استادان جاسوسی
شماره ۱۶
دخالت های آمریکا در ایران
دانشجویان مسلمان پیرو خط امام
IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL
AND THE COMPASSIONATE.

TELEGRAMS NO. TEHRAN 10752, TEHRAN 10342, MOSCOW
22156, TEHRAN 09503, TEHRAN 08916, USICA 50253 AND
TEHRAN 58831 WERE THE LAST COPIES OF THEIR ORI-
GINAL TEXTS AND, THUS, VERY DULL IN COLOR, THEREF-
ORE THEIR PRINTING AND PHOTOGRAPHING IN BOOKS
WERE NOT FAVORABLY POSSIBLE. FOR THIS REASON, THE
ABOVE-MENTIONED DOCUMENTS WERE RE-TYPED.
MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES

SUBJECT: Alternative Views from the Provinces

SUMMARY

Nine letters, written in both Farsi and English, received during the past two months from as many Iranian friends—former students, colleagues (high school teachers), and close friends—living in Shiraz and Khorasan portray post-Pahlavi Iran in a somewhat different light than American Embassy and American press reporting. Shiraz and certain remote areas of Khorasan appear calm and peaceful, generally free of violent incidents. Inhabitants of these two areas have welcomed the demise of the Pahlavis and the establishment of an Islamic Republic, and yet criticize freely and fearlessly their new leaders, including Khomeini. Although high school students throughout Iran, even those in the remotest towns, were greatly politicized, schools were running normally by Now Ruz. Although a sense of betrayal and hypocrisy of Carter's human rights policy led most to lividly condemn the USG, affection and respect remained for individual Americans. While the correspondents recognized the great problems confronting post-Pahlavi Iran, few desire to flee. On the contrary, most of these nine correspondents, inspired by the undreamed of quick success of the Revolution in toppling the Shah, seek to participate actively in the transformation of their society. In short, these predominantly young, lower-to-middle class "provincials" remain optimistic six months after the Shah's departure.

The diversity in correspondents is great: in education, from eleventh graders in high school to two masters degree holders; in age, from sixteen to about fifty-five; in experience, from an isolated villager who has only traveled to Mashhad once or twice in his life to an urbane Shirazi who has traveled widely in Europe (but not the US); in social class, from tribal lower class to urban upper middle class.

In only two respects can the correspondence of such a varied group be generalized. First, all now approve wholeheartedly of the overthrow of the Shah. Several students participated
actively in street demonstrations during the Revolution, while others (Shirazi teachers) waited on the sidelines until the outcome was certain. Several are vociferous in their criticism of the dyarchy; i.e., Khomeini and the PGOI, replacing the Shah -- but none feel the present leaders begin to compare in venality, tyranny, and corruption with those of the ancien regime.

Second, with the exception of one unsigned letter vehemently critical of Ghotbzadeh's management of NIRT and Yazdi's stewardship of MFA, all wrote openly and fearlessly, oblivious to any supposed new reign of censorship. The tone in the letters was strikingly different from ones received from the same correspondents under the Shah: Then, never a direct criticism of HIM was penned and only the most convoluted indirect ones. Now, Khomeini, Bazargan, Ministers and government policies are unabashedly and directly criticized.

The degree of politicization of the youth is remarkable, encompassing not only the previously politically aware students of Tribal High School (THS) in Shiraz, but also those of a small isolated town near the Afghan border who prior to the Revolution concerned themselves with little more than football, family chores and gardesh. One Khorasani student writes simply, "When the best youth of Iran were being killed, I was only thinking about volleyball. Funny, isn't it? During the Revolution many things changed, and so did I. I'm not the same Ali anymore."

Students at Tribal H.S. write of the confrontations between Islamic and leftist student groups for control of the curriculum and administration. One week English, "the language of the imperialists," was voted out of the THS curriculum, only to be reinstated the following week. By Nowruz, however, passing year-end exams vied with political consciousness-raising sessions for students' attentions. Even at Shiraz University (the old Pahlavi U), a considerable number of students had opted to attend classes, although they could participate in "political activities" and not attend classes one semester without losing their "registered" student status.

Nearly all strongly condemned the USG's human rights policy, perceived to be applied hypocritically in Iran. One student drew the analogy between US support of the Shah and Somoza; several drew parallels to American intervention in Vietnam.
While bitterly attacking the USG (frequently citing Carter by name) for its last ditch support of the Shah and sale of "murderous" weapons to HIM, most correspondents were careful to distinguish between USG policies and individual Americans. Respect and fondness for individual Americans remained as that for the USG plummeted to new depths.

Although ethnic battles among the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmans were mentioned, no disturbances in Shiraz or Khorasan were cited. Incidentally, several correspondents (themselves of Qashqai or Sunni Persian origin, and possibly harboring autonomy sentiments) criticized the severity of the PGOI's actions to squelch ethnic demands.

Former Shirazi colleagues, admitting the slow pace followed by PGOI's implementing its socio-economic policies, generally praised the nationalization of undeveloped lots within the city and plans for construction of housing for the poor on them. They pleaded for time for the well-intentioned Bazargan government.

Khorasani friends noted little material difference in their small town but a profound change in inhabitants' "minds".

Several correspondents, while criticizing NIRT's patently pro-Khomeini and pro-"republic of the akhunds" commented on the remarkable freedom of the press. One former Shirazi colleague noted he was spending much of his time reading all the books, from Shariati to Marx, now easily available, that he could not legally obtain during the past twenty-six years.

Finally, among the nine correspondents, only two expressed any desire to leave Iran. One, a retiring teacher, would like to visit his son studying in Texas for a few months. The other, a student from a well-educated upper-middle class Shirazi family, wishes to study economics in England upon completion of high school next year. All the others, both teachers and students who, before, had frequently confided their desire to go abroad for further education, now intended to remain in Iran and participate in the reconstruction of their society. Far from wallowing in dire predictions of national doom and catastrophe, they remained cautiously optimistic about Iran's future as well as their own.

NEA/IRN:B'Hanson
July 31, 1979
IRAN: Communication Environment Problems, Prospects, Ideas

PREMISE:

U.S.-Iran relations are very problematical.

While we have been urged by the Tehran Government to give evidence of our intentions to normalize relations, the Qom faction, specifically Khomeini, the press, and others continue to rail against us as the nefarious, imperialistic hand behind Iran's problems.

Iran's domestic policies -- executions, attacks on the Kurds, expulsion of foreign correspondents, newspaper closures -- have exacerbated an already negative sense of the "new Iran" here in the U.S., and cause us serious difficulties in projecting any "warming" of relations. We should avoid any gestures which might be construed, either here or there, as supportive of these policies.

At the same time, our interests in Iran remain considerable, not the least of which is oil. Since an Islamic Government in some form or other (with religious leadership continuing to play a pivotal role) is likely for the foreseeable future, we must, in a measured way, convey our benign intentions and assure Iran that we both wish them well and intend not to involve ourselves in their domestic affairs.

ASSETS:

Large numbers of U.S. and western educated Iranians among whom we can expect a reservoir of essential good will and from whom we can expect Western oriented decision-making.

U.S. expertise in fields of concern to Iran: business, technology, agriculture, education, defense.

U.S. position as a necessary counter to a perceived worse danger -- the U.S.S.R.

An official government (as opposed to the Qom faction) which has given indications of being pragmatic, non-extremist, and interested in normalized U.S.-Iran relations.

Large numbers of Iranian students who are or wish to be in the U.S.
LIABILITIES:

Our minimal ability to influence Iranian events.

Ayatollah Khomeini who, in addition to fathering Iran's extremist policies and pronouncements, seems heatedly anti-U.S.

Our minimal ability to communicate with the religious leadership and lower class majority of Iranians.

The "secret hand" theory which is deep in the Iranian grain and blames the U.S. (among others) for Iran's many problems.

The widely held determination to "root out foreign influence."

An officially sanctioned press which has been vitriocially anti-U.S.

Heatedly anti-Zionist sentiment and the identification of U.S. policies as supportive of Zionism against Islamic and Arab interests.

Identification of the U.S. with the Shah's government and all of its excesses.

OBJECTIVES:

Suggest that the U.S. will not involve itself in Iran's internal affairs, that we wish them well and that our interests are coterminous in our mutual desire for a peaceful, stable and independent Iran.

Promote a dialogue with Iran's new leadership.

Rebuild a meaningful and mutually beneficial long term relationship.

DANGERS:

To the extent that we move away from our current very low profile approach, we risk further assaults (verbal certainly and perhaps other). This is particularly true at a time when Iran is facing massive internal problems and frustrations, all of which feed the "secret hand" theory of foreign meddling.
Without prudence, any "warming" of our relations may appear to be an endorsement of those of Iran's current policies which are in violation of our human rights positions.

Assuming an evolution of the present government to other forms and styles in the future, too close an identification with a government increasingly known for its excesses could leave us vulnerable to the same kind of charges we faced with the fall of the Shah's government.

RECOMMENDATION:

Despite problems, and the potential for problems, the significance of our interests in Iran recommends that we explore opportunities to build a dialogue with Iran's new leadership. At the same time, these efforts should, for the long term, be both measured and low key, emphasizing our long term relationship with Iran rather than short term tactical gains.

USICA: WHAT ARE WE DOING? WHAT MIGHT WE DO?

CURRENT OPERATIONS:

- Support to the Binational Centers (Iran America Societies) in Tehran and Isfahan.
- Support to English language teaching through the BNCs in Tehran and Isfahan.
- USICA library in Tehran.
- Student counseling through AMIDEAST, at the BNC and at the USICA library.
- VOA Persian language broadcasting.
- Press work.
- (Limited) magazine distribution to institutions.
- Grant assistance to the American Institute of Iranian Studies.
- Fulbright program (grants to Iranians continue, Americans in Iran currently in abeyance)

WHAT MIGHT WE DO?

- Expanded VOA Persian broadcasting (will be increased one hour)
- American participant visits.
- Resumption of Iran America Society English teaching in Shiraz.
- Film programs at the BNC.
- A project to bring Iranian religious figures to the U.S. for the Hejira anniversary celebrations. A special seminar? Travel around the U.S. in connection with the celebrations?
- A Branch PAO in Isfahan next year?
OTHER IDEAS?

Suggest convening a special meeting to consider ideas for restoring a dialogue with Iranians. This should include the private sector, Iranologists, Ramsey Clark? Religious or theological figures? USICA and INR can co-sponsor.
1. EMPOFF STUD RECENTLY SPENT ABOUT TWO WEEKS IN SHIRAZ AND ISFAHAN. HE FOUND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY RELATIVELY GREAT BUT UNEMPLOYMENT HIGH. REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES REMAIN IN BOTH CITIES. THE TRIBES OF FARS PROVINCE SEEMED TO BE TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION. THE UNEMPLOYMENT IS STILL WIDELY BLAMED FOR IRAN'S TROUBLES, INCLUDING THE EVOLUTION ITSELF. STUD FOUNGT GROWING UPPER AND MIDDLE CLASS DISSATISFACTION BUT THE LOWER CLASS REMAINED GENERALLY LOYAL TO KHOMEINI AND THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CHANGE IN THE SITUATION OF THE MILITARY.

END SUMMARY.

2. EMPOFF STUD RECENTLY PAID VISITS TO CONSULATES IN SHIRAZ AND ISFAHAN. THE FIRST IMPRESSION OF SHIRAZ WAS THAT THE CITY HAD RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE BAZAAR WAS ACTIVE, MOST RESTAURANTS AND THEATRES HAVE REOPENED, AND THE STREETS ARE BUSY UNTIL LATE AT NIGHT. HOWEVER, MOST FACTORIES AND CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS REMAIN INACTIVE OR WORK HALF-DAYS (WHICH ARE CONSUMED BY TEA-DRINKING AND CONVERSATION). LARGE NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED COULD BE SEEN ON STREET CORNERS OR AT PUBLIC OFFICES BRINGING THEIR PLEIT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, THE LABOR OFFICE, OR THE KOMITEH. ANOTHER SIGN OF THE REVOLUTION IS THE PROLIFERATION OF KIOSKS AND SIDEKAY VENDORS, WHO FORMERLY WOULD HAVE BEEN ASKED TO MOVE ON.

6. While Amooff was in Shiraz, a consulate was visited by members of the local committee who wished to register and protect the consulate vehicles. This matter was handled with a phone call to the Deputy Governor General Consulate. Employee with national police connections recognized the committee runner, Engineer Aedullari, as a former member of a Savar and the Governor-General’s office. He was apparently decided to hitch his wagon to another star.

5. In Shiraz (as in Isfahan) the Christian hospital has been appropriated by the committee. The Shiraz Christian Association was more of a private institution than a hospital, and run by a local Christian. Other private hospitals have not been taken over.

Although Shiraz has only one committee, it is controlled by several Ayatollahs who vie for power within the structure. A local restaurant owner explained that one way a mullah could strengthen his power base was by recruiting greater numbers of Pasdaran into his camp. The quality of the recruit is less important than the addition of more bodies to tote a gun. Consequently, anyone who stops classes or working in daily shop or looking for work can become a protector of God and Country. The wielding of civil authority by these follow-youths presents a major obstacle to the extension of central government authority and normalization. Currently, the leading mullah in Shiraz is Ayatollah Khamari-Shirazi who is said to be personally deputed by the Shah.

4. The tribes in Fars Province have remained fairly quiet. The largest and most powerful tribe, the

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3. THE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE IRANIAN DRAMA REMAINS. NEARLY ALL IRANIANS WHO ARE DISSATISFIED WITH CURRENT CONDITIONS BELIEVE THAT KHOMEINI IS BACKED BY AMERICA. THIS BELIEF IS FOUND ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, AND HELD BY DOCTORS, BUSINESSMEN, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND SO ON.

10. DISSATISFACTION WITH THE CURRENT REGIME IS STRONGEST BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASSES. ISSUES INCLUDE UNEMPLOYMENT, RISING PRICES, FEAR OF THE COMMITTEES, AND THE BAN ON ALCOHOL AND MOST ENTERTAINMENT AMONG THE BAZAARIS AND LOWER CLASSES. HOWEVER, KHOMEINI STILL COMMANDS UNQUESTIONING SUPPORT. THIS SUPPORT IS PERHAPS BEST CHARACTERIZED AS RELIGIOUS DEVOTION AND IS NOT CONCERNED WITH ISSUES OTHER THAN ISLAM AND FREEDOM — THE MEANINGS OF WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION.


13. NO F-14'S WERE SEEN IN THE AIR AT SHIRAZ OR ISFAHAN, ALTHOUGH EMBASSY DID SEE A TEENAGE BOY ON ISFAHAN'S MAIN STREET READING A BLUE PAPERBACK BOOK WITH GRUMMAN F-14 IN WHITE LETTERS ON THE COVER. IT COULD HAVE BEEN ANYTHING FROM TECHNICAL TO PROMOTIONAL MATERIAL, BUT IT DOES RAISE THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE COMPROMISE. SOME OF THE ARMY AVIATION HELICOPTERS IN ISFAHAN WERE SEEN AIRBORNE BUT MOST WERE IDLE.

14. POLICE OFFICERS IN SHIRAZ ARE STILL REGULARLY PAID ALTHOUGH FEW ARE ACTUALLY ON DUTY. TRAFFIC POLICE ARE THE ONES MOST COMMONLY SEEN. SOME PATROLMEN ARE WORKING, BUT IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. ONE OFFICER EXPLAINED THAT THERE ARE TWO REASONS TO BE A POLICEMAN: (1) TO COLLECT ONE'S PAY, AND (2) TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE. HE POINTED OUT THAT...
AN ISFARAN FOLLOWER OF ATOLLAH TOLD EMPLOYEE THAT HE THOUGHT AMERICA AND IRAN SHOULD HAVE GOOD RELATIONS AND THAT SOME AMERICAN ENGINEERS SHOULD RETURN. EMPLOYEE POINTED OUT THAT AMERICANS WERE UNLIKELY TO RETURN AFTER THE WAY THEY WERE TREATED. HE REPLIED THAT WAS BECAUSE THEY WERE PAID FOUR TIMES WHAT IRANIANS WERE PAID. EMPLOYEE SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THEY HAD FOUR TIMES THE EXPERIENCE. BAZAAR SAID MAYBE THEN SAID IRAN HAS A PROBLEM. NOBODY WORKS VERY HARD.

ON THE ISSUE OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. EMPLOYEE POINTED TO THE ATTACKS UPON AMERICA IN SPEECHES AND IN THE PRESS. THE BAZAAR REPLIED THAT WAS BECAUSE U.S. COMPLAINED ABOUT THE EXECUTION OF ELHANIAN WHO WAS CLEARLY AN ISRAELI AGENT. HE SAID ELHANIAN MADE MONEY IN IRAN AND THEN SENT IT TO ISRAEL WHICH WAS STEALING FROM THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. AN ANTI-SEMITIC TIRADE FOLLOWED. NEWS DO NOT DO ANY WORK, THEY ARE MONEY LENDERS WHO CHARGE USURIOUS RATES, AND ONLY HELP THEIR OWN. 
HE CONTINUED THIS WITH ISLAM WHERE MONEY IS GIVEN TO THE NEEDY FREE OF CHARGE AND NO ONE HAS MORE ONE HOME.
SUBJECT: ISFAHAN AND SHIRAZ

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: EMBOFF SKUD RECENTLY SPENT ABOUT TWO WEEKS IN SHIRAZ AND ISFAHAN. HE FOUND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY RELATIVELY GERAT BUT UNEMPLOYMENT HIGH. REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES IN BOTH CITIES REMAIN ACTIVE. THE TRIBES OF FARS PROVINCE SEEMED TO BE TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION. THE U.S. IS STILL WIDELY BLAMED FOR IRAN'S TROUBLES, INCLUDING THE REVOLUTION ITSELF. SKUD FOUND GROWING UPPER AND MIDDLE CLASS DISSATISFACTION BUT THE LOWER CLASS REMAINS GENERALLY LOYAL TO KHOMEINI AND THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CHANGE IN SITUATION OF THE MILITARY. END SUMMARY.

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4. THE CITY WAS RESPLENDENT FOR THE CELEBRATION ORDERED BY KHOMENEI OF THE BIRTHDAY OF THE HIDDEN IMAM. CITY STREETS AND SHOPS WERE LAVISHLY DECORATED. A LARGE BALLOON INSCRIBED WITH THE NAME OF THE PROPHET DIOATED OVER A DOWNTOWN MOSQUE. FESTIVITIES WERE MARKED BY DEMONSTRATORS SHOUTING "DEATH TO THE COMMUNISTS AND SPEECHES BY NIRT HEAD QOTB-ZADEH (WHO DID NOT CONVINCINGLY DENY PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRATIONS). THERE WAS SCATTERED SHOOTING AT NIGHT AND A BUILDING ON AN ARMY COMPOUND WAS SET AFIRE.

5. WHILE ENBOPF WAS IN SHIRAZ CONSULATE WAS VISITED BY MEMBERS OF LOCAL COMMITTEE-WHO WHISHEO TO LIBERATE/PROTECT THE CONSULATE VEHICLES. THIS MATTER WAS HANDLED WITH A PHONE CALL TO THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR GENERAL. CONSULATE EMPLOYEE WITH NATIONAL POLICE CONNECTIONS RECOGNIZED ONE KOMITEE RUNNER, ENGINEER ABDULLAHI, AS A FORMER HANGER-ON AT SAVAK AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE. HE HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED TO HITCH HIS WAGON TO ANOTHER STAR.

6. IN SHIRAZ (AS IN ISFAHAN) THE CHRISTIAN HOSPITAL HAS BEEN APPROPRIATED BY THE COMMITTEE. THE SHIRAZ CHRISTIAN HOSPITAL WAS MORE OF A PRIVATE INSTITUTION THAN A MISSION, AND RUN BY A LOCAL CHRISTIAN. OTHER PRIVATE HOSPITALS HAVE NOT BEEN TAKEN OVER.

7. ALTHOUGH SHIRAZ HAS ONLY ONE KOMITEH, IT IS CONTROLLED BY SEVERAL AYATOLLAS WHO VIE FOR POWER WITHIN THE STRUCTURE. A LOCAL RESTAURANT OWNER EXPLAINED THAT ONE WAY A MULLAH COULD STRENGTHEN HIS POWER BASE WAS BY RECRUITING GREATER NUMBERS OF PASDARANS INTO HIS CAMP. THE QUALITY OF THE RECRUIT IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE ADDITION OF ONE MORE BODY TO TOTE A GUN. CONSEQUENTLY, ANY YOUTH WHO TIRES OF CLASSES OR WORKING IN DAD'S SHOP OR LOOKING FOR WORK CAN BECOME A PROTECTOR OF GOD AND COUNTRY. THE WIELDING OF CIVIL AUTHORITY BY THESE CALLOW YOUTHS PRESENTS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO THE EXTENSION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY AND NORMALIZATION. CURRENTLY THE LEADING MULLAH IN SHIRAZ IS AYATOLLAH RAHIMANI-SHIRAZI WHO IS SAID TO BE PERSONALLY DEPUTED BY KHOMENEI.

8. THE TRIBES IN FARS PROVINCE HAVE REMAINED FAIRLY QUIET. THE LARGEST AND MOST POWERFUL TRIBE, THE
QASHQAI'S, IS LED BY NASSER KHAN AND KHOESROW KHAN, BOTH RECENTLY RETURNED FROM FOREIGN EXILE. THEY ARE SAID TO BE STICKING WITH THE NEW ORDER AS LONG AS IT APPEARS TO BE IN THEIR INTEREST TO DO SO, BUT HAVE NO DEEP SEATED COMMITMENT TO KHOMERINI ET AL. THE LURS ARE SAID TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE DISAPPOINTED, UNHAPPY WITH UNEMPLOYMENT, RISING PRICES AND THE HARASSMENT OF SOME OF THEIR LEADERS. ONE MEMBER OF A LEADING LUR FAMILY TOLD EMBOFF THAT ALL THEY NEED IS FOR THE U.S. TO GIVE THEM GUNS AND THE GO AHEAD.

9. THE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE IRANIAN DRAMA REMAINS. NEARLY ALL IRANIANS WHO ARE DISSATISFIED WITH CURRENT CONDITIONS BELIEVE IT KHOMERINI IS BACKED BY AMERICA. THIS BELIEF IS FOUND ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, AND HELD BY DOCTORS, BUSINESSMEN, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND SO ON.


11- EMBOFF LUNCHE WITH ARMORED CENTER OFFICER LT. KAMAL KHAKSAR (PROTECT) AND HIS FAMILY AT THEIR HOME IN THE MARRIED OFFICERS QUARTERS. THE LIEUTENANT WAS IN
UNIFORM WHEN HE CALLED FOR EMBOFF AT CONSULATE. THIS
WAS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO HIS BEHAVIOR TWO MONTHS AGO.
AT THAT TIME WHEN EMBOFF RAN INTO HIM ON THE STREET
HE WAS OBVIOUSLY NERVOUS AND ARRANGED TO MEET AT A
RESTAURANT, WHERE HE APPEARED IN MUFTI.

12. KHAKSAR REPORTED THAT ROUTINE CHIEFTAIN TANK
MAINTENANCE IS NOW BEING PERFORMED. HE SAID THAT AS
LONG AS HE AND OTHER OFFICERS WOULD START TO DO THE
WORK THE ENLISTED MEN WOULD THEN JOIN IN, BUT A MERE
ORDER TO DO THE WORK WOULD NOT SUFFICE. HE CLAIMED THAT
A ROUTINE ENGINE OVERHAUL THEY HAD DONE HAD TAKEN ONLY
FIVE DAYS, WHEREAS BEFORE, EVEN WITH BRITISH ADVISORS,
IT HAD TAKEN TWENTY. HOWEVER, KHAKSAR SAID THAT HE AND
OTHER OFFICERS FELT THAT THE RETURN OF A LIMITED
BRITISH TEAM WAS NEEDED. RUSSIAN ADVISORS HAD REMAINED IN
SHIRAZ UNTIL ABOUT MID-MAY. THEY HAD SCHEDULED TO RETURN
IN EARLY JUNE BUT WERE ABOUT TWO WEEKS OVERDUE WHEN
SKUD WAS IN SHIRAZ. IN GENERAL, KHAKSAR WAS MOST
PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY. HE CITED LACK
OF DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE RANKS AND THE LOW MORALE OF THE
OFFICER CORPS.

13. NO F-14'S WERE SEEN IN THE AIR AT SHIRAZ OR ISFAHAN,
ALTHOUGH EMBOFF DID SEE A TEENAGE BOY ON ISFAHAN'S MAIN
STREET READING A BLUE PAPERBACK BOOK WITH "GRUMMAN F-14"
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BUT IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. ONE OFFICER EXPLAINED THAT THERE
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PAY, AND, (2) TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE. HE POINTED OUT THAT

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IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN THE PEOPLE DO NOT WANT PROTECTION FROM THE POLICE, SO THE POLICE JUST COLLECT THEIR PAY.

15. ALONG THE SHIRAZ-ISFAHAN-TEHRAN ROAD LITTLE SEEMED CHANGED BY THE REVOLUTION. A FEW STATUES HAD TOPPLED. BUT THE TOWN OF SHAHREZA WAS STILL CALLED SHAHREZA.

16. IN ISFAHAN TOURISTS WERE WELCOME AT THE SHOPS AND ATTRACTIONS ALONG MEIDAN-E-KHOMEINI (FORMERLY MEIDAN-E-SHAN), BUT THE ATMOSPHERE REMAINS MORE HIGHLY CHARGED THAN THAT OF SHIRAZ. HOSTILITY TOWARD FOREIGNERS WAS EVIDENT. PASDARANS WERE MORE COMMON, AND THE LOCAL COMMITTEES SHOWED MORE OF AN INTEREST IN THE CONSULATE.

17. ISFAHAN IS CONTROLLED BY FOUR REGIONAL COMMITTEES AND A CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THE CONSULATE IS LOCATED IN THE PRECINCT CONTROLLED BY AYATOLLAH KHADEMI BUT NEAR TO THE DOMAIN OF AYATOLLAH TAHERI, WHO ALSO WEARS THE FOREIGN PROBLEMS HAT. TO AVOID PROBLEMS DURING A TRANSFER OF FURNITURE TO TEHRAN, BOTH GROUPS WERE CONTACTED AND SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PROPERTY SECTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD BEEN OVERLOOKED AND A TWO-HOUR JOB BEGAN IN THE EARLY MORNING LASTED UNTIL MIDNIGHT. THE COMMITTEE INSISTED ON READING ALL OF THE TRASH DISPOSED OF BY THE CONSULATE (SENSITIVE MATERIAL HAD LONG SINCE BEEN DESTROYED), AND GAVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO OLDB CALENDARS—PERHAPS LONGING FOR THE GOOD OLD DAY.

18. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL SEEMS TO HAVE LITTLE INFLUENCE IN ISFAHAN. A REQUEST FOR HIS AID RESULTED IN THE COMMITTEE BEING BERATED FOR BOTHERING THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WITH A PROBLEM THAT WAS CLEARLY A COMMITTEE PROBLEM.

19. AN ISFAHAN BAZAARI, AND A DEVOTED FOLLOWER OF THE AYATOLLAH TOLD EMBOFF THAT HE THOUGHT AMERICA AND IRAN SHOULD HAVE GOOD RELATIONS AND THAT SOME AMERICAN ENGINEERS SHOULD RETURN. EMBOFF POINTED OUT THAT AMERICANS WERE UNLIKELY TO RETURN AFTER THE WAY THEY
WERE THROWN OUT. HE REPLIED THAT WAS BECAUSE THEY WERE PAID FOUR TIMES WHAT IRANIANS WERE PAID. EMBOFF SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THEY HAD FOUR TIMES THE EXPERIENCE. BAZAARI SAID MAYBE, THEN SAID IRAN HAS A PROBLEM, NOBODY WORKS VERY HARD.

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TEHRAN 8831/3
FOR GRAVES FROM USA
TO 12885 GDS 9/8/85

SUBJECT: PROGRAM POSSIBILITIES
REFERENCE: TEHRAN 3199

CLASSIFIED BY J. F. CURRAN, DIRECTOR, USA
I. INTERESTED IN YOUR REPORT CONVEYED TEHRAN REFTEL.
II. USA'S ESTIMATE OF VALUE OF IAS, ENGLISH TEACHING, AND
LIBRARY OPERATIONS ENCOURAGING.
III. CONCUR WITH EXPLORATION OF LOCAL SPEAKER POSSIBILITIES FOR
IAS (RESERVE THIS ALSO INCLUDES BOARD MEMBERS). HOWEVER,
WOULD CAUTION AGAINST ANYTHING WHICH WOULD IDENTIFY USA OR IAS
WITH THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT OR ANY OTHER GROUPING.
IV. ALSO AGREE WITH YOUR INTENTION TO EXPLOR POSSIBILITIES
FOR LOST-YIK VISIT BY AN AMERICAN PARTICIPANT. WE TEND TO
BELIEVE AS BETWEEN AN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS OR PHILOSOPHY
FOUR, PHILOSOPHY LESS LIKELY TO BE MISINTERPRETED. HOWEVER,
WE PROPOSE VERY CAREFUL EXPLORATION (AMONG OTHERS, IT WOULD BE
USEFUL TO HAVE VIEWS OF MINISTO MINATOCHI ACCOMPANIED BY A
CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF HOW SUCH A VISITOR MIGHT BE USED, WITH
IN WHAT CONTEXT, AND WHERE.
V. IF YOU ASCERTAIN TO YOUR AND 'ISSON'S FULL SATISFACTION'
AT AN AMERICAN VISIT WOULD BE WELcomed, PRODUCTIVE AND
USEFUL, WE WILL SEND FULL SUPPORT OR SEEK OUT
PROPER PLANS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.
VI. DO NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO APPEAR NEUTRAL. HOWEVER, AS
FULLY AWAY AND APPRECIATE THESE VIEWS ARE SENSITIVE, DIFFICULT
FOR 'ISSON TO RELATE TO, WE BELIEVE ANY PROGRAM
INTERESTED IN, SHOULD CAUfully WHICH LONG TERM
WILLING AND NOT CAUfully PAINS (OF LOSSES).
FOR GRAVES FROM NEA

EO 12065 GDS 8/8/85

SUBJECT: PROGRAM POSSIBILITIES
REFERENCE: TEHRAN 3109
CLASSIFIED BY R. T. CURRAN, DIRECTOR, NEA

1. INTERESTED IN YOUR REPORT CONVEYED TEHRAN REPTEL.

2. REZA'S ESTIMATE OF VALUE OF IAS, ENGLISH TEACHING, AND USICA LIBRARY OPERATIONS ENCOURAGING.

3. CONCUR WITH EXPLORATION OF LOCAL SPEAKER POSSIBILITIES FOR IAS (PRESUME THIS ALSO INCLUDES BOARD MEMBERS). HOWEVER, WOULD CAUTION AGAINST ANYTHING WHICH WOULD IDENTIFY USG OR IAS WITH THE RELIGIOUS FIGHT OR ANY OTHER GROUPING.

4. ALSO AGREE WITH YOUR INTENTION TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR LOW-KEY VISIT BY AN AMERICAN PARTICIPANT. WE TEND TO BELIEVE, AS BETWEEN AN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS OR PHILOSOPHY FIGURE, PHILOSOPHY LESS LIKELY TO BE MISINTERPRETED. AGAIN, WE ENDORSE VERY CAREFUL EXPLORATION (AMONG OTHERS, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE VIEWS OF MININFO MINATCHI) ACCOMPANIED BY A CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF HOW SUCH A VISITOR MIGHT BE USED, WITH WHOM, IN WHAT CONTEXT, AND WHERE.

5. IF YOU ASCERTAIN TO YOUR AND MISSION'S FULL SATISFACTION THAT AN AMFART VISIT WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED, PRODUCTIVE AND DESIRABLE, WE WILL LEND FULL SUPPORT THIS END IN SEEKING OUT APPROPRIATE NAMES FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

6. DO NOT WISH BY FOREGOING TO APPEAR NEGATIVE. HOWEVER, AS YOU FULLY AWARE AND APPRECIATE, THESE ARE SENSITIVE, DIFFICULT TIMES FOR U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS. WE BELIEVE ANY PROGRAM DECISIONS, HOWEVER LOW-KEY, MUST CAREFULLY WEIGH LONG TERM ADVANTAGE AGAINST SHORT TERM TACTICAL GAINS (OR LOSSES).

REINHARDT

BT

#0256

AUGUST:
- THE BUSINESS CLIMATE IN IRAN - GUIDANCE FOR U.S. BUSINESSMEN

SEPTEMBER:
- REVIEW OF THE POOR PEOPLE’S FOUNDATION
- ATTITUDES OF IRAN'S OIL FIELD WORKERS

OCTOBER:
- OIL POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
- IRANIAN AID TO THE LDC'S - POLICY AND PROSPECTS

NOVEMBER:
- MANAGING IRAN'S FINANCIAL SURPLUS
- ELECTRIC POWER PROSPECTS IN IRAN

DECEMBER:
- AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

3. WE WILL UPDATE THIS SCHEDULE APPROXIMATELY EVERY SIX MONTHS UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT PREFERENCES AN ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT. LAINGEN##

BT #8816

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 9216

AUGUST:
-- THE BUSINESS CLIMATE IN IRAN—GUIDANCE FOR U.S. BUSINESSMEN

SEPTEMBER:
-- REVIEW OF THE POOR PEOPLE’S FOUNDATION
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3. WE WILL UPDATE THIS SCHEDULE APPROXIMATELY EVERY SIX MONTHS UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT PREFERS AN ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT. LAINGEN##
1. INTRODUCTION: RECENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE
AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN INVOLVED HERE, RANGING FROM COMPROMISED
SECURITY TO VISA OPERATIONS TO THE SHEHRY CASE, HIGHLIGHT SEVERAL SPECIAL FEATRES OF CONDUCTING
BUSINESS IN THE PERSIAN ENVIRONMENT. IN SOME INSTANCES
THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED ARE A PARTIAL
REFLECTION ON THE EFFECTS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.
BUT WE BELIEVE THE UNDERLYING CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
QUALITIES THAT ACCOUNT FOR THESE DIFFICULTIES ARE AND WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY CONSISTENT.
UNFORTUNATELY, WE SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS BE USED TO BRIGE
BOTH TSS PERSONNEL AND PRIVAUE SECOR REPRESENTATIVES
WHO ARE REQUIRED TO DO BUSINESS WITH AND IN THIS
CONTINENT. END INURODTUION.

2. PERHAPS THE SINGLE DOMINANT ASPECT OF THE PERSIAN
PSYCHE IS AN OVERRIDING EGOISM. ITS ANTECEDENTS LIE
IN THE LONG IRANIAN HISTORY OF INSAERABILITY AND INSECNTRY
WHICH PUT A PREMIUM ON SELF-PRESERVATION. THE PRACTICAL
EFFECT OF IT IS AN ALMOST TOTAL PERSIAN PREOUPICATION
WITH SELF AND LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR UNDERSTANDING POINTS
OF VIEW OTHER THAN ONE'S OWN. THIS, FOR EXAMPLE, IU
IS INCOMPRENSIBLE TO AN IRanian THAT U.S. IMMIGRATION
LAW MAY PROHIBIT ISSUING HIM A TOURIST VISA WHEN HE HAS
DETERMINED THAT HE WANTS TO LIVE IN CALIFORNIA.
SIMILARLY, THE IRANIAN CENTRAL BANK SEES NO INCONSISTENCY
IN CLAIMING FORCE MAJEURE TO AVOID PENALTIES FOR LATE
PAYMENT OF INTEREST DUE ON OUTSTANDING LOANS WHILE THE
GOVERNMENT OF WHICH IU IS A PART IS DENYING THE VAILIDY
OF THE VERY GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE CLAIM IS MADE WHEN
CONFROUNED BY SIMILAR CLAIMS FROM FOREIGN FIRMS FORCED
TO CEASE OPERATIONS DURING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

4. THE REVERSE OF HIS PARTICULAR PSYCHOLOGICAL COIN
AND HAVING THE SAME HISTORICAL ROOTS AS PERSIAN EGOISM.
IS A PERVERSIVE THREAT ACROSS THE NAUTRE OF THE WORLD IN
WHICH ONE LIVES. THE PERSIAN EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT
NOUGHING IS PERMANENT AND IU IS COMMONLY PERCEIVED UHAU
HOSTILE FORCES ABOUND. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT EACH
INDIVIDUAL MUST BE CONSUEUALLY AWARE OF OPPORTUNITIES
TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST THE MALVOLENT FORCES THAT
WOULD OTHERWISE BE HIS TNDDING. HE IS OBVIOUSLY
JUSTIFIED IN USING ALMOST ANY MEANS AVAILABLE TO EXPLOIT

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SUCH OPPORTUNITIES. THIS APPROACH UNDERLIES THE SO-CALLED "BAZAAR MENTALITY" SO COMMON AMONG PERSIANS. A MIND-SET THAT OFTEN IGNORES LONGER TERM INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE ADVANTAGES AND COUNTERANCES PRACTICES THAT ARE CONSIDERED UNETHICAL BY OTHER NORMS. AN EXAMPLE IS THE SEEMINGLY SHORUTIZATION AND HARASSING TACTICS EMPLOYED BY THE POOL IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH GTE.

5. Coupled with these psychological limitations is a general incomprehension of casualty. Islam, with its emphasis on the omnipotence of God, appears to accustom at least in major part for this phenomenon. Somewhat surprisingly, even those Iranians educated in the Western style and perhaps with long experience outside Iran itself frequently have difficulty grasping the inter-relationship of events. Witness a Yazdi resisting the idea that Iranian behavior has consequences on the perception of Iran in the U.S. or that this perception is somehow related to American policies regarding Iran. This same quality also helps explain Persian aversion to accepting responsibility for one's own actions. The Deus ex Machina is always at work.

6. The Persian proclivity for assuming that to say something is to do it further complicates matters. Again, Yazdi can express surprise when informed that the irregular security forces assigned to the Embassy remain in place. "But the Central Committee told me they would go by Monday," he says. An MFA official reports that an Embassy case is 90 percent solved, but when a Consular officer investigates he discovers that nothing has changed. There is no recognition that instructions must be followed up, that commitments must be accompanied by action and results.

6. Finally, there are the Persian concepts of influence and obligation. Everyone pays obeisance to the former and the latter is totally honored in the breach. Persians are consumed with developing party favor—the influence of which will help them obtain favors—while favors are only grudgingly bestowed and then just to the EU.
7. **There are several lessons for those who would negotiate with Persians in all this:**

- **First**, one should never assume that his side of the issue will be recognized, let alone UHAU id will be conceded to have merits. Persian preoccupation with self precludes this. A negotiator must force recognition of his position upon his Persian opposite number.

- **Second**, one should not expect an Iranian readily to perceive the advantages of a long-term relationship based on trust. He will assume that his opposite number is essentially an adversary. In dealing with him, he will attempt to maximize the benefits to himself that are immediately obtainable. He will be prepared to go to great lengths to achieve his goal, including running the risk of so alienating whoever he is dealing with that future business would be unthinkable, at least to the latter.

- **Third**, interlocking relationships of all aspects of an issue must be painstakingly, forcefully and repeatedly developed. Linkages will be neither readily comprehended nor accepted by Persian negotiators.

- **Fourth**, one should insist on performance as the sine qua non of each stage of negotiations. Subtleties of intention count for almost nothing.

- **Fifth**, cultivation of goodwill for goodwill’s sake is a waste of effort. The overriding objective at all times should be impressing upon the Persian across the table the mutuality of the proposed undertakings. He must be made to know that a quid pro quo is involved on both sides.

- **Finally**, one should be prepared for the threat of breakdown in negotiations at any given moment and not be caught by the possibility. Given the Persian negotiator’s cultural and psychological limitations, he is going to resist the very concept of a rational (from the Western point of view) negotiating process.

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RUCM2J/AMMBASSY ANKARA 0220
RUFHAD/USINT BAGHDAT 0232
RUQMOD/AMMABASSY DOHA 0202
RUSPE/AMMABASSY ISLAMABAD 0264
RUQAVR/AMMABASSY JIDDA 0259
RUSEL/AMMABASSY RABUL 0269
RUQMM/AMMABASSY KUWAIT 0231
RUPTC/AMMABASSY LONDON 0322
RUQCM/AMMABASSY MANAMA 0199
RUQNMO/AMMABASSY MOSCOW 0239
RUQWMT/AMMABASSY MUSCAT 0123
RUFNPS/AMMABASSY PARIS 0328
RUSNAAA/USINCEUR VAIRINGEN GER

E:O 12063: JES 9/15/65 (TOMSHEI, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, SOPN, IR
SUBJ: VIOLENCE IN TEHRAN

REF: USINFO: 150114Z AUG 79

1. (C - ENTERMET TEXT.)

2. REFTEL IS A REASONABLY ACCURATE ACCOUNT BY A JOURNALIST WITH CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN IRAN OF CLASHES BETWEEN SECULARIST POLITICAL GROUPS AND HEZBOLLAH (SOLARLY, ADHERENTS OF THE PARTY OF GOD) LOYAL TO AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI ON AUGUST 12 AND 13. ALLOWAY'S REPORT IS COLORED SOMEWHAT BY HIS SYMPATHY FOR THE SECULARISTS AND HIS OWN BLOOD WITH ISLAMIC FANATICISM, BUT THE SHOWING POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DIVISIONS HE DESCRIBES WHICH UNDERLIE THESE CLASHES ARE VERY REAL.


4. BUT A LEGACY OF BITTERNESS WILL REMAIN TO PESTER JUST BENEATH THE SURFACE OF THE BODY POLITIC. THIS, IT SEEMS TO US, IS THE REAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN IRAN. THE ISLAMIC FORCES REMAIN PREDOMINANT. NO OTHER

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POLITICAL GROUP HAS EMERGED THAT HAS A CAPABILITY OF SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGING THEM. BUT THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS HAVE SHOWN A SINGULAR INABILITY TO COME TO GRIPS WITH IRAN'S PLURALISTIC SOCIETY WHICH CONTAINS A LARGE MODERNIZED, SECULAR COMPONENT. IN THEIR SIX MONTHS IN POWER THEY HAVE ALIENATED ONE GROUP AFTER ANOTHER. THIS PROCESS CANNOT GO ON INDEFINITELY. IT MAY NEVER COME TO CIVIL WAR, AS ALLOMAY SUGGESTS, BUT NEITHER CAN THE ISLAMIC FORCES EXPECT TO BE ABLE CONTINUALLY TO FIGHT ROUGHHOUSE OVER ALL THOSE WHO DO NOT AGREE WITH THEM WITHOUT EVENTUALLY ENCOUNTERING A MORE SEVERE REACTION THAN THEY HAVE TO DATE. LAINEZEN ET
August 15, 1979

Mr. Henry Precht
Iran Desk
Room 5246, New State
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Henry:

I am sending herewith my notes from the AMA Iran Update program on July 25-26 in New York City, together with a copy of the attendance list, per our telephone conversation last night.

Sincerely yours,

John A. Westberg

Enclosures
1. The first and by far the most significant speaker was professor James Bill of the University of Texas. He is perhaps the best known writer on Iranian affairs in the English language. His discipline is political science with an emphasis on social and political change. He began by describing the Iranian revolution as the most remarkable in history, noting that the breadth and depth of the opposition to the Shah's regime was extraordinary. Here follows other points that he made.

1.1. The main forces behind the revolution were grinding poverty (which I question) and corruption. Bill noted there were also other factors, namely oppression, the letting up of pressure by the Shah without doing anything constructive to deal with the disgruntlement with his government, the fact that popular religious leaders decided to fight the monarchy, and the decision arbitrarily by the government in early 1978 to cool off the economy.

1.2. The present political system in Iran is dominated by the Mujtahids, who are older, revered religious
leaders. There are perhaps 200 of these religious leaders in Iran today. They are not to be confused with the Mullahs, who are farther down the hierarchical ladder of Shiite Islam. Bill feels these Mujtahids are the most important people in Iran today and that we must therefore get to know who they are, how they think, and what their vision is for the Iran of the future. There are many indications that the younger Mujtahids and also other older Mujtahids do not agree with Khomeini. Bill also feels that we must count on the Mujtahids, such as Taleghani, to bridge the gap between the masses of the people and the intelligencia. However, we cannot expect the Mujtahids to provide governmental leadership, or political leadership, since their traditional role in society has been the protection of the people's rights vis-a-vis the government. They do not think positively enough to be political or governmental leaders.

1.3. Bill was very critical of the international media, referring to their job as "fourth-rate" several times during his talk. He particularly objected to the way Khomeini has been presented, arguing he is not nearly as bad as the press has made him out. Query, however, the pronouncements this week that music is evil.

1.4. There is a preoccupation within the revolutionary government today with a perceived danger of interference by the United States. Paranoid. Bill says this
stems from a number of things, including the fact that right-wing assassination squads have been knocking off eight to ten revolutionary people every night since the revolution took place. If this is true, it certainly would help to explain this matter.

1.5. There are four main forces threatening stability in Iran today. The first is the right-wing bands of assassins, which Bill feels will continue their activities for another year and a half at least until they are brought under control. Secondly, there are the ethnic separatist movements, which Bill feels is the most dangerous force. Thirdly, there is the alienation of the secular, modern-educated intelligencia, who, Bill says, is absolutely essential to the long-term future of Iran. Finally, there are the left-wing, marxist groups, the most prominent of which is known as the Fedayeen Khalq.

1.6. There are three groups which hold the key to the return of stability to Iran: The military, the professional middle class and the progressive religious leaders, the Mujtahids mentioned above. In this latter group Bill feels Taleghani is the most important. He said he did not think Shariat Madari is a significant force in this.

1.7. Bill noted that every U.S. President since Jack Kennedy has supported the Shah. Nixon and Kissinger went,
in Bill's opinion, way beyond the bonds of acceptability in the deal they made with the Shah. Other reasons why Iranian attitude towards the United States today is negative are the supportive statements by Carter right up to the end, including the famous telephone call from Carter to the Shah on bloody Friday (September 8, 1978) which was made from Camp David and, of course, received wide publicity both within Iran and without. Bill feels there will continue to be difficulties between Iran and the United States at the political level for the next year or so, but that they will pass. He says Iranians like Americans and the idea of America very much and there is a large reservoir of good will despite the universal animosity of Iranians towards our government. (There is a thought here that if Ted Kennedy should become our next President, relations with Iran would greatly improve overnight. Query whether I could interest Ted in making a trip to Iran at the appropriate time?)

1.8. Bill is mildly critical of our government's present posture toward Iran, which is that of a very, very low profile. Bill feels our government should be doing something positive, perhaps offering aid of some kind. (I disagree with this at the present time because of the paranoia referred to above by Bill himself on the part of the
Iranian government leaders today regarding interference by the U.S.) Bill stated other embassies in Teheran are building up rapidly. He specifically mentioned Korea and Japan.

1.9. There was only a passing reference to corruption in Iran today. Bill noted that the social patterns remain the same and that only a political revolution is in process so far. He seemed to feel that the customary laying on of gifts is an acceptable thing. (I should query him on how he squares this with his identifying corruption as one of the forces which caused the revolution.)

1.10. There was also only brief reference to the labor problem. Bill said it was rather encouraging that the oil workers had stayed on. He also said, however that the students were running the universities, the workers were running the factories, and the privates were running the army. He felt all of this would burn itself out fairly quickly.

1.11. Brief reference was made to the need for expatriates in Iran. Bill stated the Koreans were no longer welcome in Iran or the Gulf area for a variety of reasons, including a reported propensity to the commission of robbery, burglaries, etc.
2. There were over 50 well-known American companies represented at the conference. Among these were a number of investor companies who have had expatriates back in Teheran recently. The reports of these representatives were very favorable. The companies include du Pont, Carrier, Foremost-McKesson-Robbins, General Electric Technical Services (Repair-shop) and Harza.

3. Bud Menaker is General Counsel for Martin Marietta Aerospace. He worked in Iran for a couple of years for the PMO representing the Iranian government in telecommunications procurement. In his talk he attempted to be more critical of the present situation in Iran and less optimistic about the future. He noted the danger of the clergy fouling the government up for many more months to come, and the oft-reported oppression of the new regime, specifically mentioning the banning of movies and music and the cutting into press freedom.

4. Dan Burt, an American lawyer with offices in Saudi Arabia, flatly disagreed with the view that the situation in Iran was going to improve. He based his position on opinion in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf area to the effect that Khomeini will not remain in power much longer but will be replaced by a left-wing government. Burt said the Saudis
are terribly concerned about what is going on in Iran, by which he presumably meant the instability caused by the revolution.

John A. Westberg
AMA ATTENDANCE LIST July 25-26, 1979

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Carl Borden, Director
Paul Newhart, Manager
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Ray J. Hope, Sr. V.P.
Tidewater, Inc.
1440 Canal Street, Suite 2100
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

Robert Angus, Prog. Mgr., Iran Programs
Westinghouse Electric Corp.
1111 Schilling Road, MS 7600
Hunt Valley, Maryland 21030
SUBJECT: POLITICAL REPORTING: NEEDED RESOURCES

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS PART OF HIGH-LEVEL PROGRAM REVIEW OF PERSONNEL AND RESOURCE NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN POLITICAL REPORTING FROM SELECTED CRITICAL COUNTRIES, WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING IRAN. FOLLOWING IS A FIRST DRAFT WRITTEN ACCORDING TO THE PRESCRIBED FORMAT AND WITH DEMANDED BREVITY. WE ARE AWAITING SRF COMMENT HERE ON THE "GAPS IN COVERAGE" PART, BUT SINCE OUR SUBMISSION IS DUE COB AUGUST 21 THERE MAY NOT BE TIME TO VET THAT WITH YOU. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS, PARTICULARLY ON THE "RECOMMENDED ACTIONS" PART, AND WELCOME ANY ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY CARE TO MAKE.

3. QUOTE, IRAN.

-- MAJOR PROBLEMS/DEVELOPMENTS: REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION WITH CONTINUED INSTABILITY AND COMPETING POWER CENTERS. GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS IN TRANSITIONAL STAGE. POLITICAL PROCESS MARKED WITH SERIOUS COMPETITION AND CONFRONTATION BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR AND LEFT AND RIGHT, WITHIN ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS. SECURITY SITUATION UNSTABLE. RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ANXIOUS. MASSIVE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY UNEMPLOYMENT AND RISING INFLATION, WITH SERIOUS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. NEW LABOR MILITANCY. MILITARY AND POLICE STILL LARGELY DISORGANIZED AND DISCREDITED. OIL PRODUCTION STEADY AT 4M B/D SINCE APRIL BUT VULNERABLE TO DISRUPTIONS. ABILITY TO DEFEND BORDERS AND GULF AREA QUESTIONABLE. FEARS OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY AND/OR OUTSIDE PLOTTING. CONCERN ABOUT MARXIST/COMMUNIST ACTIVITY AND CAPABILITY FOR DESTABILIZING ACTION.
-- GAPS IN COVERAGE: LACK OF INFORMATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF: WHO THE KEY MOVERS ARE AND HOW THE CURRENTLY FRAGMENTED POWER SYSTEM OPERATES; RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RELIGIOUS LEADERS, THEIR FOLLOWERS AND SECULAR LEADERS AND GROUPS; COMPOSITION AND STRENGTHS OF VARIED GROUPS MAKING UP LEFTIST FORCES; LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION OF GUERILLA GROUPS, TRIBES, AND ETHNIC MINORITIES (KURDS, ARABS, ETC.); STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND PARA-MILITARY GROUPS; LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION OF "KOMITEHS" IN GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS, MILITARY, AND INDUSTRY; LEADERSHIP AND STRENGTH OF NEW MILITANT WORKER GROUPS, ESPECIALLY IN OIL SECTOR; MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE, OPERATIONAL PREPAREDNESS, AND WILL TO FIGHT; POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINUED MASSIVE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS SUCH AS LOW PRODUCTIVITY, SHORTAGES OF MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL, TECHNICIANS, SPARE PARTS, RAW MATERIALS, FINANCING, AND MARKETS; BAZAAR POLITICS.

-- RECOMMENDED ACTIONS: FILL VACANT ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL OFFICER POSITIONS IMMEDIATELY. REVIEW NEED FOR REESTABLISHING POL/MIL POSITION. ENSURE POL SECTION HAS A PERMANENTLY-ASSIGNED SECRETARY. CONSIDER ESTABLISHING ROTATIONAL JUNIOR OFFICER POSITION IN POL SECTION. REOPEN THE THREE CONSULATES AS SOON AS CONDITIONS PERMIT. ASSIGN OFFICERS TO THEM WITH POLITICAL REPORTING EXPERIENCE. FILL SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE NATIONAL POLITICAL ADVISOR POSITION QUICKLY. CONSIDER ADDING ONE FSN POSITION IN POL SECTION TO ASSIST WITH MEDIA COVERAGE. MAKE AVAILABLE FUNDS FOR INDIVIDUAL LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION AT POST TO HELP POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OFFICERS MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THEIR LANGUAGE CAPABILITY. ASSURE FUNDS FOR TRAVEL IN-COUNTRY AND START TRAVEL AS QUICKLY AS CONDITIONS PERMIT. INCREASE PUBLICATIONS PROCUREMENT PROGRAM. TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ALL MAJOR POLITICAL GROUPS, INCLUDING OPPOSITION, AND KNOWLEDGEABLE INDEPENDENT POLITICAL OBSERVERS. CHRISTOPHER 5972
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY OF INTRODUCTION: THERE FOLLOWS AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAN WITHIN WHICH WE PURSUE OUR INTERESTS, FOLLOWED BY SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE CONDUCT OF U.S. POLICY OVER THE NEAR-TERM (12-18 MONTHS) FUTURE. (COMPLETE BALANCE OF THIS PARA LATER). END SUMMARY.

2. CLARITY IS NO HALLMARK OF TODAY'S IRAN. OUR VISIBILITY (AND THAT OF MOST OTHER OBSERVERS) IS STILL LIMITED. THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, UNPREPARED FOR ITS QUICK SUCCESS, REMAINS ILL-ARTICULATED AND EVEN MORE POORLY IMPLEMENTED. FLOUNDERING WOULD BE TOO STRONG A WORD, BUT IRAN IS FAR FROM FINDING ITS BEARINGS POLITICALLY, AND IT WOULD EQUALLY AT SEA ECONOMICALLY WERE IT NOT FOR OIL REVENUES UNDIMINISHED FROM PRE-REVOLUTION FIGURES.

4. ONE THING IS CLEAR. ISLAM REMAINS PREDOMINANT. KHOMEINI AND HIS ENTourage AT QUM CALL ALL THE SHOTS. THERE IS MUCH TALK OF UNITY IN THE SPIRIT OF ISLAM, DESCRIBED AS ESSENTIAL TO THwart THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES AND
AND ARE SAIAD TO BE BEHIND THE REVOLUTION'S DIFFICULTIES IN KURDISTAN AND KHUZISTAN AND INDEED RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REGIMES PROBLEMS IN WHATEVER FIELD. KHOMEINI REMAINS THE SINGLE, DOMINANT MOTIVATING FORCE, UNCHALLENGED POLITICALLY FROM ANY QUARTER, THOUGH NO LONGER AS SACROSANCT AS SIX MONTHS AGO; A CASE IN POINT, PROBABLY, IS AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI DISTANCING HIMSELF IN MESHED DURING THE ELECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW COUNCIL JUST COMPLETED.


6. THOSE FORCES REMAIN SUFFICIENTLY IN COMMAND, HOWEVER, TO ENSURE THE CARRYING THROUGH OF A CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS THAT IS SCHEDULED TO PUT AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN PLACE
BY LATE FALL. NEITHER A DISTANT BAKTIAR IN PARIS NOR THE
STILL DEMORALIZED MILITARY IS ANY OBSTACLE TO THAT.
The next government is likely to be drawn essentially from
the present cast of characters in the PGOI and the Revolutio
Council, with a sufficient majority in an elected parliament
to give the reasonable longevity for the first 12-18 months
at least. But there is little reason to think that such a
majority will have much substantive cohesion beyond what
Islam can provide. Nor is there much likelihood that it
or its leaders will be sufficiently flexible to stem what
could be a growing alienation among the middle class, the
technocrats, and the secular forces generally who are needed
to run an already substantially modernized Iran.
7. KHOMEINI HIMSELF REMAINS A MAJOR DETERMINANT OF THE
POLITICAL FUTURE. WERE HE TO STEP BACK, AFTER THE
INSTALLATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND GIVE
BREATHING SPACE TO MORE MODERATE CLERICAL LEADERS SUCH AS
TALEGhani AND SHARIAT-MADARI, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AN ISLAMIC
POLITICAL BLOC COULD SHOW ENOUGH FLEXIBILITY TO ARREST THE
PRESENT ALIENATION OF THE SECULARISTS. FOR THE MOMENT
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THAT, WITNESS THE EDICTS FROM QUM
PRODUCING HARSPLY RESTRICTIVE CONTROLS ON THE PRESS AND
ENCOURAGING ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS TO TAKE TO THE STREETS TO
DENOUNCE SO-CALLED U.S.-INSPIRED, LEFT-LEANING
INTELLECTUALS OUT TO SABOTAGE THE REVOLUTION.
8. SIMILAR RIGIDITY IS STARKLEY APPARENT IN QUM'S REACTION
TO ISSUES OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY. BRUTE FORCE, INCLUDING
LIBERAL USE OF SUMMARY EXECUTIONS, APPEARS TO BE THE REGIME'S ONLY WAY OF RESPONDING. THAT POLICY MAY HAVE WORKED FOR THE MOMENT IN KHUZISTAN. IT IS NOW BEING RUTHLESSLY APPLIED IN KURDISTAN - AN AREA WHERE FORCE OF THE KIND NOW BEING APPLIED WOULD APPEAR ALMOST CERTAIN TO ALIENATE POLITICAL FORCES AVOWEDLY OPEN TO COMPROMISE ON THE BASIS OF AUTONOMY.

9. ECONOMICALLY, THERE IS WIDESPREAD DISILLUSIONMENT THAT THE REVOLUTION HAS NOT PRODUCED RESULTS - INDEED THAT IT HAS MADE THINGS WORSE FOR MANY, INCLUDING THE VERY LARGE NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED. BUT THIS HAS HARDLY DAMPENED THE ENTHUSIASM FOR KHOMEINI AMONG THOSE SEEMINGLY HARDEST HIT. HE CAN STILL FILL THE STREETS WITH SUPPORTERS FROM SOUTH TEHRAN. SO LONG AS OIL REVENUES CONTINUE AT THEIR PRESENTLY HIGH LEVELS THE REVOLUTION IS NOT CHALLENGED ECONOMICALLY. BUT THERE COULD BE GROWING POLITICAL FALLOUT IF PARALYSIS CONTINUES IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, WITH ITS HEAVY EMPLOYMENT POTENTIAL, AND IF THE STILL GENERALLY STALEMATED INDUSTRIAL SECTOR DOES NOT PICK-UP, AN AREA WHERE THE FLIGHT OF MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL AND ENTREPRENEURIAL SKILLS HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES SERIOUS AND WHERE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE RETURN OF FOREIGN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IS STILL UNCERTAIN AT BEST.

10. A REGIME WITH THIS RANGE OF PROBLEMS AT HOME MIGHT BE ADVISED TO PLAY DOWN ITS INVOLVEMENT ABROAD. BUT THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION INVOLVES THREE MAJOR TENETS IN ITS FOREIGN OUTLOOK AND THESE REMAIN POWERFULLY DETERMINED ON
A whole range of issues; these tenets include the applicability of the Iranian revolution within the universality of Islam; the rejection of foreign influence, be it godless communism or Western capitalism; and the particular menace of international Zionism to the interests of Islam. The result is an activist foreign policy, abrasive to many of our interests, especially vis-a-vis Israel, but — because of an innate suspicion of the Soviets possibly even greater than that of the Shah's regime — capable of a reasonable fidelity to genuine non-alignment.

11. In this setting, we see our interests in Iran as essentially threefold: first, the preservation of Iran's integrity and independence; second, the health of its oil industry, with a capacity for continued normal marketing in the West; third, an Iranian foreign policy that limits the degree to which it identifies Iran with the more radical of the non-aligned elements. In large part, these are interests that we share with much of the political spectrum of Iran except the far left.

12. Our current policy stance toward Iran is one of low profile, strict non-involvement, open to opportunities to enhance our relationship where possible but leaving it largely up to the PGOI as to the pace by which we move to build a new relationship. We believe this policy has been the right one to date, but we also believe a somewhat more forward policy commands itself as Iran
MOVES INTO ITS POST-REVOLUTIONARY PHASE. WE NEED NOT, AND SHOULD NOT, EMBRACE THE CURRENT REGIME; KHOMEINI IS NO FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES. BUT OTHERS IN THE ISLAMIC CAMP ARE MORE OPEN TO US, OVER TIME.

13. OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PGOI AND THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME WILL REFLECT OUR RESPECTIVE INTENTIONS TOWARD EACH OTHER. AN UNDERLYING PROBLEM FOR US IN IRAN HAS BEEN THE FACT THAT MUCH OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP DOES NOT YET PRECEIVE THAT WE HAVE ACCEPTED THE CHANGE IN IRAN (THOUGH SOME OF THIS IS TACTICAL - A REFLECTION OF THE NEED TO KEEP REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS IN TACT.) EVEN MORE FUNDAMENTAL THAN THAT HAS BEEN THE DETERMINATION OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP TO DEMONSTRATE ITS TOTAL INDEPENDENCE FROM FOREIGN (READ U.S.) INFLUENCE. WE WILL NEED TO BE UNDERSTANDING OF THIS. ANY EMBARACE FROM US RISKS BEING SUSPECT. BUT THERE IS, NONETHELESS, ROOM FOR US TO DEMONSTRATE A GREATER DEGREE OF ACCEPTANCE AND UNDERSTANDING, PARTICULARLY AS THE REVOLUTION MOVES FROM THE IMMEDIATE KHOMEINI-DOMINATED CLERICISM TO SOMETHING HOPEFULLY MORE REFLECTIVE OF SOCIOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL REALITIES OF IRAN.

14. IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, NOTHING MATTERS MORE IN THAT RESPECT THAN THE TIMING AND PERSON OF A NEW AMBASSADOR. TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE COMBINED TO GIVE THIS ISSUE AN UNUSUAL IMPORTANCE, ONE FOR WHICH THE PGOI DECLINES ANY RESPONSIBILITY BUT IN WHICH THEY SEE US TO DATE WITHHOLDING OUR VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP AND
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IN THE REVOLUTION ITSELF.

15. OF ONLY SLIGHTLY LESS IMPORTANCE IS THE AREA OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. THE PGOI HAS WELCOMED OUR PRIVATE EXPRESSIONS OF GOOD WILL AND OF WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN A MUTUAL PROCESS OF BUILDING A NEW RELATIONSHIP. BUT THEY SEE IN THE VIRTUAL ABSENCE ON OUR PART OF ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO THE SAME EFFECT A REFLECTION OF LESS THAN FULL ENDORSEMENT. THAT MAY NOT BE ALL BAD. LONGEVITY FOR THE REVOLUTION IS STILL FAR FROM CERTAIN BUT SOME POSITIVE EXPRESSION ON OUR PART OF UNDERSTANDING FOR THE DIFFICULT TRANSITION THAT IRAN IS GOING THROUGH COULD STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THE MODERATES WHO WANT GOOD TIES WITH US. AND WHILE THE

ONE (IS PRIMARILY ON THE PGOI TO ACT IN WAYS THAT ENHANCE ITS IMAGE IN THE CONGRESS AND AMONG THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, AN OCCASIONAL POSITIVE AND PUBLIC STATEMENT BY ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN ABOUT OUR INTEREST AND HOPES IN THE NEW IRAN CAN HELP REDUCE SOME OF THE CHIP ON THE SHOULDER, DAMN YOU FOR OUR GAS LINES, ATTITUDES TOWARD IRAN IN THE U.S. PUBLIC THAT DO NOT HELP US IN PURSUING OUR LONG-RANGE INTERESTS IN IRAN.

16. IN MILITARY SUPPLY, WE ARE NOW IN POSITION IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE DOD SUPPLEMENTAL, TO ACT IN WAYS THAT REFUTE PGOI SUSPICIONS THAT WE HAVE HELD BACK ON DELIVERIES FOR POLITICAL REASONS. MORE IMPORTANTLY WE CAN USE, MORE ACTIVELY THAN WE HAVE TO DATE, WHAT WILL BE A NECESSARILY REDUCED BUT STILL SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY SUPPLY

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DEPENDENCE ON US FOR OUR OWN INTERESTS, INCLUDING REBUILDING A LIAISON WITH A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT THAT REMAINS STRONGLY WESTERN AND ESSENTIALLY MODERATE IN ITS POLITICAL OUTLOOK.

17. IN THE ECONOMIC AREA, OUR ASSETS ARE NOT INCONSEQUENTIAL. THOSE NON-LEFTIST SECULAR FORCES IN THE POLITICAL FIELD WHO ARE OUR NATURAL ALLIES ARE ALSO THOSE WHO RECOGNIZE IRAN'S CONTINUING NEEDS FOR WESTERN CONTACTS IN BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO COUNSEL AMERICAN BUSINESS WITH UNRESOLVED INVESTMENT ISSUES IN IRAN TO STICK WITH IT - WITH PATIENCE, PERSISTENCE, AND A GOOD DEAL OF SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING FOR A NATIONALISTIC ATMOSPHERE THAT DICTATES A MINIMUM OF FOREIGN MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL LEVEL PRESENCE.

18. IN FOREIGN POLICY, WE SHARE WITH THE PGOI A FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC INTEREST IN IRAN'S INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE. IT IS A POLICY ASSET THE SOVIETS CANNOT CLAIM, WITH THIS OR VIRTUALLY ANY CONCEIVABLE SUCCESSOR REGIME. THIS IS NOT AFGHANISTAN. UNDERLYING THIS FACT IS BOTH THE FUNDAMENTAL AVERSION TO COMMUNISM AMONG THE ISLAMIC FORCES AND THE HISTORIC DISTANT OF THE SOVIET UNION AMONG MOST IRANIANS. THESE ARE POWERFUL REASONS WHY WE CAN AFFORD TO LET THE NEW IRANIAN LEADERSHIP BASICALLY SET THEIR OWN PACE IN BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP WITH US, WHILE EXPLOITING OPPORTUNITIES TO GAIN POLICY
GROUND WHEN SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING ON OUR PART IS CALLED FOR. THAT WILL INCLUDE TOLERATING THEIR NON-ALIGNMENT AND INDEED COMPLIMENTING THEM FOR IT WHEN IT INVOLVES, AS WE BELIEVE IT WILL, A REFUSAL TO GO ALONG WITH THE CUBANS ON THEIR VERSION OF NON-ALIGNMENT. WE SHOULD BE ALERT TO SUCH OPPORTUNITIES THIS FALL, ESPECIALLY IF ANY OF THE PGOI LEADERSHIP ATTEND THE UNGA.

19. FINALLY THERE REMAINS, HOWEVER, THE FACT OF A SUBSTANTIAL COMMUNICATIONS GAP BETWEEN US AND THE ISLAMIC FORCES IN IRAN. THAT GAP IS GREATEST IN A LEADER LIKE KHOMEINI, WHERE IT INVOLVES BOTH RIGID RELIGIOUS ORTHODOXY AND AN ENGRAINED DISTASTE AND SUSPICION OF THE U.S. IT IS LESS AMONG MORE MODERATE FIGURES SUCH AS AYATOLLAS TALEGHANI AND SHARIAT-MADARI. BUT IT IS A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO UNDERSTANDING WITH VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE CLERICAL LEADERSHIP, A GROUP DESTINED TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN IRAN OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE SEEK IMAGINATIVE WAYS TO BEGIN TO BRIDGE THIS GAP, INCLUDING EXCHANGE VISITS BY ACKNOWLEDGED EXPERTS IN THE FIELDS OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY AND LONGER TERM EXCHANGE PROGRAMS INVOLVING STUDENTS IN THESE FIELDS.
CHAPTER THREE

M. O. 12085: O.P. B/27/35 (TOMSENTH. V.L.) OR N

MAG: CVTS. PPSTART. SFUV. IR

MAGNAR: N: APPLICATIONS IN "POST-CRISIS" IRAN

AP: STATE 5-555

(ENTIRE TXT)

Summary: The report believes that Iran can no longer be characterized as being in "crisis," and, accordingly, recommends that "responsibility" be declared, and summarizing:

5. The immediate trauma of the Iranian Revolution has passed. While the situation remains far different in certain respects than under the Pahlavi regime, in the five months since February, Iran has settled into a routine. The main features of which will probably prevail for the indefinite future. These include political dominance by the Islamic clergy, a high level of religious commitment, and nationalistic rhetoric that is not substantially different than that sounded in many Third World countries, and an economy shaped by political perceptions of social justice rather than national criteria for sound management.

6. There are many in Iran who find these conditions personally upsetting. Ethnic and religious minorities are suspicious of the emphasis on Persian Shia Islam, modernist and secular elements resent their own diminished role, and as the economy and political spheres, and many others cannot see general inefficiency and arbitrariness of the current system.

7. Much of the criticism is valid. However, the conditions, which it is based cannot be termed "crisis". Rather, they are what has come to pass for normality in this country. Accordingly, we find it no longer appropriate to speak of a "post-crisis" Iran in dealing with non-immigrant visa applicants. That many Iranians would prefer to have their country by something other than what it actually is. Let us not in our view, constitute grounds for continued wording of our immigration laws. In short, the situation here is essentially similar to a number of other developing countries where local conditions provide strong incentives for many Iranians to migrate. We will deal with this situation exactly as we do in those countries where such factors are also strong.

8. Various of Iranian minorities in post-revolutionary Iran deserve special comment. Thus, reports of harassment directed at individual (

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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7. OF THE ABOVE, WE RECOMMEND THAT BEHELD BE IMPOUNDED IMMEDIATELY, AND THAT ALL IRANIAN MIV, APPLICANTS BE REQUIRED BY DEMONSTRATE BOUND TIES AS ASSET IN THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT.

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TIRAN
SUBJECT: NIV APPLICATIONS IN "POST-CRISIS" IRAN

2. SUMMARY. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT IRAN CAN NO LONGER BE CHARACTERIZED AS BEING IN "CRISIS, AND, ACCORDINGLY, RECOMMENDS THAT REFTEL BE RESCINDED. END SUMMARY.

3. THE IMMEDIATE TRAUMA OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAS PASSED. WHILE THE SITUATION REMAINS FAR DIFFERENT IN CERTAIN RESPECTS THAN UNDER THE PAHLAVI REGIME, IN THE SIX MONTHS SINCE FEBRUARY IRAN HAS SETTLED INTO A ROUTINE, THE MAIN FEATURES OF WHICH WILL PROBABLY PERTAIN FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. THESE INCLUDE POLITICAL DOMINANCE BY THE ISLAMIC CLERGY, A HIGH LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS-CUM-NATIONALIST RHETORIC NOT SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT THAN THAT FOUND IN MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, AND AN ECONOMY SHAPED MORE BY POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE THAN RATIONAL CRITERIA FOR SOUND MANAGEMENT.

4. THERE ARE MANY IN IRAN WHO FIND THESE CONDITIONS PERSONALLY UPSETTING ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ARE SUSPICIOUS OF THE EMPHASIS ON PERSIAN SHIA ISLAM. MODERNIST AND SECULAR ELEMENTS RESENT THEIR OWN DIMINISHED ROLE IN BOTH THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SPHERES. AND MANY OTHERS LAMENT THE GENERAL INEFFICIENCY AND ARBITRARINESS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM.
5. Much of the criticism is valid. However, the conditions which it is based cannot be termed a "crisis". Rather, they are what has come to pass for normality in this country. Accordingly, we find it no longer appropriate to speak of a "post-crisis" Iran in dealing with non-immigrant visa applicants. That many Iranians would prefer to have their country be something other than what it actually is. Does not, in our view, constitute grounds for continued bending of our immigration law. In short, the situation here is essentially similar to a number of other developing countries where local conditions provide strong incentives for many Iranians to emigrate. We should deal with this situation exactly as we do in those countries where "push" factors are also strong.

6. Treatment of various Iranian minorities in post-revolutionary Iran deserves special comment. Despite numerous reports of harassments directed at individual members, the embassy has not been able to document instance of official persecution directed either at individuals or at categories of people. Senior government officials and members of the Muslim leadership have repeatedly assured all minority group members that their rights will be respected in the Iranian Islamic Republic. Prejudice and bigotry most certainly do exist. But there is no qualitative difference between Iran under the Shah and Iran under Khomeini in this regard. Almost invariably when individual members of minority groups are questioned closely about their motivations for wanting to leave Iran, inchoate concerns about the future rather than specific acts of persecution in the past are given.

7. In right of the above, we recommend that refTEL be rescinded immediately, and that all Iranian NIV applicants henceforward be required to demonstrate binding ties as stipulated in the immigration and nationality act.

Tomseth

Confidential Tehran 9503
SUBJECT: MOVES TOWARD GOVERNMENT UNIFICATION

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEKS INDICATE THAT IRAN'S DUAL SYSTEM OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL GOVERNMENT IS EVOLVING TOWARD A MORE UNIFIED SYSTEM DOMINATED BY THE UNOFFICIAL, OR REVOLUTIONARY, SECTOR. THE OFFICIAL, PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (PGOI) HEADED BY PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN IS BEING INCREASINGLY OVERSHADOWED BY THE CLERICAL ESTABLISHMENT WHICH IS EXTENDING ITS AUTHORITY INTO NEW AREAS AND WHICH IS INCREASINGLY GIVING DIRECT ORDERS TO GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES NOMINALLY UNDER PGOI CONTROL. THIS SITUATION MAY BE RECOGNITION OF KHOMEINI'S PRE-EMINENCE AND OF FACT THAT ONLY HE AND HIS ALLIES CAN COMMAND RESPECT AND OBEDIENCE OF BOTH SIDES OF THE DUAL AUTHORITY SYSTEM. COUNCIL OF EXPERTS DELIBERATION MAY SANCTIFY CLERICAL PREDOMINANCE AND OFFICIALLY PUT POGI LEADERS NOT CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OUT OF PUBLIC LIFE. END SUMMARY.

4. Khomeini has openly asserted his authority over the past few weeks. For example, the "integration" of the Revolutionary Council and the Cabinet put five ministers on the Revolutionary Council and a number of religious figures into under-secretary positions in the ministries. Apparently the presence of ministers on the Council has not affected the workings of that body, but the new undersecretaries are wielding considerable influence over ministry operations. Ayatollah Khomeini, the new Undersecretary of the Ministry of Defense, is believed to be closely involved in deliberations about the future of the F-14 aircraft. (cf. Tehran 9467).

5. Khomeini's assuming the post of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, his orders to move against the Kurdish insurgents, and his calls for military discipline have directly asserted Qom's power over the Iranian military. Armed forces commanders are more likely to command obedience when their orders are backed by Khomeini's prestige than by the dubious authority of the POOI—authority which can be easily reversed. The new Commander of the Air Force, Maj Gen Bajeri, backed by Khomeini's authority has been working to re-install discipline and order in his command. By contrast, P. Bazargan's August 27 message to the Army expressing gratitude for its valor in Saqqez, received little attention.

6. The closure of a number of publications which have been criticizing the policies of the Islamic movement was undertaken at the initiative of the Revolutionary Court authorities (cf. Tehran 9446). The POOI, specifically the Ministry of National Guidance, had little role in the events except catch up with measures already taken by the Revolutionary Prosecutor.

7. The campaign against unauthorized possession of the

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TEHRAN 9653/1
WEAPONS IS NOW CLEARLY IN THE HANDS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITIES. TEHRAN REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR AYATOLLAE AHMAD AZARI-QOMI TOLD BAMDAD NEWSPAPER ON AUGUST 27 THAT ANYONE FOUND POSsessING ILLEGAL ARMS WOULD BE CONSIDERED CORRUPT ON EARTH AND SHOT. ACCORDING TO AZARI-QOMI, NO GRACE PERIOD WOULD BE ALLOWED AND THE ORDER WOULD COME INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY. FOLLOWING HIS STATEMENT, THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTORS IN MASSEHAD, ISFAHAN, NAJAFABAD, PERDOWS, BANDAR ABBAS, AND OTHER PROVINCIAL TOWNS ISSUED SIMILAR ORDERS WITH THE CONDITION THAT THOSE CARRYING WEAPONS, EXCEPT FOR THE POLICE, THE MILITARY, THE GENDARMERIE, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS (PASDARAN), WOULD HAVE ONE WEEK'S TIME TO TURN THEM IN. ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO THE PASDARAN TO SEARCH VEHICLES AND HOUSES FOR UNAUTHORIZED WEAPONS.


9. THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS MEETING TO DRAW UP A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR IRAN HAS A DISTINCTLY RELIGIOUS CAST. THE SOCIAL IDEALS OF MOST OF THE MEMBERS ARE SIMILAR TO, IF NOT IDENTICAL WITH THOSE OF KHOMEINI. WHATEVER PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES THE MEMBERS MAY HAVE, MOST ARE LIKELY TO AGREE THAT THE MUSLIM CLERGY SHOULD HAVE A PREDOMINANT ROLE IN THE NEW STATE. FYI: THE DEBATES OF THE ASSEMBLY HAVE MOVED OFF THE FRONT.
PAGE AND HAVE TAKEN ON THE ASPECTS OF A SIDESHOW TO THE EVENTS BEING SHAPED BY KHOMÉINI AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS. THE MOST RECENT REPORT ABOUT THE ASSEMBLY WAS A DEBATE ABOUT WHETHER JEWS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO AS TAHUDI OR KALIMI. END FYI.

10. SOME OBSERVERS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT ALL OF THESE EVENTS ARE AN OPEN SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE UNOFFICIAL, REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITIES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PG01. ACCORDING TO THIS THEORY, THE MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE PASDARAN INTO KURDESTAN WAS MOTIVATED NOT BY EVENTS IN KURDESTAN BUT BY KHOMÉINI’S DESIRE TO TIGHTEN HIS CONTROL OVER THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION.

11. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO NECESSITY TO SEE A PLOT IN THESE EVENTS. WHAT MAY BE HAPPENING IS THAT THOSE WHO ALREADY HOLD REAL POWER ARE BEING FORCED TO USE IT TO IMPOSE ORDER AND STABILITY ON THE NATION. LEAVING AN IMPOTENT PG01 TO TRY AND DEAL WITH ARMED BANDS, ECONOMIC CONFUSION, UNRULY TRIBESMEN, AND OTHERS SEEN AS COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES HAS NOT WORKED. WHETHER THE REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS’ MEASURES ARE EFFECTIVE OR NOT REMAINS TO BE SEEN. THERE IS A SUMMARY QUALITY TO REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE WHICH MAKES EVERYONE UNEASY. AT THE SAME TIME,
HOWEVER, STABILITY IS AN ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR CONTROLLING IRAN AND IT TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF ECONOMICS, RELIGION, OR FOREIGN POLICY. SUCH A PROCEDURE HAS DEEP ROOTS IN IRANIAN HISTORY, WHICH CONTAINS NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF RULERS TAKING EXTREME STEPS TO ENSURE THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THIS HETEROGENEOUS NATION.

12. IT IS LIKELY THAT KHOMEINI'S OPENLY EXERCISING DIRECT RULE OVER IRANIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS COMBINED WITH THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS WILL RESULT IN A CENTRALIZED STATE IN WHICH THE INFLUENCE OF KHOMEINI AND HIS ALLIES (BOTH CLERICAL AND SECULAR) WILL PREDOMINATE. IN SUCH A STATE, THE ROLE OF OPPONENTS OF CLERICAL DOMINATION, OF WHATEVER POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STRIPE, IS LIKELY TO BE EVEN MORE LIMITED THAN IT IS TODAY WHEN AT LEAST SOME SECULARISTS ARE ALLOWED TO SERVE AS FIGUREHEADS IN THE PGOI. WHILE SUCH A PROSPECT MAY NOT PLEASE MANY WHO ORIGINALY SUPPORTED THE REVOLUTION, THE INSTITUTION OF SUCH A GOVERNMENT MAY BE ONLY THE FORMAL RECOGNITION OF AN ALREADY EXISTING SITUATION.
September 2, 1979
Regional Security Officer
American Embassy, Tehran Iran
Monthly Status Report for August 1979

Chief, A/ST/FO
Department of State

I. Threat Assessment

A. The potential for violence in Iran remains high. There are increasing signs of disenchantment with the results of the revolution at many levels of society. High unemployment is a problem and ideological, sociological, and ethnological differences abound. Although it could be argued that many of these problems are not new to Iran, the lack of any effective central authority to deal with them is a cause for concern.

The PGOI, headed by Prime Minister Bazaroan, has yet to solidify its administrative control over the country and is continually upstaged by the shadow government headed by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, often making it difficult, if not impossible, to deal with the problems that have manifested themselves as a result of the revolution. Cabinet members of the PGOI have repeatedly offered their resignations in protest of interference by the revolutionary council and committees, and the resulting inability to do their job.

Traditional security and law enforcement organizations (i.e., National Police and Gendarmerie) do not exist as viable units. The military, which traditionally has not had an internal security role, is inactive. These forces are extremely reluctant to take part in any activity which might involve the use of force against other Iranians. Trials and executions (over 400 to date) are continuing against police, gendarmerie and military personnel who were involved in security functions prior to the revolution, a factor which weakens morale in these organizations and makes their personnel reluctant to get involved in law enforcement and internal security functions. A good example of these fears is a conversation that recently took place between an Emboff and a high-ranking Iranian police official (subsequently related to RSO). The police official stated that he had standing orders to quell any major disturbance in Tehran, using force if necessary. The
police official commented that if he were foolish enough to carry out these orders, his men would not obey, and, secondly, he was not about to give these orders because of the possibility of future reprisals. Until such time as there is a strong central government, possessing clear cut authority and the public support, it is unlikely that these forces will take an active role in the internal security of the country.

With the National Police, Gendarmerie, and the military inactive, the security vacuum has been filled by an irregular revolutionary guard organized into Revolutionary Komitehs (committees). Anyone encountering them is subject to arrest and detention for little if any, reason. The number of roadblocks appears to have decreased in recent days, but they can reappear at any time. Although not as a matter of course, summary justice, both capital and corporal, has been exercised by those groups. The revolutionary guards are a law unto themselves and operate from the Mao Tse-tung dictum that "power stems from the barrel of a gun."

Another group, the Pasdaran, appear to be filling the void left by the military's inaction. The Pasdaran are also known as revolutionary guards but are separate from those serving in the Komitehs. Significant is the fact that they too are engaged in internal security functions; a role that the military traditionally has not played. Their leader is an Iranian named RAJSANJANI, a Hojjatoleslan (one step down from an Ayatollah). At present there are approximately 10-12,000 Pasdaran who have been screened and selected from young, untrained Iranian Revolutionary volunteers. They are only armed with light weapons and have been receiving their training in ground force installations in Tehran—primarily Lavizan (the larger ground force base in Tehran). The guard is broken into three main groups: a major cities group; cities up to 5000 people group, and a VIP protection group. The Pasdaran are a separate para-military unit which has thus far been active in internal security functions as well as sustaining the revolution. They have been particularly active in Turkoman Sahra area and Khoramshar. It is believed that RAJSANJANI reports directly to the revolutionary council with an unknown degree of coordination with the Defense and Interior Ministries. To what degree the Komitehs and the Pasdaran will be willing to cooperate is unknown. They are independent of each other, but do represent the only viable security forces in Iran at this time.
Demonstrations

Although improving somewhat, U.S.-Iranian diplomatic relations remain in a state of flux. Anti-Americanism has subsided over the past few weeks (from its previous high in late May), but is still just beneath the surface. Hardly a day goes by without a newspaper article or public denouncement by a religious figure or member of the PGOI, linking the USG/ICA to a current problem in Iran. The U.S. continues to be a very convenient scapegoat for the everyday problems confronting the Iranian leadership. There is little doubt that any decisions or actions taken by the USG that are perceived to be disadvantageous or offensive to the Iranians would result in demonstrations, possibly of a violent nature. In this regard, anti-Shah feelings remain extremely strong. Any decision to allow him or his family to visit the U.S. would almost certainly result in an immediate and violent reaction. The ability and/or desire of the PGOI to contain such actions is questionable.

Terrorism

Terrorism, in the form of assassinations, harassment, and kidnappings, is also a very real threat. Due to the lack of central authority, there is little that can be done to contain any group or groups wishing to further their own interests through the use of violence. Two of the more prominent indigenous pre-revolution terrorist groups, the Mujahedin and the Fedayeen, have achieved a degree of legitimacy and are now active politically. Neither group has claimed responsibility for any terrorist acts since the overthrow of the Shah. Forghan (a group opposed to the role of the clergy in the government), on the other hand, has been quite active since the revolution. It has claimed responsibility for the assassination of several religious figures. We have no information indicating that any of these groups have targeted U.S. personnel in Iran, but we must appear to be attractive targets. Any of these groups might be tempted to carry out an operation either in reaction to developments perceived to be anti-Iranian or in order to induce a crisis in already shaky PGOI/USG relations. Palestinian rejectionist groups, which have pledged to seek revenge for the USG’s part in the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, must also be considered. This threat may be tempered somewhat by the fact that the PLO is seeking to develop the PGOI as an ally and may not wish to endanger the relationship by placing the PGOI in the awkward position of having to deal with a terrorist action against the USG in Iran.
B. Specific Acts Directed Against the U.S. Embassy

On August 17 at approximately 2255 hours the Embassy Compound was the object of a grenade attack. Two separate explosions, one at the new Consulate Building and one at the building housing the satellite dome directly behind the Chancery, were registered. There were no injuries, however, property damage, including labor costs, totalled approximately 8000 dollars. According to the Farsi language paper "Kayhan" (August 18) three groups have claimed credit for the explosions. These are:

- The Iranian Muslim Revolutionary Resistance Movement
- The 17th of Sharivar (September 8) Group
- The Tel Zatar Group

There has been no confirmation that any of these groups was responsible. See Tehran 9175 and 9153 for detailed information of this incident.

In the early morning hours of August 12 a group of about 35-50 armed irregulars (Pasdaran) arrived at the Embassy for the purpose of removing Mashallah Kashani and his forces from the compound. While this act was not directed at the U.S. Embassy, the method used (e.g. virtual armed takeover of the compound) did have the potential for violence involving American personnel. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed and the situation sorted itself out after approximately five to six hours negotiations with the irregular force. See Tehran 8973 for additional details.

II. Operations

A. Visitor Consultation/Briefings

CO Co. "B", Jeff Ronald visited post from August 7 to August 16 in order to conduct an inspection of the MSG Detachment.

S/A Foucht of the Naval Intelligence Service visited post from August 14 to August 17 in order to investigate allegations against the former NCOIC GySgt Main.

Seabee Mike Houseman arrived on August 26 in order to perform technical security work on new Consulate building.

B. Support Activities

RSD continued to work closely with GSO, FBO project supervisor and Consul General in order to incorporate security requirements into construction of new Consulate building.
C. Significant Activities

- The period of August 1 through August 12 required that almost all of the Security Officers' time and resources be devoted to dealing with Moushahiah Kashani and his forces.

- On August 12 Kashani was ousted from the Embassy compound by a force of armed irregulars.

- On August 15 S/A Dan McCarthy arrived for a three-week TDY.

- On August 17 the Embassy compound was the object of a combined RPG and hand grenade attack. Approximately 8000 dollars in property damage was incurred. There were no personal injuries.

- On August 18 ARSO Harland departed post on visitation.

- Annex J, Internal Destruction Plan, was rewritten and will soon be forwarded to the Department.

- Detailed security briefings were conducted for all new TDY and PCS arrivals.

- Considerable time was devoted to working with the National Police in an effort to obtain a regular uniformed security force for Embassy protection. Thus far, only the body-guard detail composed of plainclothes National Police have reported for duty on a continuing basis. Manning of perimeter security posts has been sporadic.

III. Plans for Coming Month

- TDY secretary, Lillian Johnson, will arrive from Kinshasa in order to assist RSO's with re-establishment of records and management systems destroyed as a result of February 14, 1979 attack.

- TSO Chuck Soper will arrive in order to continue work on physical Security improvements.

- Continue to negotiate for a regular security force for the Embassy.

- It is expected that the new Consulate building will open during the month of September.

- RSS will visit post sometime during the month of September.

- ARSO Harland will return from visitation on September 3.

- S/A McCarthy will depart for U.S. on September 3.
WITH A VIEW TO IDENTIFYING "COMMUNICATION TENSIONS," I HAVE, IN TALKING WITH IRANIANS, SOUGHT WAYS TO ASK DISCRETELY: WHAT ABOUT AMERICA AND AMERICANS MOST BUGS IRANIANS? THE ANSWERS VARY CONSIDERABLY, BUT ONE THREAD RUNS THROUGH MOST OF THE ANSWERS TO MY QUESTION:

1. TOO MANY AMERICANS HAVE BEEN TOO VISIBLE TOO LONG IN TOO MANY ASPECTS OF LIFE IN IRAN.

2. I RECALL, WHEN I VISITED TEHRAN IN 1973, BEING STRUCK BY THE PERCEPTION THAT SOME OF WHAT I WAS SEEING IN TEHRAN WAS REMINISCENT OF WHAT I HAD SEEN IN SAIGON IN 1967: AMERICAN TECHNICIANS AND OPERATIONS WERE HAVING A VISIBLE IMPACT ON THE LOCAL SCENE.

3. I SUBMIT THAT, WHEREVER THE AMERICAN PRESENCE IS SO PERVERSIVE THAT IT IMPACTS WIDELY ON THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE A SERIOUS "COMMUNICATION TENSION" BUILDING. A PROBLEM FOR ICA IN THE FIELD AND PERHAPS FOR OUR RESEARCH OFFICERS IN WASHINGTON. BUT MOST OF ALL A PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSIDERATION WHICH THE AGENCY MIGHT USEFULLY CALL TO THE ATTENTION OF POLICY MAKERS AT NSC, DOD AND STATE.

4. ONE MIGHT, BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATING THE DANGER, CITE PRE-CASTRO CUBA, GREECE UNDER THE JUNTA OR THE RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE IN EGYPT AND AFGHANISTAN. AN EVEN MORE ILLUMINATING EXAMPLE COULD, HOWEVER, BE CONJURED UP FOR AMERICANS BY EVOKING AN ENTIRELY HYPOTHETICAL CASE: 50,000 JAPANESE TECHNICIANS LIVING AND WORKING AROUND JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI OR A SIMILAR NUMBER OF GERMANS WHEELING AND DEALING IN DULUTH, MINNESOTA. HOW WOULD AMERICANS COME TO VIEW THESE VISITORS AND THEIR COUNTRIES?

5. GENERAL AMIR RABIMI'S STATEMENTS ABOUT BRINGING BACK FOREIGN ADVISORS AND HIS COMMENTS ON THE EFFECTS OF SUCH ADVISORS ON THE IRANIAN MILITARY IN THE PAST REVEAL THE KIND OF FRUSTRATIONS AND RESENTMENTS AMERICANS IN LARGE NUMBERS ENGENDERED HERE.

6. IN OUR EAGERNESS TO PROMOTE OUR SHORT-TERM POLICY, SECURITY, OR BUSINESS INTERESTS, WE HAVE SOMETIMES PRODUCED LONG-TERM HOSTILITY AND ALIENATION. AMERICAN
PLURALISM AND THE ENERGETIC ENTERPRISE OF MYRIAD AMERICAN
INTEREST GROUPS DOES, OF COURSE, MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO
CONTROL THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS OPERATING IN ANY
ENVIRONMENT ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD WHERE AMERICANS SEE
OPPORTUNITY. NONETHELESS, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE
LONG-TERM GENERAL AMERICAN INTEREST REQUIRES THAT
STRENUOUS EFFORTS BE MADE TO REDUCE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE
VISIBLE AMERICAN PRESENCE (AND IMPACT ON THE CULTURE)
IN SUCH COUNTRIES AS SAUDI ARABIA, MEXICO, AND EGYPT.

GRAVES
DT
#9739

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
TEHRAN 9739
The implications as I read them of your recent cable on the political structure here correctly seem to be right on the mark. I think you should have gone further to say what the implications are of the demise of the "dual government" construct for US interests. Vic suggested that I give you my thoughts in case they might be useful for a follow-up cable at some point. Here goes:

It seems to me that if there ever was a dual government, it ended early on as Khomeini quickly became the source of power. I view Khomeini's recent crackdown on the Kurds, attacks on the left, public contempt for the critical intelligentsia, and apparently temporary restrictions on the press in recent weeks, rather than as a panicky reaction to events beyond his control, as a systematic use of power by a man who has said publicly that he is not going to repeat Kerensky's mistake of not using the weapons of the revolution against sometime allies of convenience who would seize the movement for their own ends.

I think there is a question of timing here, too. Khomeini sees his Mullah-dominated constitutional assembly completing the constitution he wants for the Islamic Republic he wants. A few weeks from now the revolution will in effect be declared a success and the new permanent government will be launched. It seems to me Khomeini couldn't give it a better christening present (pun intended) than an opposition that has been disarmed and fragmented and a populace that has had the requirement for order made transparently clear. Besides, at this point, Khomeini can order half a million people into the streets on a few hours notice; his revolutionary guards will throw themselves joyously on any group, defenseless or not. In six months or a year, the inevitable disenchantments must set in, his ability to deal with critics...
will be less crisp, and I expect he would rather see his new government concede a measure of reform—and freedom—from strength and when it is ready to do so than appease critics it can no longer so easily kick into line.

What of the implications for US interests? Well, if Khomeini is able to contain the disenchantments, you have improved prospects for internal stability and for unimpaired territorial integrity. Also, it is clear to me that, in addition to order, Khomeini wants to get people back to work to ensure a decent—and even rising by local measures—standard of living. (A moral and even austere Islamic Republic should not be supposed to mean either an idle or backward one, I have been told.) Thus, our interest in continued access to Iran's oil should be safeguarded by the new government's ability to maintain order in the oil fields and its need for earnings. Our interest in Iran's spending its oil earnings in the US should be advanced (if we don't blow it by not responding to expressions of interest) by their need—increasingly beginning to be realized—to translate oil dollars into jobs through either consumer imports or, much more likely, labor intensive projects that will lead to relatively labor intensive industries. (I think this bodes well for increasing oil production, too, eventually.) Finally, a confident Khomeini with a good grip on things at home and much skepticism of things Western is going to give us real problems on many multilateral issues. We need him at least as much as he needs us in the near term and so we don't have much to threaten him with. Particularly on Middle East policy, he is going to be a contrary force we will have to reckon with.

cc: CHG:VTomseth
TO:       The Secretary
THROUGH:  F - Mr. Newsom
FROM:     NEA - Harold H. Saunders
SUBJECT:  Policy Towards Iran

Assessment:

The Khomeini/Bazargan revolutionary leadership feels increasingly beleaguered by the Kurds and other ethnics, the Left, Center secularists, foreign powers (Israel, USSR, Iraq, U.S. "imperialists") and "pro-Shah forces" (ex-Savak and military officers). Khomeini's uncompromising reaction is to lash out violently: the Bazargan moderates share some of that harsh approach but also seek compromises, better relations abroad, and are working to re-start the economy. Although there is increasing disenchantment with Khomeini even within the clergy (Ayatollahs Shariatmadari and Taleghani), he continues to command a strong majority of the lower classes, and few politicians are willing to confront him directly.

The dual leadership places its hopes in the constitutional process leading to a new government to give Iran a unified, strong, central authority. Each side (i.e., Islamic and liberal nationalist) hopes to dominate. The constitution is now being reviewed by experts (mainly clerics). A referendum will ratify the draft and elections for a parliament and president should come this year. Bazargan is a fair bet for president. Clerical influences will be strong for at least the next several years and clerics will certainly be numerous in the new parliament, but we doubt the hard-line mullahs will be able to score a decisive and lasting
victory over the secular elements. The clerics cannot themselves run a complex country and will be forced to seek help from Westernized officials and to compromise Islamic principles to meet popular needs. The main modernizing thrust of Iran's development will inevitably over time weaken Khomeini and the clerics. If Khomeini dies, clerical influence will be weakened somewhat but not eliminated. There will be less unity in their ranks and alliances will be formed with the secularists. As the Islamicists lose their hold, the question will be whether the Left or the Center inherits power.

In the short run we believe the government can manage its problems with the Kurds, although continuing sporadic violence will be a legacy of the harsh methods employed by the revolutionary guards. Iran's ability to cap the Kurdish revolt and avoid problems with the 'ethnic Arabs depends in large part on the attitude of Iraq. Superficially good relations exist at the moment, for Iraq is vulnerable with its Shia majority. For the same reason, however, Iraq will not want to see a strong, secure Shia government in Iran and may be motivated to help stir up troubles. In fact, Iraq may now be quietly helping the Kurds. The Soviets may share this attitude but will proceed cautiously, fearful of chaos on their borders and the implications for spreading instability in the region.

U.S. Policy

In these confused and uncertain circumstances our posture has been to lie low, responding to opportunities to strengthen our credentials with the GPOI but not pushing ourselves forward. We began a more active role last spring, but were set back by Iranian reaction to the Senate Resolution in May.

Our objectives in Iran--access to oil, denial of Soviet influence, promotion of a friendly, non-aligned, moderate government--will have to be pursued during the months when the Iranians will not have sorted out with precision their policy orientation and when the clerical tendencies towards authoritarianism will be only weakly resisted--in the near term--by secularists. We will want to position ourselves so that we can maintain a working
relationship with whatever group holds decisive power while maintaining ties to other significant political elements, including the opposition. We will want the Iranians to understand our firmness on our principles—e.g., human rights—and to build respect for those principles. We will also want equal and fair treatment for private U.S. interests in Iran. Our attitude towards Iran should be characterized by sympathetic understanding of the difficulties, patience in resolving them, but also regular, firm and clear reminders of our interest in an Iran that is friendly to the West and stable, respectful of individual rights and progressive in meeting the needs of its citizens.

We need to keep a clear perspective on the Kurdish and ethnic Arab problems. These are old problems and they will persist for a long time to come. To encourage their ambitions for autonomy could have destabilizing implications for the entire region.

In the short term (i.e., until a new government is formed) we want to clear away as many of the problems of the past as possible and avoid new issues of contention. During these months we are laying the basis for dealing with the new government that we hope will have more effective powers. During this period and beyond we will want to allay the suspicions of the religious leaders and, where possible, cultivate their friendship. Our handling of Arab-Israel issues will have a direct impact on Iranian attitudes. The Iranians are becoming increasingly suspicious of radical Palestinian influence especially in the oil fields, but there is still among the clerics and men like Yazdi a strong attachment to the PLO and the "Palestinian cause."

Over the longer term we will want to work for an Iran in which the moderate, secular nationalists are predominant in managing the country. But before we can exercise influence in Iran, we must develop a position of trust and respect.

Believe we should begin now to move out range of bilateral problems and offer the following suggestions: (We will be developing at a September 7 interagency meeting detailed approaches on the issues marked by an asterisk.)

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1. Should we appoint an Ambassador?

-- Bazargan and associates hope we will do so promptly, naming a person sympathetic to their revolution.

-- There is no indication the PGOI plans soon to name an Ambassador in Washington and our and their appointments of an Ambassador have never been linked. We expect the Iranians may wait until a new government is elected before sending us an envoy.

Recommendation: After consultations with key Congressmen, nominate an Ambassador to be in place in October. Possibly inform the Iranians of our plans in advance through a private intermediary.

2. Should we send a message or emissary to Khomeini?

-- We have had no direct contact with the man who remains the strongest political leader in Iran. His hostility towards us is unlikely to abate significantly, although there have been fewer venomous statements against us recently. Clearly, a first meeting could be a bruising affair.

-- A meeting with Khomeini will signal our definite acceptance of the revolution and could ease somewhat his suspicions of us. It would also enable us to approach him more readily on other issues once we have made the first call.

-- Oh the other hand, we would risk appearing to cave in to a man who hates us and who is strongly deprecated here and by Westernized Iranians. Thus, we would want to be careful not to appear to embrace Khomeini and the clerics at the expense of our secular friends. We should avoid direct linkage with any specific Iranian groups.

-- The symbolism of a call on Khomeini would not attach to visits to the other religious leaders, but they will not see us until we have seen him. We badly need contacts with Taleghani, Shariatmadari, and other moderate clerics. We want to reassure them of our acceptance of the revolution as their influence may rise in the months ahead.
Recommendation: Have Bruce Laingen pass the word that he would like to see Khomeini after his return to Tehran when he could deliver a message from Washington. Laingen could then proceed with meetings with other religious leaders. Alternatively, make a call on Khomeini a priority for a new Ambassador.

*3. How do we strengthen the military relationship?*

---The Iranians are suspicious of our handling of the FMS trust fund, need spares and technical support from us, but fear for political reasons to ask for the latter.

---We want to be responsive on military issues in order to strengthen Bazargan's authority and to assure we have friends in the military who might be key to the future political orientation of the country.

Recommendation:

a. Increase our periodic exchanges of information on the trust fund to build Iranian confidence.

b. Examine the release of sensitive items on a case-by-case basis and be prepared to release low-level classified items when serves our purposes.

c. Be prepared to meet Iranian requests for spares and support somewhat above the $5 million level previously set. Permit'Permit and friendly third countries (e.g., Italy c. 50 helicopters) to help meet military needs. Iranians want to diversify support.'

*4. How do we head off disputes between Iran and private companies?*

--- Iran has begun in a limited way to pay bills and repaid some contracts. El Dorado got $50 million and is finishing the Isfahan refinery; GMC got $10 million to restart Jeep operations. Many disputes persist and the attachment of Iranian assets is a continuing threat. GTE and American Bell are negotiating disputes with our active assistance.
Recommendation:

a. Encourage the private Iran-American Chamber of Commerce to assist us in working to resolve disputes. Perhaps a business mission to Tehran could be organized.

b. Increase our information efforts to make sure U.S. business knows of our readiness to assist them with the Iranians and our success stories to date.

5. *What can we do to reactivate the Tacksman intelligence sites?*

   -- The Iranians have not foreclosed the possibility of reopening the sites in the indefinite future, but it will be a hard political decision. Iranian management and control and possibly Soviet acquiescence could be preconditions.

   -- We are working with contractors to restart the IBEX intelligence monitoring project on a reduced scale with the idea that the Tacksman function might ultimately be included in that operation.

   Recommendation: Continue to follow the IBEX approach and make discreet soundings with the PGOI (e.g., Secretary-Yazdi at UNGA) but make no requests until a newly-elected government is in place.

6. *How do we assure a continuing supply of Iranian oil?*

   -- There is no indication that the PGOI will discriminate against us when 1980 contracts are signed in December—but decisions could be affected by negative political developments. We are now getting almost as much crude as last year (750,000 now vs. 900,000 last year) although total Iranian exports are down one-third.

   Recommendation: That we maintain a regular dialogue with key Iranians during the fall on energy. Dick Cooper could visit at an early stage.

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7. Should we resume visa operations and permit the return of adult and pre-school dependents as recommended by the Embassy?

-- We have told the Iranians adequate security for the compound is a prerequisite for visas.

Recommendation: As soon as adequate protection at the Embassy is assured, we should move ahead on normal consular operations and return of dependents on a limited scale.

8. Should we expand our intelligence activities?

-- We know little about Iranian groups and few groups seem to have any real cohesion or strength. We need to know more.

-- A CIA briefing officer gave a well-received intelligence briefing to Bazargan, Yazdi, and Entezar on August 21. The Iranians were most interested in Iraq, Palestinians, Afghans, and Soviet dangers to the PLO. They asked for a repeat briefing in two months.

Recommendation: Continue to develop an intelligence exchange with the Iranians. When feasible, seek to include Iranian military officers in an examination of the military threat.

9. Should we change our approach on human rights?

-- Although executions and harsh treatment of Kurds continue at a deplorable level, since the July amnesty some political offenders have been released from prison and there are some slight signs the Justice Ministry is reasserting its authority.

-- Critical newspapers have been closed and several foreign journalists expelled. We have raised all of these issues repeatedly with the PLO.

Recommendation: Continue to work on human rights problems as they arise and involve prominent outsiders and third countries to use their influence as well.
10. How can we improve Iranian public perceptions of the U.S. and U.S. attitudes towards Iran?

-- Anti-Americanism continues a strong, inhibiting force in our relationship.

-- The Iranians are bitterly resentful of the perceived hostile attitude of the foreign press, seeing a "Zionist-imperialist conspiracy."

Clearly, changed attitudes will depend on concrete actions on both sides—signs that they are improving on human rights and that we accept the revolution.

Recommendation:

a. ICA develop a plan of more assertive actions to enhance U.S.-Iranian ties, e.g., distinguished American visitors who can meet with religious and secular leaders, use of VOA to send political messages, increased English language teaching and magazine distribution.

b. Occasional public statements by senior U.S. officials on the importance of Iran and of good U.S.-Iranian relations.

c. More frequent press briefings along the same lines.

d. Quiet work with the Iranians to relax the ban on foreign newsmen.

e. At an early date hold a meeting of private and academic U.S. and Iranian experts on Iran to discuss ways to bridge the communications gap.
1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE RESURFACING OF SHAPUR BAKHTIAR IN PARIS AND PERSISTENT RUMORS ABOUT VARIOUS IRANIAN EMIGRES BEING ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN PLOTS TO OVERTHROW THE ISLAMIC REGIME OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI POSES A TEMPTATION TO THE IN THESE POLITICAL EXILES THE SOLUTION TO A SITUATION IN IRAN THE U.S. FINDS DISTASTEFUL. AFTER ALL, AMERICANS CAN IDENTIFY WITH BAKHTIAR WHEN HE SPEAKS (FLUENTLY IN A WESTERN LANGUAGE) OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND LIBERTY WHEREAS THEY ARE DISGUSTED AND INCOMPATIBLE WHEN AYATOLLAH KHALIGHI (IMMEDIATELY AFTER DISPATCHING ANOTHER BAGGLE OF KURDS TO THEIR FATE) PROUDLY DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS THE IRANIAN ADOLF HITLER. MOREOVER, THE ARGUMENT THAT IRAN CANNOT FUNCTION AS A MODERN NATION WITHOUT THE TECHNICAL SKILLS MONOPOLIZED BY THE IRANIAN EDUCATED ELITE STRIKES THESE SAME AMERICANS AS EMINENTLY LOGICAL. SINCE MANY MEMBERS OF THIS ELITE HAVE FLED INTO EXILE RATHER THAN PUT UP WITH A GOVERNMENT INCREASINGLY DOMINATED BY NARROW-MINDED ISLAMIC FANATICS, IT IS A SIMPLE SYLLOGISTIC STEP TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IS BOUND TO FAIL THROUGH A SHORTAGE OF THE TECHNICAL SKILLS NECESSARY TO OPERATE THE NATIONAL BUREAUCRACY AND ECONOMY.

3. IT WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE A GRAVE ERROR TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE PROPOSITION PUT FORWARD BY VARIOUS EMIGRES THEMSELVES THAT THEY HOLD THE KEY TO SETTING THINGS RIGHT IN IRAN. OUTSIDE THEIR OWN RELATIVELY MINISCULE CLASS, THEY HAVE VIRTUALLY NO SUPPORT HERE. FURTHER, THEY HAVE NO COERCIVE MEANS OF OVERTHROWING THE CURRENT ORDER READILY AT THEIR DISPOSAL. THE EMERGENCE OF NOSTALGIA WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES FOR THE "GOOD OLD DAYS;" WITH A CONCOMITANT RESTORATION OF THE MILITARY'S COERCIVE CAPABILITY, COULD ALTER THE SITUATION, BUT AS OF THIS MOMENT NEITHER OF THESE PRECONDITIONS EXISTS. FINALLY, THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO CO-OPT SUFFICIENT NUMBERS OF PEOPLE WITH THE KINDS OF TECHNICAL SKILLS REQUIRED TO OPERATE INDUSTRIES AND GOVERNMENT OFFICES ON AT LEAST A SCALE WHICH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC ITSELF DEEMS ADEQUATE. THINGS MAY NOT WORK VERY EFFICIENTLY, BUT CATCHING UP WITH WEST GERMANY WAS THE SHAH'S DREAM, NOT KHOMEINI'S.
4. FOR THE MOMENT, KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC FORCES REMAIN FIRMLY IN PLACE WITH NO EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION IN SIGHT. DISAFFECTION HAS BEEN GROWING, BUT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE THE RANKS OF THE DISMANTLED DO NOT SEEM LIKELY TO BE CAPABLE OF TRANSLATING THEIR DISSATISFACTION INTO THE KIND OF ACTION THAT WOULD CHALLENGE THE REGIME IN ANY SERIOUS MANNER. THAT IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF EMIGRES WHO HAVE LITTLE SUPPORT WHERE IT REALLY COUNTS -- IN IRAN ITSELF. THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT'S CONTINUED INABILITY TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE REALITY OF IRANIAN PLURALISM MAY YET LEAD TO ITS ULTIMATE FAILURE, BUT IF IT DOES, WE ARE REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT WHATEVER REPLACES IT WILL BE SOME GROWN RATHER THAN MURDERED IN PARIS OR NEW YORK.
Dear Bruce:

Here is a copy of the paper you requested. I also send for your background reading a contingency paper done in PAB. Please protect both carefully.

I had lunch with George Cave on Monday, following his return. I believe you have received virtually all of the substance of his two conversations through standard reporting. There are no plans for follow-up meetings and that is an open question. The fellow seems to think he might come here as Ambassador. He indicated to George there is a high regard for you personally.

The main nourishment I took from George was (1) a deep sense of inadequacy in governing among the leadership, a desire for U.S. help, but an inability to ask for or even accept it; and (2) concern over the strength of clerical influence, optimism (like us) on that count for the long term but fear that the Majlis elections might produce only mullahs -- meaning that the long term might be that much longer away. The interesting idea is that Khomeini himself shares some of these worries and is also unable to work around them. Anything you can contribute to broaden our knowledge of who is thinking what in the inner circle will be welcome.

Finally, here is a paper I did and for which DN added the sentence at the top of the second page.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Henry Prochn
We understand Secretary Brown may ask what you plan to say to Yazdi when you see him in New York. (It is not yet confirmed that Yazdi will attend the UNGA). We suggest the following points:

-- Since the Revolution we have sought to fashion a new relationship with Iran's leaders, responding positively to requests where possible. We hope the actions we have taken have been helpful -- e.g., offer of spare parts, sale of heating oil and kerosene, supportive public statements and assistance in settling commercial disputes.

-- We are prepared to go further if Iran wishes:

-- We wish to give Yazdi the name of a new Ambassador;

-- We reaffirm our readiness to have our Charge or the new Ambassador meet with Ayatollah Khomeini.

-- We are prepared to consider any new programs of cooperation -- e.g., in intelligence exchange, agricultural development, narcotics control, employment generation, oil field management -- that Iran might suggest.

-- We remain interested in the intelligence sites for SALT verification and the benefits that would have for world
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peace. At a suitable time we will be prepared to discuss this issue with the Iranians and to allow Iranians to man the sites.

We hope that Iran will see these moves as sincere gestures of good will. We hope that Iran's leaders, including Ayatollah Khomeini, would join us in attempting to combat the mistrust between our two countries. A good step in that direction would be to remove the restrictions on the foreign and domestic press and get back to the ideals behind the revolution.
I propose the following goals for my OER "contract":

1. (No. 1 in Reftel) Assess and adjust post organization, resources, and staff to make them appropriate to post-revolutionary Iran. Staff has already been greatly reduced, and I plan to develop a new staffing pattern and new job descriptions by January. As new opportunity develops to promote U.S. interests, will adjust resource allocation and staff assignments.

2. (No. 2 in Reftel) Develop institutional analysis which includes Islamic revolutionary structures, liberal and radical-left revolutionary structures, and the new government if and when the proposed new constitution is in fact adopted and spawns a new government. Rebuild physical DRS operation which was destroyed during revolution (all records were confiscated). Build up a practical DRS using titles rather than individual names, and begin using this list of "participants" for publication distribution and selection of audiences for programs. In conjunction with IAS, begin establishing "recipient" category which may contain specific names rather than just titles. I would also hope that we could before the year is out identify a number of program institutions, but this will of course depend on the political climate (no Iranian organization would dare work publicly with us at present).

3. (No. 3 in Reftel) Promote use, by library's natural audience and other individuals important to the mission, of our library's reference service and collections. I will also encourage the library to cooperate with the IAS in developing ways to build up the perception that the cultural center is of genuine service to the community, i.e., improve relevant reference materials, counsel students, and strengthen holdings in religion and philosophy.
4. (NO. 10 IN REFTEL) AS THE SECURITY AND POLITICAL SITUATION PERMITS, ASSURE THAT THE POST ESTABLISHES EFFECTIVE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH DRS INSTITUTIONS.

5. IN COOPERATION WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL, WORK WITH THE PRESS TO DEFUSE THE DANGEROUSLY VOLATILE VISA PROBLEM; COUNSEL THE MISSION WITH REGARD TO THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED CONSULAR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.

6. ENCOURAGE EFFECTIVE IAS OPERATIONS AND FULBRIGHT COMMISSIONS IN TEHRAN AND IN THE PROVINCES AS THE SECURITY AND POLITICAL SITUATION PERMITS. AS THINGS STAND NOW, ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TEACHING IS MUCH IN DEMAND, BUT MANY OTHER PROGRAM INITIATIVES ARE RULED OUT.

7. PROVIDE ANALYTICAL REPORTING ON MEDIA, CULTURAL, AND ACADEMIC DEVELOPMENTS.

8. PARTICIPATE EFFECTIVELY IN MISSION FORMULATION OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, WORKING TO MAKE CERTAIN PUBLIC AFFAIRS IMPLICATIONS ARE BUILT CONSIDERED.

9. CHARGE CONCUBES. GRAVES

**NM**
FOR NEA

1. Psychological Situation -- Khomeini and Mullahs, still enthusiastically supported by the masses, remain only effective power in Iran. They, however, have not devised means of governing efficiently, nor have they yet managed to realize anything like the anachronistic Pan-Islamic world they dream of resuscitating from an idealized past. Khomeini can certainly veto moves by other factions in Iran, but he probably cannot make his Pan-Islamic dream a reality. Nor can he quell regional, ethnic, or politically inspired uprisings without the help of the army or leftist para-military revolutionary groups. He cannot revive the modern sector of the economy and thus reduce unemployment without the help of Western-trained technicians and managers. He cannot even get the schools back in operation or stop traffic in Tehran or Shiraz. On the other hand, it seems clear that Khomeini has no real intention of giving the PGOI the unstinting support it would need to begin coping with the country's problems. There is, therefore, little prospect that the present drift will turn into anything more dynamic until the Council of Experts finishes its work and a new constitution spaws a legally constituted government -- a process which is going to take at best months and may bring forth an impractical, ultra-Islamic structure now that the untimely death of Ayatollah Taleghani has stilled the voice of the most sensible religious leader in the Council.

2. Implications for USICA -- If in fact Iran is fated to drift for months yet under a provisional government which is hamstrung by various uncoordinated revolutionary elements and supported only fitfully by Khomeini and other powerful clergy, USICA should in my judgment:

A. Avoid any action which could bring the unfavorable attention of any faction to focus on us.

B. Put our own revolution-wrecked house in order with a view to having ready the organization, staff, and equipment necessary to take effective advantage of opportunities to promote U.S. interests when they present themselves.

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 10087
E.O. 12065: GDS 9/16/85 (GRAVES, JOHN E.)
SUBJECT: ABBREVIATED HIGHLIGHTS REPORT
C. USE THE EXCELLENT CONTACTS WHICH IO ROSEN HAS DEVELOPED TO HELP THE MISSIONcope WITH PRESSING AND POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE SITUATIONS SUCH AS OUR VISA-ISSUING OPERATION.

D. IMPROVE OUR NON-CONTESTroversial, MUCH APPRECIATED LIBRARY AND ENGLISH TEACHING SERVICES TO THE COMMUNITY.

E. SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO DEMONSTRATE AMERICAN SYMPATHETIC INTEREST IN ISLAM AND THE WELL-BEING OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE.

F. UNOBTRUSIVELY ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT SUCH INSTITUTIONS AS THE IAS, FULBRIGHT COMMISSION, AMIDBAST, AND AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF IRANIAN STUDIES.

3. COMMUNICATION PROCESS -- IN ADDITION TO OUR ONGOING ENGLISH-TEACHING AND LIBRARY ACTIVITIES, THE EXCELLENT WORK OF IO ROSEN HAS RESULTED IN AN EFFECTIVE, ONGOING COMMUNICATION PROCESS VIA THE PRESS. UNLIKELY AS IT MAY SEEM IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN, ROSEN'S WARM OUTGOING MANNER, FLUENCY IN PARSI, AND INSIGHTS INTO THE PERSIAN MENTALITY HAVE ACTUALLY GIVEN THE POST EASY, CONTINUING OPPORTUNITY TO BOTH PLACE SPECIFIC RELEASES AND ENTER INTO PROGRESSIVELY MORE REWARDING DIALOG WITH MEMBERS OF THE WORKING PRESS.

NOT ONLY DO THEY NOW CALL ON US REGULARLY, ACCEPT OUR INVITATIONS, AND LISTEN SYMPATHETICALLY WHEN WE TALK OF OUR CONCERNS, THEY OFTEN OF LATE TAKE PAINS TO CONTACT US WHEN THEY ARE WORKING ON STORIES OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO US. WE COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE HAD SEVERELY DAMAGING REPORTS ON OUR NEWLY REOPENED CONSULAR SERVICE. BUT PRESS REPORTS DID NOT DWELL ON THE HUGE CROWDS AND OCCASIONAL DISORDER, THE VIEWS OF DISGRUNTLED VISA SEEKERS, AND THE CONFUSION AND OCCASIONAL INJUSTICES WHICH THE SHAKE-DOWN PROCESS IS GRADUALLY ELIMINATING BUT WHICH NONETHELESS COULD HAVE BEEN USED TO MAKE US LOOK VERY BAD INDEED. WE GOT, INSTEAD, IN ALL THE MAJOR DAILIES SYMPATHETIC, COMPREHENSIVE, SERVICE-ORIENTED REPORTING DESIGNED TO HELP IRANIANS UNDERSTAND AND EFFICIENTLY USE OUR CONSULAR BT

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4. PROBLEMS -- OUR MOST TIME-CONSUMING, FRUSTRATING ACTIVITY FOR THE MOMENT IS VISA PUSHING. IT SEEMS THAT ALL OUR CONTACTS, BOTH SELF-STYLED AND GENUINE, HAVE RELATIVES AND FRIENDS WHO ARE DESPERATELY HAGER TO ENTER THE U.S. THE PERSIAN MENTALITY IS SUCH THAT ANYONE WHO SEES THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING SPECIAL PRIVILEGE FOR HIMSELF OR HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS HAS NO QUALMS ABOUT ATTEMPTING TO USE ANY RELATIONSHIP, BE IT EVER SO TENUOUS OR FARFetched. USICA OFFICERS ARE THEREFORE OBLIGED TO SPEND SOMETHING LIKE TWO HOURS EVERY WORKING DAY EITHER GRACEFULLY FENDING OFF REQUESTS FOR HELP OR WRESTLING WITH OUR VISA-ISSUING COLLEAGUES IN AN ATTEMPT TO RENDER SERVICE TO GENUINELY USEFUL, EVEN ESSENTIAL, CONTACTS IN THE MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OR GUIDANCE, ACADEMICS, MEMBERS OF THE IAS, OR MEMBERS OF THE WORKING PRESS. THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS IN IRAN TODAY! GRAVES ET ##887

NNNN
SUBJECT: (U) SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN

REP: (A) TEHRAN 9646 (B) MOSCOW 21766 (C) STATE 237685 (D) TEHRAN 8828

1.C- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. RECENT SPECULATION ABOUT A SHIFT IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN APPEARS TO BE PREMATURE. THE SOVIETS ARE RAPIDLY BACKPEDALING IN AN EFFORT TO DISASSOCIATE OFFICIAL POLICY FROM CRITICAL PRESS COMMENTARY ON IRAN, ESPECIALLY THE BOVIN ARTICLE IN NEDELYA. THE MFA IRAN DESK OFFICE FLATLY DENIED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN. THE KOSYGIN MESSAGES TO BAZARGAN AND KHOMEINI WERE PROBABLY ALSO INTENDED TO DAMPEN SPECULATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ABANDONED ITS POLICY OF MAINTAINING FRIENDLY OFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. RECENT EVENTS IN IRAN HAVE NO DOUBT INCREASED SOVIET CONCERN AND IRRITATION WITH THE SITUATION THERE, BUT WE SEE THIS AS A SHIFT IN THE ALWAYS AMBIVALENT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, RATHER THAN A SHIFT IN BASIC POLICY. THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO VIEW THE PRESENT IRANIAN POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT AS TRANSITIONAL AND WILL WALK TO SEE WHAT FOLLOWS IT BEFORE UNDERTAKING A SERIOUS REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN. END SUMMARY.
3. AS NOTED IN REF A, RECENT SOVIET PRESS COMMENTARIES ON IRAN HAVE PROVIDED AMPLE GROUNDS FOR WONDERING IF A REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN MIGHT BE UNDERWAY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF BOVIN'S NEDELYA ARTICLE (REF B), WHICH BLASTED THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND PAINTED KHOMEINI (THROUGH QUOTATIONS FROM HIS OWN STATEMENTS) AS A DANGEROUS RELIGIOUS FANATIC. GOROVOLY'S CONVERSATION WITH DEPTOFF (REF C) ALSO TENDS TO SUPPORT THE IDEA OF A NEW SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN.

4. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, HOWEVER BELIE A SHIFT IN OFFICIAL POLICY TOWARD IRAN. PRAVDA ON SEPTEMBER 11 PUBLISHED SEPARATE TELEGRAMS SENT BY KOSEGIN, WHILE OVERFLYING IRANIAN TERRITORY EN ROUTE TO ETHIOPIA, TO BAZARGAN AND KHOMEINI. BOTH TELEGRAMS EMPHASIZE THE SOVIET UNION'S COMMITMENT TO DEVELOP GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH IRAN, AND--IN THE TELEGRAM TO KHOMEINI--ON BASIS OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

5. MFA COUNSELOR AND CHIEF OF THE IRAN SECTION STANISLAV KONSTANTINOVICH KOVRIGIN TOLD EMBOFF SEPTEMBER 12 THAT THERE HAD BEEN ABSOLUTELY NO CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN. HE SAID THE BASIC STATEMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY CONTINUE TO BE BREZHNEV'S SPEECHES OF NOVEMBER 19, 1978, AND MARCH 2, 1979, AND ELABORATED THAT SOVIET RELATIONS WITH IRAN ARE BASED ON GOOD-NEIGHBORLINES, MUTUAL RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. KOVRIGIN ALSO TERMED "AUTHORITATIVE" THE TASS DENIAL (PRINTED IN SEPTEMBER 5 PRAVDA) OF CHARGES OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN KURDISTAN BY IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGURES AND NEWSPAPERS.

6. ASKED ABOUT RECENT CRITICISM OF IRAN IN THE SOVIET PRESS, KOVRIGIN DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY CRITICISM, SAYING THE SOVIET PRESS WAS MERELY REPORTING THE NEWS THERE AS WESTERN MEDIA DO. AS FOR THE BOVIN ARTICLE, KOVRIGIN INSISTED THAT BOVIN WAS EXPRESSING ONLY HIS OWN PERSONAL VIEWS AND THAT NEDELYA, UNLIKE PRAVDA, IS NOT AN AUTHORITATIVE PUBLICATION.

7. BOVIN HIMSELF TOLD AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST (PROTECT) IN AN OFF-THE-RECORD INTERVIEW SEPTEMBER 12 THAT HIS WRITINGS REFLECT HIS OWN OPINIONS AND NOT NECESSARILY THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT. HE DENIED THAT HIS NEDELYA ARTICLE ON IRAN MEANT A REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICY.
SAYING HE DOESN'T EVEN KNOW WHAT SOVIET POLICY IS. BOVIN DESCRIBED NEDELYA AS A "POPULAR" SUNDAY SUPPLEMENT (TO IZVESTIYA) WHICH IS NOT AT ALL AUTHORITATIVE.

8. IZVESTIYA SEPTEMBER 13 CARRIED A LONG ARTICLE BY ITS TEHRAN CORRESPONDENT WHICH IPLICITLY CONTRADICTED MANY OF THE POINTS IN THE BOVIN ARTICLE. ENTITLED "IRAN: PROCESSES OF RENEWAL," THE IZVESTIYA ARTICLE -- OFFERED EXCUSES FOR IRAN'S CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, SAYING THEY WERE NATURAL FOR THE INITIAL PERIOD OF ANY REVOLUTION AND ALSO THE RESULT OF ABANDONMENT BY FORMER WESTERN ECONOMIC PARTNERS; -- SAID THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST DIRECTION OF THE IRANIAN SUPPORT WORLDWIDE;
called the severing of Iranian military and intelligence ties with the US a positive factor for general detente and peace;

said the Soviet Union took a position in support of the Iranian revolution and is ready to cooperate actively with the new Iran; and, in conclusion said the Soviet people view with understanding the difficulties confronting Iran and sincerely wish the friendly Iranian people a solution to their problems.

9. Comment: The Soviets are obviously backtracing quickly from the impression created by the Bovin article that the Soviet Union was reassessing its Iran policy. We do not take at face value, however, statements that Bovin was expressing only his "personal opinions." It is true the Nedelya is less authoritative than Pravda and that Bovin is a maverick, but he is also regarded as well-connected with Soviet leaders. His article probably accurately reflects Soviet irritation over some recent events in Iran: the use of force against the Kurds, the suppression of leftists, including the Tudeh, Iranian support for the Islamic rebellion in Afghanistan, default on gas delivery contracts, and above all, accusations against the Soviet Union by Iranian political figures and press.

10. We are not ready to conclude that this amounts to a change in Soviet policy, however. As noted in ref D, the Soviet attitude toward Iran's Islamic revolution has always been ambivalent. We see the recent mixed signals being emitted by the Soviets as confirmation that this ambivalence still exists, although the negative aspects of the Soviet attitude may weigh slightly more heavily now than earlier. The Bovin article and other recent criticism of Iran probably should be seen as a warning that

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THE SOVIETS CAN HIT BACK, IF IRANIAN POLITICAL LEADERS AND NEWSPAPERS CONTINUE TO ATTACK THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH CRITICISM MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN A TRIAL BALLOON TO TEST REACTIONS TO A POTENTIAL SHIFT IN SOVIET POLICY; IF SO, THE SOVIETS WERE APPARENTLY SURPRISED BY THE STRONG REACTION IT GENERATED IN WESTERN AND IRANIAN MEDIA AND ARE NOW TRYING TO DOWNPLAY ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

11. THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO VIEW THE PRESENT POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN IRAN AS TRANSITIONAL AND WILL MOST LIKELY WAIT TO SEE WHAT FOLLOWS IT BEFORE UNDERTAKING A SERIOUS REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICY. MFA DESK OFFICER KOVRIGIN TOLD EMBOFF THAT IRAN'S FUTURE DEPENDS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND ON WHO WILL OCCUPY THE NEW ORGANS OF POLITICAL POWER. HE ADDED HIS "PERSONAL OPINION: THAT ALL OF IRAN'S CURRENT PROBLEMS ARE ATTRIBUTABLE
TO THE PROVISIONAL NATURE OF THE PGOI. HE BELIEVED THAT THE CLERGY WOULD STILL CONSTITUTE THE MOST POWERFUL GROUP IN THE COUNTRY AFTER THE NEW CONSTITUTION TOOK EFFECT, BUT EXPRESSED MILD OPTIMISM ABOUT THE PENDING POLITICAL STRUCTURE. ASKED IF HE SAW ANY OTHER RELIGIOUS FIGURES WITH THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF A KHOMEINI OR A TALEGHANI, KOVRIGIN SAID THERE WERE NONE IN VIEW. HE CONCLUDED THIS DISCUSSION BY STRESSING THAT IRAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE IS FOR THE IRANIANS THEMSELVES TO DECIDE AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION STRICTLY ADHERES TO ITS POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

12. IN SUM, WE BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION IS STICKING TO ITS POLICY OF PURSUING GOOD STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS WITH IRAN FOR THE PRESENT. THE SOVIETS WOULD NO DOUBT PREFER A STRONGER SECULAR GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN; BUT THEY RECOGNIZE THAT KHOMEINI IS THE MOST POWERFUL IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGURE BY FAR, AND THEY PROBABLY SEE LITTLE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR ALTERING THAT REALITY. THEY ALSO KNOW THAT KHOMEINI IS 79 YEARS OLD AND CANNOT LAST FOR EVER. AT LEAST AS LONG AS KHOMEINI DOMINATES IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE, WE BELIEVE THAT MOSCOW WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE KNOWN ITS DISPLEASURE WITH IRANIAN POLICIES AND STATEMENTS HARMFUL TO SOVIET INTERESTS AND WILL WATCH FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO ENHANCE ITS INFLUENCE IN IRAN. HOWEVER, WE FEEL THAT MOSCOW WILL STOP SHORT OF TAKING DIRECT ACTIONS TO INFLUENCE EVENTS THERE. TOON

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3. THIS LEADER MUST BE ACCEPTED AND RECOGNIZED BY A MAJORITY OF THE PUBLIC. IF SUCH A PERSON CANNOT BE FOUND, A COUNCIL OF HIGHLY QUALIFIED RELIGIOUS LAW SCHOLARS WILL ASSUME THIS FUNCTION. THE LAW WILL SPECIFY THE FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF THIS COUNCIL.

4. VILAYAT-E-FAQIH IS IN FACT THE TITLE OF ONE OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S WORKS OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. NO ONE IS CERTAIN OF THE EXACT MEANING OF THE TERM OR OF ITS LONG-TERM POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. HOWEVER, ITS ADOPTION DOES REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT ALTERATION OF THE ORIGINAL DRAFT CONSTITUTION, WHICH ENVISAGED A SECULAR PRESIDENCY AND A REVITALIZED COUNCIL OF RELIGIOUS EXPERTS TO ENSURE THAT ALL LAWS WERE IN CONFORMANCE WITH
ISLAM: THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS CONTAINED IN THE ORIGINAL 1906 CONSTITUTION BUT HAD NEVER BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

5. IN THE SHORT TERM, THE ADOPTION OF THIS ARTICLE APPEARS TO CLEAR THE WAY FOR AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO TAKE CHARGE OPENLY OF ALL SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY. AS LONG AS KHOMEINI IS ALIVE, THERE WILL BE FEW RIVAL CANDIDATES FOR THE OFFICE'S OF FAQIH.


7. SINCE THE ENTIRE CONCEPT OF VILAYAT-E-FAQIH IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH KHOMEINI, PUBLIC COMMENT HAS BEEN CAUTIOUS. COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVE ABU AL-BASAN BANI SADR IS QUOTED BY BAMDAD AS ASKING HISTORICALLY WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A SCHOLAR OF RELIGIOUS LAW WHO MEETS ALL OF THE CONDITIONS DEFINED IN THIS ARTICLE. ANOTHER REPRESENTATIVE, MOOADDAM-MARAGHE'I, EXPLAINED HIS VOTE AGAINST THE ARTICLE BY SAYING THAT THIS THEOCRACY'S FUNCTIONING WAS DEPENDENT ON THE PRESENCE OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI BUT WOULD PROBABLY NOT WORK IN HIS ABSENCE.

8. ACCORDING TO A REPORTER WRITING IN THE SEPTEMBER 11 ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TEHRAN TIMES, ONE OF AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI'S LAST ACTS IN THE ASSEMBLY WAS TO VOTE ET
AGAINST THIS ARTICLE. THIS REPORT HAS RECEIVED WIDE
ACCEPTANCE IN TEHRAN. IF THERE IS TO BE ANY SIGNIFICANT
OPPOSITION TO THE ARTICLE, THEN TALEBHANI'S OPINION
COULD BECOME THE FOCUS OF THAT OPPOSITION. HOWEVER,
APPROVAL OF THIS ARTICLE IS AN INDICATION THAT THE
PROponents OF CLERICAL GOVERNMENT ARE NOW IN THE
ASCENDANT IN THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS. AT THE SAME TIME,
VILAYAT-E-FAQIH, LIKE THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, IS STILL AN
UNKNOWN QUANTITY FOR MOST IRANIANS. IF A REFERENDUM WERE
HELD ON THE SUBJECT TODAY, THIS POLITICAL CONCEPT
WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY RECEIVE OVERWHELMING APPROval AND THE
details of this arrangement would be left for the
LEARNED THEOLOGIANS TO WORK OUT. LAINGEN
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U.0. 12665: GDS, 9/19/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PGOV, IR

SUBJECT: CLERICAL INFLUENCE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOR PURPOSES OF ANALYSIS HERE, WE WOULD APPRECIATE FURTHER EMBASSY VIEWS AND INFORMATION ON PERCEIVED GROWING INFLUENCE OF CLERGY.

A. IF POSITION OF CLERGY IS BECOMING STRONGER, WHAT SPECIFIC POLICY EFFECTS MAY WE EXPECT? THAT IS, WHAT DIFFERENCES IN PG01 POLICIES (WHETHER ENUNCIATED OR DE FACTO) DO YOU EXPECT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL DECISIONS, OR MILITARY PROGRAMS?

B. WHICH RECENT PG01 DECISIONS DOES THE EMBASSY ATTRIBUTE TO PRESENTLY ENLARGED INFLUENCE OF THE CLERGY? IS THERE EVIDENCE THAT NEW CLERICAL INFLUENCE IS BEING EXPRESSED THROUGH NEW FORMS OR INSTITUTIONS RATHER THAN THROUGH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND KOMITERS -- AS HAS BEEN THE CASE SINCE FEBRUARY? FOR EXAMPLE, THE EMBASSY APPEARS TO BELIEVE THAT THE RESISTANCE ON RESALE OF F-14'S CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO CLERICAL INFLUENCE. IS THERE FIRM EVIDENCE FOR THIS VIEW? IS IT NOT POSSIBLE THAT THERE IS STRONG DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN IAF, MFA ACTIONS OR THE CLERGY JOINING THE SIDE FOR RETENTION OR POSSIBLY URGING ANY IMPLEMENTING ACTION BE DELAYED? ARE NOT KOMITERS -- WHERE CLERICAL INFLUENCE HAS BEEN EXPRESSED IN THE PAST--NOW WEAVER IN THE MILITARY THAN LAST SPRING? DOES EMBASSY HAVE EVIDENCE THAT CLERGY IS BEHIND RECENT DECISIONS TO RESTART MAJOR FOREIGN CONTRACTS AND MAKE LARGE PAYMENTS TO US FIRMS?

C. THE EMBASSY'S FINE CABLES ON EDUCATION PROBLEMS SUGGEST THAT CLERICAL INFLUENCE MIGHT BE SHORT OF DECISIVE IN THAT SECTOR. YOUR DESCRIPTION SUGGESTS THAT
The clerics may be combatted both on the policy level and at the level of implementation where many Iranians will simply do as they please. How strong is the tendency to give lip service to clerical directions, but pragmatically to continue to follow past practices, e.g., the practice of playing music on radio/TV after the Khomeini "ban"?

D. We are thoroughly confused by the press description of constitutional revisions. The new Article Five, for example, does not match with Article Five in the draft constitution. Is the document being completely rewritten? It is especially unclear how the religious leader and council described in the new Article Five relate to the draft document's Council of Guardians, the President and the Majlis.

3. We fully appreciate difficulties of groping through murky political environment in today's Iran and commend Embassy for excellence of its political reporting under adverse circumstances. It is important that we try to depict trends with as much specific detail as possible. We are also deeply interested in the insights and judgments of astute Iranian observers who are close to the action; keep ringing the doorbells. Vance et

#5467
SUBJECT: KHOMEINI MODERATES HIS ATTACKS ON INTELLECTUALS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: ATATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S SPEECHES FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF TALEGHANI CONTAINED A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS. HE SOFTENED HIS ATTACKS ON THE IRANIAN INTELLECTUALS WHOSE PREVIOUSLY ANATHMATIZED AS CHARBEZADEH (INFATUATED WITH THE WEST). INSTEAD HIS SPEECHES CONTAINED CALLS FOR UNITY -

UNITY WITHIN THE CLERGY, UNITY WITHIN THE UNIVERSITIES, AND UNITY BETWEEN CLERGY AND INTELLECTUALS. ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT BE CERAIN OF KHOMEINI'S MOTIVES, HE HAS BEEN TRYING TO ENSURE THAT A LARGE PART OF FORMER TALEGHANI SUPPORTERS, INCLUDING THE MODERATE CLERGY AND THE SECULAR INTELLECTUALS, ARE NOT INEPRABLY ALIENATED FROM THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF THE SHIFT IN KHOMEINI'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAS ANY PRACTICAL EFFECTS ON THE REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITIES OR ON THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS.

3. IN REFTEL A EMBASSY DISCUSSED SOME OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF TALEGHANI'S DEATH FOR THE IRANIAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. ONE PROBLEM CREATED BY HIS DEATH IS THAT ONE OF TALEGHANI'S MAJOR CONSTITUENCIES, THE UNIVERSITY-BASED INTELLECTUALS, HAS BEEN LEFT WITHOUT AN OBVIOUS LEADER AND PROTECTOR. TALEGHANI'S DEPARTURE HAS LEFT THIS GROUP WITHOUT A LEADER OF SUFFICIENT STATURE WHO CAN

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WORK TO PRESERVE UNITY BETWEEN MORE EXTREME CLERICAL SUPPORTERS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE MODERATE AND SECULAR ELEMENTS WHO HAVE FELT THEMSELVES UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE FROM THE ADVOCATES OF A PURELY ISLAMIC STATE. ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL TOO SOON TO MAKE A DEFINITE JUDGMENT, IT APPEARS THAT AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IS MAKING AN EFFORT TO ATTRACT THE MORE MODERATE CONSTITUENCY OF TALEGHANI AND TO ENSURE THEIR CONTINUING LOYALTY TO THE REVOLUTION.

4. AS EMBASSY NOTED REFTEL A, THE LOYALTY OF TALEGHANI'S FOLLOWING WAS INTENSELY PERSONAL AND BASED ON AN INSTINCTIVE TRUST AND RESPECT. IT WAS ALSO BASED ON A UNIQUE SET OF HUMAN FACTORS WHICH ARE NOT DUPLICATED IN ANY OTHER LEADER NOW ON THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE. AYATOLLAH HOSSEIN ALI MONTAZERI, APPOINTED IMAM JOM'EH OF TEHRAN IN PLACE OF TALEGHANI, HAS NOT ATTRACTED THE SAME LOYALTY. MONTAZERI'S PERFORMANCE AT HIS FIRST FRIDAY PRAYS ON SEPTEMBER 15 AT BEHESHT-E-ZAHRA WAS UNIMPRESSION. HE IS UNTASTINGISHED IN APPEARANCE, AND AN INEFFECTIVE SPEAKER. ALTHOUGH MANY ATTENDED FRIDAY PRAYS OUT OF RESPECT FOR THE MEMORY OF TALEGHANI, MONTAZERI MAY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ATTRACT TALEGHANI'S MASSIVE CONGREGATION AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY WHEN FRIDAY PRAYS RESUME THERE ON SEPTEMBER 21.

5. SIGNS HAVE ALREADY APPEARED ON THE GATES OF TEHRAN UNIVERSITY PROCLAIMING IT TO BE TALEGHANI UNIVERSITY, AND MONTAZERI MAY NOT BE ABLE TO MATCH THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS PREDECESSOR. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OBVIOUS REPLACEMENT FOR TALEGHANI AS LEADER OF THE EDUCATED, IT APPEARS THAT KHOMEINI HIMSELF IS MAKING CONCILIATORY MOVES TOWARD THIS GROUP.

6. THE EDUCATED HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN A TARGET FOR KHOMEINI'S SCORN AND RIDICULE. JUST A FEW DAYS BEFORE TALEGHANI'S DEATH, KHOMEINI TOLD A GATHERING AT FEZELI SCHOOL IN QOM THAT THOSE EASTERNERS WHO HAD MADE THE WEST THEIR KA'ABA WERE THE FOLLOWERS OF TAHUT (THE DEVIL) SPOKEN OF IN THE QORAN. KHOMEINI SAID THAT BLIND IMITATION OF THE WEST HAS BROUGHT THE FREEDOM FOR OUR YOUNG PEOPLE TO WATCH PORNOGRAPHY ON TELEVISION, TO

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MORE OPIUM, AND TO WASTE THEIR LIVES IN PROSTITUTES AND BARS. AFTER REFLECTING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COUNTRY’S ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE, KHOMEINI TOLD HIS LISTENERS, "ISLAM IS SERIOUS. ISLAM IS NOT FRIVOLOUS. ISLAM DOES NOT MEAN YOUNG BOYS AND GIRLS TAKING OFF THEIR CLOTHES AND GETTING INTO THE WATER TOGETHER." KHOMEINI SAID THAT ISLAM ALLOWS ONLY TWO SPORTS, SHOOTING AND HORSE RACING, BOTH OF WHICH HAVE OVERTONES OF MILITARY TRAINING. THE LATTER, HE SAID, IS SO IMPORTANT THAT ISLAM EVEN ALLOWS EATING ON THE RESULTS.

7. KHOMEINI ALSO CONDEMned the use of WESTERN NAMES FOR SHOPS, ROADS, AND PARKS AND ASKED FOR THE BOYCOTT OF PRODUCTS AND SHOPS WHICH BEAR WESTERN NAMES SIMPLY FOR THE SAKE OF PUBLICITY AND SALES. ONLY IN THIS WAY, HE SAID, WOULD IRAN BE ABLE TO OVERCOME ITS FASCINATION FOR THE WEST AND TO BECOME SOMETHING OTHER THAN A PASSIVE ABSORBER OF EVERYTHING THE WEST DISHES OUT.

8. KHOMEINI, IN THIS AND OTHER SPEECHES, HAD ESPECIALLY HARSH WORDS FOR IRANIAN INTELLECTUALS. IN AN EARLIER SPEECH HE HAD SAID, "WE DO NOT WANT INTELLECTUALS" AND THEN RETRACTED SLIGHTLY BY SAYING THAT SOME FEW MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE. IN HIS SEPT 8 SPEECH IN QOM HE ACCUSED THE INTELLECTUALS OF BEING INFECTED WITH THE SAME INFLATION WITH THE WEST (GHARBZADEGI) WHICH HAS CORRUPTED THE ENTIRE IRANIAN SOCIETY EXCEPT FOR THE MOSQUES AND THE CLERGY. (FYI: IRONICALLY THE VERY TERM GHARBZADEGI WAS COINED BY THE LATE JALAL AL AHMAD, ONE OF THE INTELLECTUALS WHO KHOMEINI HARSHLY ATTACKS.) THE DUTY OF THE INTELLECTUALS, SAID KHOMEINI, WAS NOT TO
ADVOCATE THE FALSE FREEDOM OF THE WEST, BUT TO EXPOSE ITS EVILS AND ITS ESSENTIAL WORTHLESSNESS.

9. IN ONE OF HIS FIRST PUBLIC ADDRESSES FOLLOWING TALEGHANI'S DEATH, KHOMEINI APPEARED TO CONSIDERABLY MODERATE HIS ANTI-INTELLECTUAL STANCE. ALTHOUGH STILL ATTACKING THOSE WHO WOULD CALL THE CLERGY REACTIONARY, KHOMEINI SAID THAT THE GREATEST NEED OF THE COUNTRY WAS NOW FOR UNITY, ESPECIALLY UNITY BETWEEN THE CLERGY AND THE INTELLECTUALS.

10. SPEAKING IN QOM ON SEPTEMBER 13, KHOMEINI URGED THE INTELLECTUALS TO BECOME PART OF THE SEA OF RELIGIOUS POWER SO THAT THE COMBINED STRENGTH OF THESE GROUPS COULD BETTER SERVE THE COUNTRY. 'YOU ARE ALL OF THE SAME NATION, LIVE IN ONE COUNTRY AND ONE HOME. SO JOIN FORCES AND PROTECT YOUR HOUSE.' ALTHOUGH STILL CRITICIZING THE INTELLECTUALS' INFATUATION WITH THE WEST, HE SPOKE THEM THE HARSH, BLANKET CONDEMNSATIONS HE HAD MADE ONLY FIVE DAYS BEFORE.

11. KHOMEINI ALSO APPEALED TO THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS NOT TO ABUSE THE POWER IN THEIR HANDS AND WARNED THEM AGAINST OPPOSING THE UNIVERSITY-EDUCATED YOUNG PEOPLE, WHO CONSTITUTE THE FUTURE LEADERSHIP OF THE NATION. THE OVER-RIDING CONCERN BOTH FOR THE UNIVERSITY AND FOR THE CLERGY, HE SAID SHOULD BE UNITY. HE ENTREATED BOTH THE CLERGY AND THE UNIVERSITIES NOT TO SPLIT INTO FURDING Factions AND TO PROTECT THEIR OWN INTERNAL UNITY OF PURPOSE.


13. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH KHOMEINI HAS NOT RETREATED FROM ANY OF HIS FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS ON THE HARMFUL EFFECT OF FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON IRANIAN SOCIETY, HE APPEARS TO BE CONCERNED THAT HE NOT ALIENATE THE LATE AYATOLLAH
TALEGHANİ´S SUPPORTERS AMONG MODERATES IN THE CLERGY AND THE UNIVERSITIES. THE ABSENCE OF TALEGHANİ HAS APPARENTLY FORCED THE IMAM TO TONE DOWN SOME OF HIS MORE EXTREME ATTACKS AGAINST THE SECULAR AND WESTERN-ORIENTED SECTIONS OF THE SOCIETY, WHO PERIODICALLY ANTHOMATIZED IN HIS EARLIER SPEECHES.

14. IN MODIFYING HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS, THE IMAM MAY HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE IMMINENT OPENING OF THE SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES, WHERE THERE ARE RUMORS OF SERIOUS DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE RELIGIOUS AND THE SECULAR STUDENT GROUPS. HomÉini MAY REALIZE THAT HE IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT FOR TALEGHANİ AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN THEOPOLITICAL FRACTIONS. THERE IS NO ONE ELSE WITH ENOUGH STATURE AND PREREGE. ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO BE CERTAIN, IT APPEARS THAT HomÉini IS ATTEMPTING TO EXTEND THE HAND OF FRIENDSHIP TO A WIDER SECTOR OF IRANIAN SOCIETY WITHOUT CHANGING HIS UNDERLYING MESSAGE THAT IRAN´S SALVATION LIES NEITHER IN EAST NOR WEST, BUT IN THE STRAIGHT PATH (SIRAT AL-MUSTAQIM) OF ISLAM.

15. IT IS STILL UNCLEAR WHAT HomÉini´S MORE MODERATE LINE IN HIS RECENT SPEECHES WILL MEAN IN PRACTICAL TERMS OR WHETHER HE IS OFFERING THE MODERATES ANYTHING MORE THAN WORDS. ONE AREA TO WATCH WILL BE THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS, WHICH HAS BEEN CONVERTING THE ORIGINAL DRAFT CONSTITUTION INTO THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF A THEOCRATIC STATE (SEP 3). IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE DRAFT FOR THEOCRACY IN THE COUNCIL, LED BY ATATÖLJIS EFFENDI AND MONTAZIRI, IS AT ALL RELENTED TO THE SHIFT IN THE OPINION OF HomÉini´S PUBLIC STATEMENTS. IF IT IS NOT, THEN HomÉINI´S EFFORTS AT RECONCILIATION WILL BE
DIFFICULT, ESPECIALLY AS MODERATES MAY SEE THEMSELVES BEING SYSTEMATICALLY EXCLUDED FROM ANY SHARE IN THE IRANIAN POLITICAL PROCESS.

15. WE NOTE THAT A "HOMEI NI SPEECH AUGUST 19 TO AIR FORCE OFFICERS IN COM MADE AFTER THIS CABLE WAS WRITTEN AGAIN CONTAINS AN ATTACK ON WESTERNIZED INTELLECTUALS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHETHER THESE COMMENTS WILL MARK THE BEGINNING OF A NEW SPATE OF ANTI-WESTERN SPEECHES, OR WHETHER THEY ARE AN EXCEPTION TO THE TREND WE HAVE BEEN OBSERVING SINCE TALEGHANI'S DEATH. LAINGEN BT #0291
SUBJECT: WORK OF COUNCIL OF EXPERTS PROCEEDS SLOWLY

2. SUMMARY: THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO COMPLETE ITS WORK BY SEPTEMBER 23, HAS SO FAR APPROVED ONLY FIFTEEN ARTICLES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION. THE ORIGINAL DRAFT SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION CONTAINED 151 ARTICLES, SO THE COUNCIL WILL HAVE EITHER TO SPEED UP ITS PACE OR EXTEND ITS MANDATE. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS ON SEPTEMBER 19, THE COUNCIL'S LIFE HAS BEEN EXTENDED FOR ANOTHER 15 DAYS. HOWEVER THIS NEW PERIOD MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO COMPLETE THE COUNCIL'S WORK. END SUMMARY.

3. THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS HAS BEEN PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY, IF SLOWLY. RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTS OF THE SESSIONS HAVE SHOWN THE DEBATES TO BE LIVELY, ORDERLY, AND VORACIOUS. THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR LIMITING THE LENGTH OF SPEECHES OR OF RESTRICTING THE SUBJECT MATTER. AS A RESULT, ALMOST THE ENTIRE FIRST MEETINGS WERE TAKEN UP BY GENERAL SPEECHES BY VARIOUS DELEGATES—SPEECHES WITH LITTLE RELEVANCE TO THE SPECIFIC MATTERS IN THE CONSTITUTION.

4. THE HIGH LIGHTS OF THE MAIN ARTICLES PASSED SO FAR INCLUDE:

(a) ARTICLE 5, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE THEOLOGIAN
(VILATAT-E-FAQIH). THIS ARTICLE WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL SIEPEL. ALTHOUGH THE EXACT MEANING OF THIS ARTICLE IS STILL UNCLEAR, MAJOR IMPLICATION IS TO ENSURE SHIA RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT CONTROL OVER THE OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STATE. PASSAGE OF THIS ARTICLE HAS STIRRED OPEN CRITICISM. RELIGIOUS SCHOLAR EZZATOleh SAEBAlI SEVERELY CRITICIZED ARTICLE 5, SAYING THE NEW PROVISION WILL LEAD TO AN AUTHORITY RUNNING PARALLEL WITH THAT OF THE GOVERNMENT OR IN OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT. IT IS DANGEROUS FOR ISLAM, HE SAID, BECAUSE IF A GOVERNMENT MADE MISTAKES IT COULD BE REMOVED, BUT IF A RELIGIOUS LEADER MADE A MISTAKE, PEOPLE WOULD LOSE FAITH IN THE CLERGY ITSELF AND THUS IN ISLAM. ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS DELEGATE AND REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEMBER ABOLEHASSAN BANISADR HAS ALSO CRITICIZED ARTICLE 5, SAYING THAT IF CLERGYMEN WERE TO BE TRUSTED WITH SPECIAL POWERS, THEN THE EXISTENCE OF INDEPENDENT PARTIES WOULD BE意义LESS. HOWEVER, IN REPLY TO THESE CRITICS, AYATOLLAH KHOMEnI TOLD GROUP OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS THAT OUR GOVERNMENT IS ISLAMIC, AND THAT (THEY) MUST SUPPORT ARTICLE 5 SO THAT THE COUNTRY IS NOT HARMED. THE NATION HAS CAST ITS VOTE FOR THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC; ALL OF YOU MUST COMPLY, OR YOU WILL BE OBLITERATED.

(B) ARTICLE 12, ESTABLISHING TWELVER JAFA'ARI SHI'ISM AS THE STATE RELIGION OF IRAN FOR ETERNITY. THIS ARTICLE WAS OPPOSED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUNNI AREAS, NOTABLY MOWLAVI ABDULAZIZ DELEGATE FOR BALUCHISTAN, WHO SAID THAT THE OFFICIAL RELIGION SHOULD BE ISLAM NOT ONE SECT. THE ARTICLE ALSO NOTES THAT THE VARIOUS SUNNI LAW SCHOOLS ARE RESPECTED AND MAY BE FREELY APPLIED IN AREAS WHERE SUNNIS PREDOMINATE.

(C) ARTICLE 13, DEFINES THE RECOGNIZED NON-MUSLIM MINORITIES: CHRISTIANS, JEWS AND ZOROASTIANS. THESE MINORITIES ARE GUARANTEED FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND EDUCATION, AND ARE ALLOWED TO APPLY THEIR OWN LAWS OF DIVORCE, MARRIAGE AND INHERITANCE. THIS ARTICLE CREATED A BRIEF STIR OF INTEREST IN A SMALL ANCIENT SECT CALLED THE SABEANS, WHO CLAIM TO BE FOLLOWERS OF JOHN THE BAPTIST. AYATOLLAH MAHARREn-I-SHIRAZI ENDED THAT CONTROVERSY WHEN HE SAID THAT THE SABEANS WERE INCLUDED UNDER THE PROTECTION AFFORDED TO JEWS AND CHRISTIANS. THE BABA'I SECT, HOWEVER, IS NOT CONSIDERED A TRUE SECT. #8288

NNMW

VZCZC 277
ELIGION BY THE MOSLEMS AND, THEREFORE, IS NOT PROTECTED
BY THIS ARTICLE.

- (D) ARTICLE 17, ESTABLISHES FIVE ARMS OF THE STATE,
TO BE COMPRised OF THE PEOPLE, THE LEGISLATURE, THE
EXECUTIVE, THE JUDICIARY AND THE THEOCRATIC LEADERSHIP.
THE THEOCRATIC LEADERSHIP IS GIVEN THE POWER TO SEE THAT
THE PRINCIPLES AND ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION ARE
IMPLEMENTED, IN ADDITION TO BEING THE LIAISON BETWEEN
THE OTHER FOUR ARMS OF THE STATE.

- (E) ARTICLE 21, MAKES PERSIAN THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE
OF IRAN, BUT ALLOWS FOR THE USE OF OTHER "LOCAL AND
TRIBAL" LANGUAGES ALONGSIDE OF PERSIAN IN PUBLICATIONS,
THE MEDIA, AND THE TEACHING OF LITERATURE IN LOCAL
SCHOOLS.

4. THE ASSEMBLY HAS BEGUN TO FACE THE FORMIDABLE TASK
OF ANSWERING QUESTIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE, THE JUDICIARY,
AND THE CABINET. UNLESS THE PACE OF WORK IS SPEEDED
UP, THERE SEEMS LITTLE PROSPECT FOR THE COUNCIL TO
FINISH ITS WORK BEFORE THE END OF 1979. ON 19 SEPT,
HOWEVER, KHOMEINI AGAIN URGED THE ASSEMBLY TO EXPEDITE
PASSAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION GIVING INDICATION THAT
HE MAY BE BECOMING IMPATIENT WITH THE ASSEMBLY'S SNAIL
LIKE PACE. SHOULD KHOMEINI STEP IN HE COULD UNDOUBTEDLY
SPEED UP THE PROCESS.

5. THE COUNCIL HAS CHANGED ITS ROLE FROM THAT ORIGINALLY
ENVISAGED. IT WAS FIRST THOUGHT THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD
MAKE A QUICK REVIEW OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION, AND
APPROVE IT WITH MINOR CHANGES. INSTEAD, THE COUNCIL
HAS TURNED INTO A GENUINE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, RE-WRITING, ADDING AND OMITTING ARTICLES AT WILL.

6. NOT ALL ARE PLEASED WITH WHAT IS EMERGING FROM THE COUNCIL. THERE APPEARS TO BE A STABLE BLOC OF ABOUT FIFTY TO FIFTY-FIVE DELEGATES WHO SUPPORT MOVES TO INCREASE THE ROLE OF THE CLERGY IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO FORMAL FACTION OR PARTY STRUCTURE, AYATOLLAS MONAZERI AND BEHESHTI HAVE GENERALLY BEEN SPOKESMEN FOR THIS GROUP. THERE IS A SMALL MINORITY, INCLUDING SOME OF THE NON-MUSLIM DELEGATES AND MOGADAM MARAGH'I, DELEGATE FROM TABRIZ FROM THE MUSLIM PEOPLES REPUBLICAN PARTY (MEPP) WHO HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFULLY RESISTING THE MOVES TO MERGE CLERICAL AND SECULAR AUTHORITY.

7. ALTHOUGH THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED RIGHTS FOR THE NON-PERSIAN ETHNIC GROUPS IN IRAN, THE COUNCIL HAS SO FAR MADE NO MENTION OF THESE GROUPS IN THE ARTICLES APPROVED. THE ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5, WHICH GUARANTEED EQUAL RIGHTS FOR PERSIANS, CURDS, TURKS, ARABS, ETC., HAS SO FAR BEEN IGNORED BY THE ASSEMBLY. WRITER AND CRITIC DR. REZA BARAHENI TOLD AN MEPP MEETING THAT IN HIS OPINION IF THE CONSTITUTION IS RATIFIED WITHOUT GIVING AUTONOMY TO THE MINORITIES, IT WOULD NOT BE IN LINE WITH THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. COMMENT: THE IRANIAN EXPERIENCE WITH CONSTITUTIONS AND PARLIAMENT HAS NOT BEEN A PAPPY ONE. THE 1906 CONSTITUTION WAS ONE OF THE MOST VENERABLE AND MOST IGNORED DOCUMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AN IRANIAN POET OF THE PRE-REZA SHAH ERA ONCE WROTE IN FASPERATION, "ONE CAN ONLY DEFECATE ON SUCH A PARLIAMENT."
RULE THAT WILL UNDO MANY OF THE HARD-WON SOCIAL GAINS THEIR CLASS HAS ACHIEVED IN THE LAST FIFTY YEARS.

LAINGEN
MEMORANDUM FOR: State/NEA - Mr. Harold H. Saunders
FROM: ICA/NEA - R. T. Curry
SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Communication Between United States and Iran October 1979 - February 1980

Based on discussions in your office on September 7, ICA agrees that some cautious exploration of additional opportunities for communication between the United States and Iran in the public diplomacy area is in order in the next four or five months.

As a guiding practice, we will try to encourage institutional linkages, a concept of communication endorsed on September 7. These linkages will stress the two-way flow of relations. At this time it must be recognized that their development depends on creating an atmosphere of trust and respect. In initial stages, friendly and understanding one-on-one personally developed ties are essential. Through such personal rapport can be built carefully determined institutional linkages which, in turn, can nurture further mutual relationships. Likely fields for initiating or reestablishing contact include Iranology, the humanities, physical sciences, English teaching, and physical education.

Still continuing, albeit in a low-key, modest fashion with currently limited, one-way - Iranians to the United States - programs, is the work of the Fulbright Commission. The United States should maintain its financial support of these operations as a well-established and core institutional link between private and public.
educators and institutions in both countries. Similarly, judiciously planned activities of the American Institute for Iranian Studies should be fostered.

Within this general approach and responding to the recommendations of the Charge' and our Public Affairs Officer, we will examine the following venues for some restrained initiatives which may be considered if Iranian authorities make it clear that our interest in enhanced relationships is reciprocated:

1. Propose visits to Iran by carefully selected scholars and public figures. Whenever possible, the visits will be privately arranged. Individuals should have credibility and relevance to present-day Iran.

2. Encourage invitations to Iranian Islamic scholars and, possibly, Iranian religious figures to the Hejira anniversary celebrations in the United States. Events during the visit should also include similar representatives from other Islamic societies to stress the multi-national nature of the observances. Sponsorship should be privately arranged with the Hejira Anniversary Committee playing a major role.

3. Discuss with private entities, such as the Johnson Foundation or university-based seminars including the East-West Center, bringing groups of Iranian scholars to the United States to consider non-controversial topics. Preferably the meetings should be multi-national. Possible fields are literature, creative writing or, more pragmatically, library development and library science.

4. Work with a few carefully selected foreign student advisers and admissions officers at universities sophisticated in handling Islamic and Iranian students a) to assess during this period of change in Iran evolving needs and attitudes of Iranian students so as b) to look toward plans for a possible student conference or other type dialogue in the United States at some future propitious date.
5. Explore with American educational institutions which take part in linkages or support other educational exchange operations in Islamic third-countries, such as those of the University of Nebraska at Omaha in Pakistan, possibilities for inviting Iranian students and academics to take part in such seminars or projects which foster intellectual understanding and on-going contact.

6. Consider augmentation of current ICA/IAS English-teaching and cultural institutions provided that administrative claims for past damages and sequestrations are given cognizance by Iranian authorities.

7. Be alert to opportunities to invite Iranians to take part in multi-regional exchange programs, particularly those in mass media.

NOTE:

The VOA confirms plans to increase broadcast time to Iran in Persian by one hour a day about the turn of the new year. It will add a thirty-minute morning show featuring news and news-related material and an additional thirty minutes to the front end of the current half-hour evening show. The extended evening show will provide greater opportunity for in-depth coverage and cultural material. Considerations cover events in Iran outside the political sphere, a series on Iranian Islamic studies and Centers in the United States, and interviews with American scholars and Iranologists and appropriate public figures representing a wide spectrum of political and foreign policy viewpoints.

DISTRIBUTION:

D - The Acting Director
ECA - Ms. Alice Ichman
MGT - Mr. James Lebster
PGM - Mr. Harold Schneidman
VOA - Mr. Peter Straus
State/NEA - Mr. Peter Constable

111
FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE SEP 14 REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION. ACTION OFFICE CLAIMS NON-RECEIPT.

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10506

UNIT: C-1 (E - ENTIRE TEXT).

1. DURING CONVERSATIONS WITH YAZDI OCTOBER 3, WE SUGGESTED VANCE RAISE QUESTION OF OUR ACCESS TO COMMISSARY, GULF DISTRICT AND OTHER MILITARY PROPERTIES SUCH AS MOTOR POOL AND ARMY COMMUNICATION COMDP (ACOM) FACILITY.

2. FOLLOWING DEATH OF AYATOLLA TALEGHANI, THE TALEGHANI COMMITTEE WHICH FORMERLY CONTROLLED COMMISSARY IS TURNING OVER CONTROL OF COMMISSARY AND OTHER PROPERTIES (AREH US AND IRANIAN) EITHER TO OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OR TO ARMY. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN WHO ACTUALLY CONTROLS ACCESS TO THE GULF DISTRICT. WE HOPE THAT COMMISSARY AND THE GULF DISTRICT MAY END UP IN HANDS OF PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. IF SO, YAZDI WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CONTROL DISPOSITION OF COMMISSARY AND GULF DISTRICT. WHILE YAZDI HAS NOT BEEN RESPONSIVE TO OUR APPROACHES IN THE PAST, WE THINK IT NOW MIGHT BE WORTH ANOTHER TRY.

3. IN HIS DEPARTURE STATEMENT AUGUST 23, YAZDI REPORTEDLY STATED PRESS THAT RESULTS DISCUSSING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH VANCE. YAZDI SAID HE WILL ALSO DISCUSS AMERICAN PLAN TO LAND COMBAT TROOPS IN THE PERSIAN GULF TO PROVIDE STABILITY IN THE REGION. SUCH A MOVE BY US HE SAID, WILL NOT IN ANY WAY HELP CRISIS ANY OF THE REGION'S CONFLICTS.

4. COMMENT: TEHRAN PRESS HAS BEEN FOLLOWING WITH INTEREST VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY USG OFFICIALS REGARDING FORMATION OF AFRICAN REACTION FORCES. THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF SPECULATION HERE THAT USG INTENDS TO OR HAS INCREASED NUMBERS OF UNITS IN GULF AREA; THAT WE MAY BEGIN TO SEND INFANTRY UNITS TO AFGHANISTAN AND THAT US IS CONSIDERING SOME ACTION AGAINST OIL FIELDS.

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10506
FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECTATE SEPT 24 BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION. ACTION OFFICE CLAIMS NON-RECEIPT.

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10342

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/24/79 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR P
TAGS: IR, PORG, MASS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY’S MEETING WITH YAZDI: GULF DISTRICT; US PRESENCE IN PERSIAN GULF
REF: TEHRAN 10183

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING CONVERSATIONS WITH YAZDI OCTOBER 3, WE SUGGEST SECRETARY VANCE RAISE QUESTION OF OUR ACCESS TO COMMISSARY, GULF DISTRICT AND OTHER MILITARY PROPERTIES SUCH AS MOTOR POOL AND ARMY COMMUNICATION COMMAND (ACOM) FACILITY.

3. FOLLOWING DEATH OF AYATOLLA TALEGHANI, THE TALEGHANI COMMITTEE FORMERLY CONTROLLED COMMISSARY IS TURNING OVER CONTROL OF COMMISSARY AND OTHER PROPERTIES (BOTH US AND IRANIAN) EITHER TO OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OR TO ARMY. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN WHO ACTUALLY CONTROLS ACCESS TO THE GULF DISTRICT. WE HOPE THAT COMMISSARY AND THE GULF DISTRICT MAY END UP IN HANDS OF PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE. IF SO, YAZDI WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CONTROL DISPOSITION OF COMMISSARY AND GULF DISTRICT. WHILE YAZDI HAS NOT BEEN RESPONSIVE TO OUR APPROACHES IN THE PAST, WE THINK IT NOW MIGHT BE WORTH ANOTHER TRY.
4. In his departure statement August 23, Yazdi reportedly told press that "besides discussing relations between the two countries with Vance, Yazdi said he will also discuss an American plan to land combat troops in the Persian Gulf to provide stability in the region, such a move by the US, he said, will not in any way help defuse any of the region's conflicts."

5. Comment: Tehran press has been following with interest various statements by USG officials regarding formation of rapid reaction forces. There has been a great deal of speculation here that USG intends to or has increased its combat marine forces in the Gulf area; that we may intend to send in forces to Afghanistan; and that US might be considering some action against oil fields in Middle East. Latest version of this is Kayhan story August 24 quoting Khomeini's representative to the UAE Modaressi that five to six thousand US troops are stationed in Jufair base in Bahrain. It would be very useful if Secretary could discuss with Yazdi disposition of our forces in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf so he will have full understanding of our intention in the area. Charge took opportunity during call on Ministry of National Guidance Minister Minachi today to describe press report of U.S. troops in Bahrain as totally without foundation and unhelpful to atmosphere affecting US-Iran relationship. Laingen unquote.

Laingen

BT

#0500

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CONFIDENTIAL  TEHRAN  10500
Dear Family,

It's Friday afternoon, the News\#1 Sunday, and the first day of my two-day weekend. I'm going to play tennis with the Italian Ambassador in a few minutes. We have some 60 or 70 Ukrainians here, a good number compared to Malta. My Soviet colleague is a very serious Soviet diplomat, reflecting the importance they attach to this place. I have met called on him yet, since we were gone a good deal of the summer... but I asked to make a courtesy call on him the other day and was told... call again in one week. Time, the Ambassador in Ill... sounds like a diplomatic illness to me!

The place where the action is these days in our Embassy is the Consular section... the visa issuing place. Before the Revolution the Consular section was located in a separate building in another part of town. Even then it was busy, since the student flow to the USA has always been heavy. But that building was damaged during the revolution and so we cleared down our consular activities officially except for emergency requirements. We told the government here that until we had sufficient personnel back here of our own, until we had time to rebuild an office facility, and...est important... until the government could assure our security in the compound, we were not going to reopen!

That situation continued until a week ago, when we finally finished work on a new and very modern and efficient visa issuing facility... like a bank, with rows of officials behind bullet proof glass. Also we finally convinced the government here that they had to assign 20-25 police to control the crowds, and that they finally did.

So we reopened a week ago, to find about 3000 people jamming the streets outside and clamoring for visas—especially students, many of them U.S. citizens—excited to get there in time for fall classes and many, many more of them simply applying for a student visa to try to gain entry into some school which they claimed to us was prepared to admit them. Many of these students, however, have such low grades and such limited English that we suspect their real purpose is simply to get to the US and stay on as would-be immigrants.

So our refusal rate is high... up to forty percent. We now have seven officers, including two wives, who sit behind their bullet proof glass and interview applicants all day long. A Marine helps control things inside, also behind thick bullet proof glass, and all sorts of electric buzzers operate the escalator and exit. A computer bank, linked to files in Paris, is available to check applicants to determine whether he's been turned down anywhere before.

But outside is a mess. The DIA police are getting better at crowd control, gradually but on most days we simply have to close down because no order or lines can be maintained. The place has become almost a tourist attraction in this city, sidewalk vendors have set up shop, and we suspect that the administration police are involved in all sorts of petty bribery in amusing people of pre-revolutionary preferred places in the lines. So far, fortunately, there's been no serious violence, and no Americans has been threatened in any way. But we worry a bit about that, especially the risk of angry reactions of some sort from those who are turned down. Hence the bullet proof glass inside and the police outside.

Why the numbers?... good question. Partly is the continuation of a pattern... American college students have been the preferred place for higher education of Russian students ever since World War II. Party too of course it's simply the desire to get out of revolutionary Iran, not the most pleasant place these days for the secular, westernized Iranian. And so there were half of the crowds outside are students, these Iranians who cannot hope to get an immigrant visa because gives the small number of these now available and who want to go to the US on a "visit" but who really intend to stay.

I don't mean to imply that all this is bad. It is for Iran's future, I think, because it amounts to a terrible brain drain. But for us it is an added element in our bilateral relationship with this country... a human link that adds some important strength at the grass roots to understanding. And yet the picture that all this presents is a bit of a paradox... we are not the most popular people in Iran these days; we were too obvious and too supportive of a disliked regime under the Shah. So even our friends here are cautious about being seen too close to us... and yet there is this picture of hundreds and sometimes thousands of Iranians outside our Embassy each day, probably obviously desperate to get to the United States.

The weather is lovely here now; we had a dusting of snow on the magnificent Elber mountain range behind the city last week, and there is a touch of fall in the air down here in the city. The sky is blue, the celebrated Persian blue of this country's skies in good weather, and we try to get out into the mountains on hikes and picnics on weekends... we're doing that tomorrow, of which I'll write in my next letter. I....

Bruce
Dear Family,

An AP ticker item is running tonight, saying that they have it from a high placed source that the Administration has decided to name Laingen as Ambassador to Iran. So the telephone is ringing and I'm dogging it, the story that is. Because to my knowledge no decision has yet been taken. Even a call from a Miss Berden with WCDO in Minneapolis, asking me about the report. When I said there was no basis to it, to my knowledge, she said she nonetheless wanted to ask me some questions about Iran, which was fine with me. She told me that she had greetings for me from Mrs. Carl Bag, who she understood to be my aunt. How she had Laura's name in 'beyond' me and I forgot to ask. I did ask them to return the greetings which i hope she did.

I think you all know that I have very mixed feelings about the possibility of my being named here as ambassador... because of the family separation involved. I find myself hoping it won't happen, at the same time as I recognize that I am a Foreign Service Officer who is supposed to be available to serve wherever the Secretary and President want me to serve. In other words I'm disciplined, or subject to discipline... and at the same time I'm a man who loves his family and misses them terribly right now, especially tonight with this rumor around. Evenings are hard, even with the round of National Day receptions that help a little take my mind off the separation. Daytime is tolerable, because we are very busy Embassy and there is much to do. The weather is glorious these fall days, day after day of perfect Indian summer, and that helps make this place bearable. But not enough. I don't like the family situation I'm gotten myself into and I don't mind saying so. If I had it to do over again....

Tonight Korea's national day.... a reception in a magnificent sprawling garden with a full moon overhead... Korean hospitality is like that of Japan... gracious and delicate, the women in beautiful Korean national dress of soft billowing cloth in pastel colors... everyone determined to make you comfortable at every turn. But National Days are boring nonetheless... the same people, the same round of runners to share, the same food frequently, though the Koreans... like the Chinese earlier this week...is different and delicious. Our relations with Korea being particularly close, we get a special welcome. I've had a bad press locally this week, thanks to a conversation I had a few days back with the Minister of Ingerity. I called on him in what we call a courtesy call in this business... That is, I had not met or talked with him before and I wanted to because I have tried to call on all the Ministers. We had an hour together, a conversation in Persian with one of my young officers along to translate. It was all very friendly and courteous and I had no reason to think that after I had left the Minister would call in the local press and tell them that I had come in to protest the executions recently of three elderly former Senators for being "taghout", which means corrupt remnants of the Shah's regime. In fact I had mentioned these executions as the kind of action that the regime takes that gives it an especially bad image in the US, and I thought the Minister should know that. I said I took no position on the guilt or innocence of these three men, or of any of the other 500 or so others who have been summarily executed here, but that he should know that the summary nature of the trials and the quick manner of execution did cause public opinion in my country to worry whether this regime was really any different from that of the Shah. Moreover I knew Islam as a religion of mercy and compassion and I did not see evidence of that when 81 year old former Senators were lined up and shot at two in the morning.

I obviously touched a raw nerve with this. For this or whatever reasons the Minister went public with it and this caused the Govt. spokesman to accuse me of "undue meddling" (I wonder what "due" meddling would be). Actually this business about the executions was only one part of a long conversation which was, I thought, a most friendly effort through dialogue to get focus on ways to build a better relationship. The next day a newspaper close to Khomeini denounced me in the most vitriolic terms, calling me a pawn, a venomous pawn for the CIA, presiding over an Embassy full of espionage agents, and with hands blooedied from Hereskins, Vietnams and God knew what else. It could not have been worse. It was so bad that I think most readers felt sympathy for me, and I had almost no doubt that my own feelings about these executions are shared widely among Iranians. But we are still in the middle of a great deal of revolutionary fervor here and we do need to walk a careful line... today the clandestine Soviet radio voice that broadcasts from Baku to Iran ran the full text of the nasty editorial and preceded to denounce me in their own words. That's okay; I don't mind much what the Soviets have to say on the subject. I am satisfied knowing that what I said was right.

Warmest regards to all of you...
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CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STAT 10/4/79
APPR: CHARG: IJEBRINKO: CC
DFTD: POL: FASWIFT: GC
CLEAR: POL: FASWIFT
DISTR: POL2 GE ICA
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 10697

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/4/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: SHUM, IR, PINS, PINT
SUBJECT: WEEKLY POLITICAL ROUNDUP

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).


3. THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE HAS BEEN DOMINATED DURING THE LAST WEEK BY MAJOR CABINET RESHUFFLING, THE CONTINUATION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS WORK ON A NEW CONSTITUTION, AND THE APPARENTLY QCM INSPIRED CRITICISM OF NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL CO. HEAD RASSAN NAZI3 WHICH RESULTED IN HIS RESIGNATION FROM THE NIOC AND DISAPPEARANCE, RUMORS SAY PERHAPS TO PARIS.

4. ACCORDING TO DEP PRIM MIN TABATAIBAI, THE GOVERNMENT HAS BANNED ALL UNAUTHORIZED RALLIES, DEMONSTRATIONS, GATHERINGS AND MARCHES WITH A WARNING THAT THOSE WHO PERSIST IN THESE PROTESTS WILL BE DEALT WITH HARSHLY. THE PROTEST IS PROBABLY A RESULT OF THE GROWING COMPLAINTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS FROM THE RANKS OF THE UNEMPLOYED

5. THE SLOW BUT STEADY ATTEMPT BY CITIES ACROSS IRAN EITHER TO DISSOLVE THE COMPLICATED COMMITTEE STRUCTURES OR TO MERGE THEM INTO POLICE OR REVOLUTIONARY GUARD
ORGANIZATIONS HAS MET WITH VARYING DEGREES OF SUCCESS. DURING THE MONTHS SINCE THE REVOLUTION, THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM HAS COME IN FOR A GREAT DEAL OF CRITICISM, WITH COMMITTEE BANDS BEING POPULARLY ACCUSED OF CRIMES RANGING FROM THEFT TO TORTURE TO ILLEGAL ARRESTS. ON SEPTEMBER 11, KHOMEINI ORDERED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS NOT TO ACT ON THEIR OWN IN GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS. SOME EXAMPLES HAVE APPEARED RECENTLY, ESPECIALLY IN TABRIZ OR COMMITTEE MEMBERS BEING ARRESTED AND TRIED FOR ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ACTS. IN TEHRAN, ATATOLLAR MOHAMMED REZA MARDAVI-KANI, NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES, HAS ANNOUNCED THAT ALL OF TEHRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY SUB-COMMITTEES ARE DISSOLVED. AT PRESENT, TEHRAN HAS A REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE FOR EACH OF ITS 14 DISTRICTS, AND ONE ESTIMATE OF THE SUB-COMMITTEES HAS BEEN GIVEN AS 1,280. ACCORDING TO MARDAVI-KANI, THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE 14 DISTRICT COMMITTEES WILL BE STRICTLY CONTROLLED, AND ANYONE WITH A QUESTIONABLE RECORD WILL BE PURGED.

6. ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY LATE SEPTEMBER AND EARLY OCTOBER. SEVERAL SHOPS WERE DAMAGED WHEN AN EXPLOSION SHOOK THE BAZAAR AT KHORRAMSHAHR, ALTHOUGH NO INJURIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED. A COMMUNICATIONS TOWER ON THE KHORRAMSHAHR-AYWAZ ROAD WAS BLOWN UP ON SEPTEMBER 30, AND COMMUNICATIONS MINISTER HASSAN ESLAMI CLAIMED THE EXPLOSION WAS CAUSED BY A TIME BOMB. THE TOWER FELL ACROSS AN ADJACENT RELAY STATION, DAMAGING THAT BUILDING, AND CAUSING A CUT OFF IN COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE MAIN CITIES OF THE OIL PROVINCE AND THE REST OF IRAN. ON SEPTEMBER 30 ANOTHER EXPLOSION OCCURRED NEAR THE KHORRAMSHAHR GOVERNOR'S OFFICE. NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED. AT LEAST EIGHT PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND 17 INJURED ON OCTOBER 3 WHEN A BOMB EXPLODED ON THE TEHRAN-KHORRAMSHAHR TRAIN. THERE IS STILL NO INDICATION WHO SET OFF THE BOMB.

IN TEHRAN A FIRE BROKE OUT AT THE AFGHAN EMBASSY ON SEPTEMBER 23. AN EMBASSY SPOKESMAN CLAIMED THE BLAZE WAS CAUSED BY ARSONISTS. DAMAGE WAS APPARENTLY LIMITED TO THE GUARDS CABIN AT THE EMBASSY. ANOTHER EXPLOSION, PERHAPS FROM A GRENADE, TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE THE SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY ON SEPTEMBER 24 DURING THE OFFICIAL CELEBRATION BEING HELD TO MARK SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL DAY. TWO ASSASSINATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN MASHAD, BOTH INVOLVING LOCAL CLERGYMEN. HAJ MOSHEEHOMAI WAS GUNNED DOWN LATE IN THE EVENING ON SEPTEMBER 22. A NEWSPAPER REPORT CLAIMED THAT THE CLERGYMAN HAD BEEN A SUPPORTER OF THE SHAH. A SECOND CLERGYMAN WAS ASSASSINATED IN MASHAD ON OCTOBER 1. SEYED ADI AHMADI WAS SHOT TO DEATH ON THE DOORSTEP OF HIS OWN HOUSE, AND RUMORS CIRCULATING IN MASHAD CLAIM THE DEATH WAS PART OF A PLOT TO LIQUIDATE 21 PROMINENT PERSONALITIES IN THE CITY.

7. THE ETHNIC KURDISH AREAS HAVE ALSO HAD A FAIR SHARE OF UNREST DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS. ON OCTOBER 3 EIGHT BUILDINGS IN NAQADEH, INCLUDING THE TOWNS WATER SUPPLY COWERS, THE GENDARMERIE HEADQUARTERS AND PRIVATE HOMES WERE DAMAGED IN A GRENADE ATTACK. SPORADIC VIOLENCE HAS HIT OTHER KURDISH TOWNS TOO, AND CLASHES AND INCIDENTS
HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN SARDASHT, BANAH, SAQQEZ, MAHABAD, AND URUMIYEH (REZAIYEH). IN SANANDAJ THE HOUSE OF A REVOLUTIONARY GUARDSMAN WAS WRECKED BY AN EXPLOSION ON OCTOBER 1. ON OCTOBER 2 A GROUP OF 24 REVOLUTIONARY GUARDSMEN WERE AMBUSHED IN SARDASHT RESULTING IN FIVE OF THE GUARDS BEING KILLED, EIGHT WOUNDED AND THE REST BEING CAPTURED.

8. THE BALUCHISTAN REGION HAS ALSO SEEN RECENT UNREST. ON SEPT 20 HUNDREDS OF ZAHEDAN RESIDENTS SUPPORTED BY PEOPLE FROM KHASH AND IRAN SHAH DEMONSTRATED AGAINST THE NEW IRANIAN CONSTITUTION ARTICLES WHICH STATE THAT THE OFFICIAL RELIGION OF IRAN IS THE JA'AFARI SECT OF SHI'ITE ISLAM. BALUCHISTAN IS A PREDOMINANTLY SUNNI AREA. UNCONFIRMED RUMORS OF RESTLESSNESS HAVE BEEN FREQUENT FROM THE REGION, BUT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE RT

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COVERAGE IN THE IRANIAN PRESS. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF SISTAN AND BALUCHISTAN, DR. HARIRI, PAID A RECENT VISIT TO QOM TO REPORT ON CONDITIONS IN HIS PROVINCE, CLAIMING THAT THE REGION IS UNDER CONTROL. SOME TROUBLE HAD OCCURRED IN THE LASHAR AREA WHERE TRIBESMEN ATTACKED TWO GENDARMERIE POSTS AND DISARMED THE SECURITY FORCES THERE. NEGOTIATIONS WITH TRIBAL LEADERS RESULTED IN A PARDON FOR THOSE ACCUSED OF ATTACKING THE GENDARMERIE POSTS, AND HARIRI CLAIMS THAT THE TRIBES PEOPLE WILL SURRENDER THEIR WEAPONS.
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: POLITICAL OFFICER SPENT OCTOBER 2-3 IN MASHHAD, CAPITAL OF NORTHEASTERN PROVINCE OF KHORASAN. CITY WAS IN FESTIVE MOOD AND FILLED WITH VISITORS ON OCCASION OF BIRTHDAY OF EIGHTH IMAM. MASHHAD CONTINUE ITS TRADITION OF GOING ITS OWN WAY OUTSIDE OF THE MAINSTREAM OF IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS ESTABLISHED HIS AUTHORITY THOUGH A DELEGATE WHO OVERSHADOWS BOTH THE CIVIL GOVERNOR GENERAL AND THE TWO INFLUENTIAL LOCAL RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO RAN THE CITY FOR HE MONTH BETWEEN THE EFFECTIVE COLLAPSE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN JANUARY 1979 AND THE REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY. EMBASSY WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON CONDITIONS AT MASHHAD UNIVERSITY AND ON VISIT TO LEADING MASHHAD RELIGIOUS FIGURE. END SUMMARY.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND


6. FOLLOWING THE VICTORY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN FEBRUARY 1979, THE TWO AYATOLLACHS OF MASGHAD LOST MUCH OF THEIR POLITICAL POWER TO SHEIKH TABASIS, AYATOLLACH
KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVE IN MASHHAD. TABASI WAS AN OBSCURE CLERGYMAN BEFORE THE REVOLUTION, BUT ASSISTED BY KHOMEINI'S AUTHORITY AND BY A SMALL GROUP OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO ASSERT HIS CONTROL OF THE CITY TO THE POINT THAT HE NOW ORDERS ARRESTS, TRIALS, AND EXECUTIONS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY OTHER AUTHORITY. THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT HAVE ALSO BEEN OVERSHADOWED BY TABASI.

7. A MEMBER OF A PROMINENT, LIBERAL MASHHAD FAMILY EXPLAINED THE POLITICAL ECLIPSE OF THE TWO AYATOLLAHS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) DURING KHOMEINI'S 15-YEAR EXILE FROM IRAN, THE MASHHAD RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAD BEEN FORCED TO MAKE ACCOMMODATIONS WITH THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES. AZIZI, THE LAST GOVERNOR GENERAL OF KHORASAN UNDER THE MONARCHY, HAD ESTABLISHED EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH THE MASHHAD RELIGIOUS LEADERS TO THE EXTENT THAT THE NEW REGIME HAS NOT MOLESTED HIM (AZIZI). HOWEVER, THE AYATOLLAHS HAD ALSO DEAL WITH EX-GOVERNOR GENERAL VALIAN, WHO IS ONE OF THE NEW REGIME'S NUMBER ONE TARGETS. KHOMEINI'S THREATS TO REVEAL THESE ASSOCIATIONS HAS PREVENTED THE MASHHAD AYATOLLAHS FROM EFFECTIVELY OPPOSING HIS POLITICAL AUTHORITY.

- (B) DURING THE FIRST WEEKS AFTER THE REVOLUTION, AYATOLLAH TABATABAI-QOMI DID VOICE SOME OPPOSITION TO THE PROCEDURES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS. SPECIFICALLY, THE AYATOLLAH NOTED THAT UNDER ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE THE ASSERTIONS OF A PLAINTIFF HAD TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE TESTIMONY OF IMPARTIAL WITNESSES. HOWEVER, THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS WERE USING THE PLAINTIFFS AS WITNESSES AGAINST THE ACCUSED. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY SOURCE, KHOMEINI SIMPLY IGNORED THESE OBJECTIONS AND "BLACKMAILED" THE AYATOLLAH'S INTO SILENCE BY THREATENING TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF THEIR ASSOCIATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE PAST REGIME.

8. THE MASHHAD AYATOLLAHS HAVE REPORTEDLY ALSO BEEN UNHAPPY AT THE CULT OF PERSONALITY WHICH HAS BEEN BUILT
UP AROUND KHOMEINI. THE RECENT ANNIVERSARY OF HIS TRAVELS FROM IRAQ TO PARIS (OCT 2) WAS DESCRIBED ON THE STATE RADIO AND TELEVISION AS THE SECOND GREATEST HEJRAT (MIGRATION) IN ISLAMIC HISTORY, SECOND ONLY TO THE TRAVEL OF THE PROPHET MOHAMMAD FROM MECCA TO MEDINA. SUCH LANGUAGE VERGES ON HERESY FOR STRICT MUSLIMS. KHOMEINI HAS ALSO ASSUMED THE AUTHORITY TO GRANT CLERICAL TITLES ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE. TRADITIONALLY SUCH HONORIFICS AS AYATOLLAH AND HOJJAT AL-ISLAM WERE NOT BESTOWED BY ANY INDIVIDUAL BUT WERE GRANTED BY CONSENSUS OF THE SCHOLARLY COMMUNITY WHEN A PERSON HAD REACHED A CERTAIN DEGREE OF LEARNING AND PIETY. KHOMEINI'S UNILATERALLY BESTOWING THESE TITLES ON VARIOUS CLERGYMEN IS SEEN AS A THREAT TO THE COLLEGIAL SYSTEM WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY PREVAILED AMONG THE SHIA LEADERSHIP.

9. EMBASSY SOURCE SAID HE HAD VISITED AYATOLLAH QOMI AS PART OF A DELEGATION. IN PRIVATE, THE AYATOLLAH TOLD ONE OF THE DELEGATION MEMBERS THAT KHOMEINI WAS ABLE TO "SIT UNDER AN APPLE TREE IN PARIS AND ISSUE EDICTS WHILE THOSE LEADERS ON THE SCENE HAD TO TRY AND ALLEVIATE THE BLOODSHED AND SUFFERING OF THEIR FOLLOWERS. DURING THE WORST OF THE FIGHTING IN MASHHAD, BODIES OF THE VICTIMS WERE STORED IN AYATOLLAH QOMI'S HOUSE UNTIL THEY COULD BE WASHED AND BURIED SECRETLY. QOMI SAID HE HAD TO CONSOLE THE SURVIVORS AND TO DEAL WITH THE AUTHORITIES TO TRY AND STOP FURTHER KILLING. "WHERE WAS KHOMEINI DURING ALL THIS"? HE REPORTEDLY ASKED.

10. EMBASSY WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON CALL ON CONDITIONS OF MASHHAD UNIVERSITY AND ON VISIT TO AYATOLLAH TABATABA'I-QOMI. LAINGEN.
2. EGYPTIAN EMBASSY OFFICERS ZANT AND HAREDY CALLED ON NEA/IRN OCTOBER 10 FOR A BRIEFING ON IRAN. IN GENERAL EGYPTIANS APPEARED TO SHARE GENERAL LINES OF OUR ASSESSMENT SUMMARIZED BELOW.

3. THE ECONOMY: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION STILL DOWN 50 PERCENT. OIL PRODUCTION HOLDING 3.5 – 4.0 MILLION B/D WITH REVENUES PROBABLY EXCEEDING 1978. GREATEST DEFICIENCY IS LOSS OF EXPERIENCED MANAGERS. UNEMPLOYMENT ESTIMATED 20 – 40 PERCENT; INFLATION 20 PERCENT. GOOD AGRICULTURAL YEAR. SPOTTY SHORTAGES SOME MERCHANDISE. GENERALLY SLOW MOVEMENT TOWARDS RECOVERY. ENCOURAGING THAT INCREASING NUMBER OF US FIRMS BEING PAID AND SOME AGREEING TO RESUME WORK (FLUOR ON ISFAHAN REFINERY, AMC TO ASSEMBLE JEEPS).

4. KURDS AND ARABS: RECENT OUTBREAK OF BOMBINGS AND ARMED ATTACKS CONSIDERED SERIOUS. DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIME, HOWEVER, AS THERE HAVE BEEN MOMENTS OF SERIOUS DIFFICULTY FOR PGOI IN THE PAST.

5. ARMED FORCES: SLOW MOVEMENT TO REGROUP. NEW COMMANDER OF IAF APPEARS STRONG AND DETERMINED. OUR CONTACTS WITH IRANIAN MILITARY GENERALLY BUSINESSLIKE AND POSITIVE IN TONE.

6. LEFT AND MIDDLE CLASS: LYING LOW. SMALL IN NUMBER, NO MASS APPEAL, FRAGMENTED, LACK OF STRONG, CHARISMATIC LEADERS. POTENTIAL AUGMENTATION OF STRENGTH SHOULD PRESENT REGIME STUMBLE BADLY. TUDEH PARTY SMALL AND DISCREDITED BY SOVIET LINKAGE.
7. CLERICAL ASCENDANCY: KHOMEINI--DESPITE MIDDLE CLASS, LEFT-WING AND ETHNIC DEFECTIONS--COMMANDS STRONG MAJORITY SUPPORT OF THE MASSES. HE AND OTHER HARD-LINE MULLAHS APPEAR DETERMINED TO ASSERT THEIR DOMINANCE OVER NEW CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS FOR MAJLIS AND PRESIDENT. NEVERTHELESS, THERE SOME RESISTANCE WITHIN THE PGOI (BAZARGAN, YAZDI) AND AMONG CLERICS (SHARIATMADARI).

8. FOREIGN RELATIONS: REGIME DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF SHAH-SUPPORTERS THOUGHT TO BE BACKED IN KURDISH AND ARAB AREAS BY ISRAEL AND IRAQ. VAGUE FEAR OF A SAUDI-IRAQ ALLIANCE BACKED BY US AGAINST IRAN. SOMEWHAT LESS FEAR OF SOVIET THREAT. SOVIET HAND IN IRAN NOT NOW APPARENT. EMBARRASSED DESIRE BY PGOI TO REASSURE GULF STATES AFTER CLAIMS AND THREATS ASSERTED BY VARIOUS AYATOLLATHS AGAINST BAHRAIN AND KUWAIT. ABDING FEAR OF US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE GULF AND OF US AS MANIPULATOR OF OMANI INITIATIVE FOR STRAIT OF MORMOZ. RESTRAINT ON AFGHANISTAN DESPITE CONCERN FOR INCREASED SOVIET ROLE. COOLING PRIVATE ATTITUDES TOWARD RADICAL PALESTINIANS OUT OF CONCERN FOR THEIR INFLUENCE IN TEHRAN AND POSSIBLE MEDDLING WITH OIL FIELD WORKERS. EQUAL HOSTILITY TOWARDS ISRAEL AND EGYPT. CONTINUING STRONG SUPPORT FOR PLO.

9. U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS: DESIRE ON OUR PART TO FASHION A NEW RELATIONSHIP, COOPERATING WHERE FEASIBLE, MOVING AT A PACE COMFORTABLE FOR IRANIANS IN LIGHT OF STILL STRONG SUSPICIONS AND ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS. LIMITED RESUMPTION IN SHIPMENT OF PREVIOUSLY-PURCHASED MILITARY SPARE PARTS AND SALE OF NEW SPARES. ONE-SHOT SALE OF KEROSENE AND HEATING FUEL. EXTENSIVE EFFORTS TO SETTLE COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY CONTRACT DISPUTES. INTEREST IN NAMING AN AMBASSADOR AMONG EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS BUT DIFFICULTY OF MAKING FRIENDLY GESTURE WHEN ATMOSPHERE IN IRAN SO FREQUENTLY UNFRIENDLY.

10. SCENARIOS:
--- HOPEFUL: MODERATE PRAGMATISTS MAINTAIN OR AUGMENT INFLUENCE WITHOUT CAUSING RUPTURE WITH CLERICS AND REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGUES.
--- GLOOMY: PGOI CONTROL SLIPS FURTHER. KURDS, ARABS AND OTHERS SUSTAIN REVOLT IN PROVINCES. ECONOMY UNRAVELS.
--- MIDDLE GROUND: THERE A FAIR CHANCE, HOWEVER, THAT PRESENT POLITICAL CONDITIONS WOULD PERSIST WITHOUT CLEAR RESOLUTION FOR SOME TIME TO COME. IF CLERICS ESTABLISHED FIRM CONTROL, AND THIS NOT YET ASSURED, IT SEEMED MATTER OF TIME BEFORE COMPLEXITIES OF GOVERNMENT WOULD OVERWHELM THEM. REPLACEMENT POLITICAL FORCE IMPOSSIBLE TO VISUALIZE AT THIS TIME. VANCE ET

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Policy Initiatives - Talks with PermReps

We do not need to dwell on the importance of Iran to the West. Suffice it to say that the independence and stability of Iran, if anything, more important to us now than at the time of the Shah. Our job of protecting Western interests in Iran is, of course, infinitely more difficult. We are dealing with a government that is inexperienced, deeply suspicious of our motives, and attempting simultaneously to accomplish the conflicting objectives of restoring normal conditions and transforming the society according to vaguely-defined Islamic revolutionary ideals.

The U.S. has special problems which make our task more complex than our allies. The unwinding of our military relationship is a serious point of contention with the Islamic Government. We are also confronted with a wide range of similar, but more manageable problems with commercial contracts. Some of these problems have resulted in action in U.S. courts to attach Iranian assets in this country. The Iranians do not understand the extent to which we are bound by the separation of powers, the laws, regulations and precedents which often control our action; and the political limitations that press treatment of their human rights record has created for the USG. Finally, despite our repeated denials, the Iranians are deeply suspicious that we are plotting against them in concert with the Israelis, the Shah, the Saudis, even
the Iraqis and the communists.

If, as we conclude, no group or individual outside Iran, has any real capability at the moment of significantly influencing events in Iran (i.e. bringing down the Government), our best approach would seem to attempt to

-- moderate the policies of the present regime and help to promote greater pragmatism, reconciliation and economic recovery.

-- help to preserve and strengthen elements in Iran, especially in the military, moderate religious and secular groups, which could play a useful role in the future as the political drama unfolds.

-- build confidence of the regime in an effort to reduce the prospect of harsh measures of reaction which, in turn, make stability more elusive.

In recent months, the U.S. has taken several limited steps to begin to fashion a new relationship:

-- release of spare parts in the pipeline and resumption of Iranian purchase of spares. The Iranians have been slow to take delivery.

-- sale of kerosene and heating oil.

-- concerted efforts by the State Department to help resolve commercial disputes.
--- patient efforts to close out the PMS program in a manner which would protect Iranian as well as US interests.

We would like to appoint an Ambassador, but the Iranian campaign in the press (and privately in meetings with Yazdi) \underline{\text{\textit{managed}}\text{\textit{not given us a fit opportunity. There is still considerable reluctance on the part of political leaders, especially the clerics, to talk to us.}}

There are five ideas which you might discuss with the other three ministers:

1. An approach to Khomeini. To our knowledge no senior Western ambassador or emissary has seen Khomeini since the February Revolution. We think it might be useful for Western representatives to call on him, not to 
\underline{\text{\textit{manage}}} the clerics, but to reassure him that the West accepts the Islamic revolution, has no intention of interfering in Iran's internal affairs, and is concerned with the continuing instability that derives from weakness of the Bazargan Government. The object would be to suggest very gently to the Ayatollah that Bazargan needs additional backing if the communists are not to have an opportunity for serious meddling in Iran.

We have no suggestion as to which country might make the first move, but perhaps the French, given their past assistance to Khomeini, would be in the best position,
2. Approach to the Iraqis. The Iranians are convinced that Iraq is actively assisting Kurdish and Arab rebels in Iran. There may well be some truth to these assertions. It seems very probable that if Iraq made a serious effort to police its borders, the Iranian rebels, especially the Kurds, would find it hard to continue their insurrection.

As a first step we think the French and Germans might separately engage the Iraqis in discussions of Iranian developments. The ultimate purpose of the exchange, which might require prolonged confidence building, would be to persuade the Iraqis to reduce the pressure on the Bazargan government.

3. Assistance to Iranian Military. The Iranians have told us it is their policy to diversify support for US-origin military equipment. We have replied that we would have no objection in principle provided the arrangements with Europeans were made within the framework of our laws, regulations and policies. (We will license only what we ourselves would provide.) We have also pointed out the practical problems that may arise. While there are real impediments to the diversification of support, we hope the allies will agree that all of us should do what we can to strengthen the Iranian military—which could be a key group in the future. We would like to stay in close touch with the allies in advance of these developments in order to assure that the Iranian military
receives the necessary support.

4. Contacts with Dissident Exiles. We do not believe Bakhtiar and other Iranian dissidents abroad at this time hold any promise for future political influence. We intend to avoid any association with these groups which could imply political endorsement.

5. Regular consultations. We believe it would be important to stay in continuing contact with the allies on Iranian developments. We suggest that we encourage our Ambassadors and Charge in Tehran to consult on their activities frequently, although it may be awkward for all four to assemble at once. We suggest at least quarterly meetings of the PermReps.
Dear friends,

I'm at home tonight, which is unusual lately because of a heavy schedule of diplomatic parties.... I've got the television on, listening (in Persian) to a visiting PLO delegation being lauded at the Constitutional Review Council session today, with both단단 현무소 PLO types and the Mullahs denouncing the US for its support for Imperialism, Zionism and Israeli aggression. It goes wearing after a while... you learn to soldier on, recognizing that at least some of the rhetoric is just that... said for the record and said to satisfy revolutionary press needs, which is not to say indeed it's the council of the state media and television.... When I protest to government types that this kind of attack constantly on US purposes in Iran cannot really serve the government's own interests in developing a good relationship with us the answer is usually something to the effect that we must recognize that the revolution is not yet complete and that the government itself cannot control some of the things that are said on the radio and television. Which is nonsense but what is one to do... yesterday the radio carried another a tack on me --- as a CIA agent up to all sorts of dastardly things, as demonstrated by my alleged protest over the executions.... well, I will grumble a bit when I see the Foreign Minister tomorrow and we shall see what he has to say.

Even if such government were to decide to push my name forward as Ambassador, I suspect that the enthusiasm on the part of the local government would be a bit subdued. In fact however, I can now tell you that the likelihood of my staying on here as Tempor-bo, a decision we took quite independently of attitudes here. For me it is a good thing, family and in any event have had a fairly involve tour here. That I will be relieved is still unclear, but we should know shortly. Meanwhile there is much to do, and much to worry about, if one is inclined to worry. I'm not, since our capacity to really influence the evolution of events here is limited in any event. But I am an optimist about the longer term. The Foreign Minister, returning from seeing Secretary Vance in New York, was full of criticism of US policy in many counts, but also went on to say, publicly, that Iran needed the US just as the US needed Iran. Fine. If that's the policy approach here we can live with that, because I think that kind of awareness will produce results, however slowly.

I have stuck close to the compound lately, because of the pressure of work... and that met such a bad-fuge because usually there is plenty of diversion here. Tennis is always available, and I play at least every other day. This Friday we have a tournament here against the Italian community, and we will ask them to stay on for dinner and the film "International Velvet"... the weeks a-1 we had a rum of the "Kemian Cup" tournament in softball, was as usual by the Marines... they're young and tough enough to always beat the pants off the rest of us. One might we went, with my bullet proof Hussein and police in a fellow-car, to a big Birthday party at the home of an American girl married to an Iranian. Fine time, until midnight when the revolutionaries from the neighborhood "Komiteh" discovered My car and the police outside the gates of the house and decided they didn't like what was going on. So the blocked our way and insisted we follow them to Komiteh hqds. We said kmmxx we, they had as right, etc. After some minutes they let us leave but then followed us, demanding the wankie-talkies (they have them too, stolen from our compound in February) that we follow them to their hqds. My driver, behind the wheel of the armored tank' that my Chrysler has become, is met to be trifled with at any hour and especially at midnight. He so seemed off sad were eventually left alone. Yesterday a German businessman who lives kmmxx in the city was assassinated as he left work, killed by two youths with sidelines on a motorbike. This has sent shock waves through the foreign business community, and it will kmmxx he even more difficult to get foreign businessmen to come here. We think it is an exception to the rule recently... the security situation has certainly been improving, at least in Tehran. Elsewhere in the country, no. The fighting in Kurdistan is getting worse and there is trouble in Baluchistan too. All of which is kmmxx bad, but tolerable for this regions, as long as things remain under control in the oil province of Khuzistan. Even there, there has been trouble lately, and that could really speak trouble.

Yesterday I called on a leading Mullah for a long chat... it went well and I was warmly received but I came away with a new appreciation of how much of a communication gap exists between the West and the clerical leadership of this place. Suspicion of me is deep indeed, a product of our support for the Shah, Israel, and a perception of our Societys as a materialist one generally hostile to Islam. However much I tried to emphasize that we too are a people with strong spiritual values and preoccupations I found that we were talking past each other most of the time. But we've got to keep at it, because, to coin a phrase, Islam is here to stay....

Wael Abjadi

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SUBJECT: The Current Situation in Iran
(Speech given at 33rd Annual Conference of the Middle East Institute)

PARTICIPANTS: James Bill University of Texas

PLACE: Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C.

DATE: October 5, 1979

DISTRIBUTION: INR/DDR NEA/IRN Embassy Tehran

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Bill identified those groups who are or might challenge the ruling clique:

--the ethnic tribes;

--"counterrevolutionary" groups. (They are composed of remnants of the old military and security apparatus. Bill believes they have assassinated at least 600 revolutionary guards, komiteh or religious leaders.);

--the far left, particularly the Fedayeen-al Khalq;

--the secular, modern intelligensia. ("Ultimately Iran cannot be ruled without their support.")

The Future. Bill believes that the conservative fundamentalist clergymen will not be able to retain power over the long run. Eventually a triple alliance composed of the military, the progressive religious clergy and the secular technocrats might emerge to allivate the continued chaos (which will persist as long as the fundamentalist are in power.) Amplifying on this senario, Bill suggested:

--Iran must have a central instrument of coercion and the military is the only institution which can fulfill that role. Although it has been decapitated, it will rebuild itself.

--There are progressive religious leaders who are waiting in the wings. He put the following individuals in that category: Zanjani, Shariat-Medari, Shirazi, Beheshti and Laphuti.

The US Position. In order to improve US/Iranian relations Bill suggested we:

--Admit past policy "errors";

--Send a "new breed" of representative to Iran;

--Offer to provide Iran agricultural, technical and administrative aid. (We should assure this aid reaches "the people" and not just the government); and

--Avoid contacts with the exiles.
The Current Situation

Nine months after the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty, the Iranian revolution has still not run its full course. Power continues to be fragmented, the economy is stagnated, and military and security forces remain shattered. The loose coalition of forces which overthrew the Shah has collapsed as its leaders have split over the kind of society that they envision for the future. Nevertheless, Ayatollah Khomeini is the pre-eminent figure in Iran and will most likely remain that for the coming months.

Internal Political Situation: Three major forces are currently at work in Iran:

First, Khomeini is consolidating his power and control over all aspects of Iranian society. This effort is being waged simultaneously on several fronts. A Council of Experts is preparing a final draft constitution, which will provide the legal basis for the Islamic Republic. In this process, the constitution is being made more strictly Islamic. The constitutional referendum and national elections which will follow are likely to be dominated by clerical forces. Religious forces could easily win the election and dominate the new government.

Religious leaders are increasing their control in other key areas:

--The ousting of oil chief Hassan Nazih removes the man who was most outspoken in opposition to the clergy.

--The threatened purges in the oil company, the military and the government bureaucracies are designed to eliminate the less fervent supporters of the new order.

--Even the very halting steps aimed at curbing or eliminating the independent local komitehs are part of a process which strengthens clerical control.
Second, parallel to this increased clerical domination, factions within the ruling clique are jockeying for power and position. Khomeini remains the final arbitrator of any dispute among these factions. His associates include other ayatollahs who agree with him to various degrees and secularists such as Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Yazdi. These latter men continue to fight a quiet internal battle against the clerics for Khomeini's good will. None of these associates is accepted as a possible successor to Khomeini. That fact, plus Khomeini's age (he is 79), adds much uncertainty to the regime's future course.

Finally, the new regime is being challenged by several opposition groups including:

--the ethnic minorities (most notably the Kurds and the Arabs);
--remnants of the old regime, including military and SAVAK personnel;
--leftist forces who are underground, well-armed but not an immediate threat; and
--the exiles in Europe and the US who are composed of former army officers, technocrats, the intelligentsia, and liberal politicians.

None of these groups has been able to put together an organization which can effectively challenge the Khomeini machine. The clerics have run rough-shod over the ethnic minorities and have outmaneuvered the left. Although many of the exiles would like to topple the regime, they appear to be uncoordinated and disorganized, notwithstanding the efforts in Paris of former Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar. We believe Bakhtiar has very little prospect of political success in Iran.

Foreign Policy: The form and the content of the new regime's foreign policy are still taking shape. Present foreign policy reflects the confused domestic situation, but several trends are becoming clear:

--Xenophobic nationalism: This includes general anti-Western and specific anti-US policies.

--Islamic messianism: Khomeini wants to export the revolution to Islamic or Shi'a groups abroad.
So far, however, he has not supplied much material aid to such groups. Rather, he has been exporting an idea and the revolutionary techniques and the organizational theory necessary for the idea's implementation. Iran's anti-Israel and pro-PLO stances, as well as some pro-Shi'a activities in the Persian Gulf are the key expressions to date of this drive. The Iranians have, however, been quite restrained in Afghanistan.

--Participation in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM): Iran has been searching for a new international framework to substitute for the Shah's close ties to the West. The NAM presents some possibilities, but in general Iran will remain a lone wolf.

--Recognition of Iran's geopolitical realities: Inevitable tensions exist between this element and the Islamic one. Those tensions have been particularly evident in the Persian Gulf: the "realists" of the Foreign Ministry want normal relations, but the clerics want to export the revolution. One result has been insecurity in the region as the Gulf regimes attempt to assess what Iran will do. Those states are convening a security conference (without Iran) in November. Another result has been a more assertive attitude among the minority Shi'a communities in the Gulf.

The Economy: Iran is faced with strong inflationary pressures, unemployment of 2-3 million (20 percent of the work force), and a decline in real GNP of 20 percent. Yet, the Iranian economy is functioning and even shows some tentative (if perhaps only temporary) signs of improvement. Banks are functioning, several major joint ventures are operating, oil continues to provide $60-$70 million per day in revenues, and the important wheat and rice harvests appear satisfactory.

The longer-term outlook, however, remains less encouraging. There is nothing on the economic horizon to replace oil as a vehicle for growth when crude production begins to decline gradually early in the 1980s. Furthermore, the Bazargan government has inherited an economy afflicted with a twin curse: a legacy of unrealistic prestige programs initiated during the oil boom, and the near anarchy wreaked by the revolution itself.
There could be a silver lining: the revolution affords planners a rare chance to wipe the slate clean, strip away past excesses, and rationalize the economy. The present political climate is not, however, conducive to this development. Moreover, uncertainty about the future is causing an exodus of those whose skills and talents are crucial to any economic recovery in Iran.

The initial hope that accompanied Khomeini's arrival is being replaced by disillusionment as expectations remain unfulfilled. The removal of National Iranian Oil chief Hassan Nazih not only casts doubt on the ability of the petroleum organization to function effectively but also will be seen by the modern technocrats and professionals as an attack on them.

The Soviet View of Iran

Moscow welcomed the creation of the new Iranian regime in February and set out to encourage the new regime's anti-Western policies, to help prevent the repression of pro-Soviet groups, and to protect the USSR's economic interests. Since then, the Soviets have been pleased with Iran's continuing anti-Western orientation but perturbed over their inability to improve economic and political relations with the Khomeini regime. The Soviet Ambassador has had two unpleasant encounters with Khomeini, and Khomeini has indirectly accused the USSR of involvement in the Kurdish conflict.

Moscow's options in dealing with Iran are limited. As long as there is no group that can effectively challenge Khomeini's rule, the USSR will continue to try for good relations with Iran's present leaders, even though it wants a more secular, pro-Soviet government eventually to emerge. To this end, Moscow has encouraged Iran's "progressive elements" (the ethnic minorities, the left and the secular moderates) to unite and "build for tomorrow."

Direct Soviet support for the "progressives", however, will probably remain cautious and circumspect. The Soviets are well aware that their relations with Tehran will be damaged if their efforts are detected. They must also know that support for subversive actions increases regional suspicion of Soviet intentions and risks producing a counteraction by other regional states.
The Soviets are perhaps most immediately concerned with bilateral economic problems. The Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Economic Relations conferred with Iranian officials twice last summer in an apparently unsuccessful effort to persuade Iran to comply with various contractual commitments to the USSR including natural gas deliveries. The reduced gas deliveries and Tehran's decision not to construct the export segment of a second natural gas pipeline to the USSR are particularly aggravating to the Soviets.

Moscow's frustration over the lack of progress in Soviet-Iranian bilateral relations has been evident in recent Soviet press commentary. The Soviets have used selective quotations from remarks by Iranian officials as a basis for increasingly open criticism of the Iranian leadership, particularly Bazargan's provisional government. The Soviet press has generally stopped short of direct criticism of Khomeini, but it has conveyed its displeasure with some of his policies and statements.

The Soviet media have openly defended the Iranian Tudeh Party and the ethnic minorities. However, the media have also emphasized the necessity for those groups to operate within a framework of national unity. This cautious line suggests Moscow does not want to antagonize Khomeini further or unnecessarily increase the Tudeh Party's already exposed position.
SUBJECT: SPECIAL FY-81 REVIEW OF OVERSEAS PERSONNEL

REF: YOUR CONFIDENTIAL MSG 111803Z OCT 79, SAVED SUBJECT

1. REF MSG REQUESTED ARMISH-MAAG VIEWS. COORDINATE WITH EMBASSY AND DEFBASE ATTACHÉ OFFICE (DAO), ON POSSIBLE CONSOLIDATION OF TAO AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION.

2. ALTHOUGH IT IS RECOGNIZED THERE MAY BE SOME BENEFITS TO CONSOLIDATION OF SMALL ORGANIZATIONS WHERE SOME Duplicative MANPOWER SPACES MIGHT BE SAVED, RECOMMEND THE NEW ODC IN IRAN, FORMED ON 1 OCT 79, NOT BE CONSIDERED A CANDIDATE FOR CONSOLIDATION AT THIS TIME. THE FOLLOWING REASONS ARE OFFERED FOR CONSIDERATION:

A. AS A RESULT OF THE FEB 79 REVOLUTION IN IRAN, THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN IRAN, THE LARGEST USG PROGRAM OF ITS TIME IN EXISTENCE PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION, HAS BEEN UNDERGOING DRAMATIC CHANGES. BECAUSE OF THESE CHANGES IN RESTRUCTURING AND THE SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL IMPACTS UPON THE ENTIRE USG FMS PROGRAM, IT IS DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO FORECAST WHERE A "NEW" IRANIAN PROGRAM MAY LEAD. PRESENTLY MANY OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESIDUAL PROGRAMS STILL BEING CLOSED OUT, SUCH AS PEACE ZEBRA, ARE LARGER THAN ENTIRE PROGRAMS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. ADDITIONALLY, THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS FROM THE PJOI THAT THEY WILL WANT SUPPLY SUPPORT PROGRAMS REINITIATED IN THE FUTURE. AS A RESULT OF THEIR FORCE STRUCTURE AND PREVIOUS USG FURNISHED EQUIPMENT ALREADY PURCHASED, IT WOULD BE REASONABLE AT THIS TIME TO ESTIMATE A PROGRAM TO SUPPORT THESE US PROVIDED SYSTEMS WOULD BE EXPENSIVE.

B. DUE TO THE UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE RESTRUCTURING ACTIONS ON THE PRESENT IRANIAN FMS PROGRAM AND THE SIZE OF THE PROJECTED PROGRAM, AS STATED IN 2A ABOVE, A CONSOLIDATED ORGANIZATION, REDUCED IN SIZE, WOULD PROBABLY BE UNABLE TO HANDLE THE NEW SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS WHICH MAY BE LEVIED. THEREFORE, TAKING ACTION TO CONSOLIDATE PRIOR TO A NEWLY DEFINITIZED PROGRAM WOULD BE PREMATURE.

C. PRESENTLY DAO TEHRAN HAS TWELVE (12) AUTHORIZED POSITIONS INCLUDING THE FSN POSITIONS, BECAUSE EACH OF THESE POSITIONS IS NOW REQUIRED, AND WE PERCEIVE NO REDUCTION IN THE TAO WORKLOAD EVEN IF THE TAO AND THE MAAG WERE TO BE CONSOLIDATED. WE ANTICIPATE NO REDUCTIONS IN DAO SPACES COULD LOGICALLY BE REALIZED. THE NEWLY FORMED AND ACTIVATED CTC HAS THE MAXIMUM SIX (6) MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED BY LAW. ONE AREA FOR POTENTIAL CONSOLIDATION MAY BE IN...
THE LOCAL NATIONAL POSITIONS POSSIBLY ONE DRIVER COULD BE ELIMINATED AND THE ODC FSN CLERK POSITION ELIMINATED. ONE OTHER POSSIBLE POSITION WHICH MIGHT BE ELIMINATED IS THE ODC GS-7 ADMIN CO-ORDINATOR WITH THE W-C COORDINATOR IN THE DAC, THIS MIGHT BE UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF REASONS SPECIFIED EARLIER IN 2A AND 2B, AGAIN WE CANNOT PREDICT THE WORKLOAD IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AN IT WOULD THEREFORE STILL APPEAR IMPRUDENT TO REDUCE WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL WORKLOAD DATA REQUIREMENTS.

1. THE MOST APPARENT PROBLEM WE ANTICIPATE IS THE REACTION OF THE FGOI. ALTHOUGH WE ARE MOVING SLOWLY IN THE STRUCTURING EFFORT, WE APPEAR TO BE MAKING PROGRESS. WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THIS BECAUSE OF THE APPARENT TRUST OUR LOGISTICS PERSONNEL HAVE ESTABLISHED WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS. THIS TRUST MIGHT BE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED IF THE FGOI PERCEIVED OUR ODC PEOPLE AS BEING PART OF THE DAC.

OUR MISSION/PURPOSE IS DISSIMILAR IN THAT 1% OF ODC IS TASKED TO ASSIST THE HOST COUNTRY IN SA TYPE SUPPORT, WHEREAS DAC PERSONNEL OBLIVIOUSLY ARE RECOGNIZED AS COLLECTORS OF OVERT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. AS AN EXAMPLE, PRESENTLY OUR ODC PEOPLE CAN MAKE VISITS WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS AS A PART OF NORMAL OPERATIONS. WITHOUT ANY PROTOCOL REQUIREMENT ON THE OTHER HAND, DAO IS PRESENTLY RESTRICTED TO JOIN THROUGH JOINT STAFF PROTOCOL BEFORE MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF THE FGOI.

3. IN CONCLUSION, RECOMMEND THAT THE NEW ODC ORGANIZATION IN IRAN NOT BE CONSOLIDATED WITH DAC. THE SAVINGS IN PERSONNEL AND FUNDING WOULD BE MINIMAL, AND THE POTENTIAL FOR LOST GROUND IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE/ODC MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT WOULD BE UNNECESSARILY INCREASED.

4. CHARGE CONCURS.

#0873
IRAN: MOVING TOWARD THEOCRACY.

1. (C) THE ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS DOMINATED BY MUSLIM RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHOSE MANDATE IS TO REVIEW THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN GRANTED AN EXTENSION OF TIME BECAUSE IT IS MAKING SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION. MOST OF THESE CHANGES HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO CONCENTRATE ALL POWER IN IRAN IN THE HANDS OF SHIITE LEADERS. THE LATEST CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSE ESTABLISHES THE POSITION OF A SUPREME RELIGIOUS LEADER, WHICH WILL BE ASSUMED BY THE ONE MOST RESPECTED BY HIS COLLEAGUES. IF ONE CANNOT BE CHosen, THE OFFICE WILL BE HELD BY A COUNCIL OF HOLY MEN. THE SUPREME LEADER WOULD BE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES. WOULD HAVE POWER TO DECLARE WAR IN CONSULTATION WITH A MILITARY COUNCIL (WHERE HE APPOINTS), AND WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO REMOVE THE ELECTED PRESIDENT. FOLLOWING THE PASSAGE OF THIS CLAUSE, THE ASSEMBLY IS NOW DEBATING THE SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE PRESIDENT, WHOSE AUTHORITY, IN VIEW OF THE NEW CLAUSE, WOULD BE QUESTIONABLE. THIS BODY IS REPORTEDLY CONSIDERING THREE OPTIONS. WE COULD BE APPOINTED BY THE PARAMOUNT RELIGIOUS PERSON, ELECTED WITH THE LATTER'S APPROVAL, OR CHOSEN FROM A LIST OF CANDIDATES DRAWN UP BY THE LEADER.

2. (C) IT IS CLEAR IRAN IS EVOLVING TOWARD A THEOCRATIC STATE IN WHICH THERE WILL BE LITTLE ROOM FOR DISSENTING VIEWS. ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE PASSED BY A POPULAR REFERENDUM, IT IS EXPECTED TO BE APPROVED BY A LARGE MARGIN. IN SPITE OF INCREASINGLY VITAL OPPOSITION BY THE LEFTISTS AND MODERATE SECULARISTS, THE DEEPLY DEVOUT LOWER CLASSES APPARENTLY REMAIN STEADFAST IN THEIR
SUPPORT FOR KHOMEINI AND WILL VERY LIKELY CONSIDER SUPPORT OF
THE CONSTITUTION THEIR RELIGIOUS DUTY. IT WILL NO LONGER BE
NECESSARY FOR ATATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO RUN FOR THE PRESIDENCY, OR
FOR ANYONE ELSE FOR THAT MATTER. THE LATEST CLAUSE WILL LEGITI-
MIZE THE UNOFFICIAL POSITION HELD BY KHOMEINI AND WILL REDUCE
THE PRESIDENT TO A MERE FIGUREHEAD.

PREPARED BY; LCDR D. ADAMS, USN, JSI-5
(DECL 16 OCT 85)

BT
#4391
Setting

The first six weeks of 1979 marked the final phase of the Iranian revolution. The Shah left the country on January 16, Ayatollah Khomeini returned on February 1, the Government of Prime Minister Bakhtiar collapsed on February 11, and a new provisional Government under Prime Minister Bazargan was installed. For most Iranians, Ayatollah Khomeini remained the principal political figure as spiritual guide and leader of the revolution. An Islamic Republic was proclaimed following a national referendum on March 31. In the elected Council of Experts prepared a new constitution which was to be submitted to a referendum prior to the election of a new government.

Violence against unarmed crowds by the security forces of the previous regime that had begun in early 1978, and which took thousands of lives, continued into 1979. In addition, beginning in late 1978, mobs, widely believed to have been hired by the previous regime, attacked supporters of the revolution in several locations. Thus, when the revolution succeeded, feelings of
bitterness and revenge against the leaders and supporters of the Shah's regime were intense. The traditional security forces and judicial system were discredited. In consequence power was diffused among a variety of groups which were rarely responsive to the directions of the central government. It was a period of great revolutionary fervor, political uncertainty and confusion. Revolutionary courts were established on the national and local levels; most administered justice according to their own standards. Rough justice was also meted out by a variety of revolutionary committees and armed groups -- some of which had no legal standing whatsoever; their weapons gave them authority. Throughout this period the formal government under Prime Minister Bazargan was committed to according full due process, criticized practices of the revolutionary courts, but was unable to interfere with those practices.

1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person,
   Including Freedom From:
   a. Torture.

We are aware of no reports of torture by any government agency or by the national system of revolutionary courts. There were two or three reports of harsh treatment by revolutionary groups in the provinces. In general, those persons accused of crimes by the revolutionary courts seem
to have been fairly treated in the circumstances of a chaotic prison system. Authoritative Government and clerical leaders have stated on various occasions their condemnation of torture which is specifically prohibited in the new draft constitution.

b. Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

More than 600 executions by firing squads, often carried out in the midst of night, took the lives of political and military figures identified with the previous Government, counter-revolutionaries accused of plotting to overthrow the new Government and persons accused of violating Islamic ethical norms (prostitutes, homosexuals, drug sellers). The Government argued that the public rage against such persons was so intense that if some had not been speedily tried and executed by the revolutionary courts, crowds would have taken justice into their own hands causing a far higher death toll. There is no way to prove or disprove this assertion.

The number of executions of persons from the previous regime declined substantially following an amnesty declared on July 11 by Ayatollah Khomeini for all persons except those directly involved with murder or orders to kill.
The number of persons killed because of Islamic or counter-revolutionary crimes continued at a high level into the fall months. The working of revolutionary courts caused widespread fear and resulted in the flight from Iran of thousands of citizens who believed they could be victims of an unfair system.

c. Arbitrary Arrest or Imprisonment.

Arrest and imprisonment by revolutionary groups—with or without Government sanction—remained an ever-present threat through 1979; the incidence of such arrests declined in the second half of the year. Prolonged imprisonment without charge was frequent. Many prisoners arrested in spring on suspicion of political crimes were released beginning in July. In October the Government stated there were ___ political prisoners held in jails throughout the country. We believe.....

d. Denial of Fair Public Trial.

Although supporters of the new Government have stated that the revolutionary trials were conducted fairly and with due process, we cannot agree. Most of the trials were carried out in secret in a very short time and without right of appeal. Most accused persons we know of were not afforded the right of defense counsel or time to prepare evidence in their behalf. The summary nature of the
trials by revolutionary courts was strongly criticized by leaders of the Iranian Government, as well as Iranian and international human rights groups. The guilt or innocence of persons condemned by these courts will never be known.

e. Invasion of the Home.

The search by revolutionary groups for figures from the previous regime led to frequent invasions of the privacy of homes. Our impression is that these incidents were significantly reduced in the second half of the year, as Government police forces began to reassert their authority over revolutionary groups.

2. Governmental Policies Relating to the Fulfillment of Such Vital Needs as Food, Shelter, Health Care and Education.

The new government clearly considers among its highest priorities the improvement in the standard of life of the average Iranian citizen, especially the poor classes. The Government is committed to the revitalization of agriculture, the extension of educational opportunities and the provision of improved housing and health care. But because of the revolutionary turmoil, only limited steps could be taken during the
year to implement these policies. One beginning was the work of the Reconstruction Crusade which sent young Iranians into the countryside and poorer neighborhoods to build schools and other public buildings and perform previously-neglected public services. Slowness in economic recovery made the reduction in unemployment levels a key government concern. Some progress was made in stimulating economic activity during the summer and fall.

3. Respect for Civil and Political Liberties,
   Including:

It is clear that freedom of speech, the press and assembly were significantly strengthened with the advent of the new government. That situation continued generally until August when the Government felt threatened by the Kurdish challenge to central authority and criticism from left and center groups. Newspapers and magazines were closed and foreign correspondents were expelled. A new requirement for licenses for demonstrations was established. A press law promulgated in August established penalties for criticism of political and religious leaders and was harshly criticized by Iranian journalists as excessively
restrictive. The arrest of several prominent critics was ordered and they remain in hiding.

Nevertheless, throughout 1979 and even including the post-August period of restrictions and intimidation, Iranians enjoyed a greater opportunity to express their political views than at any time in the past 25 years. The press has freely reported events, pursued officials with sharp questioning and criticized Government policies and political leaders. Although opposition leaders and editors justifiably feel that the freedom they had in the first half of the year has been abridged, their ability to speak out is still less restricted than under the previous government. By December 1, 6 previously banned papers had been allowed to resume publication.

Religious minorities experienced periods of great anxiety about their well being during the year. With the execution of the prominent Jewish leader Habib Elghanian and harsh attacks on Israel and Zionism, Iranian Jews felt seriously threatened. Similarly, when a mob attacked a Baha'i shrine and the Government confiscated property of the Baha'i community, members of that faith felt similarly threatened. The new draft constitution continues the provision in the previous constitution which recognizes the Jews, Christians
Zoroastrians, but not the Baha'is as religious minorities. The Government stated repeatedly that religious minorities would not be persecuted, their rights would be protected and that only those persons charged with specific offenses will be arrested and tried. There is no evidence of persecution by the Government, but the absence of effective Government control has sometimes allowed vigilante groups to take action against the minorities, e.g. the attack on a Baha'i shrine in Shiraz.

b. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel and Emigration.

There are no official restrictions on movement within the country. In the first month following the revolution, the departure of adult males was prohibited. Subsequently, the right of Iranians to leave the country has generally not been abridged except for a group of persons who are wanted in connection with political and criminal investigations, and some of their relatives. The number of persons barred from leaving the country from March to October is not known but is believed to total around 10,000; the list was reduced in number in October.

c. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process.

Participation in the referenda and elections held in Iran since the revolution has been freely permitted. However,
a full range of alternatives in the referenda were not available and there was not time in the elections for well-developed campaigns or for the organizations of effective political parties. The voting power has been a mixture of secret and open balloting. On occasion, groups identified with pro or anti-Government groups have intimidated candidates or sought to disrupt the electoral process. These disruptions were, in part, a consequence of ineffective government police powers, in part a result of individual zeal by revolutionary authorities.

The regime has offered greater autonomy to the provinces and to the ethnic minorities than they were permitted under the previous government. The government proposed autonomy including locally-elected councils (________ elections were held in October) and the use of local languages with Persian in the schools, media, and assemblies. These offers have been rejected by some Kurdish, Arab, and Baluchi leaders whose demands have not been made clear in detail. The demands of some leaders may include independence from Iranian central government control -- unacceptable to any authority in Tehran. Negotiations between the government and dissident ethnic groups continued sporadically most of the year.
The Kurdish revolt and disturbances caused by other ethnic leaders was often met by a sharp, forceful response by the Iranian army and revolutionary guards. Excesses of violence have been committed by both the regime's forces and rebel groups, as well as by terrorist groups opposed to the government.

4. Government Attitude and Record Regarding International and Non-governmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights:

The Iranian Government has been severely criticized on human rights grounds by many international and non-government human rights groups. Representatives of these groups have been invited to Iran and some have made visits and inspections. The Government has criticized these groups and the international press for presenting a distorted and unfair picture of conditions in Iran. Although the Government excluded most of the foreign press, it made an effort to maintain a dialogue with human rights groups.
AmEmbassy London
INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL IMMEDIATE

FROM: USNATO
NO: 7105

TO: AMBASSADOR LONDON IMMEDIATE 9770

CONFIDENTIAL USNATO 07205

STADIS

FOR GLASPIE

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/19/85 (GLITMAN, MAYNARD, WAGATCHE)

TAGS: IP

SUBJECT: (C) UPDATE ON IRAN

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. PLEASE PASS TO HENRY PRECHT FROM HOPPER.

3. ALL ITEMS IN YOUR TALKING POINTS PAPER WERE USED, IN ADDITION TO INP'S ASSESSMENT.

4. UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT BUT. SOME HESITANCE TO MAKE FIRST HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT.

5. MODERATE EXILES SEEN AS HOPELESS AT BEST, DANGEROUS AT WORST. COMFORT WAS EXPRESSED THAT PRESENT CLESICAL REGIME IS SO CLEARLY NOT ASSOCIATED WITH WEST THAT AT LEAST WE NEED NOT BE BLAMED FOR ITS HUMAN RIGHTS FAILINGS. MOREOVER, ITS PECULIAR NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS CHARACTER IS A TEMPORARY BARRIER TO COMMUNIST ADVANCES. MEAN-WHILE ITS NON-MATERIAL CAST MAKES IRAN UNLIKELY PROLIFERATION CANDIDATE FOR MEDIUM TERM. FINALLY, IT IS AN INTROVERTED REVOLUTION.

6. MOST FELT SOVIETS WERE LAYING BACK WAITING FOR EVENTUAL SOCIAL REVOLUTION. TOTAL AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD LOOK FOR STEPS TO INCREASE REGIMES CONFIDENCE IN WEST, AND EQUALLY IMPORTANT SEEK CALM, GRADUATED STEPS TO BOLSTER NEIGHBORING MODERATE STATES.

7. FRENCH AND GERMAN MINISTERS HAD FRIENDLY MEETINGS WITH YAZDI IN NEW YORK, THE FORMER IN SCHEDULED BILATERAL, THE LATTER IN UNPLANNED CONTACT AT RECEPTION. BOTH, HOWEVER, HAVE LISTS OF BILATERAL ISSUES ON WHICH THEY NEED CONCRETE RESULTS BEFORE THEY WOULD CONSIDER HIGH-LEVEL VISITS.

8. OTHERS SAW GREATER RISK OF LEFT-WING REACTION WITHIN SIX TO TWELVE MONTHS.

9. YOUR IDEAS TO LOOK FOR PRACTICAL STEPS WERE WELCOME BUT PROVOKED FEW IMMEDIATE RESPONSES. SOME THOUGHT BOTH TURKEY, WHOSE EMBASSY PERIODICALLY HAS ESTABLISHED GOOD CONTACTS, AND INDIA, MIGHT USEFULLY PLAY MIDDLEMAN ROLE WERE IT NOT FOR COUNTERVAILING PROBLEMS. SOME THOUGHT THEY MIGHT ALSO BE USED TO PASS CAUTIONARY WORDING TO SOVIETS. NOTHING CAME OF THIS.

10. ASIDE FROM IRAN'S ROLE WITH PLO -- WHICH ALSO CAUSED LATTER SOME PROBLEMS -- THEIR FOREIGN POLICY IS NOT PROBLEM NOW FOR WEST. KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER CLERICAL REGIME COULD ADD RATIONAL STRUCTURE OF MODERN GOVERNMENT TO ITS IDEOLOGICAL BASE.
11. EC-9 attempting, individually and collectively maintain relations. In fact community conducted hopeful negotiations in August. Bilateral trade continues and use of government guarantee schemes has been less than feared.

12. Local contacts by embassies plus your idea of closer consultation, in Tehran and elsewhere, welcomed. Knowledge gap existing pending present practices. Glitman
MEMORANDUM

TO: The Files
FROM: L. Bruce Laingen - Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

SUBJECT: Comments by the French Ambassador Raoul Delaye

I made a courtesy call on the French Ambassador today. He has been here two years. I would not describe him as enthusiastic about the present situation in Tehran.

He has seen Khomeini three times; two times were substantive. He describes him as friendly but not warm towards France. He seems convinced that Khomeini will inevitably fail and that the immediate gain will be by the left.

The Iranian Revolution is unpopular in France. No clerical revolution could possibly have strength with the French public.

The presence of Bakhtiar in Paris in itself does not seem to have caused the French much problems with Khomeini; at least not yet, said the Ambassador. Yazdi did not refer to Bakhtiar during his bilateral with the French Foreign Minister in New York.

The French community numbers about a thousand in Iran. That number may grow slightly following an agreement to resume construction on a conventional power plant in the Tabriz area, an agreement reached two or three days ago.
1. In the aftermath of the Revolution, the Post found it necessary to curtail its staff and activities and therefore requested that Agency program support services be reduced or suspended.

2. The climate in Iran has now sufficiently stabilized to permit renewed program activity. The Binational Center in Tehran, for example, has initiated a feature film series and two Persian plays are currently booked in the IAS Theatre. The IAS is also exhibiting a Persian artist and the art work of Persian children. A Piano Concert is scheduled for November and some 3,500 students are enrolled in English classes. The library is attracting about 150 users and fielding 20-30 requests for information a day. The student counseling service has difficulty coping with demand. The binational centers in Isfahan and Shiraz are also active. The Fulbright Commission is once again organizing exchanges and the Iranian government has recently come up with candidates for agency programs.

3. Both the climate in Iran and post objectives limit sharply, however, the kind of programming which is feasible. Iranian sensitivities preclude all but classical music and no film, play, or dance which has any overt sexual aspect can be used. Similarly, Iranian sensitivities currently make public promotion of some U.S. objectives counterproductive (i.e., Human Rights, Middle East peace based on the Camp David Agreements, American security concerns). On the other hand, the Post can make excellent use of anything which shows U.S. interest in Islam, Persian culture, the welfare of family and children, spiritual values, third world development, self-determination and territorial integrity of nations.

4. The post's key objective must of necessity be to reduce Iranians suspicion that the U.S. is seeking to undermine the revolutionary regime and is not really prepared to cooperate with Iran to resolve issues and promote mutual interests. The Post recognizes, of
COURSE, THAT THIS OBJECTIVE IS DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE
AND IS THEREFORE TAKING A LONG-TERM VIEW IN PLANNING ITS
COMMUNICATION PROGRAM. IRANIANS RECALL PAST U.S.
POLICIES AND ACTIONS WHICH ARE NOT REASSURING TO THE
REVOLUTIONARY REGIME. USICA IRAN THEREFORE MUST DEVOTE
RESOURCES TO ACTIVITIES WHICH MIGHT APPEAR MARGINAL IN
OTHER CONTEXTS: A SERVICE ORIENTED LIBRARY WHICH FOCUSES
ON IRANIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE, RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY,
GENERAL REFERENCE WORKS, STUDENT COUNSELING, AND
RESEARCHING REFERENCE QUESTIONS; SPEAKERS CONCERNED WITH
MORAL VALUES, ISLAMIC HISTORY, PERSIAN CULTURE, AND THIRD
WORLD ISSUES; FILMS AND VTR'S WHICH SHOW AMERICAN INTEREST
IN MORAL VALUES, SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE, FAMILY AND
CHILDREN, PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SERVING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS; FEATURE
FILMS WHICH APPEAL TO IRANS STARVED FOR ENTERTAINMENT
AND INDICATE U.S. INTEREST IN HAVING FRIENDLY RELATIONS
WITH REVOLUTIONARY IRAN.

5. THE POST THEREFORE REQUESTS THAT AGENCY PROGRAM
SUPPORT SERVICES AGAIN INCLUDE TEHRAN AS AN ADDRESSEE
WHEN ANNOUNCING AVAILABLE MATERIALS AND PARTICIPANTS.
THE POST RECOGNIZES THAT MUCH OF WHAT IS BEING OFFERED
TO POSTS BY THE AGENCY IS INAPPROPRIATE TO IRAN AT
PRESENT, BUT THE POST IS PREPARED TO COPE WITH A LARGE
AMOUNT OF PAPER IN ORDER TO FASTEN ON THOSE FEW OFFERINGS
WHICH ARE USEFUL IN IRAN TODAY. THE POST ALSO REQUESTS
THAT POM AND ECA ACTIVELY ENGAGE IN ACQUIRING OR
DEVELOPING PROGRAM OFFERINGS WHICH MEET THE NEED OUTLINED
IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF THIS MESSAGE.

6. THE POST REQUESTS THAT THE AGENCY SUSPEND, IN THE
CASE OF USICA IRAN, RESTRICTIONS ON AGENCY PROGRAM
SUPPORT SERVICES WHICH PRECLUDE ALERTING POSTS TO
OFFERINGS WHICH ARE NOT CENTRAL TO THEIR PROJECT
PROPOSALS BECAUSE USICA TEHRAN DOES NOT HAVE ANY PROJECT
PROPOSALS ON RECORD. IF THE CLIMATE IN IRAN REMAINS
REASONABLY STABLE, THE POST WILL, HOWEVER, PARTICIPATE
FULLY IN THE AGENCY'S NEXT PLANNING CYCLE. GRAVES
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#1276

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DE RUQMHR #1405/01 302 **
ZNY CCCC Z2H
K 2912242 OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEBC/SECGST WASDAS 4520
INFO RUEJCS/JCS WASH DC
RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI Ø351
RUQSGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA Ø345
RUEHAL/USINT BAGDAD Ø351
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA Ø326
RUSQDR/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD Ø396
RUQHRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA Ø414
RUSELE/AMEMBASSY KABUL Ø393
RUQKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT Ø351
RUQDCT/AMEMBASSY LONDON Ø474
RUQMAN/AMEMBASSY MANAMA Ø319
RUQMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW Ø252
RUQMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT Ø228
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS Ø426
RUSNAAA/USCINCUS E/R WASHINGTON GE
ET

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 91 OF TEHRAN 11405

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/29/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PIOT, SA, IR
SUBJECT: MILLIONS MARCH FOR UNITY AND KHOMEINI

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. MILLIONS OF IRANIANS PARTICIPATED IN OCTOBER 26 MARCH IN TEHRAN AND THE PROVINCES TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND FOR UNITY OF IMAM (KHOMEINI) AND OMMAT (NATION). THE MARCH HAD BEEN CALLED BY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY (IRP), LED BY AYATOLLAH BEHESTI. IN TEHRAN A CROWD ESTIMATED AT OVER ONE MILLION PEOPLE CONVERGED BY VARIOUS ROUTES ON TEHRAN UNIVERSITY WHERE THEY LISTENED TO SPEECHES, CHANTED SLOGANS, AND HELD FRIDAY PRAYERS.

3. MARCH AND MEETINGS WERE ORDERLY. IN TEHRAN, CROWD INCLUDED MANY WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND UNIFORMED MILITARY PERSONNEL. THERE WAS A GENERAL HOLIDAY MOOD, AND HARASSED MARSHALLS DID AN EXCELLENT JOB OF KEEPING ORDER AND GOOD SPIRITS. CROWDS FILLED ALL STREETS SURROUNDING TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AS WELL AS UNIVERSITY GROUNDS, WHICH WERE TOO CROWDED FOR MANY PERSONS TO PRAY.

4. AT FOREIGN MINISTER’S SUGGESTION, VISITING DEPTOF WRIGHT, ACCOMPANIED BY EMBASSY POLOFF AND WORRIED-LOOKING OFFICIAL FROM MFA PROTOCOL ATTENDED PRAYERS AND RALLY. AS GET PAST CAPE GUARDS, QUICK-TO-TINK MFA OFFICIAL INTRODUCED U.S. VISITORS AS “FROM THE SENEGAL EMBASSY.” FORTUNATELY, NO ONE INVOLVED KNEW MUCH ABOUT SENEGAL. ONLY FOREIGNERS IN EVIDENCE WERE SENEGALESE AMBASSADOR (SEAT) AND SEVERAL NEWSMEN. CROWD WAS MILDLY CURIOUS AND FRIENDLY TOWARD FOREIGN GUESTS. THERE WERE NO HOSTILITY WHATSOEVER.

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TEHRAN 11405 1/2
5. CROWD WAS ADDRESSED BY AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE IRP, AND BY MOHAMMAD ALI RAJAI', ACTING MINISTER OF EDUCATION. BEHESHTI CALLED FOR UNITY FOR ALL SUPPORTERS OF THE REVOLUTION AND, REITERATED KHOMEINI'S EARLIER CALL FOR UNITY BETWEEN THE CLERGY AND THE UNIVERSITIES. THESE SPEECHES WERE FOLLOWED BY THE ADDRESS (KHOTBEE) OF AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI, IMAM JOM'EH OF TEHRAN. MONTAZERI APPEARS TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE POPULARITY AMONG THE ORDINARY IRANIAN, WHO APPRECIATES HIS LACK OF AFFECTATION AND HIS SIMPLICITY OF SPEECH. HIGHLIGHTS OF MONTAZERI'S ADDRESS INCLUDED:

- A. PEOPLE SHOULD APPRECIATE VALUE OF FREEDOM AND NOT COMPLAIN AT SHORTAGES OF SOAP, POWDER AND MEAT. HE COMPARED THESE COMPLAINTS TO THE QORANIC STORY OF THE ISRAELITES' COMPLAINTS AGAINST MOSES AFTER HE HAD LED THEM TO FREEDOM.

- B. PERSONS IN HIGH POSITIONS, INCLUDING CLERGYMEN, SHOULD FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF THE PROPHET, AND NOT SURROUND THEMSELVES WITH SERVANTS AND GUARDS TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM THE PEOPLE.

- C. ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY BUREAUCRATS SHOULD NOT BE JAILLED, BUT SHOULD BE QUIETLY RETIRED AND REPLACED BY YOUNGER, COMMITTED PEOPLE. MONTAZERI COMPLAINED, "AT LEAST IN THE OLD DAYS, FEAR OF THE SAVAK MADE SOME OFFICIALS DO SOMETHING FOR THE PEOPLE EVERY NOW AND THEN. NO! THE SAVAK IS GONE, AND THEY NEVER THINK OF THE PUBLIC WELFARE.

- D. FIVE MINUTE ARABIC SPEECH ADVISED ARABS TO LEAVE THE EAST AND WEST AND FOLLOW THE STRAIGHT PATH OF ISLAMIC.

6. AFTER PRAYERS, CHEERLEADER LED ABOUT TWENTY MINUTES OF REVOLUTIONARY SLOGANS. THE ONLY ANTI-AMERICAN VERSE WAS, "DEATH TO THE CORRUPT TRiumvirate: CARTER, SADAT, AND BEGIN." CROWD THEN DISPERSED IN ORDERLY FASHION.

7. SIMILAR MARCHES AND PRAYERS WERE HELD IN OTHER CITIES.
OF IRAN. IN ESFAHAN, SHEIKH KHALKHALI TOLD THE CROWD THAT GENERAL HUYSER, ACCOMPANIED BY TWO BURLY SERGEANTS, HAD FORCED THE SHAH OUT OF THE COUNTRY. FRIDAY PRAYERS, WHICH HAD BEEN STOPPED IN THAT CITY FOR SOME WEEKS, WERE RESUMED AT KHOMEINI'S DIRECT ORDER UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF AYATOLLAH TAHERI. IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION GAVE PROMINENT COVERAGE TO THE MARCH OF SUPPORT IN MECCA, CLAIMING THAT IT WAS JOINED BY PAKISTANIS, KUWAITIS, AND CHADANS.

8. SOME OBSERVERS WERE CONCERNED LEST KHOMEINI'S RECENT ATTACK ON THE OPPONENTS OF VELAYAT-E-FAQIH (SEE TEHRAN 11319) WOULD LEAD TO VIOLENCE AT THE MUSLIM PEOPLES REPUBLICAN PARTY (MPRP) MEETING SCHEDULED FOR LATER THAT DAY. TO PREVENT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE, ARMED REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS FROM TABRIZ AND QOM (PRESUMABLY SHARI'AT-MADARI PARTISANS) PROVIDED SECURITY AT THE MEETING TO PREVENT ATTACK FROM THE HIZBOLLAHS (RIGHT-WING GOON SQUADS). HOWEVER, THE MEETING WAS HELD WITHOUT INCIDENT.

9. COMMENT: THE MARCHES AND RALLIES ON UNITY DAY WERE A VIVID DEMONSTRATION THAT AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI STILL COMMANDS GREAT SUPPORT AMONG ORDINARY IRANIAN CITIZENS. THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF ANY COMPULSION OR RESISTANCE AMONG THE DEMONSTRATORS. MILLIONS OF PERSONS WILL TURN OUT VOLUNTARILY IN SUPPORT OF KHOMEINI. THIS SUPPORT IS INTENSELY PERSONAL, HOWEVER, AND DOES NOT EASILY TRANSLATE EITHER INTO SUPPORT FOR A PROGRAM OF POLITICAL ACTION OR INTO SUPPORT FOR OTHER PERSONALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE IMAM. ALTHOUGH THE PRESENT REGIME FACES SEVERE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, IF THE RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS ARE ANY INDICATION, THESE PROBLEMS HAVE NOT LESSENED KHOMEINI'S CHARISMATIC APPEAL TO THE MAJORITY OF HIS COUNTRYMEN.

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CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHARGE: STAT 10/30/79
APPROV: CHARGE: LBLAINGE
RELTO: CHARGE: LBLAINGE
CLEAN: NONE
DISTR: CHARGE

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K.O. 12055: RDS-2 10/30/93 (LAINGEN, L.E.) OR-M
TAGS: PSHF, IN, US
SUBJECT: THE SHAH IN U.S.

REF: STATE 282888

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AT NO TIME HAVE WE GIVEN PGOI ANY SUGGESTION THAT USG SHOULD HONOR OR HAVE AGREED TO REQUEST PHYSICALLY TO EXAMINE THE SHAH. WHEN I SAW YAZDI AT ALGERIAN NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION OCTOBER 28, I TOLD HIM THEN THAT WE HAD NOT AGREED TO FORWARD THIS REQUEST TO SHAH'S ATTENDING PHYSICIANS. HE RESPONDED BY SAYING HE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT, GIVEN THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS ISSUE, THAT WE COULD SET ASIDE WHAT I DESCRIBED TO BE THE MEDICAL, PROFESSIONAL, AND ETHICAL STANDARDS THAT HAD PRECEDED OUR PRESSING THE DOCTORS TO AGREE TO A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY IRANIAN DOCTORS.

3. WE HAVE NOT SEEN MEDICAL BULLETIN ON SHAH SINCE THAT OF OCTOBER 25 (STATE 279129). HAS THERE BEEN ONE SINCE? LAINGEN BT #1445

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CONFIDENTIAL //NODIS//CHEROKEE TEHRAN 11445

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1. I WANT TO REVIEW THE SUGGESTION WE TOUCHED ON WHEN WE TALKED IN LATE AUGUST THAT YOU CONSIDER STOPPING BY IRAN ON SOME UPCOMING TRIP IN OR THROUGH THE AREA. ONE OF OUR LIMITATIONS HERE IS THAT WE HAVE NOT HAD ANY POLICY LEVEL VISITORS – INDEED WE HAVE HAD NONE SINCE THE REVOLUTION. THE TIME HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN GOOD, BUT ON THE WHOLE IT IS BETTER NOW AND WE WOULD WELCOME THE ADDED SUPPORT IN OUR EFFORTS TO ENHANCE OUR CREDENTIALS WITH THE NEW IRANIAN LEADERSHIP THAT A SENIOR VISITOR COULD BEING TO CARRY.

2. THE PGOI’S OWN POLICY DIRECTION IN THE ECONOMIC AREA IS STILL IN A GOOD DEAL OF DISARRAY, AND MAY REMAIN THAT WAY FOR SOME TIME – THE GOVERNMENT STILL BEING PROVISIONAL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING PROCESS NOT YET COMPLETE. HENCE THERE ARE REAL LIMITS ON WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE IRANIANSIDE. BUT WE CAN BENEFIT FROM A TIMELY REAFFIRMATION OF OUR READINESS TO WORK WITH THE PGOI IN A MUTUAL PROCESS OF BUILDING A NEW RELATIONSHIP IN THE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL/OIL AREAS.

3. WE HAVE IN MIND A FAIRLY BRIEF STOLOGY, DURING WHICH YOU COULD GET SOME POLICY POINTS ACROSS IN DIRECT CONVERSATIONS WITH SENIOR PGOI TYPES, POSSIBLY SUPPLEMENTED IN AN INFORMAL SEMINAR AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE IRAN AMERICAN SOCIETY ON A QUIET, INVITATIONAL BASIS.

4. IF YOU CONTINUE TO THINK WELL OF THE IDEA, WE WOULD WELCOME KNOWING SOMETHING OF POSSIBLE TIMING SO THAT WE COULD TAKE SOME SOUNDINGS HERE. LAINGEN

BT #1523
2. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. EMBASSY APPRECIATES THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE ITS VIEWS KNOWN AT THIS EARLY STAGE. WE CONSIDER FRESH INVESTMENT BY AMERICAN COMPANIES TO BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN REBUILDING OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH IRAN. THE TWO PROPOSALS DISCUSSED IN REF A ARE JUST THE KIND OF ESTABLISHED, LOW-PROFILE INDUSTRIES OF INDISPUTABLE USEFULNESS WHICH SHOULD BE IN THE VANGUARD OF SUCH NEW INVESTMENT. WE HOPE THAT THESE COMPANIES WILL PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE INSURED BY OPIC.

3. WE HAVE DISPENSED MISGIVINGS, HOWEVER, OVER THE UTILITY, BOTH FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE USG AND OF THE COMPANIES, OF ESPousing THESE INVESTMENTS SPONTANEOUSLY AT THIS TIME WITH THE PGOI. MOREOVER, BEFORE INCREASING OPIC INSURANCE LIABILITY, WE SHOULD HAVE A BETTER FEEL THAN WE HAVE NOW FOR PGOI ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGN INVESTMENT, AND PARTICULARLY TOWARDS COMPENSATION IN CASES OF NATIONALIZATION.

4. OUR RECOMMENDATION, THEREFORE, IS NOT TO RESUME A LIMITED PROGRAM AT THIS TIME, UNTIL THE SITUATION CLARIFIES. END SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

5. PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES. REGARDING REF A, PARA 2, OUR BEST INFORMATION IS THAT THE FORMER CENTER FOR THE ATTRACTION OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT
IS DORMANT, AND DOES NOT EVEN ANSWER THE TELEPHONE. WE ARE TRYING DISCREETLY TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT ITS PRESENT STATUS.

6. WE'RE TRYING TO FIND SOMEONE TO TALK TO. WE WONDER WHAT VALUE ANY APPROVAL GIVEN BY THE CENTER WOULD HOLD. THE PGOI, SO FAR AS WE KNOW, HAS NOT DENOUNCED THE INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGREEMENTS OF 1957 AND 1970, WHICH CLEARLY RESPONDED TO THE POLICY MANDATES OF THE FORMER REGIME. WHETHER THEY RETAIN ANY SIGNIFICANCE WITHIN THE POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTIES OF TODAY'S IRAN IS ANOTHER QUESTION. WE ARE REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT NO CIVIL SERVANT WOULD APPROVE THESE PROJECTS (AND WITH THEM THE RESUMPTION OF OPIC PROGRAMS) ON HIS OWN. EVEN IF A MINISTER WERE TO GIVE HIS APPROVAL, THERE IS NO ASSURANCE OF HOW LONG HE MIGHT STAY IN OFFICE. IN MORE NORMAL AND STABLE GOVERNMENTS, A CHANGE IN MINISTERS NEED NOT ENTAIL AN ALTERATION OF POLICY OR AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF GOVERNMENTAL APPROVAL OF A PARTICULAR INVESTMENT. WE CANNOT SAY THE SAME WITH ANY CONFIDENCE FOR THE PGOI.

7. POLICY PROBLEMS. WE WOULD HAVE GREATER CONFIDENCE IN THE APPROVAL GRANTED BY A MINISTER WERE WE CONFIDENT THAT HIS APPROVAL GENERALLY REFLECTED SETTLED PGOI POLICY REGARDING FOREIGN INVESTMENT. AT THE MOMENT, POLICY IS NOT SETTLED. A NUMBER OF OFFICIALS, OF VARYING DEGREES OF INFLUENCE, WILL TELL YOU THAT THEY ARE ALL FOR RENewed FOREIGN INVESTMENT. CERTAIN MULLAHS WOULD SAY THE SAME. THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT, HOWEVER, IS DEEPLY DIVIDED. KHOMEINI'S OWN HOSTILITY TO WESTERN INFLUENCE IN IRAN, OR WHICH FOREIGN INVESTMENT IS A MOST VISIBLY SYMBOL, NEEDS NO FURTHER Amplification HERE.

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8. IN THIS AREA, AMBIVALENCE SEEMS TO PREVAIL. FOR EXAMPLE, ISLAMIC ECONOMIST BANI-SADR, SAID TO BE DESTINED TO PLAY A HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL ROLE IN THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, TOLD US (REF ) THAT HE FAVORED FOREIGN INVESTMENT, PROVIDED THAT IT WAS FOR THE BENEFIT OF IRAN AND NOT FOR THE BENEFIT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS. BANI-SADR DID NOT AMPLIFY HIS STATEMENT. WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, HE DISALLOW REMITTANCES OF PROFITS TO FOREIGN INVESTORS. ASSUMING THAT HE BECOMES THE RESPONSIBLE MINISTER, WOULD HE ISSUE PROJECT APPROVALS, THEREBY RECOGNIZING THAT THE INVESTOR GOVERNMENT HAS A VALID AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE INVESTMENT, AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS PROTECTION?


10. IN TIME, HOPEFULLY, THIS REVOLUTIONARY PARANOIA WILL FADE AWAY. IN THE INTERIM, IS IT IN THE INTEREST OF FUTURE U.S. FOREIGN INVESTMENT GENERALLY AND OF THESE TWO INVESTMENTS IN PARTICULAR, FOR THE USG TO DRAW OFFICIAL ATTENTION TO THEM? FOR ALL THE BENEFITS THAT OPIC INSURANCE WOULD ENTAIL FOR THESE INVESTORS, WE WONDER WHETHER A HANDS-OFF POLICY AT THIS TIME MIGHT NOT SERVE THEIR INTERESTS BETTER.
11. PROBLEMS OF COMPENSATION. For the USG itself, a threshold question in deciding whether or not to increase OPIC insurance against unreasonably slow, inadequate or ineffective compensation in the event of future nationalization is the quality of the compensation actually being offered by the PGOI. While the record is mixed, the experience thus far of a number of former contractors (American Bell International, GTE, etc.) has been far from happy. We understand from Iranian sources that B.F. Goodrich is satisfied with its settlement. In negotiations with the Petroleum Joint Ventures, there is evidence (Ref.) that the PGOI is not averse to dangling the lure of future crude allocations as a means of whittling down compensation claims. At the very least, we should take a hard look at the compensation finally awarded to major U.S. banks and insurance companies before taking a decision to increase insurance levels in Iran.

12. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS. Assuming a satisfactory track record on compensation on the part of the PGOI, an end to present paranoia, and an institutional and policy evolution to the point where investment agreements and approvals again reflect settled policy, we should at that time give favorable consideration to the restoration of OPIC programs in Iran.

13. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS. We understand that U.S. investors can register projects with OPIC without actually activating insurance. Presumably, no approach to the PGOI would be required if this is the case. We so recommend with regard to these two investments for the immediate future. LAINGEN##