because of his dignified demeanor. Matin-Daftari had heard of no recent cases of torture but could not be sure since he was no expert on that matter. Foruhar's new group consists of old Iran party liberals, who are the most numerous, Foruhar's own "Weliyayat Iran" and the Socialist League. It is not a party but an action group somewhat similar to the old National Front. Some Iran party leaders are Hasib, Bakhtiar, and Ghassemi. The lawyer Shayan heads the Socialist League. Matin-Daftari gave his affiliation as non-party, but somewhere between the Iran party and the socialists—not as far to the right as Foruhar.

Religious Dissidence

As he had the first time we met him, Matin-Daftari lauded the late Islamic reformer, Shariyat, whom he described as the most enlightened religious leader of recent days who was trying in effect to rid Islam of its clergy. Shariyat had been attacked both by the mullahs of the right and the left wing followers of Khomeini. Being no expert on the subject, Matin-Daftari described religious political movements as fragmented, which is the way the Government likes to keep them. He noted that the Government through its reforms had come into conflict with only a part of the conservative religious establishment, and has been butting them up heavily ever since. He continued to attribute some of the recently published incidents to Savak "agents provocateurs". One noted speaker is Bazargan who recently got up in a mosque on old Shemiran road to preach what was, in appearance, a sermon on the unity of God. He was very indirect in his suggestion that there is no God on earth, but the political point was made. This mosque was closed down shortly after. However, Bazargan had been allowed to preach last summer in the same area for about three nights running. His people were well organized with loudspeakers so they could reach a crowd which at times numbered 20,000 in Matin-Daftari's estimation. Going among them, he saw they were young and fairly well to do. They had crowded in and closed off several roads to traffic. Bazargan himself is a dentist and a psychiatrist, not a member of the Islamic establishment.

Amendments to Legal Procedure for Trying Anti-Security Prisoners

Matin-Daftary's comments on this subject were reported (without attribution by name) in Tehran A-189.
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Possible New Trials for Old Prisoners

Matin-Daftari confided that he has been approached to act as defense attorney for a group of anti-security prisoners who are to be brought to trial in a few weeks. These are people who have been in prison for some 10 years now. They were tried and case was described to him and when their prison terms ran out they were immediately re-arrested. They are now to be tried again. He is not sure if he will take this case but is considering it.

Current State of the Judiciary

In a brief discussion of the judges' petition (Tehran A-176) Matin-Daftari remarked that recent judicial amendments have made justice even harder for people to get. The judges were intimidated by the Government and told what verdicts to reach. An example is the Tehran Examining Magistrate, Judge Khagandsel (phonic), before whom the students arrested in university disturbances are brought. He is a good man but he has been judicial system today.

Religious Dissidence

As he had the first time we met him, Matin-Daftari lauded the late Islamic reformer, Shariati, whom he described as the most enlightened religious leader of recent days who was trying in effect to rid Islam of its clergy. Shariati had been attacked both by the mullahs of the right and the leftwing followers of Khomenei. Being no expert on the subject, Matin-Daftari described religious political movements as fragmented, which is the way the Government likes to keep them. He noted that the Government through its reforms had come into conflict with only a part of the conservative religious establishment, and has been butting them up heavily ever since. He continued to attribute some of the recently published incidents to Savak "agents provocateurs". One noted speaker is Bazargan who recently got up in a mosque on old Semiram road to preach what was, in appearance, a sermon on the unity of God. He was very indirect in his suggestion that there is no God on earth, but the political point was made. This mosque was closed down shortly after. However, Bazargan had been allowed to preach last summer in the same area for about three nights running. His people were well organized with loudspeakers so they could reach a crowd which at times numbered 20,000 in Matin-Daftari's estimation. Going among them, he saw they were young and fairly well to do. They had crowded in and closed off several roads to traffic. Bazargan himself is a dentist and a psychiatrist, not a member of the Islamic establishment.

Amendments to Legal Procedure for Trying Anti-Security Prisoners

Matin-Daftary's comments on this subject were reported (without attribution by name) in Tehran A-189.
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Recent Student Trials and Other Dissent

PARTICIPANTS: Mehdiyeh Matin-Daftari, prominent dissident lawyer
George B. Lambrakis, Political Counselor, American Embassy, Teheran

DATE & PLACE: April 11, 1978, Cellar Restaurant

DISTRIBUTION: AM/CH/USIS/IRAN/INA

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This was the second luncheon discussion meeting with Matin-Daftari, our first discussion having been December 12, 1977. He was hosting at a restaurant of his choosing and was quite happy to sit at a prominent table near a group of three Iranians who occasionally showed some slight interest in our conversation. Again there was no overt indication of monitoring of the conversation by the authorities. (Protect)

Trial of student demonstrators

Matin-Daftari had just completed his role as defense attorney for one of sixteen students tried in civilian court in connection with disturbances near Tehran University last December. When I noted the press reported as many as 43 defense attorneys for the sixteen defendants, he said this case was looked upon as an important benchmark in which broader issues were involved than just the defendants' future. He was in fact very disappointed that eleven of the defendants were found guilty of disturbing the peace and sentenced to five months imprisonment (his client among them) with only five acquitted (the three girls involved among them). He said the prosecution was carried out by an assistant prosecutor who was not very good or active. Prosecution presented no evidence of physical confrontation or other illegal behavior on the part of defendants. Even the policemen who had sustained scratches testified they did not know how they got the scratches and therefore could not testify against any of the accused. Most of the defendants were in a group marching quietly with placards carrying demands and slogans such as the return of Ayatollah Khomeini. This is neither disturbing the peace nor illegal, according to Matin-Daftari, since anyone has a right to ask or petition for anything in Iran, as long as he commits no illegal acts. The authorities

POL/CM/Lambrakis/bjh

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do not have to give it to him. In this case, the group disbanded and fled when they heard police sirens. Police then chased them, locked up most of those who were not students, and from out of town and claimed to have been just a bystander. There was another case of a student picked up in another part of town who was sent to stand trial at the same time. While their trial will have another 50 days to go, will miss their university, have to petition university authorities to be allowed back into school. (They were not all from Tehran University, he told me.) Of their arrest, although he admitted that some months after their this up with his usual comment that such treatment of students only regime.

Legal system in Iran

In response to a number of probing questions Matin-Daftari gave many answers, such as the one who sentenced the students without any evidence. Two of them were suspended when they at the time) and have never been reinstated. They will probably for NICD were recently called in by Houshang Ansary personally who critical of the government. When they refused to sign a paper activity but saying they were sorry) he demanded their resignations. His resignation, which had not been accepted before, was suddenly she had six years tenure at NICD.

In reply to my question, he said he was not aware of any trials of dissidents in military court in which the defendant was represented by a civilian counsel, at least by any counsel of prominence, possibility of a defendant being represented by retired military lawyers. When I referred to a case who had been released at the end of their sentence, but were brought for trial again, Matin-Daftari said his name had been
do not have to give it to him. In this case, the group disbanded and fled when they heard police sirens. Police then chased them, locked up most of those who were not students, and from out of town and claimed to have been just a bystander.

There was another case of a student picked up in another part of town who was sent to stand trial at the same time. While their detention counted against their sentence, examinations and, therefore, have to repeat a year--and probably school. They were not all from Tehran University, he told me. of their arrest, although he admitted that some months after their arrest few have any bruises to prove it. Matin-Daftari summed motivates them to become extremists and firm opponents of the

Legal system in Iran

In response to a number of probing questions Matin-Daftari gave many judges are afraid, such as the one who sentenced the students without any evidence. Two of them were suspended when they went on strike and have never been reinstated. They will probably be dismissed in time as an example to the others. Two lawyers interrogated on their reasons for signing a petition which would have incriminated them (by admitting they were wrong) he demanded their resignations. His resignation, which had not been accepted before, was suddenly accepted. The other (a Mrs. Ramipour) was dismissed even though she had six years tenure at Nioc.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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submitted by the father of a prisoner, but it was refused by the military authorities. Matin-Daftari was not especially anxious to defend anyone before a military court, since the regulations as written would make it very easy for him to be accused himself of anti-state behavior in the process and perhaps end up as defendant in another trial himself. Nevertheless, he thought it scandalous that a prisoner would have completed his sentence and been released at a time when the government was claiming liberalized procedures. The man he would have defended was one "Shanechi" whose father is a rather distinguished bazaar merchant. Shanechi completed his original three-year sentence two years ago, but has been kept in prison ever since, and according to his father has been retried and resentenced to five more years in prison recently. Matin-Daftari claimed he did not know what the offense was beyond "anti-state activities" and had not studied the man's dossier. (Comment: I thought this a bit disingenuous since I find it hard to believe he was never told by the prisoner's father what the offense was, though it is true we have heard of cases where the prisoner himself is often in the dark as to the exact nature of the charges.)

Recent bombings

Matin-Daftari asked if I was aware of the recent bombings. I indicated I knew about the three bombings of homes of opposition leaders. He said there was a fourth the same night. It was the home of Masoud Danesh, a prominent bazaar merchant, who is one of the shareholders and a member of the board of "Hossein al-Shatir." The latter is the organization and place near the mosque on Old Shemiran Road where Ali-Shariati used to speak and which the government closed down. The organization itself was cleverly formed as a commercial company rather than a non-profit organization so that it would not require registration with the authorities in order to own property or carry out other key operations. (This was contrary to the approach taken by the Iran Writers Association formed about eight years ago, which had formally applied for registration but its application had never been approved by the police.)

Apart from the leaflets signed by the so-called "vengeance" group left at the site of these four bombings, these people have been getting telephone calls in the last day or two threatening further reprisals and calling them "spies of the Americans." He briefly joked about the American angle, suggesting this was a dramatic and amusing twist. The targets themselves blamed Majidi, who recently announced the formation of Nastakhis party "action squads."

Press protest and recent spy story

Matin-Daftari asked if I was aware (I was not) that about 100 journalists have signed a letter to Amouzegar protesting censorship and saying they are ashamed to have to keep printing lies. An example (which Matin-Daftari gave me near the end of the discussion) is the recent "spy story." He said he knew General Darakhshani's family very well. Darakhshani had died of heart disease later, the family was shocked to see in the press these espionage and taken to a military hospital where he died. He was a toman. This in itself was ridiculous: his daughter alone makes more than 20,000 toman a month. Matin-Daftari knows the husband general was a Soviet agent. When the Soviets put pressure on useless and surrendered to save lives. The colonel commanding this was an error in judgment by the general and he was tried for later, hardly the treatment one would expect for a spy.

Tabriz demonstrations and the religious situation

Matin-Daftari asked if I had enjoyed the "school boy essay" Amouzegar delivered in Tabriz a couple of days before. He said Amouzegar runs around with these perfect little speeches as if he were waiting for some professor to grade him, but they do not amount to anything. He said the large crowd that came to hear him were made up of people brought in from the countryside. Gendarmes were sent out they can bring in many people. He gave as example a recent case when Governor General Valian in Mashad said. One of the mullahs said the gendarmes had simply told him to get on the bus. He obeyed, in trepidation. To his surprise, taken to the ceremony. After it was over they were dismissed. He had been out in the countryside recently in connection with complaints from farmers that they had been cheated out of land. It turned out the owners of a racing association had promised to see expected to raise the land value and simply demanded the land. The head containing the world "Imperial." The letter simply said land owners (on their visits) demanded the presence of the land owner at a certain notary's office at a certain date for the purpose of turning over this land to the association. The farmers
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were too scared to argue and formally turned over the land. It was now too late to do anything about it, Matin-Daftari said.

In discussing Khomeini, Matin-Daftari said Ayatollah Shariatmadari had a much stronger following in Tabriz (where people care very much about their religion) and would outshine Khomeini today on purely religious grounds if Khomeini had not become so political. In fact, one of the rumors in connection with Amouzegar's rally in Tabriz on April 9 was that Amouzegar would bring Ayatollah Shariatmadari with him so that Amouzegar could apologize in public for the Tabriz deaths. A further rumor at the time said this would be done by Amouzegar in order to fool the Tabrizis into attending his meeting. In any case, Matin-Daftari characterized Shariatmadari as more modern and enlightened than Khomeini. However, followers of Shariatmadari, like those of the reformer Ali Shariati, do not dare to stand up to edicts from Khomeini, particularly as they are both under attack from government quarters.

Prison conditions and ICRC visits

Matin-Daftari mentioned the hunger strike presently under way in Qasr Prison. He thought the prisoners take water and some sugar but nothing else. Yet they are striking only for better treatment. One can imagine the quality of food they get for the 10 rials a day allotted by the government. They also complained that the newspapers they get have been chopped up so that there is practically no news in them. On the other hand, he has heard that conditions at the (DAVAR-run) Evin Prison in Tehran are quite acceptable. He noted Evin Prison was visited by ICRC delegations. However, he generally dismissed those visits since they do not make their findings public in any case.

Comment: As before, I found Matin-Daftari an impressive spokesman for dissent. He was energetic and outspoken, at times lapsing almost into a courtroom voice, and showed no signs of wear and tear from the trial he had been involved in or any other vague "trouble" I had heard he might have been in recently. Indeed, he seemed invigorated by the present climate here and quite openly criticized the government to me, where he had been considerably more hesitant in our first meeting. He obviously has many blank spots in his information, but he is an interesting interlocutor and obviously has stature among moderate dissenters.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Meeting with Oppositionist Lawyer

PARTICIPANTS: Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari, prominent dissident lawyer George B. Lambrakis, POL Counselor, AmEmbassy Tehran

DATE & PLACE: Cellar Restaurant, June 20, 1978

DISTRIBUTION: CHG OR CON DEP HED NIA/IRN
POL USIS Tabriz INR/NAI
PM BIO Shiraz INR/OIL/IR
ECON DAO Isfahan

I met Matin-Daftari for lunch. He was looking and feeling more chipper than usual. We bumped into Majles Deputy Pezeshpour, who has just announced he is restarting his former Pan-Iran Party, outside the Rastakhiz, and Matin-Daftari congratulated him on that. Matin-Daftari commented to me afterward that, with liberalization being announced by the government, it was incumbent for people to take such steps as Pezeshpour had, so as to test the limits of government tolerance. If the opposition did not do this the government could rightly say it had provided them the opportunity and they had not taken advantage of it.

In that connection, Matin-Daftari said there will be an effort to register the Iranian Free Jurists Association soon. Expanding on procedures, he explained that, at the time that the Iranian Writers' Association had made an effort once again to register officially, orders had been given to the Ministry of Justice office (in early 1977) not to accept any more applications for registration unless police permission had already been received. The procedure previously was for an application to be taken after which the office would request police permission. Under the new procedure, there is no way to prove that an effort to register an organization has ever been made. At police headquarters, potential registrants are not allowed to enter the premises, nor will anybody sign anything indicating receipt of an application. Nevertheless, the Free Jurists will go through the process and, if refused, lodge legal complaint.

This brought us around to a discussion of the recent Bar Association elections, in which Matin-Daftari's group had come out winners (see Tehran 5944) and he himself given the highest number of votes. He confirmed he was not eligible by the rules of the association to serve as president, since he was not yet 50 (born in 1933) and has not had 20 years of legal practice. He attributed the honesty of the election to a procedure by which some seven observers and
were too scared to argue and formally turned over the land. It was now too late to do anything about it, Matin-Daftari said.

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poll counters had to sign the back of every ballot as received. Thus a false ballot would require the forging of seven different signatures. He also noted that it helped to have fellow (dissident) lawyer Lahidji as one of the observers. That was why Lahidji himself had not been a candidate for the Board.

I asked him whether he was aware of any changes in legal procedures following the visit of the ICG's Bill Butler, and his associate with the Shah. Matin-Daftari said he had heard after the visit, and that was evidenced by the Shah's interview given to local newspapermen (Tehran 4584). Matin-Daftari thought that interview conciliatory. It had been followed by an announcement from the Ministry of Justice that all lawyers accredited by the Iranian Bar would be allowed to practice in military courts without further permission required, and that they could be present at the initial hearing before the examining magistrate when charges are lodged (see Tehran septet).

I asked if there had been any change to make sure someone arrested appeared before the examining magistrate within 24 hours. This launched Matin-Daftari on a long explanation. He said that in the previous years the law was already on the books, but it had been bypassed in practice by SAVAK with the collusion of the military courts. Since SAVAK is not required to keep a record of the date of arrests, there is no way for the defendant to prove he was arrested more than 24 hours before the time he appears before the examining magistrate and is charged. Another favorite trick has been for the examining magistrate to look at the defendant's file only and approve his detention. This order from the examining magistrate is then shown to the detainee, instead of refusing to sign anything, will sign the order, writing that they protest. That is then held to be proof that they have seen the examining magistrate order. All this could change only if there were the will to apply the law on the part of government agencies, Matin-Daftari said.

I asked if he and his associates had any current estimate of the numbers of political prisoners in Iranian prisons. He said a survey has been made of the prisons in Tehran, using people released and relatives of prisoners, and the count amounts to about 3,800. No survey has been made of prisons in other cities, though there are thought to be large numbers in cities such as Tabriz, Mashad and Isfahan. There are small numbers probably scattered in other jails around the country too. Students arrested in recent months who have been convicted by civilian courts are not included in this count. Thus he thought the number several times the 2,000 or so being used as a ball park figure by the Shah and the Government in recent interviews.

In reply to another question, he said the group which carried out this survey was the "Committee for the Defense of Rights of Political Prisoners in Iran," formed in March this year. It consisted of 500 interested people of whom Matin-Daftari himself is one, and the most prominent leader is Dr. Askar Sejjavadi. I have heard of Sejjavadi before as one of the top opposition leaders. Matin-Daftari explained he is an essayist on social and political subjects who was formerly a member of the "Toilers Party" in the National Front, and later left it to join the "Third Force Party." He is in his 40s.

On current problems, Matin-Daftari gave us his version of a recent incident at the Amirabad dormitories for Tehran University students. He noted, in passing, this was the old American military camp which had been turned into student dormitories by the government. He said some 1,000 students were on their way to the Tehran University supervisor's office to protest the constant searches of their rooms carried out by security forces, particularly the girls' dormitories. Guards met the group and laid into them, dispersing them. That night, around midnight, special security forces broke into the dormitories, beating students and looting them. Many tried to run away in their night clothes. Many were injured and hospitalized. Seven are still missing. This was a recent instance of police brutality (which we have heard about from other sources as well).

Matin-Daftari himself is involved in a current law suit on behalf of a lady teacher at the faculty of Social Sciences who is bringing suit for fraud against the Tehran University chancellor, along with many other students and professors. The fraud is alleged to involve giving failing grades to some 700 students without the knowledge of their professors. Those bringing suit point out that only a professor has the authority to grade a student in a particular subject.

Comment: Matin-Daftari is clearly on the warpath and feeling his oats much more than in my previous meetings with him. I understand he has become a regular appointment for many visiting foreign journalists and is considered by them an important link among the oppositionists (perhaps since the time he organized meetings for several of them with the ICG's Bill Butler).
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CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

SOCIAL JUSTICE--NARROWING GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR
COMBATING MAFIA-LIKE GROUPS THAT PREDOMINATE

PUNISHMENT FOR THOSE OFFICIALS Guilty OF CRIMES
AGAINST POPULATION, I.E., RANDOM-KILLING OF DEMONSTRATORS
ON CALLING OF PERSONS BEING SERVICED IN HOMES OF CIVILIAN
IN QOM AND ISFAHAN. (DESCRIPTIVE REPORT OF THREE
TROOPS IN POLICE VEHICLE DURING DAYLIGHT IN MAHABDEH OR
NUMEROUS WITNESSES WHO SUPPORTED BAR ASSOCIATION
COMPLAINT TO LOCAL AUTHORITY. COMPLAINT FILED IN SEPTEMBER, BUT
RESPONSE HAS COME FROM GOI. CONSEQUENTLY, POLICE
COMMITTEE WHO DIRECTED BRUTAL TREATMENT WAS MURDERED IN
MAHAB DEH A FEW DAYS AGO.)

MAHABDEH ATTEMPTED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUEST OF THE
DEMONSTRATIONS JUST PRIOR TO THE MARTIAL LAW WERE PERHAPS
ORGANIZED BY OFFICIAL POWERS. PEOPLE, HE SAID, HAD
INTERFERENCE FROM POLICIES TO CONDUCT THEMSELVES, RE-
CALLING THAT IN 1980 POLICIES HAD DISCOURAGED AND FOR
THREE DAYS PEOPLE OF TEBAN HAD DIRECTED TRAFFIC AND
MAINTAINED ORDER. DID ANYONE SERIOUSLY THINK THAT FOREIGN
ACtORS COULD CONTROL OR DIRECT IRANIANS AT THIS STAGE
IN THEIR HISTORY AGAINST GOI?

ASKED WETHER IN FACT PRESS HAD NOT BROUGHT MUCH MORE
FREE "PAN IN PLOOT YEARS, MAHABDEH AND GOI CONVENIENT-
SHIP NO MORE SOPHISTICATED, TRUE, PRESS REPORTED ON
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WROTE REPORTS THAT NATIONAL FRONT RELEASES SIX
MONTHS LATER IN DIFFERENT CONTEXT PRS WOULD NOT ALLOW
NATIONAL FRONT TO HAVE PIONEER WNS OPPOSITION WANTED.
TORS ON RADIO/TV VERY DENIED NATIONAL FRONT. CLEARLY,
THIS COULD BE NO FREE ELECTIONS IF OPPOSITION DID NOT
ENJOY ACCESS TO MAINS SOCIAL TO GOI.

ASKED about situation in courts, he said that "REALITY OF LAWYERS TO DEFEND POLITICAL OFFENDERS STILL NOT FREE NOT EASY." SPECIAL BLESS WERE IMPRIOR TO JUNIUS TO PA
"Sent letters from serving and clients were interested not to request letters."

"Asked whether Gok hands purchased represented issue with opposition, he said subject of really discussed in detail. Principle applied that government's major expeditious should be debated and decided by majors in constitutional manner. Information was kept from public, which of course wanted to see Iran strong. However, because there were no consultations, many people thought government was wasting Iran's wealth on expensive purchases."

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* T#132
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8 December 1978

Matin-Daftari is the grandson of the late Prime Minister (1951-53) Mohamed Mosadeq, who was a founder of the NF. During the 1960s, while Mosadeq was under house arrest, Matin-Daftari acted in a liaison capacity between him and NF elements. An impressive spokesman for dissent, he is one of the leading members of the Iranian Bar Association and the Association of Iranian Jurists. He has been one of the more active protagonists of the Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners in Iran since it was formed in early 1978. Matin-Daftari has been under surveillance by SAVAK (National Intelligence and Security Organization) for years and has on occasion been the subject of severe government harassment. He is well acquainted with the United States (he came here in 1960 on a Congressional Fellowship from the American Friends of the Middle East) and often confers with US Embassy officials. He apparently respects this country, but he has on occasion criticized it for "failing to live up to its ideals" in Iran. (S)
A prominent lawyer, Headavollah Matin-Daftari has long been associated with opposition activities. Although he is not one of the top leaders of the National Front, he is close to those who are. In the past, various observers have asserted that he could play a major role in the NF if there were dramatic changes on the Iranian political scene. (The NF is an umbrella organization whose members are mostly white-collar, middle-class professionals. NF members are generally united in calling for the Shah's adherence to the Constitution of 1906, but they differ widely otherwise.) (S)

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8 December 1978
CONFIDENTIAL

IN COLLUSION WITH THE U.S. IN DISTRIBUTION TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE, THE U.S. HAS BEEN OFFERED A FAVORABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEW IRAN, IT MUST REALIZE THAT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP MUST BE BASED ON EQUALITY.


5. ANONYMOUS

ANONYMOUS
IN COHUSION WITH THE U.S., IN POSITION TO THE PERSIAN INTERESTS OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. IN THE U.S. FOR ANY PROPER POLICY TOWARDS THE NEW IRAN, IT MUST BE BASED ON SECURITY.


4

ANAH

TERRAIN 332
DE NUMBER #0535  242 **
TEN CCCCD 218
R MWCXCD 70
TM AMBASSADOR THERAN
TN SUSTAIN WAHRC #545
FF
CONFIDENTIAL THERAN #0535

B.O. 12865; DES 6/38/65 (SWIFT, E. ANW) OR-P
TAGS: SHOW, PINT, IN
SUBJECT: ARREST ORDERS FOR HEDAYATULLAH MATIN-DATPIRI

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOLLOWING THE VIOLENCE WHICH BROKE OUT DURING
   DEMONSTRATIONS ON AUGUST 12 SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL
   DEMOCRATIC FRONT (NDF) IN SUPPORT OF PRESS FREEDOMS,
   THERAN'S ISLAMIC PROSECUTOR HADIAB MOHAMMAD HAJI-GHOMI
   ISSUED ARREST WARRANTS FOR THE ARREST OF NDF LEADER MATIN-
   DATPIRI IN CONNECTION WITH 'COMPLAINTS BY PEOPLE INJURED
   DURING THE DISTURBANCES'. ON AUGUST 10, THE IRANIAN
   REVOLUTIONARY COURT JUDGE NAJAFI TOLE A
   CROWD IN QOM THAT HE THOUGHT MATIN-DATPIRI SHOULD BE
   EXECUTED FOR 'INITIATING ANARCHY'.

3. IN REPLY TO THE NDF LEADERSHIP AUGUST 16 PUT OUT A
   STATEMENT STRESSING THAT MATIN-DATPIRI HAD NO PERSONAL
   RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MARCH AND THAT IN ANY CASE THE
   VIOLENCE WAS NOT THE FAULT OF THE NDF WHOSE MARCHERS
   WERE ATTACKED BY RIGHT-WING TOOBERS.

4. WHILE THERE WAS SOME QUESTION IN BEGINNING IF
   ISLAMIC PROSECUTOR GHOMI WAS SERIOUS IN HIS ARREST WARRANT,
   EMBASSY SOURCES CONFIRM THAT BOTH ISLAMIC PROSECUTOR
   AND LEADERS IN QOM ARE INTERESTED IN ARRESTING MATIN-DATPIRI.
   SOURCES ALSO SAY THAT WHILE SOME IN
   NATIONAL POOL STRUCTURE WOULD LIKE TO PROTECT MATIN-
   DATPIRI THEY ARE POWERLESS TO DO SO.

5. ON AUGUST 22, WCOS CHAIRMAN HAKIM MET WITH KHOMEINI
   IN QOM AND DURING THE MEETING PRESENTED KHOMEINI A LETTER
   FROM THE NSP ASSOCIATION WHICH HAKIM CHAIRS APPEARS TO
   BE ON MATIN-DATPIRI'S REHAB. HAKIM'S APPEAL, HOWEVER,
   APPEARS TO HAVE HAD LITTLE SUCCESS.

6. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY SOURCES MATIN-DATPIRI IS NOW
   IN HAYE AND HIS FAMILY IS RETURNING TO AHVAM AND ARE
   TRYING TO OBTAIN TELEPHONES OR TO GIVE INFORMATION EVEN TO FRIENDS. WHILE THERE IS
   SOME SPECULATION HE MAY ALREADY SNIP LEFT COUNTRY, MOST
   SOURCES FEEL HE IS STILL IN THERAN AREA.

7. COMMENT: WE ASSUME MATIN-DATPIRI COULD LEAVE ITAN
   OVER ONE OF WELL-ESTABLISHED ESCAPE ROUTE IF HE WISHED
   BUT HE MAY WISH TO REMAIN IN IRAN IN HOPE OF
   EVANGELISM TO BE IN OPPOSING PRESS CLOSURES WILL
   ABATE TOMESHT
   BY #0535

CONFIDENTIAL THERAN 9635
CONFIDENTIAL

DE EKOMER #0655 242 **

ENG CCCC 212
E 250-1634 E 70
PM AMBASSADOR THIRAN
TO SG SECZT IN 0660
BY C 00

CONFIDENTIAL THIRAN #0655

E.0. 12865: GOD 8/08/65 (SWIFT, B. ANW) OR-P

SUBJECT: ARREST ORDERS FOR HADATOLLollah MATIN-DAPARTI

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOLLOWING THE VIOLENCE WHICH BROKE OUT DURING
DEMONSTRATIONS ON AUGUST 21 SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC FRONT (NEP) IN SUPPORT OF PRESS FREEDOMS,
THIRAN'S ISLAMIC PROSECUTOR ATATOLLollah AHMAD AZARI-QOM
ISSUED WARRANTS FOR THE ARREST OF HDP LEADER MATIN-
DAPARTI IN CONNECTION WITH "COMPLAINTS BY PEOPLE INJURED
DURING THE DISTURBANCES." ON AUGUST 10, THE FIRE-BATTING
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COURT JUDGE KHALATTHI TOOK A
CROWD IN QOM THAT HE THOUGHT MATIN-DAPARTI SHOULD BE
EXECUTED FOR INITIATING ANARCHY.

3. IN REPLY THE NDF LEADERSHIP AUGUST 16 COUT A
STATEMENT STRESSING THAT MATIN-DAPARTI HADD NO PERSONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MARCH AND THAT IN ANY CASE THE
VIOLENCE WAS NOT AN EXCUSE FOR THE NDF HOUSE MARSHALS
ATTACKED BY EIGHT-MIN TERROR.

4. WHILE THERE WAS SOME QUESTION IN BEGINNING IF
ISLAMIC PROSECUTOR QOM WAS SERIOUS IN HIS ARREST WARRANT,
AMBASSADOR SOURCES CONFIRM THAT BOTH ISLAMIC PROSECUTOR
AND AMBASSADOR SOURCES IN QOM ARE INTERESTED IN ARRESTING AND
YANG MATIN-DAPARTI. SOURCES ALSO SAY THAT WHILE SOME IN
NORMAL QOM STRUCTURE WOULD LIKE TO PROTECT MATIN-
DAPARTI THEY ARE POWERLESS TO DO SO.

5. ON AUGUST 22, MIGC CHAIRMAN MAJID NHT WHT A LETTER
FROM THE BAR ASSOCIATION WHICH MAJID CHAIRAPPARENTLY
ON MATIN-DAPERT'S HATE. MAJID'S APPEAL, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO HAVE HAD LITTLE SUCCESS.

6. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY SOURCES MATIN-DAPERT IS NOW
IN NABAT AND HIS FAMILY ARE REQUESTING TO ANSWER THEIR TELEPHONES OR TO GIVE INFORMATION EVEN TO FRIENDS. WHILE THERE IS SOME SPECULATION HE MAY BE IN QOM, QOM SOURCES FEEL HE IS STILL IN TEHRAN AREA.

7. COMMENT: WE ASSUME MATIN-DAPERT COULD LEAVE IRAN
OVER ONE OF WELL-ESTABLISHED ESCAPE ROUTES IF HE WISHED
BUT HE MAY WISE TO REMAIN IN IRAN IN HOPES THAT
ANTIPERSONNEL BOMBING IN OPPOSING PRESS CLOSURES WILL
APART TOMSENT

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN #0655
6- US Military Aid. Both were bitter about this subject. They felt if the US would not pay for the Shah's soldiers, there would be no dictatorship. After all, they said, if the Army had not been paid by you it would not have fired on our people (in the June riots).

7- Khomeini's Overthrow. I tried to explain that Iran was our ally and that we did not choose our Government. However they quickly retorted, especially Palsafi, that we (the US) had put the Shah into power when we (the US) overthrew Mossadeq, they said, Dr. Kissenger himself in some interview had admitted that the US overthrew Mossadeq.

I denied that our Government overthrew the government's of others and stated that this would indeed make us most powerful and mighty, but that to my knowledge we simply did not have such omnipotence.

8- Vice, Mogadan spoke of the opening of a "roy club" at the Darband, which he indicated was very immoral. Both Halek Hafizin and the Shah had attended the opening of this club. Palsafi had not heard about this and was most interested.

9- comment. Obviosuly Eng. Mogadan and Dr. Palsafi feel the Regime is "unconstitutional", corrupt, supported by American dollars, and after some success at Referendum time, once more the same old Regime.

I did not attempt to argue with these true "representatives" of the Iranian middle class other than stating my belief as to what American policy is, that is support of reform, territorial integrity, and non-intervention, etc. But it boiled down to 'you support the Shah, we don't, you mistakenly think you are right, but we just wanted to inform you that you are wrong.'

-Rondon/
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9- Comment. Obviously Eng. Moghadam and Dr. Pahlavi feel the Regime is "unconstitutional", corrupt, supported by American dollars, and after some success at Referendum Line, once more the same old Regime.

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DATE: April 28, 1945

PLACES: Sandy's Restaurant

PARTICIPANTS: Baqerollah MOGADAN

Sadiq A.M. KHALIFAH

The Assassination Attempt:

In analyzing the affect which a successful attempt on the Shah's life would have had, Mogadad theorized that there have been no widespread unrest and the Army and security forces would have taken over immediately, but he thought this initial period of calm would soon be disturbed by intense power struggles behind the scenes. Should the Shah at some point decide voluntarily to resign rather than rule, Mogadad thought such an act would result in chaos.

US Prestige

Mogadad considers US prestige to be low since 1953 and not to have been particularly affected by such matters as the status bill and the military equipment and other such support given the Shah. Mogadad stressed this point in a new way. He likened Iran's foreign policy to a drowning man in 1953 and said the rescuer (the US) had behaved perfectly properly in knocking out the would-be victim in order to save him. After the rescue, however, Mogadad said, the rescuer hit the would-be victim again and again, meaning that the US had dashed Iranian hopes for better and more responsible governments by its policy of supporting the Shah to the hilt even to the extent of supporting his corrupt governments. Then asked what he would suggest the US should do, Mogadad admitted that we had a difficult job to do but he both to carry on relations with a regime and to try to reform it at the same time. Mogadad said most Iranians with whom he is in contact credited the US for pushing such programs as land reform, and that they now placed some blame on us for the lack of continued progress of that reform.

Masadeq

Masadeq remarked that he was in correspondence with Masadeq through certain means at his disposal and he had suggested that Masadeq use his still great influence with the Iranian people to urge the Shah to change the political climate in Iran. He said Masadeq had replied to his letter and asked for specific suggestions. Mogadad said he planned to reply in the near future, and to suggest such action as the issuance of statements or leaflets. When asked how such steps could be taken in view of government security precautions, Mogadad said it would be all to the better if some leaflets, for example, were confiscated after being distributed because that would merely increase the popularity and circulation.

The Soft Life

Mogadad is listed officially as an adviser to the Religious Authority within the Ministry of Water and Power. He explained that being an adviser involves staying home and drawing one's regular salary. He remarked that until the day before this conversation, an office had been available for him at the Ministry but now even that facade has been removed. Mogadad did say once or twice a year he is required to make certain inspection trips to projects in various parts of Iran, the most recent such trip being to Nishabur.

POL/AMB/Secret/Jan 4-65

copies to: POL/ Mr. Hearn/Std.File

Mr. Halsey

CHS

OFR

RIO

AMS

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: April 28, 1945

PLACE: Sandy's Restaurant

PARTICIPANTS: Rezaollah Moghadam

Arnie W. Halstead

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Mosadegh

Moghadam remarked that he was in correspondence with Mosadegh through certain means at his disposal and he had suggested that Mosadegh use his still great influence with the Iranian people to urge the Shah to stop the political climate in Iran. He said Mosadegh had replied to his letter and asked for specific suggestions. Moghadam said he planned to reply in the near future and to suggest such action as the issuance of statements or leaflets. When asked how such steps could be taken in view of government security precautions, Moghadam said it could be all the better if some leaflets, for example, were confiscated after being distributed because that would merely increase the Shah's popularity and circulation.

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POL/AM/1441-29-65

copies to: POL/MR. Hars/Edg.File

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CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP A
Declassified after 12 years.

53
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Rahmatollah MOQADAM, Ministry of Water and Power
              Archie M. Bolster, Second Secretary

Place: Reporting Officer's Residence

Date: October 17, 1964

Vienna Convention

When the subject of the Vienna Convention and its application to American military personnel in Iran was brought up, Moqadam volunteered that after the near-unanimous vote in favor of the Government's bill in the Senate the Shah, according to current rumors, remarked to Senate President Jafer SHARIF-KHANI that the vote had been rather one-sided. Moqadam said he knew from other sources that the opposition to the bill had had the Shah's blessing, that Sharif-Khani was involved, and that Memom Deputy Kelaini RANJOD had been asked by the Shah to lead the Majlis opposition. Moqadam made no further comments about the bill.

Development Corps and Other Corps

Moqadam remarked during a discussion of the ministry in which he works that the Ministry of Water and Power had not even been included in the group of ministries (Agriculture, Economy, Development and Housing, and Interior - A-161) assigned the task of organizing the Development Corps. He commented that this was a mistake because development in Iran must involve the provision of water, and irrigation and well-drilling come under his ministry. He further commented that he thought the proliferation of various corps was a rather superficial handling of developmental projects, the corps being like playthings of the Shah which kept His Majesty's attention away from more basic developmental works.

PCL - Mr. Martin F. Hers May 11, 1964

PCL - Fernando E. Randin

Confidential

According to Eng. Rahmat MOQADAM (ex-Majlis Deputy from Manchest, presently a minor official in the Ministry of Water and Power), he arranged for a meeting between Allaybar SALEN and Ali AMINI to take place in his house. This meeting would have taken place shortly before Amini's departure, but did not take place. Moqadam, who claims to see Amini often, did not elaborate.

Confidential

Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified 12 years after date of origin.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Rahmatollah MOQADAM, Ministry of Water and Power
Archie M. Bolster, Second Secretary

Place: Reporting Officer's Residence
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Memorandum

TO: Charles N. Rassias, Political

FROM: Fernando E. Rondon, Administration

DATE: March 22, 1963

SUBJECT: Rahmat MOGHADAM

I first met Mr. Moghadam in Washington in early 1962. Upon my arrival in Iran, Mr. Moghadam invited me out, and we have met socially several times since July, 1962.

Mr. Moghadam, although apparently very mild mannered and friendly, appears to be violently opposed to the present Regime. During the early days of the Yemen revolt, when the Imam was believed dead, Mr. Moghadam mentioned to me—Why couldn't this happen in Iran?

He apparently has close contact with some Tehran University students. He once told his group that they should attend my conversation class at the IAS Student Center. They responded that they simply could not because it was sponsored by IAS.

After the Referendum, Moghadam admitted that the Shah's opposition presently had to wait and see what would happen. He refused to admit that the Shah had scored a major victory, but did admit that much of the opposition thunder (land reform, women's rights, etc.) had been taken.

Moghadam appears to be friendly to America. I have never noticed him to have Communist leanings. He is well read on current events, especially likes to talk about revolts in other countries, and speaks good English. He gives the impression of being sincere, honest, and deeply opposed to the present GOI. He has never mentioned any alternative forms of government for Iran to me.

Confidential

FILE

POL: Larry W. Samsak

Memorandum of Conversation

During the course of a conversation at the Halideh between Mr. 'Abdallah MOGHADAM and Mr. Mahdi TALIEE of Ikhwanli, Mr. Moghadam noted that while in the U.S. Mr. AKRAMI of Ikhwanli had managed to write some rather lengthy and interesting articles for the magazine, Mr. Talies replied that the articles had been even longer, and that he was obliged to cut out some of the more provocative parts in the original drafts. Without giving any details, Mr. Talies stated that what he had written in his original drafts would not have been well received in certain quarters.

Confidential

Mr. Moghadam and Mr. Talies appear to be on very friendly terms. Mr. Moghadam told me that he occasionally writes articles for Ikhwanli which he submits to Mr. Talies for publication.

POL:IAS; SAM; S31/66

Distribution

Mr. Nararip

SAM/POL SF (CC)

BID (3) - (Akrami, Talies, Moghadam)

Confidential

GROUP D

Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

CONFIDENTIAL
Memorandum

TO: Charles C. Ross, Political
FROM: Fernando E. Rondon, Administration

DATE: March 22, 1966

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FR/

CONFIDENTIAL
During the course of an evening's chat, Mr. Hoqadam expressed his views on the current political situation in Iran and noted that political controls were tighter today than at any time in the recent past. Iranians, he said, were becoming more and more reluctant to discuss politics - even amongst themselves - lest the wrath of the authorities be aroused and cause them to suffer unpleasant consequences for boldness in unbecoming legal subjects of the Shah. While there is opposition to the Government, particularly among the intelligentsia in Tehran and those in the past who had engaged actively in politics, Mr. Hoqadam described these people as being in disarray and leaderless. According to Hoqadam, those opposed to the Government's policies are in disagreement among themselves on how to make their sentiments known, and perhaps more important, are frustrated by their inability to rally support in the present political climate.

Mr. Hoqadam stated that in the past, Iranian Governments had been attacked by domestic critics on issues falling under three basic categories - as with (1) foreign policy; (2) oil; and (3) internal policy. He noted that at the present time, Government policy in the first two categories was not vulnerable to criticism by those opposed to the regime. The Government's internal policies, however, were fertile areas for attack and appeared to be the cause of considerable discontent in the country. At this point, I expressed surprise at his words and noted that the Shah had embarked upon a revolutionary program of internal reforms. I remarked that in some circles it was believed that the Shah had captured the national mantle in Iran. Mr. Hoqadam replied that initially the Shah's program had injected a feeling of hope in the people but that the initial enthusiasm created by the reform program had now been dampened by the growing problems involved in implementing the various reforms. Mr. Hoqadam noted that while he made no unspoken claims in such matters, it was his impression that there was discontent in Iran, particularly in Tehran - despite the current economic prosperity in the capital. The Tehranis are unhappy about the way the money now being made in the capital finds its way into the pockets of the Shah's favorites, and in the rural areas, the farmers are growing cotton to sell the land reform program has run into difficulties. Mr. Hoqadam stated emphatically that the Shah has not captured the nationalist mantle of the Shah. According to Hoqadam, the Shah has no real political support in the country other than from the army and security forces and those around him who gain materially from various enterprises launched in the name of economic development. Mr. Hoqadam noted that should an assassin's bullet find its mark, those now supporting the Shah would quickly follow a new Shah here no real commitment to anything but their own safety and prosperity.

In this connection, he added that while Hoqadam is too old to play any positive role personally in Iranian politics, his name still has a magic attraction in Iran. Mr. Hoqadam said that he communicates from time to time with Hoqadai and has in the past included excerpts from Hoqadam's letters in his own articles for publication in various journals. Hoqadam optimistically said that once the Shah disappears from the scene, anyone with pretensions to leadership would have to get Hoqadam's blessing to achieve some degree of real popular support. Hoqadam feels, however, that at the present time there is no one with sufficient leadership qualities and courage to challenge the present regime even though in his opinion the Government is vulnerable to attack on domestic issues.
MEMORANDUM CC: INTEGRAT 3E

SUBJECT: Iranian Political Situation

DATE: June 30, 1966

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Khamatollah Moghadam, UN Food and Agricultural Org.
Mr. Larry W. Semakia, Second Secretary

PLACE: Mr. Moghadam’s Residence

COPIES TO: Mr. Nimi/EP
FOE MP - (2)

During the course of an evening’s chat, Mr. Moghadam expressed his views on the current political situation in Iran and noted that political controls were tighter today than at any time in the recent past. Iran’s he said, were becoming more and more reluctant to discuss politics - even amongst themselves - lest the wrath of the authorities be aroused and cause them to suffer unpleasant consequences for baldness amongst their political counterparts. While there is opposition to the Government, particularly among the intelligentsia in Tehran and those in the past who engaged actively in politics, Mr. Moghadam described these people as being in disarray and leadership. According to Mr. Moghadam, those opposed to the Government’s policies are in disagreement among themselves on how to make their sentiments known, and perhaps more important, are frustrated by their inability to rally support in the present political climate.

Mr. Moghadam stated that in the past, Iranian Governments had been attacked by domestic critics on issues falling under three basic categories - viz: (1) foreign policy; (2) oil; and (3) internal policy. He noted that at the present time, Government policy in the first two categories was not vulnerable to criticism by those opposed to the regime. The Government’s internal policies, however, were fertile areas for attack and appeared to be the cause of considerable discontent in the country. At this point he expressed surprise at his words and noted that the Shah had embarked upon a revolutionary program of internal reforms. I remarked that in some circles it was believed that the Shah had captured the nationalist mantle in Iran. Mr. Moghadam replied that initially the Shah’s program had injected a feeling of hope in the people but that the initial enthusiasm created by the reform program had now been dampened by the growing problems involved in executing the various reforms. Mr. Moghadam noted that while he made no new comments on Iran’s political situation, he was impressed that there were economic prosperity in the capital. The Tehranis are unhappy about the way the money is made and the capital finds its way into the pockets of the Shah’s favorites, and in the rural areas, the farmers are “getting sold” to the land reform program which has run into difficulties. Mr. Moghadam stated emphatically that the Shah has not captured the nationalist mantle and that it is still widely believed that the Russians are behind the Shah. According to Mr. Moghadam, the Shah has no real political support in the country other than from the army and security forces and from those around him who gain materially from various enterprises spawned in the name of economic development. Mr. Moghadam noted that should an1-assassin’s bullet find its mark, those now supporting the Shah would quickly follow a new Shah here no real commitment to anything but their own safety and prosperity.

In connection with the above, Mr. Moghadam noted that while Khomeini is too old to play any role personally in Iranian politics, his name still has a magic attraction in Iran. Mr. Moghadam said that he communicates with him from time to time. Khomeini has in the past included excerpts from Khomeini’s letters in his own articles for publication in various journals. Mr. Semakia suggested that should the Shah disappear from the scene, anyone with pretensions to leadership would have to get Khomeini’s blessing to achieve some degree of real popular support. Moghadam feels, however, that at the present time there is no one with sufficient leadership qualities and courage to assume the present regime even though in his opinion the Government is vulnerable to attack on domestic issues.

POL: Semakia: Jan 16/66

C: CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTRY OF CONSPIRATIONS

August 1, 1966

SUBJECT: The Possible Purchase of Soviet Arms by the Shah

PLACE: The Samak Family Residence

PARTICIPANTS: Reza Shah Pahlavi, US Food and Agricultural Organization
Larry W. Samak, Second Secretary

COPIES TO:
Mr. Herbie
WAF/RF - 2 (Soviet Arms Purchases)
GEO - 2
WIA/IN - Eliot
NEA/IN - Bolster

During the course of an evening’s chat, Mr. Moghadam made the following comments on Soviet arms purchases by the Shah. Mr. Moghadam stated that he had met recently with Dr. Abid (Iranian Ambassador to India) and to former Prime Minister Ahmad about the Shah’s policies and had noted concern on the part of both. According to Moghadam, Dr. Abid, during an audience with the Shah, had the Shah concerned that he know what he was doing and unwilling to discuss Iran’s interests. Dr. Abid, who according to Moghadam feels that the Shah has gone too far, reportedly complained that the Shah was not in a mood for counsel or advice. In his talk with Ahmad, Moghadam noted that the former Prime Minister was of the opinion that the Shah had already made up his mind to purchase Soviet weapons.

Moghadam questioned the wisdom of the Shah’s move, particularly in light of his recent decision to purchase arms from the U.S. He felt that many Iranian arms were of the same class. By publicizing the arms deal, however, Moghadam felt that the Shah had “dehumanized” himself into the political process of something which until recently he had meant only as a bluff. Mr. Moghadam suggested that personally was of two minds on the matter. On the one hand, as an Iranian nationalist, he was concerned about the potential threat to Iran’s national integrity posed by the introduction of a Soviet military presence. On the other hand, he and his close friends (unknown to whom he met) had befriended the Shah and hoped that he would pass on to him what he learns.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Moghadam’s remarks are among the reasons why I believe that the Shah’s policies, particularly on Soviet arms purchases, are not standing by and awaiting the reaction of the U.S.

GROUP A

CONFIDENTIAL

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Soviet arms, there are predictions in some quarters that a displaced US will see it to that the Shah’s days are numbered.

I asked him about the decrease in Iran’s arms purchases. Moghadam said that his “optimism” about Iran’s future because he felt that the Shah would surely seize the opportunity to sell arms to the Shah purchase of Soviet weapons by the Shah might not be popular with Iran. Since, it could be interpreted as tangible evidence of an independent country. Moghadam replied that most people interpreted the move, if it were made, as one agreed to by Washington to enhance the Shah’s image as an independent leader.

Moghadam, slipping on an after dinner brandy, warned to the subject of the Shah’s image in Iran and asked back to the “good old days” of Mossadegh as “truly independent”. He cautioned me not to confuse the so-called “independent” policies of the Shah with the independence shown by the active support of the Iranian people. He noted that the Shah’s foreign policy maneuvers were futile efforts on his part to gain as little as any impact on Iran.

Moghadam told me that he was planning to send Mossadegh two or three articles on Iran discussing the Shah’s economic and foreign policies. He noted that he and his friends were interested in finding out Mossadegh’s views on the Shah’s policies, particularly on Soviet arms purchases, and said he would pass on to me what he learns.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Moghadam’s remarks are among the reasons why I believe that the Shah’s policies, particularly on Soviet arms purchases, are not standing by and awaiting the reaction of the U.S.

POLI-Sanadik: Jan 1/2/66

CONFIDENTIAL

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During the course of an evening’s chat, Mr. Mogadam made the following comments on Soviet arms purchases by the Shah. Mr. Mogadam stated that he had recently talked with Mr. Abdo (Iranian Ambassador to India) and to former Prime Minister Anami about the Shah’s policies and had noted concern on the part of both. According to Mogadam, Mr. Abdo, during an audience with the Shah, had found the Shah convinced that he knew what he was doing and unwilling to discuss Iran-Soviet relations. Mr. Abdo stated that the Shah had gone too far, reportedly even away from the audience with the strong impression that the Shah was in no mood for counsel or advice. In his talk with Anami, Mogadam noted that the former Prime Minister was of the opinion that the Shah had already made up his mind to purchase Soviet weapons.

Mogadam questioned the wisdom of the Shah’s move, particularly in the light of historic Russian designs on Iran, but stated that when he had first heard of a possible Soviet arms purchase he had interpreted it as a bluff on the part of the Shah to get more from the U.S. He felt that many Iranians were of the same opinion. By publicizing the existence of a deal, however, Mogadam felt that the Shah had “cheesemated” himself into going through with something which, perhaps until recently he had meant only as a bluff. Mr. Mogadam accused that he personally was of two minds on the matter. On the one hand, as an Iranian nationalist, he was concerned about the potential threat to Iran’s national integrity posed by the introduction of a Soviet military presence. On the other hand, he said his close friends (unidentified, but presumably the dozen or so intellectuals with strong National Front sympathies with whom Mogadam meets periodically) hoped that the Shah had at least overstepped himself and that forces would come into play to unseat him and free Iran. According to Mogadam, Iranians are now standing by and awaiting the reaction of the U.S. Should the Shah purchase Soviet arms, there are predictions in some quarters that a displaced US will see to it that the Shah’s days are numbered.

I replied that the sooner Iranians discuss themselves of such illusions the better. I emphasized that the U.S. had long worked for the creation of an independent Iran and was therefore fully prepared to accept the Iranian government’s decision even when it was taken by an ill-advised Mogadam, somewhat taken aback by my reply, expressed his disappointment and stated that my words had made him “feeling” about Iran’s future because he felt that the Shah would surely seize the opportunity to sell arms to the Shah and thereby increase their influence in Iran. I asked Mogadam if the purchase of Soviet weapons by the Shah might not be popular with Iranians since it could be interpreted as tangible evidence of an independent government leading an independent country. Mogadam replied that most people in Iran would still see an “American hand” behind the Shah and would interpret the move, if it comes about, as one agreed to by Washington to enhance the Shah’s image as an independent leader.

Mogadam, sipping an after-dinner brandy, turned to the subject of the Shah’s image in Iran. He said that the Shah, in the days of the “good old days” of Mosadegh, had only been “independent” if his policies were consistent with those of the Shah. He added that the Shah’s foreign policy maneuvers were a futile effort on his part to gain respect from the populace. Therefore, Mogadam felt, the Shah had made little effort to win the respect of the Iranians.

Mogadam told me that he was planning to send Mosadegh two letters on Iran discussing the Shah’s economic and foreign policies. He noted that the Shah’s policies, particularly on Soviet arms purchases, would pass on to me what he learned.

CONSIDER

Mr. Mogadam’s remarks are a reminder of the thinking in those Iranian circles which still cling to the memory of the National Front and look to Mosadegh for inspiration.

POL/US/81/741/2/66
During the course of a general discussion on the Iranian internal political situation, Mr. Mogadam mentioned that he had talked with former Prime Minister Amini the day before and had urged him to look into the possibility of organizing a political grouping that might be permitted to participate in the 1967 general elections. Mr. Mogadam said that he was not alone in pressing Amini in this direction and noted that other friends and associates of the former Prime Minister, including several followers of socialist party leader Hoosain Maleki, had been suggesting the formation of a new political grouping under Amini’s leadership.

Mr. Mogadam (who is himself sympathetic toward the National Front) explained that various persons who in the past had been active politically were now endeavoring to rally around Amini because they respected his independence of mind and prestige. Mogadam noted further that those around Amini were hopeful that permission to move politically would be granted Amini because they believed the Shah could trust Amini not to challenge his authority or let things get out of hand. Mogadam was quick to note also that no one around Amini contemplated any political activity without prior consent from the Shah.
I asked Mogadam about Amini's attitude toward the urging of his friends. Mogadam replied that Amini, in talks with various people, had indicated interest, but only on condition that the Shah would approve of his political activity.

CONTENT: Although Mogadam stated that others were urging Amini to take action, it was not unlikely that Amini himself has decided to let the word get around that he is available to play any role the Shah might see fit for him in next year's elections. Nevertheless, it appears highly unlikely that the Shah would be amenable to a party leadership role for Amini, and the optimism expressed on this score by those around Amini appears to be based on wishful thinking alone. It is interesting to note, however, that those not well disposed toward the present regime now appear ready, indeed eager, to seek an accommodation with the Shah even though any arrangement within a tightly controlled system.

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MR. Hoqadam has been fired from his job with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, working under the Ministry of Water and Power. He claims that his role in organizing a professional group of Iranian engineers over a year ago, and an incident having political overtones which arose last summer in connection with this grouping, led to his dismissal.

Until last summer the engineer's group — said to number some 50 individuals — met on the average of once per month with the full knowledge of the authorities. At one meeting in the late spring of 1966 it was decided to write a letter to the Shah asking him to make greater use of Iranian engineers in carrying out agricultural reform. The letter was obviously interpreted in certain quarters as critical of the Shah's White Revolution, for when the archbishops congregated at the Tehran Hotel for their next meeting in June, the security authorities moved in and told everyone to go home. A letter protesting, the act of the security authorities was subsequently sent to the Shah's Secretariat requesting that the group be permitted to meet again.

According to Hoqadam, nothing happened until December 29, 1966, when he was present at a late-night meeting held by former Prime Minister Reza, telling him that his services were no longer needed. Hoqadam claims that from informants within the Ministry and elsewhere he had learned that his dismissal was a direct result of his activity in the engineer's group.

Ironically, while Hoqadam was fired (presumably for engaging in activity not considered appropriate for a government employee), the engineer's group in late January were informed by the Shah's Secretariat granting permission for the group to resume its periodic meetings. This was a matter of professional interest.

CONFLICT: Those who are members of the engineer's group will not soon forget their experience of last summer, nor will Hoqadam be ignored by those engineers in the group who are on the government payroll.

February 10, 1967
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According to Mogadam, nothing happened until December 2, 1966 when he was present with a late signatory, Interior Minister Rabani telling him that his services were no longer needed. Mogadam claims that from informants within the Ministry and elsewhere he had learned that his dismissal was a direct result of his activity in the engineer's group.

Ironically, while Mogadam was fired (presumably) for engaging in activity not considered appropriate for a government employee, the engineer, during the first week of January 1967 received a letter from the Shah's Secretariat giving permission for the group to resume its periodic meetings to discuss matters of professional interest.

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**CONFLICT**

February 20, 1967
impression that Amini in some way was guilty of malfeasance. Normally, Amini would have the right to rebut the charges through the press. Mogadam, however, doubts that the government will allow the press to give Amini's side of the story.

Comment

Mogadam is an Amini disciple so his speculation should be regarded with caution.

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Mogadam told Amini on February 27 that the Shah, before leaving for Europe, had instructed Mehdizadeh to take action against Amini. According to Mogadam, Amini had learned this from someone who is in touch with Mehdizadeh.

Mogadam described Amini as the one political leader in Iran who can cause the Shah difficulties. Amini's feeling that the Iranian economy is in for troubles; his belief that the Shah has moved too far in the direction of economic relations with the Bloc; and his disagreement with the Shah's attitude toward the Arab world are well known in influential political circles. Amini's opposition to the Shah's policies make him an attractive candidate for various political groups searching for a leader. Mogadam believes that the Shah has judged the time right to put Amini back in his place and thus cut any potential threat to Iran's current form of political stability.

In addition, Mogadam heard that when Iranian Ambassador to the UN, Anari, was in Tehran, he had reported to the Shah that the Consortium was unhappy with the Iranian government and it is now set up. Mogadam speculates that the Shah believes Amini to be the "fair haired boy" of the Consortium, and that the Shah, therefore, decided to cut Amini down.
impression that Amini in some way was guilty of misfeasance. Normally, Amini would have the right to rebut the charges through the press. Mogadam, however, doubts that the government will allow the press to give Amini's side of the story.

Comment

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KHALIL MALEKI (leader of Iran's Socialist Party whose activities are under SAVAK surveillance) told Mogadam that he had had a call from Carliner asking for an appointment. A meeting was arranged but sometime before it actually took place, Maleki received a call from Dr. Mohamad BAKHERI (Undersecretary in the Ministry of Court) who, after telling Maleki that the government was aware of the Carliner meeting, advised Maleki to watch carefully what he said to his guests if he knew what was good for him. Maleki told Mogadam that he handed the "advice" during his talk with Carliner.

Mogadam, whose French is fluent, spent several years working on a translation of the Persian of the first volume of de Tocqueville's "Democracy In America." The translation work was done under the auspices of Franklin Publications and under the watchful eye of the Pahlavi Foundation. When the translation was completed, Mogadam submitted his work to the Franklin people for correction and approval. Senator Mohamad Saidi, a solid member of the establishment who also has fluent command of French, was responsible for ensuring that the Persian rendition of de Tocqueville's classic would not offend current Iranian political sensitivities.

Senator Saidi, according to Mogadam, was thorough and took great care to change or eliminate wording even remotely critical of the institution of monarchy. For some unexplained reason, Saidi changed the title of the book on the cover in Persian to read "Democracy in the New World," although the more accurate title was allowed to stand at the top of the inner pages. The term "absolute monarchs" in the text was changed to read "authoritarian government" thus distorting de Tocqueville's meaning in certain passages.

Mogadam accepted the changes with good grace and about a month ago was pleased to receive copies of the first published Persian text of de Tocqueville's work. Shortly after the publication was printed and distributed, the authorities reversed themselves and moved quickly to stop further distribution. They also picked up as many copies as they could get their hands on of those already distributed. Mogadam does not yet know why this was done, but he speculated that someone close to the Shah must have had difficulty with the text, even after Saidi's changes, and that action was deemed necessary.

Meanwhile, Mogadam claims that intellectual circles in Iran are aware that the translation exists and are paying considerably more than the 450 riial price to get copies which escaped the collection efforts of the authorities. Mogadam personally gave a copy to his friend former Prime Minister Amir who pointed to the affair as one more clear manifestation of how heavy-handed and arbitrary the Shah's regime has become.

SECRET/NO FORM
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Comment

It seems unlikely that the ban on the translation will last too long, particularly as the word gets around that it exists and since a large sum of money was expended to print several thousand copies. On the other hand, the current translation might well be subjected to further changes before publication.

Megahed feels that the changes already made by Saidi distort the true meaning of the author. Does we hope that the authorities recalled the book to undo the evil that censor Saidi had done — ?

PARTICIPANTS:
Bahremollah NEKADAN - Agricultural Engineer
Larry V. Bemakies - Second Secretary of Embassy

DATE: December 14, 1968

PLACE: Megahed Residence

CONFIDENTIAL

Arrests

Megahed heard about the arrest of 14 young Iranians. He said the arrests took place about a year ago. One of the arrested, Bijan JASANI, is the younger brother of Rahimollah Jassani. Megahed described Rahimollah Jassani as an extreme leftist (if not an active Tudeh member) who for some reason is in the good books of the regime and sits on the Revolutionary Committee set up last year after the Administrative Congress to oversee administrative reform. Rahimollah Jassani is also the husband of Deputy Prime Minister Shafi AYVA's sister. Bijan Jassani shares his older brother's leftist orientation. According to Megahed Jassani and the other 13 were picked up for possession of Chinese Communist literature and for having contact with Chinese Communist "elements".

Megahed has also heard that 30 literacy corps members were arrested by Savak about a week ago also for possessing Chinese Communist literature and for having contact with Chinese Communist "elements".

Iran-Saudi Arabia

Megahed said that passports currently issued to Iranians for travel abroad contain a restriction on travel to Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. A business-minded friend of his was told that he could not travel to Saudi Arabia. Megahed felt the restrictions on travel to Lebanon were due to the Oman-Bahrain issue between Iran and Lebanon, but he was mystified by the restriction on travel to Saudi Arabia which reportedly went into effect after the Shah's visit to Saudi Arabia.
Comment

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Censorship

Mr. Moghadam, an avid reader of foreign affairs, said he had found the article "Force and Counterforce" which appeared in the October 1968 issue of the periodical very interesting. He decided to translate it into Persian and submitted it to Vahedgar for publication. The article was published by the newspaper but not before a portion critical of the Soviet Union had been deleted by Iranian censors.

AP correspondent Prazn Basin has a brother who did research on the Freemason movement in Iran and wrote a book about it. The book is very critical of Freemasonry and reportedly has offensive things to say about several prominent Iranians living and dead. The book apparently passed the censors and was printed for distribution. At the last minute, however, the authorities decided to block distribution (presumably as a result of pressure from influential persons connected with Freemasonry). According to Moghadam, however, a representative of Court Minister Alam has assured Basin that distribution will be permitted shortly.

Former Prime Minister Amali

Moghadam said he had seen Amali in the morning and that the former Prime Minister had indicated that the Iranian economy was headed for deep trouble. The pessimistic outlook was based on Amali's review of the budget and estimates of Iran's income. Amali also predicted that the Shah will drop Hoeyde in the very near future, perhaps after Nowruz.

Comment

Amali has always been a Cassandras on economic matters. Unlike Cassandras's predictions, however, Amali's have yet to prove true.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECTS: Terrorism, Ministry of Commerce Mahdavi, Air Force Corruption, Agricultural Situation

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Rahmatallah Moghadam, Consultant to Ministry of Water and Power and former National Front Member, Archie M. Bolster, Political Officer, Amembassy Tehran

PLACE & DATE: Tiffany's Restaurant -- January 28, 1976

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCH, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, ARMISH/MAAG, POL (2), POL/MIL, ECON, OME, DAO, Amconsul Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, BIB, INR/OI/B

NOTE: Moghadam is an unreconstructed National Front and always sees the worst in government operations. His negative comments on GOI officials and policies should, therefore, be looked at with this in mind.

Terrorism

According to Moghadam the public is skeptical about guilt of the nine terrorists executed, January 24. Many believe that the GOI may have arranged the killings of Colonels Shaffer and Turner in order to justify the Shah's public statements that there are no political prisoners in Iran, only terrorists, and to justify the regime's harsh repression of oppositionists. The story concludes that the GOI had to kill these nine defendants in order to cover its tracks. The fact that the trials were secret in his view bears out the government's reluctance to let the true situation be known.

Newspaper reports about the killings of terrorists in Sarl, Amol, and Gorgan were partially inaccurate, said Moghadam. A girl arrested in Amol gave police a lead to a hideout in Gorgan, so they surrounded the suspected house, attacking it when they heard "the sound of gunfire coming from within." When they stormed the house they found only a tape recorder inside which continued to play sounds of gunfire. The terrorists had escaped and are still at large. Moghadam said this story had come from a friend who lived in Gorgan, and he insisted that it was true.
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Comment

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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SUBJECTS: Terrorism, Ministry of Commerce Mahdavi, Air Force Corruption, Agricultural Situation

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Rahmatollah Moghdam, Consultant to Ministry of Water and Power and former National Front Member Archie H. Bolster, Political Officer, Amembassy Telavan

PLACE & DATE: Tiffany's Restaurant January 28, 1976

DISTRIBUTION: AIB/DCH, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, ARMISH/MAAG, POL (2), POL/MIL, ECON, OI, DAO, Amconsul Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, BTO, INR/OIL/8

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CONFINIDENTIAL
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Minister of Commerce Mahdavi

One of Moghadam's friends said, it was widely流传ed that Mahdavi
would eventually succeed Khomeini as Prime Minister. In very Persian
fashion, Mahdavi was said to have been put in his present position
because of American support for his technocrat image. Continued
American support would assure him the Prime Minister. A rumor is
circulating that Mahdavi is under investigation for an alleged
300 million Rial shortage discovered in the books of the Industrial
and Mining Development Bank of Iran, which Mahdavi headed before
becoming Minister of Commerce in 1974.

Air Force Corruption

Moghadam said he had heard there were some 30 Air Force officers in
custody for corrupt activities. These investigations might implicate
the late General Khatami, adding fuel to rumors that his hang-g gliding
death had been arranged to spare the GOI embarrassment when the facts
came out.

Lagging Agricultural Production

Returning to a frequent theme of his conversations, Moghadam commented
that Iran's agricultural production continues to lag far behind what
it should be. He had just returned from Ahwaz, January 27, where he
learned that one of the largest agro-business firms in the area is
selling off its land. He said it was widely known in Ahwaz that
Managing Director Janshied Mehdast was trying to sell all of the land
holdings of his Iran-California Company, probably in lots of 1,000
hectares which could be farmed by individuals or families. To Moghadam,
this failure shows that large-scale agriculture in Iran needs assistance
from the government if it is to be turned around and made profitable.
Moghadam had just received a copy of a comprehensive report on Iranian
agriculture done by the Booker Agricultural and Technical Service
Company of England recommending a "master plan" for Iran's agriculture.
Although he had not yet studied it in detail, Moghadam thought this
consultants' report was too general to be of much practical value.
Moghadam recently had printed in Khodantha magazine an article
pointing out some of the weaknesses in GOI agricultural policy. He
commented that Editor Amirani had been obliged to seek GOI approval
for its publication, which showed how sensitive the government was to the
poor state of Iranian agriculture.

I dropped by to see Moghadam on the Imam Reza holiday to chat after his release from prison. (He was among the opposition leaders arrested shortly after imposition of martial law in Tehran.) After noting he was in reasonably good shape and not too pale, I asked how he had been. He
said he was well treated although his first 11 days were
spent in solitary confinement and he never got out in the
sun during that month. Later he had been moved to a cell
with others, mostly mullahs, who were brought in and taken
cut out regularly. Among them was Imam Mofateh, of the Old
Shemiran Road mosque. Mofateh is still in jail. I then
said I was puzzled why he was held so much longer than the
other political leaders, most of whom were released the
same day they were arrested. Moghadam said he had asked
his namesake (but no relative) General Moghadam of SAVAK
then said it was because, after imposition of martial law, they
had wanted to break communications between various
opposition groups. I asked Moghadam if that sounded like
a good reason; was Moghadam that much more effective than
other leaders in maintaining communication between groups?
He smiled and said he was.

Moghadam said he was interrogated entirely by SAVAK people.
When asked about the aims of his group, he explained these
were within the constitution. Various pamphlets put out by his party and contacts made with others also constituted
permissible political activity. He made no secret of his being
a constitutional party. (COMMENT: This is a more definitive
part of the past year as to whether he has not shown his
hand prematurely should the "thousand flowers" suddenly be
chopped off in a reversal of the Shah's policy.)
Minister of Commerce Madavi

One of Moghadam's friends said it was widely believed that Madavi would eventually succeed Khomeini as Prime Minister. In very Persian fashion, Madavi was said to have been put in his present position because of American support for his technocrat image. Continued American support would assure him the Prime Minister. A rumor is circulating that Madavi is under investigation for an alleged 300 million Rial shortcut discovered in the books of the Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran, which Madavi headed before becoming Minister of Commerce in 1974.

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POL: AMB/3601.2 mp

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Rahmatollah MOGHADAM MARAGHEH
George B. LAMBRakis, American Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: October 14, 1978, Mr. Moghadam's Residence

SUBJECT: Internal Situation

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, BIO, OR, ECON, NEA/IRN,
INR/RHA, INR/OIL/B

I dropped by to see Moghadam on the Imam Reza holiday to chat after his release from prison. (He was among the opposition leaders arrested shortly after imposition of martial law in Tehran.) After noting he was in reasonably good shape and not too pale, I asked how he had been. He said he was well treated although his first 11 days were spent in solitary confinement and he never got out in the sun during that month. Later he had been moved to a cell with others, mostly mullahs, who were brought in and taken out regularly. Among them was Imam MOFATEH, of the Old Shemiran Road mosque. Mofteh is still in jail. I then said I was puzzled why he was held so much longer than the other political leaders, most of whom were released the same day they were arrested. Moghadam said he had asked his namesake (but no relative) General Moghadam of SAVAK then said it was because, after imposition of martial law, they had wanted to break communications between various oppositional groups. I asked Moghadam if that sounded like other leaders in maintaining communication between groups? He smiled and said he was.

Moghadam said he was interrogated entirely by SAVAK people. When asked about the aims of his group, he explained these were within the constitution. Various pamphlets put out by his party and contacts made with others also constituted permissible political activity. He made no secret of his relations with him, as he has nothing to hide, being a constitutional party. (COMMENT: This is a more definitive part of the past year as to whether he has not shown his hand prematurely should the "thousand flowers" suddenly be chopped off in a reversal of the Shah's policy.)
Mohammad volunteered that he had been to Kayhan earlier in the day at the invitation of the gathered newspaper editorial and technical staff there. He had talked about his party and its policies. He seemed happy about his reception.

When I asked about the situation among the opposition at present, Mohammad said they were puzzled and did not know what to make of it. He added that to be perfectly frank (as I think he was, at least in part) the opposition is bothered by what lies behind President Carter’s two messages of support for the Shah. He then rehearsed for me again his basic thesis that the Americans were responsible for foisting the Shah on Iran in 1953 and keeping him in power by helping him build a strong army and police. This upset the balance of power between the Shah and his people. It behooves the U.S. to stay out of the Iranian situation, but Carter’s two messages indicate the U.S. is intervening in the Shah’s side once again.

I took this occasion to say that, frankly, we have expressed support for the Shah insofar as he is head of state of Iran and Iran is an important friend and ally of the U.S. in whose stability and continuing progress we have a stake. At the same time we have indicated our support for continuing liberalization in this country. Such liberalization should come gradually and not in a revolutionary manner so as to maintain this stability. Free elections next summer seemed to us a good goal for a start. I then asked him how he viewed the future role of the Shah.

Mohammad said he agreed the Shah was needed, both to keep the army under control and to prevent any possible chaos that might result from a sudden collapse of authority. He asked if this did not mean he agreed with me? He did not demur directly but repeated another basic theme of his that the Shah is not sincere and is just fooling around, hoodwinking us Americans. U.S. Presidents come and go and the Shah knows how to take advantage of them. For example, Kennedy had indicated some helpful desires in connection with internal political liberalization and thought the Shah was applying them. Then came Johnson and Nixon who reversed this policy and gave the Shah everything he wanted. He recalled an occasion when a USIS officer has asked him if he would be interested in meeting with President Nixon at the Iran-America Society during the President’s visit to Iran, to which Mohammad had assented. Nixon never visited the IAS, and he had a letter from the USIS officer explaining that no one in the Embassy had been involved in Nixon’s only activity here, a private audience with the Shah. When President Carter came in he had raised hopes, but the recent messages puzzled Mohammad and his friends.

I again went through our policy, suggesting that Mohammad and his friends would do best to organize themselves to take advantage of the promised free elections. I added that it was unrealistic of them to believe that the Shah and his supporters would yield power to the oppositionists simply because the oppositionists asked for it. The oppositionists must show they have something to contribute. I noted he himself had told me a couple of months ago the trouble they were having in pulling together a common program. If the opposition had a set of specific goals and an organization the Shah could negotiate with them and speed their participation in internal political situation. As long as individual leaders present an inchoate approach, what could he expect Shah or anyone else to take them seriously? Mohammad appeared to accept these remarks.

He reverted to the theme that the Shah had no intention of liberalizing as witness the appointment of Sharif-Emami — "a corrupt man" — instead of choosing someone more suitable. He rejected my argument that the Shah is preparing the succession of his son; the Shah is far too selfish to worry about his son, Mohammad said. He also referred to the killing of so many people in Jaleh Square on September 8. He said the situation now was “worse than before.” Then they tortured, now they killed people. He did not press this argument further, however, when I reminded him of some of the horrors he had accused the government of when we just began our talks a year ago.

After some further discussion we agreed to meet again once Moghdam has had a chance to sound out others among his colleagues (e.g. Engineer BASARGAN, who Moghdam said just returned from Mashad).
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COMMENT: Moghadam was certainly feeling me out with his remarks about the Carter statements, but I believe he reflects true concern among the constitutional opposition as to whether U.S. policy has shifted in the last few months. I expect to have this question brought up again and will deal with it along the lines indicated.

An irrigation engineer and cartographer, Rahmatollah Mogadam-Maraqbi helped to found the Radical Movement of Iran and has led it ever since. Politically active in opposition to the Shah for over two decades, he has been jailed for dissident activities since September 1978. Mogadam classifies himself as a moderate and insists that he has always striven for freedom within the limits of Iran's Constitution. He describes his political philosophy as being between those of the socialists and the centrists in France. In addition, he notes that the term radical in his organization's title was inspired by the moderate Radical Socialist Party in France, and he resents any attempt to associate his party with extremism. (C)

US officials with whom Mogadam has met assess him as a balanced, pro-American, intellectual man who is sincere and communicates frankly. They also note that in mid-1978 Mogadam, because of his moderate stance, had difficulties in his meetings with other opposition leaders who were trying to formulate a unified opposition program. Mogadam has always been friendly to US officials and is willing to carry on substantive dialogues. He admired former Prime Minister (1951-53) Mohammad Mosadeq but was not a member of the National Front, a coalition that supported Mosadeq in his power struggle with the Shah. He has told US officials that the US image has suffered in Iran because of American support for the Shah and lack of understanding for Mosadeq's historical significance. (C)

Born in Tehran, Mogadam is a graduate of the Iranian Military Academy. He studied cartography and geography in France from 1949 to 1953, graduating from the French Army College and the University
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Rahmatollah MOQADAM-MAROQBI
(Phonetic: mohgadahm mahraheh-ee)
Leader, Radical Movement of Iran (since 1975)
Addressed as: Mr. Mogadam

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Born in Tehran, Mogadam is a graduate of the Iranian Military Academy. He studied cartography and geography in France from 1949 to 1953, graduating from the French Army College and the University
of Paris. He returned to Iran and served as an officer in the army until 1955. He was a member of the now defunct Mardom (loyal opposition) of the Majles (lower house of Parliament) from Azerbaijan. He has held several positions dealing with irrigation in the Ministry of Agriculture. (U)

Nogad, about 58, has published articles on agriculture and land use. In 1962, he was invited to the United States to observe American agriculture and to speak to Ag. (U) Leader Grantee. He speaks French and English. (U)

13 December 1978

Hasan NAZIE
(Phonetic: naZEEeh)

Chairman, Bar Association
(since about July 1978)

Addressed as: Mr. Nazie

Hasan Nazie, a lawyer and a longtime political activist, has promised to make the Bar Association a more active institution than it has been. Shortly after taking office, he associated the organization with a call for the retrial in civilian courts of political prisoners who had been convicted in military courts. He signaled his intention to initiate such organizational reforms as holding more meetings, circulating a monthly report to the country's lawyers, prosecuting corrupt lawyers, and attacking bureaucratic red tape. Nazie is ambitious and something of a political opportunist; in 1966 he reportedly believed he could use Tudeh (Communist) Party support in advancing his political fortunes.

In the 1950s Nazie, an ardent nationalist, was one of the founders of the Freedom Movement of Iran (PMI), a right wing, religious, nationalist organization that was at various times associated with the National Front (NF), a coalition that supported Prime Minister (1951-53) Mohammad Mossadegh in his struggle with the Shah. After the PMI withdrew from the NF in May 1961, Nazie emerged as the leader of a party majority that favored a more peaceful effort to assume power and argued against the use of violence in removing the Shah. During that period, he and his party advocated an end to the acceptance of foreign military aid, the installation of a neutralist (but non-Communist) government, and reasonable control over the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the consortium, a group of 17 international oil companies working in partnership with the NIOC. After the PMI rejoined the NF in October 1961, he served (cont.)
of Paris. He returned to Iran and served as an officer in the army until 1955. He was a member of the now defunct Nationalist (loyal opposition) Party for a short period beginning in 1955. In 1961 he served as a deputy in the Majles (lower house of Parliament) from Azerbaijan. He has held several positions dealing with irrigation in the Ministry of Agriculture. (U)

Mosadegh, about 58, has published articles on agriculture and land use. In 1962 he spent two months in the United States observing American political processes and agriculture as a foreign leader grantee. He speaks French and English. (U)

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on the Central Council and the Central Executive Committee of the FNI and headed its Propaganda and Publications Commission. (S)

Little career or personal information is currently available on Nazie. Now in his early fifties, he apparently was one of the leading figures among the younger nationalists in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1960 he worked for the Workers Social Insurance Corporation, and in July 1961 he was imprisoned for a short time for anti-Vieti government activity. In 1962 Nazie was a member of the council of the Association of Azerbaijani Citizens Resident in Tehran. (C)

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13 December 1978

IRAQIAN INTERESTS IN PURCHASE OF REFINED PRODUCTS

(AGENDA ENTIRE TEXT)

In your background in your meeting with NIOC's HESS, you would be aware of the following. On July 14, 1975, Acting on behalf of Nasim, asked Amrada-Hess, cell producer of 1,000 barrels to be allocated between kerosene and gaso.

Azimi explained that Kerosene is followed by a similar bombing of products and was responsible in a substantial reduction in Arab oil exports. The output to 1,000 barrels a day. Reduction leads to the inability to store Arab oil products. A limited supply of a winter without additional fuel will have a long-term impact.

A Hess has agreed to supply about 50,000 barrels divided roughly between kerosene and gaso. There will be no reduction in US domestic stocks. Targeted by Hess, and foreign supplies will be down.

Oil in Iraq, Iranians have contracted for the tankers, thus each which are slated to begin loading very shortly.

4. Kerosene has been in short by Hess of US origin, and I am being highly appreciative of the fact that USG will come to quickly. Emergency need for products tend to fluctuate slightly by arrival and that would now it under (perhaps the IGO interests reparable this time) so Hess plan to cease it at specified dates to periodic 1/5th day refinery exports. I am informed...
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SUPPLY OF OIL TO THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET AND THERAV

CIRCUIT THE SITUATION IN THE U.S. AND ANY EFFECT ON THE OIL MARKET.

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SUPPLY OF OIL TO THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET AND THEREFORE MAKE THE TRANSITION IN THE U.S. AWAY FROM AN EGRESSIVE PRODUCTION ON IMPORTED OIL POSSIBLE AND SMOOTH. NAIZI SAID THAT IT WAS THE GOVERNMENT, RATHER THAN NOIC THAT CONTROLLED THE LEVEL OF PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS.

SITUATION IN KUWAIT AND ITS PRESENT AND POTENTIAL FUTURE IMPACT ON THE OIL SECTOR. NAIZI WAS UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO BE SPECIFIC. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PROBLEMS EXISTED, BUT HE MAINTAINED THAT ONLY A FEW PEOPLE WERE RESPONSIBLE AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PANAMAS SHOULD BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS. NAIZI EMERGED THAT THE AHA DISPUTES OR THE SAROTAGE HAD ANY IMPACT ON OIL PRODUCTION OR EXPORTS.

NAIZI GRADUATED FROM TIBRAN UNIVERSITY (LAW) IN 1956, ROSE TO BE A LAZER IN IRAN FOR A TIME, AND THEN CONTINUED HIS STUDIES IN SWITZERLAND FROM 1956 TO 1959. DURING HIS SERVICE IN THE BAZAN, NAIZI SERVED AS LEGAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND AS A MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENTAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. NAIZI WAS A FOUNDER IN 1959 OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL LAWYERS AND HAD BEEN AN ACCOMPLISHED LAWYER IN THE NATIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. NAIZI WAS ALSO ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE PROFESSIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEM.
NADIR IS MORE OF A SOCIETY OF IRANIAN BARON. HE IS NOT MEETING WITH CHANCE, NAZIR WAS VERY FRIENDLY, AND
CONVERSATIONAL. HE WAS WILLING TO WORK IN FATHER IS SAD THAT HE DOES NOT SPEAK ENGLISH AND HE APPARENTLY
SHOWS HIS ENGLISH AND HIS ENGLISH IS NOT VERY LITTLE ENGLISH. (MICO'S DIRECTOR FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, REZA AZIMI, TRANSLATED.) NAZIR
IS VERY SOFT AND SLOW-SPoken. DESPITE HIS APPOintMENT AS
PAK OF MICO, NAZIR OBVIOUSLY REMAINS FAR MORE INTERESTED
IN LAW AND POLITICS. OR PROBABLY TURNS THE DAY-TO-TAY
WORKING OF THE OIL COMPANY, LARGE TO HIS EXPERIENCED
MICO DRAP. EALDAG.

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 32 OF 32 TIRHAN 97514
1. The Iranian press over the weekend has devoted much space — and engaged in much speculation — over the summoning of National Iranian Oil Company chairman Hassan Nazime before the Revolutionary Courts. Nazime has not been relieved of his duties, and he has not been charged specifically. Rather, he has been told to answer attacks by the clergy that he has acted "against Islam and the nation," and the government.

2. Although instructed to appear in court Sunday morning, Nazime has not done so; nor has he returned to his home. Oil industry sources have told us that he has in fact contacted the court directly by phone, to arrange an appearance later, after emotions have cooled. (Nazime's lawyer, a lawyer, and is president of the Iranian bar association.) There has been no confirmation of this, although spokesmen Nazime's wife as saying he has spoken to Prime Minister Bazargan's office.

3. NIOC personnel seem stunned by the attacks on Nazime. However, there appear to have been no strikes in support of Nazime and reports are that production in Khuzistan continues normally.

4. Comment: Nazime may be relieved by the government and the Supreme Leader, who relieve Nazime has gone to war to protect the regime and its interests. The appointment of a new oil minister will be seen to dilute Nazime's power. Whether this will permit Nazime to continue to be "Iranian" is not clear. We are attempting to reach industry and government contacts for their views, and will comment further as the issue develops. LAHJEN ET

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I.O. 12065: CODE 10/1/75 (SENS. A.D.) OR-
7451: ENG, IR
SUBJECT: NAZIEH QUL AS NIOC DIRECTOR

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE IRANIAN PRESS OVER THE WEEKEND HAS DEVOTED MUCH
SPACE — AND ENGAGED IN MUCH SPECULATION — OVER THE
SUMMING-UP OF NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY CHAIRMAN NAZIEH
NAZIEH BEFORE THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS. NAZIEH HAS NOT
BEEN RELEASED OF HIS DUTIES, AND HE HAS NOT BEEN CHARGED
SPECIFICALLY: RATHER HE HAS BEEN TOLD TO ANSWER ATTACKS
BY THE CLERIC THAT HE HAS ACTED AGAINST ISLAM AND THE
NATION AND THE

3. ALTHOUGH INSTRUCTED TO APPEAR IN COURT SATURDAY
MORNING, NAZIEH HAS NOT DONE SO; NOONE HAS BEEN RETURNED
TO HIS HOME. OIL INDUSTRY SOURCES HAVE TOLD US THAT HE
HAS IN FACT CONTACTED THE COURT DIRECTLY, BY PHONE, TO
ARRANGE AN APPEARANCE LATER. AFTER MOTTION TO COOLED
(NAZIEH IS KIMBROE'S LAWYER, AND IS PRESIDENT OF THE
IRANIAN BAR ASSOCIATION) THERE HAS BEEN NO CONFIRMATION
OF THIS. ALTHOUGH AFP QUOTE NAZIEH'S WIFE AS SAYING
HE HAS SPOKEN TO PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE.

4. NIOC PERSONNEL SEEM STUMPED BY THE ATTACKS ON NAZIEH.
HEARD, THERE APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN NO STRIKES IN SUPPORT
OFT NAZIEH AND REPORTS ARE THAT PRODUCTION IN KHUDISTAN
CONTINUES NORMALLY.

5. COMMENT: NAZIEH MAY HAVE DECIDED TO SILENCE
THOSE WHO BELIEVE NAZIEH HAS GONE TO WAR TO PROTECT
NIOC PROPER ASSOCIATED WITH THE FORMER REGIME. THE
APPOINTMENT OF SATURDAY OF ALL AKBAR MONIRAS AS THE NEW
OIL MINISTER WILL BE SEEN TO LIQUEfy NAZIEH'S POWER, WHETHER
THIS WILL PERMIT NAZIEH TO BE REASONED AS NIOC
DIRECTOR IS NOT CLEAR. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO REACH INDUSTRY
AND GOVERNMENT CONTACTS FOR THEIR VIEW, AND WILL COMMENT
FURTHER AS THE ISSUE DEVELOMS. LATHREN
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E.O. 12665 7DS 18/4/84 (SENS, A.D.) OR-W
TAGS: ENB, IS
SUBJECT: NAZIR OUT AS NILOC DIRECTOR?

1. (C) THE CASE OF FORMER NILOC CHAIRMAN HASSAN NAZIR CONTINUES TO MAKE HEADLINES IN IRAN. ALTHOUGH HE REMAINS AS MANAGING DIRECTOR OF THE COMPANY, HE HAS NOT APPEARED IN PUBLIC SINCE SEPT 79 AND WAS WIDELY HONORED TO SAVE PERSIAN OIL FROM BEING SHIPPED TO CHINA. HE IS STILL IN TEHERAN AND IN TOUCH WITH HIS FAMILY. (WE HAVE BEEN RELIABLY TOLD HOWEVER THAT HE IS STILL IN TEHERAN AND IN TOUCH WITH HIS FAMILY.) IT IS REPORTED THAT HARASSMENT OF HIS FAMILY BY REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS HAS DIMINISHED THOUGH HIS HOUSE CONTINUES TO BE WATCHED AND HIS TELEPHONE, IT IS ALLEGED, TAPED.

2. (C) THE NEW OIL MINISTER, ALI AKBAR MOINIFAR, AND PRIMIN BAZARGAN FOUND IT NECESSARY TO ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY ON MONDAY THAT THE POLITICAL BRIDGEGRADS WOULD NOT AFFECT IRAN'S POLICY ON OIL/PRODUCT PRODUCTION AND EXPORT. THIS WAS CONFIRMED TO ECONOMISTS TODAY BY REZA AZIMI-ROSEINI, HEAD OF NILOC'S INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, WHO ANNOUNCED THAT ONLY ONE MAN -- MOINIFAR -- HAS AUTHORITY TO SPEAK FOR THE COMPANY. MEANWHILE A CERTAIN PARADOX CAN BE NOTED AT THE RIGOROUS LEVELS OF NILOC HEADQUARTERS. AZIMI SURMISED THAT BY NEXT WEEK HE AND HIS WIFE WOULD HAVE "A CLEANER ENVIRONMENT," OF WHO WILL BE IN SENIOR POSITIONS. THE LATTER NEWS REFERS TO MOINIFAR'S PROMISE, QUOTED IN THE PRESS, OF A "CLEAN SWEEP" OF THE NILOC RANKS -- WITH THE TIMING YET TO BE DETERMINED.

3. (C) IN A LETTER TO PRIMIN BAZARGAN, MOBEDA ADDA, SECRETARY OF THE ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF THE OIL INDUSTRY, SAID THE OIL WORKERS DO NOT SEEK BUT TO BE WITH NAZIR BECAUSE IN PRINCIPLE NAZIR HAS NO FAITH RITUALS IN ISLAM OR THE REVOLUTION OR THE LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION. THE LETTER GOES ON TO BASE THIS ACCUSATION ON NAZIR'S ALLIEOPOZY TO CERTAIN POLICIES (INCLUDING BANK NATIONALIZATION) DECLARE BY ROSEINI TO BE "REVOLUTIONARY ACTS."


5. NAZIR'S REPLY TO THE 14 CHARGES AGAINST HIM WAS
1. (C) THE CASE OF FORMER NIIOC CHAIRMAN HASSAN NAZIZ CONTINUES TO MAKE HEADLINES IN IRAN. ALTHOUGH HE REMAINS AS MANAGING DIRECTOR OF THE COMPANY, HE HAS NOT APPEARED IN PUBLIC SINCE SEPT 25 AND WAS WIDELY RUMOURED TO HAVE FLED THE COUNTRY. (WE HAVE BEEN RELIABLY TOLD HOWEVER THAT HE IS STILL IN TEHRAN AND IN TOUCH WITH HIS FAMILY.) IT IS REPORTED THAT HARASSMENT OF HIS FAMILY BY REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS HAS DIMINISHED ALTHOUGH HIS HOUSE CONTINUES TO BE WATCHED AND HIS TELEPHONES, IT IS ALLEGED, TAPE T. 

2. (C) THE NEW OIL MINISTER, ALI AKBAR MOINIFAR, AND PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN FOUND IT NECESSARY TO ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY ON MONDAY THAT THE POLITICAL BUCKSARAS WOULD NOT AFFECT IRAN'S POLICY ON CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION AND EXPORT. THIS WAS CONFIRMED TO ECONOMISTS TODAY BY EHSAN AZIMI-BOROFEKINI, HEAD OF NIIOC'S INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, WHO ADDED THAT ONLY ONE MAN -- MOINIFAR -- HAS AUTHORITY TO SPEAK FOR THE COMPANY. MEANWHILE A CERTAIN PARADOX CAN BE NOTED AT THE HIGHER LEVELS OF NIIOC HEADQUARTERS -- AZIMI SURPRISED THAT BY NEXT WEEK HE -- AND HE -- WOULD HAVE "A CLEARER IDEA OF WHO WILL BE IN SENIOR POSITIONS." THIS LATTER COMMENT REFERS TO MOINIFAR'S PROMISE, QUOTED IN THE PRESS, OF A "CLEAN SWEEP" OF THE NIIOC RANES -- WITH THE TIMING YET TO BE DETERMINED.

3. (C) IN A LETTER TO PRIMIN BAZARGAN, MORETA ADAAMI, SECRETARY OF THE ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF THE OIL INDUSTRY, SAID "THE OIL WORKERS DO NOT SEE MY LIFE WITH NAZIZ BECAUSE IN PRINCIPLE HE HAS NO FAITH IN ISLAM OR THE REVOLUTION OR THE LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION." THE LETTER WENT ON TO BASE THIS ACCUSATION ON NAZIZ'S ALLEGED OPPOSITION TO CERTAIN POLICIES (INCLUDING BANK NATIONALIZATION) DECLARED BY KHOMEINI TO BE "REVOLUTIONARY ACTS." 

DE RUOMER #0712 200 ** 
INT: CCCC C3E 
R #071232 OCT 70 
EM AMBASSAD TEHERAN 
TO SECRSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4100 
BY 
CONFIDENTIAL TEHERAN 18712 
E.O. 12857: DFS 10/7/85 (SENS. A.D.), OR-X 
TAGS: KNEG, IR 
SUBJ: IRANIAN NAZI AFFAIR

1. A HIGHLY-PLACE SOURCE IN NIIC TOLD ECONCONCERN THAT A 
DECISION HAD BEEN MADE NOT TO NAME A NEW MANAGING 
DIRECTOR 
UNTIL THE NAZI CASE HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF. MEANWHILE THE 
DIRECTORS ARE WORKING WITH THE NEW OIL MINISTER AKBAR 
MOINPAH DIRECTLY, ALTHOUGH THE MINISTER DOES NOT MAINTAIN 
AN OFFICE AT NIIC PREMISES. WE ARE TOLD THAT DR. MOHAMMAD-
ALI MAROQ IS ACTING AS “SHADOW” MANAGING DIRECTOR FOR THE 
MOMENT.

2. MEANWHILE FETTOW HAS LEARNED FROM INDUSTRY SOURCES 
THAT THE NIIC BOARD WRIT A LETTER TO ATTORNEY KHOMEINI 
EXPRESSING “100 PERCENT SUPPORT FOR NAZI AND EMRASING 
THAT COMPANY DECISIONS ARE MADE BY THEM AND NOT JUST 
BY NAZI. NAZI IS SAID TO BE IN HIDING AND IN 
EASE OF CONTACT WITH HIS FAMILY AND FORMER ASSOCIATES.

Laingen 
BY 
#0712

NNNN 
CONFIDENTIAL 
TEHERAN 18712

CONFIDENTIAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA

Name: 
Nationality: 
Date and place of birth: 
Position: 
Party affiliations: 
Previous career: 
Languages spoken: 
Additional information: 
Education: 
Occupation: 

PREPARED: 
1950-51: assistant professor of philosophy and religion, University of 
Teheran. 
1939-41: two years’ military service, as reserve officer. 
1941-43: deputy to first secretary, member of internal security, 
1948-50: arrested on charges of inciting against the Imperial 
1950: court-martialed and sentenced to prison 
1952: died following an accident in prison. 

Date of preparation: November 2, 1950
CONFIDENTIAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA

Name: 
Nationality: 
Date and place of birth: 1902, Germany
Position: Deputy to Majlis
Party affiliation: National Front
Previous career: 
Languages spoken: Persian, French, some Arabic
Attitude toward and service in the United States: 
Military service: 
Family details: 
Education: 
Occupation: 
Prior employment: 
Prepared by: "wa"
Remarks:

Dr. Baghai's name first became prominent on the political horizon during the first term of the 13th Majlis. He gained widespread popularity at that time for his opposition to Goelhayan's Supplementary Bill agreement and his attacks on the Army for interference in general elections.

The latter grievance became almost obsessive, and in March 1949 he delivered a nine-day filibuster before the Majlis, accusing Ali Mansur, then Chief of Staff, of illegal interference in non-military affairs. He sent an open letter to the Shah on the same subject and filled his daily papers, Xalas, with similar attacks. This all-out campaign earned him libelous popular acclaim but eventually led, in December 1949, to his arrest. He was tried by a military court and sentenced to one year's imprisonment, on rather flimsy charges of intrigue against the Imperial Army. Popular resentment ran so high that he was tried again by a civil court and acquitted. Re-elected to the Majlis in February 1950, Dr. Baghai is currently one of its most vocal deputies.

He makes no secret of the fact that he is still out for the Shah's neck and accuses him of five specific offenses: (1) ignoring Constitutional law; (2) acting as accessory to the assassination of Mohammed Hassad, later editor of Harok-e-Moaven; (3) playing a role with any foreign power that supports his position, however interesting; (4) usurping the press and otherwise infringing upon civil liberties; (5) promoting a return to dictatorship. During the recent trial of Mahmoud Jafari, alleged assassin of Baghai, Dr. Baghai spoke in Jafari's defense, reportedly not because he believed in Jafari's innocence but because the trial offered a dramatic means of allying at Kamar's regime.

Toward the same end, his tactics in the current Majlis are consciously obstructionist and, his editorials in Xalas defy the government on any pretext. (Xalas, which once called the National Front leader, has recently suspended because of persistent attacks on the Court and the government, but promptly reappeared under the name of Bagh-e-Shah.)

There is no doubt that Dr. Baghai is intensely ambitious, and many American observers feel that he would grasp any opportunity to further his climb for a political career. Opportunism outweighs his sincerity, and he probably is using the National Front as a convenient vehicle to carry his to power, although he charged, during the Jafari trial, that communism was a "devilish doctrine, the teaching of which is the root of all evil." He has been accused of extreme leftist views — at any rate, he can be expected to change his tune, opportunist even carries over into personal affairs: he has stated publicly that he divorced his wife because politicians could operate better as bachelors.

Although there is little confidence in the stability of Dr. Baghai's thinking, he is generally considered intelligent, well-informed, the brains of the National Front movement. In popularity and influence, he ranks next to Dr. Conde in the National Front group.

A big stocky man, Dr. Baghai — pleasant and soft-spoken socially — is a fiery orator on the Majlis floor and becomes almost frenetic in disputes. There is little evidence to refute his reputation for integrity, but his sincerity is doubtful, with opportunism so obviously a determinate factor in all his actions.

The Iranian Workers' Party

Recently the Embassy's Labor Attaché, Mr. C. C. Finch, discussed the Iranian Workers' Party and problems related to it with Dr. Masdug, the founder of the Party. Mr. Finch had met with him twice in July in Abadan. The discussions at that time were particularly related to the oil crisis. The latest conversation, of its interest, is summarized in this dispatch. Dr. Issa Sepahbodi, a close colleague of Dr. Baghai in the work of the Iranian Workers' Party, participated in this meeting. He impressed Mr. Finch as being at least the equal of Dr. Baghai in his intimate knowledge of the past history, present operations, and anticipated future of the Party.

During the course of this interview, Dr. Baghai discussed with Mr. Finch his reasons for going to Abadan last summer, the political aims of his party, its membership and the methods by which it is financed. Dr. Baghai also described the source and numerical strength of his support and commented in detail on specific leaders of the non-communist Iranian trade unions.

Dr. Baghai stated that he has now established branches of his party in Ahwaz, Qas, Kera, Tehran, Soroush, and Samm. He proposes to establish branches at Isfahan, Zanjani, and Bavsh.

Dr. Baghai rather defensively introduced the subject of his reason for going to Abadan which he allegedly came in order to establish a branch of the Workers' Party in that city. As the Department knows, he failed in that effort and was in fact said to have had his car stoned in a visit he made to the Fields Area. He now states that his visit to Abadan was not to establish a branch of the Party, but was purely a private visit and that he went with no special encouragement or instructions from the Prime Minister, contrary to the rumors current at the time of his arrival in Abadan. He stated that he hoped to establish a branch of his party in Abadan in the future, but has no present plans concerning it.
Remarks:

Dr. Baghai's name first became prominent on the political horizon during the first term of the 19th Majlis. He gained widespread popularity at that time for his opposition to Golbahar's Supplementary Oil Agreement and his attacks on the Army for interference in general elections.

The latter grievance became almost obsessive, and in March 1949 he delivered a nine-day filibuster before the Majlis, accusing Ali Reza, then Chief of Staff, of illegal interference in non-military affairs. He sent an open letter to the Shah on the same subject and filled his daily paper, styled, with similar attacks. This all-out campaign earned him a large popular following but eventually led, in December 1949, to his arrest. He was tried by a military court and sentenced to one year's imprisonment on rather flimsy charges of intriguing against the Imperial Army. Popular resentment ran so high that he was tried again by a civil court and acquitted. Re-elected to the Majlis in February 1950, Dr. Baghai is currently one of its most vocal deputies.

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Toward the same ends, his tactics in the Majlis are consistently obstructionist, and his editorials in Almeida defy the government on any pretext. (Almeida, which was once a right National Front line, was recently suspended because of persistent attacks on the government, but promptly reappeared under the name of Ahang-e-jerdi.)

There is no doubt that Dr. Baghai is intensely ambitious, and many American observers feel that he would grasp any opportunity to further his line for a political career. Opportunism outweighs his sincerity, and he probably is using the National Front as a convenient vehicle to further his power, although he has been charged, during the Jafari trial, that Damascus was a "devilish doctrine, the teaching of which is the root of all evil," he has been accused of extreme leftist views — at any rate, he can be expected to change his tune at any time. Opportunism even carries over into personal affairs; he has stated publicly that he divorced his wife because politicians could operate better as bachelors.

Although there is little confidence in the stability of Dr. Baghai's thinking, he is generally considered intelligent, well-informed, the brains of the National Front movement. In popularity and influence, he ranks next to Dr. Mosafar in the National Front group.

A big, stumpy man, Dr. Baghai — pleasant and soft-spoken socially — is a fiery orator on the Majlis floor and becomes almost frenzied in disagreements. There is little evidence to refute his reputation for integrity, but his sincerity is doubtful, with opportunism so obviously a dominating factor in all his actions.

The Iranian Workers' Party

Recently the Embassy's Labor Attache, Mr. C. C. Finch, discussed the Iranian Workers' Party and problems related to it with Mr. Mosafar Baghai, the founder of the Party. Mr. Finch had met with him twice in July in Abadan. The discussions at that time were particularly related to the oil crisis. The latest conversation, based on its interest, is summarized in this dispatch. Dr. Isa Sepahbodi, a close colleague of Dr. Baghai in the work of the Iranian Workers' Party, participated in this meeting. He impressed Mr. Finch as being at least the equal of Dr. Baghai in his intimate knowledge of the past history, present operations, and anticipated future of the Party.

During the course of this interview, Dr. Baghai discussed with Mr. Finch his reasons for going to Abadan last summer, the political aims of his party, its membership, and the methods by which it is financed. Dr. Baghai also described the source and numerical strength of his support and commented in detail on specific leaders of the non-communist Iranian trade unions.

Dr. Baghai stated that he has now established branches of his party in Ahwaz, Qasr, Karaj, Tehran, Shush, Diszaf, and Ras Hormoz. He proposes to establish branches at Isfahan, Zanjan, and Bahav.

Dr. Baghai rather defensively introduced the subject of his visit to Abadan which he alleged made in order to establish a branch of the Workers' Party in that city. As the Department knows, he failed in that effort and was in fact said to have had his car stolen in a visit he made to the Poldasheh area. He now states that his visit to Abadan was not to establish a branch of the Party, but was purely a private visit and that he went with no special encouragement or instructions from the Prime Minister, contrary to the rumors current at the time of his arrival in Abadan. He stated that he hoped to establish a branch of his party in Abadan in the future, but has no present plans concerning it.
Dr. Baghai described his party as "socialist in attitude in so far as socialist policy is consistent with the policies of the Iranian Government." He especially noted that the policies of his party are linked to those of the National Front and that the party opposes the aims and the policies of the Tudeh. He claimed a membership of about 10,000 for the Workers' Party in Tehran and defined membership in terms of those supporters who are registered as party members and including only those who pay a monthly subscription of five rials or more. He also claimed that there were about a million supporters of his party in Iran, but he was unwilling to comment on how a proportion of these could be described as supporters if one used the Tehran definition. He did estimate that his hard core of enthusiastic supporters numbered about 300. Dr. Baghai estimated that about 1,000 of the 10,000 members claimed for Tehran were workers who belonged to trade unions. He stated that he had no idea how many trade union members throughout the country supported his party, although he did admit that the interest and participation of trade union members was most limited. He believes that the limited participation is actually not a result of the weak and uncertain leadership of the trade unions.

His comments on specific leaders were as follows:

Mousavi, Khomeini Hedayat, the Federation of Trade Unions of Workers of Iran (FTUWI), Aliy Ghavamshah, the Iranian Trade Union Congress (ITUC) and Mohammad Reza Shahbaf (ITUC) were all characterized as "insecure leaders." He believes that Mr. Cyrus Majd (now fighting with his own version of a trade union supporting National Front policies) has a more impressive personality but Mr. Majd was described as "being worthy of no credit in trade union activities." Mr. Amir Gavan (originally the Central Federation of Trade Unions of Workers and Peasants of Iran (CFTP)) now an officer in the ITUC, is thought by Dr. Baghai to be a Tudeh leader, in spite of his protestations to the contrary. Dr. Basta thought it unlikely that Mr. Gavan would be able to win any real workers' cooperation since, according to information received by the Iranian Workers' Party, Mr. Gavan has been repudiated by the workers.

The other outstanding trade union leader in Isfahan, Mr. Shams-e-Sadri, is also thought by Dr. Baghai to lack the confidence of the workers.

Dr. Baghai stated that there were only four Iranian trade union leaders who had even limited confidence of the workers. They were Mr. Ghavamshah, who, despite personal shortcomings,
Dr. Baghai described his party as "socialist in attitude in so far as socialist policy is consistent with the policies of the Iranian Government." He especially noted that the policies of his party are linked to those of the National Front and that the party opposes the aims of the policies of the Tudeh. He claimed a membership of about 10,000 for the Workers' Party in Tehran and defined membership in terms of those supporters who are registered as party members and including only those who pay a monthly subscription of five rials or more. He also claimed that there were about a million supporters of his party in Iran, but he was unwilling to comment on how a proportion of those could be described as supporters if one used this Tehran definition. He did estimate that his hard core of enthusiastic supporters numbered about 300. Dr. Baghai estimated that about 1,000 of the 10,000 members claimed for Tehran were workers who belonged to trade unions. He stated that he had no idea how many trade union members throughout the country supported his party, although he did admit that the interest and participation of trade union members was most limited. He believes that the limited participation is actually not a result of the weak and uncertain leadership of the trade unions.

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Hossein, Kazemzadeh, the Federation of Trade Unions of Workers of Iran (KEM), Amin Ghoselbash, the Iranian Trade Union Congress (ITUC) and Mohammad Nezhavkar (ITUC) were all characterized as "insecure leaders." He believes that Mr. Cyrus Najaf (now probably with his own version of a trade union supporting National Front policies) has a more impressive personality but Mr. Najaf was described as "being worthy of no credit in trade union activities." Mr. Amir Ghan (originally the Central Federation of Trade Unions of Workers and Peasants of Iran) (KEM), now an officer in the ITUC, is thought by Dr. Baghai to be a Tudeh leader, in spite of his protestations to the contrary. Dr. Baghai thought it unlikely that Mr. Ghan would be able to win any real workers' cooperation since, according to information received by the Iranian Workers' Party, Mr. Ghan has been repudiated by the workers.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MEMORANDUM Dec 10

TO: Mr. Ray M. Melbourne
Mr. John H. Stutebaker

FROM: C. C. Finch

SUBJECT: C. C. Finch conversation with Dr. Sepahbodi

Monday, December 10, I had a conversation with Dr. Sepahbodi. He is an officer of the Iranian Workers Party and is a close friend of Dr. Bagai. Both Sepahbodi and Bagai have been members of the faculty of the University of Tehran for some years. They have a close personal relationship. I believe that it can be a safe assumption, therefore, that Sepahbodi speaks with some authority about the Iranian Workers Party.

Dr. Sepahbodi opened our conversation by stating that the Iranian Workers Party is supporting four candidates, under its own banner. They are Mr. Yasserri (Alavat constituency), Dr. Goushegour (Listof), Mr. Beig (Tehran), and Dr. Sepahbodi (Tehran).

Dr. Sepahbodi emphasized repeatedly the fact that the National Front was not itself a political party but, rather, represented the "broad interests of all classes of people," in an apparent effort to give the National Front certain practical political support. Sepahbodi and Bagai have been instrumental in calling together a special committee, with between 10 and 12 members to "advise" Dr. Mosadeq and to give him support. The four principal groups represented on the committee are, according to Sepahbodi, (1) the followers of Kashani, (2) the Iranian Workers Party, (3) the Iran Party, and (4) the corporations of the bazaar.

Among those attending the meetings are Khosrow, Kashti, Aleyar Saleh, Marzian, Mosher, Yacki, and Kashani. The group has no regular officers, no parliamentary procedure and no fixed time or place to meet. Dr. Mosadeq does not attend meetings of the group because, according to Sepahbodi, he is the head of government and cannot become involved in politics. Then Allah Kashani attends meetings he is always, by acclamation, made chairman of that particular session because of his great knowledge in the affairs of Iran.

Later in the conversation, Sepahbodi obliquely again referred to the committee indicating the further aim of the committee was to establish a "local group of intellectuals interested in social and administrative reform."

I also discussed with Sepahbodi the part played by the Iranian Workers Party in the demonstration and riot of December 6. He stated
that it was imperative for me to realize that the struggle between the Iranian Workers Party and Tudeh is ideological and cannot be resolved by physical force. Dr. Sepahbodi based on that of scientific socialism but he also emphasized that action is necessary for Iran than for Britain. In fact, although he socialist philosophy of the Iranian Workers Party was substantially the left of Fabians and more similar to that of the French and German syndicalist of the last half of the 19th century.

After a lengthy dispute on the difficulties of intellectuals in Iran today, Dr. Sepahbodi suddenly stated, in connection with the December 6 riot and demonstration, that the Iranian Workers Party could not, of course, be held accountable as a party, for the violence during the demonstration it was regrettable and those of the Iranian Workers Party and the communists were ideological and drastic forces in Iran to punish the communists physically in order to keep their popular appeal, as necessary for all the democrats then realize ideological validity, importance, and power of their opposition.

Dr. Sepahbodi was completely at ease, self-assured and glib during the entire interview. He suggested by his ready answers his anticipation of the line of the questions. He has asked for a further Workers' Party. I have tentatively arranged to visit him at his home on the afternoon of December 11, knowing any objection of the Ministry.

PS. File

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MEMORANDUM

Dec 10

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Mr. John H. Stebbins

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Dr. Sepahbodi opened our conversation by stating that the Iranian Workers Party is supporting four candidates, under its own banner. They are Mr. Vasseri (Ahwaz constituency); Mr. Gohar-Dari (Qeshm); Mr. Reza (Tehran); and Mr. Sepahbodi (Tehran).

Dr. Sepahbodi emphasized repeatedly the fact that the National Front was not itself a political party but, rather, represented the "broad interests of all classes of people." In an apparent effort to give the National Front certain practical political support, Sepahbodi and Bagai have been instrumental in calling together a special committee, with between 10 and 12 members to "advise" Dr. Mosadeq and to give him support. The four principal groups represented on the committee are, in the order given by Sepahbodi, (1) the followers of Keshani, (2) the Iranian Workers Party, (3) the Iran Party, and (4) the corporations of the bazaar.

Among those attending the meetings are Messrs. Hashtiti, Alayy Saleh, Marwandi, Movahed, and Keshani. The group has no regular officers, no parliamentary procedure and no fixed time or place to meet. Dr. Mosadeq does not attend meetings of the group, because, according to Sepahbodi, he is the head of government and cannot become involved in politics. Then Allah Keshani attends meetings he is always, by acclamation, made chairman of that particular session because of his great eminence in the affairs of Iran.

Later in the conversation Sepahbodi obliquely again referred to the committee indicating the further aim of the committee was to establish a "broad group of intellectuals interested in social and administrative reform."

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TO: Mr. R. M. Melbourne
FROM: Mr. C. C. Finch
SUBJECT: Summary of Conversation between Mr. Sepahbodi and Labor Attache C. C. Finch (5 Sept. 46, 11:00)

Mr. Sepahbodi called at his own request on the Labor Attache to discuss further details of the Iranian Workers Party. In response to a question by the Labor Attache, Mr. Sepahbodi alleged that the Workers Party was absolutely without any responsibility for the demonstrations and resulting riot of 6 December. He stated that the responsible rioters must have been those outside the Workers Party who claimed party membership in an effort to confuse the public and to discredit the party. Sepahbodi stated unequivocally that the agitators claiming party affiliation did so without authority and with no encouragement.

Mr. Sepahbodi stated that the Party, which he had earlier described as socialist in concept, intended itself as a third force between the policies of the Soviet Union and those of the United States, with the Worker Party embodying neither set of concepts. He explained the former the Party had no political relations with America forced to conclude any possibility that Iranians would believe that the United States was a supporter of the Party. Mr. Sepahbodi was most uneasy at efforts of the Labor Attache to establish just what the Party believed constitutes a socialist philosophy. He revealed his lack of more than an elementary knowledge of socialistic history and his almost total unfamiliarity with the development of international socialism. Mr. Sepahbodi claimed that the leaders of the Workers Party did not find that its devotion to socialist ideas was incompatible with the aims of the Mossadegh Government.

Mr. Sepahbodi denied that Mullah Kazemi was providing funds for the Workers Party out of Metal funds, alleging that the largest at the disposal of Mullah Kazemi was much exaggerated. He insisted that the total income of the Workers Party from individual donations from its members and supporters, these sums varied from 5 rials per man per month to hundreds (Mr. Sepahbodi stated that "some" pay thousands) each month. According to Mr. Sepahbodi the Workers Party is in debt but he stated that was the usual status of Iranian political parties and that political parties were not organized in Iran or elsewhere to show a profit. He admitted that the Workers Party had not received, is not receiving, nor does it expect to receive any sums from the United States Government officially or unofficially. He alleged that the communists were responsible for the "propaganda stories." He stated that no workers were paid to participate in the various demonstrations to which the Workers Party had lent support.

Mr. Sepahbodi claimed that there are now four active Party branches: 1) Tehran, with a total party membership of about four thousand of whom one thousand are enthusiasts (mostly students), 2) Almas, with a total membership of about one thousand of whom 200 are enthusiastic supporters, 3) Mashad, with a total membership of about one thousand of whom 100 are ardent supporters, 4) Isfahan, whose total membership was uncertain since the Party branch was new but Mr. Sepahbodi thought it to be at least 500, about half of whom were enthusiasts.

Mr. Sepahbodi again admitted that there are no workers in the inner core of the Party. He is interested in workers only as giving numerical support (and consequent pressure). The Party policy is to encourage the support of workers and Mr. Sepahbodi believes that the workers should be most anxious to understand the intention of the Party is to protect them and that that protection is most possible by leading them. Mr. Sepahbodi was doubtful regarding the possible useful leadership which could be provided by other than university men.

Mr. Sepahbodi ended this phase of the conversation by expressing regret over the damage done to newspaper offices and printing establishments on December 6. He believes that editors of "some" newspapers were guilty of mischiefous anti-nationalism in their support of the communists and that other editors were equally guilty in their opposition to the Mossadegh Government.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TO: Mr. R. M. Melbourne
FROM: Mr. C. C. Finch
SUBJECT: Summary of Conversation between Mr. Sepahbodi and Labor Attaché C. C. Finch/LC/Cle/14, (13)

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Mr. Sepahbodi stated that the Party, which he had earlier described as socialist in concept, intended itself as a third force between the policies of the Soviet Union and those of the United States, with the Workers Party embracing neither set of concepts. It is a consequence of the foregoing, Mr. Sepahbodi alleged that Dr. Baghali, the leader of the Workers Party, thought it necessary to speak out publicly against the United States. Mr. Sepahbodi believes that Dr. Baghali does otherwise the mass of the people would have believed the stories in the newspapers, which are said to be Communist-inspired, that the United States Embassy in Tehran is giving financial aid and moral encouragement to the Party. Mr. Sepahbodi thinks it was in the interests of good Iran-American relations that America be castigated in order to preclude any possibility that Iranians would believe that the United States was a supporter of the Party. Mr. Sepahbodi was most uneasy at efforts of the Labor Attaché to establish just what the Party believes constitutes a socialist philosophy. He revealed his lack of more than an elementary knowledge of socialism's history and his almost total unfamiliarity with the development of international socialism. Mr. Sepahbodi claimed that the leaders of the Workers Party did not find that its devotion to socialist ideals was incompatible with the aims of the Mossadegh Government.

Mr. Sepahbodi denied that Nallah Kashani was providing funds for the Workers Party out of Shrine funds, alleging that the larges at the disposal of Nallah Kashani was much exaggerated. He insisted that the total income of the Workers Party came from individual donations from its members and supporters; these sums varied from 5 rials per man per month to hundreds (Mr. Sepahbodi stated that "some" pay thousands) each month. According to Mr. Sepahbodi the Workers Party is in debt but he stated that was the usual status of Iranian political parties and that political parties were not organised in Iran or elsewhere to show a profit. He admitted that

the Workers Party had not received, is not receiving, nor does it expect to receive any sum from the United States Government officially or unofficially. He alleged that the communists were responsible for these "propaganda stories". He stated that no workers were paid to participate in the various demonstrations to which the Workers Party had lent support.

Mr. Sepahbodi claimed that there are now four active Party branches: 1) Tehran, with a total party membership of about four thousand of whom one thousand are enthusiasts (mostly students). 2) Ahwaz, with a total membership of about one thousand of whom 200 are enthusiastic supporters. 3) Tabriz, with a total membership of about one thousand of whom 100 are ardent supporters. 4) Isfahan, whose total membership was uncertain since the Party branch was new but Mr. Sepahbodi thought it to be at least 500, about half of whom were enthusiasts.

Mr. Sepahbodi again admitted that there are no workers in the inner core of the Party. He is interested in workers only as giving numerical support (and consequent pressure). The Party policy is to encourage the support of workers and Mr. Sepahbodi believes that the workers should be most anxious to understand the intention of the Party is to protect them and that that protection is most possible by leading them. Mr. Sepahbodi was doubtful regarding the possible useful leadership which could be provided by other than university men.

Mr. Sepahbodi ended this phase of the conversation by expressing regret over the damage done to newspaper offices and printing establishments on December 6. He believes that editors of "some" newspapers were guilty of misconceived anti-nationalism in their support of the communists, and that other editors were equally guilty in their opposition to the Mossadegh Government.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TO: Mr. R. M. Kelbourne
FROM: Mr. C. C. Finch
SUBJECT: Elections

December 19, 1951.

Mr. Sepahbodi discussed the Iran Workers Party with the Labor Attaché who later was joined by Mr. Kelbourne; the following is a summary of the second part of the conversation:

Mr. Sepahbodi believes that the elections will begin soon and that a "reelection" election could be completed in three or four months. He stated that he thought the voting for the elections to the Majlis would begin in the Northeast followed by the Northwest, North central area, central Iran and so on to the South, in the order listed. If it were necessary for political reasons, the timing of the elections in any one area could be abruptly changed and the elections could be held in the South regardless of the prior tentative schedule. Mr. Sepahbodi implied that elections in the North of Iran were likely to be held quickly if the Government were unable to pay the workers in the refinery and oil production areas. In that case the elections would be held before it becomes known that the Government is delaying wage payments and/or deferring on contracted debts.

Mr. Sepahbodi believes that the new Majlis will assemble before the elections are completed. He stated that the return of at least 95 deputies was necessary for the first step toward the convening of the Majlis. Mr. Sepahbodi stated that he thought no communist would be returned and that none would dare to stand in the face of the opposition of the Shah, Khomeini, police and other "reins of forces". He also stated that the Khomeini call for a Majlis would be composed of 200 members was a long term plan and was not to be anticipated as a government act at this time.

SUPPLEMENTARY BIOGRAPHIC DATA

September 15, 1952

Baghal, Dr. Mosaffar
Supplementing Embassy's CBO of November 20, 1950.

Career:
Feb 1950 - Feb 1952: Deputy to 16th Majlis from Tehran.
Oct 1951: Member of Iranian Mission to Security Council.
Apr 27, 1952: Deputy to 17th Majlis from Tehran.

Remarks:
Baghal was elected to the Majlis from both Tehran and Karun, with a high number of votes. He virtually held a double seat in the Majlis until the deputies voted that he must accept only the Tehran election. He was among the National Front deputies whose credentials were rejected by Jamsh Ameri and Mir Sayyid Abbas Mahdi Mirmahalleh, but after extensive debate he was accepted by the Majlis.

Still an active member of the National Front, Baghal has however concentrated most of his efforts since April 1951 on his own personal party, the Workers Party, a minor group of the Front. Organized by Baghal, this ephemeral group is purely political in its aspirations with, inconclusively, no following among the actual workers or trade organizations of Iran. Its main purpose seems to be furthering the political ambitions of Baghal himself, who recently reorganized it in order to eliminate elements which sought to seize its leadership. His efforts to establish the party in Kurdistan led to a serious clash with Khomeini Askari, who rejected Baghal's attempt to infringe on his own territory. Khomeini requested Mr. Baghal to remove Baghal from the oil field area. Throughout the elections, the workers party clashed with Khomeini's personal following in various areas, and this internal friction within the National Front threatened to seriously weaken its entire structure.

Baghal is currently in a serious condition in the hospital. By his own report, he is suffering from paralysis and diabetes. Some say that he had a heart attack on April 1, 1952. An unconfirmed, but credible, story is that he was badly weakened by excessive indulgence in the drug cocaine, an addiction which he adopted after 18 months of opium seeking and which has not only made him seriously ill but has crippled his personal finances.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TO: Mr. R. M. Kelbourne

FROM: Mr. C. C. Finch

SUBJECT: Elections

December 19, 1951.

Mr. Sepahbodi discussed the Iran Workers Party with the Labor Attaché who later was joined by Mr. Kelbourne; the following is a summary of the second part of the conversation:

Mr. Sepahbodi believes that the elections will begin soon and that a "test" election could be completed in three or four months. He stated he thought the ballot for elections to the Majlis would begin in the Northeast followed by the Northwest, North central area, central Iran and so on to the South, in the order listed. If it were necessary for political reasons, the timing of the elections in any one area could be abruptly changed and the elections could be held in the South regardless of the foregoing tentative schedule. Mr. Sepahbodi implied that elections in the North of Iran were likely to be held quickly if the Government were unable to pay the workers in the refinery and oil production areas. In that case the elections would be held before it became known that the Government was delaying wage payments and/or defrauding creditors.

Mr. Sepahbodi believes that the new Majlis will assemble before the elections are completed. He stated that the return of at least 95 deputies was necessarily the first step toward the convening of the Majlis. Mr. Sepahbodi stated that he thought no communist would be returned and that none would dare to stand in the face of the opposition of the Shah, Mosadeg, police and other "destabilizing forces". He also stated that the Mosadeg Hall for a Majlis would be composed of 200 members was a long term plan and was not to be anticipated as a Government aim at this time.

CC Finch

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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION DATA

September 15, 1952

BAGHAI, Dr. Mohsan

Supplementing Embassy's BID of November 20, 1950.

Career:

Feb 1950 - Feb 1952: Deputy to 16th Majlis from Tehran.
Oct 1951: Member of Iranian delegation to Security Council.
April 27, 1952: Deputy to 17th Majlis from Tehran.

Remarks:

Baghaili was elected to the Majlis from both Tehran and Orumiyeh, with a high number of votes. He virtually held a double seat in the Majlis until the deputies in the North of Iran were elected. He was among the National Front deputies whose credentials were rejected by Javad Amedi and Mr. Sayyid Nabi Mir-Ashraf, but after extensive debate he was accepted by the Majlis.

Still an active member of the National Front, Baghaili has however concentrated most of his efforts since April 1952 on his own personal party, the Workers Party, a leftist group of the Front. Organised by Baghaili, this ephemeral group is purely political in its aspirations with, incongruously, no following among the actual workers or trade organizations of Iran. Its main purpose seems to be furthering the political ambitions of Baghaili himself, who recently reorganised it in order to eliminate elements which sought to seize its leadership. His efforts to establish his party in Christian led to a serious clash with Lowieh Hakl, who resented Baghaili's attempted infringement on his own territory. Hakl requested Dr. J explaining to restore Baghaili from the oil field area. Throughout the elections, the workers' party clashed with Hakl's personal following in various areas, and this internal friction within the National Front threatened to seriously weaken its entire structure.

Baghaili is currently in a serious condition in the hospital. By his own report, he is suffering from paralysis and diabetes. Some say that he had a bad heart attack. An unconfirmed, but credible, story is that he was badly weakened by excessive indulgence in the drug cocaine, an addiction which he adopted after long-time opium smoking and which has not only made him seriously ill but has crippled his personal finances.
Conversation with a Prominent Leader of the National Front

The Leader of the National Front, Prof. Mousavi-Bagai, recently met with the reporting officer for an interview at his home. Mousavi-Bagai, one of the most prominent figures in the National Front, discussed various issues during the interview.

1. The National Front is the largest political party in Iran. The party has been led by Dr. Mousavi-Bagai since its founding.

2. The government believes that the National Front is a serious political threat. They believe that the party is working with foreign powers to undermine the stability of the regime.

3. The party has been accused of having ties with foreign intelligence agencies. These allegations have been denied by the National Front.

4. The government has arrested several members of the National Front in recent months. The party claims that these arrests are politically motivated.

5. The National Front has been a vocal critic of the government's policies. They have called for democratic reforms and an end to corruption.

6. The party has been banned from participating in elections by the government. The National Front has vowed to continue fighting for their cause despite the ban.

7. The government has placed restrictions on the media and internet to prevent the spread of information critical of the government. The National Front has been targeted by these measures.

8. The party has called for international support in their struggle. They have sought to form alliances with other opposition groups in the region.

9. The government has increased security measures in response to the threat posed by the National Front. They have also stepped up their efforts to infiltrate and disrupt the party's activities.

10. The National Front has vowed to continue its fight for democracy and human rights. They remain committed to their cause despite the challenges they face.
October 27, 1952

Conversational with a Prominent Leader of the National Front

The Labor Attaché recently met with Mr. Hoseineh, Bagai, leader of the Iranian Workers' Party and president of the National Front. Bagai was interviewed at his home in a district of unlighted back streets, in an atmosphere of considerable secrecy. This was the fifth conversation of the Labor Attaché with Mr. Bagai. He looked tired and his pallor properly reflected his recent, and serious, illness.

The common denominator of the conversations, so far as the reporting officer was concerned, was the complete absence, at this date in the deteriorating Iranian economy, of a plan. The conversations followed these lines:

1. The breakup of the Iranian Workers' Party is based on issues long-buried, but early recognized by Bagai. The beginning was in 1948 when Bagai believed that he could make a strong labor party, based on socialist convictions, if he could unite his in a middle-of-the-road policy the anti-communist socialists led by Maleki and the largely leaderless religious elements. He found the Malekists to be hard and efficient workers but not good socialists and too ambitious to attempt to dominate the party through their own faction. Dr. Bagai alleged that Mr. Maleki supported a change of government from a monarchy to a republic. When Mr. Bagai left on his trip to Europe and to the United States and met Maleki later when he was ill, he left the power of the party in their hands. On his return to active participation in party affairs he found that although they paid lip service to socialist principles, they were in fact communist editors, and not loyal to Mr. Maleki.

Bagai therefore forced the issue and said that unless the party was purged of these elements, he would resign. Asked if he would resign if the Maleki faction were forced out he agreed, and having witnessed the discrediting of Maleki he had no alternative but to keep his word and resume active participation, as leader, of the party. During this part of the conversation Mr. Bagai seemed objective and answered questions that were pertinent to the main issues discussed.

2. The government believes that once the British have gone that the pressure and actions by the British Government to control Iran will be reduced, but hardly eliminated. Bagai ascribed, as pro-British officers of the Iranian Government, the failure of the Government to collect income or duty taxes. He coupled a combination of those men and the price of oil as the basis for the refusal of the large landowners to pay the taxes levied on them.

3. He professes to believe quite sincerely that the American Government has been the tool of the British in Iran (and the whole of the Middle East). He sees as the only means to Iranian nationalism sent from the United States (despite any legal actions which the British might take) or cash help. He at once discounted my estimate of the unemployment in Tehran at 50,000-55,000 (building it) and yet said that the nadir was growing daily, especially among the "great numbers" of unemployed.

4. He said that although it was true that his party was founded on the concept of raising the standard of living for the poor, that the development of such a program would not be possible without the preliminary step of ridding the country of the British. He claimed to agree with the Government that it must prepare an oilless economy, but stated that the Government (and he) had no plans for the gradual movement away from the concentration of unemployed workers in Muskeet. He said that earlier he had proposed to the Government that it use the unskilled labor to build irrigation canals in the south and roads in the north but the Government did not favor it.

5. He believes that his split with Maleki will go on indefinitely, with Maleki gradually losing the intellectual's support he now has; that no worker does, or will, support Maleki. He pictures a withering away of Maleki as a Titoist communist element and symbol.

6. He contends that with the departure of the British that America will have an opportunity to have a new, independent and enlightened oil policy for Iran. He spells that out in terms of distribution and marketing facilities, failing that he believes that America will be under undeserved attack, not only by the leftist people and papers, but also by Iranian patriots who will realize that the Tehran Declaration was without meaning.

7. He apparently hinges a part of his hope on the coming American election, believing that a Republican President would not act independently of (if not in open opposition to) the British. On this score he linked the American Democratic and British Conservative Parties in their international relations. He thought that Point IV was doing some good work, but that Iran not only did not need the military Missions, but that they were dangerous to Iranian neutrality. He suggested in an involved way that Iran could hardly count on military defense from the United States, a country which would stand by Athens, paralyzing the continuance of the British blockade, while Iranian nationalists were starving.

8. His only comment on the reported infiltration of Tudeh elements in the Party and Government was that the greater danger of the moment was the retention of British elements in positions of power.

9. When questioned concerning the need to alleviate the desperate conditions of the workers, Mr. Bagai stated that the present labor law does not have adequate provisions for enforcement. He ascribed this to the machinations of the AICG influence with the government just after the Second World War (when the Labor Law was passed). He stated that all his allegations were in the documents captured by the Workers' Party from the AICG information office. Mr. Bagai stated that it should be a primary responsibility of the deputies of the Parliament to
pass a new, and enforceable, labor law. He personally believes that the only hope for effective enforcement lies in the control by the government not only of labor wages but also of factory production and distribution.

In short, Baghi has an exaggerated idea of the strength of his own Party, of the readiness of Malekii’s branches to fade quietly away. He is unwilling to recognize that the Tudeh Party has become a more important political agency than his Party. He has no plan for financing the Government deficit, no plan to reduce the concentration of dependent National Iranian Oil Company workers, nor for feeding or housing the unemployed, no plans to meet the economic crisis with winter is certain to bring.

He is waiting for the American election in the hope that the Republicans will be elected, that their election will mean the solution either of the oil question, or that it will generate an American urge to underwrite whatever budget deficits might exist.

For the Ambassadors:

Roy M. Maboureaux
First Secretary of Embassy

CONFIDENTIAL

SUPPLEMENTAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA

Tehran
February 3, 1953

BAGHI, Dr. Nonafr
Supplementing Embassy’s CDA of November 20, 1950, and Embassy’s supplement of September 15, 1952.
CAREERS
Oct 4, 1952: Released from hospital

REMARKS
Known to have been a near-alcoholic and widely rumored to have taken dope; Baghi’s condition apparently was improved when released from the hospital.

Long-standing differences over domestic policy and party organization between two factions within the Tudeh (Workers) Party came to light when Deputy Baghi announced his resignation from the party on October 12. Opposition to Baghi led by former Tudeh leader, Khalil MALEKI. According to sources favoring to Maleki, the open break came as a result of Baghi’s intention to participate in the “Zabed conspiracy” to overthrow Mossadeq, with the view of enhancing his own political position. Baghi was said to be looking toward the Prime Ministry at some point in the future, and to have felt that a new structure to accomplish these ends. Maleki, supporter of Maleki, had been attempted to subvert party for the purpose of instilling social change by revolutionary methods, while Baghi was represented as desiring legal means for more moderate changes. The upshot was that the Baghi faction, retaining control of party newspaper, SHAHR, formally expelled Maleki and his group and recalled Baghi to leadership on October 15. Baghi was seriously hurt by Maleki’s defection from an organizational standpoint, but nevertheless retains strong support among working-class people as a political figure with considerable stature in the Majlis.

In an editorial in SHAHR, Baghi supported break with the UK, but insisted that Britain’s “activities” be purged from government organizations. At the same time he warned that government’s liberal attitude toward Tudeh Party must cease. Although he collaborated in action leading to dissolution of the Senate, Baghi has become increasingly prominent as a leading opponent of major government measures. Baghi has been accused by his opponents of filth with Khashan for his own political ends. He has, most recently, the Public Security Law, the Press Law, the Electoral Law, and most recently, the extension of Mossadeq’s plenary powers, going so far as to threaten resignation from the National Front on January 19. It is instructive to note that to date Baghi has stoutly affirmed his allegiance to the Nationalist Movement, while appearing in opposition to the government in the role of champion of the Majlis and defender of democratic processes.
pass a new, and enforceable, labor law. He personally believes that the only hope for effective enforcement is in the control by the government not only of labor wages but also of factory production and distribution.

In short, Negai has an exaggerated idea of the strength of his own Party, of the readiness of Nahak's bench to fade quietly away. He is unwilling to recognize that the Tudeh Party has become a more important political agency than his own Party. He has no plan for financing the Government deficit, no plan to reduce the concentration of dependent National Iranian Oil Company workers, nor any plan for feeding the unemployed, no plans to meet the economic crisis next winter is certain to bring.

He is waiting for the American election in the hope that the Republicans will be elected, that their election will mean the solution either of the oil question, or that it will generate an American urge to underwrite whatever budget deficits might exist.

For the Ambassador:

Roy M. Melbourne
First Secretary of Embassy
increase in Iranian population, pointing out that 300,000 people in Caspianistan
now had a single deputy, and by saying that the lower house of Parliament in
neighboring countries was larger than that in Iran. He was already working on
plans for a new Majlis with a larger chamber that would accommodate 200 De-
puties and provide improved arrangements for the press and the diplomatic corps
both in the chamber itself and in the remainder of the building.

(b) He agreed that the term for the Deputy should be four years rather
than two, but he did not think that the terms of the present Deputies should be
extended. In this he ran counter to that of most of the Deputies.

(c) He agreed with proposals for reducing the present quorum require-
ments. He thought that one-third of the Deputies present in Tehran rather than
two-thirds would be sufficient to hold a debate and that the presence of a bare
majority of those present in Tehran rather than of three-fourths of their mem-
ber should suffice for voting.

(d) He was opposed to any royal veto power, and the suspensive veto
on financial bills now requested by the Shah, namely one under which the Shah
could require another reading for which a two-thirds majority would be neces-
sary for approval. Helmat thought that the Shah's power to dissolve the Majlis
under Article 13 gave the Shah whatever authority he needed, but he expected
that His Majesty would insist on getting the suspensive veto.

(e) He was opposed to giving power to the Senate in the matter of
money bills or changing the national accounts. When some Senators had come
to talk over this matter with him, he had pointed out to them that many Deputies
were away over the way the Senate is behaving, that fourteen or so Majlis
had gotten along without a Senate, and that if the Deputies voted as a bloc
in Congress, Senators might find that their institution had been abolished
entirely. That pleased the Senators down. (The President of the Majlis was
obviously pleased with this line of argument, and his listeners joined him in
a good laugh at the expense of the discomfited Senators.)

As to certain concrete proposals for revising the Constitution, Helmat
explained that his position was as follows:

(a) The number of Deputies should be increased from the 196 to the
200 already allowed by the Constitution. Helmat justified this by saying that
already the original proportion of citizens to Deputies had been upset by the
increase in Iranian population, pointing out that 300,000 people in Caspianistan
now had a single deputy, and by saying that the lower house of Parliament in
neighboring countries was larger than that in Iran. He was already working on
plans for a new Majlis with a larger chamber that would accommodate 200 De-
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explained that his position was as follows:

(a) The number of Deputies should be increased from the 196 to the
200 already allowed by the Constitution. Helmat justified this by saying that
already the original proportion of citizens to Deputies had been upset by the

increase in Iranian population, pointing out that 300,000 people in Balochistan now had a single deputy, and by saying that the lower house of Parliament in neighboring countries was larger than that in Iran. He was already working on plans for a new Majlis with a larger chamber that would accommodate 200 Deputies and provide improved arrangements for the press and the diplomatic corps both in the chamber itself and in the remainder of the building.

(b) He agreed that the term for the Deputy should be four years rather than two, but he did not think that the terms of the present Deputies should be extended. In this he ran counter to that of most Deputies.

(c) He agreed with proposals for reducing the present quorum requirements. He thought that one-third of the Deputies present in Tehran rather than two-thirds would be sufficient to hold a debate and that the presence of a bare majority of those present in Tehran rather than of three-fourths of their number should suffice for voting.

(d) He was opposed to any royal veto power, even the suspensive veto on financial bills now requested by the Shah, namely one under which the Shah could require another reading for which a two-thirds majority would be necessary for approval. He felt that the Shah’s power to dissolve the Majlis under Article 13 gave the Shah whatever authority he needed, but he expected that His Majesty would insist on getting the suspensive veto.

(e) He was opposed to giving power to the Senate in the matter of money bills or surveying the national accounts. When some Senators had come to talk over this matter with him, he had pointed out to them that many Deputies were away over the way the Senate was behaving, that fourteen or so Majlis members had walked out without a Senate and that if the Deputies voted as a bloc in the Congress, Senators might find that their institution had been abolished entirely. That pleased the Senators immensely. (The President of the Majlis was naturally pleased with this line of argument, and his listeners joined in a good laugh at the expense of the disaffected Senators.)

Introduction in the Majlis

He explained that His Majesty’s desire for a calm Majlis during his absence would be met. He added that after the return of the Shah the opposition might do something “right or bad things.” When I asked him in French how large this opposition was, he replied that it included some 12 to 15 Deputies. A few moments later however he added that he was not sure whether the estimates of 13 to 15 opposition Deputies was not correct, and that the President of the Majlis approved of this estimate.

Opposition in the Majlis

I asked Hezmat what the result would be if the opposition were elected to the Majlis, whether he could really create trouble. He replied by saying that it would not be a bad thing
to have him in the Majlis since his talents all lay in the direction of negating action and causing trouble. As Hakmat's son translated the phrase into French, he was the kind of fellow who was always putting monkey wrenches in the works."

Possibility of Political Parties

Hakmat raised on his own initiative the subject of the possible creation of a political party or political parties in Iran. He said that he had been speaking for some time to the Shah on the need for a political party. The Shah had appeared to be coming around to his way of thinking but the matter had of course been put off until after the Shah's return. He hoped then to convince His Majesty.

Trying to avoid the implication that Iran might simply be imitating Turkey, I asked whether Hakmat meant that there should be a sort of national party that would have the support and patronage of the head of the state or whether he meant that Iran might have several parties right away. Hakmat replied that he was quite ready to have two or three parties, that there was a place, in fact a necessity, for criticisms of the Government and that there was no harm in having them organized as an opposition.

Comment: This revelation of a design to establish a party may explain why Ernst Potocnik, whenever he has introduced the subject of the need for some national "movement" to inspire Iranian youth, has always insisted that he did not mean the creation of a political party. I had not previously been aware that anybody was currently pushing for the creation of a party.

Tegirani's plan of decentralization

The second topic which Hakmat raised without any question on my part was the excessive centralization in Iran. He felt that the people in the provincial cities and villages regarded the Government as a very distant entity and one which by its very remoteness was incapable of taking into account popular desires.

I proposed was to introduce municipal and provincial councils to advise the Governors General and their subordinates. When I questioned him as to the power these councils should have, he made it clear that they were to be purely advisory; the Majlis should retain all taxing power.

August 22, 1955

Rumors as to the Future of Dr. Mosafar PAQAI

About two weeks after the departure of General ZANEDI, rumors began floating in Tehran to the effect that Dr. Mosafar Paqai, head of the Tollers' Party and a past close collaborator and later bitter opponent of MEKDEH, would soon be released from the forced residence in Zahedan to which he had been sent by Zanedi and would be brought back to an official position of power, either as a Chelent Minister or as Prime Minister. Since that time, these rumors, or variants on the same theme, have been an almost constant pattern in Tehran. While these reports cannot be traced to any one source, they show an amazing vitality. Having reached a peak in the last week of July, they seem to be dying away at the present time, but they may well come up again.

It has been reported that Paqai has been devoting his time in Zahedan to writing a book or a series of essays, and that his only recreation is going to the railway station every week to watch the train from Pakistan come in. More than two months ago, a letter from Paqai was read to an anniversary meeting of the Tollers' Party in Tehran. This letter was strongly leftist and anti-Western, although not in a doctrinaire fashion, and, needless to say, did not in any way attack the Shah or the institution of the Monarchy. At this meeting, incidentally, pictures of Paqai and Aminollah KASHANI were displayed side by side.

The latest unconfirmed rumors have it that Ali ZOOFARI, one of Paqai's political lieutenants, is conferring with him in Zahedan, having brought a signed letter from the Shah to Paqai. It is also reported that Paqai has recently received two refrigerators from the court, and that each commercial aircraft flight from Tehran to Zahedan carries frozen meats and other delicacies from the Court to Paqai's hotel. According to another very recent rumor, Paqai may soon leave the city of Zahedan and go to live on one of the estates of Interior Minister AJAM in eastern Iran. (Recent rumors about the return of Paqai have dovetailed with a rumor to the effect that Ambassador Chapin is friendly to nationalist and left-wing figures.)

Other rumors tell of supposedly clandestine publications by the Tollers' Party which strongly attack the Tudeh and the National Resistance Movement but praise the Shah, and which are actually encouraged by the security forces. Certain Thrird Force publications are reported to be written in the same general vein, a report which fits in with the very prevalent belief that the right wing of the Third Force is in contact with the Court.
to have him in the Majlis since his talents all lay in the direction of negating action and causing trouble. As Hakmat's son translated the phrase into French, he was the kind of fellow who was always putting monkey wrenches in the works."

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Comment: This revelation of a design to establish a party may explain why Ernest Parson, whenever he has introduced the subject of the need for some national "movement" to inspire Iranian youth, has always insisted that he did not mean the creation of a political party. I had not previously been aware that anybody was currently pushing for the creation of a party.

Regional Unity of Decentralization

The second topic which Hakmat raised without any question on my part was the excessive centralization in Iran. He felt that the people in the provincial cities and villages regarded the Government as a very distant entity and one which by its very remoteness was incapable of taking into account popular desires.

Hakmat's proposal was to introduce municipal and provincial councils to advise the Governors General and their subordinates. When I questioned him as to the powers these councils should have, he made it clear that they were to be purely advisory: the Majlis should retain all taxing powers.

About two weeks after the departure of General ZAHELI, rumors began floating in Tehran to the effect that Dr. Hosefard Pooqai, head of the Toller's Party and a past close collaborator and later bitter opponent of MOHAMMED, would soon be released from the forced residence in Zabadan to which he had been sent by Zabadan and would be brought back to an official position of power, either as a Chinelt Minister or as Prime Minister. Since that time, these rumors, or variants on the same theme, have been an almost constant part of the rumor pattern in Tehran. While these reports cannot be traced to any one source, they show an amazing vitality. Having reached a peak in the last week of July, they seem to be dying away at the present time, but they may well come up again.

It has been reported that Pooqai has been devoting his time in Zabadan to writing a book or a series of essays, and that his only recreation is going to the railway station every week to watch the train from Pakistan come in. More than two months ago, a letter from Pooqai was read to an anniversary meeting of the Toller's Party in Tehran. This letter was strongly leftist and anti-Western, although not in a doctrinaire fashion, and, needless to say, did not in any way attack the Shah or the institution of the Monarchy. At this meeting, incidentally, pictures of Pooqai and Ayatollah KASHAN were displayed side by side.

The latest unconfirmed rumors have it that Ali ZANGARI, one of Pooqai's political lieutenants, is conferring with him in Zabadan, having brought a signed letter from the Shah to Pooqai. It is also reported that Pooqai has recently received two refrigerators from the court, and that each commercial aircraft flight from Tehran to Zabadan carries frozen meats and other delicacies from the Court to Pooqai's kitchen. According to another very recent rumor, Pooqai may soon leave the city of Zabadan and go to live on one of the estates of Interior Minister AMIN in eastern Iran. (Recent rumors about the return of Pooqai have dovetailed with a rumor to the effect that Ambassador Chapin is friendly to nationalist and left-wing figures.)

Other rumors tell of supposedly clandestine publications by the Toller's Party which strongly attack the Teheran and the National Resistance Movement but praise the Shah, and which are actually encouraged by the security forces. Certain Thrid Force publications are reported to be written in the same general vein, a report which fits in with the very prevalent belief that the right wing of the Third Force is in contact with the Court.

August 22, 1955

Rumors as to the Future of Dr. Hosefard Pooqai
The rumors about the impending return of Baqai are heard equally among idle chatterers and in the halls of the Majlis. Deputy Shams-ed-Din QAN'TAZADI went so far as to tell a newspaperman that the Majlis would never under any circumstances accept Baqai as a member of the Cabinet or as Prime Minister; he is reported to have told a personal friend a few minutes later that he himself would kill Baqai with his bare hands if the latter ever appeared in the Majlis building.

Politically-sophisticated observers assume that, whether the rumors are true or not, they are based on an assumption that the Shah, in his zeal to eliminate corruption and bring about social and economic reforms, is seriously considering calling on Baqai as the one man of great energy, ruthlessness, and revolutionary zeal who could be depended upon to smash the conservative and pro-Zahedi opposition, bring about immediate improvement in the living conditions of the people, and at the same time be acceptable to the intellectuals and the politically-conscious minority of the lower classes. It is also assumed that, while Baqai might be brought into the Cabinet at any time, he could become Prime Minister only if the Majlis had been dissolved.

As long as there is no confirmation for these rumors, they must be regarded as very probably untrue. Furthermore, there seems little likelihood that the Shah is seriously considering making a deal now with Baqai or with other nationalist groups as a means of speeding up action on his reform program, even should he feel that reforms are deliberately being thwarted by conservatives in the Cabinet, the administration, and the Parliament. The Shah does not appear either as desperate or so divorced from reality as to think he could escape with a whole political skin from such a maneuver, or not to realize the Fundamental law he would be opening by burning a demagogue of Baqai's stripe loose on the Iranian political scene with royal backing.

Granted that the rumors are untrue, their continued circulation gives rise to the question of who started them and who keeps them moving. The three main possibilities as to the source of these rumors are described below in their order of probability.

The Shah, and possibly the Interior Minister, while not seriously considering the possibility of bringing in such a dangerous and ambitious man into the Government, may have started and fed the rumors in order to keep the Parliament in line with the Government. Actually, the threat of the possible return of Baqai probably has been an element in inclining the conservative majority in the Parliament to the belief that they must not overturn the Ala Government lest the Shah, in his anger, inflict a much worse visitation upon the conservative interests of the country by bringing in strong-minded leftist nationalists and by dissolving the Majlis.

The diarists of Dr. Baqai, including his political lieutenants in the Toilers' Party, would have every reason to start such rumors, since the rumors add to the prestige of their group. It is difficult to understand, however, how such a small and unimportant body of politicians could keep the rumors going for such a long period of time. If they have, in fact, done so, their monetary resources must be far greater than has been heretofore known.

It is also possible that various persons, observing the political scene, may consider it logical that the Shah seek new allies to put over his reform program and that they then spread the rumors about Baqai in order to give the impression that they are themselves in the know concerning future political developments.

It would also be possible for the extreme conservative groups in and out of the Majlis who most strongly distrust the Shah to have spread such rumors early after the advent of the Ala Government in order to frighten more moderate conservatives from attempting to reach a modus vivendi with the Shah. However, the continuation of the rumors during the past two months has had a disheartening effect on the morale of many conservatives, including Majlis Deputies, who tend to feel that to compromise with the Ala Government is far better than to risk the tender mercies of Baqai and that the devil you know is safer than the one howling outside. It would therefore seem probable that if the pro-zahedi extreme conservatives started the reports, they spread completely out of control after the first few weeks.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:

William Koren, Jr.
Counselor of Embassy
For Political Affairs

Copies sent: Embassy London
Consulate Meshed
Isfahan
Khorramshahr
Tabriz
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The proponents of Dr. Baqai, including his political lieutenants in the Teheran Party, would have every reason to start such rumors, since the rumors add to the prestige of their group. It is difficult to understand, however, how such a small and unimportant body of politicians could keep the rumors going for such a long period of time. If they have in fact done so, their monetary resources must be far greater than has been heretofore known.

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William Koren, Jr.
Counselor of Embassy
For Political Affairs

Copies sent: Ambassadors London
Ambassador Meshed
Isfahan
Khorramshahr
Tabriz
NAṢĪR-KERMĀNĪ, Mosafar

Dr. Mosafar Naṣīr-Kermānī (usually referred to as Dr. Naṣīr), leader of the Workers’ Party and once the second most important figure in the National Front, has made a political career as an oppositionist. Regardless of the political hue of the government in power, it perennially finds in Naṣīr a principal source of real or potential opposition. As a result, attempts have been made in the past to silence him by purchasing his formal adherence with cabinet portfolios and ambassadorships, which he has refused. The ambitious Naṣīr has set his sights no lower than the Prime Ministership. Recently he was reported to have assigned two specialists of his Workers’ Party the task of preparing an action program and “shadow cabinet,” ready for use in the event that the reins of power should ultimately fall to him. Agile and opportunistically though he is, however, there is no evidence that this is likely to happen.

Naṣīr’s optimistic calculations stem from his belief that, with the deterioration of the political situation, the Shah (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi—see biography) will turn to him as the most moderate spokesman of the nationalist, reformist forces in Iran. In this hypothesis the Shah would retain his throne, although his powers would be circumscribed. As of late 1959 such an eventuality seemed questionable however, in light of the fact that the Workers’ Party can claim no parliamentary representation. It consists merely of the personal following of Naṣīr and lacks organic structure, a mass base, and any political direction other than the shifting course adopted by its leader in response to the dictates of opportunism. Nationalist, anti-Communist, and vaguely socialist in its aims, the Workers’ Party appeals mainly to factory workers and bazaar merchants, although it has achieved some success in attracting dissatisfied elements of all classes and certain segments of the army and the police. There is no evidence that the party has successfully appealed to those nationalists among the educated classes who look to former Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadeg (see biography) as the symbol of their opposition to the regime. Although it does not have the freedom of action enjoyed by Iran’s two “official” parties, Naṣīr’s party is tolerated by the government within carefully circumscribed limits. It has been unsuccessfully wooed by the “official” opposition Mardom (People’s) Party.

Born in Kermān, in 1908, Naṣīr received his primary and secondary education in Iran and obtained a degree in philosophy and pedagogy from
BAGAI-KERMANI, Mosafar

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Born in Kerma, in 1908, Bagai received his primary and secondary education in Iran and obtained a degree in philosophy and pedagogy from...
the Sorbonne in Paris. He began his career in 1936 as assistant professor of philosophy and pedagogy at the University of Tehran, a position he held until 1954. In 1947 he was elected deputy to the 15th Majlis from Kerman, and was subsequently reelected to the 16th and 17th sessions of that body. In the Majlis Baghai opposed the government's Supplementary Oil Agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and was one of the deputies who, under Mosadegh's leadership, forced through the oil nationalization bill. He fiercely attacked the army for interference in politics, and was an outspoken foe of the then Chief of Staff, General Ali Razmara. In 1949 Baghai's all-out campaign against the government through his daily paper, Shahad (Witness), earned him widespread popular acclaim, but led to his arrest and a sentence of one year's imprisonment imposed by a military court. As a result of popular pressure, he was released within a month and the matter pursued no further.

By the time Mosadegh became Prime Minister in April 1951, Mosaffar Baghai was at the forefront of the nationalist movement and was considered second in importance only to Mosadegh himself in the National Front. In May 1951, Baghai and Khalil Maleki, former leader of the Communist-controlled Tudeh Party, joined in forming the Workers' Party, a move which enhanced Baghai's position by enlisting Maleki's Marxist cadres in his own political cause. This alliance proved ephemeral, however, and a schism between the two factions in October 1952 terminated his association with Maleki. Soon after the split, Baghai reverted to his natural posture of opposition and became one of Mosadegh's most bitter opponents. This rupture cost the Workers' Party much of its popular following. Baghai's newspaper, Shahad, became a leading opposition journal, strongly critical of Mosadegh's flirtation with the Tudeh Party, which Baghai considered a "foreign" party and therefore insinual to a "true nationalist's" interests. Pathologically xenophobic, Baghai was particularly anti-British and charged that Mosadegh had not gone far enough in eliminating British influence in Iran.

With the overthrow of the Mosadegh regime in August 1953, Baghai's vociferous opposition was directed at the successor government of Fazlollah Zahedi (see biography), which he accused of corruption and treachery in reestablishing diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom in late 1953. Failing to come to terms with Baghai, General Zahedi moved against him, shutting down Shahad and frustrating his
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State - October 1959  

attempts to be elected deputy to the 19th Majlis. Baqī was twice placed under house arrest in 1954 for campaigning in Kermand, the second time for a period of one year. Released from forced residence in December 1955, he resumed active direction of his Workers' Party.

By muting the tone of his opposition and refraining from criticism of the Shah in his appeals for reform, Baqī, in May 1957, won the right to hold the first "unofficial" political meeting since the coup which overthrew Mossadeq's National Front. He has continued to hold meetings, exhorting the dissatisfied to rally to his party ("the only socialist party in Iran"), advocating the establishment of trade unionism, and attacking the Baghdad Pact and "British imperialism." Careful not to let his activities get out of hand, the government maintains a close check on the Workers' Party. With Baqī still facing prosecution on a number of charges connected with his past activities, the government holds an effective weapon should it choose to strike him down.

Mozafar Baqī is considered intelligent and shrewd, but unstable in his political philosophy and an unabashed demagogue. Although his attitude with regard to the United States is not a matter of record, he is believed to be less hostile toward this country than toward the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. Pleasant and soft-spoken socially, he is a fiery orator whose frenetic disagreements have on occasion involved him in parliamentary fisticuffs. Baqī is described as a big man. In the past he has suffered serious illness from the effects of alcohol and drugs. He speaks Persian, French, and some Arabic. Dr. Baqī is divorced.
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COUNTRY: Iran

SUBJECT: Possibility of legal candidacy in 1950 elections

DATE OF REPORT: 3 April 1950

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SOURCE: A senior intelligence official with access to reports concerning internal security matters.

REFERENCES:

1. According to Ali Forooshan, leading member of the Taliqani party, who is in charge of financial affairs for the party, prior to 11 October 1950, he offered legal assistance to a candidate for the upcoming elections. He also requested that he be named a candidate in the upcoming election, and Ali Forooshan agreed to take part in the campaign.

2. Legal counsel instructions to his party members and prepared to take part in the campaign, with the aid and financial assistance of Iranian merchants.

3. Also according to Forooshan, prior to 15 October 1950, the official of the Taliqani party and Mr. Legal decided to form a coalition in February 1950. Then, Mr. Legal was to take part in the coming election campaign as the candidate of the two parties from Tehran.

FIELD COMMENT: The source of this report reported in May 1950 that Ali Forooshan was a former deputy, publisher of the Taliqani party newspaper "Aamand," and a very close friend of Mr. Legal.

1. FIELD COMMENT: In 12 October 1950, the source of this report reported that according to Ali Forooshan...

SECRET

[Signature]

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2. Mr. Vali was still exerting efforts to obtain the Shah's consent for his nomination. This is, of course, in conflict with paragraph 2 above.

3. Field Comment: On 9 March 1959, an Iranian security official with contacts among right-wing political groups reported that he is certain that the Shah is seriously considering asking Mr. Reza to become Prime Minister, as the Shah government continues to flail about unsuccessfully on the land reform question.

1. According to Ali Farahani, leading member of the Tafillah party who is in charge of financial affairs for the party, prior to 11 October 1959, Mr. Vali was received in audience by the Shah through the intercession of Princess Shams.

2. Mr. Vali requested that he be installed in the party, and Ali Kohari, a leading figure in the party, was permitted to take part in the coming election campaign. The Shah consented to Noghi's election to the Majlis, but refused to allow Ali Kohari to become involved in political activities.

3. Mr. Vali gave instructions to his party leaders and prepared to take part in the campaign, with the aid of financial assistance of Persian merchants.

4. Also according to Farahani, prior to 15 October 1959, Mr. Vali of the Tafillah party and Mr. Noghi decided to form a coalition in February 1959. Then, Mr. Noghi was to take part in the coming election campaign as the candidate of the two parties from Hamadan.

1. Field Comment: The source of this report reported in May 1959 that Ali Kohari was a former deputy, publisher of the Tafillah party newspaper Shams, and a very close friend of Mr. Vali.

2. Field Comment: In 11 October 1959, the source of this report reported that according to Ali Farahani.
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Secretary WASHINGTON

INFO

Amounal ISFAHAN

KHOUSRO SHIR

HASSAN A-45

TARIGI A-47

FROM

Amnesty TAHRIAN

SUBJ

Acquittal of Dr. Noskar DAKAI

REP

Cirtal 4/77

The conviction of Dr. Dagi, leader of the Guardians of Freedom, on charges of mutinying the police to disobedience was reversed by an Home Court of Appeals December 25. Dr. Dagi was arrested in September 1964 and following anti-government electoral activities and was sentenced to two years imprisonment in June 1964.

In the course of his appeal, Dr. Dagi reviewed the history of his relations with the National Front and his later break with Nosair. His defense of his own actions constituted a strong attack on the National Front.

Dr. Dagi's appeal and his subsequent release have aroused a certain interest here and have prompted speculation about his future plans. The latter includes the belief on the part of some that Dagi will somehow or other be used by the Government to offset the opposition, particularly the National Front. Dagi himself has been at pains to deny this story in the press. Whatever political role he may find for himself, the Iranian political scene is likely to be affected by the reappearance of an astute and dynamic politician of the calibre of Dr. Dagi.

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21 JAN 1962

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POL 4/369/1290 1/3/62
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including a commemoration to students killed at the university in 1953, dated 7 December 1961 and signed by the student committee attached to the Guardians of Freedom.

4. The nine persons in this column were referred to by SAHAK as members of the high council of the Guardians of Freedom.

5. Based on attendance at Bagdi’s meetings about two years ago, probable identifications of some persons listed here are: Bagdi, Baha-ud-Din Masudi, Abdullah Shehabi, Hameed Xovoozhday, Mohamed Ali Youssifzadeh, Ali Farrahbadi, and Ali Aghbar Qamad.

6. This report was coordinated with the

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Field Comments

About five thousand persons attended Bagdi’s meeting, and a few policemen stationed in the street. The speakers were Hamed Ramzi Nabihin, Hamed Nabil, and Bagdi. Nabihin pointed out that when Amali was in the Najlis he said nothing; in favor of the people, but now he Prime Minister suddenly wanted to do everything for the people, which Nabihin found hard to believe since Amali is from one of the old wealthy families. Nabihin said that Amali realized the difference between himself and those present at the meeting, and he knew that to eliminate corruption would affect his family and friends. Amali was afraid to hold elections because good persons would be elected and this would be dangerous for him and his friends.

Hakiki spoke briefly, introducing Bagdi, and promising to continue the fight for freedom.

Bagdi said they should advise Amali about elections. Amali should not make the same mistakes his predecessors, Jaafar Shefri-Dayal and Hameed Xovoozhday, made. The fact that Shefri-Dayal and Xovoozhday were gone and Bagdi was holding the meeting proved that they were not important and that they, Bagdi and his supporters, were important. By failing to hold elections Amali disregarded the law, but Bagdi swore to fight for elections. Bagdi spoke for some time on the good job Amali was doing to eliminate corruption.

2. According to National Front leaders, the National Front had received information from several persons that the Shah wanted Bagdi acquitted, and then would give his information with which to attack the National Front. According to rumor in some military circles, Bagdi was released on a promise to attack the National Freedom movement.

3. The Guardians of Freedom organization has distributed a few tracts.
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6. This report was coordinated with the --asse.

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BEFORE/CONTINUED CONTROL

- 2 -

Rezaei Dabestani 4

Sheikh Ali Dabestani, teacher, leader of some student unions

Vahidda (29), professional

Abdullah (32), student at National Teachers Training College

Sheik Ali (32), student at National Teachers Training College

Field Observations

1. About five thousand persons attended Bagai’s meeting, and a few policemen stationed on the street. The speakers were Rezaei Dabestani, Rezaei Mohammadi, and Bagai. Dabestani pointed out that when Amini was in the Majlis he said nothing; in favor of the people, but now as Prime Minister he was suddenly seen everywhere for the people, which Rezaei Mohammadi found hard to believe since Amini is from one of the old wealthy families. Dabestani said that Amini realized the difference between himself and those present at the meeting... and he knew that to eliminate corruption would affect his family and friends. Amini was afraid to hold elections because good persons would be elected and this would be dangerous for him and his friends.

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BEFORE/CONTINUED CONTROL
SECRET

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BACKGROUND: As you know, approximately a week ago I met an Iranian student, Mansour Rafizadeh, who is returning to the U.S. to complete his graduate work in Economics. Rafizadeh is the Vice President of the National Group of Iranian Students in the United States, which is the organization of the student supporters of Dr. Mossafir Baghali. He also publishes a monthly (soon to become bi-weekly) newspaper which supports the views and policies of Dr. Baghali and which is distributed to some 4,000 Iranian students in the U.S. and in Western European countries.

Since he was a pleasant and interesting man and since he knows my wife's sister and her husband in the States, I invited him to my home to meet my wife and have drink before his return to the U.S. He called me later to state that he would not be able to come since he was going to the house of a doctor who was a friend of his, and invited my wife and me to accompany him. I agreed, and on Sunday night (6/3/62) we met him at the Embassy about 9:00 p.m. and leaving my car there proceeded to his friend's house by taxi.

After arrival there I was surprised to find that the friend was Dr. Baghali himself. I believe he had told me this when he invited me but I did not understand who's house we were going.

We spent some three hours at Baghali's and ate, drank and talked. In addition to much small talk the following items came up which may be of interest to your Section:

**Ali Amini** The doctor and his group considers Amini as honest, but not capable of nor in a position to accomplish the things needed in Iran. Baghali's party is not openly campaigning against Amini, however. Even the N.G.I.S.U.S. newspaper in the U.S. does not attack Amini nor his policies at this time.

**Land Reform** The present land reform program is doomed to failure. Conditions vary immensely from area to area. Some owners receive 10% to 15% return annually on their holdings and others are happy to receive 2% to 3%. There should be a flexible program to adapt to the varying conditions in different parts of the nation. Land reform is necessary, however, and must be carried out.

**The University Riots** The recent riots, resulting in the closing of the University of Tehran, were the results of manipulations of General Bahktiar. General Bahktiar was encouraged and assisted in these activities by "that Colonel in the Military Attaché Office at the American Embassy - the one with the Russian name." After some thought he came up with YASEVICH as the name. I asked how it could be that the Embassy which is widely considered to be in favor of and to support Amini's government would tolerate one of its officers to support Bahktiar in an effort to weaken or overthrow Amini's government. Baghali's reply was vague and more or less to the effect that the State Department and the military did not always agree on policy or act in coordination. I disclosed my knowledge of YASEVICH'S activities and did not correct Baghali's misconception as to his position in the Embassy.

**Shah** The Shah seems to be considered as a necessary evil. I get the impression that if Baghali were in power he would allow the Shah to reign but not to rule. He is considered useful as a figurehead for the masses of the Iranian people to identify themselves with.

According to Baghali, the Shah was in favor of Amini at the time he appointed him. However, at a later date he actually wanted to get rid of Amini and replace him with someone else. For unexplained reasons (unexplained to me) this could not be done and the Shah now is again strongly behind Amini. This bit confused me and I asked for an explanation and was left as confused as before.

**Elections** None in view on the horizon.

**Baghali's Party** Strongly advocates reforms in Iran. This would include just about everything apparently. Particularly, land reform and tax reform, and a clean-up of the government. Baghali feels that with proper taxation and collection Iran could reduce immensely the amount of foreign aid needed and the period for which it would be required. His party wants no dealings with the Russians and fears Russian influence or domination in Iran. Likewise, he wants as little as possible to do with the British. He seems to be strongly pro-American and would look to the U.S. for support and assistance if he formed a government.

I have been told incidentally, by an Iranian attorney, that Baghali talks pro-American when with Americans, pro-Russian when with Russians, pro-British when with Englishmen, and so on.

His party is strongly anti-National Front and consider Mossadeq a menace to Iran. Baghali has a photo on the wall in his house of a student killed in the demonstrations against Mossadeq's government some years ago.

The above is obviously no resume of three hours conversation, but if Baghali's views on any item not mentioned are of interest, I might be able to recall whether the subject was mentioned and what was said. My Farsi is inadequate and the doctor speaks only Farsi and French, so the conversation was carried on with Rafizadeh as interpreter.

While returning to the Embassy by taxi, Rafizadeh remarked that the doctor
June 7, 1962

Conversation with Dr. Baghail on June 3, 1962

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- AMINI. The doctor and his group considers Amini as honest, but not capable of nor in a position to accomplish the things needed in Iran. Baghail's party is not openly campaigning against Amini, however. Even the M.O.I., U.S. newspaper in the U.S. does not attack Amini nor his policies at this time.

- Land Reform. The present land reform program is doomed to failure. Conditions vary immensely from area to area. Some owners receive 10% to 15% return annually on their holdings and others are happy to receive 2% to 3%. There should be a flexible program to adapt to the varying conditions in different parts of the nation. Land reform is necessary, however, and must be carried out.

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While returning to the Embassy by taxi, Rafizadeh remarked that the doctor...
had suggested that we come by taxi since his home was watched all the time and if my car was seen outside, there might be rumors flying of an impending coup.

At the start of the evening I explained to Baghai that I knew very little of his country, its people, customs and politics, and that in my work in the Consular Section I was not aware of the Embassy's views or policies on any given question and could only make personal observations.

TO: Chief, Political Section
FROM: CAS

SUBJECT: Leaflet Written by Dr. Baghai Against the Status of Forces Agreement

The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must cite the control known but need not cite CAS as the source.

1. Attached is a copy and a summary translation of a leaflet entitled "Is It or Is It Not," which attacks the Status of Forces Agreement, and was written by Dr. Nasafer Baghai, head of the Toli Arzu Party. Although dated 23 October 1964, it was not being circulated until about two weeks ago.

2. According to an official Iranian service report dated 16 November, Dr. Baghai stated on 10 November that his declaration should be printed during the next week and in order to distract the security officials, it should be printed and distributed from another city. Dr. Baghai was quoted as saying that although the publication of his declaration shall be the cause of his arrest, this was not important. (Comment: See also P-534/64, 3 November, from another source.) At that time SAVAK planned to try to find out where the declaration was to be printed and to stop the publication of it.

3. When detached from this memorandum, the attachment may be considered for limited official use.
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had suggested that we come by taxi since his home was watched all the time and if my car was seen outside, there might be rumors flying of an impending coup.

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TO: Chief, Political Section

FROM: CASH

SUBJECT: Leaflet Written by Dr. Baghai Against the Status of Forces Agreement

The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must cite the control HOP/NO2 but need not cite CASH as the source.

1. Attached is a copy and a summary translation of a leaflet entitled, "Is It or Is It Not," which attacks the Status of Forces Agreement, and was written by Dr. Nazafar Baghai, head of the Toilers Party. Although dated 23 October 1964, it was not being circulated until about two weeks ago.

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TO: Chief, Political Section  
FROM: CAS
DATE: 3 November 1964  
FILE 534/64

SUBJECT: Plans of Dr. Baqai to Issue Pamphlet Attacking the Status of Forces Agreement

The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must cite the control NOFORN but need not cite CAS as the source. The source is an Iranian official (EB) with good contacts in the security services; from Baqai.

1. Dr. Mosaffar Baqai said on 2 November 1964 that Ayatollah Khomeini had made a public speech in Qom on 26 October in which he attacked the Status of Forces Agreement and the S100 million dollar Arms Purchase Agreement recently passed by the Majlis.

2. Baqai stated that he himself was in the process of drafting a pamphlet to be signed with his name in which he would attack the government for sponsoring and passing the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States. Baqai further stated that the line he would take vis-a-vis the Americans would be that the Americans were unwisely allowing this law to hurt their image and their reputation in Iran. Baqai also stated that he was prepared to face arrest in putting out this pamphlet, but felt it was necessary for him to take some initiative in this matter in view of the fact that he expected that others opposed to the Agreement would also act it.

3. Baqai expressed the opinion that the Shah must have tacitly approved attacks against the Agreement made in the Majlis during the recent debate, for it was inconceivable to him that spokesmen against the Bill would have dared to do so without the Shah's prior consent.

Mozaffar BAGAI-KERMANI

President, Toilers Party and Guardians of Freedom

Mosaffar Bagai-Kermani has been a chronic oppositionist since 1949. He is a devoted nationalist, with overtones of socialism, wholeheartedly opposed to Communism, strongly anti-British but not unfriendly to the US. Within this framework, however, his politics tend to shift freely, depending on the conditions of the moment. A former supporter of ex-Premier Mohammad Mossadeq, Baqai was at one time the second most popular man in Iran. Since then his political fortunes have waned considerably. At the present time, he probably has little following beyond his two political organizations, the Toilers Party and the Guardians of Freedom--both of which are primarily personality cults without a significant popular base.

Baqai's activities are closely circumscribed by the government, and he is opposed by both the Toilers (Communist) Party and Mossadeq's National Front. His strength lies in his nuisance value, and is derived largely from his skill as a demagogue. In his ambition for the Premiership he would probably sacrifice a few scruples to attain it. However, he has made so many political enemies during his long career that his chances are small. One source has asserted that the Shah is willing to allow Baqai a limited amount of freedom of action as a check on the government.

Baqai was born in Kerman in 1908. His father, Shahab Kermani, was a famous poet and Constitutionalist. Mosaffar received his early education in Iran, and earned a PhD in philosophy and pedagogy from the Sorbonne in 1935. Returning to Iran, he joined the faculty of Tehran University, where he has lectured on ethics off and on ever since. In 1939-41 he completed his military service as a reserve officer. Baqai reportedly joined the Toilers Party in 1946, but left it soon after. In 1947 he was elected to the Majlis as deputy from Kerman. He first came into prominence in 1949, when his attacks on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and the army won him popular acclaim. In November 1949 he was arrested for publishing sharp criticisms of the army in his newspaper, Sabedol. A court martial sentenced him to a year in prison, but he was acquitted by a civil court.

Baqai had joined Mossadeq's National Front while in the Majlis, and in May 1951 he founded the Toilers Party to serve as the right wing's answer to the growing popularity of the Toilers Party. Baqai described the Toilers Party as "socialist in attitude so far as socialist policy is consistent with the policies of the government." By this
Memorandum

TO: Chief, Political Section
DATE: 3 November 1964
P-534/64

FROM: CAS

SUBJECT: Plans of Dr. Baqi to Issue Pamphlet Attacking the Status of Forces Agreement

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1. Dr. Mosaffar Baqi said on 2 November 1964 that Ayatollah Khomeini had made a public speech in Qom on 20 October in which he attacked the Status of Forces Agreement and the 200 million dollar Arms Purchase Agreement recently passed by the Majlis.

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Baqi had joined Mossadeq’s National Front while in the Majlis, and in May 1951 he founded the Toilers Party to serve as the right wing’s answer to the growing popularity of the Tudeh Party. Baqi described the Toilers Party as “socialist in attitude so far as socialist policy is consistent with the policies of the government.” By this
time Bagai was regarded as second only to Mosadeq in the nationalist movement, and he accompanied Mosadeq in October 1951 to the UN, to answer Britain's protest in the Security Council against Iran's nationalization of the AIOC.

In early 1952 a split appeared in the Toller Party between Bagai and a more radical faction led by Khalil Maleki. It became irreconcilable in October 1952, when Bagai returned after a period of hospitalization to resume his leadership of the party. Maleki and his followers bolted, forming their own organization. Meanwhile, Bagai had begun to disagree with Mosadeq over the role of the Tudeh Party in Iranian politics. He began to criticize Mosadeq's policies in Keshar and on the floor of the Majlis. In April 1953 Bagai was implicated in the murder of Mosadeq's chief of police, General Mahmoud Afshartous. Mosadeq was still seeking to have Bagai's parliamentary immunity lifted in order to prosecute him when the Mosadeq regime was overthrown in August 1953.

Bagai cast his lot with the pro-Shah forces, led by the new Premier, General Pahlavollah Zahedi. When it appeared that Zahedi planned to stay in office for an undetermined period, however, the ambitious Bagai reverted to the opposition. In December 1953, he was absolved in the Afshartous affair, but his newspaper was closed down for having attacked the government. When the Majlis was dissolved in January 1954, Bagai's parliamentary career ended. His efforts to win re-election to the Majlis in 1954, and the government's efforts to prevent it, resulted in several months of election postponement in Keran. Bagai spent a month in jail in June 1954 and in December was again arrested and exiled to Zahedan for a year. Released in December 1955, he was again detained during an investigation into the 1951 murder of ex-premier Ali Razmara, Bagai's opponent during the 1949-51 period and one whose death Bagai had cheered. Bagai was cleared and released in December 1956. For the next several years he remained relatively inactive, but in 1960 he again ran for the Majlis. He was a vocal critic of the election rigging of that year, and he formed the Guardians of Freedom, who made fair elections a plank in their platform. In December 1960 Bagai was arrested on charges of sedition and confined to Tehran. When he tried to go to Keran in February 1961 to campaign, he was jailed. Tried by the military, he was sentenced to two years in prison, but a civil court again acquitted him. Since then, his activities have been limited; during the 1963 elections he was again ordered to stay in Tehran. His party, unable to operate in Iran, has established branches in Europe and the US. Keshar is currently being published in the US.

Bagai is a big, stocky man and a fiery orator. Pleasant and soft-spoken, he is considered intelligent and well-informed. He is

divorced, reportedly because he believes that a politician can operate more efficiently if he is single. Bagai was seriously ill in 1952; he described it as paratyphoid and diabetes, but some sources claim he was suffering from alcoholism and cocaine addiction. Bagai speaks fluent French and some Arabic in addition to Parsi.

\[ Signature \]

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13 January 1966
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ADDENDUM FOR POL FILES

FROM : CAS, September 1971
SUBJECT: Dr. Mozaffar BAQAI (BAGHAI, BAGHAI-KERMAN)

CAS records - much of which include Embassy/POL reporting from the 1950's - indicate that Dr. Mozaffar BAQAI, born in 1910 in Kerman, was active throughout the 1950s and less so in the late 1960s as the leader of the Toller's Party (Nasb-e-Zanatkeslan). He was jailed periodically until 1962 for rabble-rousing. He was known for his opposition to the ("U.S. supported" and "corrupt") Zahedi government following Mossadeq's overthrow and has at one time or another been anti-Shah, anti-US, and anti-Communist. He has the reputation of being more intelligent than most Iranian politicians, and a reformer.

He has allegedly been covertly supported and funded by (in chronological order) Soviets, British, The Shah and SAVAK.

In August 1971 CAS learned that Dr. BAQAI had been given permission (possibly encouraged) by SAVAK to re-activate his Toller's Party. Dr. BAQAI was said to be renting office space for the party's headquarters.

It is highly likely that in 1971 Dr. BAQAI will operate his party in a manner acceptable to SAVAK as a means of diverting leftist political energies into responsible channels.

CAREER:

1936 : Asst. Prof., University of Tehran (Embassy Bio-Form-1950)
1939-41 : Two years military service as a Reserve Officer.
Oct 1949: Editor of "Shahid", which expresses views similar to the Tudeh Party's. BAQAI is suspected of secret contacts with the Soviet Embassy.
Dec 1949: Arrested on charges of intriguing against the Iranian Army.

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POL - Mr. Ford

Sept. 26, 1971

POL - Donald R. Toussaint

POL's local adviser, Memuchehr Saidi, has reported the following which I thought you would be interested in:

1. Dr. Baghli Kermani -- long popular with pro-socialists and with university students -- has recently received permission to organize a political party (name unknown). He has already rented office space for the party near the Majlis on Baharestan Square.

2. Saidi speculates that Kermani's activities may prove a source of embarrassment to the government -- for he is somewhat of a rabble-rouser/demagogue and has considerable following among disenchanted socialists and students.

I don't vouch for the veracity of the story but thought you might want to try and find out if there is anything to it.

Note: According to Saidi, Dr. Baghli Kermani is from an old and well-known family but is not very well off and is reportedly an opium addict.

cc: POL/BIO

POL: DToussaint:VLW

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ADDENDUM FOR POL FILES

FROM: CAS, September 1971

SUBJECT: DR. MOZAFFAR BAQAI (BAGHAI, BAGHAI-KERMANI)

CAS records - much of which include Embassy/POL reporting from the 1950's - indicate that Dr. Mozaffar BAQAI, born in 1910 in Kerman, was active throughout the 1950s and less so in the late 1960s as the leader of the Toller's Party (Hezb-e-Zahmatkeshan). He was jailed periodically until 1962 for rabble-rousing. He was known for his opposition to the "U.S. supported and "corrupt" Zahedi government following Mossadeq's overthrow and has at one time or another been anti-Shah, anti-US, and anti-Communist. He has the reputation of being more intelligent than most Iranian politicians, and a reformer.

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Oct 1949: Editor of "Shahid", which expresses views similar to the Tudeh Party's. BAQAI is suspected of secret contacts with the Soviet Embassy.
Dec 1949: Arrested on charges of intriguing against the Iranian Army.
Feb 1950: Retried by civilian court, released from prison, elected to the 16th Majles.

Apr 1951: Reported to be a close advisor of Mossadeq. A knowledgeable source reported he had heard that BAQAI received money from the Soviets.

Mar 1952: Elected to the 17th Majles from Kerman. His faction in the Majles is composed of petty bazaar merchants and craftsmen; it represented the right wing of the Iranian National Toilers Party which split in Feb 1952; it supports Mossadeq; he demanded the purging of communist elements from the Toilers Party; it reaffirmed the faction's allegiance to Islam.

Aug 1952: BAQAI is considered the Majles' most intelligent member, also its most opportunistic and dangerous.

Oct 1953: BAQAI is reported leader of right wing opposition to the Zahedi government. Allegedly in the pay of the British.

Dec 1953: BAQAI is Professor of Esthetics at Tehran University. He was arrested in Baft and held incomunicado during elections for the 18th Majles. He is still publishing "Shahid" which attacks the Zahedi government.

Jan 1954: Lt. Col. MOQADAM (probably the man who in 1971 is Chief, Dept 3, SAVAK) campaigned for BAQAI among junior officers in the Army. Speculation in Kerman is that the British are backing BAQAI through Sayed Zia Tabatabai.

Mar 1954: BAQAI told his Toiler's Party (planning) committee that he intended writing Zahedi saying he will take revenge for Zahedi's persecution of him by harming Z's son, Ardeshir.

Jun 1-8: Arrested and released by Prime Minister Zahedi.


Jan 1955: Arrested for inciting mobs. Sent to enforced residence in Zahidan. (Begins to sound like MONOPOLY.)

Aug 1955: Still in enforced residence in Zahidan but rumors say a) Shah has sent him a sealed envelope, and b) BAQAI may leave Zahidan to live on the estate of Min Interior Asadollah Alam. Feeling is that the Shah may want BAQAI as a reforming Prime Minister.

Dec 1955: Returned to Tehran.

Jan 1956: Accused of being part of the successful plot to assassinate P. M. General RAZMARA.

Jul 1956: Active again in politics. According to a reliable source, he is pretending to be pro-American.

Aug 1960: Made an outspoken speech.

Sep 1960: Blamed for distributing nationalist pamphlets at the University.

Nov 1960: Offered to bring the Toiler's Party into the National Front.

Mar 1961: BAQAI is supported by the Free Mason Lodge, thereby suspected of having the support of British. In prison again.

Sep 1961: Released from prison.

Sep 1961: Professor of Litterature, Tehran University. On SAVAK's list of Iranian politicians as head of "Guardians of Freedom" and the Toiler's Party.

Jan 1969: Professor of Statistics at Tehran University. Still has followers, especially in Kerman. In good health.

Aug 1971: Has been given permission to reactivate the Toiler's Party. Is currently searching for office space for party headquarters.
Feb 1950: Retired by civilian court, released from prison, elected to the 16th Majles.

Apr 1951: Reported to be a close advisor of Mossadeq. A knowledgeable source reported he had heard that BAQAI received money from the Soviets.

Mar 1952: Elected to the 17th Majles from Kerman. His faction in the Majles is composed of petty bazaar merchants and craftsmen; it represented the right wing of the Iranian National Toilers Party which split in Feb 1952; it supports Mossadeq; it demanded the purging of communist elements from the Toilers Party; it reaffirmed the faction's allegiance to Islam.

Aug 1952: BAQAI is considered the Majles' most intelligent member, also its most opportunistic and dangerous.

Oct 1953: BAQAI is reported leader of right wing opposition to the Zahedi government. Allegedly in the pay of the British.

Dec 1953: BAQAI is Professor of Esthetics at Tehran University. He was arrested in Baft and held incomunicado during elections for the 18th Majles. He is still publishing "Shahid" which attacks the Zahedi government.

Jan 1954: Lt. Col. MOQADAM (probably the man who in 1971 is Chief, Dept 3, SAVAK) campaigned for BAQAI among junior officers in the Army. Speculation in Kerman is that the British are backing BAQAI through Sayed Zia Tabatabal.

Mar 1954: BAQAI told his Toiler's Party (planning) committee that he intended writing Zahedi saying he will take revenge for Zahedi's persecution of him by harming Z's son, Ardeshir.

Jun 1-8: Arrested and released by Prime Minister Zahedi.


Jan 1955: Arrested for inciting mobs. Sent to enforced residence in Zahidan. (Regards to sound like MONOPOLY.)
he published an open letter to then Vice President Nixon in his now defunct newspaper Shahab (Witness). He has expressed a view that should he ever become prime minister (this was in the days when prime ministers counted for something in Iran) he would permit the Shah to reign but would circumscribe the Imperial power. The Shah on the other hand had appeared to give him greater rein than he has allowed to other leftist politicians and as recently as 1971 Baqa'i was given SAVAK permission to re-establish the Toilers Party. Presumably this was intended to attract support which might otherwise have been given to less malleable leftist groups. However, nothing further was heard from the Toilers Party or Baqa'i until he wrote the letter to the Shah.

Despite a long and tempestuous career he has had little influence on government policy except as a leader of the movement to nullify the rigged 1960 general elections. His position has been consistently nationalist, very anti-British and, perhaps beginning with the 1964 Status of Forces Agreement, rather anti-American as well. Though ambitious and opportunistic, he is regarded as honest where money is concerned, lives very simply in south Tehran and is respected by some for this.

He has used the open letter tactic at least twice in the past. Once in 1949 to criticize controls instituted by then Chief of Staff General Razmara, and again in 1953 when
he published an open letter to then Vice President Nixon in his now defunct newspaper Shahab (Witness). He has expressed a view that should he ever become prime minister (this was in the days when prime ministers counted for something in Iran) he would permit the Shah to reign but would circumscribe the Imperial power. The Shah on the other hand had appeared to give his greater rein than he has allowed to other leftist politicians and as recently as 1971 Baqa'i was given Savak permission to re-establish the Toilers Party. Presumably this was intended to attract support which might otherwise have been given to less malleable leftist groups. However, nothing further heard from the Toilers Party or Baqa'i until he wrote the letter to the Shah.

In view of his recent open letter to the Shah criticizing the establishment of the Iran Resurgence Party as both illegal and unwise, I thought you might find a little background data on Mosafar Baqa'i to be of use.

A congenitally oppositionist, Baqa'i has been active in Iranian politics since the mid-1940's. He has espoused various leftist viewpoints but always with a sizeable dose of personal opportunism. He was briefly a member of the Tudeh Party, later joined the National Front and after his 1951 founding of the Toilers Party he became the second most important man in the National Front. He broke with Mossadegh in 1952 and lost considerable support for his Party in the process. Later he first supported, and then opposed, General Zahedi and has generally been in opposition to every prime minister since. As a result of his constant opposition he has few friends among the establishment but many powerful enemies. These have imprisoned or exiled him a number of times but he has always rebounded in one way or another. He has been accused, for example, of complicity in the assassination of General Razmara, the murder of Mossadegh's Chief of Police General Afsharatus and a variety of lesser crimes but has usually been acquitted on appeal. As the Shah's power grew, Baqa'i's prominence decreased and he pretty much faded from sight with the rise of the Iran Novin Party.

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Honorable Mr. William Sullivan
Ambassador of the United States of America in Iran

Tehran January 46, 1978

I acknowledge with thanks receipt of Your Excellency’s letter dated January 4, and am particularly thankful for your attention and perusal of the Iranian Tollers’ Party Declaration of December 9, 1977.

The explicitness with which you state that the policy of President Jimmy Carter’s government is based on non-intervention in other countries’ internal affairs seems hopeful-inspiring because we are confident that if foreign powers should refrain from intervening in our country’s internal affairs and taking steps to the disadvantage of our people, the Iranian nation will succeed in establishing the rule of law and a democracy based on the ideals pursued by all freedom-loving peoples of the world.

I am pleased about Your Excellency’s suggestion of exchanges of views on the matter of securing basic human rights. I have had the opportunity in the past to have meetings with United States ambassadors and high ranking officials on account of my positions and national responsibilities. I believe that such contacts can be beneficial to the understanding and betterment of relations between the two nations.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Mozaffar Baghaili-Kermani
Leader of the Tollers’ Party
of the Iranian People

BIO NOTE

Dr. Mozaffar Baghaili-Kermani - Born about 1908-10 in Kermarn Province. Listed as Politician in SRF file.

Baghaili-Kermani was leader of the Iranian Tollers Party in 1962. He was subsequently founder and president of the Iranian National Workers Party, a small, very old group which hung about the fringes of the National Front in the mid to late 1960s.

Baghaili-Kermani is an ex-Majles deputy who was highly critical of the Shah during the Mossadeq period. He sent a letter to the Prime Minister in late November criticizing the government for its role in the Karadj road incident where ununiformed young men set upon a political group of oppositionists who were meeting and injured over a hundred. Dr. Baghaili-Kermani was described to Embassy officer Stempel as "sort of the Sancho Panza and apparently respected in the past, he is not particularly active in the oppositionist movement."

POL: JDStempel:1-4-78
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