اسناد نظری جاسوسی
شماره (18)
دانشجویان مسلمان پیرو خط امام
AMERICAN USE

CONFIDENTIAL
PROG 7/24/79
CHG: LBLAINGEN
ECON: MJOHNSON
NONE
ECON- 3 CHG: POL RF CHRON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, PRIORITY

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/24/85 (JOHNSON, MARK) OR-E
TAGS: EFIN, EGEN, PEPR, IR
SUBJECT: CALL ON MINISTER OF FINANCE ARDALAN

1. (C- ENTIRE TEXT)

2. CHARGE, ACCOMPANIED BY VISITING DEPT OFF. CALLED ON
MINISTER OF FINANCE ALI ARDALAN JULY 23. ARDALAN WAS
JOINED BY DEPUTY MINISTER DR. IBRAHIM-ZADEH WHO INTER-
PRETED.

3. CHARGE OPENED CONVERSATION BY EXPLAINING OUR UNDER-
STANDING AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE REVOLUTION. WE WERE
WILLING TO WORK WITH IRAN IN THE TASK OF REBUILDING OUR
RELATIONS AND STOOD READY TO CooperATE IN THOSE AREAS
WHERE IRAN FELT WE COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE. CHARGE SAID
WE SHARED COMMON INTERESTS AND ASSETS, SUCH AS OUR
COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, WHICH COULD AID THIS REBUILDING.

4. ARDALAN REPLIED BY OFFERING HIS VISITORS A HISTORICAL
SURVEY OF THE LONG AND FRUITFUL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
IRAN AND THE U.S. THE MEMORIES OF THOSE AMERICANS WHO
WORKED IN IRAN IN THE EARLY YEARS AFTER IRAN'S CONSTITU-
TIONAL UPRISING WERE CHERISHED BY IRANIANS. ARDALAN
SPOKE FONDLY OF DR. JORDAN, AN AMERICAN WHO HELPED
ESTABLISH ALBORZ COLLEGE WHERE MANY IRANIANS HAD GOTTEN
THEIR FIRST TASTE OF HIGHER EDUCATION. SIMILARLY, IRANIAN
PATRIOTS REMEMBERED PEOPLE LIKE MORGAN SHUSTER AND
HOWARD BASKERVILLE IN TABRIZ WHO SYMPATHIZED WITH THE
ASPIRATIONS OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. HE AGREED THAT THESE
PAST RELATIONSHIPS WOULD INFLUENCE THE FUTURE. ARDALAN
HOPED THAT THE NEW GROUP OF AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD
HAVE THE SAME FEELING TOWARD IRAN.

5. TURNING TO SUBJECT OF BANK NATIONALIZATIONS, THE
MINISTER EMphasIZED THAT FOREIGN INTERESTS WOULD BE
PROTECTED AND RESPECTED. THIS WAS REQUIRED BY BOTH
CONFIDENTIAL

ISLAMIC TRADITION AND GOVERNMENT LAW, HE SAID. NO TIME-
TABLE EXISTED YET FOR THIS COMPENSATION AS THE PGOI,
WORKING THROUGH A SPECIAL INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE,
WAS STILL INVESTIGATING THE VARIOUS BANKS. IBRAHIM-ZADEH
ADDED THAT THE COMMITTEE IS NOW IN THE VERGE OF MERGING
THE NATION'S 36 BANKS INTO A FEW MAJOR BANKS, PERHAPS
FIVE OR SIX.

6. CHARGE THEN RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF REACTIVATING
THE U.S.-IRAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OR THE BUSINESS COUNCIL
AS A WAY OF IMPROVING THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN AMERICAN AND
IRANIAN FIRMS. ARDALAN SAID HE WAS IN FAVOR OF DOING
THIS ALTHOUGH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MATTERS LIKE THE
CHAMBER OR COUNCIL RESTED WITH THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE.
ARDALAN'S MINISTRY WOULD BE WILLING TO BACK UP ANY
PROPOSAL PUT FORTH BY THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE. LOOKING
FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD, DID THE MINISTER SEE ANY ROLE FOR
THE JOINT COMMISSION? THE CHARGE SAID WE WERE NOT
PUSHING THE COMMISSION BUT WANTED TO SEEK ARDALAN'S
VIEWS. THE MINISTER FELT THAT IDEA WAS BASICALLY GOOD,
BUT HE HAD NO PARTICULAR VIEWS ON TIMING. THIS SUBJECT
WOULD NEED STUDY BY THE INTERESTED PARTS OF THE PGOI.

7. CHARGE USED CASE OF GTE AS ILLUSTRATION OF WHAT WE
WERE ATTEMPTING TO AVOID. MINISTER WAS BASICALLY AWARE
OF PROBLEM BUT HAD NO REAL INVOLVEMENT IN THIS DISPUTE,
WHICH HE HOPED COULD BE SOLVED THROUGH DIALOGUE RATHER
THAN COURTS. ARDALAN THEN WENT ON TO MAKE WHAT WAS
PROBABLY HIS CENTRAL MESSAGE DURING MEETING: U.S.
SHOULD AVOID FORMING IMPRESSIONS OR DRAWING CONCLUSIONS
ABOUT IRAN BASED ON THE RUMORS BEING FLOATED IN THE U.S.
AND EUROPE BY IRANIANS WHO HAD FLED DURING THE REVOLUTION.
ARDALAN SAID THESE PEOPLE—"ANTI-REVOLUTIONARIES"—WERE
TRYING TO UNDERMINE IRAN'S CREDITWORTHINESS BY SPREADING
LIES. ARDALAN EMPHASIZED THAT "WE ARE GOING TO PAY
EVERY PENNY WE OWE."

8. REFERRING TO ARDALAN'S COMMENTS ON "IMAGE," CHARGE
EXPRESSED REGRET OVER EXPULSION OF NEW YORK TIMES
CORRESPONDENT YUSSEF IBRAHIM. CHARGE SAID THIS KIND
OF ACTION CANNOT CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE. THE
PICTURE OF THE REVOLUTION WILL BECOME LESS BALANCED IF
IRAN CONTINUES TO EXPEL JOURNALISTS. ARDALAN TOOK NOTE
OF THESE REMARKS BUT OFFERED NO SUBSTANTIIVE REPLY, SAYING
ONLY THAT IT SHOULD BE RAISED WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY.
9. ALTHOUGH MEETING WAS SOMEWHAT SHORT ON SUBSTANCE, IT WAS VERY CORDIAL IN TONE. THE MINISTER CONVEYS A PROFESSORIAL IMAGE AND DOES NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING A FORCEFUL PERSONALITY. WE SUSPECT THAT HE LOOKS TO HIS ARTICULATE AND ENERGETIC DEPUTY, IBRAHIM-ZADEH, FOR DIRECTION. ZADEH, FOR INSTANCE, SEEMED MORE POSITIVE ON THE WORK OF THE BANKING COMMITTEE AND ON THE REJUVENATION OF THE BUSINESS COUNCIL.

10. COMMENT: MEETING ENDED ON A PERSIAN NOTE. AS WE WERE TAKING OUR LEAVE, IBRAHIM-ZADEH DREW DEPTOFF ASIDE. HE SAID HE HAD SOME FRIENDS. THEY NEEDED VISAS. COULD WE DO ANYTHING FOR THEM... END COMMENT. LAIGEN##
CONFIDENTIAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA

Nora.—Consult Diplomatic Serial 3569 of April 10, 1941, and references therein. Forms are to be prepared on typewriter in triplicate, one copy for file and two for Department.

Name: BAZARGAN

Nationality: Iranian

Date and place of birth: About 1907, in Tehran

Position: Head of Provisional Board of Management, Nationalization Board

Date appointed: June 6, 1952

Language spoken: Persian, French

Attitude toward the United States: Neutral

Family details: Father is Hajji Abbas, well known bazaar merchant. Family highly religious. Married, one son.

Education: School of Technology, University of Tehran. Central Technical College, France.

Remarks: Basargin is a highly religious man, almost verging on fanaticism, who observes all Muslim rites assiduously and writes profusely on religious matters. He is a devotee of Kadian and is close to other members of the National Front.

Though narrow-minded on subjects relating to Islam and its precepts, Basargin is otherwise an intelligent man of some vision, well versed in engineering and conscientious about his work. One British source who had worked with him at the University reported that he was easy to work with, receptive to new ideas, and constructive in his own ideas.

Basargin has no strong antipathies toward foreigners, but is considered anti-Communist, interested in ridding the University of Tudeh influences.

Prepared by: Mary Ruth Parrish / Kurish Shahban

Biographic Clerk / Research Assistant
SUPPLEMENTARY BIOGRAPHIC DATA

May 6, 1952

RAZARGAN, Nohdi

Supplementing Debussy's CHD of June 21, 1951.

Career:

May 7, 1952: Resigned as Head of Provisional Board of Directors, NIOC.

Remarks:

Razargan's resignation reportedly came about as a result of serious differences with Hossein NAKI, member of the Joint Oil Committee and influential in the entire nationalization movement. It is believed that the two men had been at odds for some time, and that in meetings of the Committee Naki accused Razargan of incompetence and inefficiency. Naki reportedly also remarked the fact that Razargan was supporting Dr. Baghli's candidate for election to the Majlis from Isfahan rather than his own.

Razargan remains in his position as Dean of the Engineering College, University of Tehran.
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SUPPLEMENTARY BIOGRAPHIC DATA

October 28, 1952

BAZARGAN, Mehdi

Supplementing Embassy's CBD of June 21, 1951; and Embassy's Supplement of May 8, 1952.

Career:

While Bazargan was serving on the Provisional Board of Directors of the NIIOC, Abdul Hossin Khalili officiated for him as Dean of the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Tehran. In the Spring of 1952 it was decided that Khalili should hold this position on a permanent basis; consequently Bazargan is now simply a member of the Engineering Faculty.

Organizations:

President, Union of Engineers of Iran.
thus lost all credit if the clerical milieu but still has some prestige as a former Mosadiq deputy; the Ali Akbar a'zadi (NAYE) a former dean of the faculty of letters in-cabinet and former deputy, who is regarded as a real scholar; Mohammad NIAZI (DES), who teaches principles of Sunni jurisprudence and whose influence is limited by his Sunni background; and Hajjabad (ALI), regarded as one of the best Islamic scholars in Iran but also as erratic and eccentric; and - Dr. Mohseni ZADEH; an honest, hard-working scholar without outside interests and respected as such.

5. Other Faculty: The most "political" faculty at the University of Tehran has long been the Faculty of Technology whose former petroleum professor, Mehdi BAZARGAN, leader of the "council movement of Iran," is currently in jail after having been convicted of treason. According to all reports, Bazargan is still highly popular at the Faculty of Technology, even among students who generally remain aloof from political matters. Two other professors at that faculty, Abdul Hossein HOSSEINI and Mohseni ZADEH, have also been identified as National Fronters (5-351). On the other hand, Professor Ahmad HOSSEINI, who broke with Mosadiq in 1952 and became one of his leading opponents, is also respected for professional competence and personal courage.

The university has a Council for Scientific Research, on which are found some of its most important scientists. Its chairman is Chancellor Taheri and its vice chairman is Professor Mozaffar HIRDAK (see Law Faculty). One of the most respected members is Professor Hossein HOSSEINI, a research scholar in parasitology and head of the Institute of Public Health Research. A modest man, he does not on brief acquaintance give evidence of the exceptional qualities that some of our university contacts attribute to him. (One of them said he is "very popular and highly respected," another said "you can't find in charge of any organization.") Dr. Ismatollah FORGHANI-FAR, another member of the Council, and the head of the Department of Physics, is said to be much respected and interested in socio-political issues. Dr. Ali Asgar HOSSEINI, Professor of the Science College and chief of the Institute of the Iranian Sciences of the University, is a respected scientist but a poor administrator. Dr. Nader SHARIFI, dean of the Faculty of Medicine, is a respected constitutionalist and may speak out if the climate changes even slightly. Dr. Hossein KAKHAVAN, of the Cancer Research Institute, is said to have latent influence due to his integrity, his courage, and his known interest in political and social problems. Professor HOSSEINI, a leading mathematician and member of the Council, has philosophical interests extending beyond his discipline. He has been noted, and continues to be noted, as one professor who has repaid the hos italty shown to him to the Soviet Union with panegyrics about the advanced state of mathematics in that country, comparing that progress favorably with the status of the science in the United States.
Nebdi BAZARGAN was active in the petroleum affairs of the Pahadeg government and in a number of other projects involving his engineering talents. Today he is one of the four or five most active and trusted nationalists and should be classified in the young activist group. He is a partner in three construction firms: No Kar, YAD and the new Arbel Company. All three companies hire many of the active nationalists among Tehran's engineers. The YAD Company title is an abbreviation for the Farsi which means eleven University Professors and is an excellent example of the nationalist ties between the old Mosadeqista, the construction industry and the University. Bazarjan is a strongly religious man and is a leader of the Anjoman-e Falime Islami (Society for Islamic Instruction), an organization which meets for religious observances from time to time and which has obvious political undertones. Finally, Bazarjan is again on the engineering faculty of the University of Tehran. He was one of a group of about a dozen professors removed from the faculty for political reasons in 1954, but he was reinstated and has been teaching again for almost three years.
See A-351 from Tehran Dec. 21, 1963: The Iranian Intellectual Community (filed under Mahdavy, Hossein)
CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEMIN

7 November 1963
1-21/63

Chief, Political Section

CAS

Trial of PKI Leaders

The following is for your information and whatever use you may wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must not cite CAS as the source. The source is a former official (B) in the Kenesek government with good contacts among opposition leaders from a Freedom Movement of Iran leader (F).

1. Since the government was not allowing outsiders to attend the trial against Mohdi Monargi, Ayatollah Sayed Rahmat Taleqani, Tadehleh Sahabi, and others, the Freedom Movement of Iran (PKI) leaders refused to speak anymore at the trial. They also told their lawyers that they were not to defend them anymore. The PKI leaders were particularly unhappy about the lack of newspaper coverage.

2. The government then brought in a few newspapers from small newspapers, who reported only what the prosecutor said. The PKI leaders decided to continue their silence. The government insisted that in a military trial the accused had no right to dismiss their defense lawyers. At this point, retired General Maharam, lawyer for the defense, said that inasmuch as the PKI leaders had dismissed him he would be unable to defend them anymore. At this point the trial was recessed. (Comment: See A-19/6) for an account of the trial session on 29 October in which the PKI leaders refused to speak or allow the defense councils to speak for them.) General Rezaieh Zareini, who is chief judge, continues to express sympathy for the PKI leaders and claims that he must do his duty.

3. The government continues to put out falsehoods to the PKI prisoners, and has said that if they would forgo their opposition to the Shah, the government might let the trial wither away. Monargi, Taleqani, and Sahabi have rejected such proposals.

4. During the trial, Taleqani has not spoken at all. Monargi has spoken only about the court's being incompetent to try them and has condemned the lack of a jury. (Comment: A number of sources report that the PKI leaders are gaining popularity in opposition circles through this trial and their uncompromising attitude toward the government.)
TO: Chief, Political Section
FROM: CAS

DATE: 21 January 1964

SECRET

subject: Refusal by Dr. Mehdi Bazargan of Special Visiting Privilege

The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must cite the control NOPORN but need not cite CAS as the source. The source is a former member of the National Front Central Council.

On 20 January 1964 it was arranged through Police Chief General Nasiri that Mrs. Mehdi Bazargan and her five children, the youngest one, ten months of age, could go to the jail and meet with Dr. Mehdi Bazargan, recently sentenced to ten years in solitary confinement in the Freedom Movement of Iran (PMI) trials. Mrs. Bazargan and children went to the jail and waited to see Dr. Bazargan. After over an hour of waiting Dr. Bazargan sent the family a note stating that there were nine persons sentenced for PMI activities, and if he visited with his family, it would mean that he had accepted a special privilege, which he refused to do. None of the prisoners have been permitted visitors.
4. I pointed out that General Cast and Mr. Lamkanis
had met with Minister of Defense and his colleagues to
discuss this same subject, but received no help. No clear
indications of GOI thinking. I reviewed frustration:
and harassment. Military mission was undercooking in its
efforts to obtain access to its records, U.S. govern-
ment property and personal possessions, and said these
matters needed speedy resolution.

5. Bazargan said he realized he had been slow in giving
me some guidance on this subject and thanked me for our
patience. He personally felt that Iran needed to have
some sort of continuing military logistics relationship
with the United States, but that his government had not
yet decided what form it should take. He asked me to
retain our small armish-maag group through the new uzi
holiday period and promised to have some further dis-
susions on the subject after that period.

6. He then expressed surprise that Armish was still
having problems on access and other similar matters.
He gave went some instructions in Farsi and told me
that he hoped to have an early resolution of our problems.

7. He and Entezam then said they were having great
difficulty getting a handle on outstanding contractual
obligations between Iran and the U.S. on military equip-
ment. They were particularly interested in the trust
fund and how it worked. It seemed that some "Komitay"
had taken all the records from General Toqarshian's
office and nobody in the government knew where they were.

8. I said that General Cast had discussed these subjects
with Minister Madani and had left him some documents.
However, until Armish could have access to its files,
it could not but not provide greater details.
WE RECEIVED ON MARCH 11 A LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN DATED MARCH 1 EXPRESSING REGRETS FOR THE FEB 14 ATTACK ON THE EMBASSY AND GOI WILLINGNESS TO REIMBURSE US FOR THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED. THE FULL TEXT OF THE LETTER, COMPLETE WITH SPELLING AND OTHER ERRORS, FOLLOWS:

QUOTE THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF IRAN PRESENT THEIR COMPLIMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND WHILE EXPRESSING THEIR DEEP REGRET AT THE INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON FEB 14, 1979, WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT THE SAID REGRETTABLE OCCURRENCE WAS INSTIGATED BY ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO PREVENT SERIOUSLY THE REPETITION OF SUCH INCIDENTS.

QUOTE IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE REGRETS OF THIS GOVERNMENT BE COMMUNICATED TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

QUOTE FURTHERMORE, THIS GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO DECLARE THEIR READINESS TO INDEMNIFY THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE ABOVE INCIDENT.

QUOTE THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW THE ASSURANCES OF THEIR HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. END QUOTE.

(SIGNED) MEHDI BAZARGAN, PRIME MINISTER.

SULLIVAN

#2846
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC  PRIORITY 449
E.O. 12065: GDS 3/20/85 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, IR

SUBJECT: March 30th Referendum

1. C - entire text.

2. During meeting with Prime Minister March 19, Ambassador asked if timing and form of forthcoming referendum will remain as advertised. Bazargan replied affirmatively but noted he himself is not involved in preparations for the referendum. They are being handled by Interior Minister with the assistance of a special commission. He implied that he could not be absolutely categoric but believed the referendum would go through on March 30th with a single question to which voters would be asked to reply Yes or No.

3. Bazargan agreed there were many people sniping at the format of the referendum, but he said as far as he knew referenda are always Yes or No propositions to a single question. He hoped to explain all this to the critics and reduce the political controversy on the question.

SULLIVAN
I was surprised by our arrival to find no photographers and no Mideast TV cameras in attendance. In an obviously pre-staged move, Bazargan briefly said "on camera" and clearly went out of his way to demonstrate war personal relations. While the cameras were still in the room, to congratulate him on his success in stopping summary executions, I do not think there was a sound "recording" of our conversation.

Our discussion then ranged over a number of subjects which will be reported by separate telegrams. However, one of my principal points concerned the need for assistance in physical security of embassy compounds against attacks generated by PLO and Fedayeen in the wake of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Bazargan said he could pass word "indirectly" to local PLO representatives that government did not want any material support for American embassy. He also said that PLO in effective forces were under instructions to refrain from summary execution and prevent difficulties.

As other reporting cables will indicate, conversation was friendly and constructive throughout. Bazargan and Entezam displayed understanding of Soviets and desire to maintain good relations with U.S.

At same time, discussion turned to problems in the government's control over Palestinian guerrillas, and is its future. SOURCE: SISSN 5039

-27-
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 455
INFO: AMEMBASSY AMMAN 006 RUEHAM
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 002 RUEMBE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 012 RUENFC
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 005 RUEHDM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 011 RUJMD
AMEMBASSY LONDON 009 RUJTE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 004 RUENTV
TAGS: PEPR, XF, IR
E.O. 12065: RDS-4 3/20/99 (Lambrakis, G.B.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, IR, XF
LIMDIS

SUBJECT: Iranian Position on Middle East Negotiations

1. C - entire text.

2. During meeting with Prime Minister Bazargan and his deputy Amir Entezam, March 19, Ambassador adverted to President Carter's efforts in the Middle East and said he had been asked to inform the Prime Minister that chances were good for signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in the coming week or so. Bazargan replied that he and his government have been too busy with internal affairs to keep up even with the newspapers and therefore have not really taken a position on the treaty. Amir Entezam broke in to say he had not yet had a chance to brief the Prime Minister because of the press of business, but Amir Entezam, as spokesman, had told the press this morning that Iran opposes any treaty or other moves which are against the interests of the Palestinians.

4. The Ambassador then went over the arguments in favor
of the peace process, noting that the PLO and some others do not seem to appreciate the value of an autonomous Palestinian state on the West Bank as a step toward permanent solution of the Arab-Israeli problem. Bazargan did not reply directly, but asked what provisions this treaty process would make for the plight of the Shias in southern Lebanon who feel themselves between the Palestinian and Israeli guns and are getting hurt. The Ambassador noted that Pol Counselor Lambrakis, who was accompanying him, had spent time in Lebanon and was aware of the Shia problem there. The Ambassador and Lambrakis then noted that, while there is nothing specific about the Shias in Lebanon in the present negotiations, their fate will help create an environment which should minimize friction in southern Lebanon, we hope. In any case, we are aware of Iran's interest in the Shia situation in Lebanon.

Bazargan said in passing that another reason GOI has not focused on the problem has been the illness of Foreign Minister Sanjabi. He has a slipped disk in his back and tried coming back to work March 18, but had to return to his bed, where he needs a long rest. This appears to conflict with newspaper reports that Sanjabi delivered a speech as planned at the NIOC building in Tehran March 19, and with
from head of MFA American Dept. that Sanjabi worked a full
day (until 2:00 p.m.) at MFA March 19 and may'be
delivering a political speech March 20. Is Bazargan
misinformed, or is he anxious to squelch reports of
Sanjabi's tendered resignation?)

6. Comment: Awareness in GOI of Lebanese Shias is
something USG should keep in mind. It is possible this
will give us a handle to interest GOI in the Middle East
problem on behalf of the ongoing peace process, countering
to a certain degree the hold Palestinians have gained
over the Islamic movement here.

SULLIVAN
CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
CHG:CWNAAS
POL:JDSTEMPEL
NONE
POL(3) CHG ECON ICA OR
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USLO RIYADH
AMEMBASSY ROME
ANENBASSY TOKYO
USCINCUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCINCPAC

E.O. 12065: XDS-4 5/6/09 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PFOF, PGOV, PINS, IR
SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT) THIS IS A REPORTING CABLE.

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE REVIEWED U.S. DESIRE TO NORMALIZE U.S.-IRAN TIES, NOTED PROPAGANDA AGAINST USG, AND STRESSED U.S. IS NOT IN ANY WAY INTERVENING IN IRANIAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. BAZARGAN STRESSED HIS PERSONAL
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COMMITMENT TO GOOD U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS, AND STRESSED PGOI DESIRE FOR GOOD, EVEN EXPANDED, ECONOMIC TIES WITH U.S. PM SOUGHT FAVORABLE USG ATTITUDE TOWARD PROBLEMS OF CONTRACT TERMINATION AND CONTINUANCE. BAZARGAN OPINED IT WOULD TAKE ANOTHER ONE/TWO MONTHS TO HAVE A DRAFT CONSTITUTION READY, BUT SAID ELECTORAL LAW FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY HAS JUST BEEN COMPLETED. BAZARGAN-ENTEZAM BIO NOTE. END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE, ACCOMPANIED BY ACTING POLCOUNS STEMPEL CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN MORNING MAY 6. DEPUTY PM AMIR ENTEZAM WAS PRESENT AND TRANSLATED, THOUGH IT WAS APPARENT THAT BAZARGAN UNDERSTOOD MOST OF WHAT WAS BEING SAID IN ENGLISH. MEETING OPENED ON WARM NOTE OF GREETING ALL AROUND. CHARGE SPOKE IN TERMS TO THOSE HE HAD USED WITH OTHER MINISTERS: U.S. ACCEPTS RESULTS OF IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND WISHES NEW PGOI SUCCESS. USG STRONGLY DESIRES TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS TO EXTENT AND AT PACE PGOI DESIRES. U.S. SUPPORTS IRAN'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC STABILITY.

4. NOTING THAT THERE HAS BEEN MUCH ANTI-U.S. PROPAGANDA IN SPEECHES AND MEDIA, CHARGE STRESSED THAT U.S. IS NOT INTERVENING AND WILL NOT INTERVENE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN. PRIME MINISTER WELCOMED CHARGE'S STATEMENT WITH THANKS. CHARGE SAID IF EVER DOUBT AROSE ON THIS SCORE, BAZARGAN OR SENIOR OFFICIALS SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO CALL CHARGE OR AMBASSADOR, WHEN HE ARRIVES. TIMELY FRANKNESS WAS GOOD WAY TO MINIMIZE MISUNDERSTANDING.

5. BAZARGAN RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVORED GOOD U.S.-IRAN TIES, ALLUDING TO VALUE OF HIS PREVIOUS MEETINGS WITH AMB SULLIVAN AND POLOFF. GOOD RELATIONS WITH U.S. WERE PERSONAL BELIEF FOR PRIME MINISTER, AND WHEN FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI'S APPOINTMENT WAS BEING CONSIDERED, PM HAD QUESTIONED YAZDI ON THIS POINT HIMSELF UNTIL HE WAS ASSURED THAT YAZDI SUPPORTED, FRIENDLY TIES WITH U.S. PGOI FEELS U.S. DOES INDEED WANT IRAN TO BE A STRONG POWER, AND BAZARGAN JUDGED U.S. WAS SINCERE IN WANTING GOOD RELATIONS. IF U.S. AGREES THAT IRANIAN INTERPRETATION OF U.S. INTENTIONS IS CORRECT, QUOTE WE BELIEVE THAT YOUR NEW AMBASSADOR WILL BE ABLE TO HELP US. UNQUOTE BAZARGAN THEN SAID IF USG HAD ANY INFORMATION THAT WOULD HELP IRAN DEFEND ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM ITS ENEMIES, QUOTE WE WILL APPRECIATE IT IF YOU CAN PASS IT TO US. UNQUOTE HE INDICATED DEPUTY
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PM ENTEZAM SHOULD BE CONTACT FOR THIS PURPOSE.

6. PM NOTED THAT U.S. AND IRAN HAD HAD GOOD ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS. NEW PGOI WANTED SAME, PERHAPS EXPANDED, ECONOMIC TIES. MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WOULD OF COURSE CHANGE. WEAPONS PURCHASES WOULD STOP, BUT PGOI NEEDED TECHNICAL HELP AND SPARE PARTS. PGOI HOPED AND EXPECTED TO HAVE FAVORABLE USG HELP IN SETTLING QUESTIONS OF CONTRACT TERMINATION AND RENEWAL. ENTEZAM ADDED THAT PGOI WANTED USG QUOTE NOT TO BE AGAINST US UNQUOTE ON DECISIONS WHETHER TO RENEW CONTRACTS OR NOT. ENTEZAM NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT $8 MILLION IN SPARE PARTS WAS STILL WAITING IN TEXAS FOR SHIPMENT TO IRAN, AND URGED SOME ACTION ON THIS MATTER. CHARGE SAID HE WOULD CHECK ON IT, BUT THOUGHT SHIPMENT OF WHOLE $8 MILLION WORTH HAD BEGUN SOME DAYS EARLIER. (MISSION BELIEVES AT LEAST ONE PLANLOAD HAS ALREADY ARRIVED; DETAILS WILL BE FORWARDED TO PGOI.) ENTEZAM ASKED FURTHER QUESTION ABOUT REPORTED ARRIVAL OF NINE U.S. MILITARY PLANES. CHARGE SAID THESE WERE NINE CARGO PLANES TO TAKE OUT BACKLOG OF HOUSEHOLD SHIPMENTS AND THAT PLANES WERE COMING AT RATE OF ONE OR TWO PER DAY, NOT ALL AT ONCE. ENTEZAM NOTED THIS WITH SATISFACTION.

7. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM CHARGE, PM DEVOTED A FEW MINUTES TO BROAD BRUSH OVERVIEW OF REVOLUTION, NOTING THAT HE WAS MERELY ELABORATING ON HIS RECENT TV TALK. IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAS SUCCEEDED VERY RAPIDLY. THIS BROUGHT MANY DIFFICULTIES, BUT PGOI WAS TRYING TO GET TOGETHER AND BEGIN TO MEET ITS PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY SECURITY. ENTEZAM ADDED THAT PGOI HAD SUPPORT OF QUOTE 99 PERCENT OF PEOPLE UNQUOTE WHO ARE WILLING TO GIVE UP A GREAT DEAL TO MAKE REVOLUTION SUCCEED. CONCERNED THAT RECENT KILLINGS OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENT LEADERS (GEN QARANI AND AYATOLLAH MOTAHARI) HAD INCREASED ANXIETY, BAZARGAN SAID THESE PROBLEMS WOULD BE OVERCOME. NEW DRAFT CONSTITUTION WAS BEING WORKED ON, BUT IT WOULD TAKE ONE TO TWO MONTHS FOR IT TO BE READY FOR RELEASE TO PUBLIC IN FINAL FORM. MEANWHILE, NEW ELECTORAL LAW HAD JUST BEEN COMPLETED, SO ADMINISTRATIVE PREPARATIONS FOR ELECTIONS OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WERE WELL ALONG. TWO OR THREE MONTHS MORE WOULD PROBABLY BE

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NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THIS PROCESS; THIS WAS EXAMPLE OF
PROBLEM WHICH GREW FROM RAPID SUCCESS OF REVOLUTION.
(COMMENT: BAZARGAN AND ENTEZAM APPEARED SINCERELY POSITIVE,
BUT THEY WENT TO SOME MODEST PAINS TO PAINT GOOD
PICTURE OF REVOLUTION GRADUALLY CONSOLIDATING ITS GAINS.
SINCE DISCUSSION CAME AT END OF MEETING, CHARGE DID NOT
PUSH FOR THEIR REACTION TO HARD QUESTIONS OF POLITICAL
ORGANIZATION. VIEW GIVEN ABOVE IS PROBABLY AS CLOSE
TO AN APPROVED QUOTE PARTY LINE UNQUOTE FOR THE ISLAMIC
PGOI AS CAN BE FOUND.)

8. ENTEZAM AND BAZARGAN: ENTEZAM IS NOW CLEARLY PM'S
RIGHT HAND MAN. HE HAS BEEN CLOSE TO BAZARGAN FOR
SOME YEARS, BUT REALLY CAME INTO HIS OWN JUST BEFORE
AND JUST AFTER SUCCESS OF REVOLUTION. DEPARTURE OF
YAZDI FROM PRIME MINISTERIAL ENTOURAGE HAS GIVEN
ENTEZAM GREATER ROLE IN GENERAL POLITICS OF PGOI,
INCLUDING FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHICH WERE VIRTUAL YAZDI
PRESERVE. ENTEZAM IS ABOUT 48, A 1963 UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA BERKELEY PHD IN ECONOMICS, AND HAS HAD HIS
OWN PRIVATE CONSULTING FIRM FOR SEVERAL YEARS. WITHIN
LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) HE ROSE TO POSITION
ON CENTRAL GOVERNING BODY OVER PAST TWO YEARS AND WAS ONE
OF THOSE CHOSSEN BY BAZARGAN FOR GOVERNMENTAL POSITION
BECAUSE OF HIS MODERATE VIEWS. HE WAS CHIEF CHALLENGER OF
CURRENT TEBRAN MAYOR TAVAKOLI, WHO REPRESENTED THE LEFTIST
FACTION OF THE LMI. BAZARGAN CHOSE ENTEZAM TO REPLACE
TAVAKOLI AS THE LMI'S PRINCIPAL DAY TO DAY CONTACT WITH
THE EMBASSY SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION'S
SUCCESS.

9. BOTH ENTEZAM AND BAZARGAN SHARE A WESTERN INTELLECTUAL
VIEW OF THE WORLD AND THE WAY OF LIFE SHOULD BE
ORIENTATED. THOUGH RELIGIOUS (BAZARGAN MORE SO THAN
ENTEZAM), BOTH IMPLICITLY BELIEVE MORE IN WESTERN
RATIONALIST CONCEPTS THAN THEIR THEOLOGICAL ALLIES IN THE
ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. DURING THIS MEETING BAZARGAN LOOKED
HEALTHY AND ALERT. NAAS##
Tehran, Iran

May 24, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As you know, a series of large demonstrations to protest the recent resolution by the United States Senate are planned for this afternoon and tomorrow. I am deeply disturbed that at no time since the preparations of the demonstrations were announced have I seen any action or appeal by the Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure that the public actions will be peaceful. I urge that the Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran take whatever steps are necessary to call for calm and a peaceful atmosphere.

Your Government is aware that the U.S. Administration has been making a maximum effort to improve relations, restore our ties to a normal course, and limit to the extent possible emotional or misinformed responses. We have no ability to control statements from the American press or the U.S. Congress. We have done our best, however, to present a factual picture of events in Iran and to describe to all interested American parties the mutual interest and concerns we share with Iran.

We are concerned by the phenomenon of increasing anti-Americanism in Iran, much of which seems to be based on a popular misunderstanding of the attitude of this Administration.

I have been instructed by my Government to express its concern that the demonstrations today and tomorrow

His Excellency,
Eng. Mehdi Bazargan,
Prime Minister,
Tehran.
may threaten the safety of American Embassy personnel in Tehran. We would like the Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to consider additional measures to provide protection in the emotionally-charged circumstances. The United States Government expects the Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to fulfill its internationally recognized responsibilities to protect the lives and property of foreign diplomatic personnel.

In order to reduce the possibility of violence, I would like to suggest that the demonstrations be routed away from the Embassy and prevented from approaching the walls of the Embassy.

Mr. Prime Minister, as I had expressed to you personally, our two countries and peoples have much in common to provide a firm foundation for a good relationship in the future based on mutual respect. I sincerely hope that your Government will take whatever steps are necessary to cool the present atmosphere so that both of us can go about our work in improving our relations in the interest of both of our peoples.

With high esteem,

Sincerely,

Charles W. Naas
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.
DURING CHARGE MEETING WITH BAZARGAN (REFTEL), PRIME MINISTER ASKED ABOUT AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN AND SAID HE HAD WANTED TO SEE AMBASSADOR BEFORE HE LEFT. HE REMINISCED BRIEFLY ON HIS MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR IN VERY FLATTERING TERMS, WAS Genuinely pleased that AMBASSADOR HAD RETURNED SAFELY, AND ASKED AMBASSADOR TO GIVE HIS PERSONAL BEST WISHES. WAAS
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO FOURTH OF JULY MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN FOR THE PRESIDENT: QUOTE ON BEHALF OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN I WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. THE FOURTH OF JULY INVOKES THE MEMORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, AN OCCASION THAT I DEEM FIT TO SEIZE TO CONVEY, THROUGH YOU, OUR GOOD WISHES FOR THE PROSPERITY AND WELL-BEING OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. UNQUOTE

2. FOLLOWING RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER SHOULD BE DELIVERED TO PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN: QUOTE DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF BEST WISHES TO COMMEMORATE THE ANNIVERSARY OF OUR INDEPENDENCE IS DEEPLY APPRECIATED. THANK YOU—ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL EXPRESSION OF FRIENDSHIP AND GOODWILL. SINCERELY, JIMMY CARTER. UNQUOTE

3. NO RELEASE INTENDED, BUT NO OBJECTION IF RECIPIENT WISHES TO DO SO. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL. VANCE BT #9918

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver to you the following text of President Carter's response to your gracious message of congratulations on my country's Independence Day:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your kind message of best wishes to commemorate the anniversary of our independence is deeply appreciated. Thank you, on behalf of the American people, for your thoughtful expression of friendship and goodwill.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

I take this opportunity, Mr. Prime Minister, to express my own appreciation of your message and to record my gratitude for the warm welcome I have had since my arrival from both the government and people of Iran.

Sincerely yours,

L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Mehdi Bazargan,
Prime Minister of Iran,
Tehran.
2. SUMMARY: I CALLED ON PM BAZARGAN AUGUST 11. PM YAZDI WAS PRESENT AS TRANSLATOR. FOLLOWING OPENING REMARKS ON OUR MUTUAL DESIRE FOR A FRUITFUL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, BAZARGAN SAID THAT THE PG01 IS DISAPPOINTED THAT U.S. PROMISES HAVE NOT BEEN BACKED UP BY ACTIONS. YAZDI RAISED THREE PROBLEM AREAS: MILITARY SPARE PARTS, VISAS AND LACK OF A REPLACEMENT FOR AMBASSADOR CUTLER. I RESPONDED BY DETAILING WHAT WE HAVE DONE IN THE MILITARY SUPPLY AREA, POINTING OUT THAT THERE ARE ACTIONS WHICH THE PG01 MUST ALSO TAKE TO RESUME THE FLOW. I SAID THAT WE, TOO, ARE DISAPPOINTED BY OUR CONTINUING INABILITY TO GAIN ACCESS TO PROPAGANDA AND RECORDS RELATED TO OUR PAST MILITARY PRESENCE IN IRAN AND ASKED FOR HIS HELP IN THIS REGARD. ON VISAS, I TOLD BAZARGAN WHAT WE HAD BEEN DOING AND WHAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DO, BUT AGAIN SAID WE NEEDED PG01 COOPERATION IN REMOVING THE IRREGULAR SECURITY PRESENTLY ON OUR COMPOUND. YAZDI RAISED HOME TREATMENT OF U.S. CORRESPONDENTS AS AN IRITANT IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. YAZDI RESPONDED WITH HIS NOW FAMILIAR CHARGES OF A CONSPIRACY IN THE U.S. MEDIA TO SLANDER THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. BAZARGAN WAS MORE DISPASSIONATE IN HIS VIEW OF THE PRESS. THE MEETING ENDED WITH AN APPEAL FROM BAZARGAN FOR CONCRETE ACTS ON OUR PART TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. GOODWILL TOWARD IRAN. I SAID WE HAD TRIED AND WOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO DO THIS, BUT URGED IRAN TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE RATHER THAN TO TWEAL ON THE PAST AND TO STATE WHAT ITS REVOLUTION WAS FOR AS WELL AS WHAT IT WAS AGAINST. END SUMMARY.

3. I BEGAN BY THANKING BAZARGAN FOR RECEIVING ME AS CHARGE WHICH I TOOK AS AN INDICATION OF THE PG01'S DESIRE TO WORK WITH THE USG TO BUILD A BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP THAT TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE NEW REALITIES IN IRAN. I EXPRESSED MY GOVERNMENT'S WARMEST REGARDS AND RESPECT FOR HIM PERSONALLY AND THE PG01. WE WANTED TO WORK WITH IRAN, I TOLD HIM, ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WOULD TAKE TIME AND PATIENCE TO DEVELOP A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP. WE HOPE THAT IN PURSUING THAT GOAL THERE WOULD BE RESTRAINT AND UNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES. I SAID THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT WE WERE READY TO HELP IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE THAT MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO IRAN'S STABILITY AND THE WELL-BEING OF ITS PEOPLE. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT WE COULD MAKE PROG-

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LESS IN BUILDING OUR RELATIONSHIP BECAUSE IT WAS THE DESIRE OF BOTH OUR PEOPLES THAT WE DO SO. WHILE WE HAD SOME PROBLEMS TO WORK OUT, WE HAD STRONG CONTINUING MUTUAL INTERESTS. ON OUR SIDE WE REGARDED THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE STABILITY OF IRAN AS IMPORTANT TO US BEFORE THE REVOLUTION AND JUST AS IMPORTANT TO US IN ITS AFTERMATH. I WOULD BE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON TOWARD THE END OF AUGUST AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO CARRY ANY MESSAGE HE MIGHT HAVE.


5. UNFORTUNATELY, FROM IRAN'S POINT OF VIEW, BAZARGAN SAID, THE U.S. HAD NOT RESPONDED IN ANY POSITIVE WAY THAT THE P30I COULD USE TO DEMONSTRATE THE WORTH OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH US TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. "YOU HAVE ONLY GIVEN LIP SERVICE TO BETTER RELATIONS," HE SAID, "AND WE HAVE ONLY HEARD PROMISES FROM YOU. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE CITED ASSURANCES GIVEN BY AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN AND CHARGE NAAS THAT MILITARY SPARE PARTS WOULD BE DELIVERED. "NOTHING HAS HAPPENED," HE SAID, "NOT EVEN A DATE WHEN WE MIGHT EXPECT DELIVERY HAS BEEN GIVEN US. THERE WAS ALSO A PROBLEM INVOLVED IN CLEARING IRAN'S MILITARY ACCOUNTS. IRAN HAD RECEIVED NO INVOICES ON WHAT IT HAD BOUGHT AND PAID FOR SINCE 1966, HE CLAIMED. THE P30I CONSEQUENTLY HAD NO IDEA OF WHAT ITS FINANCIAL POSITION WAS IN THIS AREA. SOME FIGURES HAD BEEN PRO-

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6. TURNING TO ANOTHER AREA, HE SAID THAT WE WERE NOT
MEETING VISA NEEDS OR EVEN INDIVIDUALS NEEDING "MEDICA-
TURENTS". SOME PEOPLE WHO HAD HAD OPEN HEART SURGERY
AND HAD MADE APPOINTMENTS FOR CHURCHES IN THE U.S.
HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET VISAS. YAZDI INTERPRETED TO
SAY THE P301 WAS UNDER GROWING PRESSURE TO ALLOW STU-
DENTS TO GO TO THE USSR FOR STUDY. THIS WAS SOMETHING
THE P301 DID NOT WANT TO DO, HE SAID, BUT WHICH IT MIGHT
HAVE TO ACCOMMODATE (IF WE DID NOT ISSUE VISAS TO THEM TO
GO TO U.S. SCHOOLS, THE THREAT REMAINED UNCLEAR).
PAZARZAN SAID THAT THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF OUR
FAILURE TO NAME A REPLACEMENT FOR AMBASSADOR CUTLER.
YAZDI REPEATED HIS EARLIER CONTENTION THAT YOUR CHARGE
TO US WITHIN 24 HOURS THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD
ACCEPTED OUR DECISION, AND HE TOLD THAT THEY WERE SUBSTI-
TLY TOLD THAT IT WOULD TAKE ONLY FIVE OR SIX WEEKS
TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS.

7. I RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT I WELCOME PAZARZAN'S
FEARNESS, PARTICULARLY SINCE SOME OF THE THINGS HE
RAISED I HAD PLANNED BRINGING UP MYSELF. I WAS UNAWARE
THAT IRAN HAD RECEIVED NO INVOICES FOR ITS MILITARY
PURCHASES SINCE 1966; QUITE FRANKLY I FOUND SUCH A CON-
TINUATION HARD TO BELIEVE. I NOTED THAT IN EARLIER DIS-
Cussions WITH FM YAZDI AND MOND RIahi I HAD DEALT AT
SOME LENGTH ON THE COMPLICATED NATURE OF OUR PAST MILI-
TARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. I ASSURED HIM THAT OUR PUR-
CHASES WAS NOT TO STOP THE FLOW OF ESSENTIAL SPARE PARTS
TO IRAN, BUT RATHER TO DEAL WITH THE ENTIRE RELATIONSHIP
IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO JEOPARDIZE OUR ABILITY TO BE
IN POSITION TO PROVIDE THE KIND OF SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP
IRAN MIGHT WANT FOR THE FUTURE.

8. THOUGH PATIENT EFFORT WE HAD REACHED A POSITION
WHERE WE WERE NOW ABLE TO RESUME DELIVERY OF SPARE PARTS
IN THE PIPELINE. THIS HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE MOD
AND THE MFA TWO WEEKS AGO, AND WE WERE NOW WAITING FOR
IRAN TO MAKE SHIPMENT ARRANGEMENTS SO THAT DELIVERIES
COULD BE EFFECTED. SEVERAL PLANE LOADS OF SPARES HAD
BEEN DELIVERED IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS THROUGH AR-
RANGEMENTS WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE MAAS AND THE IIACF AND
FURTHER, WE WERE READY TO CONSIDER NEW ORDERS, INCLUDING
THAT FOR COBRA/FOW CALIBRATION SERVICES. I SAID THAT AN
OFFICE WOULD BE HAND CARRYING AN LOA FOR THIS CASE TO
IRAN ON AUGUST 13.
I also said that we had been using a meeting of high Iranian and PLO officials concerned with the military supply issue for some time. Such a meeting, which would deal with procedures, would, in our view, help develop better understanding of this complicated subject.

(Bazargan got on the phone—to Miah—I believe—and after a brief conversation agreed that such a meeting should be convened. Yf and Yazdi set August 14 at the MFA as the date and venue.) On the matter of accounting, I told Bazargan that there was a meeting scheduled in Washington August 22-24 for the specific purpose of dealing into this matter. A great deal of work was going into preparations for this meeting and at least under the PLOI to send a representative to it. The Mag would be represented in any event, and could brief PLOI officials later, but we believed it would be far preferable for the PLOI to have its own representative present. I urged Bazargan to consider this.

10. Both Bazargan and Yazdi appeared to be taken aback by my statement that it was up to the PLOI to make arrangements for delivery of its spares. Yazdi asked if we did not deliver these items for Iran. I explained that was only in certain instances, and that the usual practice was for the purchaser to make its own arrangements. I again said that the meetings I had referred to could be useful in helping the PLOI to understand this very complicated subject and urged that it send someone to Washington in addition to participating in the procedural meeting on August 14.

11. I then raised a number of problems on our side. I noted that we had retained a small military mission in Iran and that the bulk of those members still felt had been involved in trying to wind up in an orderly way our past military properties in Iran. We had had only very limited success in getting access to records at Gulf District, in reclaiming communications equipment and other properties that belonged to us, in disposing of commissary stocks, even in resolving such minor matters as the

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MAIL ABANDONED AT THE APO. IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF THE MONETARY VALUE OF WHAT WE ARE AFTER, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SEVERAL MILLION DOLLARS INVOLVED IN THE COMMISSARY STOCKS ITSELF; WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRINCIPLE INVOLVED IN OUR CONTINUING INABILITY TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO WHAT IS CASH. I ASKED FOR YAZDAN'S COOPERATION IN RESOLVING THESE ISSUES, NOTING THAT I WOULD BE SENDING A LEX TO YAZDI IN A FEW DAYS ON THIS SAME SUBJECT ACCOUNTING FOR THE TEMPEST WHICH UNFORTUNATELY, WAS THER.

12. ON VISAS, I TOLD BAZARGAN THAT IT WAS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO STOP THE FLOW OF PEOPLE BETWEEN IRAN AND THE U.S. I NOTED THAT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REVOLUTION AND THE ATTACK ON THE EMBASSY WE HAD CONFRONTED A NUMBER OF ISSUES IN RESUMING FULL-SCALE CONSULAR OPERATIONS. THESE INCLUDED LACK OF AN ADEQUATE PHYSICAL FACILITY, A SCARCITY OF STAFF AND INADEQUATE SECURITY. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS, WE REMOVED OUR EFFORTS TO SEE THAT EVERY QUALIFIED PERSON WOULD GET A VISA IN TIME TO REACH HIS SCHOOL IN THE U.S. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE PRESENTLY PROCESSING 450 STUDENT VISA CASES A DAY AND THAT WE HAD PUT ON OUR CREAMS TO COMPLETE NEW CONSULAR FACILITIES THAT WILL BE AMONG THE MOST MODERN IN THE WORLD. I EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THERE COULD BE INSTANCES OF INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING MEDICAL ATTENTION NOT BEING ABLE TO GET VISAS, AND ASKED BAZARGAN TO LET US KNOW OF ANY SUCH INSTANCES SO WE COULD HELP.

13. I WENT ON TO POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT WE HAD BEEN FORCE TO WORK WITHIN CERTAIN CONSTRAINTS IN OUR EFFORTS TO RESUME FULL-SCALE CONSULAR OPERATIONS, INCLUDING THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF AN IRREGULAR SECURITY FORCE ON OUR COMPOUND. WE WERE GENUINELY APPRECIATIVE OF THE HELP ITS MEMBERS HAD PROVIDED, ESPECIALLY IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE FEBRUARY ATTACK ON THE EMBASSY, BUT CONDITIONS HAD NOW CHANGED, IN OUR VIEW, THEIR PRESENCE WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE. INDEED THE ABSENCE TO WHICH THEY HAD INVESTED THEMSELVES IN OUR INTERNAL OPERATIONS WAS DIRECTLY RELATED TO OUR ABILITY TO OPERATE ACCORDINGLY, WE THOUGHT IT IMPERATIVE THAT THEY BE REMOVED AND REPLACED BY A REGULAR SECURITY FORCE OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND.

14. YAZDI SAID THE HEAD OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WAS SUPPOSED TO TALK TO MASHALLAH KASHANI THAT VERY DAY WITH A VIEW TO HAVING HIM AND HIS PEOPLE LEAVE. THEY WOULD
15. I THEN RAISED TREATMENT OF U.S. CORRESPONDENTS BY THE PGOI, SAYING THAT I UNDERSTOOD THE PGOI CONCERN THAT THE AMERICAN PRESS WAS NOT PRESENTING A BALANCED PICTURE OF IRAN. I HAD NOT COME TO LODGE AN OFFICIAL COMPLAINT ABOUT THE EXPULSION OF AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS BUT I SAID WHAT TO EXPRESS MY CONCERN ABOUT THE IMPACT SUCH ACTIONS WERE HAVING ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. WHILE OUR PRESS WAS NOT PERFECT, WE DID ALLEGE OCCASIONAL BIASED REPORTING. I SUGGESTED THAT CORRESPONDENTS WERE MOTIVATED BY SIMPL Y NOT HUMAN CONSIDERATIONS. THEY FOCUS ON THE SENSATIONAL BECAUSE THEY KNOW THAT IS WHAT SELLS. BUT, AS A FREE PRESS MAY NOT ALWAYS PRINT WHAT WE MIGHT WANT IT TO, THE ONLY THING WHICH WAS A CONTROLLED PRESS.

16. I TOLD BAZARGAN THAT TO OUR PEOPLE THERE APPEARS TO BE AN EFFORT DIRECTED SPECIFICALLY AGAINST THE AMERICAN PRESS, A PERCEPTION THAT DOES NOT HELP THE CLIMATE IN WHICH THE PGOI AND WE MUST WORK IN OUR EFFORT TO REBUILD OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. I CITED THE REMARKS BY DR. MOINI OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE TO THE EFFECT THAT AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS IN IRAN OFTEN SEEM TO BE SHIPS FIRST AND JOURNALISTS SECOND. SUCH A STATEMENT, WITHOUT ANY FOUNDATION, AND BY A SENIOR PGOI OFFICIAL, WOULD BE IN NO ONE'S INTEREST.

17. WITHOUT WAITING FOR BAZARGAN TO RESPOND, YAZDI SAID THAT THE “PROBLEM WITH YOUR PRESS IS THAT IT IS MISINFORMING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC; IT IS SLANDERING US.” HE CITED AN INTERVIEW HE HAD GIVEN TO GREGORY ROSE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT HE REPRESENTED NEW YORK MAGAZINE WHICH ROSE SUBSEQUENTLY BILLED AS AN INTERVIEW WITH BOTH YAZDI AND MOINI AND SOLD TO PENTHOUSE MAGAZINE. ANOTHER ZEIT

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Example was the Newsweek feature, "The Joyless Revolution." "Did you read it?" he asked. While Yazdi turned to translate for a seemingly puzzled Bazargan I began to protest for his specific remark only to have him return to the subject wise rounded head. "Should we fill out the heel carpet for these people?" he asked. "If we have never treated us fairly. They call us fanatics and backward. This same U.S. News and World Report once called me a communist. I wrote them a letter FBI but the charge, and they wouldn't even print it."

12. At that point Bazargan quietly observed that there was a time when the foreign media had been very sympathetic to the Iranian revolution. Even before the Carter administration had decided to stop supporting the Shah, he said, the foreign press was portraying the situation in Iran as it really was. After the revolution, too, reporting was fair. I suggested that the time article on Hormuz, a copy of which I had sent to Yazdi, surely had been favorably balanced. I also suggested that NBC, a very respectable news organization, could have tried to remain balanced had it been given the chance.

13. Yazdi countered that the NBC team had been expelled because it had violated Iranian regulations governing foreign correspondents. I said that correspondents wished to know what the regulations were if they were to abide by them. Yazdi claimed that the NBC team leader had been briefed by Dr. Behzadnia of the Ministry of National Guidance the last time he had been in Iran, but that he chose to ignore the rules and go to Qom instead where he got a letter from the Local Committee authorizing him to go to Turkestān. I responded that the pool, having made its point, should now invite NBC back.

20. Yazdi ignored this, asking instead if I did not see a clear pattern in the American press treatment of Iran. I said I did not, although I did see a clear pattern of accusation in the Iranian media that the U.S. was interfering in Iran's internal affairs. Such accusations were without basis. Yazdi conceded that, but quickly added that there was a historical basis for Iranian journalists' suspicions. To make his point he recited a Persian saying: "One bitten by a snake is then afraid of every black and white rope he encounters returning to the offensive, Yazdi said, the U.S. press is against us."

21. To put an end to this fruitless line of discussion,
BAZARZAN FOR HIS GENEROSITY IN RECEIVING ME
HE SUGGESTED MY OFFER TO CONVEY ANY MESSAGE MIGHT
HAVE TO WASHINGTON WHEN I RETURNED FOR CONSULTATIONS. I
APPEALED TO HIM AGAIN FOR HIS HELP IN GAINING ACCESS TO
U.S. MILITARY RECORDS AND PROPERTY AT THE GULF DISTRICT
AND EXTENDED MY BEST WISHES TO HIM PERSONALLY AND TO HIS
GOVERNMENT. BAZARZAN SAID HE APPRECIATED MY VIEWS AND
ASSURANCES. HE TOLD A STORY ABOUT HOW IN THE PERIOD
IMMEDIATELY AFTER WW II EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED IN IRAN,
EVEN A BABY'S CRYING, WAS blamed ON BRITISH AGITATION.
LATER, DURING THE TIME OF MOSSADEGH, THE U.S. ENJOYED
GREAT PRESTIGE AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE GOOD WORKS
AMERICANS HAD PREVIOUSLY DONE IN AND FOR IRAN, BUT WHEN
MOSSADEGH WAS OVERTHROWN IRANIANS BEGAN TO BLAME EVERY-
THING THAT HAPPENED IN THE COUNTRY ON THE U.S. JUST
AS THEY HAD ONCE BLAMED THE BRITISH. THIS PERCEPTION
MAY NOT BE ACCURATE, BAZARZAN SAID, BUT IT IS A REALITY
TO BE DEALT WITH. ACCORDINGLY, THE U.S. MUST DO SOME-
THING TO BACK UP ITS GOOD INTENTIONS, TO SHOW THAT IT IS
NOT AGITATING AGAINST IRAN'S INTERESTS.

224. I SAID I THOUGHT WE WERE ALREADY SHOWING OUR SIN-
CERITY IN THIS REGARD AND ASSURED HIM THAT WE COULD
CONTINUE TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO DEMONSTRATE OUR GOOD-
WILL. AS FOR IRAN AND THE PEOI, I SUGGESTED THAT, WHILE
WE HAD TO LIVE WITH THE PAST, WE SHOULD NOT EMBLAL ON IT.
IT WAS IMPORTANT TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE, JUST AS IT WAS
IMPORTANT FOR THE REVOLUTION TO STATE WHAT IT WAS FOR AS
WELL AS WHAT IT WAS AGAINST.

225. COMMENT: IT WAS CLEAR FROM MY DISCUSSION WITH
BAZARZAN THAT YAZDI HAD BREACHED HIM THEROUGLY JUST
BEFORE MY ARRIVAL. BAZARZAN'S COURTINESS DID NOT STOP
HIM FROM SPEAKING FRANKLY, ALTHOUGH YAZDI'S TRANSLATION
OF WHAT HE SAID OFTEN HAD A ROUGHER EDGE THAN BAZARZAN'S
ACTUAL REMARKS. INDEED, THE DIFFERENCES IN THE IMPORTANCE
EACH MAN ATTACHED TO THE SUBJECTS THAT WERE DISCUSSED AND
THE APPROACHES THEY TOOK TO THEM WERE PERHAPS ALMOST AS
SIGNIFICANT AS THE SUBJECTS THEMSELVES. BAZARZAN WAS
CLEARLY PREOCCUPIED BY THE VISA QUESTION, PRESUMABLY BE-
CAUSE...
CAUSE OF ITS IMMEDIACY AS A DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE.
SEVERAL TIMES HE CAME BACK TO THIS WITH QUESTIONS DIRECTED
TO YAZDI WHICH THE LATTER EITHER ANSWERED PERFUNCTORIALLY
OR IGNORED.

24. YAZDI, ON THE OTHER HAND, FOCUSED ON THE OVERALL
PILATEPAL RELATIONSHIP AND ON WHAT HE HAS PREVIOUSLY
EMPHASIZED AS A NEED ON OUR PART TO PROVE THAT WE ARE
WORTH IRAN'S FRIENDSHIP. HE AGAIN SHOWED THAT HE IS NOT
ABOVE ENGAGING IN EXAGGERATION (HIS CONTENTION—STATED
THROUGH BAZARGAN—THAT IRAN HAD NOT RECEIVED AN INVOICE
SINCE 1966 FOR ITS MILITARY PURCHASES), OR EVEN CRUE
THREATS (THAT IRAN WILL SEND ITS STUDENTS TO RUSSIA IF
WE DO NOT TAKE THEM) FOR THE PURPOSE OF GAINING NEGOTI-
ATING ADVANTAGE. TO THE EXTENT THAT HE COOLLY USES SUCH
TACTICS IN A COORDINATED FASHION TOWARDS HIS ULTIMATE
STRATEGIC GOALS, ONE MUST AT LEAST ADMIRE HIS CONCEPTUAL
ABILITIES IF NOT HIS ACTUAL METHODS. ON THE ISSUE OF THE
PRESS, HOWEVER, YAZDI DOES NOT SEEM CAPABLE OF REASON.
THUS, IT WAS BAZARGAN WHO SHOVED AN ABILITY TO EXAMINE
THE ISSUE MORE DISPASSIONATELY. LAIEN
BIT

#2970

KKNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 3970/8
1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN AT APPROPRIATE TIME:

QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER, I AM PLEASED TO EXTEND TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF IRAN BEST WISHES ON THE OCCASSION OF EID-E FEITR. MAY YOU AND YOUR COUNTRYMEN BE BLESSED WITH HEALTH AND HAPPINESS, AND MAY GOD GUIDE YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES TO SUCCESS IN YOUR GREAT EFFORTS FOR YOUR PEOPLE. WE IN AMERICA STAND READY TO COOPERATE WITH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND TO STRENGTHEN THE LONG-STANDING TIES OF FRIENDSHIP THAT HAVE EXISTED BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES. WITH BEST WISHES, JIMMY CARTER.

UNQUOTE.

2. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF PGOI WISHES TO DO SO. CHRISTOPHER 87 25 Z 21 Aug 75 724

2 Z CN CHG RF CHRON PPDC, IR N/A E.O. 12065: 215670 17 Aug 75 25 Z CN 724

EID-E FEITR MESSAGE

SUBJECT: PPDC, IR

TAGS:

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 12065: N/A

E.O.: 215670

CHRON
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am honored to be able to extend, on behalf of the entire American community in Iran, our best wishes on the great festival of Eid-e-Fetr. We rejoice with you in the joy and festivity of this occasion. We take this opportunity also to wish you and your people all success in your efforts to build a new and strong Iran, a country and people whose friendship matters greatly to all Americans.

Sincerely,

L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Mehdi Bazargan
Prime Minister of Iran,
Tehran.
CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 9710

DE RUQMRH #9710 245 **
ZNY CCCC ZZH
R 0212452 SEP 79
PM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUHC/SECGSTATE WASHDC 3584
INFO RUJKCS/SECDTC WASH DC
RUJKCS/JCS WASH DC
RUQMB3/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0254
RUQMOU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0245
RUHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0260
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0226
RUQBD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0293
RUQMR/E/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0288
RUQSL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0297
RUQMW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0258
RUDT/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0365
RUQMA/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0224
RUHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0278
RUOMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0152
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0313
RUSNAAA/USINC EIR VAIBINGEN GE

CX

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 9710

"F.G. 12065: GDS 9/2/85 (SWIFT, E. ANN) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: BAZARGAN SPEECH

REFS: (A) TEHRAN 9663, (B) TEHRAN 9653

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. BAZARGAN SPEECH AUGUST 31 WAS CLEARLY MORE A
REACTION TO MOUNTING CRITICISM OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS
THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS INEFFECTIVE THAN A SERIOUS ATTEMPT
AT RESIGNATION. THE SPEECH ALSO GIVES AN INTERESTING
VIEW OF HOW BAZARGAN VIEWS THE LACK OF POWER OF HIS
GOVERNMENT AND HIS SUBSERVIENT RELATIONSHIP TO KHOMEINI.

3. IN THE SPEECH BAZARGAN DEFENDS HIS GOVERNMENT AGAINST
CHARGES OF INDECISIVENESS, INACTION AND LACK OF REVOLU-
TIONARY ATTITUDE, AND CALLS ON HIS CRITICS TO ASK
KHOMEINI TO DISMISS HIM IF THEY THINK HE SHOULD NOT
BE PRIME MINISTER. AT THE END OF THE SPEECH, BAZARGAN
POINTS OUT THAT HE TAKES NO PLEASURE FROM HIS POSITION
AS PRIME MINISTER AND THAT HE HAS SENT A LETTER TO
KHOMEINI ODORING HIS RESIGNATION. IT IS NOT AT ALL
CLEAR WHEN OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS THIS LATEST BAZARGAN
OFFER OF RESIGNATION WAS SENT, BUT IT DOES SEEM CLEAR
THAT KHOMEINI HAS NO INTENTION OF TAKING BAZARGAN UP
ON HIS OFFER.

4. BAZARGAN SPEECH IS A GOOD REFLECTION OF THE PROBLEMS
INHERENT IN IRAN'S DUAL-SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AND OF
THE GROWING POWER OF THE UNOFFICIAL SIDE OF THE GOVERN-
MENT WHICH WAS REPORTED IN REF B. BAZARGAN DESCRIBES
HIS GOVERNMENT AS "A KNIFE WITHOUT A BLADE": MEANING

-41-
IT APPEARS THAT HIS GOVERNMENT CAN MAKE LAWS BUT THE
CONFIDENTIAL
TEHRAN 9710

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AUTHORITY TO CARRY THEM OUT RESTS IN THE HANDS OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES. THE POWER KHOMEINI HOLDS
OVER BAZARGAN'S GOVERNMENT IS ALSO GRAPHICALLY
DESCRIBED: "ALL OUR AFFAIRS ARE IN HIS HANDS, AT HIS
OWN COMMAND, INCLUDING THE POWERS OF DISMISSAL,
APPOINTMENT, DECISION-MAKING, ISSUING ORDERS, EVERYTHING.

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ET

#9710

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TEHRAN 9710
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DE RUQMHR #0136/01 260 **
ZNY CCCC ZZE
O 1711402 SEP 79
PM AMEBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUECG/SECGSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3809
INFO RUEJCS/SECDEF WASH DC
RUEJCS/JCS WASH DC
RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0285
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANZARA 0268
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0281
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0256
RUSSCD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0320
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0319
RUSSL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0234
RUQMW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0298
RUEBC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0392
RUQGAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0268
RUEEMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0231
RUQMMIT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0173
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0346
RUSNAAA/USCINCUR VAHINGEN GE
ET

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 10138

A.O. 12005: GDS 9/17/95 (LIMBERT, JOHN) OR-P
TAGS: PCOV, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: FM BAZARGAN CRITICIZED

1. (C) SUMMARY: DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS, FM MERDI
BAZARGAN HAS BEEN THE TARGET OF CRITICISMS FROM VARIOUS
SIDES. HE HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF ANTI-CLERICALISM, OF
INEFFECTIVENESS, AND OF GENERAL BUNGLING. BAZARGAN
HAS ANSWERED THESE ATTACKS BY CLAIMING THAT THE SAME
PERSONS WHO WERE CRITICIZING HIM ARE NOT ALLOWING
HIS GOVERNMENT TO FUNCTION. DESPITE THESE ATTACKS,
IT APPEARS THAT BAZARGAN STILL ENJOYS THE SUPPORT OF
KHOMEINI AND WILL NOT BE REPLACED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
 AND SUMMAR.

2. (C) THE FIRST ATTACK ON BAZARGAN CAME FROM AYATOLLAH
DR. MOHAMMAD BEHESHTI, VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL
OF EXPERTS, MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, AND
CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLICAN PARTY. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH PARS NEWS AGENCY
IN QOM ON SEPTEMBER 14, DR. BEHESHTI BLAMED THE GOVERN-
MENT AND PM BAZARGAN FOR Failing TO IMPLEMENT A BILL ON
THE FORMATION OF LOCAL COUNCILS. ACCORDING TO BEHESHTI,
THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TWO MONTHS BEFORE HAD APPROVED
A BILL CALLING FOR THE FORMATION OF COUNCILS AT PROVINCIAL,
CITY, DISTRICT, AND VILLAGE LEVELS. BEHESHTI SAID DR.
BAZARGAN'S GOVERNMENT HAD FAILED TO IMPLEMENT THIS BILL,
NEITHER BECAUSE OF DELIBERATE PROCRASTINATION OR BECAUSE
OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE WEAKNESS. (DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER BANI-ASSADI TOLD CHARGE SEPT 17 THAT BAZARGAN'S
OFFICE, IMMEDIATELY AFTER RECEIVING THE REVOLUTIONARY
COUNCIL'S BILL, HAD SENT A LETTER TO THE COUNCIL
TELLING THEM THAT THE BILL AS DRAFTED WAS UNREALISTIC
BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD WORK OUT A FEASIBLE BILL
ALONG THOSE LINES.)

3. (C) LATER THE SAME DAY, THE MONOTHEISM PARTY (HEZB-ETOWHIDI) ISSUED A SEVEN-POINT STATEMENT CRITICIZING THE
BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT FOR NEGLECT AND INDIFFERENCE. LITTLE
IS KNOWN ABOUT THE HEZB-ETOWHIDI EXCEPT THAT IT IS
AN ISLAMIC POLITICAL GROUPING WITH POSSIBLE TIES TO
AYATOLLAH SADQ ROWHANI. THE CRITICISMS DIRECTED AT
BAZARGAN INCLUDED:

- (A) GOVERNMENT INDIFFERENCE TO CRITICISMS OF IRAN
IN THE FOREIGN PRESS, BOTH WESTERN AND NON-ALIGNED.

- (B) SEEKING POPULARITY BY PLAYING WITH WORDS AND BY
OPPOSING THE ADVICE OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS. "PERHAPS
YOU HAVE FORGOTTEN THAT THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT
IS LED BY THE CLERGY."

- (C) DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING THE REVOLUTIONARY
COUNCIL'S BILL ON FORMATION OF LOCAL COUNCILS.

- (D) NEGLECTING TO FOLLOW AYATOLLAH ROWHANI'S
ADVICE ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF PURGING THE GOVERNMENT
OF ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS.

4. (U) THESE ATTACKS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY AN ATTACK ON
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 15 BY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND
COUNCIL OF EXPERTS MEMBER ABU AL-HASAN BANI-SADR.
SPEAKING TO AN AUDIENCE IN YAZD, BANI-SADR ATTACKED
BAZARGAN'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND ACCUSED HIM OF HINDERING
THE WORK OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. BANI-SADR
ALSO ACCUSED BAZARGAN OF:

- (A) REFUSING TO ACCEPT CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM.

- (B) BUNGLING IN KURDESTAN AND THAN TRYING TO
CLAIM CREDIT FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION THERE.

- (C) OPPOSING THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE BANKS,
A FAVORITE PROGRAM OF BANI-SADR.

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#0138

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 10138/1
5. (U) IN AN ATTACK APPEARING IN THE ENGLISH AND PERSIAN-LANGUAGE PRESS OF SEPTEMBER 16, TEHRAN REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR AYATOLLAH AHMAD AZARI-QOMI CRITICIZED BAZARGAN FOR ALLEGEDLY ANTI-CLERICAL STATEMENTS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S EULOGY FOR AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY ON SEPTEMBER 11. AZARI-QOMI (WHO ANNOUNCED HIS RESIGNATION FOR HEALTH REASONS) SAID THAT BAZARGAN HAD SAID THAT TALEGHANI, UNLIKE THE MAJORITY OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS, WAS NOT OPPOSED TO THE MANIFESTATIONS OF MODERN CIVILIZATION. ACCUSING BAZARGAN OF WEAKENING REVOLUTIONARY UNITY, AZARI QOMI SAID, "IT IS VERY STRANGE THAT A DISTINGUISHED FIGURE AS MR. BAZARGAN WOULD MAKE AN UNFAIR ACCUSATION AGAINST THE CLERGY. WAS IT NOT TALEGHANI'S GOAL TO UNITE ALL GROUPS, THE FOREMOST OF WHICH WAS A COMMITTED AND ACTIVE CLERGY? HOW CAN HE (BAZARGAN) PRAISE TALEGHANI BY STIRRING UP THE PEOPLE AGAINST THE CLERGY AND BY CONDEMNING THIS PROGRESSIVE AND ACTIVE GROUP AS REACTIONARY?"

6. (C) LOCAL PRESS ACCOUNTS OF BAZARGAN'S SPEECH DID NOT INCLUDE THE STATEMENTS WHICH OFFENDED AZARI-QOMI. EMBASSY WILL CHECK FULL TEXT OF SPEECH (WHEN AVAILABLE) TO ESTABLISH EXACTLY WHAT PRIME MINISTER SAID.

7. (C) ALTHOUGH THE PRESS HAS BEEN GIVING WIDE PUBLICITY TO THESE ATTACKS, BAZARGAN'S REACTION HAS SO FAR BEEN LIMITED TO A STATEMENT AT AN ECONOMIC SEMINAR (REPORTED BY ETTELAAT OF SEPTEMBER 16) THAT THE SAME (UNNAMED PERSONS WHO WERE CRITICIZING HIS GOVERNMENT FOR ITS INEFFECTIVENESS WERE THE SAME ONES WHO WERE INTERFERING IN GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS AND PREVENTING HIS CABINET FROM OPERATING.)

8. (C) THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME (NOR WILL IT BE THE LAST TIME) THAT BAZARGAN HAS BEEN UNDER ATTACK FROM MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL RELIGIOUS LEADERS, AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. ALTHOUGH THE ATTACKS COMING FROM VARIOUS DIRECTIONS AND FROM VARIOUS PERSONALITIES, NOT NECESSARILY PART OF ANY CONCERTED ANTI-BAZARGAN CAMPAIGN, THERE ARE ENOUGH COMMON THEMES IN THE CRITICISMS TO INDICATE THE COMMON INTERESTS OF HIS OPPONENTS. THESE THEMES INCLUDE:

- (A) IGNORING THE ADVICE OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS.
- (B) IGNORING THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.
- (C) GENERAL INEFFECTIVENESS AND BUNGLING.

9. (C) IT IS WORTH NOTING, HOWEVER, THAT NONE OF THESE ATTACKS MENTION AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI BY NAME AND THAT
NONE OF THE ATTACKERS NOTE ANY CLAIM TO SPEAK FOR HIM. IN PREVIOUS DISAGREEMENTS OF THIS KIND, BAZARGAN HAS HAD ENOUGH SUPPORT FROM THE IMAM TO OVERCOME CALLS FOR HIS DISMISSAL. IT IS LIKELY THAT AS LONG AS BAZARGAN CONTINUES TO HAVE KHOMEINI'S SUPPORT (AND THERE IS NO SIGN OF HIS LOSING IT) HE WILL BE ABLE TO SURVIVE SUCH ATTACKS. BAZARGAN'S SURVIVAL, HOWEVER, IS UNLIKELY TO MAKE HIS GOVERNMENT ANY MORE EFFECTIVE IN DEALING WITH THOSE WHO HAVE ALREADY TAKEN OVER MOST OF ITS FUNCTIONS. LAINGEN ET

#0138

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CONIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10466

S.O. 12065: GDS 9/29/85 (SWIFT A.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, IR
SUBJECT: BILATERAL PROBLEMS

REF: STATE 253666

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. Acting on a letter (undated but probably late February) from Prime Minister Bazargan statethat PGOI "would like to declare their readiness to indemnify the damages caused by the above incident" (i.e. attack on Embassy), Embassy has sent three diplomatic notes to Ministry of Foreign Affairs. First two of May 29 and June 17, 1979 gave Embassy status report on continuing assessment of damages. Note of August 9, 1979 gave final estimate of damages and losses that occurred during the attack.

3. This final report of August 9 requested PGOI payment to Embassy of $1,041,566 for damages to ICA building and equipment, Embassy buildings and equipment, personal property losses and losses at Tabriz. Embassy has not yet followed up on this matter in any direct approach with either Yazdi or other MFA officials.

4. Embassy suggests Secretary may wish to raise various questions of access to military properties and damages to Embassy property with Yazdi in broad brush manner in context of an effort to clean up the past. This could be followed by more detailed discussions between EIP officers and Yazdi or other members of the UNGA such as Bayandor.

5. Re IAS building at Shiraz, Embassy suggests we not include this in light of current contacts with Iranians involved in IAS board in Shiraz which appear to offer some promise. LAINGEN

TT #0466

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-47-
SUBJECT: EID-E GHORBAN MESSAGE

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN AT APPROPRIATE TIME:

QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: IT IS MY PLEASURE TO EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF IRAN MY BEST WISHES ON THE HOLY OCCASION OF EID-E GHORBAN. MAY YOU AND YOUR COUNTRYMEN BE BLESSED WITH HEALTH AND HAPPINESS AND MAY YOUR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF YOUR COUNTRY MEET WITH SUCCESS. WE IN AMERICA SEEK TO WORK WITH YOU AND YOUR ASSOCIATES IN DEVELOPING AN ENVIRONMENT OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND POSITIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES AND COUNTRIES. WITH BEST WISHES, JIMMY CARTER. HIS EXCELLENCY, DR. MEHDI BAZARGAN, PRIME MINISTER OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, TEERAN. UNQUOTE.

2. THE WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF GOI WISHES TO DO SO. VANCE
October 28, 1979

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

The President has asked me to convey the following message to you:

"DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

It is my pleasure to extend to you and to the people of Iran my best wishes on the holy occasion of Eid-E Ghorban. May you and your countrymen be blessed with health and happiness and may your efforts on behalf of your country meet with success. We in America seek to work with you and your associates in developing an environment of mutual respect and positive cooperation between our two peoples and countries.

With best wishes,

Jimmy Carter"

Sincerely,

[Signature]

L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

His Excellency
Dr. Mehdi Bazargan,
Prime Minister of the Islamic
Republic of Iran,
Tehran.
Mehdi BAZARGAN
(Phonetic: bazarGAHN)

Member, Executive Committee, National Front
(since at least August 1978)

A professor, politician and businessman, Mehdi Bazargan has a long history of opposition to the Shah. He is one of the leaders of the Iran National Front—usually referred to as the National Front (NF)—and a member of the seven-man NF Executive Committee. The front is a revival of the NF of the 1930s, a coalition that supported Prime Minister (1951-53) Mohammad Mosadeg in his power struggle with the Shah. After Mosadeg was overthrown, many NF members fled the country and moved to Europe or the United States; Bazargan, who had been an active supporter of Mosadeg, stayed in Iran and continued to work against the Shah, using his flair for injecting religious themes into his demagogic rabble-rousing. (C)

In mid-1978 Bazargan emerged from a period of relative political inactivity. He spoke at several rallies, during which he called for a return of truly constitutional government, expanded freedom of the press, total independence of the judiciary, and free elections. In October 1978 Bazargan went to Paris to see exiled religious opposition leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Bazargan is a moderate compared to Khomeini, who calls for the end of the Shah's rule and the Pahlavi dynasty. Bazargan heads the Liberation Movement of Iran and the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedom. (C)

A Career in Opposition

The son of an Azerbaijani merchant, Bazargan was born in 1905. He attended school in France for eight years. After receiving a degree in thermodynamics from the University of Paris, he returned to Iran in 1936 and subsequently served as assistant professor, then professor, and

(cont.)
finally dean of the Engineering Faculty of Tehran University. He was appointed technical and parliamentary under secretary in the Ministry of Education in May 1951. The following month he was named chairman of the board of the National Iranian Oil Company, charged with implementing Mosadeq's oil nationalization program; he served until May 1952. In February 1953 Bazargan became director general of the Tehran water system, but after the downfall of Mosadeq, he was dismissed in 1954 and imprisoned briefly in 1955. (C)

In 1957 Bazargan resumed teaching at Tehran University, where he headed the Islamic Students Society and founded the National Freedom Movement of Iran (NFMI). The NFMI, now defunct, was a rightwing, religious, nationalist organization, which was at various times affiliated with the NF. A member of the Central Committee of the NF during 1961-63, he was convicted of treason (along with nine other NFMI leaders) by a military court in 1964. Bazargan was sentenced to 10 years of solitary confinement, but he was pardoned by the Shah in 1967. After his release he lived quietly in Tehran and devoted himself to running an engineering firm, but despite his enforced inactivity, his name remained known and respected in opposition circles. (C)

Personal Data

A particularly devout Shi'a Muslim, Bazargan has written extensively on religious matters. Although he is narrowminded almost to the point of fanaticism regarding Islam and its precepts, he is otherwise an intelligent man who can be receptive to the ideas of others. Bazargan speaks French and English. (C)

8 December 1978
2. CHARGE PAID COURTESY CALL ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR COOPERATION (HAM KARI) BANI ASSADI SEPTEMBER 16. ASSADI, WHO IS SON-IN-LAW OF PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN, WAS RECOMMENDED TO CHARGE BY RAMSAY CLARK. ASSADI IS A U.S. EDUCATED (PURDUE, ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MA) AND UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA) SOCIAL SCIENTIST WHO "SEES HIMSELF, AS HE SAID, AS BEING INVOLVED IN THE GOOD FACE" OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION: THE PGOI'S EFFORTS TO REFORM AND RESTRUCTURE IRAN'S ECONOMY AND SOCIETY. AS ARE SO MANY OF IRAN'S TECHNOCRATS, ASSADI WAS PLAINLY DISTURBED BY THE DARK FACE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTION, THE JAILINGS AND EXECUTIONS, BUT SEEMS TO HAVE RATIONALIZED THEM AS NECESSARY. AT ONE POINT DURING THE CONVERSATION, ASSADI CLAIMED THAT KHOMEINI HIMSELF WAS CHECKING THE DEMANDS OF EXTREMISTS THAT MORE BE KILLED. ASSADI SAID HE HAD BEEN PRESENT JUST BEFORE THE FIRST EXECUTIONS WHEN KHOMEINI HAD ORDERED THAT ONLY THOSE UNQUESTIONABLY GUILTY OF KILLING BE EXECUTED. KHOMEINI HAD ORDERED THIS EVEN THOUGH "THE PEOPLE" WERE DEMANDING REVENGE.

3. ASSADI PLAINLY PREFERRED TO DISCUSS THE SOMEWHAT AMORPHOUS TASKS OF HIS OFFICE WHICH IS IN CHARGE, APPARENTLY, OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND SELF HELP PROJECTS. AT THE TIME OF THE CHARGE'S VISIT HE HAD BEFORE HIM THE IIIPAPT PLANS FOR LOCAL AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS WHICH ARE SUPPOSED TO BE HELD THIS FALL. THE ORIGINAL PLAN, ASSADI SAID, HAD BEEN SENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE THREE MONTHS BEFORE BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. THIS PLAN HAD BEEN COMPLETELY IMPRACTIBLE AND THEY HAD SENT IT BACK TO THE COUNCIL UNDER A LETTER SAYING THAT THE PLAN WOULD NOT WORK BUT THAT THEY WERE WORKING ON A NEW PLAN. (ASSADI PLAINLY HAD BEEN STUNG BY CRITICISM APPEARING IN THE PRESS THAT BAZARGAN HAD DONE NOTHING TO IMPLEMENT THE COUNCIL'S CALL FOR LOCAL ELECTIONS). ASSADI SAID THAT RESTRUCTURING AND DECENTRALIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERN- MENT COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED OVER NIGHT. GOVERNMENT IN IRAN HAD ALWAYS BEEN RUN FROM THE CENTER, AND IT WAS NOT EASY TO REVERSE THIS CENTURIES-OLD TRADITION AND GET LOCAL COMMUNITIES TO RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. ASSADI SAID HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH THE MINISTERS THAT AFTER-
NOON TO DISCUSS A PLAN WHICH CALLED FOR MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS UNDER A SYSTEM OF FUNCTIONAL GROUPINGS (I.E. LABOR ETC). HE DID NOT LIKE THIS IDEA AS HE FELT IT GAVE TOO MUCH POWER TO THE LEADERS OF THESE GROUPS AND THAT IT WOULD NOT MESH WITH THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF ELECTIONS WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON PARTIES.

4. COMMENT: WE DO NOT YET KNOW WHAT THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING WAS. INTERIOR MINISTER SABAGHIAN ANNOUNCED SEPTEMBER 10 THAT A NEW BILL ON URBAN AND RURAL COUNCILS HAD BEEN SENT TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL FOR ITS APPROVAL. WE HAVE NO WORD YET WHEN THESE LOCAL LEVEL ELECTIONS MIGHT BE HELD. DURING THE MEETING, ASSADI SAID THAT THE PGOI INTENDS TO GO AHEAD WITH THESE ELECTIONS EVEN IF THE CONSTITUTION IS NOT COMPLETED.

5. ASSADI SAID THE PGOI WAS LOOKING INTO WAYS TO RAISE THE STANDARDS OF LIVING IN THE VILLAGES AND REDUCE THE DISPARITY BETWEEN CITY AND RURAL LIFE. ONE IDEA WHICH THEY WERE CONSIDERING WOULD BE TO GIVE EACH VILLAGE A LARGE AMOUNT OF MONEY TO USE FOR THEIR OWN NEEDS.

6. ASSADI SPENT SOME TIME ENTHUSIASTICALLY DISCUSSING HIS "CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION", A PEACE CORPS LIKE ORGANIZATION WHICH SENDS STUDENTS OUT INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE TO WORK WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS TO SPEED UP DEVELOPMENT. ALTHOUGH CHARGE PRESSED ASSADI WITH QUESTIONS, HE DID NOT RECEIVE A VERY CLEAR PICTURE OF EXACTLY HOW THIS ORGANIZATION (IF IT CAN BE CALLED THAT) WORKS. EARLY IN THE REVOLUTION, ASSADI APPEAREDLY PROPOSED THAT ALL UNIVERSITY STUDENTS BE SENT (A LA CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION) TO THE COUNTRYSIDE FOR A PERIOD OF TIME TO WORK IN RURAL COMMUNITIES. AS ASSADI DID NOT WIN APPROVAL FOR THIS IDEA, HE HAD TO SETTLE FOR A GENERAL APPEAL THROUGH THE NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS FOR VOLUNTEERS TO WORK IN HIS CRUSADE. HE SAID THE CRUSADE WAS RUN BY A BOARD COMPOSED OF SIX MINISTERS, TEN MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE CRUSADE. THE VOLUNTEERS ARE PAID AND ARE SOMEHOW MANAGED BY LOCAL BOARDS IN THE PROVINCIAL CITIES. THE CRUSADE PT

#0321

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VZCZC 319
APPEARED TO BE A STOPGAP MEASURE AND ASSADI DID NOT SEEM TO VISUALIZE ITS CONTINUATION ONCE LOCAL AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS BEGAN TO FUNCTION. COMMENT: SOME REPORTS REACHING EMBASSY INDICATE THAT SOME OF THE PROFESSIONALS AND STUDENTS GOING OUT INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE WITH CRUSADE IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE REVOLUTION WERE GREETED WITH SUSPICION (AS GOVERNMENT SPIES) AND DISTRUST. DURING TROUBLES IN TURKOMAN SARAI IN EARLY REVOLUTION TWO VOLUNTEERS WERE KILLED. WE NOTE FROM RECENT FRIS REPORT THAT THERE IS “SOMETHING CALLED THE "CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION" WHICH IS GOING TO BE USED IN RECONSTRUCTING KURDISTAN. WE DO NOT KNOW IF THIS IS THE SAME OUTFIT.

7. ASSADI SEEMED VERY INTERESTED IN US LOCAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT AND WE ARE ARRANGING TO MAKE SOME BOOKS ON THIS SUBJECT AVAILABLE TO HIM. COMMENT: ASSADI IS JUST THE SORT OF WESTERNIZED TECHNOCRAT THAT ONE WISHES WOULD HAVE SOME INFLUENCE IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS VERY EFFECTIVE. LAINGEN ET #0321

NNNN
VZCZC 320
CONFIDENTIAL

Tehran 17/75

SUBJECT: CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION

REF:

1. In his call on me, Prime Minister Bani-Assadi (Ferdinando's attached) asked about Prime Minister Bazargan's recent detailed inventory (REF B) of the accomplishments of the crusade. He suggested that the number and scope (REF C) of the accomplishments seemed rather extraordinary, considering that the crusade had only been launched three months before. In the speech, the accomplishments were indeed extraordinary. The revolution itself was constitutional. However, a proof of God's concern for its success. He noted the accuracy of Bazargan's claims, Bani-Assadi had quite a point. This was indicative of 1-1/2 inches between the two (referred) which substantiated every accomplishment.

2. As an example, he cited the recent building of schools in Tehran Province. It had been difficult earlier, but now, school plants were not ready for the opening of school. Before, the Crusade set up tents throughout Tehran to which the citizens went to paint, cement, bricks—anything to contribute. At the same time, Arman had offered their services to do the work. Moreover, continued Bani-Assadi, the Crusade had pulled 13,000 people. Noting the expression of Mr. Bazargan's face, referred to a campaign that most Iranian villagers had never even seen a president. The volunteer dental teams that went out to the villages had neither the time nor the resources to do fillings and crowns.

3. The development of the Crusade over the past five months had not been easy. Opposition from the bureaucrats on the one hand, and from those (unspecified) who were not exploitation for their own political ends, had almost always been three months ago. He talked to Ferdinando into launching a general appeal. Even Prime Minister Bazargan (Fami-Assadi's father-in-law) had been skeptical about launching the special appeal for rebuilding the schools. However, as he made a lot of empty propaganda, Bani-Assadi appealed to Bazargan and explained that Bazargan was in a situation. He had to have all the elements in a situation with him to proceed. He was not sure of a move. 
SOUVENIRS, WAS A TIME, BAKI-ASSADI PROPOSED FOR ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF CERTAINTY. IN ANY EVENT, THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION HAD BEEN SO IMPRESSED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE SCHOOLS CAMPAIGN THAT HE HAD ASKED THAT IT BE EXTENDED. THIS APPARENTLY BROUGHT BAZARGAN AROUND.

S. EYB ECONOFF EXPLAINED THAT HIS EFFORTS TO EXPLAIN THE CRUSADE AND ALL IT SYMBOLIZED TO WASHINGTON WOULD ENCOUNTER A SIMILAR SKEPTICISM. MUCH HAD BEEN CLAIMED FOR A VERY SHORT TIME WITHOUT MUCH SPECIFICITY AS TO MEANS. BAKI-ASSADI SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF EYB ECONOFF COULD VISIT SOME OF THE PROJECTS HIMSELF. HE THEN BACKED OFF A LITTLE, SAYING THAT THE FEELING AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AMONG THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRUSADE WAS PARTICULARLY VIRULENT. LATE THAT NIGHT, HOWEVER, HE CALLED EYB ECONOFF TO SAY THAT HE HAD ARRANGED FOR HIM TO VISIT PROJECTS IN SHIRAZ ON THE FOLLOWING TUESDAY, OCTOBER 9.
1. (C/UNILAF TXIT.)

2. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: IN ORDER TO LEARN MORE ABOUT HIS CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION (REFS), THE ECONOFF CALLED ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HOSSEIN BANİ-ASSADI. THE CRUSADE (JIHAD) IS SEEN AS A PRIME MOVER IN A PLAN FOR RESTRUCTURING THE COUNTRY, OF WHICH BANİ-ASSADI IS ONE OF THE ARCHITECTS. THIS TEL DISCUSSES THE GOVERNMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE PLAN. SEPARATE MESSAGES WILL DEAL WITH THE CRUSADE ITSELF.

3. GENERALLY, BANİ-ASSADI (AND APPARENTLY OTHERS LIKE HIM) HAS FOUND PORTIONS OF THE KORAN, SHARIA AND RELATED SOURCES CONFIRMED BY HIS STUDIES OF MANAGEMENT THEORY IN U.S. UNIVERSITIES. ALTHOUGH MANAGEMENT THEORY IS IN NO WAY CONSIDERED TO BE OF EQUAL DIGNITY WITH THE KORAN, IT SEEMS TO BE ACCEPTED IN SOMEWHAT THE SAME LITERAL FASHION. ASSUMING THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY MOMENTUM CONTINUES, AND THAT BANİ-ASSADI HAS THE INFLUENCE THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE, IRAN WILL BE REORGANIZED ON A HIGHLY ECLISIC THEORETICAL BASE.

4. THAT MANAGEMENT THEORY NORMALLY CONTEMPLATES A MODERN CORPORATION, AND NOT AN ENTIRE DEVELOPING COUNTRY GOING THROUGH A REVOLUTION, DOES NOT SEEM TO PERTURB BANİ-ASSADI. HE DOES NOT DOUBT THAT REVOLUTIONARY IRAN COULD PUT INTO POLITICAL PRACTICE MANAGEMENT THEORIES STILL TOO ADVANCED FOR MOST CORPORATIONS. AFTER ALL, SAYS BANİ-ASSADI, THE REVOLUTION ITSELF REPRESENTS A MIRACLE. END SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

5. GENERAL TO BANİ-ASSADI'S THINKING IS THE KORANIC EXHORTATION THAT BELIEVERS AVOID DISSENSION, ACHIEVE CONSENSUS, AND ABOVE ALL, PARTICIPATE. JIHAD, HE POINTS OUT, MEANS CRUSADE, BUT ALSO EFFORT OR STRUGGLE. ONE OF THE EVILS OF THE OLD REGIME WHICH LED BANİ-ASSADI TO RETURN TO THE U.S. FOR GRADUATE STUDIES WAS ITS PERPETRATION OF AUTOCRACY, AND THE DAMPENING OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND INITIATIVE WHICH 30D IMPOSES ON THE BELIEVING MUSLIM.
5. At the University of Pennsylvania, Bani-Assadi studied under Professor A'off, and absorbed his theory of "circular organization," a management theory designed to mitigate the dampening effect on creativity and initiative of the authoritarian level-by-level hierarchy in the normal organization. (i.e., one deals with one's immediate superior, immediate subordinates and laterally on the same level.) According to A'off, one should interact not with one, but with two levels above and two below. Overlapping committees as the point of interaction among the different levels, and consensus rather than individual authority as the source of decision-making. Flow from this, at least as A'off is interpreted by Bani-Assadi.

6. Bani-Assadi has been a prime mover in three pieces of legislation, two passed and one pending, before the Revolutionary Committee. In modifying the centralized government structure and in order to encourage greater participation and responsibility at all levels, they reflect both Islam and A'off. Specifically, they deal with:

7. Political and administrative authority, the bill still pending provides for the devolution of power right down to the village level. Sketching out an organization chart, with the central administration at Tehran at the top, he put the provincial governors at the next level, and below them, the section chiefs (trade, health, etc.) in each governorate. At the bottom was a line of boxes representing the villages. Between the governors and section chiefs is found a lateral box for a committee. Bani-Assadi drew an arrow from Tehran to this committee, to emphasize two-level participation. Between the section heads and the villages was another committee in which the governors also participate.

8. Bani-Assadi acknowledged that A'off's management theory did not fit exactly at this lowest level, since there was no second level below the people in the villages. Generally, however, these overlapping committees would ensure the participation which was among the purposes of the BT.

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INFO RUQMRD/AMEMBASSY JUEL 7750
RUSEO/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1126
RUYHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 7072
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY RUSU 2722
ET
J CONFI IENTIAL SECTION 71 OP 22 TEHRAN 1277G

E.O. 12265: DES 10/7/75 (SUNS, A.D.) OR-E
TAGS: PINT, PPIN, 12
SUBJECT: BANI-ASSADI: TOWARDS A RESTRUCTURED IRAN REVOLUTION.

9. FISCAL AUTHORITY. TRADITIONALLY, PROCEEDS FROM TAXES COLLECTED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WERE SENT TO TEHRAN, WHERE THEY WERE CENTRALLY APPORTIONED BY MINISTRY AND PROVINCE. THE FIRST OF THE TWO NEW BILLS RECENTLY PASSED WOULD AUTHORIZE COLLECTION AND RETENTION EVEN AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL OF SOME TAXES ALONG WITH COMMUNITY DECISION AS TO HOW THESE REVENUES WOULD BE EXPENDED. THE SAME FISCAL AUTONOMY WOULD BE GRANTED TO CITIES AND PROVINCES.

10. NEITHER THE MANNER IN WHICH THESE COMMUNITIES TAX THEMSELVES (I.E., INCOME, REAL ESTATE, PERSONAL PROPERTY, SALES), NOR THE PURPOSES TO WHICH TAXES WILL BE APPLIED ARE SPELLED OUT IN THE AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION. BANI-ASSADI HAD THE IDEA THAT ONE TAX WOULD BE A SORT OF TRANSIT TAX ON NON-INHABITANTS, "RATHER LIKE THE AIRPORT TAX PAID BY INTERNATIONAL TRAVELLERS." (OR LIKE SPEED TRAPS?)

11. PRESENTLY, BANI-ASSADI WENT ON, LOCALITIES WILL STILL HAVE TO DEPEND ON TEHRAN (AND OIL REVENUES) FOR THE FINANCING OF SCHOOLS, LOCAL ROADS, HOSPITALS, ET AL. IN TIME, HOWEVER, "AS IRAN BECOMES SELF-SUFFICIENT CHIEFLY THROUGH GREATER RELIANCE ON AGRICULTURE," LOCALITIES WILL BE ABLE TO SELF-FINANCE ALL SUCH EXPENSES. AT THAT POINT, OIL REVENUES COULD BE DEDICATED EXCLUSIVELY TO MAJOR PROJECTS OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE.

12. CRUSADE. WHAT WOULD MATE THE SYSTEM WORK, BANI-ASSADI INSISTED, WAS THE ENTHUSIASM UNLEASHED BY THE REVOLUTION AND A DESIRE FOR POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT HITHERTO UNKNOW IN IRAN. THIS ENTHUSIASM WAS LIKE "MOLTEN METAL," WHICH HAD TO BE PROPERLY INSTITUTIONALIZED BEFORE IT COOLED, AFTER WHICH IT WOULD BE TOO LATE. THE CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION WAS A PRINCIPAL MEANS OF KEEPING THIS REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT "MOLTEN" WHILE THESE NEW INSTITUTIONS WERE BEING SHAPE. NEVER BEFORE IN HISTORY, RHAPSODIZED BANI-ASSADI, HAD SUCH GENUINE ENTHUSIASM BEEN AROUSEN.

13. THE CRUSADE IS DISCUSSED IN FOLLOWING MESSAGES LAINGEN
CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11510

E.O. 12065: 3DS 12/31/65 (KENNEDY, MOORE) OR-
TAGS: PPRR IR
SUBJECT: SHAH'S MEDICAL TREATMENT: DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER BANI-ASSADI PROTESTS

REFS: A. TEHRAN 11005: B. TEHRAN 17826:

1. C-ENTIRE TEX.

2. IN THE COURSE OF A CALL BY TIDY ECONOFF TO DISCUSS
THE CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION (REFS), BANI-ASSADI
EXPRESSED DEEP BITTERNESS OVER U.S. ADMISSION OF SHAH
FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. WHY, HE ASKED, COULDN'T THE SHAL
BE TREATED IN MEXICO? WHY WOULD THE U.S. ALLOw TWO
QUALIFIED IRANIAN PHYSICIANS TO EXAMINE HIM? EVEN
ASSUMING THAT INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO THE IRANIAN
PHYSICIANS, HOW COULD THE PCCI BE SURE THAT IT WAS CORRECT?

3. BANI-ASSADI DID NOT COMMENT ON TIDY ECONOFF'S STORY.
ANSWERS, CLEARLY BY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SHAH WAS
ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF MEDICAL ETHICS. "THE MAN IS
A CRIMINAL. HE SHOULD BE EXTRADITED," SAID BANI-ASSADI.

4. COMMENT: ONLY BY SWITCHING THE SUBJECT BACK TO THE
CRUSADE (SEPTEMBER) AND HIS ADMIRATION OF IT WAS TIDY ECONOFF
ABLE TO RESTORE THE USUAL PLEASANT TONE OF HIS CONVERS-
ATIONS WITH BANI-ASSADI. RELIGIOUS, A DEEP BELIEVER IN
THE REVOLUTION, BUT ALSO AN ADMIRER OF THE U.S., BANI-
ASSADI SEEMED MORE BOTHERED THAN ANYTHING ELSE BY THE
DECISION TO ADMIT THE SHAH. THERE WOULD, HE SAID, BE
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DEMONSTRATORS IN FRONT OF THE
EMBASSY ON NOVEMBER 1. ALL THAT WAS PLANNED WAS THE
PRESENTATION OF A PROTEST. LAINEN

BT

#1516

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STAT 11/4/79
ECON: MKENNEDY
ECON: MKENNEDY: KJG
NONE
ECON-3 CHARGE POL, CHRON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECPSTATE WASHDC, PRIORITY

TAGS: ECON, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION: DISCUSSION WITH
DEPUTY PM BANI-ASSADI.

REF: TEHRAN 11005

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE CRUSADE (JEHAD), SAID BANI-ASSADI, WAS FACING
MAJOR PROBLEMS, WHICH WERE ONLY BEGINNING TO SURFACE.
THE BUREAUCRACY, MUCH OF WHICH WAS NOT YET PERMEATED WITH
THE IDEALS OF THE REVOLUTION (COMMENT: AN UNDERSTATEMENT)
HAD LITTLE USE FOR THE ARDENT VOLUNTEERS IN THE CRUSADE.
THE FIERCELY INDEPENDENT VOLUNTEERS, FOR THEIR PART, HAD
NO USE FOR THE BUREAUCRACY. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY WOULD
COMMANDER PUBLIC VEHICLES AT WILL, WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION
OR ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY.

3. TODAY ECONOFF REMARKED THAT A U.S. BUSINESSMAN IN THE
SOUTH HAD COMPLAINED THAT THE JEHAD HAD WALKED OFF WITH
41 OF HIS JOINT VENTURE'S VEHICLES. "YES," REPLIED BANI-
ASSADI, "AND THEN THESE BUSINESSMEN, QUITE CORRECTLY,
PRESENT THE PGOI WITH THE BILL."

4. THE JEHAD, CONTINUED BANI-ASSADI, WAS A CREATION OF
THE PGOI WHICH CONTINUED TO FUND IT. NEVERTHELESS, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE LATEST MANAGEMENT THEORY, IT WAS
STRUCTURED TO AVOID HIERARCHY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CENTRAL
OFFICE IN TEHRAN PROVIDED ONLY A SUPPORT FUNCTION. IF,
FOR EXAMPLE, SHIRAZ CALLED IN FOR MORE PIPE FOR WATER-
SUPPLY PROJECTS, THE SUPPORT OFFICE WOULD MAKE THE NECESS-
ARY ARRANGEMENTS.

5. ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
JEHAD WAS "CHAOTIC", BANI-ASSADI WANTED TO DO NOTHING
WHICH WOULD SPOIL THE SPONTANEITY OF THE VOLUNTEERS.
THEY WOULD REMAIN UNPAID (EXCEPT THAT A "SANDUQ", OR
CONFIDENTIAL

TREASURE CHEST, WAS BEING ESTABLISHED FOR THOSE IN FINAN-
CIAL NEED), AT THE SAME TIME, SOME REGULATION OF THE
RELATIONSHIP OF THE JEHAD WITH THE NORMAL FUNCTIONS OF
GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE DEVELOPED. DID TDY ECONOFF
HAVE ANY IDEAS? LAINGEN##
E.O. 12065: GDS 1/28/85 (PATTERSON, D.R.) CR-P
TAGS: IR
SUBJECT: (C) SUGGESTED CONTACTS
REF: STATE 22023

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR RECHECKING TELEPHONE NUMBER
   OF KHOMEINI AND BANI-SADR'S BROTHER. WE RECEIVED
   647-555 WHICH IS NOT FPT NOT HIS NUMBER. IF COITAM DOES
   NOT HAVE ANOTHER NUMBER FOR BANI-SADR, PLEASE ASK WHETHER
   HE KNOWS ANY OTHER CHANNELS (FRIENDS, WORK COLLEAGUES
   OR RELATIVES) THROUGH WHICH PATTERSON MIGHT CONTACT
   BANI-SADR. PLEASE GIVE COITAM OUR THANKS FOR LIST.

SULLIVAN
MT
#1362

NNNN
ECONOFFS SPENT AN HOUR ON OCTOBER 22 WITH ABOH-HASAN BANI-SADR, ISLAMIC ECONOMIST AND INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES HAD ALREADY WARNED THAT BANI-SADR HAS A TENDENCY TO BE EULUSIVE IN HIS REIPIES, AND EVEN CONTRADICTORY, AS MAY BE APPARENT IN WHAT FOLLOWS.


5. BANI-SADR CONFIRMED THAT THE CLERGY AND KOMITERS WERE SEEKING PRICE INFORMATION FROM BAZARIS ON IMPORTED GOODS: HOW MUCH THEY HAD PAID THE FOREIGN SUPPLIER, AND WHAT THEIR MARKUP WAS. BANI-SADR EXPLAINED THAT PRICE JAKONNING WAS A TRADITIONAL CIRRHICAL FUNCTION IN IRAN. HIS GRANDFATHER, A MULLAH, HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR DROPPING

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-65-

TEHRAN 11115

7. MOST OF THE INDUSTRIES NOW IN DIFFICULTIES, BANI-SADR WENT ON, SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE FIRST PLACE. THEY WERE A "FANTASY" SATISFYING THE NEEDS OF THE UPPER CRUST, AND, OF COURSE, THE GREED OF THE MULTINATIONALS. WHY, FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD IRAN HAVE SIX AUTOMOBILE ASSEMBLY PLANTS? ONE SHOULD SUFFICE, AND THAT SHOULD NOT MERELY ASSEMBLE THE FOREIGN COMPONENTS BUT FABRICATE THE ENTIRE VEHICLE. EVEN IN THE UNITED STATES, HE WENT ON, IT HAS BEEN ESTIMATED THAT 55 PERCENT OF ALL MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS CONSUMED BY THE PUBLIC SERVE NO REAL NEED. THEREFORE, THE FIRST STAGE (OF THREE) IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF IRAN WILL INCLUDE A REALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO SERVE TRULY PRODUCTIVE ENDS AND GETTING THE PEOPLE "ENGAGED IN THE SECOND PHASE CONSUMER GOODS WILL BE REINTRODUCED. THE THIRD PHASE WILL COME INTO BEING WHEN IRAN IS CAPABLE OF PLAYING AN INDEPENDENT ROLE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY." THIS PROCESS OVERALL IS EXPECTED TO TAKE 20 TO 25 YEARS.

8. ELSEWHERE IN THE CONVERSATION, HOWEVER, BANI-SADR CONCEDED THAT DURING THE FIRST STAGE, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN EMPLOYMENT, THUS ALSO CONCEDING THAT REDUNDANT FACTORIES WOULD HAVE TO BE SHUT IN OPERATION.
10. BANI-SADR CONCEDED THAT THESE FAR-REACHING CHANGES WOULD NOT BE EASY TO PUT INTO EFFECT, ESPECIALLY DURING A REVOLUTION. "WE HAVE NO CHOICE," HE SAID, "UNDER THE OLD REGIME, THE COUNTRY WOULD HAVE DIED."

11. COMMENT: BANI-SADR REFERS TO HIMSELF AS AN ECONOMIST, BUT SEEMS MUCH MORE INTERESTED IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. WHEN ASKED ABOUT ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS HE EITHER CHANGES THE SUBJECT OR EXPLAINS THAT HE LEAVES THE DETAILS TO OTHERS. HE EXPRESSES CONCERN FOR BUREAUCRACY, BUT SUGGESTS HE WOULD DO A GOOD JOB AS A DEPARTMENTAL MINISTER. HE CRITICIZES MINISTERIAl DECISIONS AND CRITICIZES FAILURES TO MAKE DECISIONS. HE CLAIMS HE WANTS TO LEAD WHEN IN FACT HE LECTURES. HE IS ABSTRACT AND ELUSIVE, YET AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE IN THE NEW REGIME. HE SEEMS TO BE A MOLDED OF CONTRADICTIONS. WHETHER HIS IS AN HONEST CONCLUSION, OR LACUIC FISNESS, WAS NOT CLEAR TO EMPOFF.
STADIS ACTION

AMERICAN ACADEMIC EXPERT RECENTLY GAVE DEPTOFF NAME OF
MOHAMMED TAVASSOLI (TEHRAN TELEPHONE 243-906), IDENTIFYING
HIM AS PERSON PREFERRED BY KHOMENI GROUP FOR CONTACT WITH
EMBASSY SHOULD THAT EVER BE DESIRABLE OR PRACTICAL. VANCE
BY #3337
SECRET/DEIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2722

ECB E T SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00368
YDIS

C/O. 12065: DCS 1-8-69 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, FINS, PORS, POIV, IR

SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT'S (LMI) NEAR-TERM POSTURE

SUMMARY: LMI's TAVASSOLI TOLD EMBOFF LMI PLANS MANY DEMONSTRATIONS JAN 6 TO ECLIPSE "FEELER" JAN 7 EFFORTS. LMI WILL ISSUE NO RET NO STRONG STATEMENT AGAINST BAKHTIAR GOV'T FOR "A FEW DAYS," WAITING TO SEE IF AND HOW BAKHTIAR GETS SHAH TO LEAVE. STRIKES WILL CONTINUE, HOWEVER. SOURCE EXPLAINED LMI SOLUTION TO IRANIAN IMPASSE AND EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER GROWING TUDER AND OTHER EXTREMIST STRENGTH. END SUMMARY.

1. LMI's MOHAMMAD TAVASSOLI CALLED ON EMBOFF STEMPEL EVENING JAN 7 TO DISCUSS PRESENT SITUATION. TAVASSOLI MADE POINT OF SAYING SITUATION IN IRAN OVER PAST SIX MONTHS HAD UNFOLD AS LMI HAD PREDICTED IT WOULD, AND SHAH WAS HANGING ON DESPITE OVERWORTHING PERCEPTION OF "THE PEOPLE" THAT HE HAD TO GO. BECAUSE EMBOFF COPY OF KHOMINI ANNOUNCEMENT DISTRIBUTED IN TEHRAN JAN 7 WHICH CALLED BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT ILLEGAL, CALLED FOR CONTINUATION OF STRIKES IN ALL SECTORS, ASKE MINISTRY EMPLOYERS TO PREVENT NEW MINISTERS FROM COMING TO THEIR OFFICES, AND URGED ALL CITIZENS NOT RET NOT TO PAY TAXES, INCLUDING WATER AND LIGHT BILLS. TO THIS END, LMI WILL SPONSOR MANY SMALLER RALLY JAN 6 WHICH WILL DESIGNATED TO SHOW MOVEMENT'S STRENGTH. TAVASSOLI HOPED THESE WOULD BE PEACEFUL, BUT SAID LMI WAS READY FOR OTHER EVENTUALITIES.

2. DESCRIBING BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT AS VIRTUALLY INDISPENSABLE OF ANY NATIONAL FRONT (INF) GOVERNMENT, TAVASSOLI SAID LMI BELIEVES BAKHTIAR AND SANJARI ARE REALLY COLLUSING WITH SHAH AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF IRANIAN PEOPLE. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S. TO DISCERN WHER ITS TRUE INTERESTS LIE AND NOT BE FOOL BY "FALSE" COALITION GOVERNMENT. EMBOFF OFFERED MILD REJOINDER THAT BAKHTIAR SEEMED TO BE ON VerGE OF ACHIEVING WHAT LMI CALLED DEPARTURE OF SHAH. SOURCE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND SAID LMI WOULD NOT BE ISSUING STRONG STATEMENT AGAINST BAKHTIAR BECAUSE MOVEMENT WOULD BE WAITING TO SEE IF SHAH LEAVES COUNTRY. IT WAS NOT ENOUGH FOR SHAH TO GO ON VACATION; PEOPLE OF IRAN WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY SOLUTION WHICH DID NOT MEET WITH KHOMINI APPROVAL (i.e., SHAH HAS TO GO). EMBOFF EXPRESSED THIS POSITION. WHILE TAVASSOLI MAPPLED ON QUESTION OF WHETHER SHAH'S DEPARTURE ON VACATION WOULD BE CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY FIRST STEP, IT WAS CLEAR LMI HAS RETAINED HARD POSITION THAT SHAH MUST LEAVE TO APPEASE.

5. IF SHAH DOES NOT LEAVE, OR MAKE SUBSTANTIAL PLANS TO
SECRET/SENSI

SECRET/SENSI

VTGUN JAN 26
VIRGINIA TECHNICAL
INSTITUTION WASHINGTON, M.D.

I AM HOPEFULLY IMMEDIATELY

I F R E P E N S I O N D E T R E N T R E N T M A N

STRIKES HAD BEEN SETTLED UNTIL KHOMEINI HAD GIVEN HIS
PERMISSION. NEWSPAPERS HAD WAITED UNTIL KHOMEINI
PERSONALLY HAD OK'ED THEIR EFFORTS BEFORE AGREEING TO
PUBLIC.

2. IN BRIEF DISCUSSION OF PROSPECT OF MILITARY TAKEOVER,
TAHASSOLI EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT U.S. HAD APPARENTLY
ACTED TO RESTRRAIN IRANIAN MILITARY, AND EMPOFF HOPED
THAT U.S. FAVORED CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION, NOT MILITARY
COUP. TAHASSOLI SAID LMI WAS GREATLY RELIEVED THAT GEN.
OVISSI HAD DEPARTED AND CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS OVISSI WHO
HAD WARNED LMI WITH TAHASSOLI LAST SPOKE TO EMPOFF ABOUT
PROSPECTS OF MILITARY COUP.

3. COMMENT: MEETING TOOK PLACE BEFORE NEWSOFT GENERAL
JAM'S RESIGNATION BECAME KNOWN EARLY JAN. IT IS OUT
VIEW THAT, DEPENDING ON FALLOUT FROM JAM DEPARTURE, LMI
MAY ADVANCE IT'S TIMETABLE FOR PRESSING SAVITTIC GOVERN-
MENT. SULLIVAN

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TEHRAN 330-12

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DE RUQMAH #6211 165 ** محمد توسل -
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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6211

E.O. 12056: GDS 6/14/79 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PINS, NGOs, SHUM, IR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH TEHRAN MAYOR TAVASSOLI

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT: REPORTING CABLE.)

2. SUMMARY: TAVASSOLI SAID REVOLUTIONARY ADMINISTRATION SUFFERS FROM LACK OF MONEY AND INDISCIPLINE OF WORKERS. HE URGED US UNDERSTANDING OF REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. END SUMMARY.

3. TEHRAN MAYOR TAVASSOLI ASKED DEPARTING POLOFF STEMPEL TO CALL ON HIM AT HIS OFFICE. STEMPEL HAD NOT SEEN TAVASSOLI SINCE DECEMBER, AND MAYOR WELCOMED HIM WARMLY AS OLD FRIEND. AFTER BRIEF DISCUSSION ON SUCCESS OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, TAVASSOLI (DISPLAYING BETTER SENSE OF HUMOR THAN POLOFF HAS EVER SEEN) SAID RUNNING "REVOLUTIONARY TEHRAN" WASN'T THE KIND OF JOB HE HAD EXPECTED. SAME PROBLEMS EXISTED WITH MUNICIPALITY AS WITH NATIONAL GOVERNMENT—LACK OF MONEY AND INDISCIPLINE OF WORK FORCE. POLOFF COMMENTED THAT TEHRAN SERVICES HAD GOTTEN BACK TO NORMAL FAIRLY QUICKLY GIVEN REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION. TAVASSOLI REPLIED, "YES, BUT YOU DON'T KNOW HOW OFTEN I HAVE TO TALK TO THE WORKERS TO MAKE THEM UNDERSTAND OUR PROBLEMS." HE SAID TEHRAN METRO WAS BEING REVIEWED, AND CONTRACTS APPEARED VERY ONE-SIDED; SUCH THINGS TOOK MUCH TIME. MAYOR ADMITTED HE WORKED AT LEAST A 23-HOUR DAY; "CALLS EVEN REACHED HIM LATE AT NIGHT."

4. TAVASSOLI SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE PLEA FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN AMERICA. HE SAID U.S. SHOULD BEHAVE IN A WAY THAT WILL KEEP RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES." POLOFF REPLIED IN SPIRIT OF FRANK FRIENDSHIP THAT SUGGESTION CUT BOTH WAYS. THERE FOLLOWED SHORT DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS FORCED ON BOTH COUNTRIES BY RECENT EVOLUTION OF SITUATION. TAVASSOLI ASKED FOR UNDERSTANDING ON CASE OF CONTRACTS WITH UNFAIR CANCELLATION CLAUSES, ASSISTANCE WITH GRAIN SHIPMENTS, AND A FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE ON SPARE PARTS. POLOFF SAID U.S. ATTITUDES WOULD PROBABLY REFLECT PG0I AND KHOMEINI ATTITUDES AND SAID FRANKLY OUTPUT FROM SENIOR FIGURES WAS NOT VERY REASSURING OR HELP-INDUCING. TAVASSOLI ADMITTED THAT SOME STATEMENTS WERE EXTREME, BUT NOTED U.S. SHOULD STOP ANTI-ISLAMIC CAMPAIGN IN AMERICAN PRESS. POLOFF SAID SHAH'S MEN HAD MADE EXACTLY SAME POINT A YEAR EARLIER. IT WOULD HELP IF MORE IRANIANS UNDERSTOOD NATURE OF U.S. FREE PRESS. POLOFF SAID THERE WERE SOME THINGS PG0I AND KHOMEINI WERE DOING THAT WENT AGAINST OUR VALUES, SUCH AS THE REVOLUTIONARY EXECUTIONS AND SUPPRES-
SION OF WOMEN. PGOI COULD EXPECT UNFAVORABLE PRESS COVERAGE OF THIS, AND THERE WAS LITTLE ANYONE COULD DO ABOUT IT. POLOFF SUGGESTED ISLAMIC MOVEMENT SHOULD DO BETTER JOB OF PUBLICIZING ITS POSITIVE ASPECTS, AND TAVASSOLI READILY AGREED.

5. AT END OF DISCUSSION, TAVASSOLI DEFENDED NEED FOR REVOLUTIONARY TRIALS, BUT SAID THEY HAD NOT BEEN CARRIED OUT WELL. HE ASCRIBED THIS TO SWIFTNESS OF REVOLUTIONARY VICTORY AND LACK OF JUDICIAL PREPARATION. IN INTERESTING SIDE COMMENT, HE SAID IT WAS "IMPOSSIBLE" FOR ISLAMIC MOVEMENT TO TURN SUCH TRIALS OVER TO MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OFFICIALS, SINCE THESE WERE ALL "SLAVES OF THE SHAH." (COMMENT: TAVASSOLI IS A LEFTIST MEMBER OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, BUT HIS STATEMENT REFLECTS "WE BROTHERS" SPIRIT OF MOST COMMITTED ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARIES, AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PLACE BEYOND THE PALE THOSE WHO WORKED IN ANY WAY FOR OLD REGIME.) POLOFF GAVE TAVASSOLI NAME OF HIS SUCCESSOR, AND MAYOR HAD NO TROUBLE WITH THE IDEA OF SEEING OFFICIAL U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM TIME TO TIME.

WAAS
ET
#6211

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 6211
1. (ACTION CABLE.)

2. DURING CHARGE'S MEETING WITH MINSTATE FOR REVOLUTIONARY AFFAIRS SARASI (REFTEL), SHAHABI ASKED IF U.S. COULD PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION ON WORKINGS OF FEDERAL SYSTEM, ESPECIALLY DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN CENTER AND STATES.

3. SHAHABI READS BOTH FRENCH AND ENGLISH, BUT FRENCH BETTER THAN ENGLISH, AND WE THOUGHT IF YOU WERE ABLE TO OBTAIN MATERIAL FROM ICA OR LOCAL ACADEMIC SOURCES, ESPECIALLY ANYTHING ON SUBJECT IN FRENCH, THIS WOULD BE CHANCE FOR YOU TO BE RESPONSIVE PERSONALLY TO REQUEST FOR USG HELP IN AREA WHICH IS NOT FUZZED WITH LOCAL SENSITIVITY AND YET IS IMPORTANT FOR INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT. NAAS
CONFIDENTIAL

DE: SUHREE #5227 148 **
ZNY CCCC 226
D 22112 12 MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1540
BT
CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 05227

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

BCHG: STATE

APPRV: CHG: CVNAAS

DRTFD: POL: JDSTEMPEL

CLEAR: POL: VTMOSETH

DISTR: POL

F.O. 12865: DCS 5/26/95 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TACS: PROV, PINT, PINT, IR

SUBJ: MEETING WITH MINISTER SAHABI

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT REPORTING CABLE)

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE DISCUSSED WITH MINISTER SAHABI U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS. MINISTER EXPRESSED HOPE CURRENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS WOULD NOT IMPAIR GOOD TIES WHICH POOL WANTS. SAHABI TALKED OF NEW GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND SHOWED ACTIVE INTEREST IN FEDERAL SYSTEM. BIO NOTE.

END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE AND ACTING POLCO WHICH CALLED ON MINISTER OF STATE FOR REVOLUTIONARY AFFAIRS MR. YADOLLAH SAHABI MORNING MAY 20. SAHABI received AMERICANS IN PLEASANT, GAY AND ELOQUENT PERSIAN MANNER AND DISCUSSION WAS FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT. FOLLOWING ARE IMPORTANT POINTS:

4. AFTER CHARGE EXPRESSED U.S. INTEREST IN GOOD TIES WITH NEW POOL AND ASSURED MINISTER THAT USG WAS NOT RPT NOT INTERFERING IN IRAN AND WOULD NOT DO SO, SAHABI IMMEDIATELY AND IN AN UNDERSTANDING MANNER EXPRESSED REGRETS FOR MEDIA ATTACKS ON USG IN WAKE OF PUBLICITY GIVEN JAVITS RESOLUTION ON IRAN. SAHABI SAID IRAN IS IN REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD AND AFFIRMED TWICE THAT BAZARAN GOVERNMENT WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH U.S. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE MANY QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED BETWEEN IRAN AND U.S. AND REGRETTED VERY MUCH THAT QUOTE MISUNDERSTANDINGS UNQUOTE WERE MARRING PUBLIC SCENE. FORMIN WOULD BE CALLING TO TALK TO CHARGE ABOUT PROBLEM (TAZI DID CALL; SEE SEPTEL ON LATER MEETING). HE SAID THAT MUCH OF WHAT WAS IN RESOLUTION WAS TRUE SOME OF WHAT PRESS IN IRAN WAS SATING IS TRUE. IRAN IS IN REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION-EVEN QUESTION AS SIMPLE AS THAT OF NEW PASSPORTS IS NOT RESOLVED YET. ROLE OF REVOLUTIONARY COURTS, MASS DEMONSTRATIONS AND VARIOUS MOVEMENTS ARE ALL CHANGING. IRAN'S PROBLEMS WILL BE WORKED OUT, BUT IT WILL TAKE TIME. CHARGE COMMENTED THAT EXECUTIONS AND TRIALS WITHOUT INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED STANDARDS CAUSED U.S. AND OTHERS TO THINK MORE BADLY OF THE REVOLUTION THAN THEY WOULD OTHERWISE. WITH OBVIOUS PAIN IN HIS BROW, SAHABI SAID QUOTE YOU ARE RIGHT; WE ARE NOT HAPPY WITH THESE EXECUTIONS OURSELVES, BUT WHAT CAN YOU EXPECT IF THE BAZARAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT STAY IN OFFICE, THERE WILL BE NO HOPE FOR STABILITY. END QUOTE.

(COMMENT: WE THINK HE IS PROBABLY RIGHT.) SAHABI SAID COUPES WERE A SHORT TERM EXPEDIENT WHICH WOULD NOT LAST; POOL WANTED TO WIND THEM UP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT IT WOULD TAKE A LITTLE TIME.

-75-
6. CHARGE ASKED ABOUT NEW GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE. SAHABI IMPLIED THAT DRAFT CONSTITUTION WOULD BE RELEASED WITHIN TWO WEEKS. CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD BE CALLED WITHIN 30 TO 60 DAYS. PGOF EXPECTED ASSEMBLY TO LAST A MAXIMUM OF FOUR MONTHS, WITH ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT AND THE PARLIAMENT TO FOLLOW TOWARD THE END OF THIS YEAR. WITH RESPECT TO RELATIONSHIP OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARD TO NEW GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, SAHABI SAID THIS CONFUSES EVEN MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT. FOR NOW, DR. MUSTAPA CHAMAN IS THE HEAD OF THE GUARDS, BUT HE IS NOT A DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. DEPUTY PM BANI-ASSADU HAS NO CONNECTION WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS.

SAHABI SAID HIS OWN OFFICE, THE BUREAU OF REVOLUTIONARY AFFAIRS, WILL BE IN CHARGE OF REVIEWING ALL LAWS AND HARMONIZING THEM WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE THANKED ACTING POLCOLS FOR SENDING HIM A COPY OF THE U.S. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. AFTER DISCUSSION OF FEDERAL SYSTEM, INCLUDING DUAL LINES OF GOVERNMENT AND STATE AND FEDERAL TAX STRUCTURES, SAHABI SAID THAT IF WE HAD ANY MORE MATERIAL ON U.S. FEDERAL STRUCTURE, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IT. PGOF PLANNED TO REMAKE IRAN INTO FEDERATED SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT TO HELP EASE TRIBAL AND OTHER PROBLEMS OF DECENTRALIZATION. CHARGE SAID USS WOULD BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFO (SEE SEPTEMBER).

7. BIO NOTE: SAHABI IS IN HIS 60'S AND A CLOSE, LONG-TIME FRIEND OF PRIME MINISTER BAZARIAN. OTHERS WHO HAVE SEEN HIM HAVE NOT BEEN IMPRESSED WITH HIS GRASP OF PROBLEMS AND COHERENCE, BUT DURING THIS MEETING HE EXHIBITED SOPHISTICATED VIEW OF IRAN'S PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL AND REMAINED ALERT THROUGHOUT. HE HAS NO INDEPENDENT POWER BASE, HOWEVER, AND MUST BE COUNTED AMONG THE PGOF'S SECULARISTS. HIS REACTION TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS AND U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS MADE IT CLEAR HE LACKS SYMPATHY FOR THE THOMEINI ENTourage. HE IS OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF INSTITUTIONALIZING THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, AND SPOKES FORCEFULY ON THE NEED TO GET A NEW GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE IN PLACE. HE IS ONE OF THE REVOLUTION'S ELDER STATEMENTS. MAAS 767 49237

TERRAN 5027
CONFIDENTIAL

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHARGE: STATE 5/28/79
APPRV: CHARGENMAAS

DEPT: ICA:JSHELLNBERG
AM
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: DS POL OR
RCON POL RF

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 5218

F.O. 12065: GDS 5/20/79 (SHELLENBERGER, J.) OR-O
TAGS: SEDU, IR
SUBJECT: CALL ON DR. SHARIAT-MADARI, MINISTER OF HIGHER
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: MINISTER RECEIVED CHARGE AND PAO MAY 20
AND DURING NEARLY ONE HOUR VISIT OUTLINED GENERAL POLICIES
RESPECTING IRANIAN STUDENT STUDY ABROAD, LANGUAGE TRAINING,
EXCHANGE OF PROFESSORS, VISITING U.S. IRANIANISTS, ETC.
ON THE GENERAL U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP, THE MINISTER, IN
A VERY PERSONALIZED MANNER, TICED OFF A NUMBER OF PAST
UGS SINS: ON THE WOLF? THE CONVERSATION WAS LOW KEY
AND WITHOUT POLEMICS, AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT FROM AN ACADEMIC
whose SPECIALITY IS PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AND WHO HAS
TAUGHT AT U.S. UNIVERSITIES. END SUMMARY.

3. THE MINISTER RECEIVED US WITHOUT CEREMONY, INTRODUCED
A COLLEAGUE FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AND IMMEDIATELY RAISED
the SUBJECT OF STUDENT ORIENTATION AND PREPARATION FOR
STUDY ABROAD. HE BELIEVES MUNCH BETTER LANGUAGE PREPARA-
TION IS ESSENTIAL AND WOULD THINK CANDIDATES FOR STUDY
ABROAD SHOULD HAVE ONE TO TWO YEARS INTENSIVE PREPARATION.
HE ASKED WHETHER THE IRAN AMERICA SOCIETY WAS HOLDING
CLASSES AND SEEMED PLEASED TO HEAR THAT IT WAS. PAO
DESCRIBED FORMER ORIENTATION PROGRAMS AT IAS AND EXPRESSED
Readiness to resume these when AS MINISTRY IS READY.
MINISTER SAID THE NEW QUALIFYING EXAM FOR THOSE SEEKING
STUDENT PASSPORTS FOR STUDY ABROAD WOULD BE HELD AS EARLY
AS NEXT WEEK AND HE ANTICIPATED A CONSIDERABLE DROP IN THE
NUMBER OF PASSPORTS WHICH WOULD BE ISSUED. HE PROJECTED A
MUCH MORE COMPREHENSIVE ENGLISH TEACHING PROGRAM IN IRAN
AND SAW NO PROBLEM WITH ISSUANCE OF WORK PERMITS TO
FOREIGNERS WHO WOULD COME TO TEACH LANGUAGES HERE.

4. ON INSTITUTIONAL EXCHANGES OF PROFESSORS, THE MINISTER
COMMENTED FAVORABLY ON THE FULBRIGHT PROGRAM, BUT WENT ON
TO SAY THAT THE UNIVERSITIES HERE WILL BE DISCOURAGING
OVERSEAS TRAVEL BY IRANIAN PROFESSORS FOR THE TIME BEING.
HE DOES NOT BELIEVE IRAN CAN SPARE PROFESSORS EVEN FOR
BRIEF PERIODS ABROAD. ON THE OVER-ALL QUESTION OF INTRA
UNIVERSITY LINKS, HE SAID ALL SUCH PAST AFFILIATIONS WERE
BEING REVIVED TO ASSURE THAT THEY WERE NECESSARY AND IN
THE INTEREST OF IRAN. HE INDICATED THAT SOME HAD LITTLE
PRACTICAL UTILITY. THOSE THAT STAND THE TEST OF SCRUTINY
WILL DOUBTLESS BE RESUMED, HE SAID. THE MINISTER DES-
CRIBED A PROJECT ACCORDING TO WHICH PROFESSIONAL BODIES
IN VARIOUS FIELDS, ESPECIALLY THE SCIENCES, WOULD BE WORK-
ING THIS SUMMER TO ESTABLISH GOALS FOR UNIVERSITY CURRICULUM,
5. WE MENTIONED THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF IRANIAN STUDIES AND THE DESIRE OF AMERICANS WHO ARE PERSIAN STUDIES SCHOLARS/RESEARCHERS TO COME TO IRAN. HE ASKED ABOUT THE VARIOUS FIELDS OF INQUIRY, AND THEN OPINED THAT THIS SUMMER WOULD NOT BE A GOOD TIME FOR SUCH VISITS BECAUSE OF THE PREOCCUPATION OF IRANIAN ACADEMICS AND OTHERS WITH INTERNAL CONCERNS. HE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME UNIVERSITY STUDENT CONFERENCES THIS SUMMER TO WHICH FOREIGN STUDENTS MIGHT BE ADMITTED. HIS GENERAL ADVICE WAS TO DISCOURAGE RESEARCHERS FROM COMING HERE UNTIL FALL AT THE Earliest.

6. AT THE CLOSE OF OUR VISIT, I MADE THE POINT THAT THE USG LOOKS FORWARDS TO AN OPEN, COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND THAT OUR MUTUAL INTEREST IN IRAN'S INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROVIDED A GOOD FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE. THE MINISTER REPLIED TO THIS STATEMENT BY TICKING OFF SOME OF THE PAST "SINS"—ALL PART OF THE NOW FAMILIAR LIPSEY I RECEIVE—BUT AGREED THERE WOULD BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION IN THE FUTURE.

DE RESMHE #8546 274 **
ZNY CCOCZ Z1H
0 0111682 OCT '79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEBC/SECESTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4/018
INFO RUEBHT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0622
BT
CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10546
E.0. 12065: ODS 10/1/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, IR
SUBJECT: ELECTION SCHEDULE
REF: TEHRAN 16440

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING SEPT 30 CALL BY CHARGE AND EMBASSY POLITICAL
OFFICER, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR SABAGHIAN DISCUSSED
SCHEDULED LOCAL AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS. SABAGHIAN SAID
THAT FIRST STEP WOULD BE ELECTIONS FOR COUNCILS IN 150
MUNICIPALITIES ON OCTOBER 12 AND 13. ELECTIONS IN TEHRAN
AND THE MAJOR PROVINCIAL CITIES OF MASJID, TABRIZ,
SHIRAZ, ISFAHAN, AND AHWAZ WOULD BE HELD LATER.

3. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A
REFERENDUM ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION, BY PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS, AND THEN BY ELECTIONS FOR A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.
ALL OF THESE ELECTIONS SABAGHIAN HOPED WOULD BE COMPLETED
THAT THE VILLAGE AND DISTRICT (BAZESH) ELECTIONS WOULD
PROBABLY BE THE LAST TO BE HELD, SINCE THE MINISTRY OF
INTERIOR'S APPARATUS WAS WEEKEN AT THOSE LEVELS.
(FYI: IN A SEPARATE INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN SEPT 30
TEHRAN TIMES, SABAGHIAN SAID THAT THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS
SHOULD COMPLETE THEIR WORK BY OCTOBER 23 AND THAT THE
REFERENDUM COULD BE HELD AT THE END OF NOVEMBER. END FYI).

4. ASKED ABOUT THE DATE FOR MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS
IN THE MAJOR CITIES SABAGHIAN ESTIMATED THAT THESE
ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD ABOUT TWO WEEKS AFTER THE
OCTOBER 12/13 ELECTIONS AND BEFORE THE REFERENDUM ON THE
NEW CONSTITUTION.

5. SABAGHIAN SAID THAT HE HOPED THESE ELECTIONS WOULD
PROVIDE PRACTICAL DEMONSTRATION OF THE NEW IRANIAN
REGIME'S DETERMINATION TO ESTABLISH ISLAMIC AND DEMOCRATIC
PRINCIPLES IN THE COUNTRY. HE SAID THAT THESE ELECTIONS
WILL ESTABLISH A PERMANENT GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE WHICH
SHOULD HELP TO ALLEVIATE SOME OF THE ABUSES CAUSED BY
THE WEAKNESS OF THE Provisional GOVERNMENT. COMMENT:
WE WISH WE COULD BELIEVE THIS. LAINGEN
BT #6546

NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
CHG: CWNAAAS
POL: JDISTEMPEL
NONE
POL

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

AGREEMENT CHANNEL***

E.O. 12065: GDS-4 4/15/79 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PDIP, PGOV, IR
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT FOR IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S.

REF: STATE 90602

1. ACTING POL SECTION HEAD WAS CALLED TO MFA APRIL 14 TO RECEIVE PGOI DIPLOMATIC NOTE REQUESTING AGREEMENT FOR REZA SADR, PRESENT MINISTER OF COMMERCE, TO BE AMBASSADOR TO U.S. NOTE INCLUDED FOLLOWING BIODATA (INFORMAL TRANSLATION FROM Farsi): DR. REZA SADR, 47 YEARS OLD. FINISHED HIGH SCHOOL IN KASHAN, STUDIED PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY WHERE HE RECEIVED HIS BA AND PHD. WAS IN U.S. 1963-72, STUDIED AT UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, RECEIVED BA IN CHEMISTRY. RETURNED BRIEFLY TO IRAN IN 1972, THEN WENT BACK TO NEW YORK UNIVERSITY WHERE HE RECEIVED A MA IN MANAGEMENT STUDIES. WHILE IN U.S., WORKED FOR MANIFOLD SUPPLIES FROM 1964-68, AND LATER FOR KEYSANZA (PHOENIC FROM THE Farsi) COMPANY. NAMED MINISTER OF COMMERCE BY BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT, FEB 1979.

2. IN CONVERSATION, DEP HEAD OF 4TH POLITICAL DIVISION ALI PARŞAKIA INDICATED PRIVATELY THAT PROFESSIONALS WERE JUBILANT OVER SADR APPOINTMENT. MFA SEES SADR AS LONG-TIME KHOMEINI SUPPORTER WHO HAS CLOUT NECESSARY TO "BRING WASHINGTON EMBASSY UNDER CONTROL." OFFHANDEDLY NOTING THAT IT WAS "IMPOSSIBLE" FOR FOREIGN MINISTRY TO CONTROL ROUHANI NOW, HE SAID, SADR HAD BEEN NAMED SPECIFICALLY TO STRAIGHTEN OUT IRANIAN REPRESENTATION IN WASHINGTON. PARŞAKIA ALSO NOTED THAT APPOINTMENT OF MAN VERY FAMILIAR WITH U.S. SCENE WAS DELIBERATE EFFORT TO SHOW NEW PGOI'S INTEREST IN IMPROVED RELATIONS. PARŞAKIA URGED PROMPT U.S. ACCEPTANCE AND EXPRESSED HIS OWN APPROVAL AT U.S. CHOICE OF "GOOD CAREER" AMBASSADOR
CONFIDENTIAL

FOR IRAN. WITHOUT LINKING IT WITH SADR NOMINATION, ACTING POLCHEIF INQUIRED ABOUT STATUS OF U.S. REQUEST; PARSAKIA SAID APPROVAL SHOULD BE FORTHCOMING SOON. NAAS##
CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
CHG: CWNAAS
CHG: CWNAAS
NONE
POL

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/23/85 (NAAS, C.W.) OR-M
TAGS: PDIP, PGOV, IR
SUBJ: REZA SADR WILL NOT BE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S.

REF: TEHRAN 3910

IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER OF COMMERCE REZA SADR ON APRIL 23 HE INFORMED ME THAT AT HIS REQUEST THE** PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN HAD AGREED NOT TO SEND HIM AS AMBASSADOR TO U.S. THEREFORE, POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH HIS STATUS IN U.S. DID NOT ARISE. HE APPEARED SURPRISED THAT I DID NOT KNOW OF THIS CHANGE IN PLANS AND SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE FOREIGN MINISTRY INFORM US OFFICIALY. HE SAID THAT ON REFLECTION, AFTER REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SUBMITTED, HE BELIEVED HE COULD DO MORE FOR HIS COUNTRY BY REMAINING AS MINISTER OF COMMERCE. NAAS##
I CALLED ON LOUIS DEMOULLIN AND DISCUSSED WITH HIM
IN GENERAL CONDITION OF BUSINESS AT THE TIME AND
WAS SOME SPECIFIC POINTS WHICH I WANTED TO
TAKE PARTICULARLY IN VIEW TO CIRCULATE AMONG
SOME OF THE BUSINESSES AND MINERALS WHERE I HAD
SALES.

TO THIS END, I CALLED UPON THE MINISTERS OF
SPORT AND OF EDUCATION AND CALLED ATTENTIONS
TO CIRCULATE IN THE PRESS AND I BELIEVE I
OPPOSED AND PROPOSED TO THE MINISTRY A PROGRAM TO
INCREASE WRITING AND ARTS WHICH WOULD HELP
CONCERNED FRANKLY, I POISED UPON THE MINISTERS TO
STEER THE TRUST FUNDS ($60,000) TO SUPPLY BULLETIN
SCHOOLS AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, CIVIL DEFENSE
COMPETENCY SITUATION, ETC.

I ALSO SENT A LETTER TO THE AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN AND CALLED UPON HIM TO GIVE US A
NEW BEGINNING, THEY COULD ONLY DO IT IN THE AIR AND IT WAS CLEAR.

I THEN WROTE THE LORI ON A NUMBER OF THINGS TO
EACH OF THE KING'S SKEPTICAL MINISTERS TO PROVE THE
SUCCESS AND INCREASE THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST. I
NOTE THAT WHILE THE GOVERNMENT TOOK
AS OUT OF JAIL, THE FACT THAT TO STILL STAY IN THE
COUNTRY THAT PRISON IN THIS VITAL, VITAL
EXTENT TO WHICH A U.S. CITIZEN COULD ACHIEVE
HIS PROGRESS IN IRAH, TO SOME LIBERAL.--AND THAT
CONFLICTED WITH THE NATIONAL INTEREST WHICH THE
PRIEST'S PRISON, AS ANOTHER WRITTEN PROPOSITION
AFFECTS THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH AMERICAN BUSINESS HAD
THE CHANCE IN IRAH.

HEZA SAHE RESPONDED BY SAYING HE WAS QUITE PLEASANT
WITH THE U.S. HAVING BEEN WORKING DIRECTOR OF THE
PLANT IN ISFAHAN FOR 14 YEARS AND WHO SWORE
AND HIS WASTE JOB. HE SHOWED US PICTURES THAT HE,
IN AN OPINION, HAD TO BRING THE PLANT TO POINT OF
US HAPPY IN IRAH IN THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF, NOTING
A LITTLE TIME THERE HAD OCCURRED A MAJOR CONSTRUCTION
AND ANOTHER U.S. POLICY.--ACR KNOCKED AROUND AMERICA'S
SPONSORSHIP FOR THE SHAH. HE THEN WENT ON THAT FORM

CONFIDENTIAL 2/24/67-1
TODAY THE "ZIONIST-DOMINATED AMERICAN PRESS" PREJUDICES PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST THE REVOLUTION AND EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE IRRITATION WITHTHE RECENT NEWSWEEK ARTICLE ON IRAN. (THIS MAY HAVE PARTLY BEEN CAUSED BY THE FACT THAT AN INTERVIEW HE GAVE TIME DID NOT SURVIVE EDITING.) THERE Ensued A CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF THE ALLEGED ZIONIST INFLUENCE IN THE U.S., WHICH--AS IS THE CASE WITH MANY IRANIANS THESE DAYS—MADE NO PROGRESS IN CONVINCING THE MINISTER TO THE CONTRARY.

PGIOI WANTED AN IMPROVED COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP; SAID HE HOSTILE TO AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN "WHO CAN FLOURISH IF THEY ARE WILLING TO WORK WITHIN THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REVOLUTION." PICKING UP MY WORDS, HE SAID ALL THAT IS NECESSARY FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS TO HAVE A FREE REIN IN THE IRANIAN ECONOMY IS "MUTUAL RESPECT." IRANIANS CAN FORGET THE PAST, HE ADDED, "IF U.S. BUSINESSMEN WILL ACT AS EQUAL PARTNERS NOW.

7. HE THEN SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE SHERRY AND SHEIBANI CASES AND I THANKED HIM, AGREING THAT THE BUSINESS CLIMATE SEEM TO BE IMPROVING. I NOTED THAT WHILE POSSIBLY TOO EAAAY TO RESURRECT THE JOINT COMMISSION, PERHAPS IN THE INTEREST OF MORE OPEN COMMUNICATION WE COULD GET THE IRAN/AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND THE BUSINESS COUNCIL STARTED AGAIN. REZA SADR SAID HE AGREED THAT ANYTHING ON THE JOINT COMMISSION WOULD BE PREMATURE AT

#8873

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 8873/2

DE REGMER #8873/62 223 **

C/W CCCC 12H

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FM AMBASSADOR TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3135

BT

CONFIDENTIAL 62 02 TEHRAN 8873

R: ECON-3 CG

POL AF CHRON

AT THIS STAGE BUT THOUGHT THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IDEA
A GOOD ONE. AT MR. SENS SUGGESTION, WE AGREED TO BE
GUEST OF HONOR AT A KICK-OFF LUNCHEON IN A MONTH OR SO.

8. IN PARTING, WE ASKED REZA SADR WHETHER HE COULD CONFIRM
THAT NATIONALIZATION WAS NOT A THING OF THE PAST AND HE
SAID HE HOPED SO; WE THEN SAID WHAT OF GENERAL MOTORS
HAVE THEY BEEN NATIONALIZED OR NOT AND HE REPLIED,
EMPHATICALLY, THAT GM'S SHARE IN GENERAL MOTORS IRAN HAS
NOT BEEN NATIONALIZED. WE TOLD THE MINISTER THAT WE PUT
GM'S RECENT TREATMENT HERE ON THE PLUS SIDE OF THE LEDGER,
THANKING HIM FOR THE GOOD RECEPTION THEIR REPRESENTATIVES
HAD HAD FROM HIM IN THEIR RECENT VISIT. WE HAD PUT GM'S
EXPERIENCE ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, ALTHOUGH RECENT DEVELOP-
MENTS APPEARED MORE HOPEFUL. LAINGEN

BT

#88733

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 8873/2
2. SUMMARY: I MET WITH PGOI SPOKESMAN DEF PRIM MIN
TAPATBAEI TO DISCUSS RECENT ANTI-U.S. STATEMENTS
MADE OVER NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION (NIRT).
IN A FRANK AND FRIENDLY CONVERSATION TAPATBAEI DISCUSSED
THE PGOI'S OWN PROBLEMS WITH NIRT, AS WELL AS STILL
EXISTING ANTI-U.S. FEELING IN IRAN, DESCRIBING THE PGOI'S
DIFFICULTIES VIS-A-VIS INTENSE POPULAR EMOTIONS.
TAPATBAEI ASKED THAT OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN
BE MORE TO HELP SOLVE THE PRESENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAN, AND ASKED FOR MORE FREQUENT
MEETINGS WITH THE EMBASSY IN ORDER TO PREVENT AND
OVERCOME SUCH DIFFICULTIES.  AND SUMMARY

3. I MET WITH DEF PRIM MIN SADEQU TAPATBAEI ON 13 AUGUST
TO DISCUSS ISSUES OF RECENT ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENTS
ON NIRT AND MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE UNDER SECRETARY
REZAIAN'S ALLEGATIONS THAT AMERICAN REPORTERS OFTEN
TELEPHONE TO SPY FIRST AND REPORTERS SECOND.
TAPATBAEI RESPONDED BY CLAIMING THAT THE NIRT IS ONE
OF THE LARGER PROBLEMS BEING FACED BY THE PGOI.  WHILE
EVERYONE ASSUMES THAT THE NIRT IS GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED,
HE SAID, IN REALITY THERE HAS BEEN MUCH DIFFICULTY
BETWEEN THE PGOI AND NIRT MANAGEMENT.  IN FACT, PM
REZAIAN WAS SCHEDULED TO ATTEND A MEETING AT NIRT THAT
VERY AFTERNOON IN AN ATTEMPT TO SMOOTH OUT PROBLEMS THE
PGOI HAS BEEN HAVING WITH THE ORGANIZATION.
4. TAPATBAEI WENT ON TO SAY THAT A VARIETY OF POLITICAL
VIEWS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED VIA THE NIRT FACILITIES,
INCLUDING SOME THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED ATTACKS ON THE
PGOI ITSELF.  ELABORATING FURTHER ON ANTI-U.S. STATEMENTS
BEING MADE BY NIRT AND THE PRESS, HE EXPLAINED THAT THE
ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT AMONG THE PEOPLE OF IRAN WAS
STILL VERY STRONG, AND REPORTERS WERE OFTEN INFLUENCED
BY SUCH FEELINGS.  AS AN EXAMPLE, TAPATBAEI DESCRIBED
HIS TRIP TO GERMANY SOME MONTHS EARLIER, WHEN IRANIAN
STUDENTS THERE HAD DEMANDED NOT ONLY THAT IRANIAN-
AMERICAN RELATIONS BE BROKEN, BUT THAT THE U.S. ALSO
BE FORCED TO PAY REPARATIONS FOR ALL OF THE SHAH'S
MISDEEDES IN IRAN.  IF THESE STUDENTS, WHO COULD BE
CONSIDERED AMONG IRAN'S FUTURE INTELLECTUALS AND WHO ALL
LIVE ABROAD FEEL THIS WAY, HE SAID, HOW CAN ONE
EXPECT THE COMMON AND UNEDUCATED PEOPLE TO FEEL
DIFFERENTLY?  IN AN EFFORT TO EXPLAIN THE PRESSURES
UNDER WHICH THE PGOI WAS OPERATING, TAPATBAEI DESCRIBED

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5. ACCORDING TO TABATABAI, POPULAR ANTIPATHY WAS NOT LIMITED TO THE USA, BUT INCLUDED THE WEST IN GENERAL, AND GERMANY IN PARTICULAR. THERE WAS, IN ADDITION, A DEEP HATRED FELT FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THIS ANTI-US FEELING SPRANG FROM THE VERY RELIGION OF THE IRANIANS, AND IN THE LONG RUN WOULD DO MUCH TO PUT THE USA IN A FAR BETTER LIGHT HERE.

6. ALONG PREVIOUSLY REPORTED LINES, I EXPRESSED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO ESTABLISH AND ENCOURAGE GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND ASKED TABATABAI FOR ANY SUGGESTIONS HE MIGHT HAVE TO IMPROVE THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THIS REPORT. TABATABAI CLAIMED THAT OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN, INCLUDING THOSE AT THE WHITE HOUSE, DEPT. OF STATE, AND MYSELF, SHOULD DO MORE TO "AXE PUBLIC OUR PRIVATE EXPRESSIONS OF UNDERSTANDING ON IRAN." HE SAID THAT THE ONLY REASON HE KNEW THE U.S. WAS MAKING SUCH EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS WAS BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN TOLD SO IN CABINET MEETINGS. PRIOR TO HIS APPOINTMENT AS DEP PRIM MIN, HE HAD SIMPLY NOT REALIZED IT, AND CERTAINLY THE ORDINARY PEOPLE OF IRAN SAW NO INDICATION OF SUCH EFFORTS SINCE AMERICAN PRESS COVERAGE APPEARED TO BE ANTI-REVOLUTION IN TONE. I RESPONDED BY SAYING I HAD SEEN VERY LITTLE IN PERSIAN PRESS COVERAGE TO INDICATE IRAN'S DESIRE TO ENCOURAGE A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP, AND ASKED IF WHETHER SUCH A MUTUALLY DESCRIBED GOAL SHOULD NOT ALSO BE GIVEN OFFICIAL PUBLICITY IN IRAN. TABATABAI SAID THAT "IN A MONTH OR SO," WHEN POPULAR ANTI-U.S. FERVOR HAD SOMEWHAT DIED DOWN, THIS WOULD INDEED BE POSSIBLE. IF FRIENDLIER PUBLICITY COULD COMMENCE IN THE U.S., HOWEVER, IT WOULD MAKE THE PGOI'S TASK MUCH EASIER.

7. TABATABAI ALSO ASKED FOR MORE MEETINGS WITH ME SINCE HE HAD FOUND THE FRANK TALK TO BE VERY USEFUL. HE INDICATED, PERHAPS CARRIED AWAY BY HIS OWN

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TEHRAN 9144/1
ENTHUSIASM, THAT HE WOULD EVEN COME TO THE EMBASSY IF IT WERE MORE CONVENIENT.

6. AS A LAST POINT, I THANKED TABATABAI FOR THE P301'S AID IN REPLACING THE (MASHALLAE YASHANI) EMBASSY SECURITY GUARD GROUP WITH A SECURITY UNIT MORE APPROPRIATE TO THE EMBASSY, AND STATED THAT THIS WOULD FACILITATE THE OPENING OF NORMAL CONSULAR ACTIVITIES WITHIN A SHORT TIME. TABATABAI'S RESPONSE WAS THAT HIS OFFICE HAD BEEN UNDER TREMENDOUS PRESSURE ON THIS SCORE, AND AS A PARTING GIFT HE PRESENTED ME WITH A YOUNG RELATIVE'S STUDENT VISA APPLICATION FOR PROCESSING OUTSIDE THE NORMAL CHANNELS. 

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ABC

Tehran, 11/3

SECRET

SUBJECT: CHARGE'S TALK WITH INTERIOR MINISTER ON EXECUTIONS

DATE: G/M 12/1/85

To: State Department

From: Embassy Tehran

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: (A) Tehran 10511, (B) Tehran 10564

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SEPTELS GIVE FULL TEXT OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TABATABAIE'S STATEMENT OCTOBER 1 CRITICIZING CHARGE'S EXCHANGE ON EXECUTIONS WITH INTERIOR MINISTER BAZARGAN. SEPTELS ALSO REPORTS BAZARGAN'S STATEMENTS IN INTERVIEW WITH TEHRAN EVENING RADIO THIS AFTERNOON --- STATEMENTS WHICH PUT ENTIRE EXCHANGE ON EXECUTIONS INTO MORE ACCURATE PERSPECTIVE.

3. WHILE TABATABAIE'S STATEMENTS ON CHARGE'S STATEMENT ON EXECUTIONS OF THREE SENATORS ARE FAIRLY STANDARD FARE, JUMHURI ISLAMI'S EDITORIAL IS NOT.

4. JUMHURI ISLAMI IS THE OFFICIAL PAPER OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY WHICH IS CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH KHOMEINI. THE PARTY CHAIRMAN IS THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS ATATOLAH SEHRESATI. WHILE JUMHURI ISLAMI IS FAMOUS FOR ITS INTEMPERATE EDITORIALS, IT ATTACKED YAZDI ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO, IT CAN ALSO BE SEEN AS A SEMI-OFFICIAL ORGAN OF SOME OF KHOMEINI'S CLOSEST ALLIES AND SUPPORTERS WITHIN THE CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT.

5. EMBASSY DOES NOT PLAN PUBLIC RESPONSE TO JUMHURI ISLAMI EDITORIAL. FAO GRAVES, HOWEVER, WILL RAISE OUR CONCERN OVER TABATABAIE'S STATEMENT AND ESPECIALLY TONE OF EDITORIAL WHEN HE SEES CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN PRESS DIVISION OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE BAZANDIA OCTOBER 2 IN APPOINTMENT SCHEDULED SOME DAYS AGO.

6. EMBASSY NOTES WITH WHY AMUSEMENT THAT TEHRAN TIMES ON SAME PAGE AS CHARGE'S MEETING WITH BAZARGAN CARRIES STORY THAT MINISTER BAZARGAN TOLD ITALIAN JOURNALIST FABBAGI THAT THE DECIMAL SUMMARIES EXECUTIONS BY IRAN REVOLUTIONARY COURTS SAYING HE HAD OFTEN EXPRESSED HIS SADNESS AND DISGUISE TO KHOMEINI. LAINGEN
CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/2/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P

TAGS: IR, SOPN, PINT

SUBJECT: CHARGE'S MEETING WITH DEP PRIM MIN TABATABAI

REF: TEHRAN 10560

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE HAD A MEETING WITH DEP PRIM MIN
   TABATABAI ON OCT 2 TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERN THAT PUBLIC
   MEDIA AND PGOI SPOKESMEN CONTINUED TO FEED NOTION THAT
   THE USA WAS HOSTILE TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. TABATABAI
   ASSURED CHARGE THAT THE JUMHURI-YE-ISLAMI EDITORIAL
   ATTACKING THE USA FOR CHARGE'S ALLEGED "MEDDLING" OVER
   EXECUTIONS REFLECTED NEITHER OFFICIAL PGOI NOR KHOMEIINI'S
   VIEWS. END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE MET WITH DEP PRIM MIN AND GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN
   TABATABAI ON OCTOBER 2 TO DISCUSS INTER ALIA, THE
   JUMHURI-YE-ISLAMI EDITORIAL (REFTEL) WHICH HAD ACCUSED
   THE USA OF INTERFERING IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IN
   ANSWER TO CHARGE'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE JUMHURI-YE-
   ISLAMI NEWSPAPER REFLECTED EITHER THE PGOI OR QOM'S
   VIEWS VIS-A-VIS THE USA, TABATABAI EMPHASIZED THAT THIS
   WAS DEFINITELY NOT RPT NOT SO. HE SAID THAT THE PAPER
   WAS NOT EXPRESSING THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE PGOI, THE
   REVOLUTION'S LEADER IMAM KHOMEIINI, OR ALL THE PEOPLE
   OF IRAN. THE PAPER DID, HOWEVER, REFLECT SENTIMENTS HELD
   BY SOME RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND SOME OF THE PEOPLE.
   TABATABAI SAID THAT JUMHURI-YE-ISLAMI WAS ONE OF THE
   PGOI'S WORST CRITICS, AND HAD FREQUENTLY ACCUSED FOWMIN
   YAZDI AND NIRT HEAD GHORTZADEH OF BEING AMERICANS. THE
   PAPER HAD ALSO ACCUSED THE PGOI OF BEING TOO PRO-WEST.
   TABATABAI SAID THAT WHEN HE READ THE EDITORIAL, HE
   HIMSELF HAD BEEN UPSET AT THE ATTACK ON BOTH THE US
   GOVERNMENT AND ON CHARGE.

4. TABATABAI CLAIMED THAT A RECENT ENGLISH LANGUAGE
   PAPER VERSION OF REMARKS BY HIM SUGGESTING THAT THE USA
   IS IRAN'S NUMBER ONE ENEMY HAD NOT BEEN AT ALL ACCURATE.
   WHAT HE HAD ACTUALLY SAID WAS THAT "IT IS A MISTAKE TO
   THINK OF THE USA AS OUR NUMBER ONE ENEMY. OUR MAIN
   ENEMY IS ISRAEL (AND ZIONISM) WHICH SEES ITS EXISTENCE
   THREATENED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
   OF IRAN." WHEN CHARGE ASKED WHILY WHETHER THIS MEANT
   THE PGOI NOW SAW THE USA AS ITS SECOND MAJOR ENEMY,
   TABATABAI SAID THIS WAS BY NO MEANS THE CASE. THE
   NUMBER TWO SPOT, HE CLAIMED, WAS HELD BY THE SOVIET
   UNION, AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED. HE ADDED THAT THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD EVEN PAID A VISIT TO PROTEST RECENT ANTI-SOVIET STATEMENTS.

5. COMMENTING FURTHER, TABATAEAI SAID THAT HE HIMSELF SAW RELIGIOUS AND LEFTIST FANATICISM AS THE CHIEF DANGER TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. HE CLAIMED THAT THE NEWSPAPER JUMHURI-YE-ISLAMI WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THIS SORT OF FANATICISM.

6. COMMENT: IN GENERAL, THE TONE OF THE MEETING WAS WARM AND FRIENDLY, WITH TABATAEAI DOING HIS BEST TO BE CONCILIATORY. CERTAINLY THERE IS NO ANTI-AMERICANISM EVIDENT IN HIS OWN OFFICE. TABATAEAI'S STAFF-AIDE ESCORTED CHARGE DOWN TO THE LOBBY AND TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK FOR HELP WITH A NEPHEW'S STUDENT VISA. FYI: PRESS ATTENTION TO CHARGE-SABAGHIAN EXCHANGE WAS VERY LIGHT OCTOBER 2. ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEHRAN TIMES AND KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL CARRIED TABATAEAI'S STATEMENTS (REFTEL) TO PRESS AND ALSO QUOTED TEHRAN RADIO OCT 1 AS CRITICIZING SABAGHIAN FOR EVEN OFFERING AN EXPLANATION TO CHARGE'S COMMENTS. FARSI PRESS OCTOBER 2 DID NOT MENTION THE SABAGHIAN-CHARGE-TABATAEAI EXCHANGE. LAINGEN
Confidential Bonn 19713

P.O. 12065: SDS 12/19/85 (Van Heuven, Marten) OR-P
Tags: PEPR, IR, IR

Subject: Tabatabai to meet PAG officials

1. (C - Entire text.)

2. The foreign office confirmed to us on October 19
   a newspaper report that Iranian vice prime
   minister Tabatabai will meet this week with Chancellery
   state minister Wischenekski and officials of the
   ministry of interior. Our source in the foreign
   official said that Tabatabai is in the PAG on a private
   visit (his family still resides here), and is taking
   the opportunity to consult with the PAG. Our source
   claimed that there was no other particular reason for
   the talks. He could not explain why Tabatabai
   was meeting interior officials.

3. We will seek a readout on the discussions next
   week. Stoessel

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1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE FOREIGN OFFICE IRANIAN AFFAIRS OFFICER SCHOEPS TOLD US OCTOBER 24 THAT THE MOST INTERESTING PART OF THE OCTOBER 19 DISCUSSION BETWEEN IRANIAN PREMIER TABATABAI AND CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT (WHO JOINED THE SCHEDULED MEETING WITH HIS DEPUTY, FOREIGN MINISTER WISCHNEWSKI) WAS AN EXCHANGE CONCERNING THE FUTURE NUCLEAR CONTRACT WITH KWU. TABATABAI EXPRESSED IRAN'S CONTINUED INTEREST IN RESTARTING WORK ON THE PROJECT, AND SUGGESTED GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATIONS DIRECTED TOWARD THE END. THE GERMAN POSITION WAS THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT COULD TALK DIRECTLY TO KWU - IT WOULD BE IMPROPER FOR THE FEO TO INSERT ITSELF INTO PRIVATE BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS. SCHOEPS SAID THE FOREIGN OFFICE CANNOT DECIDE TO WHAT EXTENT TABATABAI WAS AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER IN BONN.

3. OIL: IRAN'S OIL SUPPLIES WERE DISCUSSED. TABATABAI INDICATED THAT, DESPITE SOME SPECIFIED PRODUCTION PROBLEMS, THE CURRENT PRODUCTION LEVEL WOULD BE MAINTAINED. SCHOEPS SAID THIS ACCORDED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE'S ASSESSMENT OF IRANIAN PLANNING.

3 KURDS: SCHOEPS TERMINAL TABATABAI'S
COMMENTARY ON THE KURDISH REBELLION. A DISAPPOINTING REPERITION OF TEHRAN'S PROPAGANDA LINE ON MINORITY PROBLEMS. THE GERMANS HAD HOPED FOR A FRANK EXCHANGE ON THIS PROBLEM.

5. OTHER ISSUES. SCHOEPS CLAIMED TO BE UNINFORMED ABOUT OTHER MEETINGS TABATABAI HAD PLANNED, INCLUDING THOSE AT THE INTERIOR MINISTRY (REPTEL) AND WITH POLITICIANS. SCHOEPS NOTED THAT TABATABAI WAS STILL IN GERMANY ON HIS ESSENTIALLY PRIVATE VISIT, AND MIGHT NOT HAVE YET HELD THE MEETINGS. SCHOEPS SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF THIRD COUNTRIES.

6. SCHOEPS SUMMED UP THE VISIT AS WITHOUT RESULT, AS HAD BEEN EXPECTED. HE THOUGHT THAT THE VISIT HAD BEEN A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO REINFORCE, THOUGH TABATABAI, GERMANY'S RELATIONSHIP TO IRAN. THE IRANIAN SPEAKER WORKED AS A PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY IN BOCHUM FOR SEVENTEEN YEARS, HAD MARRIED A GERMAN WOMAN, WHO WAS STILL RESIDING IN BOCHUM WITH THEIR CHILDREN (HENRY TABATABAI'S VISIT), AND SPOKE EXCELLENT GERMAN (BUT NO ENGLISH). SCHOEPS TOLD US THAT BONN VIEWED HIM AS "THEIR MAN IN TEHRAN," ALTHOUGH THE GERMANS ARE NOT QUITE SURE OF HIS INFLUENCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. SCHOEPS SAID THAT THEIR INFORMATION INDICATED THAT TABATABAI HAD A FAIRLY GOOD RELATIONSHIP TO KHOMEINI BECAUSE OF THEIR CONTACTS WHEN THE LATTER WAS IN PARIS.

7. COMMENT: SCHOEPS FELT THAT, GIVEN THE CURRENT UNPOPULARITY OF THE US AND UK IN IRAN, TABATABAI'S GERMAN TIES GIVES BONN AN ADVANTAGE IN DEALING WITH TEHRAN THAT EVEN THE FRENCH DO NOT HAVE. SCHMIDT'S DECISION TO TAKE TIME OUT FROM HIS BUSY SCHEDULE TO JOIN THE TABATABAI-WISCHMÉWSKI MEETING SHOWS A CONSCIOUS GERMAN EFFORT TO CULTIVATE THIS PERCEIVED ADVANTAGE. END COMMENT. STOESSL

BY #0172
January 12, 1978

Mr. Charles W. Naas, Director
and Mr. Myles L. Greene
NEA/IRN
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Charlie and Myles:

Realizing that the holidays, combined with the President's visit, have impeded my progress, I hope you won't mind a joint effort which tries to answer Charlie's letter of November 23 and Myles' epic of December 27.

First things first—we trust you have seen that part of the President's press conference given on his way home which refers to human rights and Iran. I am enclosing the relevant question and answer, including an extra copy which we would appreciate your flogging to D/HA when they show signs of losing the presidential perspective. We were very pleased by the Visit and, as you know from others, so were the Iranians. My contacts, especially some of the "alienated ones", were delighted to see the President mention human rights and relieved that he did not go on too heavily.

Qajar Cuties: Myles, thanks for sending us the Firouz material. Suffice to say, we feel the Prince has no backing here, and your question about human rights under the Qajars gets right to the heart of the matter. Moreover, such sketchy views as I have been able to turn up suggest that Firouz became an early apologist for Soviet views and has not demonstrably changed his spots in the past few years though he may be a more sophisticated exponent of them than today's crop of students are of theirs.

The Waldheim letter is interesting of course, because the signatories have figured in this type of correspondence addressed to others. I do not know if Waldheim has seen the letter, but it was eventually delivered to the U.N.,
according to a local source with contacts among the oppositionists. The charges within the letter are the extreme points of view on all subjects, usually containing a kernel of fact and popcorn balls of innuendo. It would be rather useless and too time-consuming to go into all the inaccuracies in the piece, but let me cite a couple of the more obvious: 1) Comments on torture which hint at recent use are probably flatly false; 2) the description of the Resurgence Party clearly misrepresents the amount of popular participation and is flatly wrong stating that the GOI has intimidated people into voting for approved candidates; and 3) the letter overdoes the point about lack of freedom of expression—the letter itself being one form of such freedom.

It would be useful for us if you could have INR/OIL/B run some spot checks thru the computer on the names at the bottoms of the various letters we've sent you—I know their computer can do it, if someone will take the initiative. In that connection, I'm enclosing a rough cut at a list of key dissidents which you might like to crank into the process.

Regarding the enclosure to Charlie’s letter from the Libera-
tion Movement, I have checked with my OR colleagues who are as mystified as I am about some of the "incidents" portrayed in the "communique". The "execution" of Akhoondi was, of course, carried out after a military tribunal convicted him of killing Embassy employee Hosnan. The GOI's weakness on this one stems from the fact that his trial was announced and sentence carried out before the effective date of the reforms, but after they had been announced. The October "religious demonstrations" mentioned in the other communique do not correspond to the dates we have for some events, and include others which we are not convinced took place at all. For example: Tehran University students have not, to our knowledge, called for the return of Khomeini (as charged in item 1); attacks against the students were not carried out before November 18 (item 2); and there appear to have been no religious disturbances in October except for the larger meeting on October 15, which the communique dates as the 7th, and places in the wrong city. We have not run the names of alleged torture victims through our special contact, but we have no other knowledge of them. (Perhaps one of the international groups visiting Iran's prisons could ask about them?)

Which brings us to Sadigeh (or Sadegh) Ghotbazadeh (or Gombazadeh), who wrote to the Department's Robert Montell. We received his packet, apparently from Ollie Jones in HA/HR
(through you?). Chotbzaeh, of course is the noted T.V.
personality who went on 60 minutes in March 1977 charging
Savak with trying to kill him and producing a rather
elderly old man as a witness. Our sketchy records show
he was a student in the U.S. in the early '60s and is a
member of "moderate" dissident movement in Europe. He has
been linked to Musa Sadr's group in Lebanon and has traveled
to the Middle East many times under assumed names. He is in the
U.S. lookout book, but apparently turns up in America with
disgusting (and probably illegal) regularity. His bio
should be checked out thoroughly.

We have no other information on the specific charges in
the packet, either regarding individual names, or the text
of what appears to be the Movement's description of Iranian
conditions. The latter seems to be grossly overdrawn, badly
out of date in some spots, and takes no account of what's
been happening during the past year in Iran. Should anything
else turn up, well let you know.

To return briefly to Myles' recent letter: we hope that,
armed with the President's remarks, the final "country
evaluation plan" which emerges in October recognizes
that there are probably a lot of other regions which have
a lot further to go than this one. On the other hand,
cautious, objective pressure such as that applied by Bill
Hodges (we note with pleasure his projected return to Iran
this spring), can probably push the issue ahead.

The last note on the question of executions: To our best
knowledge in the past three years there have never been any
executions without due process according to Iranian law.
There have been folk killed in shootouts, but I can hardly
bring myself to call them "innocent college students" when
the police (not SAVAK, the police) haul out an arms cache
that would have given the Viet Cong control of a whole
district in my Vietnam days from the "innocent lodgings"
from which these students have been shooting at police for
several minutes to an hour or more. Perhaps the above is a
bit trisky, but you understand my point--in my time here,
the GOI has not resorted to the random police killing that
marks some other regimes. It seems unfair to single out
Iran simply because the mid-60's leftist movement has its
propaganda effort better geared (from where, by the way?)
than its counterparts in Cuba, the Philippines, etc.

Wish you a better New Year's to you both--and what's this
report been about Myles departure?

Beat to all,

John D. Stempel

Enclosures
I want to bring to your attention the substance of a conversation with Sadegh Ghotbzadeh who, according to recent press reports, appears to be a key aide and spokesman for the Ayatollah Khomeini. Ghotbzadeh called me some time in November, 1977, to request that I have lunch with him, identifying himself as head of an Iranian resistance movement based in Paris. I asked Charlie Naas, then Country Director for Iran, whether he had any information on Ghotbzadeh. Naas did not know of Ghotbzadeh or his organization. I subsequently had lunch with Ghotbzadeh, approximately 2-3 weeks prior to the visit of the Shah in December, 1977 if my memory is correct. Main points made by Ghotbzadeh follow:

-- he was in the US to make contact with Americans both in and out of the Government whom he knew were familiar with Iranian affairs. (He apparently was familiar with my Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Report on "US Military Sales to Iran."

-- he and his organization were admirers of the US and the ideals for which it stood. He was particularly pleased with the emphasis being placed on human rights by the Carter Administration, and saw an opportunity to influence the policies of the Administration so that it would not repeat the mistakes of previous administrations namely -- identifying US interests in Iran and the region as being coincident with and dependent upon the views, policies, and indeed the continuing rule of the Shah.

-- the Shah was universally hated within Iran, and that pressures were building throughout Iranian society against the Shah and his repressive form of government.
Since Mr. Khomeini and his Organization had established contacts with all levels of Iranian society, including the military. These contacts were reporting that the Shah was increasingly unpopular and that a revolution was brewing.

- the US was identified with the Shah's government because of the US view that US interests included support of the Shah and his policies. Thus the US had many common interests but that the US would act when the revolution came unless the Carter Administration took steps to avoid identification with the Shah and its repression.

- With regard to the military, the top generals and other leaders were "bought" by the shah. The few and middle-ranking officers were increasingly deplored of the corruption and repression of the regime. In the crunch case, the bulk of the military would support the Iranian people rather than the corrupt leaders.

- In conclusion, Chuberdad stated that he had renewed hope in the Carter Administration as a result of its policies of human rights. Because the United States restraint policy announced by the President would lead to a more realistic posture towards the Shah's government some of which recently visited Washington.

I discussed the above with Capt. Boyd following our meeting. Subsequently, Chuberdad sent me a letter published by his organization, including a statement of August 22, 1978 in the name of Ayatollah Chuberdad. I forwarded all of this information to M/A/3D, DSS/TNA Rhet-21-40/78.

I have not heard from Chuberdad in any personal way since the luncheon and the telephone conversation on 30 December, 1977, which, in retrospect, was his last.

Chuberdad seemed to be a serious fellow who acted in a moderate, sensible way. He hoped the new Administration would change American policy toward Iran and would welcome it. We did not seem ideologically anti-American.

I hope that the above is of interest and possible use to you.
Dear Mr. Montell,

I hope you are well and fine. I'm sorry that I haven't been able to write you sooner, but I wish to thank you now for your valuable time that you gave me in Washington.

Enclosed you'll find documents concerning tortures, police methods, letters from the families of the imprisoned and certain communiqués regarding Iran. Unfortunately some of them are still in the original French. These will be translated into English and the translations sent to you later on; however, in view of the urgency resulting from the Shah's upcoming visit to the U.S., I thought it best to send you everything as is.

I hope you realize that this trip is extremely important because it is the first contact with the present Carter Administration. I am sure that the Shah will try the same methods and the same arguments that he used during his first trip to Washington after the late President Kennedy took office. He'll try to convince President Carter that if he is given a free hand with his repressive methods, he will soon finish off the opposition and rally the people around himself.

Needless to say, this argument holds no water. He has used it before and he has failed over and over. But since he uses this kind of argument with new people each time, he succeeds in getting away with his crimes and goes off scot-free to commit fresh ones.

I'm not trying to analyze the entire American foreign policy in Iran, nor the Shah's policy regarding our people, but rather what I wish to emphasize is the fact that our people see the Americans supporting the Shah as the primary cause of repression in Iran. The Shah is in real trouble in Iran, economically, politically and socially. I hope you are aware of all this and that when you judge the Shah, you will judge him on the entire record of his rule, taking all these things into account.

I sincerely hope the documents submitted here will find their way to the President's attention, and I trust to you to do this in whatever way you deem most helpful. I hope to see you soon in Washington and promise to send you more documents on various subjects. In the meantime I remain.

Yours sincerely,

Sadegh Ghotbzadeh

P.S. A commission of the Red Cross has gone to Iran and made inquiries about the political prisoners and their conditions in the prisons. The reports will be secret but should be extremely useful. I hope you will be able to get hold of this report through the necessary channels.
SECRET

ACTION

ACTION: 001297

INFO: AMB DCM EC-2 PM OR ADM ICA CRU-2 8/GMH

SECRET STATE 017110

TGT: 12065: GDS 1/21/75 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJECT: SADEGH GHOTIZADEH

1. AMERICAN PROFESSOR WHO HAS KNOWN GHOTIZADEH FOR YEARS TELLS US THAT IN THE PAST TWO YEARS HIS POSITION IN SAHEMI ENTOURAGE APPEARS TO HAVE CHANGED. FORMERLY, GHOTIZADEH WAS CLEARLY THE DOMINANT PERSONALITY, TO WHOM NAZDI SHOWED DEREENCE. DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS, HOWEVER, THE TWO MEN HAVE SEEMED ABOUT EQUAL IN RANK AND STATURE.

2. PROFESSOR DESCRIBED GHOTIZADEH'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS LEFT OF CENTER, STRONGLY ANTI-COMMUNIST. SINCE HIS STUDENT DAYS IN THE US, GHOTIZADEH HAS HAD A CONSPIRATIONAL/REVOLUTIONARY OUTLOOK. OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, THOUGH, HE HAS APPEARED MORE DISCIPLINED AND LESS PRONE TO SHOOT FROM THE HIP WITH WILD IDEAS.

3. GHOTIZADEH HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOUMEDIENNE AND MAAFAT. HE ALLEGEDLY DESPISES THE IRAQIS AND ADMIRER AMABAD. HE WAS CLOSE TO MUSA SADR AND INVOLVED IN SHIA AFFAIRS IN LEBANON. HIS RELATIONS WITH QADAFI HAVE BEEN AN ON-AND-OFF AFFAIR.

4. GHOTIZADEH APPEARS TO BE GENERALLY RESPECTED BY THE SAHEMI GROUP (BENESHII AND BAZARGAN) IN TEHRAN.

5. FINALLY, DEPARTMENT HAS RECEIVED SEVERAL CALLS FROM ESMIR AFSHAR REGARDING GHOTIZADEH'S PROSPECTIVE VISIT TO THE U.S. WE ARE DECLINING TO DEAL THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES.
CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 1131
FOR SCHRADENBERGER/SHAW FROM BRESCIA

1. ON FRIDAY APRIL 6, HERB ERB AND I HAD A CONVERSATION WITH
MR. F. TROWBRIDGE, VOM BAUR, A WASHINGTON ATTORNEY WHO HAS HAD
A LONG STANDING ACQUAINTANCESHIP OF SADEGH GHOEBZADEH OF HINT.
MR. VOM BAUR REPRESENTED GHOEBZADEH IN 1961 WHEN HE WAS
ARRESTED FOR CONDUCTING AN ANTI-SHEH DEMONSTRATION AND SIT-IN
AT THE IRANIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. THE INCIDENT OCCURRED
WHILE GHOEBZADEH WAS A STUDENT AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY'S
SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE. THE ARRESTULTIMATELY RESULTED
IN HIS BEING DEPORTED FROM THE U.S. AND HIS BEING TRIED IN
ABSENTIA IN IRAN AND SENTENCED TO DEATH. GHOEBZADEH AND
VOM BAUR HAVE BEEN IN CORRESPONDENCE AND HAVE BEEN SEEING
EACH OTHER INTERMITTENTLY OVER THESE LONG YEARS.

2. VOM BAUR WAS VERY FORTECOMING IN GIVING US HIS VERY HIGH
OPINION OF GHOEBZADEH. HE FEELS THAT HE IS A MANN OF GREAT
INTELLIGENCE, INTEGRITY, AND CONSCIENTIOUSNESS. HE CHARAC-
TERIZED HIM AS MODERATE IN HIS OUTLOOK, WILLING TO MAKE
REASONED JUDGMENTS BASED ON FACTS AND LOGIC. VOM
BAUR CONSIDERED HIM TO BE A FRIEND OF AMERICA AND THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE IN SPITE OF HIS LONG-STANDING ANTI-SHEH POSITION.

IN THE MATTER OF DR. AMINI'S SITUATION WAS OUTLINED WITH
VOM BAUR IN ORDER TO GET HIS ADVICE ON A POSSIBLE COURSE OF
ACTION THROUGH GHOEBZADEH. HE ADVISED THAT A CAREFULLY-
RAFTED, WRITTEN EXPLANATION OF THE SITUATION MAY BE HELPFUL
IN GETTING GHOEBZADEH'S ASSISTANCE IN INTERCEDING ON DR.
AMINI'S BEHALF. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT GHOEBZADEH WOULD BE
PERSUADED BY THE FACTS IN THE CASE RATHER THAN BY EMOTION-
ALISM.

2. EXPLAINED TO VOM BAUR THAT WE WOULD BE RELATING THE CON-
TEXTS OF OUR DISCUSSION WITH HIM TO THE POST, AND VOM BAUR
AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE ALL RIGHT WITH HIM.

FRIEDRICH

#7877

-103-
FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Iran

SUBJECT: Iranian Government Report on Asadullah Mobasheri

REPORT NO.: NIV-5735

DATE OF REPORT: 23 February 1962

NO. OF PAGES: 3

DATE OF INFO: October 1961

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: Iran, Tehran (11 January 1962)

REFERENCES: NIV-5362, 5380

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Iranian Intelligence officer (C) with access to reports concerning internal security matters. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Below is an edited translation of a report on Asadullah Mobasheri, chief of the inspections department, Ministry of Justice, prepared in the National Intelligence and Security Organization (RAVAK) in October 1961.

Asadullah Mobasheri is fifty years old and married. He has five children and resides in his own house, first on the right, Nuche Shapar Ali Reza, Pahlevi Avenue. He completed his elementary and secondary education in Tehran and graduated from the law college in 1935, this also being the year he was employed by the Justice Ministry. He began his civil service with the Justice Department at Yazd, and was subsequently transferred first to Isfahan and then to Shiraz. Afterwards he was transferred to Tabriz for reasons mentioned hereunder, and has been in Tehran since.

Mobasheri was in Isfahan during World War II and at a time when the Tudesh [Communist] Party was at its peak of its power throughout the country, particularly in working centers. Mobasheri provoked the workers of the Isfahan mills, suggesting that they throw the employers out of the mills, have committees elected to run the mills, pay wages and other expenses out of the proceeds of sales, and hand over the remainder, if any, to the employers. His provocations resulted in extensive strikes at Isfahan; government authorities, finding Mobasheri the agent provocateur and responsible for the workers' strikes, transferred him to Shiraz. There, too, he was active and endeavored to provoke tribal chieftains. His activity attracted the attention of the British Consul at Shiraz, who reported Mobasheri's secret efforts to the British Embassy in Tehran and the latter asked the Foreign Office to have Mobasheri recalled to Tehran and no position or mission be given him anywhere in the south. Consequently, Mobasheri was transferred to Tehran and assumed his new duties here as deputy public prosecutor for the Penal Court, and in this capacity he helped the late Ali Akbar Kavehizadeh, who was later Justice Minister, investigate dossiers on
railway employees and the imprisonment sent to the Penal Court against Roshan Bahadur, former Director-General of the Railway Administration. Roshan Bahadur went toward Roshan Bahadur and on a result he was able to obtain many privileges for the railway and a branch of the Central United Council in the railway.

Roshan Bahadur visited Europe in 1947 and 1948 and he was during this visit that he got his LL.B. in Paris. Upon his return he was given an important position and he was set as director until 1949. In that year Ali Ahmad took over as Minister of Justice and Sardar Bahadur Akram put a few good words for Roshan Bahadur and as a result Roshan Bahadur was made head of the technical division of the Justice Ministry. Toward the end of Roshan Bahadur's term as Justice Minister, Roshan Bahadur was made deputy governor for the Supreme Court (Court of Cassation). He eventually was made director-general of inspection by present Justice Minister Akram. Roshan Bahadur also acts as adviser to Akram and takes part in all council and important matters of the ministry. Roshan Bahadur is a member of the eight-member council in the Justice Ministry, set up by Akram. He teaches of Roshan Bahadur, Sardar Akram, Sardar Bahadur, Sardar Bahadur, and Roshan Bahadur.

In 1945 Roshan Bahadur assisted an intelligence network for the British Party to get information on political activity of the British Railway officials in Lahore. When the British learnt of this network they assigned the late Bakhsh Bahadur, one of their agents and a Justice Ministry official, to approach Roshan Bahadur about joining the said intelligence network, if possible, in order to keep the British informed of the network activity. Individually, the late Bakhsh Bahadur was able to join the network as a probationary member. At that time, Roshan Bahadur’s Intelligence network had taken a shop opposite the British Railway gate on武器 Lane in order to observe the people going into the railway. The shop was run by one of the network members. So one night when the late Bakhsh Bahadur was going into the British Railway to report and give documents to the British Railway officials, the network member in charge of the shop, who knew all network members, saw him going into the British Railway and reported this to the network at once. Bakhsh Bahadur was dismissed from the network the next day and the network changed his tactics. There is no information available on the present status of this network.

Roshan Bahadur had an important part in gathering the judges, the casos for a strike, together and getting them to strike for a few hours about the time the teachers had arranged their strike during the last days of Jaffer Sharif-Quaid’s office.
2. This probably is connected with a case in which Rehavam was ordered by the authorities to examine differences among military executives who had been interned during World War II as security threats. The case had been unresolved, as had evidence of whether executions were involved. The case was referred to an inquiry body that could not be reported again in public terms of events earlier.

3. In recent years Minister of Justice Shitrit to November 1956, and

4. 572-5758 concluded that this evidence had been found, held secret records, and was consistent with approved appointments, transfers, promotions, and other changes in the ministry.

5. According to earlier reports Harf, a lawyer, was a former member of the Zedek Party, but left the Party when he discovered that it was under British sponsorship. In 1951 he was reported to be associated with the National Front, and in 1954 with the National Resistance Front. 570-57560 and 5758 are Israeli Government reports concerning incidents in the government and election, these persons.

6. This report has been coordinated with the Embassy.
E:\2065: GB\3/29/83 (Taylor, Clyde D.) OR-E

SUBJECT: Planning and Budget Minister Moinfar's Views

1. (C - Entire Text)

2. The Embassy has extracted the following comments by
Minister of State for the Plan and Budget Organization
All areas present from a transcript of an interview
March 21 or 22 granted a foreign journalist (Financial
Times - London). We understand that little of the
interview was published. Moinfar's comments do not reveal
a high level of expertise or articulation, but perhaps
that was intentional, or at least understandable, given
the present character of the GDR. Embassy comments follow
some of his statements.

3. The Budget: There will be a "temporary" budget for
the first three months of the New Year (i.e., March 21
to June 21), during which we will have to study all the

TAYLOR: MAX 3/29/83 1137 E/C/G/TAYLOR
PROBLEMS AND MAKE FINAL DECISIONS ON EXPENDITURES. 

THUS, WE HOPE TO HAVE AN ANNUAL BUDGET WITHIN THE THREE MONTH PERIOD. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE BUDGET WILL BE PLANNED FROM THE EXPENDITURE SIDE AND NOT ON REVENUE POTENTIAL, WHICH IS CHIEFLY A FUNCTION OF THE DISCRETIONARY LEVEL OF OIL EXPERTS. THE AIM IS NOT TO SPEND MONEY FOR AMBITIOUS PROJECTS. THE BUDGET WILL NOT BE AS HIGH AS LAST YEAR'S (NOTE: WHICH WAS AUTHORIZED BY REALS 2935 BILLION OR DOLS. 41.6 AT 70.5 CONVERSION) IT WILL PROBABLY BE 75-80 PERCENT OF THE 1357 LEVEL. REDUCTIONS WILL BE OBTAINED FROM THE MILITARY SIDE ALTHOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT WE HAVE OTHER EXPENSES FOR THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE SUCH AS RURAL ROAD ROADS, LOW-INCOME HOUSING, NEEDS OF THE VILLAGES AND AGRICULTURE. COMMENT: THERE IS LITTLE SURPRISING IN HIS MOST GENERAL VIEWS, BUT IT IS GOOD THAT HE REALIZES THE POTENTIAL FOR WELFARE EXPENDITURES, WHICH TO A LARGE DEGREE WILL OFFSET SAVINGS FROM MAJOR PROJECTS AND MILITARY CUTS. HIS ESTIMATE ON THE 1358 BUDGET (I.E., 75 TO 80 PERCENT OF 1357'S), WOULD PUT IT AT ABOUT THE SAME LEVEL AS 1356, I.E., REALS 2200 TO 2350 BILLION.

4. MAJOR PROJECTS: PROJECTS SUCH AS KISH ISLAND ARE NOT RIGHT FOR OUR PEOPLE. I AM NOT AGAINST TOURISM, BUT BEFORE GOING AHEAD WITH LARGE HOTELS OTHER NEEDS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. WE HAVE INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS WHICH ARE
UNDER STUDY PROJECTS WHICH WE HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER TO CONTINUE OR PUT ON HOLD. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT SUCH PROJECTS WILL BE DELAYED OR CHANGED CONSIDERABLY. THE SECOND GAS PIPELINE (I.E., IGAT II) IS AMONG OUR MAIN PROJECTS WHICH ARE UNDER STUDY. COMMENT: OUR SOURCE SAID HE TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO PIN MOINFAR DOWN ON VARIOUS MAJOR PROJECTS, ESPECIALLY IGAT II; HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT MOINFAR AND STAFF DO NOT HAVE ANSWERS YET AND THAT THE STAFF IS NOT UP TO MEETING SUCH TASKS.

5. REVENUES: THE JOURNALIST SUGGESTED OIL REVENUE OF DOLS 16 BILLION FOR YEAR 1358; MOINFAR SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO SAY TO THAT. HE SAID THAT THE MAXIMUM OIL PRODUCTION WAS 6 MILLION (B/D), BUT HE SUPPOSED IT WOULD BE LESS THAN THAT AND, IN ANY CASE, WOULD BE RELATED TO THE EXPENDITURE NEEDS. CUSTOMS REVENUE MAY NOT BE AS MUCH AS BEFORE SINCE THE IMPORTATION OF LUXURY AND NON-ESSENTIAL GOODS WILL BE REDUCED. THERE WILL BE NO ENTRIES IN THE BUDGET FOR REVENUE FROM FOREIGN LOANS NOR LOANS TO OTHER COUNTRIES. WE HAVE NO NEED FOR FOREIGN LOANS. OUR NATION HAS DEVELOPED TO THE EXTENT THAT IF THE PEOPLE FEEL THE GOVERNMENT IS IN NEED OF MONEY THEY WOULD GIVE IT THEIR JEWELS, RINGS, NECKLACES THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE ARE THE SAME. COMMENT: APART FROM THE FOOLISHNESS, WE BELIEVE THAT MOINFAR HAS
NOT FACED UP TO THE OBLIGATIONS MADE TO SOME FOREIGN COUNTRIES, WHICH, THOUGH NOT LARGE IN FIRM COMMITMENTS, WOULD BE POLITICALLY AND IN SOME CASES ECONOMICALLY (E.G., THE IRON ORE PROJECT IN INDIA) UNWISE TO DISHONOR.

6. CONSEQUENCES OF CANCELLING PROJECTS: THE INTERVIEWER LED MOINFAR INTO THE CONSEQUENCES OF CANCELLED PROJECTS. MOINFAR SAID THAT CANCELLING A PROJECT DOES NOT MEAN UNEMPLOYMENT; THE TYPES OF PROJECTS WILL BE CHANGED SO THE SAME UNEMPLOYED PEOPLE WILL FIND WORK ELSEWHERE.

ALSO CONSIDER THAT WE HAVE HAD A GREAT NUMBER OF FOREIGN WORKERS IN THIS COUNTRY. I DO AGREE, HE SAID, THAT IN THE FIRST FEW MONTHS THERE WILL BE UNEMPLOYMENT, BUT GRADUALLY THERE WILL BE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNEMPLOYED. I BELIEVE IN NEW TECHNOLOGY, BUT IF TECHNOLOGY CAUSES UNEMPLOYMENT IT SHOULD NOT BE EMPLOYED. WE GAVE AS AN EXAMPLE ROAD CONSTRUCTION, SAYING THAT IF THERE ARE NUMBERS OF UNSKILLED WORKERS IDLE, THE MACHINERY, ALTHOUGH ALREADY PROCURED, SHOULD BE LEFT ASIDE AND THE WORKERS EMPLOYED.

7. ARREARAGES ON PUBLIC PROJECTS: HE SAID THAT THE PROBLEM ON ARREARAGES RELATED NOT ONLY TO FOREIGN CONTRACTORS BUT LOCAL. WE STARTED PAYMENTS BEFORE NO RUZ AND HAVE AS A CONSEQUENCE ALREADY INJECTED MUCH MONEY INTO THE MARKET. WE ARE MAKING REGULAR PAYMENTS— I DON'T HAVE ANY FIGURES TO GIVE YOU. WE WILL GRADUALLY
PAY THE GOVERNMENT DEBTS AND THERE SEEMS TO BE NO
(FINANCIAL) PROBLEM SINCE THE OIL EXPORTS ARE GOING
AND WE HAVE ENOUGH POSSIBILITIES FOR (REVENUES FOR)
OUR PAYMENTS.

8. CORRUPTION: MOINFAR, HARDLY PROMPTED BY THE INTER-
VIEWER, WENT ON AT LENGTH ABOUT CORRUPTION, THE "PAHLAVI
PERCENTAGE" AND SAID THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE STUDY
OF PROJECTS THAT IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT
THOSE BASED ON DISHONESTY WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND
BY A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.

9. COMMENT: BASED ON THIS JOURNALIST'S IMPRESSIONS AND
THE EMBASSY'S OTHER CONTACTS, SOME INCLUDING OFFICERS IN
THE PBO, IT APPEARS THAT MOINFAR AND COMPANY HAVE A LONG
ROW TO HOE TO GET FROM REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC TO THE
REALITIES OF PLANNING AND FINANCING AND ECONOMY AND
GOVERNMENT. MOINFAR DISMISSED ALL HIS UNDER SECRETARIES
AND, FROM REPORTS, IGNORES HIS DIRECTORS GENERAL,
PREFERRING TO SURROUND HIMSELF WITH ADVISORS FROM THE
LOWER RANKS OR THOSE NEW TO PBO. FORMER PBO MINISTER
MEHRAN DESCRIBED MOINFAR TO EMBOFF AS "LEFT OF THE
NATIONAL FRONT" AND HAVING SOME COMPETENCE, BUT NOT
IN THE SAME ACADEMIC LEAGUE AS ARDALAN AND Rowlavi.
WE HAVE LITTLE OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT HIM, OTHER THAN
THAT HE WAS A DIRECTOR GENERAL IN PBO. SULLIVAN##
E.O. 12065: GDS 10/23/85 (TOMSETT, VICTOR L.) OR-P

FAC: PINT, ERGO, IR

SUBJECT: OIL MINISTER REPORTEDLY BEATEN AND HOSPITALIZED

1. (U) ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEHRAN TIMES OF OCTOBER 23
carried story that oil minister Ali Akbar Monif
farr was hospitalized in TEHRAN after suffering a heart attack
October 22. According to the story, Monifar's condition
was critical when he arrived at the hospital. He is now
recovering and is expected to be out in three days.

2. (C) NEWSPAPER VERSION HAS BEEN CONTRADICTED BY
REPORTS THAT MONIFARR WAS IN FACT BEATEN BY ANGRY OIL
WORKERS IN KHUZESTAN. ACCORDING TO EYEWITNESS REPORT
RECEIVED FROM KHUZESTAN-BASED JOURNALIST,
MONIFARR WAS DRAGGED FROM HIS CAR IN ABADIAN BY WORKERS
ANGRY AT RECENT WAGE CUTS AND REFUSALS TO PAY GASES.
HE WAS SEVERELY BEATEN BEFORE HE COULD BE RESCUED.

3. (C) THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER REPORTS THAT MONIFARR
SPENT TENURE AS OIL MINISTER HAS BEEN STORMY. ACCORDING
TO ONE STORY EMPLOYEES WERE THREATENED INTO ATTENDING
MEETINGS AND RALLIES IN SUPPORT OF THE NEW MINISTER
AND AGAINST FORMER NIOC DIRECTOR NAJIB LAINGEN.

ET #12065

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 11263

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: OCT 22

CHARGE: LR

ATTACH: POL: SLIMMEN: CO

CLEAR: POL: VT: US:

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E.O. 12366: RDS-3 12/30/99 (NCAPPS, WILLIAM)

TAGS: PINR, IR, VE

SUBJECT: (U) IRANIAN MINISTER OF PETROLEUM, ALI ASHAR MOINFAR

REFS: 1) CARACAS 12993, 2) TEHRAN 11123 (NOT SENT TO CARACAS)

1. (C) AS HEAD (SINCE SEPTEMBER 1977) OF THE NEWLY CREATED MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM, ALI ASHAR MOINFAR HEADS UP THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (NIOC), THE NATIONAL IRANIAN GAS COMPANY, THE NATIONAL IRANIAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, AND THE PETROLEUM DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND FINANCE. HE IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF CABINET OFFICIALS WHO HAD POPULIST AFFINITIES BUT ARE LITTLE KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC. MOINFAR HAS NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN PETROLEUM AFFAIRS, AND HIS SUBSTANTIVE KNOWLEDGE SEEMS LIMITED TO CIVIL ENGINEERING AND SEISMOLOGY. IN ADDITION, HE LACKS SUPERIORITY SKILLS. HIS POLITICAL CONNECTIONS, HOWEVER, ARE EXCELLENT. HE WAS A FOLLOWER OF PRIME MINISTER MOSELI BAZARIAN WHOSE LATTER WAS A PROFESSOR OF ENGINEERING AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY IN THE 1960s. AS AN ENGINEER, MOINFAR MAY BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO PAKT AND ENSAB WORKERS THAN WAS HIS PREDECESSOR, HASSAN BAGAHVARI. THE MINISTER HAS ANNOUNCED THAT HE WILL PURGE THE INDUSTRY OF ALL PERSONS AND PEOPLE ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRAVUS GOVERNMENT. IF EXPERIENCED MANAGERS AND EMPLOYEES ARE REMOVED, PRODUCTION AND MOCAB WILL Collider.

2. (C) AS REPORTED IN LONDON, MOINFAR WAS RECENTLY TRAVELLED FROM HIS CAR IN A BEATEN, IRAN, BY OIL WORKERS AND AT NURSE CUTS AND REFUSED TO PAY BONUSES. UN WAS
SEVERELY WOUNDED IN DECEMBER 1971, Ho CULD NOT RETURN. HIS RESSION WAS SUDDENLY CONTRADICTED BY THE DEATH OF HIS SON, WHICH ACCRUDED THAT MOTHINAH HAD BEEN HOSPITALIZED IN THERZIN AFTER SUFFERING A HEART ATTACK ON OCTOBER 25. MOINHAH MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR AN INJURY WITH \[VENIZILAN ENERGY MINISTER \] 


4. (D) MOINHAA, ABOUT 57, SPENT 9 YEARS IN JAPAN.

5. (C) NAZIR IS TECHNICALLY STILL HEAD OF NICOC. REPLACEMENT HAVEN'T BEEN NAME TED. HE HAS BEEN GROWING ECLIPSED BY MOINHAH, HOMER, AND HAS PROBABLY RETAINED LITTLE OR NO POWER UNDER THE NEW ORGANIZATION. SOME OF NAZIR'S ENEMIES SEEM DETERMINED TO SAY HIM FOR SEVERAL ALLEGED CRIMES AT NICOC, AND IS NOW IN EXILE. AT THIS MOMENT HE IS CLEARLY OUT OF POWER AND CALLED FOR NOT TO WISH TO BE CAUTIONIN IN MENTIONING AN INTEREST IN NAZIR. YANE BY #3768
SECRET-SENSITIVE

December 13, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES

FROM: NEA/IRN - Henry Precht

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, Adviser to Khomeini, December 12, 1978, at Dominique's Restaurant

I had dinner with Robert Hirschman of WETA and Dr. Yazdi and for a short time Marvin Zonis at Hirschman's invitation. Yazdi, an American citizen, was on his way to spend a day in Houston where he is in cancer research. He has known Khomeini since the early 1960's. Yazdi is a reserved, exceedingly calm, but very persistent idealist. I believe he is intelligent and honest with himself. The following paragraphs summarize the main points in our conversation:

-- The President's December 12 statement: Yazdi regretted the President's statement because it again showed total American support for the Shah and denigrated the opposition, specifically Khomeini. He did not know whether Khomeini would react strongly to the President's implied and "not true" criticism.

-- Khomeini on violence: Yazdi said that following the September 8 "massacre," Iranians had asked Khomeini for permission to take up arms against the Shah. Khomeini had refused, but authorized them to acquire arms in the event an armed struggle might be necessary at a later stage. He indicated that if the army attempted to crack down harshly, Khomeini would be obliged to issue a call to arms. I asked him about the "torrents of blood" statement attributed to Khomeini. Yazdi said that he had complained to UPI that Khomeini had made no such call for violence. I asked if Khomeini did not feel responsibility for the violence and destruction against banks, movie theaters, hotels, etc.? Yazdi said Khomeini had not called for such actions and that some were the work of SAVAK. He acknowledged that it was not possible to control strictly their followers in Iran and that
Khomeini must bear some of the responsibility for the destruction. I asked about responsibility for the assassination of American military personnel. Yazdi again denied this was Khomeini's doing, but asked in turn whether the Americans who trained and equipped the Iranian army were not responsible for the deaths of innocent Iranians?

Yazdi's position on violence is that the Iranian Government has been responsible for the killing of innocent persons in Iran. The Khomeini revolt is an unarmed one that suffers from the violence of the Government.

--- The December 10-11 demonstrations: --- I asked Yazdi whether Khomeini's group considered the peaceful demonstrations a defeat. Some people believed that Khomeini wanted violence on Ashura and that he had been committed to bring down the Shah on that day. Yazdi denied that Khomeini had made such assertions. He said that their people in Iran had planned the demonstrations to show to the outside world that they were capable of absolute discipline and a peaceful expression of their views. He felt that they had succeeded enormously.

Yazdi said the opposition had had two choices: It could have marched toward the Palace or it could have marched as it chose in a neutral direction. The Government had no such choice. If it had attempted to prohibit the demonstrations, there would have been a slaughter and the army would have been unable to hold together.

I asked about the Khomeini organization in Iran. Yazdi did not want to talk about this but made a passing reference to our "central committee and delegations and means of communication."

--- The Islamic Republic: --- I asked if Khomeini's people came to power what would happen to such responsible figures as Dr. Yeganeh whose only defect perhaps was that he had served the Shah's Government? Yazdi said that if such men were otherwise clean and were willing to work for the new Government, there would
be no problem. A person like Ganji, who was well-known to Yazdi, had been listed as one who took millions out of Iran. Yazdi implied that that would finish Ganji.

I asked how an Islamic board of review would work? He said Iranian economists would be obliged to come up with some new system (e.g., service fees) to replace interest rates. He felt confident this could happen. In its dealings abroad Iran would pay and receive interest. What about co-education? No problem said Yazdi, there could be co-education. He emphasized that it would take some time and the re-education of the people to build a new political system founded on Islamic principles. It would not be like the tribal society in Saudi Arabia, and in fact would be unique in the world.

When the Shah goes, Khomeini would designate a cabinet which would serve as a transitional government until elections could produce a lasting government. Elections would be absolutely free. They were an essential element in the Khomeini program. The Islamic Republic would also enjoy full freedom of speech and the press, including the right to attack Islam. The Shias had no fears because they knew they were strong.

As to foreign relations, the Islamic Republic would seek good ties with all countries. It would not sell oil to South Africa or Israel, however. I asked whether Iran might send troops to aid the Arabs in another Arab-Israeli war? No, said Yazdi. How about joining an Arab oil embargo? I don't know, he said.

Yazdi dismissed the communists as being unimportant politically in Iran. Similarly, he dismissed the threat of Soviet intervention. He appreciated that Iraq was nervous because Iraq's social/political situation made it ripe for the same kinds of events occurring in Iran.

We asked whether Khomeini's people had had any contacts with any foreign governments, e.g., Saudi Arabia or Egypt? He said they had not. He dismissed the Libyan Government as so inept that it could be of little help to Khomeini.
The military: After the Shah, Khomeini forces would purge the senior Generals, if any remained in the country. He said a number of officers had come secretly to see Khomeini and he was confident of support within the army. The task of the Islamic Republic would be to educate the army to a national mission rather than one of protecting the Shah.

Yazdi said the Islamic Republic would probably cancel many arms sales contracts as they did not serve Iran's interests. It would pay its debts for any contracts that were cancelled. He said the new Government would be happy to buy tractors instead from the U.S.

The future of the Shah: I described a number of arrangements ranging to the "King of Sweden model" which might be adopted to preserve a position for the Shah. Yazdi was uncompromising. The Shah must go and his system must be abolished. We were dealing with a mass revolution. If Khomeini argued that the Shah could stay with reduced powers, he would be rejected by his followers.

Would it be possible for a Sanjabi to negotiate a new government? Would Khomeini accept that? "No."

Wasn't it necessary to keep the Shah in order to preserve military discipline and prevent civil war? Yazdi was confident that once the Shah was gone, Iran's problems would be solved and the military would have no choice but to sign up with the Islamic Republic.

The U.S. Role: The U.S. was crucial, Yazdi said. If the U.S. withdrew its support of the Shah, he would fall immediately. If the support continued, the U.S. would suffer the same fate as the Shah in Iran. Would the Ayatollah call for violence against Americans if he called for a holy war on Shah's regime? That was a real possibility, Yazdi said, particularly, if the U.S. continued to make statements such as the President's statement of December 12. He could not, of course, control all of the Iranians who were in a rage in any event.
SECRET-SENSITIVE

What about Khomeini's threat to cancel oil contracts with the U.S.? That would depend, Yazdi said, on how the U.S. performed between now and the day that the Shah fell.

On parting, we agreed that neither of us would acknowledge that there had been any official contact between Khomeini and the U.S. Government.

Comment

All of this sounds naive. It is, but it is also deeply felt. I had the impression that the Khomeini organization is very amateurish in its handling of PR and contacts with foreigners. But, clearly, they know how to operate in Iran in a way that the Shah's people have forgotten.

cc: D - Mr. Christopher
    P - Mr. Newsom
    NEA - Mr. Saunders
    CIA - Mr. Ames
    NSC - Captain Sick
    Ambassador Sullivan

Drafted: NEA/IRN:HPrecht:amp
12/13/78 - ext:20313

SECRET-SENSITIVE

-119-
ACTION

UNCLASSIFIED

VV ESA876BRA848
00 RUGMHR
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ZNR UUUU ZZK
BT
UNCLAS PARIS SVC.

ZUI RUEHSID 186SW H/W ZDK RUFNPS 2956
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4032
INFO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 4050
BT.
UNCLAS PARIS 02956

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: IR, FR, PINT
SUBJECT: (U) KHOMEINI CAMP'S REACTION TO VISIT OF BAKHTIAR TO PARIS

1. (U) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS FROM THE AP TICKER:

A. DR. YAZDI SAID SATURDAY NIGHT THAT AYOTULLAH KHOMEINI WOULD AGREE TO MEET PREMIER BAKHTIAR WHEN HE ARRIVES IN PARIS. YAZDI SAID THAT KHOMEINI HAD KNOWN IN ADVANCE OF BAKHTIAR'S PLAN.

B. SOURCES IN KHOMEINI'S ENTOURAGE SAID THAT BAKHTIAR MIGHT MEET AS EARLY AS SUNDAY IN KHOMEINI'S HOUSE IN SUBURBAN PARIS. YAZDI SOUNDED JUBILANT AND SAID HE WAS HAPPY BECAUSE BAKHTIAR'S MOVE SHOWED HE MIGHT BE CHANGING HIS POLICY.

C. YAZDI SAID BAKHTIAR HAD SAID THAT HE WANTS TO HEAR KHOMEINI'S OPINION AND, IF SO, KHOMEINI IS WILLING TO LET HIM HEAR IT.

-120-
D. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH FRENCH RADIO SATURDAY NIGHT, BAKHTIAR SAID THAT HIS VISIT TO PARIS WOULD LAST A MAXIMUM OF THREE DAYS. BAKHTIAR SAID THAT HIS OFFER TO MEET WITH KHOMENI WAS A GOOD WILL ATTEMPT WHICH HE WAS MAKING WITH GREAT PLEASURE. BAKHTIAR DID NOT KNOW IF KHOMENI WOULD RETURN TO TEHRAN WITH HIM. BAKHTIAR RESPONDED TO A QUERY OF WHETHER THE AIRPORT WOULD BE OPENED FOR HIS FLIGHT TO PARIS BY CONSIDERING THIS A SECONDARY QUESTION AND "WHAT IS NECESSARY WOULD BE DONE."

E. IRANIAN SOURCES SAID THAT GENERAL FERIDUM JAM, WHO WAS MINISTER OF DEFENSE IN THE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT, BUT RESIGNED TWO DAYS LATER, MET WITH KHOMENI ON FRIDAY NIGHT.

F. AP COMMENTED THAT BAKHTIAR'S DECISION TO COME TO PARIS APPEARS TO HAVE DIVIDED KHOMENI'S CLOSEST AIDES AND DELAYED UNTIL SUNDAY FINAL CONFIRMATION THAT THE MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE. YAZDI SAID WITHOUT QUALIFICATION THAT KHOMENI WOULD MEET WITH BAKHTIAR AND HAD KNOWN IN ADVANCE THAT BAKHTIAR WAS COMING. BUT SADEGH GHOTBIADEH LATER TOLD REPORTERS KHOMENI WOULD RECEIVE BAKHTIAR IF BAKHTIAR IS COMING TO OFFER HIS RESIGNATION AS PREMIER. GHOTBIADEH SAID THAT ANY OTHER MOTIVATION WOULD BE STUDIED WITH CARE BEFORE KHOMENI TOOK A DECISION ON THE MEETING. QUERIED ON THE CONTRADICTION, YAZDI SAID THE TWO AIDES WERE EXPRESSING THEIR OWN UNDERSTANDING OF DEVELOPMENTS AND ADDED THAT IT WAS NATURAL THAT TWO PEOPLE MIGHT REACH DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS. YAZDI SAID KHOMENI WOULD MAKE KNOWN HIS DECISION SOMETIME SUNDAY.

CHAPMAN
BT
00111

UNCLASSIFIED

-121-
CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY: IRAN (IR)

REPORT NUMBER: 6 846 0134 79

TITLE: SITREP FOR PERIOD 171222-181222L MAR 79

OMITTED

DATE OF INFO: 790317

DATE OF REPORT: 790318

PLACE OF AGG: 790317, TEHRAN, IRAN

REFERENCE: FOR U-HED-49125, M-351-15016

SOURCE: LOCAL NEWS MEDIA, USDAO PERSONNEL, EMBASSY OFFICIALS, 6 846 0&18

SPECIAL INST: IRC

SUMMARY. (C) REPORT FORWARDS INFORMATION FOR THE PERIOD 171222-181222L MAR 79. INFORMATION CONCERNS ECONOMICS, AFGHAN MINSITR OF JUSTICE, POLITICAL ACTIVITY, YAZDI MARCHES, EMBASSY SECURITY.

THRU 21 OMITTED

DETAILS: (C) A. ECONOMICS - IN AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S FIRST MAJOR SPEECH ON ECONOMICS HE, REFLECTING PR. BAZAHRANS GROWING CONCERN FOR THE IRANIAN ECONOMY, HAS WarnED THE PEOPLE THEY MUST IMMEDIATELY START WORKING TO SAVE THE "BANKRUPT ECONOMY." BOTH THE SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAVE CALLED ON THE YOUTH OF THE NATION AND THE OVERZEALOUS GUARDIANS OF THE REVOLUTION TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN ACHIEVING A HEALTHY FINANCIAL SITUATION IN IRAN. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THE NATION WAS BROKE THURSDAY DAYS AFTER THE REVOLUTIONARY VICTOR ON FEB 11. ORIGINATOR COMMENTS: (C) ECONOMIC REALITY IS BECOMING A MAJOR CONCERN OF THE GOVERNMENT. BAZAHRAN SEEMS TO HAVE COMMENCED KHOMEINI THAT IF THE ECONOMY DOES NOT RECOVER, THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ENDURE. THE PROBLEM IS HOW DO YOU
CONVINCE A POPULATION THAT HAS LONG BEEN WITHOUT POWER OR FREEDOM, THAT THE BATTLE IS OVER AND THEY MUST RETURN TO THEIR JOBS, HOW DO YOU CONVINCE THEM THEY MUST HAVE DISCIPLINE AND MUST WORK FOR A "BOSS". HOW CAN FACTORIES RUN IF WORKERS ONLY DETAIL THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND VOTE ON WHAT TYPE OF WORK THEY WILL DO IF THE ECONOMY IS TO RECOVER.

2. AFGHANISTAN: A GROUP OF ABOUT 100 YOUTH PUSHER THEIR WAY INTO THE AFGHANISTAN EMBASSY IN TEHRAN PROTESTING THE PERSECUTION OF MUSLIMS BY MARXIST LEADERS IN YAROL. PRESS REPORTS STATE THAT A SECOND INCIDENT OCCURRED AT THE AFGHAN EMBASSY RESIDENCE IN NORTH TEHRAN. YOUTH ATTACKED THE HOME AND PULLED DOWN THE MUSLIM FLAG. TWO IRANIAN SHEA LEADERS, AYATOLLAH SADIQ MOSEINI ROUMI AND AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADADI HAVE CONDEMNE THE KAHN REGIME AND CALLED FOR THEM TO STOP THEIR "DEVILISH ACTS".

ORIGINATOR COMMENTS: (G) THE-AURIA OF POWER, SURROUNDING IRANS AYATOLLAHS MAY BEGIN TO SHINE IN OTHER OPPRESSED ISLAMIC NATIONS.


WILL BEGIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

D. POLITICAL ACTIVITY:
(1) THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT WAS CALLED FOR ALL GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS BELIEVING IN DEMOCRACY AND ANTI-IMPERIALISM TO JOIN ITS RANKS. THIS IS A PRE-REFERENDUM ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE THE ACTIVITIES OF THOSE WHO OPPOSE AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND THE YESACH-NO REFERENDUM.
(2) THE IRANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY HAS DESCRIBED ITSELF AS A MARXIST-LENINIST, COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION. THEY FURTHER STATED THEY HAVE NO CONTACTS WITH THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, BUT ARE OPPOSED TO SOVIET SOCIAL-IMPERIALISM. THE PARTY FURTHER STATED THEIR ONLY DISAGREEMENT WITH ISLAM IS ISLAM'S ACCEPTANCE OF CAPITALISM AND THE PARTY'S REJECTION OF CAPITALISM.
(3) A NEW PARTY BEING FORMED IN THE PROVINCES IS THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY. IT IS REPORTED TO HAVE GAINED UP TO 10,000 MEMBERS IN RUDSAN.

ORIGINATOR COMMENTS: (C) A FREE ELECTION SOMETHING NEW IN IRAN, AS THE REFERENDUM APPROACHES NEW POLITICAL PARTIES APPEAR LIKE FLOWERS IN SPRING.

E. YAZDI ASSISTANT TO THE PM FOR REVOLUTIONARY AFFAIRS, OR ISRAHIM YAZDI, MAY BE THE FIRST CASUALTY OF JAMES BILL'S
TIME MAGAZINE ARTICLE, TO BE ACCUSED OF PRO-U.S. INCLINATION IS A SLANDER NOT MANY POLITICIANS CAN SURVIVE IN PRESENT IRAN. MR. YAZDI HAS REBUTTED MR. GILL'S COMMENTED. HOWEVER, A SHADOW REMAINS CAST OVER HIS CRIMINALITY. AN EMBASSY OFFICIAL HAS TALKED WITH AN IRANIAN WHO REPORTEDLY DISCOVERED A GROUP OF IRANIANS FROM attempting to KILL YAZDI.

OFFICIAL COMMENT: (c) WITHOUT A DOUBT MANY OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICALLY ACTIVE IRANIANS WERE TRAINED IN THE U.S. WE FEEL THAT BECAUSE OF THAT TRAINING, EVENTUALLY A FAVORABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM, THE U.S., AND IRAN WILL BE FURTHERED. HOWEVER, EVERY TIME AN ARTICLE BRINGS THESE PEOPLE AND THEIR BACKGROUND BEFORE THE LESS SOPHISTICATED MASSES, IT DOES NOTHING BUT HARM TO WHAT COULD BE A GOOD FUTURE RELATIONSHIP.

F. MARCHEL, EMBASSY OFFICIALS REPORT THAT MR. YAZDI NOW RULING ON THE 21ST AND 23RD OF MARCH THERE WILL BE FRESH MARCHES IN IRAN.

G. EMBASSY SECURITY, DURING THE NIGHT OF 17/18 MARCH SHOOTING IN IRAN NEAR THE COMPOUND WAS HEARD AT 3:30, 4:00 AND 8:50 P.M. NO DAMAGE OR CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.

H. COMMENT ON THE 17TH AND 17TH THE U.S. CONSULATE STUDENT ANNEX OF THE COMPOUND WAS ENTERED AND SLIGHT DAMAGE WAS DONE TO THE INSIDE OF THE BUILDING.

OFFICIAL COMMENT: (g) NIGHTLY SHOOTING ON OR NEAR THE EMBASSY COMPOUND HAS BECOME COMMON ACQUAINTANCE. THE ONLY GOOD TO FIND IN THESE SHOOTOUTS IS THAT NO ONE HAS BEEN HIT.

A GENERAL ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING APPEARS TO BE ON THE UP-SWING. RECENT CONTACT WITH IRANIANS FINDS MANY WHO COULD SPEAK VERY GOOD ENGLISH IN THE PAST, NOW UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE EXCEPT IN Farsi. ADDITIONALLY, WE MAY SEE A FURTHER DEGRADATION OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY POSITION WITH THE SIGNING OF THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI PEACE TREATY. ALTHOUGH THE U.S. EMBASSY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO SECURE A SATISFACTORY METHOD OF MOVING U.S. GOODS FROM IRAN, AN AIR FRANCE AIRCRAFT, OBSERVED BY MAARA, WAS LOADING PALLETIZED BAGGAGE.

MAAR, MAR 165.
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC    PRIORITY 532
EXDIS
S.O. 12065: RDS-4 3/26/99 (LAMBRakis, G.B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINR, PINS, PEPR, IR
SUBJECT: Biographic Information on Deputy Prime Minister
         Ebrahim Yazdi.

1. C - entire text.
2. The following biographic information on Ebrahim Yazdi
   comes from a conversation with Yazdi more than a month ago
   but was not reported earlier because the Embassy was
   invaded on the day it was to be drafted. Some of the
   details have faded from memory, but the general outline
   contains some information that we believe is not on file
   in Washington.

3. According to a form Yazdi filled in on his most recent
   entry into Iran, he was born in 1931. This fits in with
   his own account of his life as given to Pol Counselor and
   contrasts with published version of his age, which originally
   had him as 39 years old, and have since described him
   as in his early forties. Yazdi appears to be in fact 47
   or 48 years old, despite a youthful appearance under a full
   beard. He has three brothers.

4. Yazdi has three brothers, one or two of them older than
   himself. All four appear to have studied to become phar-
   macists, in Iran, with a year or two of post-graduate study
   elsewhere. The oldest brother is a doctor (perhaps an

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-125-
ophthalmologist) with his own private clinic in Tehran. Another brother is living here, and a third one reportedly in Baltimore, an American citizen.

5. Yazdi claims to have been very active as a student in Tehran in helping to form an Islamic movement with such other notables of today as Ayatollah Taleghani and Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. This was in the 1940's and early 1950's and, according to Yazdi, was aimed primarily at countering the appeal of Marxism among Iranian youth, especially the students. In this he claims a kinship of effort with people such as the philosopher Ali Shariati, who was a little younger.

6. Yazdi says he left Tehran for the United States in the early 1950's and did some post-graduate studies and teaching in New Jersey and elsewhere, ending up in Texas. His field had become scientific, particularly medical, research. After the anti-Shah demonstrations in Iran during 1962 and 1963, and the subsequent exile of Ayatollah Khomeini to Turkey and eventually Najaf, Iraq, Yazdi said he took a job teaching at the American University of Beirut to be closer to the scene.

7. The Lebanese government turned against Iranians some time in 1966 or 1967 (the exact occasion escapes us) and Yazdi had to leave, along with many other Iranians. He returned to the U.S., after having visited Khomeini and being appointed by Khomeini as his personal representative.
for the United States, Yazdi says. In the U.S. he was active on Khomeini's behalf.

8. When Khomeini was thrown out of Iraq last year, Yazdi went to Paris, London, and Bonn, but was told by oppositionists there not to go visit Khomeini in Najaf because he would be arrested. After some hesitation, he nevertheless flew to Baghdad and arrived in Najaf the very evening that Khomeini was packing up to leave.

9. The guards refused to let him see Khomeini, but by using subterfuge (asking to pray in a mosque and using another exit) he got to Khomeini and accompanied him, his son and two other disciples on the drive to the Kuwaiti border. There the party was refused permission to enter Kuwait and, after a few hours, instructions from Baghdad came to let Khomeini's group come back to Baghdad for departure to Paris. Yazdi himself was refused the same permission and kept prisoner overnight at the border post. The next day instructions from Baghdad released him so that he could follow Khomeini. He went to Paris with Khomeini and stayed there as an intimate member of his entourage.

10. The above was volunteered by Yazdi without much prodding and could conceivably be doctored for our ears. It fits in, however, with what we have heard about him from other Islamic sources, namely that he is not a Marxist
or a Communist, although like many Iranians of his generation he was exposed to Marxism and Communism during his university years and would have had to take a position for or against it. His early association with Ayatollah Taleghani and Bazargan would explain his stature in the movement, particularly as he seems to have been delegated or perhaps self-selected to get close to Khomeini while Khomeini was in exile. He apparently spent some time with Khomeini before being appointed Khomeini’s personal representative in the U.S. This put Yazdi early on in the role of a bridge among various top leaders of the Islamic movement, a role he apparently still plays.
CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
CHG:CWNAAS
POL:JDSTEMPEL
NONE
CHG POL (2) ECON, OR ICA RF

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

LIMDIS

E0. 12065: XGDS 4/25/09 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJ: IBRAHIM YAZDI AS FOREIGN MINISTER

REF: A)TEHRAN 4244 B)TEHRAN 3245 (EXDIS)

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: YAZDI'S NOMINATION AS FOREIGN MINISTER RAISES MORE QUESTIONS THAN IT ANSWERS. MIXED SIGNALS ON YAZDI'S ROLE WITH PLO. BANI-ASADI WILL PROBABLY REPLACE YAZDI. YAZDI WILL EXPRESS HIS VIEWS INTELLIGENTLY BUT THEY WILL BE ANTI-WEST. END SUMMARY

3. PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN'S APRIL 24 ANNOUNCEMENT THAT YAZDI WOULD BE FOREIGN MINISTER POSES MOST INTERESTING QUESTION: WAS HE PROMOTED OR KICKED UPSTAIRS? BASIC BIODATA ON YAZDI SUBMITTED IN REFTELS; BELOW WE DEAL WITH SOME IMPOUNDERABLES IN THE YAZDI EQUATION.

4. SPECULATION IS RIFE THAT YAZDI WAS KICKED UPSTAIRS BECAUSE HE WAS EITHER GETTING IN BAZARGAN'S WAY, OR HAD LOST HIS UTILITY AS A GO-BETWEEN WITH THE PGOI AND THE COMMITTEE STRUCTURE. EVIDENCE FOR LATTER VIEW IS ADDUCED BY THOSE WHO SAW YAZDI GET INTO FURIOUS SHOUTING MATCH WITH COMMITTEE GROUP AT AIRPORT WHEN LIBYAN PRIME MINISTER JALLUD ARRIVED ON APRIL 22. EYEWITNESSES SAY YAZDI WANTED TO KEEP JALLUD ON PLANE UNTIL HE EXPLAINED WHERE LIBYANS HAD HIDDEN IMAN MUSA SADR. COMMITTEE WANTED TO LET PM LAND AND TAKE HIM TO QOM. KHOMEINI'S SON RUSHED TO SCENE AND CONVINced YAZDI TO YIELD TO COMMITTEE VIEW. TWO GOOD SOURCES SAY YAZDI'S DAYS AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER WERE NUMBERED FROM THAT MOMENT.
5. ALTERNATE VIEW (THERE'S ALWAYS ONE IN IRAN) SAYS THAT
YAZIDI ROLE AS MAN WHO BROUGHT PLO TO IRAN WAS CREATING
PROBLEMS FOR BAZARGAN, AND PROMOTION TO FOREIGN MINISTER
WAS CONSIDERED BEST WAY TO GIVE YAZIDI MORE AUTHORITY FOR
HANDLING PLO AND AT THE SAME TIME GET HIM AWAY FROM THE
PM'S OFFICE. NON-IRANIAN NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENT CLOSE TO
PLO CHIEF HASSAN DISPUTES THIS VIEW, AND SAYS PLO HAS BEEN
HAVING PROBLEMS WITH YAZIDI. (HE ALSO CONFIRMED INFORMATION
REPORTED EARLIER THAT PLO ARE TRAINING MUJAHIDDIN AND
FEAYEEN AND JUST ABOUT EVERYONE WHO WANTS TO LEARN
WEAPONRY.) SOURCE CLOSE TO YAZIDI WHO HELPED ARRANGE ENTRY
FOR PLO IN EARLY DAYS SAYS PLO BECAME ANNOYED WITH YAZIDI
WHEN HE WANTED TO RESTRICT PLO TO TRAINING NEW REVOLUTION-
ARY GUARDIANS CORP. THERE IS SOME LEeway IN VARIOUS
STORIES, BUT IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT IN SOME WAY YAZIDI ROLE
WITH PLO, FOR GOOD OR BAD, WAS CONNECTED WITH HIS BEING
NAMED FOREIGN MINISTER.

6. ANOTHER IRANIAN SOURCE INDICATES THAT EMBARRASSMENT
OVER REVELATION THAT YAZIDI HAS U.S. PASSPORT (HE ADMITTED
THIS IN PERSIAN PRESS EVENING APRIL 24) AND CHARGES THAT HE
WAS A CIA AGENT MEANT HE HAD TO BE GOTTEN OUT OF PM'S
OFFICE. BAZARGAN'S PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT YAZIDI'S DEPUTY
FOR REVOLUTIONARY AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO WOULD BE GIVEN TO SOME-
ONE ELSE SUGGESTS SOME TRUTH TO THIS. NAMING OF HOSEIN
BANI-ASADI (BAZARGAN SON-IN-LAW; INFLUENCE OF FAMILY AND
DOWREH LIVES ON IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN) TO DEPUTY PORT-
FOLIO FOR QUOTE COOPERATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE
UNQUOTE IS NOT A DIRECT REPLACEMENT FOR YAZIDI, BUT
MOST OBSERVERS FEEL HE WILL EVENTUALLY GET HOLD OF YAZIDI'S
REVOLUTIONARY RESPONSIBILITIES, SINCE HE HAS BEEN DEPUTY
TO THE MINISTER FOR REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM, YADOLLAH SAHABI,
AS WELL AS BAZARGAN RELATIVE.

7. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY, NOT INCONSISTENT WITH EITHER OF
THE ABOVE, IS THAT YAZIDI, WITH THE PGOI'S BEST CONNECTIONS
TO THE COMMITTEE COMPLEX, WAS SEEN AS THE BEST MAN TO
BEGIN TO START PULLING IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY TOGETHER
INTO A COHERENT WHOLE. HE HAS BEEN DEALING IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS EXTENSIVELY ANYWAY, AND HIS APPOINTMENT AS
MINISTER NOW GIVES HIM A MANDATE OVER THE INSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE AS WELL.
8. YAZDI THE MAN: US CORRESPONDENT WHO HAS FOLLOWED
YAZDI PERSONALLY SINCE PARIS SAYS YAZDI IS CONSUMMATE
MEDIA MANIPULATOR (VIEW THOSE OF US WHO HAVE DEALT WITH
HIM SHARE) WHO IS REALLY DEVOUT BELIEVING MOSLEM.
CORRESPONDENT DESCRIBES HIM, HOWEVER AS MAN WHO ALWAYS
HAS HIS MASK ON; IN TEN MONTHS, ONLY TIMES HE SHOWED
INNER PERSONALITY WERE ONCE IN PARIS IN DISCUSSION OVER
KHOMEINI ROLE WHEN HIS RELIGIOUS SIDE CAME OUT, AND AT
TIME OF US EMBASSY SACKING WHEN HE BLEW UP AT PHOTOGRAPHERS
OF EVENT AND ORDERED THEIR CAMERAS BROKEN AND FILM EXPOSED.

9. EMBASSY DEALINGS WITH YAZDI: HE IS A HARD MAN TO REACH,
BUT IN PERSON-TO-PERSON CONTACT, EITHER OVER PHONE OR IN
PERSON, HE IS VERY SMOOTH AND FRIENDLY. HE UNFOLDS
UNPALATABLE NEWS WITH JUST A SHADE OF APOLOGY, AND HAS
EXCELLENT UNDERSTANDING OF HOW TO MANIPULATE VALUE SYSTEM
OF HIS LISTENERS TO PRODUCE REACTION HE WANTS TO ACHIEVE.
HE HAS GOOD POLITICAL TOUCH, BUT VERY MUCH BELIEVES US IS
CAUSE OF IRAN'S TROUBLES FOR PAST 26 YEARS. HE IS NOT
HARD-LINE OR STRIDENT ABOUT IT, BUT FIRMLY COMMITTED TO
VIEW. AS FOREIGN MINISTER HE COULD TURN OUT TO BE PERSIAN
REFLECTION OF STRAIN OF ANTI-US, ANTI-WESTERN THOUGHT
IN THE TRADITION OF KRISHNA MENNON AND NUMEROUS YANKEE
WAITING AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE 60'S AND 70'S.
IN TRUE PERSIAN FASHION, HE WILL PROBABLY BE MODERATELY
ASSERTIVE IN PUBLIC AND MORE REASONABLE IN PRIVATE.
UNLESS HE GETS CARRIED AWAY BY HIS NEW INCARNATION, HE
WILL PROBABLY REMAIN SOMEONE WE CAN TALK TO WITH SOMEWHAT
MITTER PROSPECTS OF GETTING RESULTS (ONCE HE AGREES TO A
POSITION) THAN MANY OF HIS REVOLUTIONARY COLLEAGUES
DIFFER. NAAS##
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
STATE
POL: JDSTEMPEL
POL: DMCGAFFEY
NONE
CHG POL(3) OR, ECON, ICA RF

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, PRIORITY

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, US, IR
SUBJ: INTERVIEW IN IRAN TIMES - DR. IBRAHIM YAZDI

1. AYANDAGAN OF MAY 9 REPORTED AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN THE IRAN TIMES (A U.S. PAPER) WITH THE SON OF FOREIGN MINISTER DR. IBRAHIM YAZDI. THE INTERVIEW DISCUSSES DR. YAZDI'S U.S. CITIZENSHIP STATUS, PURPORTEDLY QUOTING A FORMER EMBASSY TEHRAN OFFICIAL.


3. AS DR. YAZDI HAS REPEATEDLY DENIED U.S. CITIZENSHIP HERE, THIS STORY WILL BE EMBARRASSING, AND WE EXPECT QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. PLEASE PROVIDE THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE INTERVIEW, AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE, ASAP. NAAS##
SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOLLOWING CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE HAS BEEN APPROVED.

Q. IS EBRAHIM YAZDI A U.S. CITIZEN?

A. WE CANNOT CONFIRM THAT HE IS A U.S. CITIZEN.

Q. DOES HE NOW HAVE OR HAS HE EVER HELD A U.S. PASSPORT?

A. STATE DEPARTMENT PASSPORT FILES ARE CONFIDENTIAL AND PROTECTED BY THE PRIVACY ACT. WE CANNOT, THEREFORE, CONFIRM OR DENY REPORTS OF ANY INFORMATION IN THESE FILES.

Q. IF DR. YAZDI IS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, CAN HE RETAIN HIS U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT IF HE IS CONSIDERED AN IRANIAN CITIZEN UNDER IRANIAN LAW?


Q. IF IN FACT DR. YAZDI IS A U.S. CITIZEN, HAS HE LOST HIS U.S. CITIZENSHIP BY ANY ACTIONS—HE HAS TAKEN? IF SO, IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN THE PROCESS OF REVOKING HIS CITIZENSHIP?

A. AS I INDICATED PREVIOUSLY, IF WE HAD ANY INFORMATION ON THIS QUESTION, IT WOULD BE PROTECTED BY THE PRIVACY ACT.

VANCE

BT

#1960
Believe that the Dr. Yazdi of your 20 September letter to Charlie Naas is probably Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, a dentist, with whom Embassy officers have been in contact in the past. Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi was one of the founders in 1946 of the Islamic Society of University Students, an anti-communist but pro-Mossadegh Islamic fundamentalist organization. It was led by Muhammad Maghshab and Qolam Ali Bazargan. In 1960, Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi was an employee of the "Drug Production Company". No further information.
1. Iran's foreign minister was plainly determined to create a strong impression of the Islamic Revolutionary Army as a new breed of man. Like Iran's student demonstrators whose ranks he recently led, he did not seem interested in winning friends as much as demanding attention to his cause and proclaiming its justice. Whatever interests the new government may have in the UN or the US seemed of secondary importance to Yazdi's desire for psychic satisfaction and the promotion or protection of his own political future in Iran.

3. It was, after all, the return in triumph of one who had been scorned in exile. Thus, as a street fighter lecturing the Board of Directors of the Establishment, he told the Council on Foreign Relations of 25 years of mistakes in US foreign relations ranging from China, Vietnam to Iran and Africa. He told the UNGA of his satisfaction after "screaming the outrage of my people... from the sidewalks" to "have penetrated the walls and you are hearing me loud and clear." Similarly, he used his first meeting with the Secretary to relieve himself of the brooding pain of 25 years of US support for the Shah and 7 months of doubts he has had about our friendship.

4. Yazdi on this visit was more aggressively sure of himself and yet also very insecure. Thus, he affects a modified Mao dress code and ornaments his discourse with sociological concepts like alienation that we believe mans our farhang may devise for him. His remarks are not
QUALIFIED BY UNCERTAINTY OR BY SENSITIVITY TO THE PERCEPTIONS OF HIS LISTENERS. HIS ORIENTATION IS STRONGLY IDEOLOGICAL AND IDEALISTIC, BUT THERE IS LITTLE IN HIS THOUGHT THAT IS DEEP, SUBTLE OR ORIGINAL. HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE A POLITICIAN'S TALENT FOR INFLUENCING HIS AUDIENCE NOR IS THERE MUCH SIGN OF A POLITICIAN'S FLEXIBILITY IN HIS APPROACH.

5. POLITICS, HOWEVER, ARE A CONTINUING PREOCCUPATION. HIS EVERY WORD IN A MEETING IS RECORDED BY ONE OR MORE NOTETAKERS. IN FACT, THE NOTETAKERS MAY BE THE PRINCIPAL AUDIENCE ON THESE OCCASIONS. HE INSISTED ON HAVING THE VIDEOTAPE OF HIS WETA INTERVIEW BEFORE LEAVING THE STUDIO. HE TOLD A DEPTOFF PRIVATELY THAT HE FELT THREATENED SOMEHOW BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN IN THE US WHEN THE TEHRAN PRESS REPORTED OUR CHARGE'S "DEMARCHE" ON EXECUTIONS. THE APPROACH SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE, HE SAID, TO THE MFA WHERE HE HAD INSTRUCTED HIS OFFICERS NEVER TO SPEAK TO THE PRESS. HE MADE CLEAR IN THE SAME PRIVATE CONVERSATION THAT HE VERY MUCH HOPED FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW US AMBASSADOR WHO WOULD BE SYMPATHETIC TO THE REVOLUTION. WE SUSPECT THAT YAZDI SINCERELY FEARS THE US MAY SEEK TO OVERTHROW THE ISLAMIC REGIME AND IS INTENT ON PERSONALLY MANAGING THE US-IRAN RELATIONSHIP HIMSELF TO PROTECT THE REVOLUTION.

6. YAZDI MAY FEEL VULNERABLE TO ATTACK BY POLITICAL Factions IN TEHRAN. HE TOLD ONE IRANIAN CONTACT OF INTENSE INFIGHTING AND THE NEED TO CONTINUE PURGES UNTIL "WE FEEL SECURE WITH OUR OWN PEOPLE." HE SAID TO ANOTHER CONTACT THAT HE TOLD KHOMEINI HE SHOULD STAY OUT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CITED THE APPOINTMENT OF AN AMBASSADOR TO BAHRAIN AS A VICTORY HE ACHIEVED OVER THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT. THUS, IF YAZDI IS TO HAVE ANY INFLUENCE AND POLITICAL FUTURE IN IRAN, HE MUST PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST THE CHARGE THAT HE IS AMERICA'S NO. 1 AGENT. HE SUCCESSFULLY DEMONSTRATED THE ABSURDITY OF THAT CHARGE THIS WEEK. UNFORTUNATELY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONS, HE CLEARLY BELIEVES MUCH OF WHAT HE SAYS TO ENDEAR HIMSELF TO IRANIAN AUDIENCES. VANCE

RT

#3952
DE RQMBR #1217 298 **
ZNY CCCC ZZH
0 231238Z OCT 79
PM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4415
INFO RQMBR/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0040
RUSH/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2833.

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11217

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STAT 10/23/79
APPRV: CHRG: LEBLAINGEN
DRAFT: POL: HEPBETH: GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CEG ICA
ECON CONS CHRON
SP 3/4/78

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11217

C/O 12065: GES 10/23/79 (LAINGEN, L. BRUCE) OR-P
TAGS: IR, L, PINT
SUBJECT: YAZDI ON LEBANON AND PALESTINIANS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING CALL OF CHARGE AND VISITING DEPTOFF ON FUO MIN
YAZDI, WE REFERRED BRIEFLY TO US EFFORTS TO STABILIZE
SITUATION IN LEBANON. YAZDI SAID CONDITIONS IN NORTHERN
LEBANON WERE BECOMING INTOLERABLE FOR SHIAS WHO WERE
CONSIDERING JOINING FORCES WITH PALESTINIANS AGAINST
ISRAELIS AND CHRISTIANS. US MUST USE PRESSURE TO STOP
ISRAELI ATTACKS.

3. WE REPLIED THAT US WAS ATTEMPTING TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL
BUT PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ATTACKS MUST ALSO BE ENDED IF
ISRAEL WAS TO CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE. IT SEEMED TO US
THAT IRANIAN REVOLUTION, WHICH MOBILIZED ENTIRE PEOPLE IN
PEACEFUL DISPLAY OF POLITICAL WILL, WAS A BETTER MODEL
FOR THE PALESTINIANS. YAZDI SAID IRANIANS HAD BEEN
WORKING ON PLO TO THAT END. IRANIANS WANTED PLO TO INJECT
GREATER USE OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY IN ITS APPEAL. IF PLO
CONTINUED SECULAR APPROACH, VICTORY WAS NOT ASSURED.
IF PLO DID CREATE A PALESTINIAN STATE ON PURELY SECULAR
LINES, THE MARXISTS AND RADICAL PALESTINIANS WOULD MOVE
QUICKLY TO TAKE OVER. YAZDI SEEMED TO THINK THAT
IRANIANS HAD MADE SOME IMPRESSION ON PALESTINIANS. HE
ALSO MADE QUITE CLEAR IRAN'S COMMITMENT TO THE PALESTINIAN
CAUSE: "WE HAVE HELPED THEM AND WE WILL HELP THEM IN THE
FUTURE." LAINGEN

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STATE 7/5
CHG: LBLAINGEN
POL: VLTOMSETH/BJH
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POL RF

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECESTATE WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USINT BAGHDAD
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY PARIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/5/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, IR
SUBJ: 4TH OF JULY RECEIPTION

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DESPITE UNCERTAINTIES OF OUR SITUATION HERE AS A
CONSEQUENCE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTION, MISSION DECIDED TO CON-
DUCT OBSERVANCES OF THE 4TH OF JULY IN AS NORMAL MANNER
AS POSSIBLE. THIS INCLUDED AN OFFICIAL VIN D'HONNEUR TO
WHICH THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS, BUSINESS AND PRESS REPRE-
SENTATIVES, AND A NUMBER OF SENIOR PGOI OFFICIALS WERE
INVITED. FEW AMONG THE LATTER GROUP BOthered TO R.S.V.P.,
AND THUS IT WAS SOMETHING OF A PLEASANT SURPRISE THAT A
SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER DID IN FACT ATTEND. FM YAZDI LED A
LARGE DELEGATION FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. DEPUTY PM
AMIR-ENTEZAM WAS ALSO THERE, AS WERE THE MINISTERS OF
NATIONAL GUIDANCE (MINACHI) AND AGRICULTURE (IZADI).
CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR MOULAVI CAME AND SO DID GEN.
EFFEKHARI OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIES ORGANIZA-
TION, COL. IRAN-NEJAD OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, AND VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY GEN. MADANI.
WE ARE INCLINED TO REGARD THIS TURNOUT AS A CONSCIOUS
EFFORT ON THE PGOI'S-PART TO TELL US THAT IT IS SERIOUS
IN ITS DESIRE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH US. SEVERAL
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OF THE OFFICIAL IRANIANS ASKED MISSION OFFICERS ABOUT OUR PLANS FOR SENDING AN AMBASSADOR. LAINGEN##
I. CHARGE, ACCOMPANIED BY VISITING DEPUTY CHIEF OF
MINISTRY OF FINANCE ALLI ARDALAN JULY 26 1979, VISITED BY DEPUTY MINISTER DR. IBRAHIM-ZADEH WHO INTER-
SPERSED.

2. CHARGE OPENED CONVERSATION BY EXPLAINING THE UNDER-
STANDING AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE REVOLUTION AS AFP'S
WILLING TO WORK WITH IRAN IN THE TASK OF REBUILDING OUR
RELATIONSHIP AND STOOD READY TO COOPERATE IN THOSE AREAS
IN WHICH AFP AND IRAN COULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE. CHARGE THEN
SHARED COMMON INTERESTS AND ASSETS, SUCH AS OUR
HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS, WHICH COULD AID IN THE REBUILDING.

3. ARDALAN REPORTED HIS VISITORS A HISTORICAL
SITIATION OF THE LONG AND FRUITFUL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE U.S. AND THE PEOPLE OF NOW AMERICANS WHO
LIVED IN IRAN IN THE EARLY YEARS AFTER IRAN'S CONSTITU-
TIONAL REVOLUTION WAS CONSIDERED A BONU.

4. FAMILY OF MR. JORDAN, AN AMERICAN WHO HELPED
FIND APPROPRIATE CANDIDATES FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT, WAS
INVITED TO DINNER WHERE CHARGE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO
REMEMBER AMERICAN CITIZENS IN TAHRI, WHO.HYMENIZED WITH THE
REVOLUTION OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. HE AGREED TO THESE
INVITATIONS WHICH WOULD INFLUENCE THE FUTURE. ARDALAN
MADE CLEAR THE NEW GROUP OF AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD
BE TREATED FAVORABLY TOWARD IRAN.

5. CHARGE THEN SAID, THE POSSIBILITY OF REACTIVATING
THE U.S.-IRAN TRADE COMMESSION OR THE BUSINESS COUNCIL
AS A WAY OF IMPROVING THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN AMERICANS AND
IRANIANS FIRST, ARDALAN SAID HE WAS IN FAVOR OF DOING THIS
THOUGH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MATTERS LIKE THE
QUALITY OF COUNCIL MUST BE WITH THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE.
ARDALAN'S MINISTRY WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE ANY

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PROPOSAL PUT FORTH BY THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE. LOOKING
FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD, DID THE MINISTER SEE ANY ROLE FOR
THE JOINT COMMISSION? THE CHARGE SAID WE WERE NOT
PRESSING THE COMMISSION BUT WANTED TO SEEK ARADELAN'S
VIEWS. THE MINISTER FELT THAT IDEA WAS BASICALLY GOOD,
BUT HE HAD NO PARTICULAR VIEWS ON TIMING. THIS SUBJECT
WOULD NEED STUDY BY THE INTERESTED PARTIES OF THE POGI.

F. CHANGE USED CASE OF GTR AS ILLUSTRATION OF WHAT WE
WERE ATTEMPTING TO AVOID. MINISTER WAS BASICALLY AWARE
OF PROBLEM BUT HAD NO REAL INVOLVEMENT IN THIS DISPUTE.
WHICH HE ROPEE COULD BE SOLVED THROUGH DIALOGUE RATHER
THAN COURTS. ARADELAN THEN WENT ON TO MAKE WHAT WAS
PROBABLY HIS CENTRAL MESSAGE DURING MEETING: U.S.
SHOULD AVOID FORMING IMPRESSIONS OR DRAWING CONCLUSIONS
ABOUT IRAN BASED ON THE HUMORS BEING FOCUSED IN THE U.S.
AND EUROPE BY IRANIANS WHO HAD FLED DURING THE REVOLUTION.
ARALAN SAID THESE PEOPLE—"ANTI-REVOLUTIONARIAN"—WERE
TRYING TO UNDERMINE IRAN'S CREDITWORTHINESS BY SPREADING
LIES. ARADELAN EMPHASIZED THAT WE ARE GOING TO PAY
EVERY PENNY WE OW.

G. REFEREING TO ARADELAN'S COMMENTS ON IMAGE, CHARGE
EXRESSED REGARD OVER EXPULSION OF NEW YORK TIMES
CORRESPONDENT YUSSEF IDRRAHIM. CHARGE SAID THIS KIND
OF ACTION CANNOT CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE. THE
PICTURE OF THE REVOLUTION WILL BECOME LESS BALANCED IF
IRAN CONTINUES TO EXPEL JOURNALISTS. ARADELAN TOOK NOTE
OF THESE REMARKS BUT OFFERED NO SUBSTANTIVE REPLY, SAYING
IT

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ONLY THAT IT SHOULD BE RAISED WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS.
D. ALTHOUGH MEETING WAS SOMewhat SHORT ON SUBSTANCE, IT
WAS VERY CORDIAL IN TONE. THE MINISTER CONVEYS A PROFESSIONAL
IMAGERY AND DOES NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING
A FORCEFUL PERSONALITY. WE SUSPECT THAT HE LOOKS TO HIS
ARTICULATE AND ENERGETIC DEPUTY, IBRAHIM-ZADEH, FOR
DIRECTION. ZADEH, FOR INSTANCE, SEEMED MORE POSITIVE ON
THE WORK OF THE BANKING COMMITTEE AND ON THE REFORMATION
OF THE BUSINESS COUNCIL.

18. COMMENT: MEETING ENDED ON A FRIENDLY NOTE, AS WE
WERE TAKING OUR LEAVE, IBRAHIM-ZADEH DRAW REPROF HAVING
SAID HE HAD SOME FRIENDS. THEY NEEDED VISAS. COULD
WE DO ANYTHING FOR THEM... AND COMMENT. LAUGH
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CREF: NON
SUBJ: MINISTER ALL ARBALAN AND ECONOMIC POLICIES

1. (C) SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING IS BASED UPON AN APRIL CALL ON MINISTER FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND TRADE OF
ALL ARBALAN, OUR CONTACTS IN ARBALAN'S PUBLIC STAT-
MENTS, AND, AN OLD SCHOOL LAWYER/ECONOMIST AND
NATIONALIST IN PERSIA, DESCRIBES A MODERATE COURSE IN
ECONOMIC POLICY, WHICH WILL HELP ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND OFFER HIS OFFICE AS LiaISON POINT.
THE INVESTMENT POLICY IS WELCOME BUT ON CAUSE-OF-CASE BASIS.
IS PLANNING FOR TAX REFORM, WITH LOWER EMPLOYEE AND
BUSINESS INCOME AS WELL AS INCENTIVES TO KEEP OLD
INVESTORS. RESPECT FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY AND IND-
USTRIAL RIGHTS WILL BE MAINTAINED, BUT IT IS ILLEG-
AL TO TREAT FOREIGN CONTRACTS MADE WITH
THE OLD REGIME. IT SEEMS TO RECOGNIZE THE DEFICIENCIES
IN INDUSTRY AND THE DILEMMA POSTED BY THE CONFLICTING
URGES TO GET THE COUNTRY BACK TO WORK, BUT TRYING TO
ORDAIN THE ECONOMY'S STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY. MORE
THAN ANY OTHER MINISTRY, IT HAS RETAINED MUCH OF THE
PREVIOUS MANAGEMENT TEAM, WITH FOUR OF HIS FIVE UNDER-
SECRETARIES FROM THE SAME MINISTRY. ARBALAN IS A WELL-INFORMED
PERSONALITY, AND HIS PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS AT THE TALKERS POLICY IS UNFORTUNATE AT A TIME WHEN
IRAN NEEDS DIRECTION IN ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND NEW
POLICIES. THE SUMMARY

2. (LC) ACTING ECONOMIC COUNSELOR CALLED ON MINISTER
ARBALAN APRIL 1. MOST OF THE HOUR WAS DEVOTED TO
U.S./IRAN COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE POST-
REVOLUTIONARY PROBLEMS OF CONTRACT RESOLUTIONS, U.S.
BUSINESS, TRADE, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY INTERLOPERS
WHO ARE WITH IRANIAN BUSINESSES IN THE U.S. (REFER
TO CONGRESSIVE ADVICE, ENGLISH-SPEAKING, EV UNIVERSITY
TO IRANIAN ECONOMIST PROF., ARBALAN: EVARDS AP-
PLIES TO A SHUFFLED UNUNITED COUNTRYMEN MAY HAVE
HELP FROM THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MUSE, USING PSK
ECONOMIC ADVICE RE TRANSLATOR, CONSIDER
HIM, FIRST-CLASS CONTRACT MEETINGS AND COORDINATION
TO ARBALAN. HE REPRESENTED APPRECIATION FOR HIS
ATTENTIVE IN FULFILLING HIS FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
AND PASSED A RING SIZE PROBLEM IN FEBRUARY
AND WAS UP ON JOINT MARCH/merc arranges
TO RESOLVE SOME OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS IN ECONOMIC
POLICY, CLEANS COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES, ARBALAN
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SAID HE TOO DESIRED TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS CARRIED FROM THE PREVIOUS REGIME AND DEVELOP CONTINUE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COMMERCIAL TIES.

2. (LCU) EMPF. AFTER DESCRIBING IN DETAIL VARIOUS PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE "NORMALIZATION" OF BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS, SOUGHT FROM ARDALAN INFORMATION AND ADVICE ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED. ARDALAN SAID, AS RE- PORTED IN BRIEF, THAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF SUCH AS SABILI AND MASAYMI IN THE U.S., BUT HE EXPLAINED HIS UNDERSTANDING AND TREATMENT ON U.S. PART, REMINDING THAT THE EVOLUTION WILL CONTINUE TO ASSIST IRAN'S FEDERATION FOR SOME TIME, DESPITE RECENT EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE ITS INSTITUTIONS ON MORE NORMAL PATTERNS. EMPF. SAID GULI GOVERNOR MOAVIN, RESPONSIBLE TO AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN'S PROBLEMS IN COMMUNICATING WITH IRANIAN ENTITIES, HAS SUGGESTED TO PRE MINISTER SAMJADI THE EARLY ESTABLISHMENT OF A BUSINESS CONTACT OFFICER IN IRAN'S WASHINGTON EMBASSY (NOT IRANIAN 300). ARDALAN, PROBABLY MORE AWARE OF THE FACILITIES AT THAT TIME, WANTED EMPH. TO EXPECT SOMEONE FROM IRAN; HE SAID IT IS TOO EARLY TO EXPECT SOMETHING EFFECTIVE, THAT HE SHOULD GIVE THEM SOME TIME. HE DROPPED HIS OWN OFFICE AS A POINT OF CONTACT IN CASES WHERE U.S. FIRMS WERE NOT ABLE TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH IRANIAN ENTITIES AND IN WHICH IRANIAN ENTITIES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ASSURE, CONDITION THEIR BUSINESS WITH IRAN. EMPF. SUGGESTED THAT THE MAHALI UTILIZED THE IRANIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE TO ASSIST IN SOLVING COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS BETWEEN U.S. AND IRANIAN PRIVATE FIRMS. EMPF. THEN INQUIRED AT THE GOVERNMENT REPORTED FACT THAT THE MINISTRY HAS OFFICE TO SET UP AS A MINISTRY DEPARTMENT AS A CONTACT POINT ON ECONOMIC CONTACTS. EMPF. TRANSLATOR DID NOT REPORT THIS AND THE TRANSLATOR'S ND CREDENTIALS "EFFON" TO EMPF. MAHALI MEETING, SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD THAT THE MINISTRY WOULD DO THE SAME IT WAS ORGANIZING THE REPORTED API REPORTS OR DEPARTURES OF AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN, WE MUST ANTICIPATE THAT FRAUDS WHO WERE PARTY TO ILLEGAL TRANSMISSION OF PRIVILEGEDuchaS WOULD BEGIN THE WORK OF LEGAL BID 1980,

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4. (LOU) ARDALAN EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER IRAN’S IMAGE ABROAD AND PRESS FOR HELP IN ERADICATING FALSE IMAGES AND INFORMATION SO AS TO ADVANCE A RETURN TO NORMALCY PERHAPS ANTICIPATING A COMMENT FROM EMBASSY CONCERNING THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS AND EXECUTIONS, ARDALAN SAID HIS SON CALLED HIM THAT MORNING FROM ABDAD AND SAID THAT THE FOREIGN PRESS WAS MAKING A BIG ISSUE ABOUT THE LOUDYA EXECUTION. ARDALAN ASKED, WHAT IS THE BIG COMMOTION? EVERYONE KNOWS HE WOULD BE EXECUTED SOME TIME. EMBASSY COMMENTED THAT THE U.S. AND WESTERN PRESS WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED THAT HIGH OFFICIALS OF THE PREVIOUS REGIME WOULD BE CHARGED AND TRIED FOR VARIOUS MATTERS, BUT WE EXPECTED FROM A REVOLUTION WHICH PROCLAIMED ABHORRENCE OF THE PREVIOUS REGIME’S TACT ADHERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES TO FOLLOW DUE PROCESS IN THESE TRIALS. TO THIS, ARDALAN ONLY REITERATED THAT WE MUST BE PATIENT, THAT REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLES IS STILL FUNDING ITS COURSE.

5. (LOU) MINISTER ARDALAN, IN RESPONDING TO EMBASSY’S APPREHENSIONS FOR EFFORTS TO CATCH UP ON OVERDUE PUBLIC DEBT SERVICE, SAID ALL GOI EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE THROUGH MARCH HAD BEEN MET BY NO RIZ (MARCH 21) AND THAT OBLIGATIONS FALLING DUE IN APRIL WERE ALREADY BEING PROCESSED. COMMENT: WE CAN BUT CONCLUDE THAT ARDALAN IS INFORMED. WE ARE AWARE FROM U.S. BANKER OP. PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT YET UNPAID FROM EVEN JANUARY, E.G., INDUSTRIAL CREDIT BANK. ARDALAN MIGHT BE CORRECT AS FAR AS GOI DIRECT AND GUARANTEED DEBT, BUT IS LIKELY THAT EVEN SOME OF THE LATTER IS STILL Ouste.

C. (U) ARDALAN ANNOUNCED APRIL 5, THAT A NEW TAX SYSTEM BASED ON ISLAMIC JUSTICE WOULD BE DECLARED SHORTLY. IF DESCRIBED THE NEW TAX PHILOSOPHY AS REFLECTING THE ONENESS OF GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE. THUS, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT HAVE TO PURSUE PEOPLE FOR TAX AS BEFORE; PEOPLE WILL WILLINGLY PAY THEIR FAIR AND REASONABLE TAXES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR INCOME. HE SUGGESTED THAT TAXES ON EMPIRICAL SALARIES WILL BE LOWERED AND EXEMPTIONS FROM INCOME TAXES WIDENED. TAXES ON PROPERTY (LAND AND DWELLINGS) WILL REFLECT THE RECENT DECREASES IN VALUES AND MAY BE LOWERED IN RATE BY AS MUCH AS 30 PERCENT. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL APPROVED FACILITIES BY WHICH SOME 10,000 PENDING TAX CASES INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS AND CORPORATIONS UP TO YEAR 1345 (1966/67) CAN BE RESOLVED.
WE SAID THAT THESE CASES, WHICH INVOLVE AMOUNTS NOT EXCEEDING RIALS 500,000 (ABOUT $7,000), CAN BE SETTLED BY PAYING THE AMOUNT BELIEVED OWED AND THE PERSON/FIRM WILL BE GIVEN A TAX CLEARANCE. THE SAME POLICY APPLIES TO THOSE PAYING DISPUTED CASES NOT EXCEEDING RIALS 100,000 SINCE 1964. THOSE WHICH THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS ONE MORE THAT THE MAXIMUM AMOUNTS MENTIONED CAN SETTLE WITH A 20 PERCENT DEDUCTION FROM THE AMOUNT CLAIMED. THE IRAN'S TAX SYSTEM IS MARRED IN YEARS OF UNSETTLED CLAIMS. FEW CORPORATIONS ARE MORE CURRENT THAN TWO OR THREE YEARS PAST. APART FROM PUBLIC SECTOR INDIVIDUALS WHOSE TAXES ARE WITHHELD, FEW INDIVIDUALS OR FIRMS MADE EFFORTS TO PAY TAXES SINCE SEPTEMBER 1979, FIRSTLY BECAUSE OF STRIKES IN THE TAXATION DEPARTMENT OF THE PEAQ AND SECONDLY IN THE BELIEF THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE REVOLUTION WOULD AT LEAST PARTIALLY REMOVE THEIR OBBLIGATIONS. ARDALAN'S PROGRAM CONCERNING OLD CLAIMS IS A GOOD START IN CLEARING THE DECKS, WHILE PRESERVING SOME INTEGRITY TO TAX OBLIGATIONS. HIS EXPECTATION OF THE 'IRRESISTIBLE URGES TO PAY TAXES' ESCAPES THE WESTERNER'S PERCEPTION OF THE PEAQ, MUCH LESS OF THE WESTERNER'S RELATIONSHIP TO GOVERNMENT. IT IS TRUE THAT IN THE TIME OF MOSSADEQ IRANIANS WERE RELATIVELY WILLING TO PAY TAXES, BUT WE DOUBT THAT THE PROFESSION OF TAX COLLECTOR LINE WITH THE SHAH.

7. (LOU) ARDALAN REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCED THAT THE PEOI HAS NO INTENTION OF NATIONALIZING COMPANIES OR INFRINGING ON PROFESSIONAL Liberty. THOSE WHICH COMPANIES WIL REMAIN IN THE SAME PREVIOUS NAMES. HE SAID THAT MOST COMPANIES ARE BANKRUPT AND THEIR DEBTS TO GOVERNMENT EXCEED THE LEVEL OF THEIR ASSETS. Thus, SHAREHOLDERS OF THESE COMPANIES SHOULD NOT EXPECT ANY DIVIDENDS FOR SOME TIME. HE SAID THAT A FRACTION IN AMERICA'S BUSINESS WORLD, STRIKES AND ECONOMIC INACTIVITY AND THAT HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF THE CBI ALL OF THEM WOULD HAVE COLLAPSED. SOME BANKS, HE SAID, HAD LOANED MORE THAN THEIR CAPITAL.

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HE SPOKE OF CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE BEING RENDERED, BUT CAUTIONED AGAINST EXPECTING AN EARLY RECOVERY. COMMENT: ARDALAN HOPEFULLY WAS MISREPORTED CONCERNING THE BANKS. AT LEAST ONE, WELL, IS CREDITED BY ITS PRESIDENT (SHOARA) AND FOREIGN BANKERS AS NOT HAVING BEEN BANKRUPT. THE ACCUSATION THAT SOME BANKS LOANED IN EXCESS OF THEIR CAPITAL DEFIES MONETARY THEORY AND NEEDS NO COMMENT.

8. (C) ARDALAN'S PUBLICLY EXPRESSED POLICY CONCERNING RESPECT FOR CONTRACTS WITH FOREIGNERS MADE BY THE PREVIOUS REGIME IS FUZZY AND HIS IMPRECISE STATEMENTS TO EMBOSS PROBABLY REFLECT THE FACT THAT THE PLOI WILL NOT BE CLEAR ON THE ISSUE UNTIL IT HAS MARSHALLED STAFF AND STUDIED AND EVALUATED THOSE CONTRACTS. THE PRESS REPORTED ARDALAN SAYING, CONCERNING SUCH CONTRACTS, THAT "COST OF THE NON-ESSENTIAL ONES WILL BE CANCELED, BUT ALL CONTRACTS, HOWEVER, WILL BE STUDIED AND REVIEWED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY ARE ESSENTIAL OR NOT. SINCE THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT AT PRESENT IS IN AN EXCEPTION SITUATION, THE SELLING COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT EXPECT ANY COMPENSATION." HE SAID HE WOULD EXPECT THAT COUNTRIES PARTY TO CONTRACTS WOULD UNDERSTAND IRAN'S PROBLEMS AND ITS NEED TO REVIEW CONTRACTS; IN THE MEANTIME THEY SHOULD NOT DEMAND COMPENSATION. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE AND HOPE THAT THE LATTER STATEMENT IS THE GOVERNMENT ONE ON THIS ISSUE AND THAT AFTER THE BUREAUCRACY RETURNS TO WORK, REVIEWS AND EVALUATES THE STATUS OF CONTRACTS, THAT LEGITIMATE CLAIMS WILL BE PAID EVEN IF THE CONTRACTS ARE CANCELED.

9. (LOU) ARDALAN GIVES EVIDENCE OF RECOGNIZING THE DEFICIENCIES IN INDUSTRY AND THE DILEMMA FACED BY THE OFTEN CONFLICTING GOALS OF RESTORING EMPLOYMENT AND YET REORIENTING THE ECONOMY'S STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY. AN EXAMPLE IS HIS COMMENT THAT THE NATIONAL IRANIAN STEEL COMPANY IS A NON-ECONOMICALLY INDUSTRIAL UNIT WITH A MONTHLY LOSS OF MORE THAN RIALS 2.5 BILLION. ITS MILL, THE SOVIET ENGINEERED AND TECHNICALLY SUPERVISED HOT MILL OUTSIDE ISFARAN, LAST YEAR SHOWED EXPENSES OF RIALS 62 BILLION WITH ONLY RIALS 22 BILLION IN REVENUES, A RIALS 40 BILLION OR 4567 MILLION LESS. (COMMENT: THE MILL HAS ALWAYS SHOWED A LOSS AND OPERATED WELL BELOW CAPACITY, BUT ITS PERFORMANCE WAS JUSTIFIED AS A LOSS LEADER OF THE INDUSTRY.) FURTHER, LAST YEAR WOULD HAVE BEEN MOST BUSINESSES WORST YEAR DUE TO SIX MONTHS' STRIKE ACTION, AS IN THE CASE OF SUCH PUBLIC INDUSTRIES, MAINTAINING FULL PAYROLL. COUNTRY-WIDE, THE GOVERNMENT FACES THE DEMAND AND POLITICAL NEED TO GET PEOPLE WORKING AND REDUCE THE HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT RESULTING FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY STRIKES AND ECONOMIC DAMAGES. YET MANY OF THE INDUSTRIAL UNITS IT WOULD HAVE TO ASSIST IN ORDER TO
RESUME EMPLOYMENT ARE INEFFICIENT AND OFTEN OWNED OR MANAGED BY PERSONS WHOSE TIES WITH THE OLD REGIME MAKE IT EVEN MORE UNPALLATABLE TO PROVIDE RECOVERY CREDITS.

THUS, THE PGOI FACES "CATCH-22" POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH REGARD TO UNEMPLOYMENT AND INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE EVEN UNDER MORE FAVORABLE, STABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.

10. (C) TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, ARDALAN HAS RETAINED MORE SENIOR OFFICIALS IN HIS MINISTRY THAN ANY OTHER MINISTER. WHILE HE HAS REDUCED THE NUMBER OF UNDERSECRETARIES FROM SEVEN TO FIVE, FOUR OF THE FIVE ARE HOLDOVERS. THEY ARE: DEPUTY MINISTER REZA GHOLI ARABI, UNDERSECRETARY AND DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT SEYED AHMAN BAHGOO (A NEW APPOINTEE); FOR ECONOMIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS UNDERSECRETARY DR. AHMAD KOOROS, WHO IS FROM ANSABY'S TIME; FOR TREASURY, SOHRAB VAREZHAN, FROM TEKANGI'S TIME; AND FOR TAXATION, HASSAN ALI REZAI, FROM MEHRAZ'S TIME. DR. JAMSHID ASHRAFI, FORMER UNDERSECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND CREDITS, WAS OUT OF IRAN ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS WHEN THE GOVERNMENT FELL. HE WAS BURNED AND HOSPITALIZED IN LONDON AND COULD NOT RETURN. FRIENDS ARE ADVISING HIM NOT TO RETURN AND IT IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED THAT HE WOULD NOT GET HIS OLD JOB BACK. HIS DIRECTOR GENERAL REZA KHALEGHI-RAD IS THE DE FACTO UNDERSECRETARY FOR THAT BUREAU, WITH DR. KOOROS HAVING AUTHORITY TO SIGN FOR ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

THE NEW ADVISOR TO THE MINISTER, DR. IBRAHIM-ZADEH, APPEARS TO HAVE SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE ON ARDALAN. INFLUENCE WHICH TO DATE APPEARS TO BE MORE REVOLUTIONARY/RADICAL THAN ARDALAN'S NATURAL BENT. HE WAS A MUCH-PUBLICIZED SPEAKSMAN FOR IRAN AT THE GENEVA OPEC MEETING. WE HAVE NO IMPRESSIONS YET CONCERNING THE UNDERSECRETARIES' TENDENCIES UNDER THE PGOI. OUR LONG-TIME CONTACT DR. KOOROS, U.S. EDUCATED AND WITH AMERICAN WIFE AND CHILDREN (WHO REMAIN IN THE U.S. SINCE DECEMBER), DOES NOT RETURN OUR CALLS. HE, ALONE OF THE TOP SIX IN MANAGEMENT, SPEAKS ENGLISH.

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11. (C) BIOGRAPHIC ON ARDALAN: IN APPEARANCE ARDALAN SEEMS LATE 60S AND HAS A KINDLY GRANDFATHER IMAGE. HE IS OLD-PERSIAN POLITE AND, CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS BASED ON SOME OF THE REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC HE EXPRESSED AT GENEVA, HE NEVER EVEN SLIGHTLY "TURNED THE KNIFE ON THE U.S. DURING A ONE-HOUR DISCUSSION CENTERING ON OUR COMMERCIAL, CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS. FROM OTHER CALLED WE ARE TOLD THAT HE IS FLUENT IN FRANCE, BUT IF HE SPEAKS ANY ENGLISH HE KEEPS IT HIDDEN. IMP. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR JANAJIR AMOUZEGAR, WHO WAS A CLASSMATE OF ARDALAN AT TEHRAN FACULTY OF LAW, DESCRIBED ARDALAN TO EMROOF AS 'OLD SCHOOL. HE THINKS HE HAS NEVER LEFT IRAN. HE DID NOT RISE ABOVE THE 'ASSISTANT SECRETARY' LEVEL IN THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE (UNDER JAMSHEID AMOUZEGAR) BECAUSE OF HIS NATIONAL FRONT ALLEGIANCE. JANAJIR BELIEVED HE SHOULD HAVE ATTAINED AT LEAST THE DEPUTY MINISTER LEVEL BASED ON HIS SKILLS. DIR. GEN. KHALEGHI-ROD (PROJECT) DESCRIBES ARDALAN AS HONEST, SINCERE AND A GENTLEMEN, AS DO SEVERAL OTHER OF OUR CONTACTS. BUT HE SAYS HE IS UTTERLY INCAPABLE OF COPING WITH THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS HE FACES. ACCORDING TO KHALEGHI-ROD, ARDALAN, WHO IS CHARGED WITH ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM, MERELY DISCUSSES, MAYBE AGREES WITH SUGGESTIONS, BUT SELDOM PROVIDES NECESSARY AUTHORITY OR SHOWS INITIATIVE TO EXECUTE SOLUTIONS. NAAS BT 

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1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT REPORTING CABLE)

2. SUMMARY: I MET WITH MINISTER OF LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS VALI EHSAN FOROUHAR. WE DISCUSSED IRANIAN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO BRING ABOUT THE TRANSFER FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE TO THE CITY. THIS HAS BEEN A PROBLEM FOR MANY YEARS IN IRAN. DURING OUR MEETING, FOROUHAR EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE REVOLUTION ON THE ECONOMY. HE NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD IMPLEMENTED A SERIES OF MEASURES TO STABILIZE THE ECONOMY AND TO PROVIDE JOBS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT TO STRENGTHEN THE IRANIAN ECONOMY. (/END SUMMARIZE/)

3. I OPENED MY REMARKS BY NOTING THAT IRAN AND THE U.S. HAVE MANY INTERESTS IN COMMON AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS WOULD NOT DISRUPT THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. FOROUHAR SAID THAT HE WANTED TO WORK WITH US TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS. HE NOTED THAT THE IRANIAN ECONOMY HAD BEEN HIT HARD BY THE REVOLUTION, BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD IMPLEMENTED A SERIES OF MEASURES TO STABILIZE THE ECONOMY AND TO PROVIDE JOBS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT TO STRENGTHEN THE IRANIAN ECONOMY. (/END SUMMARIZE/)

4. I THEN TURNED TO THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT, NOTING THAT A NEW PERSPECTIVE IS NEEDED TO UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE REVOLUTION. FOROUHAR AGREED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS COMPLEX, BUT HE NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD IMPLEMENTED A SERIES OF MEASURES TO STABILIZE THE ECONOMY AND TO PROVIDE JOBS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT TO STRENGTHEN THE IRANIAN ECONOMY. (/END SUMMARIZE/)
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LEAKS, ESPECIALLY THOSE SUCH AS ROADS AND BIBLIOTHESES WHICH
EMPLOYED LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE, EVEN IN SOME OF THOSE
POORER AREAS NOT OF DURABLE VALUE. REPORTS HAD BEEN GOOD-
CONTRASTED IN THE VARIOUS AREAS NOT TO ENCOURAGE PEOPLE LIVING
IN THOSE AREAS TO REMAIN AND THE UNEMPLOYED IN URBAN AREAS
TO RETURN TO THE COUNTRYSIDE. IN ADDITION, THE GOVERN-
MENT HAS IMPLEMENTED AN AMBITIOUS UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
SCHEME TO EASE THE TRAUMA EXPERIENCED BY ECONOMIC DIS-
LOCATION. FOODSAR CLAIMED THAT POSITIVE RESULTS HAD BEEN
ACHIEVED AND THAT UNEMPLOYMENT HAD BEEN REDUCED.

I WOULD THINK THAT I MUST HAVE SOMEWHAT CONFUSED ABOUT THE
SITUATION OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SCHEME AS THAT I
WEIGH THE CASE IN THE CASE AND ASKED FOODSAR TO
CLAIM THAT I WANTED TO KNOW THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
SOCIAL SECURITY. HOWEVER, IT WAS RELUCTANT TO DISCLOSE.
I WAS ALLOWED TO SPEAK WITH VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS WHO CAN
EXPLAIN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOCIAL SECURITY.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE FOODSAR
SCHEME IS NOT COMPLETELY IDENTIFIED. FOODSAR SAID
THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE
INSURANCE SCHEME WAS NOT COMpletely IDENTIFIED.

TO A QUESTION ON THE DYNAMICS OF THE IRANIAN WORKPLACE AND THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY REGARDING THE URBAN
UNEMPLOYED, FOODSAR GAVE A STANDPOINT LECTURE ON THE
DYNAMICS OF IRANIAN AGRICULTURE UNDER THE REFORMS DURING
IRANIAN PEASANTS TO THE CITIES TO FIND JOBS. IT WAS SAID THAT
THE PROCESS TENDED TO FUND FROM ITSELF, I.E., AS MORE
PEOPLE LEFT THE FARM, FARM INCOME FALLS FALL AND
FURTHER BRINGS PEOPLE IN THE CITIES. NOTHEVER-

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LIES, AND PEOPLE RETURNED THERE TO THEIR FORMER VILLAGES.

The government noted that if rural incomes could be raised to 70 percent of urban incomes, many of these people would be prepared to go home. While offering no statistical evidence, Forouhar claimed that the PDKI believes that economic depression in recent months had indeed resulted in a reversal of the country's urban-to-rural migration which had so dominated Iran's recent history.

Ironically, the government's own programs, such as loans for the unemployed and its success in getting people back to work in urban industries had partially offset the gains in this regard since some individuals who might have otherwise returned to their rural homes had been tempted to remain in the cities in the hope of getting better work or government assistance.

7. Forouhar conceded that his ministry's relationship with the various worker committees had sometimes been a problem for him. He said that he was "not in favor of those who chose very carefully and went to some pains to differ..." initiate from "opposed" or "worker interference in management functions." Nonetheless, he believed that there is an important role for "legitimate" trade unions, trade unions formed by the workers themselves rather than the kind of sham organizations the government under the Shah had formerly sponsored. His government would of course be prepared to offer proper encouragement to workers' own efforts.

8. In closing, I drew Forouhar's attention to the cooperation program between his ministry and our own department of labor which existed in the past, while noting that the present moment certainly was not the time to consider resumption of such a program. I said that I wished him to know that we would be receptive to any specialized help which we might be able to provide. Forouhar appeared to be genuinely pleased by my offer, and expressed his hope that the present uncertainties of our relationship would soon pass and be followed by a new era of cooperation based upon the mutual interests of our two countries.

9. Comment: Forouhar was related about what he appeared to regard as a momentary and minor irritant in Iran-American relations. This was consistent with the posture of the other cabinet members I met with yesterday who seemed to want to reassure me that while Iran would not tolerate what it interprets to be indifference in its foreign affairs, it genuinely desires to maintain a friendly relationship with us. (From my visit since has been given a press conference at which he reportedly made some very inflammatory remarks about U.S.-Iran relations.)
امام خمینی:
"این نه پا می‌گیری بپذیری که بانی از ایالات متماکن حالا که آمریکا را اولت شکست داده است با روابط با آمریکا دارند.

دانشجویان مسلمان پرو خطا امام

پس ۱۰۰ ریال