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VOL. XII.

HARNACK'S HISTORY OF DOGMA.    VOL. VII.
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

The Translator deeply regrets that, in preparing this concluding volume for publication, he enjoyed only to a limited extent the aid of the late lamented Professor Bruce, whose enfeebled state of health precluded the possibility of close and continuous scrutiny of the English rendering,—although he was engaged in examining proof-sheets within a few weeks of his death. In expressing the hope that the volume will not seriously suffer from appearing mainly on his own responsibility, the Translator may perhaps be permitted to bear testimony to the profound interest Dr. Bruce took in Harnack's great work, to his pains-taking and unwearied efforts to secure that it would be adequately presented to English readers, and to the singular geniality of his intercourse with those who had the honour of co-operating with him in his labours.
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ERRATA.

Page 9; line 2 from top, read beside in place of besides, and delete comma after this.
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SECOND PART.

DEVELOPMENT OF ECCLESIASTICAL DOGMA.

THIRD BOOK.

THE THREEFOLD ISSUE OF THE HISTORY OF DOGMA.
“Also haben die Sophisten Christum gemalet, wie er Mensch und Gott sei, zählen seine Beine und Arm, mischen seine beiden Naturen wunderlich in einander, welches denn nur eine sophistische Erkenntuiss des Herrn Christi ist. Denn Christus ist nicht darumb Christus genennet, dass er two Naturen hat. Was gehet mich dasselbige an? Sondern er träget diesen herrlichen und tröstlichen Namen von dem Ampt und Werk, so er auf sich genommen hat; dasselbige giebt ihm den Namen. Dass er von Natur Mensch und Gott ist, das hat er für sich; aber dass er sein Ampt dahin gewendet und seine Liebe ausgeschüttet, und mein Heiland und Erlöser wird, das geschieht mir zu Trost und zu Gut.” (Luther, Erlang. Ausg. XXXV. S. 207 f.)

“Adversarii, quum neque quid remissio peccatorum, neque quid fides neque quid gratia neque quid justitia sit, intelligant, misere contaminant locum de justificatione et obscurant gloriam et beneficia Christi et eripiunt piis conscientiis propositas in Christo consolationes.” (Apologia confessionis IV. [II.] init.)
CHAPTER I.

HISTORICAL SITUATION.

In the fourth section of Chapter IV., Vol. V. (p. 222 ff.), it has been shown that by Augustine the traditional dogma was on the one hand strengthened, i.e., the authoritative force of it, as the most important possession of the Church, was intensified, while on the other hand it was in many ways expanded and recast. That dogma which, in its conception and its construction, was a work of the Hellenic spirit on the soil of the Gospel (see Vol. I., p. 17 ff.), continued to exist; in thinking of dogma one thought of the knowledge of a supernatural world and history, a knowledge that was revealed by God, that was embodied in unalterable articles of doctrine, and that conditioned all Christian life; but into its structure there were interwoven by Augustine in a marvellous way the principles of Christian life-experience, of the experience which he had passed through as a son of the Catholic Church and as a disciple of Paul and the Platonists, while the Roman Church thereafter gave to dogma the force of a great divine system of law for the individual and for Christian society.

By these foregoing steps, of which the influence continued to be fundamental, the inner history of Western Christianity in the Middle Ages was determined. We have seen that no substantially new element can be pointed to in the period of a
they were strengthened. Just for that reason a crisis was bound to arise. The unity which for Augustine included dogma, the claims of the understanding, the legal regulations of the Church and the principles of individual Christian life, was destroyed; it could not be maintained. Those claims and these legal regulations and principles betrayed more and more of a centrifugal force, and, as they grew stronger, asserted the claim to sole supremacy. Thomas, indeed, the greatest of the Schoolmen, still set himself to solve the vast problem of satisfying under the heading and within the framework of a Church dogmatic all the claims that were put forward by the ecclesiastical antiquity embodied in dogma, by the idea of the Church as the living, present Christ, by the legal order of the Roman Church, by Augustine's doctrine of grace, by the science of Aristotle, and by the piety of Bernard and Francis. But the great work of this new Augustine certainly did not issue in lessening the strain of the mutually antagonistic forces and in securing a satisfying unity. So far as it aimed at this effect the undertaking was futile; to some degree indeed it produced the opposite result. The wealth of material employed in carrying it out only served to strengthen to the utmost all the forces that were to be kept controlled within the unity of the whole. Thomas was as much looked up to as a teacher by the rational criticism of Nominalism as by the Mysticism of Eckhart and the "Pre-Reformers," and if he undoubtedly laid the foundation for the most extravagant theories of the Curialists, yet on the other hand he strengthened the recollection of the Augustinian dictum, that in religion it is purely a question about God and the soul.

The task is a difficult one, and can scarcely be carried out, of indicating in a few of its characteristic features the inner state of Christian religion in the West at the close of the fifteenth century; for the picture this period presents is almost as com-
plicated as that exhibited by the second century of our era. After what has been stated in the foregoing Book, it must be enough for our purpose to specify briefly the most important currents in their relation to dogma.

I. Curialism.—About the year 1500 a great party was in existence that treated Church and religion simply as an outward form of dominion, and sought to maintain and extend them by means of force, officialism, and an oppressive system of dues. The nations held that the chief seat of this party was to be sought for in Rome itself, at the papal court, and they were aware that the secularising of the Church, which had become a heavy burden, not only on consciences, but on all vigorous forces of life and on all ideals, was carried on from Rome without shrinking or shame. It is a matter of no importance whether among those who in this way undertook to build up the Church of Christ there were some who in their hearts had continued inwardly devoted to the cause for which they ostensibly laboured; for we have to do here only with the results which they had their share in producing. For this party of Church politicians there was at bottom only one dogma—that the use and wont of the Roman Church was divine truth. The old dogma had only value and importance in so far as it was of a piece with the usages of the Roman Church. There is implied in this that this party had the strongest interest in giving to the modern decisions and verdicts of the Curia entirely the same value and authority as belonged to dogma. As, on the one hand, it could never think of abrogating anything authoritative (if an old tradition, a passage of Scripture, or a dogmatic distinction was inconvenient, any unwelcome consequence was obviated by the new rule that had now made its appearance, that only the Church, i.e., Rome, had the right to expound), so on the other hand it had to see to it that the nations became accustomed to the startling novelty of attributing the same sacredness to papal decisions as to the decrees of the great Councils. About 1500 this quid pro quo had

1 Cf. the introductions to the history of the Reformation by Kolde (Luther), v. Bezold and Lenz (Luther), and also Müller's Bericht in the Vorträge der Giessener Theol. Conferenz, 1887.
already succeeded up to a certain point, though the success was still far from being perfect. But the spirits of men were wearied and perplexed after the unhappy course of things during the period of the Councils (Constance, Basle). Even the Councils had succumbed, or were rendered powerless. Somewhere, nevertheless, a fixed point had to be found. Accordingly, the Romanists succeeded in again persuading many that it was unquestionably to be found in Rome, and there alone. The princes, moreover, intent only on maintaining secular rule over the churches in their own dominions, left the Curia to act in an irresponsible way in the provinces of faith, morals, and Church practice, and so on their part strengthened the presumption with regard to the religious (dogmatic) infallibility and sovereignty of the Roman Chair. The Curia, of course, could have no interest in gathering the papal decisions into a sacred code and placing this as a Church law-book side by side with the old dogma; for thereby the idea would only have been encouraged which there was a wish to combat—that the Pope, namely, was bound by a strictly defined dogmatic canon. What was desired rather was to accustom the nations to see invariably in the papal directions issued ad hoc, the decisions that were necessary and that terminated all discussion. Just on that account the Curia was only gratified when there still remained a certain dubiety about many questions that were stirred regarding dogma and Church polity; such dubiety it deliberately fostered where a definite decision could not be

reached without provoking considerable opposition. It had long been learned, too, from experience, that angling is better in troubled waters, and that uncertain souls are more easily ruled than souls that have a clear view of what is valid in the Church and has the support of truth.

Very closely connected with this was the circumstance, that in Rome the advantages were more clearly seen which the once dreaded *Nominalistic* Scholasticism could furnish in Church affairs. A theology which, like the Thomistic, aimed at securing for believers an *inner conviction* of the things they had to believe, could certainly also render the Church the greatest services, and these services the Church can never quite dispense with, so long as it does not wield an unlimited external power. But every theology that is directed towards awakening inner convictions and producing a unity of thought, will to some extent also train its scholars in criticising what is at the time in force, and will therefore become dangerous to a Church system which forbids all scrutiny of its use and wont. It was otherwise with the Nominalistic Scholasticism. After a development for more than 150 years, it had reached the point of showing the irrationality, the (to human view) contingent and arbitrary character of even the most important Church doctrines. Though an interest of faith might also be involved in this great critical process (see above Vol. VI., p. 162), yet its most manifest result was that there was a resolute surrender to the authority of the Church. The Church must know what the individual can never know, and its faculty for understanding reaches further than the intelligence of believers. That this result was bound to be welcome to the Curialists is very obvious; Innocent IV. indeed had been beforehand with the assertion, that the layman may satisfy himself with faith in God as requiting, if only he is obedient to the Church. They had no objection to urge, therefore, against that *fides implicita*, which is nothing but blind obedience, and specially convenient for them must have been the dissolution of the Augustinian doctrine of grace which Nominalism had effected by laying stress on the miracle of the Sacraments and on merit. But who, then, really believed still in the dogmas, and sought life on the ground of his belief?
point of a man’s being well-pleasing to God and having merit. Faith, which had always been regarded in Catholicism as something merely preliminary, is here shrivelled up into submission to an apparatus. During the time immediately before the Reformation many of those who served in working the machine in Rome had a Humanistic smile on their lips; but they never went so far as to express vigorous scorn; for there was too much convenience in the system that had been built up, and those who maintained it had too little thought to admit of their jesting being ever taken seriously.

There can be no doubt that this whole mode of procedure was a way of burying the old dogma; not less doubtful is it that there developed itself here—with an alarming logical consistency certainly—an element that lay in the beginnings of Western Catholicism. Augustine, in his day, had thrown himself into the arms of Church authority, and declared the “credere,” as meaning blind submission to what the Church teaches, to be the starting-point in the inner process of the Christian life. But what a wealth of Christian experience he at the same time brought with him, and how well he understood how to make of his Church a home! From this there had been a lapse, or it had come to be treated as a matter of indifference. To obey and submit to be trained!—but the training was provided for by the Sacrament, was provided for by the ludicrously small

1 It has been repeatedly pointed out in foregoing passages how there are betrayed already in Tertullian the elements of the later Catholicism, and even, indeed, of Scholasticism. It would be a fine piece of work to gather together and estimate all the material relating to this: Tertullianus doctorum Romanorum præcursor. It is a remarkable fact that among the old Catholic Fathers the man who most truly represented primitive Christianity was at the same time the most modern.

2 He himself could certainly have no inkling of the shocking superstition, a defence of which would one day he sought for in his ill-omened proposition; “Quod universa frequentat ecclesia, quin ita faciendum sit, disputare insolentissimæ insanæ est” (Ep. 54 ad Januar.), and of the facility with which the proof from the general usus of the Church would be employed.
offerings to which the Church could impart the worth belonging to moral acts. Besides this, there was no longer a place for dogma in the old sense of the term, as the definitely outlined content of what is to constitute the inward conviction of a Christian and is to be vitalized within him. As dogma was encumbered by a hundred new definitions of which scarcely any one could take full account—these new definitions, again, being differentiated according to the form in which Rome had spoken, as absolutely binding, qualifying, probable, admissible, etc.—it also became bereft of its direct significance. It is the legal system of the Roman Church, but a legal system ever taking new shape through ever new arbitrary decisions: it is enough for the Christian to adhere to the institutions which it has brought into existence. If this course of things had gone on uninterruptedly and been victorious—victory seemed already to await it about 1500—then dogma would have continued indeed to exist in an outward way, but inwardly both the old dogma and dogmatic Christianity in general would have disappeared, and their place would have been taken by a form of religion belonging to a lower stage. For the way in which Curialism placed itself above dogma, merely showing respect to its formal dignity, did not arise from the freedom of the Christian man, but only indicated the complete secularising of religion by politics. The “tolerari potest” of the Curia and the “probabile” produce a still worse secularisation of the Church than the “anathema sit.” And yet there was still inherent in this quite secularised notion of the Church a Christian element—although by that time its power to bless had almost entirely disappeared. That element was faith in the Kingdom of Christ on earth, in its presence and supremacy in the midst of the earthly and sinful. In having this faith, those who earnestly resisted all opposition were superior to their opponents; for they felt that the men who opposed, aimed at building up a Church from beneath, that is to say, from the holiness of Christians. They represented a religious thought when they upheld the empire of the Pope; or rather, in protecting the Church against Mystics and Hussites, they involuntarily conserved the truth of the conviction that the Church of Christ is the reign of the gospel among sinful men.
2. The opposition to Curialism was not held together by an identity of thought; the motives, rather, which had prompted the opposition were very various. Men were influenced by political, social, religious, and scientific considerations; but they were agreed in the one point, that the usages of the Roman Church had grown into a tyranny, and that the testimony of ecclesiastical antiquity was against them. In connection with the observation of this the theses were maintained, that papal decisions had not the importance of articles of faith, that it was not competent to Rome alone to expound Scripture and the Fathers, that the Council, which is above the Pope, must reform the Church in its head and members, and that in view of the innovations in dogma, in cultus and in Church law which had emanated from Rome, the Church must return to her original principles and her original condition. These positions were not only represented in the period before the appearance of Luther by Conventicles, Hussites, and Waldensians or wild sectaries; they found their defenders still more in the ranks of the truest sons of the Roman Catholic Church. Bishops, theological faculties and monks of unquestionable orthodoxy gave expression to them, and Luther was justified in appealing to such men at the beginning of his career as a reformer.¹ Even against papal pronouncements to a different effect there was held to be a good Catholic right to maintain, that the basis of the Roman Catholic Church is to be found only in Scripture and in the dogmatic tradition of ecclesiastical antiquity.² With a firmness that seems strange to us to-day this standpoint is still represented in the Augsburg Confession;³ of course it will be impossible to deny that, after what had taken place previous to

¹ From the year 1519; see also his speech at Worms.
² Hence also Luther’s appeal to the Greeks, who were certainly no heretics.
³ In Art. XXI. these terms are used: “Hæc fere summa est doctrinæ apud suos, in qua cernit potest nihil inesse, quod discrepet a scripturis vel ab ecclesia Catholica, vel ab ecclesia Romana, quatenus ex scriptoribus nota est.” The cautious mode of procedure of the Augsburg Confession has been made more apparent by Ficker’s fine book on the Confutatio (Leipzig, 1891). The Confutatores were unfortunately right in a number of their exposures of the defective candour of the Confession. Luther also was no longer so well satisfied with the book at midsummer, 1530, as he had been in May, and he had, to some extent, the same strictures to make as the Catholics with regard to dissimulation.
the year 1530, it could still be asserted there only from tactical considerations. But even the Emperor himself, as we know, applied the same criterion: in the acceptance or rejection of the "twelve articles," i.e., of the Apostolic Symbol as expounded in the early Church, he saw a profession of orthodoxy or heresy.  

How untenable, however, this standpoint was, and what a lack of thought was implied in defending it in all seriousness! In point of fact it was only the circumstance that no crisis of any gravity had as yet exposed its weakness that rendered deception possible as to its having grown frail; and, as the Emperor himself was not really guided in his action by it, so none could maintain it any longer without qualification. Was it not the case, then, that since the time of Augustine there had entered into the iron composition of Western religion an immense mass of theological propositions and Christian experiences, which had never been authoritatively fixed, but which nevertheless everyone regarded as legitimate? How many regulations there were which were generally recognized as salutary and proper, and which rested, notwithstanding, only on papal direc-

1 See the information given by Agricola, as quoted by Kawerau (Johann Agricola, 1881), p. 100: "It happened that in the Vigils of John the Baptist the Emperor held a banquet in the garden. Now, when Queen Maria asked him what he thought of doing with the people, and with the Confession that had been delivered up, he gave the reply: Dear sister, since my coming into the holy Empire, the great complaint has reached me that the people who profess this doctrine are more wicked than the devil. But the Bishop of Seville gave me the advice that I should not think of acting tyrannically, but should ascertain whether the doctrine is at variance with the articles of our Christian faith. This advice pleased me, and so I find that the people are not so devilish as had been represented; nor is the subject of dispute the Twelve Articles, but a matter lying outside of them, which I have therefore handed over to the scholars. If their doctrine, however, had been in conflict with the Twelve Articles of our Christian faith, I should have been disposed to apply the edge of the sword." It is to be noted here that both Thomas and Duns (see Ritschl, Fides implicita, p. 15 f., 20) put down the contents of the symbol as the theologia revelata, of which the subject-matter is distributed among two sets of seven propositions—seven upon God and seven upon the Incarnation (the mystery of the Godhead, the vision of whom is blessedness, and the mystery of the humanity of Christ, which is the ground of attaining to the honour of God's sons). Not even is the Church included here. (Biel was the first to add it, without, however, bringing out the main Catholic feature, see p. 34 f.). Everything, on the other hand, that is not included here belongs to Natural Theology, and is subject to an estimate different from that applied to the doctrines of faith.
tions or on the tradition of the immediately preceding centuries! What a readiness there was on all hands to acknowledge the decisive title of the Pope to interpret Scripture and tradition, in cases where his pronouncements coincided with what was regarded by one's self as correct! How much doubt there was as to how far the Council was superior to the Pope, and what powers a Council had when it acted without the Pope or assumed an attitude of opposition towards him! And what uncertainties prevailed as to what was really to be reformed, the *abuses* or the *usages*, the outward condition of the Church—that is, its constitution and ritual forms, or the administration of the Sacraments, or the Christian life, or the conception of the Church, as the kingdom established by God in which Christ reigns. We derive a clear view of this host of uncertainties even from the line of action followed by Luther from the year 1517 till the year 1520. Although by that time he had already laid his hand on the helm and knew distinctly whither he was steering, what painful contradictions, compromises, and uncertainties, we at once see to have marked his course in those years, when we observe what reforms he then contemplated, and what view he took of the powers belonging to the Church! At that time he could almost in one breath acknowledge and repudiate the authority of the Church of Rome, curse the papacy and profess submission to it!

And yet what is in itself untenable and full of contradictions can nevertheless be a power. This was true of the opposition to Curialism about the year 1500. We should, however, be very much mistaken were we to assume that the efforts of the opposition, which appealed to ecclesiastical antiquity against the innovations of Curialism, exercised, or were even intended to exercise, any considerable influence on the shaping of *doctrine* in the direction of a conscious return to the old ecclesiastical theology. The thought of such a return was almost entirely absent, because *the period generally was an untheological one*. This distinguishing feature which characterised the two generations immediately preceding the Reformation—the development of which, moreover, had begun at an earlier date—has had little justice done to it hitherto in the formation of an estimate
of the Reformation. The case can be briefly stated: about the year 1500 theology as such was discredited; no one expected anything from it, and it had itself ceased to have any real confidence in its work. Many factors had contributed to this. Nominalist Scholasticism had in a sense declared itself bankrupt, and had buried itself in subtleties that were the result of a systematic abuse of the Aristotelian philosophy. Humanism turned away from theology with complaint or with ridicule—in both cases mainly on the ground of a superficial criticism. The men of piety—they might be pious as Erasmus or pious as Staupitz—sought a remedy for the evils of the times, not in theology, but always still in mystic transcendentalism and indifference to the worldly conditions that environ the bodily life of men; that is, they sought it with St. Francis or the holy communists of the primitive Church of Jerusalem. Everywhere in the circles of the religiously awakened, the cry for "practical Christianity" was united—as it is to-day—with a weary dislike of theology. Not that by any means there had as yet been a growing out of theology; but the anxieties, which were the results of the general revolution in the times, were enough—as they are to-day—to awaken the feeling that nothing more could really be done with doctrine as it was then expressed. Besides all this, the active life had for two generations been insisting upon its rights, and accordingly a diminished worth was attached to quietistic contemplation. This was the mightiest revolution in the spirit of the times. Even the Renaissance was only an element in it. For religion and theology a crisis thus arose, a crisis the most severe they could pass through from the time of their origin; for both of them were embedded in acosmistic Quietism. Either they must disappear along with this, or they must be forcibly severed from it and transferred into a new medium.

Had the ecclesiastical "doctrine" been only science, it would, under such circumstances, have run its course; it would have been obliged simply to step aside and give place, even outwardly, to another mode of thought. This result really followed among the Anabaptist-Antitrinitarian and among the Socinian groups, with whom all those elements combined found lodgment which.
led on to "Illuminism." This will have to be dealt with later on. But Christian doctrine is not merely "science," and during the eighteen centuries of its existence Christendom as a whole has never had the wish to break with history (even the most radical movement — Calvinism — represents no complete apostasy). Nay, it has felt as if every break, even with the most unhappy past, would mean self-dissolution. The past, however, was dogma and dogmatic theology. If there was neither the ability nor the wish to become severed from these, and if, nevertheless, there was an ever-increasing estrangement from them—as the cry for practical Christianity and the disregard for the theological element proved—the necessary consequence was that dogma was respected as a system of law, but put aside. That was really the state of things that had established itself also among the ranks of the parties in opposition. Anyone who attacked dogma exposed himself to the risk of being set down as an anarchist. But anyone who sought a remedy for the times in return to dogmatic Christianity and in closer occupation with its contents, and who aimed at getting quit of certain practical abuses by falling back on the old dogmatic theory, was regarded as wrong-headed, as a creator of disturbance, nay, as a man to be suspected. Within the circles of higher-class science favourable to reform, and even within the circles of the silent opposition throughout the land, it was apt to be looked on as an instance of monkish squabbling when an attempt was made to proceed by means of theory against the indulgences, the unlimited worship of saints, and the ritualistic extravagances of the Church system. But even such attempts were partial and infrequent. At the most there was a falling back upon Augustine—the age tolerated that up to a certain point, nay, demanded it; but where can we find, in those days, the man who turned back to Christology and the doctrine of God in order on the basis of these to revise and recast what was held as valid?

The ultimate cause of this lack and this incapacity is not indeed to be sought for in the desolating effects of Nominalism, or in the aesthetic spirit of the Humanists;¹ it lay, rather, in the

¹ Cf. Drews, Humanismus und Reformation, 1887.
enormous disagreement that existed between the old dogma and the Christian intuitions that had taken shape in the Christian life of the time. This disagreement, which we have noted even in Augustine, and which is so plainly perceptible at the beginning of the Middle Ages in Alcuin, had become even greater. Which out of the number of the old ecclesiastical dogmas, then, had still a directly intelligible meaning for piety in its then living form? Which dogma, as traditionally understood, had still a real motive power for Christian thought and life? The doctrine of the Trinity? But we only need to glance at the Scholastic doctrine of God, or at Anselm's doctrine of reconciliation, or at the books of devotion and the sermons of that period, in order to feel convinced that the time was past when the thought of the Trinity might, as in the days of Athanasius and the Cappadocians, form the main basis of edification for the Church. The doctrine of the two natures? But unless we are disposed to lend an ear to the sophists, can we fail to hear the strong protests against this doctrine's power to edify, that came from Bernard's mystic devotion to the Bridegroom of the Soul, from the Jesus-love of St. Francis and Thomas à Kempis, and from the image of the man Jesus, whose sorrow-stricken features were presented to view by every preacher in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries? Did not the doctrine of grace, whether we think of it in the Augustinian-Thomistic or the Scotistic form, did not the huge apparatus of the Sacraments presuppose quite a different Christ from that sharply-defined intellectual thought-structure of Leontius and John of Damascus, which glorified the triumph of the divine nature in the human, and sought to produce by mere contemplation of the union the feeling of a subjugation and redemption of all flesh? Here lay the ultimate cause of the inward estrangement from dogma. Thought was no longer Greek thought, though speculation might apparently succeed without special trouble in returning to these conceptions. But for speculation the conceptions were now only presuppositions, they were no longer Christianity itself. When, however, the old faith is no more the expression of inner conviction, a new faith shapes

itself under the envelope of the old. All spheres in which Christian thought and life moved lay far apart from those spheres of thought in which there had once developed itself the faith that might be held. It had now come to be a faith that must be held; therein one had the merit of Christ, the Church, the Sacraments, one's own merit and the indulgences. Within these faith and Christian life moved. While one asserted that he stood on the old ground and had not departed from it by a hair's breadth, there had been advance—a glorious advance indeed; but on the pathway there were gulfs that had not been avoided, and they led down to the deepest regions. There were not a few who observed this with terror and strong displeasure; but how could it be helped, so long as it was not clearly seen how the condition had developed in which one found himself, at what point the error had really arisen, and where the height lay that one was required to reach?

We can understand how under such circumstances there should have been a going back to the authority that had at first pointed out the path by which one had travelled for a thousand years, and on which there had been the experience of a splendidly gratifying progress, but also of a deep fall—a going back, that is to say, to Augustine. In his works were to be found most powerfully expressed all the thoughts from which edification was derived; and on the other hand it was believed that the grave abuses and errors were not to be found there which one lamented at the time. Hence the watchword: "Back to Augustinianism, as to the true Catholicism of the Fathers." In very different forms this watchword was given forth; in a comprehensive way by men like Wyclif, Huss, Wesel, Wessel, and Pupper of Goch; in the most cautious form by all those theologians who in the fifteenth century and at the transition from the fifteenth century to the sixteenth went back, in opposition to the prevailing Nominalism, to the Thomistic doctrine of grace. There seems to have been not a few of them;

1 Very thorough work has been carried on by Dutchmen during the most recent decennia on the Augustinians of the Netherlands. A very excellent monograph on Goch has quite lately been produced by Otto Clemen (Leipzig, 1890). On the relation of Goch to Augustinianism, see l.c., pp. 209-223.
but if they were few, the distinguished position of those who reverenced Thomas made up for the smallness of their number; for some of them were to be found among the highest prelates, even in Italy. The importance of this retrograde theological movement at the beginning of the sixteenth century is not to be underestimated; it became—no doubt under the strong pressure of the German Reformation—one of the most influential factors in the Romish Church, when the question arose in the middle of the sixteenth century as to the dogmatic position that was to be taken up towards Protestantism. But Augustine could give to no age more than he himself possessed. Even by him an artificial connection only could be formed with the old dogma, because he had in many respects inwardly grown out of it; and on the other hand the germs of the abuses and errors of later times which there was a desire to discard were already deposited in him, whether one might observe it or not. To find in Augustine a remedy for the evils from which the Catholic Church suffered would at the best have been to secure a reform for a few generations. But the old abuses would inevitably have returned; for their strong, though hidden, roots lie in Augustinianism itself. Had the Church been remodelled after his pattern, there would very soon have been a re-introduction of everything there was the wish to remove. This is no airy hypothesis; it can be proved both from the Christianity of Augustine himself and from the history of the Catholic Church in more recent times. While the grave errors and abuses could only assert themselves powerfully by means of a disintegrating process on Augustinianism, yet they must be regarded as active influences of which the sources lay in Augustine’s Christianity.

But this observation, while it goes to the root of things, must not prevent our noticing very distinctly that the genuine Augustinianism exercised a potent critical influence on what had become disintegrated, including Nominalism. It was a power full of blessing. It may very well be said that there never would have been a Reformation had there not been first a revival of Augustinianism. It may of course be asserted, on the other hand, that this revival would not even have resulted in such Decrees as those of Trent, had it not been strengthened by a
new force. But at any rate there was so great a gulf between
the immoral, the irreligious, and even pagan mechanicalism of
the ruling church system, and the piety of Augustine, that one
cannot fail to observe the salutary reform that would have
resulted, if, for example, the Christianity of Wyclif had become
determinative in the Catholic Church.

In addition to all this, there had developed itself, amid the
decay of mediæval institutions, and under the great change of
existing conditions, one element which we find everywhere at
the beginning of the Reformation period, and which animated
in varying degrees the opposing parties. Along all lines of
development there had been an ultimate arriving at it; in all,
indeed, it was the secret propelling force, which broke up the
old and set itself to introduce something new. It is difficult to
describe it in one word: subjectivism, individuality, the wish to
be one's self, freedom, activity. It was the protest against the
spirit of the centuries that had been lived through, and the
beginning of a new attitude to the world generally. On a
superficial view it appears most distinctly in the ideals of the
Renaissance and Humanism; but it lived quite as much in the
new politics of sovereigns and in the indignation of the laity at
the old regulations in corporation and community, in Church
and State. It was powerful in the Mystics' world of feeling,
with their striving after practical activity; nay, it is not undis-
coverable even in the Nominalistic Scholasticism, which, in its
gloomy work of ruining the traditional theology, was not
directed by the intellect only, but wrought from a dim impulse
to restore religion to faith, and to bring to view faith's inde-
pendent right and its freedom. The new element revealed
itself everywhere as a two-edged principle: the age of Savo-
narola was the age of Machiavelli; in religion it comprehended
all forms of individual religiousness, from the right of unbridled
imagination and of prophetism to the right of liberty belonging
to the conscience that is bound by the gospel. Within these
extremes lay a whole graduated series of individual types; but
at many points in the series the eager endeavour to come to
one's self, to be and live and act and work as one's self, awakened
the restless feeling: if thou art now thyself, and beginnest thy-
self to live as a man and as a Christian, where is the rock to which thou must cling; what is thy blessedness, and how art thou to become certain of it? How canst thou be, and continue to be, at once a blessed and a free man? In this feeling of unrest the age pointed beyond itself; but we do not observe that even a single Christian could clearly understand the question that lay at the basis of this unrest, and give to it the answer.

It certainly repays trouble to consider what would have become of dogma if the development had continued which we observe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and if no new factor had intervened. Issues of dogma there would assuredly have been; but the question, of course, does not admit of being decided as to what issue would have remained victorious. We can conceive (1) that Curialism might have rapidly achieved a complete triumph and vanquished all refractory elements; in that case the sovereign papal will would have come to be the court of final appeal even in the domain of faith and morals, and the old dogma would have become a part of the papal consuetudinary law, which would really have been modified ad libitum by arbitrary interpretations and decisions of the Pope. Under such circumstances, believers would have been obliged to become accustomed to the thought that fides implicita, that is, obedience, was a work of merit, imparting value to all their other doings, so far as the sacramental system imposed these upon them. In a material sense dogma would have come to an end; the Church would have remained the institution authorised to grant salvation; even though no one had believed what it taught, yet all would have submitted to its regulations. There would thus have been a sinking to a lower stage of religious development. But it can also be conceived (2) that from the circles of the parties opposed to it a reform might have been forced upon the Church; a reform which, within the field of ecclesiastical law, would have consisted in a reduction of the powers of the papacy in favour of an ecclesiastical oligarchy, and, within the field of dogmatic, in an establishment
of the Augustinian-Mystic Christianity. We can very well imagine that all the Augustinian-Mystic thoughts, which as yet had received no dogmatic symbolic definition whatever, but which formed the basis of the piety of the best Christians, would have come eventually to be strictly formulated. In this case two things would have been possible: the attempt might have been made to maintain the connection with the old dogma, as even Augustine had maintained it (even in that event it would at any rate have become clearly apparent that those dogmas were presuppositions that had been transcended), or it would have been shown that another view of the Godhead and another view of the God-man must be substituted for the old. But (3) there might also have been expected at the beginning of the sixteenth century a breaking up of the Church. One section would have advanced along the path described under 1 or 2, another would have taken its course from the illuminist directions that were given in the pantheistic Mysticism that neutralised historic Christianity, in the rationalistic criticism of dogma by Nominalism, and in the Humanistic conception of the world. If such a movement had taken shape, it would have been a question whether it would have stopped short before Scripture, or whether it would not even have advanced beyond it. One might be ready to expect both in observing the signs of the times about the year 1500. In the one case a rationalistic or an enthusiastic Bible-Christianity would have been the issue, in the other case developments would have necessarily resulted which cannot be calculated. But in both cases the old dogma would have ceased to exist. But, lastly (4), one could have expected (though it is questionable whether, in view of the mediæval condition of things, such an expectation could have arisen had the Reformation not taken place) that out of the fermenting elements in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries a new and deeper type of religion would have developed itself. That is to say, if we combine things that clearly present themselves to view—that a number of the theologians (Dominican Mystics) were disposed to labour, even in theology, only at what was really for edification, that the point was being sought for in the spiritual nature of man that is at the same time the
seat of religion and the nucleus of the soul's life, that out of this nucleus there was to be formed by regeneration a new inner man, who must become certain of his blessedness and freedom; if we add to this that Nominalism had taught the lesson that the endless efforts of speculation can produce no certainty, that certainty therefore must be sought for somewhere else; and if we then take into consideration what the general state of mind was—that men were then striving to free themselves from the spirit of the Middle Ages, to return to the sources, and to live henceforth as independent personalities, it is perhaps not too bold to expect in the province of religion, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, a new development that would include an evangelical reformation of all that constituted religion, but that would thereby also uproot and put an end to the old dogma, inasmuch as the new point of departure, the living faith in God as being gracious for Christ's sake, and the right to be free springing from that faith, could only allow what belonged to it to retain its place in theology.

But the actual history did not exactly correspond with these expectations. This time, also, history did not connect the new epoch with the old as logic develops a new position from the refutation of an old. The real issues of dogma rather, in the sixteenth century, continued to be burdened with contradictions, which raised for the period that followed important problems. For that reason one might be in doubt as to whether issues can really be spoken of; still, after what has been developed in the Prolegomena to the history of dogma (Vol I., i ff.), and what has been stated in the sequel, it will certainly be necessary to use this term.

In the sixteenth century the crisis in the history of dogma took a threefold issue.¹

¹ The crisis in the history of dogma—if we review the development in connection with the whole movement of spiritual life we shall not speak of issues, nor shall we be satisfied with the movements in the history of dogma. In that case, rather, the historical reflections would have to be included, which Dilthey has so admirably
The old Church developed itself on the one hand more decidedly into the papal Church, and thereby struck out on the path indicated above (sub. 1); but, on the other hand, it gave fixity to the Augustinian-Mediaeval doctrines, and added them to the old dogmas as equally legitimate portions of the system (see above, sub. 2). Although that took place at Trent in a way clearly indicating that the position taken up was not within dogma, but above it, and that on that account there was the decision to regulate it by the practical needs of the Church as an outward institution, yet one was obliged to make compromises; for the Reformation forced even the old Church to judge spiritual things spiritually, or at least to adopt the appearance of a spiritual character. Just for that reason the Decrees of Trent still belong to the history of dogma; for they are not merely products of the ecclesiastico-political skill of the Curia, although they do very really bear that character. So far, however, as this is not the case, they prepared many difficulties for the Church, and checked its full development into Curialism. The discords and struggles within the Catholic Church during the following three centuries made this sufficiently plain. But these struggles resulted, step by step, in suppressing the elements of opposition, till at last, after the immeasurable service which the French Revolution and Napoleon I. rendered to Curialism, the complete victory of the papacy could be proclaimed in the dogma of Mary and in the Vatican Decrees. In this way that was at last attained which the Curia and its followers already developed in his dissertations on "The Natural History of the Mental Sciences in the Seventeenth Century" (Archiv. f. Gesch. der Philosophie, Vol. V., p. 480 ff.: Vol. VI., pp. 60-127, 225-256, 347-379, 509-545); cf. also his essay on "The Autonomy of Thought, Constructive Rationalism, and Pantheistic Monism, viewed in their connection in the Seventeenth Century" (l.c. Vol. VII., pp. 28-91). Dilthey distinguishes between three great trends in the theology of the sixteenth century, which in some minds, of course, crossed one another: (1) The ecclesiastical theology, which adhered to the system of dogma (though with modifications); (2) the transcendent theology (Christianity as the fulfillment of the universal religious striving and struggle that goes on everywhere and at all times in humanity)—the school that deals with the universal that lies behind the religions and their forms; (3) the ethical rationalism (expressed most definitely in Socinianism). The first tendency has its root in the more or less purified ecclesiastical tradition, the second in the intuition and feeling of an All-One that reveals itself in a variety of degrees in all that is individual, the third in the ideas of the Stoa.
sought to reach in the sixteenth century; as the Church became the handmaid of the Pope, so dogma also became subject to his sovereign rule. It is at the same time a matter of entire indifference in what speculations Catholic theologians indulged with regard to the relation of the papacy to dogma, when they asserted that the Pope was bound by Catholic doctrine; for anyone who has the right to expound will always be able to find a way in which a new dogma which he creates can be set forth by him as an old one. The whole idea of dogma, however, as the faith which ought to animate every Christian heart, and which makes the Christian a Christian, is in reality discarded so far as it is left to each individual to determine whether or not he can adopt the faith in its whole extent. If he succeeds (but who could succeed in view of the whole, half, and quarter dogmas, and the countless multitude of decisions?), so much the better; if he fails, then no harm is done, if only he has the intention to believe what the Church believes. That we have here an issue of the history of dogma, whether more new dogmas are afterwards to be formulated or not, is a matter beyond doubt.

2. In the sixteenth century Antitrinitarian and Socinian Christianity developed itself. It broke with the old dogma and discarded it. In view of the rapid decline of the Socinian communities it might be held that the consideration of their Christianity does not belong to the general history of the Church at all, and therefore also does not belong to the history of dogma; yet, if we take into account with how much certainty Antitrinitarianism and Socinianism can be connected with the mediæval development (Nominalism), with what energy the Protestant dogmatic of the seventeenth century grappled with them as its worst enemies, and finally, how closely in touch is the criticism applied to dogma by evangelical theologians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the Socinian criticism, we should be in conflict with history were we to think of ignoring the issue of the history of dogma that is presented in Socinianism.

3. But a third issue is to be found in the Reformation itself, though certainly it is the most complicated, and in many re-
pects the most indefinite one. Instructed by history itself, the
Reformation obtained a new point of departure for the framing
of Christian faith in the Word of God, and it discarded all
forms of infallibility which could offer an *external* security for
faith, the infallible organisation of the Church, the infallible
doctrinal tradition of the Church, and the infallible Scripture
codex.¹ In this way that view of Christianity from which
dogma arose—Christian faith the sure knowledge of the ulti-
mate causes of all things, and therefore *also* of the divine provi-
sions for salvation—was set aside: Christian faith is rather the
firm assurance of having received from God, as the Father of

¹ With regard to the first point a proof is unnecessary. With regard to the second
let Luther's treatise be read, "Von den Conciliis und Kirchen" (1539); but along
with this also Form. Concord. P. I. Epitome, p. 517 (ed. Müller): "Reliqua vero
sive patrum sive neotericonum scripta, quocunque veniant nomine, sacris litteris
nequaquam sunt æquiparanda (not even the decrees of the Councils therefore) sed
universa illis uta subjicienda sunt, ut alia ratione non recipiantur, nisi testium loco,
qui doceant, quod etiam post apostolorum tempora et in quibus partibus orbis doctrina
illa prophetarum et apostolorum sincerior conservata sit. . . . Symbola et alia scripta
non obtinent auctoritatem judicis." Also Art. Smalcald. II, p. 303: "Verbum
dei condit articulos fidei, et praetera nemo, ne angelus quidem." Also "Etliche
Artikel, so M. Luther erhalten will wider die ganze Satansschule (1530, Erlanger
Augs. XXXI. p. 122): "The Christian Church has no power to lay down any
articles of faith, has never yet done so, nor will ever do so. . . . All articles of faith
are sufficiently laid down in Holy Scripture, so that one has no liberty to lay down
more. . . . The Christian Church ratifies the Gospel and Holy Scripture as a sub-
ordinate; it displays and confesses as a servant displays his master's livery and coat-
of-arms," and see other passages. With regard to the third point, later Protestantism
narrowed its position. But, so far as is known, no Lutheran of any standing, with
the exception of Kliefoth, has ventured to sever himself publichly from the Luther of
the earlier years. If, however, the attitude is at least justifiable in Protestantism
which Luther took up in his well-known prefaces to the New Testament books (see
the remarks on the Epistle of James, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse),
that implies the discarding of the infallible Scripture canon. At the same time,
while historically very important, it is essentially a matter of indifference that there
are to be found in Luther, especially after the controversy on the Eucharist, many
assertions that are to the effect that every letter of Scripture is a foundation of Christian
faith, for the flagrant contradiction that something at the same time does not, and does,
hold good, can only have the solution that it does not hold good. This, however,
necessarily follows also from Luther's view of faith, for the basis of his view is that faith
is wrought by the Holy Ghost through the preached Word of God. Moreover, there is
a common admission at the present day in the widest circles in Protestantism that
historic criticism of Scripture is not unevangelical. No doubt this admission extends
only to the "principle." Many forbid themselves the application.
Jesus Christ, the forgiveness of sins, and of living under Him in His kingdom—nothing else. But from that dogma all supports were at the same time removed; for how can it be unrefromable and authoritative if men, with their limitations and entanglements in sin, sketched and formulated it, and if every security external to it is lacking? And yet the Reformers allowed the old dogma to remain; nay, they did not even submit it to revision. No doubt it was not as a law of faith over and above faith, a law resting on certain outward guarantees, that they let it retain its force; their so acting was from the conviction, scarcely ever tested, that it exactly corresponded with the Gospel, the Word of God, and that it attests itself to everyone as the obvious and most direct meaning of the Gospel. They regarded it as a glorious confession of God, who has sent Jesus Christ, His Son, in order that we, being delivered from sins, may be made blessed and free. Because they found this witness in dogma, every motive disappeared for inspecting it more closely.\(^1\) It was not as dogma that it continued to them authoritative, but as a confession of God the Lord, who is hidden from the wise, but revealed unto babes. But because it remained in force at all, it remained in a sense as dogma. The old dogma was certainly not merely an evangelic testimony to the God of grace, to Christ the Redeemer, and to the forgiveness of sins; indeed it reproduced these thoughts of faith only in an indefinite way; it was, above all, knowledge of God and the world, and a law of faith. And the more strenuously the Reformation accentuated faith, the more emphatically it represented it as the basis of all, in contrast with the uncertainties of the hierarchical, ritual, and monastic Christianity, the more disastrous did it necessarily become for it that it forced together, without observing it, this faith and that knowledge of faith and law of faith. When in particular there was now added the pressure of the external situation, and, as the result of the storms that had arisen (Fanatics, Anabaptists), the courage disappeared to assert anything "that is at variance with the Catholic Church or the Church of Rome, so far as this Church is known from the writers of Scripture." ("quod discrepet ab ecclesia catholica vel

\(^1\) See Kattenbusch, Luther's Stellung zu den ökumen. Symbolen, 1883.
ab ecclesia Romana, quatenus ex scriptoribus nota est”), the movement issued in the Augsburg Confession, which does not indeed deny the principle of evangelical Christianity, but which at the same time began (yet compare already the Marburg Articles) to pour the new wine into the old bottles.¹ Did the Reformation (in the sixteenth century) put an end to the old dogma? It is safer to answer this question negatively than positively. But if it is granted that it uprooted the foundations of dogma—as our Catholic opponents with perfect justice represent—that it is a powerful principle and not a new system of doctrine, and that its history, throughout the periods of Orthodoxy, Pietism, and Rationalism, and down to the present day, is not an apostasy, but a necessary development, then it must also be granted that the entirely conservative attitude of the Reformation towards the old dogma belongs, not to the principle, but to the history. Therefore, the Reformation, as a continuously active movement, certainly represents an issue of the history of dogma, and, we hope, the right and proper issue.²

¹ That the gospel of the Reformation found a masterly expression in the Confession of Augsburg (Loofs, D. Gesch., 3rd ed., p. 399: he cautiously adds, certainly, “and in the Apology explaining it,”) I cannot admit. The Augsburg Confession laid the basis for the doctrinal Church; the blame very really lies with it of contracting the Reformation movement. Would anyone have so written before 1526, not to say before 1529? Its arrangement is Scholastic, and, besides, is wanting in clearness; its statements at important points are, positively and negatively, intentionally incomplete; its diplomatic advances to the old Church are painful, and the way in which it treats the sectaries as naughty children, and flings out its “anathemas,” is not only loveless but unjust, dictated not merely by spiritual zeal, but also by worldly wisdom. Yet it must not be denied that at the most important points it struck the nail on the head, and that inlaid in this earthen vessel there are precious stones, with a simplicity and fitness of setting which we find in no other Reformation writing. We can already develop from the Augsburg Confession the Church of the Form of Concord, if not the particular doctrinal formulæ; but we can also, by moving backwards, derive from it, and maintain, the freer evangelical fundamental thoughts, without which there never would have resulted a Reformation or an Augsburg Confession. As regards its author, however, it may be said without hesitation that Melanchthon here undertook—and was required to undertake—a task to which his gifts and his character were not equal.

² It is very instructive here to place together the testimonies of two men who were as different as possible, but who, in their estimate of the Reformation, as regards its relation to the past and its relation to the present, are entirely at one. Neander writes
With a view to the delineation of our subject, the duty arises of describing more precisely the threefold issue of the history of dogma briefly sketched here. But just because they are issues, what is required of us is no longer an exhaustive statement; for in the issues of a thing it is no longer the thing itself that is the moving force—otherwise it would not take issue—but new factors intervene and come to occupy its place. For our purpose, therefore, it must be enough that we describe briefly the dogmatic development of the Romish Church till the time of the Vatican Decrees, without entering more minutely into political plans and complications, which must be left to Church history and the history of creeds; that, further, we bring under notice the

(in his Account of the part taken by him in the "Evangel. Kirchenzeitung, 1830, p. 20): "The spirit of the Reformation... did not attain quite at the beginning to clear self-consciousness. So it happened that in an unobserved way many errors passed over from the old Canon Law into the new Church practice. To this there was added, on the part of a number of the Calvinistic theologians, a mingling and confusing of the Old and New Testament points of view. Luther—who on so many sides towered above the development of his time—setting out from the principle of the faith that unfolds itself freely and by its own inner divine force, reached here also consciousness of pure evangelicalism, but owing to the movements connected with the Eucharist controversies, and during the Peasants' War, that pure consciousness became clouded again." The same scholarly and truthful man confessed publicly more than once that, although he claimed personally to hold the full evangelical faith, he could by no means entirely identify himself with the Augsburg Confession, and, though with all modesty, yet he clearly indicated that that can be no longer done by any Christian of the nineteenth century who has learned from history. To the same effect Ritschl asserts (Gesch. des Pietismus I., p. 80 ff., 93 ff.; II., p. 60 ff., 88 f.): "The Lutheran view of life did not continue to run in an open channel, but was hemmed in and obstructed by objective-dogmatic interests, and became less distinctly visible. Protestantism was not delivered from the mediæval womb of the Western Church in its complete power and equipment, as was Athene from the head of Zeus. The imperfect way in which it took its ethical bearings, the breaking up of its comprehensive view of things into a set of separate dogmas, its preponderating expression of what it possessed in rigidly complete form, are defects which soon made Protestantism appear at a disadvantage in contrast with the wealth of mediæval theology and asceticism. ... The Scholastic form of the pure doctrine is really only the preliminary, and not the final, mould of Protestantism." That Protestantism, or Lutheranism, when measured by the Augsburg Confession, no longer possesses a common pure doctrine is simply a fact, which is not altered by simply casting a veil over it. Of the twenty-one articles of faith in the Augsburg Confession, articles 1-5, 7-10, 17, 18, are in reality subjects of controversy even in the circles of those who still always act "on principle" as if nothing had become changed. In concrete the particular divergences are not only "tolerated" but permitted; but no one, to
Socinian criticism of dogma; and that, finally, we come to understand the Reformation in such a way that its distinctive character, as contrasted with the dogmatic inheritance of the past, shall become as clear to us as the dogmatic contraction that was its more immediate issue, and as the main lines of its further development down to the present day. To give a full historic narrative down to the time of the Form of Concord and the Decrees of Dort, and then to break off, I regard as a great mistake, for by such procedure the prejudice is only strengthened that the dogmatic formulations of the Churches of the Reformation in the sixteenth century were their classic expression, while they can certainly be regarded only as points of transition.¹

use Luther's language, will bell the cat and publicly proclaim, and guide the Church in accordance with, what is unquestionably a fact which can never again be changed. We do not find ourselves in "a state of distress" so far as the public expression of our faith is concerned, but the untruthfulness, the timidity, and indolence with which we confront the changes in knowledge—that is the "state of distress." Luther had first to find the truth, and, when he had found it, he sold all that he had in order to purchase it for himself and Christendom. He sold the most glorious thing which the age possessed—the unity of the Catholic Church; without regard to the "weak," and at the cost of all his old ideals of heaven and earth, he reduced it to ruins; but his Epigones are so faint and anxious-minded that they will not even admit to themselves any new thing they have learned, and are in danger of selling themselves to a tradition of yesterday, or, after flinging away all evangelical perceptions, of retiring upon Greek dogma.

¹ Why I do not include the history of old Protestant doctrine in the history of dogma may be gathered from Paulsen, Gesch. des gelehrten Unterrichts, 2nd ed., Vol. I. (1896), pp. 432-450. Add to this that the history of old Protestant doctrine is the German after-bloom of the essentially Romanic Scholasticism. What is of value in it consists in some great fundamental perceptions, which, however, can be better studied at the fountain-head—that is, in the Reformers. The rest is without worth, is even without historical interest of a higher kind, and, in spite of the authority which princes, professors, and consistories have given, and still give, to it, is antiquated, and, as a spiritual force, exhausted. The objection of Dilthey is a serious one (Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Philos., Vol. V., Part 3, p. 353 ff.), that Luther's Christianity is not an issue of the history of dogma because it has the old dogma, and above all the doctrines of original sin and satisfaction as its necessary pre-suppositions. I make the admission to Dilthey that one has to take his choice. There is much, it is true, that would justify us in continuing the history of dogma down to the present day; but what has run its course in it from the end of the seventeenth century in Protestantism has certainly no longer a resemblance formally, nor to some extent even materially, to the old history of dogma. Now, if we observe that this development in Protestantism is not an apocryphal one, but that it had one of its roots—in my opinion its strongest root—in the Reformation, we shall certainly have a right, in spite of the
Even Seeberg and Loofs break off with the Book of Concord and the Synod of Dort. In the case of the former, the adoption of this terminus is certainly intelligible; one is only surprised not to find the Confession of Westminster, the most important Confession of the Calvinist Churches at the present day. On the other hand, it is difficult to understand how Loofs follows the view of the rejuvenated Lutheranism, a view of which, nevertheless, he himself disapproves in his closing section (p. 463), "Whoever looks with favour on the Union thereby acknowledges that the present must be so connected with the sixteenth cen-

admission that the old dogma was the necessary pre-supposition of the Christianity of Luther, to regard Luther as himself representing the issue of the history of dogma—in the same way, let us say, in which Christ must be regarded as the end of the law, although the law was not cancelled, but affirmed by Him. And here a further remark must be made about the old dogma as the “necessary pre-supposition of the Christianity of Luther.” If it is in no sense admitted that the doctrine of original sin, the doctrine of satisfaction, and the doctrine of the “person and work” of Christ in general, have a rightful place in the pure, spiritual religion, then certainly the matter is decided; one must then say with Dilthey that Luther’s doctrine of justification itself exists only as long as these, its pre-suppositions, exist—that is, they cannot be united with the piety that thinks. But these very pre-suppositions, in my opinion, admit of a treatment under which their core is still preserved, and under which they still do what they did for Luther’s experience of justification, while their mythological or metaphysico-transcendental form falls away. If that can be proved—the limits of this problem as regards proof I am fully conscious of—then it is possible to adhere to Luther’s conviction of justification, together with the objective positions that lie at the basis of it, without asserting these positions in the inflexible dogmatic form which they once received. But in that case it is here again made out that Luther represents an issue of the history of dogma. Dilthey’s objection is at bottom the same as that of Kübel (Neue Kirchl. Zeitschr. 1891, p. 43, etc.): Since, according to Luther, the individual experience of faith is unquestionably dependent on the structure of the old dogma, he belongs to the history of the old dogma. But, in point of fact, it depends on a number of important motives, which found in the old dogma an imperfect expression. (Something similar had to be noted already in Augustine, although in a lesser degree.) It will be objected that it is not motives that are in question, but the reality or unreality of alleged facts. That also is correct; the question then will be, whether to these alleged facts (universal attribution of guilt, θεός ἐν σαρκί, sacrificial death of Christ) there does not correspond something real, although not, certainly, as explained and spun out by the Greeks, Augustine, and Anselm. Furthermore, in a second series of essays in the Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Philos., Vol. VI., Pars 3, 4 (see Preuss. Jahrb., Vol. LXXV., Part 1, 1894), Dilthey has so firmly grasped the new religiousness of Luther and the Reformers, and has lifted it so high above the plane previously reached in history, that it can no longer be difficult for him to acknowledge that Luther represents an issue of the history of dogma. On these articles see below.
tury that the period of the Epigones is excluded. Now, as the orthodoxy of the Epigones in the sixteenth century has its root in this, that the Reformers still retained a number of Old Catholic presuppositions and dogmas which were not in agreement with their own fundamental thoughts, a convinced approval of the Union must lead one to see that it is the problem for the present to carry through the fundamental thoughts of the Reformers in a more thorough-going and all-sided way than was done, or could be done, in the sixteenth century." Very correct; but in that case one has only the choice—either to continue the history of dogma down to the present day, or to content one's self with setting forth the ground-thoughts of the Reformation. But the latter is, in my opinion, what is required, and that not merely because the giving form to Protestantism has, notwithstanding the 380 years during which it has existed, not yet come to an end—the Augustinian-Roman Church needed still longer time—but, above all, because, as Loofs very correctly remarks, "the Reformers still retained a number of Old Catholic presuppositions and dogmas that were not in agreement with their fundamental thoughts, and in these the theology of the Epigones has its roots." Here, therefore, the distinctive character of the Reformation principle is recognised in this, that, looked at in its negative significance, it cancelled not only mediaeval doctrines, but Old Catholic presuppositions and dogmas. But there is no dogma down to the present day which is not Old Catholic, or derived from what is Old Catholic. Accordingly the Reformation, that is, the evangelical conception, faith, cancels dogma, unless one puts in the place of the real homogeneous dogma some thought-construction of what dogma might be. But that being so, it is a bad and dangerous case of connivance when within the history of dogma the history of the Reformation Churches is only considered so far as their doctrinal formulations kept within the lines of the old dogma, or were in complete dependence on it. The Reformation is the end of dogma in a sense similar to that in which the gospel is the end of the law. It shook off the law of faith, not with the view of declaring it to be sin, but as expressing the thought that it increases sin, an assertion that was made of the Mosaic Law by Paul. It substituted for the demand
for the *act* of faith, which answers to the law, the freedom of the
children of God, who are not under the burden of a compulsion
to believe, but have the joy of a blessing bestowed upon them.
And as the Apostle Paul said with reference to the law, it can
say with reference to dogma, "Do we make void the law of
faith?—nay, we establish it;" for it knows and teaches that
the believing heart gives itself as a captive to Jesus Christ, and
renders Him obedience.

As the force and violence of the breach with the past was only
imperfectly expressed in the symbolic formulations of Protes-
tantism in the sixteenth century, we should to-day be witnesses
against ourselves and our Christianity if we were to judge these
formulations finally complete. By this "we" there are to be
understood not only some modern theologians, or the straight-
forward adherents of the Evangelical Union—for them that is
self-evident—but not less, nearly all Lutherans. "The general
habit," Loofs is justified in saying, "is to speak of different
Christian confessions: no man of modern orthodoxy is orthodox
in the sense of the period that produced the last symbols, and
almost nowhere is obligation to the symbols conceived of as it
was then." But what a wretched state of things is the result of
this attitude, when there is an unwillingness to admit to one's
self that it is assumed! One cannot go back; neither is he
willing to go forward: and thus the ruling power is exercised
by the fancies with which the theologians of the Romantic
epoch bridged over abysses and closed up gulfs—is exercised by
ecclesiastical aestheticism; is exercised by the fides implicita of
Nominalism, that is, by ecclesiasticism and anxiety about schism.
Each one regards the fancy of the other as false; but it is
reckoned to him for righteousness if he has closed up the gulf
at all, no matter by what deceptive means it is done. In view
of this, the history of dogma would find rest for itself were it to
propagate the old prejudice that Protestantism stands to-day
beside the Form of Concord and the Synod of Dort. Even if
what we to-day discern, possess and assert—not in spite of our
Christianity, but on the ground of it—the purity of faith as faith
in the Father of Jesus Christ, the strict discipline of Christian
knowledge, moderation in judging diverging Christian convic-
tions, entire freedom of historic investigation of Scripture, with a hundred other good things—even if these things could not be successfully derived by us from the Reformation itself—nothing else would remain for us but to testify that the Reformation was not the final thing, and that in the course of history we have passed through new purifications and received new good things as gifts. As evangelical Christians we are not bound to the Reformation, still less to the “entire Luther” and the “entire Calvin,” to whom some, in melancholy despair of the clearness of the gospel and of their own freedom, in all seriousness point us, but to the gospel of Jesus Christ. But we do not depart from the plain testimony of history when we rediscover in the Christianity of Luther and in the initial positions of the Reformation that to which Protestantism has at the present day, in weakness and under restriction, developed itself, and when we hold also that Luther’s conception of faith is still to-day the moving spirit of Protestantism, whether there be many or few who have made it their own. Just on that account the steps are to be warmly welcomed towards finding successors to the faith formulæ of the Epigones of the Reformation period in Confessions that do not require to be submitted to under great distress and to be laboriously maintained, but that can be adhered to with truthfulness as the evangelical faith. Failure, no doubt, followed the genuinely evangelical attempt in the year 1846 to introduce a new confession: the Union was too weak to be able to do more than proclaim itself; it appeared to collapse at the moment when it was to confess what it really was. But the problem has remained unforgotten, and attention has recently been again directed to it in a very impressive way by an evangelical theologian, who describes himself as orthodox and pietistic. We do not need to dispute about terms; he makes the demand for a new “dogma” (Christliche Welt, 1889, Oct. and Nov.). He means a new Confession of evangelical faith, emancipated from dogma. But while among us, owing to a most melancholy, blindedness, such a demand is at once regarded as in itself suspicious, and is met with scorn and the frivolous cry, “Beati possidentes,” things begin to stir among our brethren across the
Atlantic. Before me there lie a number of notices from the ranks of the earnest Calvinists there, contemplating a revision of the Westminster Confession (the chief symbol), that is, a correction of it in many points that were held in the seventeenth century to be the most important. At the head of this movement stands Professor Schaff (see his article, "The Revision of the Westminster Confession: A paper read before a special meeting, Nov. 4th, 1889, of the Presbytery of New York.") If any name, that of Schaff is a guarantee that nothing will be undertaken here that will not be carried through, and carried through, too, in the most prudent and gratifying way. [I allow these lines to stand, though his Church has been deprived of Schaff.] Schaff, and very many along with him, wish an alteration, or possibly an elimination, of Confess. C. III. 3, 4, 6, 7; VI. 1; X. 3, 4; XXV. 6; XXIV. 3. But they desire still more. The following noteworthy words are employed (p. 10):—". . . Or if this cannot be done without mutilating the document, then, in humble reliance upon the Holy Ghost, who is ever guiding the Church, let us take the more radical step, with or through the Pan-Presbyterian Council, of preparing a brief, simple, and popular creed, which shall clearly and tersely express for laymen as well as ministers only the cardinal doctrine of faith and duty, leaving metaphysics and polemics to scientific theology; a creed that can be subscribed, taught, and preached ex animo, without any mental reservation, or any unnatural explanation; a creed that is full of the marrow of the gospel of God's infinite love in Christ for the salvation of the world. Such a consensus-creed would be a bond of union between the different branches of the Reformed Church in Europe and America and in distant mission fields, and prepare the way for a wider union with other evangelical Churches. . . . In conclusion, I am in favour of both a revision of the Westminster Confession by the General Assembly and an oecumenical Reformed Consensus to be prepared by the Pan-Presbyterian Council. If we cannot have both, let us at least have one of the two, and I shall be satisfied with either.” To this height of freedom have those risen whom Lutherans are fond of speaking of as “legalistic” Calvinists! What would be said among us if a man of honour were to demand a revision
of the Augsburg Confession? Of course the Calvinistic Churches of America possess something we do not possess—a freely organised Church, which gives laws to itself, and—courage! So we shall perhaps follow some day, if the Evangelicals in America go before with the torch.

One thing at any rate is made apparent by these steps of progress, though it is clear already from the principle of the Reformation—namely, that the Confessional definitions in Protestantism are not regarded as infallible. There is, it is true, an eager search in Lutheranism for an intermediate notion between reformable and infallible; but, so far as I see, no one as yet has been able to discover it. The old dogma, however, gave itself out as infallible; nay, it was only dogma so far as it advanced this claim. The formulations of Protestantism in the sixteenth century are not dogmas in this sense.
CHAPTER II.

THE ISSUES OF DOGMA IN ROMAN CATHOLICISM.

(i) The Codification of the Medieval Doctrines in opposition to Protestantism (Decrees of Trent).

A CODIFICATION of its doctrines was forced upon the Catholic Church by the Reformation. For long the effort was made in Rome to add to the condemnation of the Lutheran tenets a positive statement of Romish doctrine, or even to secure that addition through a Council. From the strictly Curialistic standpoint both the one thing and the other seemed as unnecessary as it was dangerous. That princes and peoples should have imperatively demanded both, and that a Council should really have come to be held, which, apart from its decrees for reform, that necessarily resulted in a considerable improvement in the state of the Church, gave fixed form to hitherto undefined doctrines, was a triumph of Protestantism. As it was understood by the princes, this Council was finally to solve a problem that had been previously dealt with, not without a real mutual approximation, at religious conferences, and which, for the time, appeared to have found a solution in the imperial Interim. But in point of fact the Curia brought it about that at Trent the opposition to Protestantism found its keenest expression. In this way the Curia rendered Protestantism very important service; for what would have become of the Reformation after Luther's death—at least in Germany—if there had been a greater inclination to come to terms at Trent?

In framing the Decrees of Trent the best forces co-operated which the Church then had at its command. True piety and pre-eminent scholarship took part in the discussions. The renovated Thomism, made stronger in Italy by the Reforma-
tion itself, already held at the Council a place of equality with every other party. From Humanism and the Reformation the mediæval spirit of the Church had derived power, had strengthened and steeled itself for the conflict. This spirit, in union with the Curia, really governed the Council by which a regeneration of the old Church was effected. This regeneration comes to view within the dogmatic sphere in the breach with the sceptical, critical elements of Scholasticism, and in the confidence thereby obtained in doctrine and theology. Notwithstanding what had happened before at the Council of Florence, it was unquestionably an immense undertaking to shape out ecclesiastical dogmas with a firm hand from the almost unlimited material which Scholasticism and Mysticism had provided, and to do so after a long period of silence extending over centuries. Such a task would never have been thought of, and still less could it have been carried out, had not the Reformation gone before with its Augsburg Confession. The opposition to the Reformation, by which all schools represented at the Council, otherwise so different in character, were bound together, determined both the selection of the dogmas to be defined and their formulation. At many points we can still see that at Trent the Augsburg Confession was followed; in all the Decrees the opposition to the evangelical doctrine was the guiding motive. The dogmatic Decrees of Trent are the shadow of the Reformation. That it was given to Catholicism to understand itself, to give expression to its distinctive dogmatic character, and thereby to rescue itself from the uncertainties of the Middle Ages, was a debt it owed to the Reformation.

1 In dogmatic and ethical Probabilism, it is true, the Nominalistic scepticism returned, in a form very convenient for the Church.

2 Loofs (Dogmengesch, p. 333 f.) is right in enumerating the following conditions and tendencies in Catholicism as presuppositions of Tridentinism: (1) The reorganisation in strict mediæval spirit of the Spanish Church by the crown under Ferdinand and Isabella; (2) the restoration of Thomism (especially in the Dominican Order); (3) the zealous fostering (Mystic) of Catholic piety, especially in some new Orders and congregations for Reform; (4) the Humanistic efforts for Reform and the ennobling of theology due to Humanism (there were even Humanists who wished to return to Augustine); (5) the strengthening of the papacy and the reappearance of Curialism from the middle of the fifteenth century; (6) the ecclesiastical interest of the secular sovereigns.
Yet Roman Catholicism was still not able to give full expression to itself in the Decrees of Trent. This must become apparent to everyone who compares the Decrees with the present-day condition and the present-day aims of the Church, and who thoroughly studies the Acts of the Council with the view of seeing what the strict Curialistic party wished even then to reach and did not yet reach. Not merely did the strain between Episcopalism and Papalism remain unrelieved—a cardinal ecclesiastical question for Roman Catholicism, indeed the decisive question—but to the recently strengthened Augustinian-Thomist School also much greater scope had to be allowed within dogmatics than was permitted by a Church system based on the outward sacrament, on obedience, on merit, and on religion of the second order. The regard to the Augustinian-Thomist School is to be explained on different grounds. First of all, if there was a wish publicly to define dogmas like those of original sin, sin, election, and justification, the authority of Augustine could not be altogether passed by, even though at the time there was not a single voice raised on his behalf; secondly, the most capable bishops and theologians, men of true piety, were to be seen among the ranks of the Thomists; finally, the fact could not be concealed that a need for reform, in opposition to the ecclesiastical mechanicalism, really existed in the widest circles, and that it could be met only by entering into the Augustinian thoughts. So it came about that the Roman Church in the sixteenth century derived more from Augustine to introduce into its dogma than we should be entitled to expect from the history through which it passed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. But the way in which it adopted Augustinianism at Trent was not without an element of untruthfulness. No doubt we ought not to reproach the Fathers of the Council if they laboriously turned and polished the separate Decrees and made constant corrections; so long as dogmas are not proclaimed by prophets, but constructed by the members of a synod, it will be impossible to invent any other method than that by which the work was carried on at Trent. But the untruthfulness here lies in this, that one of the parties—and it was the party whose influence
was finally determinative—had no wish whatever for Augustinianism, that it sought rather to establish as dogma the use and wont of the Roman Church, which was compatible only with Semi-Pelagian doctrine and sacramental mechanicalism. And yet this does not include all that must be said. The untruthfulness lies still deeper. The ruling party, in league with Rome, and under direction from Rome, had no wish whatever for definitions, for it knew very well that its fundamental dogmatic principles, as they came to view in its practice, did not admit at all of being framed, and dared not at all be framed. It had accordingly, throughout the whole Council, the one end only in view—to emerge from the purgatory of the Council as far as possible unchanged, that is, having with it all its customs, practices, pretensions, and sins. In the formulation of the Tridentine dogmas this aim was reached by it, though it might be only indefinitely. Just on that account these dogmas are in part untrue and misleading, although a keen eye perceives even here what scope was left to "Probabilism," that deadly enemy of all religious and moral conviction. But it gained its end completely when it followed up the Decrees with the Professio Tridentina, and, at the same time, had it established that to the Pope alone the right is to be attributed to expound the Decrees. Thus it gathered figs of thorns and grapes of thistles; for it now needed to fear no single turn in the Decrees, and, on the other hand, it enjoyed the advantage which so imposing a manifesto of the whole Church against Protestantism necessarily secured.

How the Curia carried on its work at Trent we know, since we received the bitter account of Paolo Sarpi. Just for that reason we must include the Tridentinum within the history of the issues of dogma; for a stronger power than the interest of faith, or the interest of pure doctrine, presided over the efforts of the Council, and directed them in its own spirit—the interest,

1 Even the self-designation of the Synod is equivocal: "Hsec sacrosancta, ecumenica et generalis Tridentina Synodus in spiritu sancto legite congregata, in ea præsidentibus (eisdem) tribus apostolorum sedis legatis"; compare also the famous and frequently repeated addition: "salva semper in omnibus sedis apostolorum auctoritate." As is well known, there was also obstinate discussion as to whether there was to be given to the Council the title: "universalem ecclesiam representans."
viz., of the Roman Church to assert itself as the unreformable institution that exercises rule and grants salvation. And if it is undeniable that at Trent, and in the Decrees of the Council, a devout faith also expressed itself, which knew no higher power above itself, yet it passed out of view in the general result. Through his prerogative to be the sole exponent of the Decrees, the Pope really made the whole dogmatic work at Trent uncertain and illusory, and the succeeding centuries proved distinctly enough that one would embrace the gravest errors regarding the practical and dogmatic interests of the Roman Church were he to think of forming a view of the faith of the Roman Church on the basis of the Tridentine Decrees alone (taken as they sound). Indeed, he would only discover here somewhat vaguely what at the present day is the real endeavour of the Roman Church in the region of dogma and was visible at Trent only behind the scenes—namely, to transform dogma into a dogmatic policy, to declare all traditions as they sound to be sacrosanct, while admitting, however, at every point conflicting probable opinions, and to debar the laity from faith and dogma, in order to accustom them to a religion of the second order—to the Sacraments, the saints, the amulets, and an idolatrous worship of the members of Christ’s body.

Under such circumstances there only remains an interest of a secondary kind in considering in detail the Decrees as they sound. If we have once made clear to ourselves the contradictory aims that were to be united in them, and feel certain that it is really a matter of indifference whether a Decree has more of an Augustinian ring or not, general history can only in a meagre way take to do with these laboriously refined and elaborated works of art. In the sequel, therefore, we shall restrict ourselves to what is most important.1

The Synod, assembled to deliberate on "the extirpation of heresies and reform of morals" (de exstirpandis hæresibus et moribus reformandis), begins, at the third session, with reaffirming the Constantinopolitan Symbol, including the "filioque"; this Symbol, moreover, is introduced with the words "symbolum fidei, quo sancta Romana ecclesia utitur" ("Confession of faith which the holy Roman Church uses"). It then, at the fourth session, at once took up the question as to the sources of knowledge and the authorities for truth. For the first time in the Church it happened that this question was dealt with at a Council. Everything that had, from the days of the struggle against Gnosticism, been either established or asserted with some uncertainty in the consuetudinary law of the Church still needed final determination. All the more important is the Decree. In its making the main point of the whole decision lie in preserving the "purity of the gospel" (puritas evangelii), it gives positive evidence of the influence of the Reformation; but in its declaring the Apocrypha of the Old Testament canonical, in its placing tradition alongside Scripture as a second source of information, in its proclaiming the Vulgate to be authoritative, and in its assigning to the Church alone the right to expound Scripture, it defines most sharply the opposition to Protestantism.

As regards the first point, the Reformation, by its re-adoption of the Hebrew canon, had given expression to its general postulate, that there should be a going back everywhere to the ultimate and surest sources. In opposition to this the Tridene-

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1 Or, "de confirmandis dogmatibus." See III. 1 fn.
2 The Lutheran Reformation, besides, had not already expressed itself confessionally on the sources of knowledge and authorities, and, as is well known, did not even do so later on.
tinum sanctioned the current traditional view. Yet the act of fixing was in itself of the greatest importance; strictly speaking, indeed, it was only through it that a point of rest was attained in the history of the canon within the Roman Church. Even at that time there were still Bible manuscripts belonging to the Church that contained 4th Book of Esra, Hermas, the Epistle to the Laodiceans, etc. This uncertain state of things was now finally terminated.²

As regards the second point, the important words run as follows:—“That truth and discipline are contained in the books of Scripture and in unwritten traditions which, having been received from Christ’s own lips by the Apostles, or transmitted as it were manually by the Apostles themselves, under the dictation of the Holy Spirit, have come down even to us”³ (or, “and also receives with an equal feeling of piety and reverence the traditions relating sometimes to faith, and sometimes to morals, as dictated either orally by Christ or by the Holy Spirit, and preserved in continuous succession within the Catholic Church”).⁴

The entire co-ordination of Scripture and tradition was in many respects a novum (especially as regards discipline). A usage was here sanctioned—no doubt to meet the Protestant criticism, which could not be repelled from Scripture alone—

¹ It is also noteworthy, that in the enumeration of the New Testament books, the Epistle to the Hebrews is counted in as the fourteenth Pauline epistle without remark.
² The Tridentine Decree goes back even at this place to the Bulls of Eugene IV., which in general were among the most important parts of the material for the decisions of the Council. In the Bull pro Jacobitis “Cantate Domino” the most of the Apocryphal Books are already without distinction placed in a series with the Canonical Books, while the Epistle to the Hebrews is described as an Epistle of Paul. This reckoning follows the Canon of Innocent I. (Ep. 6 ad Exsuperium Tolosanum c. 7). In approving this the Tridentinum originated the contradiction of on the one hand recognising the Alexandrian Canon of the Bible, and on the other hand following the Vulgate, while Jerome rejected the Apocrypha, or at least treated it quite freely; see Credner, Gesch. des Kanons, p. 300 ff., 320 ff.
³ “Veritatem et disciplinam contineri in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus, que ab ipsius Christi ore ab apostolis acceptae aut ab ipsis apostolis, spiritu sancto dictante, quasi per manus tradita ad nos usque pervenerant.”
⁴ “Nec non traditones ipsas tum ad fidem tum ad mores pertinentes tamquam vel oretenus a Christo vel a spiritu s. dictatas et continua successione in ecclesia catholica conservatas pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia suscipit.”
that had as yet by no means been fully established in the Middle Ages, as was made clearly apparent at the deliberations connected with the framing of the Decree. Voices were raised demanding that priority should be given to Scripture; but they failed to assert themselves. The defining tradition more precisely as traditio Christi and traditio apostolorum (spiritu sancto dictante), without, however, indicating in any way what the two traditions embraced, and how they were distinguished, was a master-stroke of dogmatic policy, which clearly shows that the object in view was not to furnish a strong basis for that which constitutes Christianity. But the fact is extremely noteworthy that there is entire silence maintained here as to the authority of the Church and of the Pope. In this the untruthfulness of the Decree reveals itself; for the ultimate concern of the Curia was to see that its arbitrary decisions were regarded as sources of knowledge and authorities on truth.\(^1\) It was able to attain that by the help of this quite indefinite Decree; but at that time it was unable as yet to give direct expression to it; hence there was silence maintained with regard to the Pope and the Church.

The proclaiming of the Vulgate ("that it shall be held as authoritative in public reading, disputation, preaching, and exposition, and that no one shall dare or presume to reject it on any pretext whatever")\(^2\) was a violent measure, which could not be justified even by the law of custom, and was, besides, directly counter to the age in which one lived.\(^3\) The same thing is to be said of the requirement, that everyone shall be obliged to adhere to the sense of Holy Scripture to which the Holy Mother-Church adheres ("to whom it belongs to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Holy Scriptures")\(^4\), and

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1 Repeatedly at the Council speeches were delivered—especially by Jesuits, but also by others—the sum and substance of which was, that as the Church could never err in faith, its theory and practice were correct in all particulars (the Church, however, is Rome). But as there was not frankness enough to proclaim this position publicly, it did not come clearly to view in the decisions.

2 "Ut in publicis lectionibus, disputationibus, praedicationibus et expositionibus pro authentica habeatur, et ut nemo illam rejicere quovis pretextu audet vel præsumat."

3 "Here the Church for ever broke with its own past, and with all that comes under the name of science." Credner, l.c., p. 324.

4 "Cujus est judicare de vero sensu et interpretatione scripturarum sacrarum."
that no one shall dare to set himself up against the "unanimis consensus patrum." This requirement, it is true, was not in itself new; but it was new that the whole Church should abolish all historico-exegetical investigation of the foundations of religion. The way in which, in the sequel, the use of Scripture generally is subjected to reservations, is also unprecedented; the decision, moreover, that the Church alone possesses the right to expound Scripture is ambiguous when there is nothing said as to who the Church is. Here also there was not yet courage enough to represent that the Pope was the Church.

At Sessions V. and VI. the Synod then dealt with original sin and justification. This order was due simply to the opposition to Protestantism, and gives to the two Decrees an importance which does not really belong to them. A better course, therefore, is to consider the following Decrees first (Sessions VII.-XXV.); for in them (Sacraments VII., XIII., XIV., XXI., XXIII., XXIV.; Mass XXII.; purgatory, saints, images, indulgences XXV.) the determining interests of Catholicism found expression, and there was here no need to give one's self anxiety.

That there was the wish to affirm of the Church that it was the Sacrament-Church is apparent from the proposition which is found in the prologue to the Decree of Session VII., and which fills the place of a whole dogmatic chapter: "by means of the Sacraments all true righteousness either begins, or, having been begun, is increased, or, having been lost, is restored" ("per sacramenta omnis vera justitia vel incipit vel coepta augetur vel amissa reparatur"). Not a word is said as to how the Sacraments have that power, as to what relation they have to the Word and promises of God, and as to how they are related to faith. This silence is the thing of most significance; for it shows that just the Sacrament itself as externally applied is to be regarded as the means of salvation. Accordingly, without any determination of what the Sacrament in genere is,

1 "Certainly in this way Scripture becomes consecrated, but it is reduced to a mummy, which can no longer develop any kind of life." Cremer, l.c.

there is a passing on at once to thirteen anathematisms, it being previously certified merely that all that follows is derived from the teaching of Holy Scripture, from the apostolic traditions, the Councils, and the consensus patrum. Consequently the thirteen anathematisms contain a continuous series of definitions, in which the most recent use and went in the Church, as defined by the Schoolmen, is raised to the level of dogma, while all historic memories pointing in an opposite direction—whose testimony was certainly audible enough—were suppressed. These dogmas formulated in the thirteen anathematisms are really the protest against Protestantism.

Canon 1 raises to the position of dogma the doctrine that there are seven Sacraments—no more and no less—and that all the seven were instituted by Christ.1 Canon 4 rejects the doctrine that man can be justified before God without the Sacraments (or without a vow to receive the Sacraments [votum sacramenti]) by faith alone (per solam fidem). Canon 5 pronounces anathema on those who teach that the Sacraments are instituted for the sake of only nourishing faith (propter solam fidem nutriendam), and thus severs the exclusive connection of faith and Sacrament. Canon 6 formulates the Scholastic doctrine of the efficacy of the Sacraments ex opere operato (without, however, applying this expression here), and thereby excludes more decisively the necessity of faith, a mysterious power being attributed to the Sacraments.2 Canon 7 defines this efficacy of the Sacraments still more exactly, asserting that where they are received in due

1 Here, no doubt, the question can still always arise, whether He instituted them all "immediate"; but in view of the literal terms of the Decree that would be a case of sophistry.

2 "Si quis dixerit, sacramenta novæ legis non continere gratiam, quam significant (see above, the Scholastic controversy, Vol. VI., p. 206 f.), aut gratiam ipsam non ponentibus obicem (see above, Vol. VI., p. 223 f.) non conferre, quasi signa tantum externa sint acceptae per fidem gratiae vel justitiae et notae quaedam Christianae professionis, quibus apud homines discernuntur fideles ab infidelibus, anathema sit." It is characteristic that the Canon does not assume a third possibility between the Sacraments as vehicles and the Sacraments as signs. Such a possibility, too, is hard enough to conceive of, as is proved by the Lutheran doctrine, which makes the attempt. The Scotist doctrines with regard to the concomitance of the gracious divine effects and the rite are not expressly controverted by the Tridentinum; but the terms employed are unfavourable to them.
form (rite), they communicate grace from God’s side (ex parte dei) always, and to all receivers too. Canon 8 concludes this survey with the words: “if anyone shall say that grace is not conveyed ex opere operato by the Sacraments of the New Law, but that faith alone in the divine promise is sufficient for obtaining grace, let him be anathema.” The 9th Canon raises to a dogma the doctrine of “character” (baptism, confirmation, and consecration to the priesthood), but is cautious in not defining this “character in anima” more exactly than as “a certain spiritual and indelible sign” (“signum quoddam spirituale et indelibile”).

The 10th Canon pronounces anathema on those who assert that all Christians have the power to preach the Word and administer the Sacraments, and thus directs itself against the universal priesthood. The 11th Canon raises to a dogma the doctrine of the intentio of the priest (“intention of at least doing what the Church does”), without which the Sacraments are not Sacraments. Lastly, the 13th Canon gives fixity to all unratiﬁed customs of the Church connected with the celebration of the Sacraments, it being declared: “If anyone shall say that the received and approved customs of the Catholic Church, which are usually applied in the solemn administration of the Sacraments, may either be despised or omitted by ministers as they please without sin, or changed into other new ones by any pastor of the Churches, let him be anathema.”

As in all these statements the Council adopted only negative definitions, it succeeded in the happiest way in steering clear of all the reefs in Scholastic discussion of the Sacraments. Even in

1 “Si quis dixerit, per ipsa novae legis sacramenta ex opere operato non conferri gratiam, sed solam ﬁdem divine promissionis ad gratiam consequendam suﬁcere, anathema sit.”

2 Compare Cat. Roman. II., 1 Q. 19, where, however, little more is said than that the character “veluti insignis quoddam animae impressum est, quod deleri nunquam potest . . . et præstat, tum ut apti ad aliquid sacri suscipiendum vel peragendum eﬃciamur, tum ut aliqua nota alter ab altero internoscatur.”

3 “Intentio saltem faciendi quod facit ecclesia.”

4 “Si quis dixerit, receptos et aprobatos ecclesiae ritus in solemni sacramentorum administratione adhiberi consuetos aut contemni aut sine peccato a ministris pro libito omitti, aut in novos alios per quaecunque ecclesiarum pastorem mutari posse, anathema sit.”
the selection of what is negatively defined—how much would still remain to be defined—there is apparent an admirable skill. Generally speaking, what is here marked out is really the basis common to all the Schoolmen. Hence, when the definitions are translated into a positive form, they come closest to Thomism, while at the same time they do not exclude the Scotist positions.

There now follow the Decrees on the Sacraments singly. Here the decretum pro Armenis in the Bull of Eugene IV., "Exultate deo," had so prepared the way with its short and yet comprehensive definitions that the dogmatic determination offered no great difficulty to the Fathers. The character of the definitions of particulars is akin to that of the general definitions; the most extreme, and therefore disputed, Scholastic theses of the Schools are trimmed down in the interest of unity of faith; and thus a type is produced, which comes very close to the Thomistic, and yet does not make it impossible for the doctrines to be re-shaped in harmony with dogmatic Probabilism.

Among the propositions relating to Baptism (Session VII,) the 3rd Canon (in introducing which no connection is indicated) is the most important, because by implication it makes all the rest unnecessary: "if anyone shall say that in the Church of Rome, which is the mother and mistress of all churches, there is not the true doctrine concerning the Sacrament of Baptism, let him be anathema." The 9th and 10th Canons restrict the importance of baptism, in opposition to the evangelical view; the 10th is especially instructive from its putting together remembrance and faith (recordatio and fides) in a way that depreciates faith, as well as from its limiting the effect of baptismal grace to former sins. As regards Confirmation, the history of the development of this observance is now finally expunged—history, that is to say, is transcended by dogma (Can. I);

1 See Denzinger, Enchiridion, 5th ed., p. 172 f.
2 "Si quis dixerit, in ecclesia Romana, quae omnium ecclesiarum mater et magistra, non esse veram de baptismi sacramento doctrinam, anathema sit."
3 "Si quis dixerit, peccata omnia, quae post baptismum fiunt, sola recordatione et fide suscepti baptismi vel dimitti vel venalia fieri, anathema sit."
moreover, it is henceforth an article of faith, that the bishop alone is the minister ordinarius of this Sacrament (Can. 3).

In dealing with the Eucharist (Session XIII.) the Council was not satisfied with Canons, but rose to a Decree. But this Decree, if one glances over the Scholastic questions of dispute, is certainly seen to be pretty vague. It is likewise known that there was here a coming together of opposing theological parties. In defiance of history it is asserted (c. 1) that it has always been unanimously confessed by all the Fathers that the God-man is present "truly, really, and substantially in this Sacrament under the form of things sensible."¹ In spite of imposing language about it, the effect of the Sacrament is really restricted to deliverance from daily (venial) sins and protection against mortal sins (c. 2). Then it is said (cap. 3), the old definition of the Sacrament in its entirety being adopted: "it is indeed common to the most holy Eucharist with the other Sacraments that it is the symbol of a sacred thing and the visible form of invisible grace; but there is this point of pre-eminence and distinctiveness found in it, that the other Sacraments only have power to sanctify when someone uses them, while in the Eucharist the Sacrament is itself the author of sanctity previous to the use."² It had always (it was asserted) been the Catholic faith that the God-man is present immediately after consecration, and wholly present, too, under both forms, in His Godhead, body and soul; a more precise definition of this is then given—again as describing the faith that had always prevailed in the Church: "that by the consecration of bread and wine a conversion takes place of the entire substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and of the entire substance of the wine into the substance of His blood. Which conversion is fittingly and properly designated by the holy

¹ "Vere, realiter et substantialiter sub specie rerum sensibilium in hoc sacramento."
² Cf. Cat. Rom. II., c. 4, Q. 39: the Eucharist is the fons of all Sacraments, which flow from it like brooks.
³ "Commune hoc quidem est sanctissimae eucharistiae cum ceteris sacramentis symbolum esse rei sacrae et invisibilis gratiae formam visibilem; verum illud in ea excellens et singulariter reperitur, quod reliqua sacramenta tunc primum sanctificandi vim habent, cum quis utitur, at in eucharistia ipse sanctitatis auctor ante usum est."
Catholic Church transubstantiation." ¹ Hence there is required for the Sacrament (c. 5) the worship of adoration (cultus latriæ) (including the festival of Corpus Christi), and the self-communi-
cating of the priests is described as traditio apostolica (c. 8). The appended anathematisms are nearly all directed against Protestantism. Anyone is condemned who does not recognise the whole Christ corporeally in the Sacrament, who believes that the substance of the elements remains after the consecration, who denies that the whole Christ is in every part of each ele-
ment, who regards the Sacrament as being Sacrament only “in use” (“in usu”), but not also before or after use (“ante vel post usum”), who rejects worship of the Host and the Corpus Christi festival, etc. But the worst Canons are 5 and 11; for the former condemns those who hold that the forgiveness of sins is the principal fruit of the Eucharist, and the latter runs: “if anyone shall say that faith alone is sufficient preparation for taking the Sacrament of the most holy Eucharist, let him be accursed.”² Many demanded that lay-communion also sub utraque (under both forms) should be simply condemned, and a Decree to that effect was really imminent. But under the pressure of the princes and of public opinion the question was for a time delayed, and thereafter, there being influences at the Council itself that strongly asserted themselves in favour of granting the cup to the laity, it was decided—but only half-decided—by a Decree (Session XXI.) that betrays only too plainly the embarrassment felt. The granting of the cup to the laity was not forbidden—indeed the admission was found neces-
sary here that “from the beginning of the Christian religion the use of both forms had not been infrequent,”³ but an anathema was pronounced on everyone who should demand the cup ex dei præcepto (as commanded by God), or who was not persuaded that the Catholic Church denied it to him on good

¹ "Per consecrationem panis et vini conversionem ferior totius substantiæ panis in substantiam corporis Christi domini nostri et totius substantiæ vini in substantiam sanguinis ejus. Quæ conversionis convenienter et proprie a sancta catholica ecclesia transsubstantio est appellata."

² "Si quis dixerit, solam fidel esse sufficientem preparationem ad sumendum sanctissimæ eucharistiae sacramentum, anathema sit."

³ "Ab initio Christianæ religionis non infrequens utriusque speciei usus fuisset."
grounds. The Scholastic doctrine of the whole Christ in either kind (totus Christus in qualibet specie) formed the dogmatic basis of the right to deny. From nothing can the perverted state of "science" in the Church be more plainly proved than from the fact that this "science" succeeded in its presuming to correct the institution of Christ. But of course science was really only the pretext; for the motives were quite different that led the Church to withhold the cup from the laity.¹ A crowd of difficulties threatened to arise in connection with the question of the sacrifice of the Mass (Sessio XXII.). This was the most seriously assailed institution, and a theoretical vindication of it could not be evaded; while on the other hand it was impossible to write volumes. Yet volumes would have been required in order to solve all the problems that had been handed down by Scholasticism, problems that had been much discussed, but had never been settled or reduced to precise formulae. Indeed the questions regarding the relation of the sacrificial death of Christ to the Eucharist (above all to the first celebration), and again of the Mass to the first Eucharist and to the death on the Cross, were in a pre-eminent degree the real mysteries of the labyrinthine dogmatic, and here every doctrinal statement had only resulted in creating new difficulties! Besides, there was entire vagueness as to how the significance and use of the Masses were to be theoretically understood. The evil state of practice taught that the Mass was the most im-

¹The Decree concludes with a remark which suggests yielding to necessity: "Duos vero articulos, alias (scil. Sess. XIII.) propositos, hos nondum tamen excussos, videlicet: An rationes, quibus s. catholica ecclesia adducta fuit, ut communicaret laicos atque etiam non celebrantes sacerdotes sub una tantum panis specie, ita sint retinenda, ut nulla ratione calicis usus cuiquam sit permittendus, et An, si honestis et Christianis caritati consentaneis rationibus concedendus alicui vel nationi vel regno calicis usus videatur, sub aliquibus conditionibus concedendus sit, et quænam sint illæ: eadem s. synodus in aliud tempus, oblata sibi quam-primum occasione, examinandos atque definiendos reservat." With this is to be compared the Decree of the 23rd Session: "Integrum negotium ad sanctissimum dominum nostrum (scil. the Pope) esse referendum, qui pro sua singulari prudentia id efficit, quod utile republice Christianæ et salutare potenti usum calicis fore judicaverit." That the decision could not be come to at Rome and in the Council to grant the cup to the laity was an extremely happy circumstance for Protestantism, for many of those who had the fate of the Protestant cause in their hand would have been induced by that concession to make a compromise.
portant function within religious and ecclesiastical life; yet dogmatic theory, which could not surrender the unique importance of Baptism and the Sacrament of Penance, left only the most meagre room for the efficacy of the Mass. In a very skillful manner the Decree (c. 1) glides over the gulf in the historic proof for the establishment of the Mass (by Christ), while it defines in a way full of manifest contradictions the effect of the ordination, this effect being described in c. 1 as "saving virtue for the remission of sins which are committed by us daily" ("salutaris virtus in remissionem peccatorum, quæ a nobis quotidie committuntur"), in c. 2, on the other hand, as "a truly propitiatory sacrifice" ("sacrificium vere propitiatorium"), which cancels also the "crimes and heinous sins" ("crimina et ingentia peccata") of the penitent (contritii); indeed the expositions here given can only be understood as meaning that in a way that is direct, and that includes all blessings, the Mass applies Christ's death on the Cross. For the rest, there is a thorough-going vindication (c. 4), although in a cautiously veiled form, of the whole evil practice of the Mass, as also a vindication of the Masses in honour of saints (in honorem sanctorum, c. 3), and, finally, of the Roman Mass Canon down to the last word (c. 4). Even the demand that the Mass shall be in the vernacular is rejected, nor is any proof given (c. 8). The Canons pronounce anathema on everything that contradicts these doctrines, and so makes a sharp separation between the Church of the sacrifice of the Mass and the Church of the Word.

1 "Una enim eademque est hostia, idem nunc offerens sacerdotum ministerio, qui seipsum tune in cruce obtulit, sola offerendi ratione diversa. Cujus quidem oblationis cruentæ fructus per hanc incarnatam uberimis perciuntur; tantum abest, ut illi per hanc quovis modo derogetur."

2 "Quare non solum pro fidelium vivorum peccatis, poenis, satisfactionibus et alis necessitatibus (in this way the whole disordered state of things is sanctioned), sed et pro defunctis in Christo, nondum ad plenum purgatis, rite juxta apostolorum traditionem (!) offeritur."

3 "Qui constat ex ipsis domini verbis, tum ex apostolorum traditionibus ac sanctorum quoque pontificum piis institutionibus"—notice what are put together here!

4 "Non expedire visum est patribus"; see on this Gihr, Das hl. Messopfer, 4th ed., p. 305 ff. In reading this work even a mild evangelical spirit must admit the Reformers' title to speak of the Mass as idolatry.

5 A certain influence of the Reformation is apparent in its being required (c. 8) that the minister shall explain (in the vernacular) something of what is read in the Mass,
As might have been expected, the Decree concerning Penance (de poenitentia, Sessio XIV.) is the fullest. As the chief parts of this Sacrament were settled matters for Scholasticism, and as the Tridentinum took over here the whole Scholastic work, it is not necessary to repeat in detail the positive definitions (see Vol. VI., p. 243 ff.). The formulations are distinguished by great clearness; as we read, we have the feeling that we stand on firm ground, though it is on ground which the Church has created for itself.\(^1\) Everything here, down to the questions as to materia, quasi materia, forma, is developed with precision. It is to be pointed out as specially noteworthy, that the feeling of comfort and of relief of conscience that follows upon the reconciliatio is not described as a regular result of the Sacrament (c. 3). But still more noteworthy, on the other hand, is the influence which the Reformation exerted on the description of the penitent disposition that is requisite. The party which declared attritio to be enough for saving reception of the Sacrament did not succeed in asserting itself; in opposition, rather, to the teaching and practice of the two foregoing centuries contritio was required, and attritio declared to be merely a salutary preparation ("ad dei gratiam impetrandam disponit," "viam ad justitiam parat"). Yet as attritio is called "contritio imperfecta," as it is described as "a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, who, however, is not yet indwelling, but only moving,"\(^2\) as the assertion is also made that the reconciliatio is not to be ascribed to contritio "without a vow to receive the Sacrament" ("sine sacramenti voto"), and as a distinction again is drawn between contritio and contritio(caritate perfecta) itself, as, finally, in spite of all excellent things said about the feeling of sorrow, this feeling is not conjoined with fides, is not developed from fides, all the attempts to get clear of the mechanical view of penance were in vain, and it was shown by

\(^1\) It may be noted by the way that in c. 2 the sentence occurs: "Ecclesia in neminem judicium exercet, qui non prius in ipsam per baptismi januam fuerit ingressus," i.e., the baptised are all placed under its jurisdiction.

\(^2\) "Donum dei et spiritus sancti impulsum, non adhuc quidem inhabitantis sed tantum moventis."
the subsequent development of the doctrine of penitence in the Church, that there was no serious intention to expel the attritio.\footnote{That the Tridentinum attempts to idealise the attritio is on good ground pointed out by Stuckert, Die Kath. Lehre v. d. Reue (1896), p. 63.} What the 4th Chap. of the Decree de penitentia really does is to throw dust in the eyes of Protestants. In the 5th Chap. stands the extravagant statement, that “the whole Church has always understood that full confession of sins is required of all by divine law, because Christ has left behind him priests, representatives of himself, as overseers and judges to whom all mortal offences are to be made known”\footnote{“Universa ecclesia semper intellexit, integrum peccatorum confessionem omnibus jure divino necessarium existere, quia Christus sacerdotes sui ipsius vicarios reliquit tamquam presides et judices, ad quos omnia mortalía críminá deferantur.”} The old dispute as to whether the priest only pronounces forgiveness, or bestows it as a judge, is settled according to the latter alternative (c. 6). As the position is rejected, that God never forgives sins without also remitting the whole penalty, room is obtained for the satisfactiones: without these God accepts heathens, but not Christians who have lapsed. But in a remarkable way the satisfying penalties (satisfactoriae poenae) are also presented under an aspect which is quite foreign to their original establishment within the institution of penance; by these, it is represented, we are made conformable (conformes) to Christ, who has rendered satisfaction for our sins, (“having from thence the surest pledge also, that if we suffer together we shall also be glorified together”).\footnote{“Certissimam quoque inde arrham habentes, quod si compatimur, et congloriificabimus,” c. 8.} That is an evangelical turn of thought, which falls outside the framework of the “penance.”\footnote{Compare also what immediately follows; the thought is evangelical: “neque vero ita est satisfactio hæc—per illum acceptantur a patre.” All the greater is the contrast presented by the series of propositions directly succeeding.} The 15 Canones de penitentia, however, leave nothing to be desired in the way of rejection on principle of the evangelical view. Let the 4th only be brought under notice: “If anyone shall deny that, for full and perfect remission of sins, three acts are required in the penitent, forming, as it were, the material of the Sacrament of Penance, namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are called the three parts of penance, or shall say that...
there are only the two parts of penance, namely, terror struck home to the conscience through the knowledge of sin, and faith awakened by the Gospel or by the absolution through which one believes that his sins are remitted to him through Christ, let him be anathema."

On the Sacrament of Extreme Uction (S. XIV.) it is not necessary to lose a word. The decisions, also, as to ordination to the priesthood (S. XXIII.) contain the Scholastic theses without any corrections. They begin with the famous words: "Sacrifice and priesthood are so conjoined by the appointment of God that both exist in every law" ("sacrificium et sacerdotium ita dei ordinatione conjuncta sunt, ut utrumque in omni lege extitterit"). The Church of the sacrificial ritual asserts itself as also the Church of the priests, and it does the latter because it does the former. Along with sacrifice, Christ instituted at the same time the priesthood; the seven orders (ordines) have been in existence from "the very beginning of the Church" (c. 2). The old question of dispute as to the relation of the bishops to the priests (whether they, properly speaking, form an order), is not definitely decided. It is merely asserted that they are superior to the priests, as they have taken the place of the Apostles (c. 4). All co-operation of the laity at the ordination of the clergy is very strongly disapproved of at the close of the Decree. The Decree as to marriage (Sessio XXIV.) has not understood how to give to this formless Sacrament any better dogmatic shape. A kind of homily must take the place of

1 "Si quis negaverit ad integrum et perfectam peccatorum remissionem requiri tres actus in poenitente, quasi materiam sacramenti penitentiae, vid. contritionem, confessionem et satisfactionem, quae tres penitentiae partes dicuntur, aut dixerit, duas tantum esse penitentiae partes, terrores scil. incussos conscientiæ agnito peccato et fidem conceptam ex evangelio vel absolutione, qua credit quis sibi per Christum remissa peccata, anathema sit."

2 "Ab ipso ecclesiae initio."

3 The uncertainty as to the position of the bishops is still further increased by the 6th Canon, which is occupied, not with enumerating the seven orders, but with treating of the "hierarchia divina ordinatione instituta, qua constat ex episcopis, presbyteris et ministris." How is the hierarchy related to the seven orders?

4 The Canons reject the Protestant doctrine. Above all in c. 1 the opinion is condemned, that there is no sacerdotium externum, and that the office is only the nudum ministerium predicandi evangelium. The 8th Canon leaves the Pope free to create as many bishops as he pleases.
theological development. Only in the anathematisms do the interests of the Church find expression.\(^1\)

Purgatory and the Saints were already referred to in passing in the Decree as to the Mass. They were expressly dealt with at the 25th Session. The Decree as to purgatory contains the indirect admission that much mischief had been done in the Church in connection with it, and that it had led Christendom into superstition; there is allusion even to “base gain, scandals, and stumbling-blocks for the faithful” (turpe lucrum, scandala, fidelium offendicula). But just on that account the “sana doctrina de purgatorio” shall henceforward be strenuously insisted on. To more precise definitions, which would have had the spirit of the age against them, the Council did not proceed. So, likewise, there was only a quite rapid dealing with the invocation and worship of saints, as also with relics and pictures. The intercession of saints is established, and the Protestant view declared “impious.” The worship of relics and pictures is also maintained,\(^2\) an appeal being made to the second Nicene Council. Anyone who is not acquainted with the practice of the Church might conclude from these calm definitions, which are adorned by no anathemas, that unimportant abuses were dealt with, especially as the Church did not omit here also to lament the abuses (“if any abuses, however, have crept into these holy and salutary observances, the holy Synod has the intensest desire that they be forthwith abolished, etc.”), and at the close really gives directions for checking the disorder—directions, however, which, as subsequent history has taught, really gave to the bishops, or ultimately, let us say, to the Pope alone, the title to perpetuate the old disorder, and to intensify it by his authority. The largest amount of reserve

\(^1\) The view is condemned (1) that marriage “non gratiam confert.” The Church reserves to itself in the Canons the entire legislation as to marriage, and sanctions all that it had previously done in this province. In c. 10, in spite of marriage being a Sacrament, anyone is condemned who does not regard the unmarried state as better than the married. But why, then, is there no sacrament of virginity?

\(^2\) Yet with the addition: “Non quod credatur inesse aliqua in his divinitas vel virtus, propter quam sint colendas.”

\(^3\) “In has antem sanctas et salutares observationes si qui abusus irrepserint, eos prorsus aboleri sancta synodus vehementer cupit,” etc.
and caution was shown in the way in which indulgences were spoken of. The Scholastic theory of indulgences is not in any way touched; the abuses are admitted, and their removal—"lest ecclesiastical discipline be weakened by too great facility"—is strongly insisted on. But with regard to the matter itself there is no yielding, even to the extent of an inch; for indulgences have a saving value for Christendom. What is needed is only that the business of granting holy indulgences be carried on in a pious and holy way on behalf of all believers; everyone is to be condemned who declares them useless, or denies that it is competent to the Church to dispense them.

Thus the Church completed by the Tridentinum her course of distinct secularisation as the Church of sacrifice, priest, and sacrament. In her declaring to be true, saving, and divine all that the Church of Rome did, all the usages she adopted on her long progress through the Middle Ages, she withdrew from the struggle which Luther's theses conjured up, the struggle to reach a true inward understanding of the Christian religion.

1 "Ne nimia facilitate ecclesiastica disciplina enervetur."

2 "Pravos queasus omnes pro his consequendis, unde plurima in Christiano populo abusum causa fluxit."

3 In addition to the indulgences (see Schneider, Die Ablässe, 7th ed., 1881) one must study the theory and practice of the benedictions and sacramentalia, in order to see how far the Catholic Church had drifted, not only from what is Christian, but even from spiritual religion. The dogmatic expositions of the "benedictio constitutiva" and the "consecratio," as distinguished from the "benedictio invocativa," are a veritable mockery, not only of the Christian, but of all spiritual religion. I gather out a few passages from a work of very high authority, Ghirr, Das hl. Messopfer, 4th ed., 1887, p. 220: "However perfect as regards natural worth, artistic adornment, and beauty, the articles may be that are intended for use in the sacrificial celebration, they are certainly not on that account alone to be forthwith employed in divine service: in addition to these qualities the most of the vessels used in worship require a previous benediction or consecration... they must become something sacred (res sacra). By the blessing and the prayers of the Church the liturgical vessels become, not merely sanctified, but also fitted to produce various saving effects in those who use them devoutly and who come into contact with them. The articles employed in worship which are blessed or consecrated are, as it were, transferred from the domain of nature to the kingdom of grace (—so we have a cloth transferred to the kingdom of grace, a flagon transferred to the kingdom of grace, etc. !)—and are the special property of God; they thus far bear in themselves something divine, on the ground of which a certain religious veneration is due to them and must be paid to them." P. 220, n. 1: "The consecration (benedictio constitutiva or consecratio, in which holy oil is made use of) is essentially distinct from the invocative
All discussions as to grace, freedom, sin, law, good works, etc., were at best relegated to the second place; for they were only conducted on the assumption that under all circumstances the Church asserted itself as that which it had become—as the papal, sacrificial, and sacramental institution. In the Tridentinum the Roman Church formally embodied its refusal to treat the question of religion at the level to which that question had been raised by Luther. It held firmly to the ancient mediæval stage. That is pre-eminently the significance of the great Council.

But, nevertheless, a discussion of the Reformation conception of Christianity on its merits dared not be avoided. That was demanded even by many Catholic Christians. Just at that time, indeed, there was a party influential in Catholicism who strongly accentuated the Augustinian-Mystic thoughts—they were a counterpoise to the sacramental system—and who set themselves to oppose the Pelagianism and Probabilism which are the co-efficients of the Sacrament Church. The two

benediction on this ground, that it impresses upon persons and things a higher, supernatural character, i.e., it transfers them permanently into the state of sanctified and religious objects.” P. 300, n. 2: “In the case of the candles that are blessed there is still the sacramental element to be taken into account. That is to say, these candles are not merely religious symbols, which represent something supernatural, but are also sacred objects, which—in their own way—produce a certain supernatural effect, inasmuch as they impart to us on the ground of, and by virtue of the prayer of the Church, divine blessing and protection, especially against the spirits of darkness.” P. 360: “Incense that has been blessed is a sacramental; as such, it does not merely represent something higher and mysterious, but works also (in its way) spiritual, supernatural effects . . . it is the organ (vehicle) of divine protection and blessing. Through the sign of the cross and the prayer of the Church the incense receives a certain power to drive Satan from, or to keep him from, the soul, etc. . . . It serves (also) to consecrate persons and objects. That is to say, with the incense-clouds there diffuses itself also the power of the blessing which the Church pronounces and means to bestow; the incense-clouds bring all they touch into a consecrated atmosphere.”

Let one read also the detestable section on the benediction of the priest’s garments (p. 255 f.) and its allegorical and moral significance. “The garments used in worship only lose their benediction from being mended when the new unconsecrated piece applied or inserted is larger than the consecrated piece, but not when it is smaller,” etc. As in the indulgence the Church really, i.e. in praxis, created for itself a second Sacrament of Penance, so it created for itself in the “sacramentalia” new Sacraments, which are much more convenient, because they are entirely in the Church’s power. In both cases it legitimised in Christianity Rabbinism and the theory and practice of the Pharisees and Talmudists.
Decrees on original sin and justification are, on the one hand, the precipitate of the discussion with Protestant Christianity, and, on the other hand, a compromise between Thomism (Augustinianism) and Nominalism. The Decree on justification, although a product of art, is in many respects remarkably well constructed; indeed, it may be doubted whether the Reformation would have developed itself if this Decree had been issued at the Lateran Council at the beginning of the century, and had really passed into the flesh and blood of the Church. But that is an idle reflection. That the Roman Church expressed itself on justification as the terms of that Decree represent, was itself a consequence of the Reformation. Just for that reason the Decree must not be over-rated. It was the product of a situation which never repeated itself, nor ever again will repeat itself, for the Roman Church. At that time this Church stood under the influence at once of Augustinianism and Protestantism, not as regards its Sacraments and institutions, but certainly as regards the spiritual conception of religion; for it could not simply identify itself with the old Nominalistic Scholasticism; but as yet the Jesuits had not found the way to adopt the critical and sceptical momenta of Nominalism, to translate them into momenta of Probabilism, and thus to create those elastic loci which adjusted themselves to every pressure and every turn of Church politics. Against the Thomists, therefore, one was, up to a certain point, defenceless at Trent; the Thomists, on the other hand, as the proceedings at the religious conferences had already shown, were not strongly averse to the Protestant doctrine of justification (looked at as a doctrine by itself), however decided they might be in their opposition to Protestantism. The deep distinction between Protestants and Augustinian Thomists is apparent enough from the fact, that just on account of the doctrine of justification the former combated as heretical the "usages" of the Roman Church, while the latter could not understand why it should be impossible to unite the two. Yet a clear perception of the contrast of position was not arrived at, because even Protestantism was then already beginning to treat the doctrine of justification as a Scholastic doctrine, and in its deriving from
justification the right to religious and spiritual freedom had become uncertain and narrow. So it could not but follow that an effort should be made to express the contrast in Scholastic definitions, which are not without their importance, which, indeed, are highly important as setting forth the different fundamental views, but which, nevertheless, rather conceal than elucidate the real distinction in its full extent. Or is the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism really described when it is said that for the former justification is a process (!), for the latter a once-occurring event; that by the former an infused grace (gratia infusa) is taught, by the latter an imputed righteousness (justitia imputativa); that for the former it is a question about faith and love, for the latter a question about faith alone; that the former includes in its thinking the idea of conduct, while the latter thinks only of relationship? These are all merely half-truths, although the controversy of creeds—especially later on—was carried on chiefly in the line of these antitheses. It would stand hard with Protestantism if its view admitted of being expressed in these sharp formulæ.

On the other hand, if the Roman Church remains the Roman Church—and at Trent the decision was formed to undertake no self-reformation—it is a matter of comparative indifference what it contemplated teaching with regard to justification and original sin; for all the propositions here promulgated, whether their terms suggest Nominalism or Augustinian Thomism or even the Reformation,¹ are only minor propositions under the major, that the use and wont of the Roman Church is the supreme law.

Having first made these necessary observations, let us examine the two Decrees. In the Decree on original sin the flagrant Pelagianism, or Semi-Pelagianism, of Nominalism is rejected in strong and gratifying terms; but the positive propositions are so shrewdly constructed that it is always possible still to connect with them a meaning that widely diverges from that of Augustine.

¹ As is well known there was at one time a near approach in Rome to approval of the entire first half of the Augsburg Confession.
At the very beginning, in Chapter I., it is said that Adam lost the holiness and righteousness “in which he had been constituted” (“in qua constitutus fuerat”). That is ambiguous: it can be understood as “creatus” (Thomistic; increated righteousness); but it can also be understood as an added gift (Scotistic; donum superadditum), and the latter interpretation is perhaps confirmed by the phrase “accepta a deo sanctitas et justitia” (“holiness and righteousness received from God”). So also there is ambiguity when it is said that by the Fall the whole Adam in body and soul was “changed for the worse” (“in deterius commutatus”); for what does “for the worse” mean? In the 6th Decree there is substituted for this, “lost innocence” (“innocentiam perdidisse” c. 1); but immediately afterwards it is declared that free will is by no means destroyed, but “weakened in force and perverted” (“in viribus attenuatum et inclinatum”). This definition teaches that “for the worse” (“in deterius”) is really to be understood as a comparative, and that there was no inclination to approve of Augustine’s doctrine of sin and freedom. In the 2nd Chapter (cf. Chap. III.) inherited death and inherited sin are strictly taught, and there is set over against them the sole merit of Christ, communicated in baptism (infant baptism, Chap. IV.), by which merit the reatus originalis peccati, that is, guilt, is completely wiped out, so that there is now no longer anything hate-worthy in the man, and the way to heaven (ingressus in cœlum) stands open to him. But the Decree also says indirectly that all sin itself is at the same time abolished: “this holy Synod confesses and holds that concupiscence or slumbering passion remains in the baptized; when this is exposed to conflict it cannot do injury to those who do not yield to, but strenuously resist it through the grace of Christ Jesus. . . . With regard to this concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Council declares that the Catholic Church has never understood it to be called sin because it is truly and properly sin in the regenerate, but because it springs from sin and disposes to sin.”

1 Manere in baptizatis concupiscientiam vel fomitem, haec s. synodus fatetur et sentit: quæ cum ad agonem relicta sit, nocere non consentientibus viriliter per Christi Jesu gratiam repugnantibus non valet . . . hanc concupiscientiam, quam aliquando
With this very rationalistic Scholastic reflection about evil desire the religious standpoint for contemplating sin was abandoned, and room was again made for all questions of doubt that were bound to lead to Nominalistic (Pelagian) answers. Because in the whole Decree on original sin what was dealt with was not faith and unbelief, because therefore forgiveness of sin appeared as an external act, without mention being made of the medium in which alone men can win for themselves assurance of forgiveness, it was inevitable that the definitions—if there was a wish to avoid the magical—should issue in Pelagianism. If the process of the forgiveness of sins takes place outside of faith, evil desire cannot be sin; for in that case baptism would be insufficient, since it would not secure what it is meant to secure, namely, the removal of sin. Further, as the continued existence of evil desire cannot be denied, nothing remains but to declare it a matter of indifference. Such an assumption, however, must necessarily have a reflex influence on the shaping of the doctrines of the primitive state and of free will; concupiscence must be ascribed to the nature of man, and accordingly holiness cannot express his true nature, 1 but is a donum superadditum. The Decree, therefore, did not reach the height of the Protestant view, at which, without regard to the earthly condition of man and the psychological questions, the problem of sin and freedom is identical with the problem of godlessness and trust in God. 2

The “thorny doctrine of grace,” as a modern Roman theologian has in an unguarded moment styled it, occupied the Fathers:

1 Apostolus peccatum appellat, s. synodus declarat, ecclesiam Catholicam nunquam intellectisse peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie in renatis peccatum est, sed quia ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat.”

2 That in spite of the Augustinianism there was a wish to leave everything in the old position is shown by the closing sentence of the Decree: “Declarat synodus, non esse sue intentionis comprehendere in hoc decreto, ubi de peccato originali agitur, beatam et immaculatam virginem Mariam, dei genericem sed observandas esse constititiones felicis recordationis Xysti papa IV., sub poenis in eis constitutionibus contentis, quas innovat.” There could, indeed, be as yet no venturing beyond these definitions “felicis recordationis,” without raising a storm, for the opposition between Franciscans and Dominicans at this point was still unbroken.
for months. The Decree which finally took shape could—after all that had been written in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—have been gladly welcomed by the Protestants, on many things an understanding could easily have been come to, and other things might have been left to the Schools, had it not been necessary to say to one's self that here language frequently concealed thought, and that the authors of the Decree, in spite of their Biblical attitude and their edifying language, did not really know what faith meant, as evangelically understood. In spite of all appearance to the contrary, the interest that really governs the whole Decree is the desire to show how there can be an attainment to good works that have weight in the sight of God.

The voluminous Decree, which takes the place of the original sketch, falls into three parts (1-9, 10-13, 14-16). Almost every chapter contains compromises.

Chap. I. describes the entire inability of the children of Adam to deliver themselves from the dominion of sin, the devil, and death by means of natural power (per vim naturæ) or by means of the letter of the law of Moses (per litteram legis Moysis). Yet there is immediately added as a supplement, "Although free will is by no means extinguished in them, however it may be diminished in power and perverted" ("tamesti in eis liberum arbitrium minime extinctum esset, viribus licet attenuatum et inclinatum"). Chap. II. declares that God has sent Christ in order that all men might receive adoption and become sons of God (Him hath God set forth as the propitiator through faith in His blood for our sins" ["hunc proposuit deus propitiatorem per fidem in sanguine ipsius pro peccatis nostris"]). Here, therefore, faith seems to have its sovereign place given to it. Yet (Chap. III.)—all do not accept the benefit of the death of Christ, but only those to whom the merit of His suffering is imparted. What follows leaves the question in obscurity whether an eternal election of grace must be thought of. Yet so it would appear: those only are justified to whom regeneration through the merit of Christ's suffering is given by means of the grace through which they become righteous. A vague sentence indeed, which leaves it to everyone to determine the relation between election,
justification, and regeneration. In Chap. IV. justification is described in a fundamental way as justificatio impii. It is a translation from the standing of the sinful Adam into the standing of grace and adoption (that has an evangelical ring), and, in the era of the gospel, is effected simply through baptism (“or the vow to receive it” [aut ejus voto]). But in the process of describing justification more exactly in Chap. V., the thought of “translation from one standing into another” (“ab uno statu in alterum”) becomes embarrassed and uncertain. It is here asserted, that is to say, that the beginning of justification is wrought by the gratia præveniens, that is, the vocatio (by which adults are called in the absence of any merits of their own [“qua adulti nullis eorum existentibus meritis vocantur”—this in opposition to the lax views of Nominalism]; but its contemplated end is, “that those who have been alienated from God by their sins, may be disposed by His inciting and aiding grace, to convert themselves in order to their own justification, by their freely assenting to, and co-operating with, the same grace.” ¹ In this way the Augustinian-Thomistic view is abandoned in favour of the laxer view; but still there is no mention whatever of faith. With a view, however, to conciliate the Thomists, the Decree still further proceeds: “in such a way that, when God touches the heart of man by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, man neither does nothing whatever himself in receiving that inspiration, since he can also reject it, nor, on the other hand, can he, of his free will, without the grace of God, bring himself into a position of righteousness before God.” ² But of what avail is this conciliation, if, while a human activity towards the good is asserted, no thought of faith is entertained? Even in this “preparation for the justification” (“praeparatio ad justificationem”) the thought of merit must necessarily come in; ³ for the activity

¹ “Ut qui per peccata a deo aversi erant, per ejus excitantem atque adjuvantem gratiam ad convertendum se ad suam ipsorum justificationem, eidem gratiae libere assentiendo et co-operando, disponantur.”

² “Ita ut tangente deo cor hominis per spiritus sancti illuminationem neque homo ipse atque nihil omnino agat, inspirationem illum recipiens, quippe qui illum et abijicere potest, neque tamen sine gratia dei movere se ad justitiam coram illo libera voluntate possit.”

³ The Decree does not, indeed, say that “the letting one’s self be disposed for grace” is a merit, yet it does not exclude this view.
that knows itself to be entirely in-wrought, and therefore is at the same time "gift," "virtue," and "reward of virtue" ("donum, virtus, præmium virtutis"), is faith alone. But just on that account also, faith forbids the breaking up of "justification," as "translation into the state of adoption," into various acts. Wherein the right "disposition" consists is shown in Chap. VI. It consists (1) in the "faith through hearing" ("fides ex auditu"); this is a free movement God-wards, inasmuch as one believes that the content of divine revelation is true, and believes this in particular of the reconciliation and justification through Christ, (2) in insight into the fact that one is a sinner, and accordingly, in fear of the divine righteousness, in reflection on the divine mercy, in the hope that springs from this that God will be favourably disposed for Christ's sake, and in incipient love to Him as the source of all righteousness, from which there arises "a certain hatred and horror" of sin,¹ (3) in the entering, in connection with the decision to receive baptism, upon a new life and course of obedience to the commandments of God. What has all that to do with justification? This description is certainly not sketched from the standpoint of one by whom justification has been experienced, but by one who stands without, and reflects on what the course of justification must be if there is to be nothing to upset thought and nothing to be unintelligible. Will the justified man know of anything he can assert, prior to his experience of justification, regarding his incipient faith, incipient love, incipient hatred, incipient repentance? Will he not rather say with the apostle that he is dead in sins? What is an incipient good from the standpoint of one who has the knowledge of Augustine: "for me the good is to cling to God" ("mihi adhæreret deo bonum est")? And what is the idea of faith involved, if it is nothing but the beginning of the beginning, a holding the divine revelation to be true! Here everything still belongs to the mediæval mode of view, which has no capacity for perceiving the personal experience, that religion is a relation of person to person. Under the influence of the desire, legitimate in itself, that faith shall produce life, a direct leap is taken by the contemplating mind from

¹ I.e., "per eam penitentiam quam ante baptismum agi oportet."
assent to love, after the unhappy distinction has been made between "preparation for justification" and "justification itself," while "faith in the promises" ("fides promissionum") is dealt with as an empty phrase. In Chap. VII. "justification itself" is now described in quite a Scholastic way. It is — this is the first statement made — not only the forgiveness of sins, but also sanctification and renewal of the inward man; nay, that Augustine may not be pronounced too much in the right, there is added, "renewal by voluntary acceptance of grace" ("renovatio per voluntarium susceptionem gratiae"). But how can a man be sanctified otherwise than by the wonderful assurance given him of forgiveness of sins? It is characteristic again of genuine Mediævalism that beyond thinking of forgiveness as the mechanical removal of sin, there is no ability to form any thoughts regarding it. But if in the matter of forgiveness all depends on its being believed as such, the question of chief importance relates to the inward condition and spirit of him who believes it. If this question is put, then the form of expression "not only forgiveness of sins, but also renewal of the inner man" is simply absurd — unless forgiveness of sins be viewed as an act that takes place outside human consciousness and feeling, and that, certainly, is the presupposition of the Catholic thesis. There now follow the definitions as to the "final, efficient, meritorious, instrumental, and formal causes"1 of justification, which have little interest. The only thing of importance is that there is described as the "instrumental cause," not faith, but (in skilfully chosen words) the Sacrament of Baptism, "which is the Sacrament of the faith without which no one has ever come to participate in justification" ("quod est sacramentum fidei, sine qua nulli umquam contigit justificatio"). This justification then brings it about that we are not only regarded as righteous, but are truly described as such, and are such, seeing that we receive into ourselves righteousness, "every-one according to his measure, which the Holy Spirit apportions to individuals as He wills, and according to each one's own disposition and co-operation" ("unusquisque suam secundum mensuram, quam spiritus s. partitur singulis prout vult et secundum

1 "Causa finalis, efficiens, meritoria, instrumentalis, formalis."
propriam cujusque dispositionem et co-operationem”). Here we have the complete contradiction of the evangelical conception—and even, indeed, a flagrant contradiction of the terms “translation into a new standing” (“translatio in novum statum”); for, strictly speaking, what is suggested here is not a translation into a new standing as a divinely-produced effect, but the being filled with righteousness, as if righteousness were a material, this being filled, moreover, being first of all gradual and different in the case of different individuals, and then determined by the measure of one’s own disposition and co-operation. Here, therefore, not only the doctrine of the “meritum de congruo,” but also the anti-Thomistic doctrine of the “meritum de congruo ante justificationem,” are, by implication, left open at least. With greater precision the “receptio justitiae” is then described as “inherent diffusion of the love of God” (“diffusio caritatis dei inhaerens,”) so that, along with the forgiveness of sins, a man receives as infused all these things—namely, faith, love, hope—through Jesus Christ, into whom he is engrafted. It is not the term “gratia infusa” that leads astray here—one might very well so express himself figuratively—but it is the incapacity again to get out of faith anything else than assent. Hence the further statement is forthwith made that without the addition of hope and love faith cannot perfectly unite with Christ. But are not “faith,” “hope,” and “love” together what the evangelical Christian understands by “faith” alone? Certainly it would be possible to understand the Decree accordingly, and on this basis to effect a union with the Tridentine view. But the definite assertion that now follows—namely, that eternal life is only imparted to hope and love, shows that the controversy at this point is no dispute about words; for the placing together of “love” and “eternal life” has its ultimate ground in the wish to derive eternal life also from man’s own deeds, while that life is unquestionably given in the faith in forgiveness of sin itself and in that alone.

In the 8th Chapter there is an embarrassed discussion of the Pauline principle, that justification is tied to faith and takes place gratuitously. Here there is a flat contradiction of the apostle, the principle being represented as meaning “that we are
described as being justified by faith, because faith is the \textit{beginning}, foundation, and root of human salvation” (“ut per fidem ideo justificari dicamur, quia fides est humanæ salutis initium, fundamentum et radix”). That is more than ambiguity. Equally lacking in truthfulness is the explanation of the “gratis”; for while it is represented here as meaning that nothing that precedes justification, neither faith nor works, \textit{merits} the grace of justification, yet, according to what has been stated in Chap. V., that foregoing preparation is absolutely necessary that justification may be obtained. At the close of this first section there now follows (Chap. IX.) the polemic against the empty “fiducia” of the heretics, the formulating of which gave the largest amount of trouble to the Fathers. Help was sought for in the end by transforming the opposing doctrine into a fictitious object of dread. Although one must believe that sins are, for Christ's sake, gratuitously forgiven by the divine mercy, “yet it must be said that to no one \textit{boasting} of his trust and his assurance of the remission of his sins, and \textit{easily resting} in that alone, are, or have been, his sins forgiven” (“tamen nemini fiduciam et certitudinem remissionis peccatorum suorum jactant
et in ea sola quiescenti peccata dimitti vel dimissa esse dicendum est ”).\(^1\) What the real aim of this self-evident statement is only appears from what follows. Here it is affirmed that certainty regarding one’s own justification does not necessarily belong to justification, that it is not needful that one should firmly believe in the forgiveness of his sins in order to be really freed from his sins, and that it is an error to assume that forgiveness of sins and justification are effected only in faith (“as if anyone not believing this must have doubt about the promises of God, and about the efficacy of the death and resurrection of Christ”\(^2\)). In order that these propositions, which rob true faith of all meaning—faith means simply nothing else than being, or having the wish to be, a member of the Catholic Church—may not

\(^1\) Also the addition, “\textit{cum apud hereticos et schismaticos possit esse immo nostra tempestate fit, et magna contra ecclesiam Catholicam contentione prædicatur vana hiec ab omni pietate remota fiducia}.”

\(^2\) “Quasi qui hoc non credit, de dei promissis deque mortis et resurrectionis Christi efficacia dubitet.”
appear too startling, there is added to them the proof, suggestive either of want of candour or want of understanding, that when man thinks of his weakness he must always continue to fear whether he has received grace, as if that had ever been denied by any serious-minded Christian, while undoubtedly the conclusion drawn, that certainty of salvation is impossible, is entirely incompetent!

The 2nd section treats of the "increase of justification" ("incrementum justificationis.") Here it is taught (Chap. X.) that the justified are renewed from day to day by observing the commandments of God and of the Church, and that accordingly "they grow in righteousness, faith co-operating with good works, and are in a greater degree justified" ("in ipsa justitia cooperante fide bonis operibus crescunt atque magis justificantur.") Justification, then, is here conceived of in its progress (not justification itself) as a process resting upon grace, faith, and good works. With regard to good works it is taught (Chap. XI.) that even the justified man is placed under the law of commandments, and that these commandments are by no means incapable of being fulfilled. In hesitating terms it is affirmed that they are easy and sweet rather, because they can be fulfilled, or because one has to pray with a view to their fulfilment, and God gives help for this end. Moreover, the righteous do not cease to be righteous when they fall into daily sins; for God does not forsake those who are already justified, if they do not forsake Him. But this view can give rest to no tender conscience, if it be the case that the maintenance of justification must be dependent in some way on one's own action. The Decree expressly observes that one must not rely on faith alone, but on faith and the keeping of the commandments (observatio mandatorum), even though the latter be interrupted by small sins. In order, however, to conceal the laxness of this rule, a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος is employed, and the proposition is constructed thus:—"Therefore no one ought to flatter himself on the ground of faith alone, thinking that by faith alone he is made an heir and shall obtain the inheritance, even though he does not suffer with Christ, that he may also be glorified with Him" ("Itaque nemo sibi in sola fide blandiri debet, putans fide sola se heredem
esse constitutum hereditatemque consecuturum, etiamsi Christo non compatiatur, ut et conglorificetur.”) To this it is added, that it is contrary to the teaching of the orthodox religion to say that the righteous cannot do a single good work that is not imperfect; still less can the assertion be tolerated, that all works deserve eternal penalty, and that there must be no looking at all to the eternal reward. In this last cautious turn the notion of desert, without the term describing it, is introduced. It was necessary for the Fathers to move here very warily, if they were to put matters right with all parties. In the 12th and 13th Chapters it is then taught, that, although justification grows, no one is entitled to become assured of his election and of the “gift of perseverance” ("donum perseverantiae") except by special revelation ("nisi ex speciali revelatione"). Yet here again, in Chapter XIII., there is an ambiguity, since only “the being assured with an absolute certainty” ("certum esse absoluta certitudine") is forbidden, while it is elsewhere said that one must base the surest hope on the “help of God” ("in dei auxilio," so not on grace), and since the Pauline sentence is suddenly woven in, that God works the willing and the performing. Yet “labours, watchings, almsgiving, prayers, offerings, fastings, chastity” ("labores, vigiliae, eleemosynae, orationes, oblationes, jejunia, castitas") are requisite, for we are not yet regenerated “in glory” ("in gloria") but “unto the hope of glory” ("in spem gloriae"). Accordingly the whole penance system is recommended, that there may be progress in assurance. However noteworthy it is that all external legality and merit are here left out of consideration, still the fundamental view is retained, that eternal life and the assurance of justification are dependent also on good works, which, however, on the other hand, are to be regarded as the victorious struggle of the spirit with the flesh. The uncertainty of the whole conception is sufficiently indicated by the threefold view taken of good works: they are = “suffering together with Christ” (“compari Christo”) = “keeping the commandments of God” (“observatio mandatorum dei”; in this sense meritorious, though that is not expressly said) and = “contending with the flesh, the world, and the devil” (“pugna cum carne, mundo et diabolo”).
In the last section the restoration of justification when it has been lost is dealt with. The restoration is effected (Chap. XIV.) by means of the Sacrament of Penance ("second plank after shipwreck" ["secunda post naufragium tabula."]) The penance of the lapsed must be different from that of the candidate for baptism; the description of it follows the well-known scheme. Attritio is not thought of, but it is remarked that the Sacrament of Penance does not always, like baptism, cancel the temporal penalty, along with cancelling guilt and the eternal penalty; hence satisfactions are needed. But it is not the case, as the opponents think, that justification comes to be lost only through unbelief; it is lost rather through every mortal sin (Chap. XV.); nay, it can be lost through such sin, while faith continues to exist. In no way could the inferior conception of faith entertained here be more plainly expressed. It is only here that the Decree now begins to speak explicitly (ex professo) of merit (Chap. XVI.), and it is roundly asserted that eternal life is at the same time fulfilment of the promise and reward, inasmuch as ultimately all depends only on "good works" ("bene operari"): "and so to those who perform good works on to the end, and who hope in God, there is to be offered eternal life, both as grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Christ Jesus, and as a reward to be faithfully rendered, in terms of the promise of God Himself, to their good works and merits." But in order to remove from this view the appearance of self-righteousness, there follows a highly-pitched explanation which is Augustinian, and even goes beyond Augustine. "For since Christ Jesus continually pours virtue into the branches, a virtue which always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works, and without which their good works could on no account be well-pleasing and meritorious before God, it must be believed that nothing further is lacking to the justified in order to its being held that by their good deeds, which are wrought in God, they have fully satisfied the divine law as regards their

1 "Atque ideo bene operantibus usque in finem et in deo sperantibus proponenda est vita æterna, et tamquam gratia filii dei per Christum Jesum misericorditer promissa, et tamquam merces ex ipsius dei promissione bonis ipsorum operibus et meritis fideliter reddenda."
state in this life, and have truly merited also the attainment of life eternal in its time, provided only they depart this life in grace . . . thus neither is our own righteousness set down as of our own origination, nor is the righteousness of God ignored or repudiated. For the righteousness that is called our own, because we are justified through its inhering in us, is at the same time the righteousness of God, because it is infused into us by God through the merit of Christ. Nor must it be kept out of view that although in Holy Scripture there is so much attributed to good works that even to him who shall give to one of the least of His a cup of cold water, Christ promises that he shall not lose his reward . . . yet there must be no thought whatever of a Christian man’s confiding or glorying in himself and not in the Lord, whose goodness toward all men is so great, that He wills that what are His gifts should be their merits.”

If we might understand the Decree as meaning that all that it says of justification is to be taken as relating to approval in the last judgment, or if we might introduce the evangelical notion of faith where it speaks of “faith” and “good works,” we could very well make it the basis of conference with the Catholics. The correct interpretation of it, however, is that which lies not in the direction of Protestantism, but in the direction of the prevailing use and wont of the Roman Church, as is proved by the propositions regarding the “disposing of one’s self for grace”

1 “Cum enim ille ipse Christus Jesus tamquam caput in membra et tamquam viris in palmites, in ipsos justificatos jugiter virtutem influat, quae virtus bona eorum opera semper antecedit, comitatur et subsequitur, et sine qua nullo facto deo grata et meritiora esse possent, nihil ipsis justificatis amplius deesse credendum est, quo minus plene illis quidem operibus, quae in deo sunt facta, divinae legi pro hujus vitae statu satisfecisse et vitam aeternam suo etiam tempore, si tamen in gratia decesserint, consequendam vere præmeruisse censeantur . . . ita neque præsens nostra justitia tamquam ex nobis præsens statuitur, neque ignoratur aut repudiatur justitia dei. Quæ enim justitia nostra dicitur, quia per eam nobis inhærentem justificamur, illa eadem dei est, quia a deo nobis infunditur per Christi meritum. Neque vero illud omittendum est, quod licet bonis operibus in sacris litteris usque adeo tribuatur, ut etiam qui uni ex minimis suis potum aquæ frigide dederit, promittat Christus eum non esse sua mercede caritatum . . . absit tamen, ut Christianus homo in se ipso vel confidat vel glorietur et non in domino, cuius tanta est erga omnes homines bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita, quæ sunt ipsius dona.”
("se disponere ad gratiam") and the thirty-three appended anathematisms.¹

The Decrees had the effect of binding the Catholic Church to the soil of the Middle Ages and of Scholasticism, and, at the same time, of fencing it off from Protestantism; but as the formulations adopted were ambiguous in all the questions to which the Church itself cannot wish an unmistakable answer, the necessary freedom of development was preserved in spite of the huge burden of dogmatic material. To this there was added, that the important doctrines about the Church and about the Pope were not touched—through stress of circumstances they had to be left aside; but this compulsory reticence proved in subsequent times to be extremely favourable to the papacy. The mediaeval Church went forth from the Council of Trent as still substantially the ancient Church. It still included within it the great discord between world-renunciation and world-dominion, Sacrament and morality, and precisely through these discords it asserted that elasticity and many-sidedness which admitted of its holding within it such Cardinals as Richelieu and Borromeo, and enabled it to retain in connection with itself all obedient spirits. Its view was still so much directed in the last resort to the world beyond, that for it the

¹Of these anathematisms the first three are aimed at Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism, as is also the 22nd. The remaining 29 all direct themselves, and that too with the greatest keenness, against Protestantism. What is most characteristic is the rejection of the following propositions:—"Opera omnia, quæ ante justificationem fiunt, quacumque ratione facta sint, vere esse peccata vel odium dei mereri, aut quanto vehementius quis nitiatur se disponere ad gratiam, tanto eum gravius peccare" (7). "Gehenne metum, per quem ad misericordiam dei de peccatis dolendo configimus vel a peccato abstinemus, peccatum esse" (8). "Hominem justificari vel sola imputatione justitiae Christi vel sola peccatorum remissione exclusa gratia et caritate, quæ in cordibus eorum per spiritum sanctum diffundatur atque illis inhaeret, aut etiam gratiam, qua justificanur, esse tantum favorem dei" (11). "Fidem justificantem nihil aliud esse quam fidiciam divinae misericordiae peccata remittendis propter Christum, vel eam fidiciam solam esse, qua justificanur" (12). "Hominem a peccatis absolvii ac justificari ex eo quod se absolvii ac justificari certo credat, aut nominem vere esse justificatum nisi qui credat se esse justificatum, et hac sola fide absolutionem et justificationem perfici" (14). "Nihil præceptum esse in evangelio præter fidem" (19). "Hominem justificantum teneri tantum ad credendum, quasi vero evangelium sit nuda et absoluta promissio vitae æternæ sine conditione observationis mandatorum" (20). "Justitiam acceptam
enthusiast, wearing away his life in voluntary poverty, was the greatest saint: but at the same time it preached to men, that all its ideals lay hid in the visible ecclesiastical institution, and that obedience to the Church was the highest virtue. It had still no other thought than that believing is equivalent to "being Catholic," and consists in the willingness to hold as true (or, the willingness not to meddle with) incomprehensible doctrines. The restlessness that still remained here it sought partly to soothe away, partly to stimulate, by means of the Sacraments, the indulgences, the Church service, and the ecclesiastical directions for mystico-monastic discipline.

(2) The Main Features of the Dogmatic Development in Catholicism during the period between 1563 and 1870, as preparing the way for the Decrees of the Vatican.

During the three centuries between the Council of Trent and the Council of the Vatican three great controversies stirred the Catholic Schools, and even became extremely dangerous to the whole Church. At Trent the opposing positions in which they took their rise were concealed; just for that reason a discussion

non conservari atque etiam non augeri coram deo per bona opera, sed opera ipsa fructus solummodo et signa esse justificationis adepte, non autem ipsius augendae causam" (24). "In qualibet bono opere justum saltem venialiter peccare aut mortaliter, atque ideo poenas æternas mereri tantumque ob id non damnari, quia deus ea opera non imputet ad damnationem" (25). "Justos non debere pro bonis operibus exspectare et sperare æternam retributionem" (26). "Nullum esse mortale peccatum nisi infidelitatis" (27). "Sola fide amissam justitiam recuperari sine sacramento pænitentiae" (29). "Justicatum peccare, dum intuatur æternae mercedis bene operatur" (31). The Canones conclude with the words, "Si quis dixerit, per hanc doctrinam (scil. by this Decree) aliqua ex parte gloriae dei vel meritis Jesu Christi derogari et non potius veritatem fidei nostræ, dei denique ac Christi Jesu gloriam illustrari, anathema sit." It cannot be denied that to some extent the propositions of Protestantism, which are condemned in the Canons, undergo adjustment; on the other hand, many weak points in the Protestant doctrine are hit upon; but certainly the clearest impression we receive is that the Tridentine Fathers had no understanding whatever of what Luther meant by the righteousness of God, faith, and the forgiveness of sins. He bore witness of the religion which had opened to his view in the gospel, and which governed and blessed him as an indivisible power; they sought to do justice at once to many points of view, religion, morality, the Sacrament, and the Church.
of them in the times that followed was inevitable. There was (1) the controversy between Curialism and Episcopalism, which parted into two questions, (a) whether the bishops had independent, divine rights apart from the Pope (and, in the Council, rights superior to the Pope), (b) whether tradition was to be understood in the sense of Vincentius of Lerinum, or whether the Pope was to be held as determining what is to be regarded as tradition; (2) the controversy between Augustinianism and the Jesuitic (Scotistic) Pelagianism; (3) the controversy regarding Probabilism. These three controversies had the closest inward connection with each other; at bottom they formed a unity, and on that account also the Vatican Council decided all three at one stroke. The party distinguished by its Curialistic, Pelagian, and Probabilistic tendency proved the victor.

(1) (a) The original Curialistic outline of the position of the Pope in the Church, which made the Pope the lord of the Church, and declared the bishops assistants, whom Christ's governor adopts "for purposes of oversight" ("in partem sollicitudinis") could not be established at Trent. The recollections of the Council of Constance were, in spite of the Bull of Leo X. "Pastor æternus," still too vivid. But neither could the contrary doctrine, that the Council stood above the Pope, and that every bishop, as a successor of the Apostles, had his power from Christ, be raised to a dogma. The sharply-opposed theses, "the Pope is the bishop, the universal bishop, the governor for Christ," and "the bishops have their poweroriginally from Christ, so that the Pope is only primus inter pares, representative of the unity of the Church, and custodian of its external order and uniformity," could in no way be reconciled. Hence the decision of this question at Trent had to be delayed. But owing to small observations interspersed throughout the text of the Tridentine decisions, and owing especially to the prominence given to the "ecclesia Romana," a bias was already given to the question in favour of the Curialists. But what was bound to have an incomparably greater effect was that the Council, hurrying in a precipitate way to a close,

1 See also Sess. 6 de reform. c. 1, where the Pope is styled "ipsius dei in terris vicarius."
not only left entirely in the hands of the Pope the confirmation of its Decrees and the adoption of measures for carrying them out, but even quietly accepted the Bull in which the Pope reserved the exposition of the Decrees exclusively to himself.¹

The “Professio,” which appeared immediately thereafter, misleadingly styled the “Professio Fidei Tridentinae,” set the seal to this modification of the Tridentine Decrees, in so far as it included obedience to the Pope within “faith” itself.² The way in which Rome manipulated the Professio from that time forward, and by means of it brought all bishops under subjection to itself, was a master-stroke of Curialistic politics. The Catechismus Romanus also, which the Pope took occasion from the Council to order and approve, was favourable to Curialism, although on the ground of its Thomistic doctrine of grace it was inconvenient to the Jesuits, who, on that account, attempted indeed to contest its authority.³ Yet, leaving out of view isolated steps that were taken in all Catholic countries, there

¹ See Köllner, l.c., pp. 116 ff.
² See Köllner, l.c., pp. 141-165. The words of the Professio, a confession of faith (!), run thus: “Sanctam catholicam et apostolicam Romanam ecclesiam omnium ecclesiarum matrem et magistrum adgnosco, Romanoque Pontifici, beati Petri apostolorum principis successori ac Jesu Christi vicario, veram obedientiam spondeo ac juro.”
³ See Köllner, l.c., pp. 166-190. On the attacks of the Jesuits on the Catechism, see p. 188, and Köcher, Katech.-Gesch., pp. 127 ff.: they sought to show, not merely that it was partisan, but that it was heretical also. The result of the attacks has been that the Catechism has been forced into the background in more recent times. The sections of it bearing upon the Church are strictly Thomistic, and therefore favourable to papal autocracy. Thus, in P. I., c. 10, q. 10, the unity of the Church is proved from Ephes. IV. 5, and then it is further said: “Unus est etiam ejus rector ac gubernator, invisibilis quidem Christus, quem æternus pater dedit caput super omnem ecclesiam, quæ est corpus ejus; visibilis autem is, qui Romanam cathedram, Petri apostolorum principis legitimus successor, tenet.” It would have been impossible to secure general recognition of a proposition of this kind at Trent. In Q. 11 there then follows a wordy statement about the Pope, in which he is not described as representative of the unity of the Church and as its outward guide, but rather: “necessarium fuit hoc visible caput ad unitatem ecclesie constituendam et conservandum.” A still further step is represented by the words: “Ut Christum dominum singulorum sacramentorum non solum auctorem, sed intimum etiam prebitem habemus—nam ipse est, qui baptizat et qui absolvit, et tamen is homines sacramentorum externos ministros instituit—sic ecclesiae, quam ipse intimo spiritu regit, hominem sua potestatis vicarium et ministrum praefecit; nam eum visibilis ecclesia visibili capite egeat, etc.”
arose in France a powerful movement against Curialism, quite independent of Jansenism. France, indeed, never fully recognised the Tridentinum in a formal way, although in point of fact the Tridentine system of doctrine asserted itself among the clergy, and even among the Church authorities. From the end of the sixteenth century (Henry IV.), but, above all, during the reign of Louis XIV., the Church of France, in its most important representatives (Bossuet), went back with decision to "Gallicanism." Yet the positive programme was far from being clear. Some were opponents of Curialism in the interest of the unlimited power of their king, others in the interest of their nation, others, again, from their being Episcopalists. But what did Episcopalism aim at? It had no greater clearness about itself in the seventeenth century than in the fifteenth. There was the admission that there belonged to the Pope a supremacy of rank ("suprematus ordinis"), but there was no common agreement as to whether this "suprematus" meant only the first place inter pares, or whether real prerogatives were connected with it. If there was a deciding for the latter, it was doubtful, again, whether these prerogatives were equivalent to a "cura ecclesiae universalis" committed to the Pope. If this was certain, the questions had again to be asked, whether he could exercise this cura only while consulting and co-operating with all the bishops, and what measures were to be adopted with the view of guarding the bishops against papal encroachments. The fixed point in the Episcopalist theory was simply this, that the bishops were not appointed by the Pope, that they were therefore not delegates and representatives of the Pope, but ruled their dioceses independently "jure divino," that the Pope consequently could exercise no direct power of jurisdiction in their dioceses. But how that could be united with the "suprematus ordinis" of the Pope remained vague. It was clear also that an autocratic power of the Pope (infallibility, universal episcopy) was rejected, and that the Council was regarded as superior to the Pope; yet there was a vagueness as to the meaning to be attached to the position that was admitted, that the Pope stands at the head of the Council. These difficulties, however, finally issued in somewhat definite formulae, namely,
in the four Propositions of the Gallican Church (1862), which have more of a Church-and-State than an Episcopalist character: (1) In temporal matters the princes are subject to no ecclesiastical power, and can be neither directly nor indirectly deposed; no power over temporal and civil affairs has been committed by God to the successors of Peter. (2) The Pope possesses, certainly, the "full power in spiritual things" ("plena potestas spiritualium rerum"), yet in such a way "that the decrees of the sacred œcumenical Synod of Constance regarding the authority of general Councils are at the same time valid and remain undisturbed"; the Gallican Church disapproves of those "who impair the force of those decrees, as if they were of doubtful authority and were less fully ratified, or who twist them into being merely deliverances of a Council for a time of schism." (3) The Pope, in the exercise of his power, is bound by the Canons, and must also have respect to the rules, customs and arrangements adopted in France. (4) The Pope has, no doubt, the highest authority (? partes) in matters of faith, and his decrees apply to all Churches and every Church in particular;

1 See Collect. Lacensis I., p. 793. Art. "Gallikanische Freiheiten" in Wetzer und Welte's Kirchenlex, 2nd ed. V., p. 66 ff. A century earlier Pithou (1594) gave an account of the liberties of the French Church, and already laid down the two fundamental rules, that the Pope (1) has no voice in France in regard to civil and temporal matters, and that (2) in spiritual matters he is bound by the decisions of the Councils, and therefore by those of Constance also. These ideas were brought, as an ecclesiastico-political programme, before King Henry IV., when he ascended the throne, with the view of inaugurating State-Catholicism. See Mejer, Febronius (1880), p. 20: "Under the protection of the Bourbons, who made the Gallican theory their own, there flourished throughout the whole of Romanic Europe a rich literature in support of it: Peter de Marca, Thomassin, Bossuet, are names that will not be forgotten so long as there is a jurisprudence of ecclesiastical law. The scientific method of this Gallican Episcopalism differs from that of the fifteenth century especially in two things—first, in its deriving its proof from the history of law, a mode of proof that originated in France with the Humanistic jurisprudence of Gujacius, and set itself to describe the Church constitution of the first centuries with the view of declaring the later constitution an abuse; secondly, in this, that in connection therewith, and also with the traditional French practice, it vindicated for the French King somewhat the same ruling ecclesiastical power as the Roman Emperor possessed according to the Justinian books of laws."

2 "Ut simul valeant atque immota consistat S. Œcumenice Synodi Constantiensis decreta de auctoritate conciliorum generalium."

3 "Qui eorum decretorum, quasi dubie sint auctoritatis ac minus approbata, robur infringant, aut ad solum schismatis tempus concilii dicta detorqueant."
“still, his decision is not incapable of reform, unless the assent of the Church has been added.”

These propositions were rejected, first by Innocent X., then by Alexander VIII., as entirely worthless and invalid. Yet that would have been of little avail had not the all-powerful king, hemmed in by Jansenists and Jesuits, and ever and anon distressed about his soul’s salvation, himself abandoned them. He very really betrayed himself and the Church of his country to the Pope, without formally withdrawing the four articles. In point of fact these rather remained in force during the eighteenth century, that is, the French clergy were for the most part trained in them, and thought and acted in accordance with them. But as the eighteenth century was passing into the nineteenth, a second monarch completed the betrayal of the French Church to the Pope—the same monarch who formally recognised the Gallican Articles and raised them to the place of a State-law—Napoleon I. The way in which the French Church and the French Church-order, really degraded already by the Revolution, was, with the consent of the Pope, completely demolished by Napoleon, so that, with a disregard of all traditional order and right, he might reconstruct this Church in league with the Pope (Concordat of 1801), was an abandonment of the French Church to Curialism. This was not certainly Napoleon’s idea. What he wished was to be master of the Church of his country, and the Pope, whom he had in his grasp, was, as high priest, to be his useful instrument. But he had not considered that Western Catholicism no longer allows any secular ruler to be forced upon it, and he had regarded his own political power as invincible. Of his original intentions, therefore, nothing was realised, save the reducing to ruins of the old, relatively independent, French Episcopal Church. He thus laid the foundation of the French Ultramon-

1 "Nec tamen irreformabile esse judicium, nisi ecclesia consensus accesserit."
2 See the strong condemnation in Denzinger, l.c., p. 239 f.
3 That this degradation, and the reconstruction by means of the Civil Constitution given to the clergy, were already favourable to the future Curialistic development of Catholicism has been recently shown by Lenz in an able essay on the Catholic Church and the French Revolution (in the Journal Cosmopolis, 1st year, 2nd number).
tane Church (without knowing or intending it, the Assembly of 1789, in drawing up the Constitution, had prepared the way for this), and after the tyrant had been overthrown, Pius VII. knew very well what thanks he owed him. Romanticism (de Maistre, Bonald, Chateaubriand, Lacordaire, etc.) and the Restoration, in conjunction with the Jesuits, completed the work; nay, even agitations for political freedom had to fall to the advantage of the Curia. But, above all, the writings of de Maistre ("On the Pope"), in which the Catholic spirit of the Middle Ages, the spirit of St. Thomas, learned to speak in new tongues (even in the language of Voltaire and Rousseau), contributed to bury out of view Gallicanism and Episcopalism. The great Savoyard, who introduced the Ultramontane "aperçu" into the writing of history, became the instructor of Görres; but he found a follower also in that boldest of all publicists, L. Veuillot, who understood how to recommend to the French clergy and their following as divine truths even the most audacious paradoxes. At the present day France, even Republican France, is the main support of Catholicism, of the Catholic propaganda and of Ultramontanism: the French have become the Normans of the modern papacy.

In Germany the Episcopalist agitations were of little account till the middle of the eighteenth century. But at that time they broke out most powerfully in the work of the Suffragan Bishop, Nicolas von Hontheim (Febronii de statu ecclesiae et legitima potestate. Romani Pontificis, 1763). Different lines

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1 Yet see the firm rejection of the positions of Lammennais by Gregory XVI. in the years 1832 and 1834 (Denzinger, l.c., p. 310 f.). Indifferentism and the demand for freedom of conscience are here placed upon the same level: "Ex hoc putidissimo indifferentismi fonte absurda illa fluuit ac erronea sententia seu potius deliramentum, asserendam esse ac vindicandam cullibet libertatem conscientiae. Cui quidem pestilentissimo errori viam sternit plena illa atque immoderata libertas opinionum, quae in sacre et civilis rei labem late grassat, dictitantibus per summam impudentiam nonnullis, aliquid ex ea commodi in religionem promanare."

converge in this book: Gallicanism, the natural-right theories regarding the State which had originated with Hugo Grotius (and the Roman-law theories regarding the emperor or the sovereign), the Dutch Humanism. Hontheim had studied at Louvain. The teachers there, who were under the influence of Van Espen, had taught him that Catholic and Papist were not the same thing, and that the actually existing state of papacy in Germany could not cancel the original order of things, which was involved in the divinely ordained Episcopal office on the one hand, and in the natural rights of the State on the other. The primacy had only a human-historical development; the Church was really represented and led by the Council, to which the Pope is subject. This state of things, which rested on the divinely ordained apostolicity and equality of all bishops as rulers of the Church, must again be established. In the end Hontheim let himself be forced to retract. But his ideas continued to have influence, though not exactly in the direction he had intended. He was more a Gallican and an Episcopalist than a representative of the natural right of the State, which, in the eighteenth century, was becoming modified into the absolute right of the prince. But the ecclesiastical Electors who adopted his thoughts were interested in them primarily as sovereigns, only in a secondary way as bishops. This turn of things was disastrous. The Ems Punctation (1786), the occasion of which was the grievance about the Nuncios, could not hold out any promise to the emperor and the sovereigns, who did not wish an independent Episcopal church, but a State Church in the strictest sense of the term. The opposition, hitherto concealed, between Episcopalism and State Churchism necessarily came to be all the more strongly expressed, from the great bishops themselves, in their own interest, passing over to adopt the State Church thoughts. Owing to this opposition, and also to the divided state of Germany and the rivalry between Prussia and Austria, what was undertaken at Ems very rapidly proved a failure. Never, certainly, since the days of Constance and


2 On this, see Köllner, l.c. I., p. 430 ff.; Schmid, l.c. I., p. 15 ff.
Bâsle, was the sovereignty of the bishops and the unimportant position of the Pope more boldly formulated within Catholicism than by the German bishops at Ems a hundred years ago. But it was a childish illusion of the "philosophical" age to imagine that a structure like that of the papacy could be overthrown by decrees like those of Ems, and it was a vast deception to believe that Roman Catholicism was really weary of life, and had given final proof of its weakness by being forced to suppress the Jesuits. In the storm of the Revolution it became apparent that the old lion still lived, and in their alarm the princes then hastened to impart to it on their side still more vigour. The collapse of the Imperial Church, with which the State Church of Joseph II. also disappeared, was a fortunate occurrence for Rome. How the Curia succeeded in suppressing what remained of Episcopalist and State Church thought in Germany, in constructing the Church anew by means of concordats, and in gradually training for itself an Ultramontane Episcopate and an Ultramontane clergy, after the National Church tradition had, as in France, been abolished; how in this work there co-operated not only the Jesuits, but above all the princes, the Romanists, and the unsuspecting Liberals—has been fully narrated quite recently. The Vatican Decrees were the culmination of this development.

(1) (2) Their opposition to the Protestant principle of Scripture, and the impossibility of really furnishing traditional proof

1 Cf. K. Müller in Herzog's R.-E., 2nd ed., Art. "Josefinismus"; on the Synod of Pistoja under the direction of Ricci, see in the same work the article by Benrath. Against the adviser of Joseph II., the Canonist Eybel, who had made a most startling impression with his book, "Was ist der Papst," see the Breve of Pius VI., "Super solidate" (Denzinger, l.c. p. 273).

2 See the accounts by Mejer, Schmid, Nielsen, Friedrich, Nippold. We also possess excellent accounts of the history of the Catholic Church of the nineteenth century in separate German countries. Future historians will compare the advance of Romanism in our century with that in the eleventh century; it is more powerful at any rate than that of the Counter-Reformation. See also Hase, Polemik, 3rd ed., 1st Book.

3 How little ability there was even in the year 1844 to forecast on the Protestant side the development of the papal system into the doctrine of infallibility is shown by a remark of Köllner (l.c., p. 426), whose "Symbolik" cannot be charged with failing to do justice to the Roman Church. "Quite uneclesiastical, and suggestive only of the fanaticism of particular Jesuits, is the view of the Pope in the Confessio Hungarica Evangelis proposita. '... Papam caput esse ecclesie nec errare possit.'"
for many doctrines and usages, led the Catholic theologians in
the period that followed (1) to subordinate Scripture in an ever
increasing degree to tradition, (2) to utilise more fully the dis-
tinction drawn by the Tridentinum between two kinds of
tradition (see above), as a distinction giving a title to regard
some traditions as subject to no higher standard. As regards
the first point, Jesuits in particular had done so much with their
Rabbinic art in the way of planing all round the dogma of
inspiration, and had produced so many different views of that
dogma, that in the end almost nothing remained of it. Perrone,
who enumerates all these forms in his dogmatic, mentions also
the last, according to which inspiration does not imply a
miraculous origination of Scripture, but is to be held as only
meaning that the Holy Ghost has subsequently (in the Church)
borne witness to the inerrancy of Scripture. Yet this theory,
maintained by the Jesuits Lessius and Hamel (1586), did not
succeed certainly in establishing itself; nay, the Vaticanum
rejected it by declaring (Constit. de fide c. 2): “But the Church
holds those books as sacred and canonical, not because, having
been composed by human industry alone, they were then
authenticated by its authority, nor only because they contain
revelation free from error, but because, being written under the
inspiration of the Holy Spirit, they have God for their author,
and have been handed down as such to the Church itself.”
This formulation still leaves room certainly for a lax view of
inspiration (“assistentia positiva”); but on the other hand, it

1 Cf. Holtzmann, Kanon und Tradition, 1859. J. Delitzsch, Lehrsystem d. röm.
K., I., p. 295 ff. Hase, l.c., pp. 63 ff. The Professio fidei Tridentinae had already
taken a great step beyond the Tridentinum, inasmuch as it substituted the following
for the Tridentine distinction between the traditiones ab apostolis:—“Apostolicas et ecclesiasticas traditiones reliquasque ejusdem ecclesiae ob-
servationes et constitutiones firmissime admitto et amplerctor.” There is thus intro-
duced here an entirely new terminology, a circumstance to which Holtzmann was the
first strongly to direct attention (p. 253). It is only after this that mention is first
made in the Professio of Holy Scripture!


3 “Eos libros vero ecclesia pro sacratis et canoniciis habet, non ideo, quod sola
humana industria incurrenti sua deinde auctoritate sint comprobati, nec ideo dum-
taxat, quod revelationem sine errore continant, sed propter quod Spiritu s.
inspirante conscripti deum habent autorem atque ut tales ipsi ecclesiae traditi sunt.”

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is assuredly in the interests of Catholicism, apart from its opposition to Protestantism, that all that has been handed down as in the strictest form holy should be also preserved by it as such. The lax view, as is well known, made it possible that there should be the beginnings of an historic criticism of the Bible in the seventeenth century (Richard Simon). Yet the advantages derived from being able to think of one’s self as a man of science are so seriously counterbalanced by the drawbacks which even the mildest criticism has for the Church, that even the most decided traditionalists—who have really no need for the Bible at all—prefer to content themselves with the mere appearance of Bible criticism. What came to have much deeper influence than this anti-Protestant mock fight about the Bible, was the further shaping of the notion of tradition in the post-Tridentine development. This course of formulation came to a head in the utterance of the first infallible Pope, the authenticity of which, so far as I know, has not been called in question—"The tradition is I"—after Möhler had in vain sought to reconcile the Catholic notion of tradition with history and criticism.

As early as the seventeenth century the controversialists, in opposing Chemnitz, who had attacked the Roman "disputationes de traditionibus" as "pandects of errors and superstitions," laid special stress on the ecclesiastical traditions. As a matter of fact, in the time that followed, the Tridentine distinction between "traditiones a Christo" and "traditiones ab apostolis" almost entirely disappeared—it was handed over to the Schools; on the other hand the distinction of the Professio between "traditiones apostolicae" and "traditiones ecclesiasticae" became fundamental. Bellarmin was still timid in turning to account the ecclesiastical traditions; he still sought for the most part to reach his point by means of the Tridentine definition, and treated the ecclesiastical traditions disparagingly; yet the future principle of tradition, which quite sets itself above history, as well as above the Church Fathers, was already for-

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1 Such an appearance is very easily produced at the present day by letting the tradition about the Bible stand, while there is entwined around it a wreath furnished by readings in Egyptology, Assyriology, and Greek and Roman literature.
mulated with admirable clearness by Cornelius Mussus, formerly a member of the Tridentine Council: "For my part, to speak frankly, I would have more reliance regarding those things that touch the mysteries of faith upon one supreme pontiff than upon a thousand Augustines, Jeromes, and Gregories." There belongs to this connection also the remark of the Jesuits, which has almost a naïve ring about it, "the more recent teachers are, the clearer they are" ("quo juniores, eo perspicaciores esse doctores"). It was the Jesuits entirely who put an end to the old notion of tradition represented by Cyprian and Vincentius, and secured a hold for a new one, which for a long time, certainly, was really dominant, but is the opposite of the old. The unqualified deliverance that the Church receives new revelations through the Pope was certainly avoided by cautious theologians of dogma; yet for such a deliverance there was substituted the simple assertion, that "traditio ecclesiastica" is just that which the Church (the Pope) has formulated as an article of faith. How seriously this was held is apparent from the urgent directions, not to be in anxiety about the traditional proof (from history) in support of any more recent dogma; even that is certain and original Church doctrine for which no proof can be furnished, if it is in force as Church doctrine. In this connection are meant to be estimated the depreciatory judgments on the Councils that were pronounced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the Jesuits, as also the freedom of the criticism applied to the Church Fathers. The Roman Church cannot, of course, part with the Councils, as little as with any other article of its venerable house-furnishings; but it has no longer a real interest in them, and although during the course of two centuries

1 "Ego, ut ingenua fater, plus uni summo pontifici crederem in his, quas fidei mysteria tangunt, quam mille Augustinis, Hieronymis, Gregoriis."

2 Passages to be found in Holtzmann, p. 267.

3 Yet testimonies could be gathered to show that in authoritative quarters there was no hesitation in making such statements as that this or that had not yet been revealed to the Church.

4 Of course the historical proof is a beautiful adornment, but it is nothing more; nay, the undertaking to prove is even held as not without danger. One who undertakes to prove anything is not sure that the proof will be perfectly successful, and that it will make an impression.
it has called to order more than one Jesuit who has recklessly handled the real tradition, it cannot but be pleased when now and again it appears that on closer inspection everything in history shows signs of uncertainty and is full of errors and forgeries. What have the Jesuits and their friends not taught us in this respect for two hundred years! The letters of Cyprian falsified, Eusebius falsified, numberless writings of the Church Fathers interpolated, the Constantinopolitan Symbol falsified by the Greeks, the Councils convoked contrary to the intentions of Rome, the Acts of the Councils falsified, the Decrees of the Councils of no account, the most venerable Church Fathers full of heterodox views and without authority—only one rock in this ocean of error and forgery, the chair of Peter, and, making itself heard through history, only one sure note incapable of being misunderstood, the testimony to the infallibility of the successor of Peter. And yet—the Pope is infallible even without this testimony; the Church itself is the living tradition; the Church, however, is the Pope. Nothing changes in the Church, although it itself continually changes;¹ for when any change is made by the Church (the Pope), it receives at once a certificate of antiquity, which carries it back to the time of the Apostles. The Pope can, at the present day, formulate a new dogma, and this was done by him in the year 1854 with regard to the immaculate conception of Mary, although one of his predecessors had declared that “the eternal wisdom had not yet disclosed the depths of this mystery to the Church.” Much, therefore, may still lie hidden in the womb of the future, which the eternal wisdom will reveal to the Popes who are to come—but according to the terms of the Ultramontane dogmatic, new revelations do not take place.

As compared with the conception of tradition that is accepted at the present day, how tame the Tridentine Decree regarding tradition appears! It sounds already in our ears like a legend of the olden time: “that truth and discipline are contained in the Scriptures and in the unwritten traditions which have come

¹ See the unguarded saying of Archbishop Scherr, of Munich, in reply to Döllinger, “You know that there have always been changes in the Church and in its doctrines,” in Friedrich, Tagebuch, 2nd ed., p. 410 f.
down to us as having been received by the Apostles from Christ’s own lips, or as being transmitted, as it were, from hand to hand by the Apostles themselves, the Holy Spirit having dictated them.”¹ But unfortunately it cannot be asserted that this principle has gradually developed itself into the principle accepted at the present day, for the latter was already in full force in the second half of the sixteenth century. It merely did not find expression, from the adverse force of circumstances (propter angustias temporum). Just on that account no history of the Roman conception of tradition from the Council of Trent to the Council of the Vatican can be written; there can only be narratives furnished, which indicate the approaching complete victory of the revolutionary principle of tradition over the older principle.² In this victory the de-Christianising and secularising of the Christian religion in Catholicism became complete. The Gnostic principle of tradition (secret apostolic tradition) and the “enthusiastic” principle, against which the Old Catholic principle was in its day set up, obtained entrance into the Church, and established themselves there, under cover of the latter. As judged strictly by the standard of the ancient Church the doctrine of tradition in force at the present day is heretical, because it is Gnostic and enthusiastic.³ But it is no longer attached to an elastic fellowship, in which the conflicting factors control and correct one another up to a certain point, but to a single Italian priest, who possesses the authority, and in part also the power, of the old Cæsars. He is no longer checked by any restriction that arises from the historic nature of the Christian religion. Yet, hemmed in as he is by the cordon of the sacred college, by the traditions of his chair, and by the superstition of the faithful, he can scarcely formulate as a

¹ “Veritatem et disciplinam contineri in liberis scriptis et sine scriptis traditionibus, quæ ab ipsius Christi ore ab apostolis acceptæ aut ab ipsis apostolis spiritu s. dictitante quasi per manus traditæ ad nos usque pervenerunt.”

² See the sections in Holtzmann, p. 31 f., 52 f., 83 f., 224 f., 231 f., 237 f., 250 f., 260 f., 273 f., 283 f.

³ Hence there is great accuracy in the Articles of Schmalkald, P. III., a. 8 (p. 321, Müller) : “Quid, quod etiam papatus simpliciter est merus enthusiasmus, quo papa gloriatur, omnia jura esse in scrinio sui pectoris, et quidquid ipse in ecclesia sua sentit et jubet, id spiritum et justum esse, etiam si supra et contra scriptum et vocale verbum aliquid statuat et præcipiat.”
“traditional article of faith,” anything that has against it the spirit of the thirteenth century or of the Counter-Reformation.¹

(2) In the Catechismus Romanus, published in 1566 by Pius V., the Thomist doctrine of grace, which had found only a fragmentary expression at Trent, was very distinctly stated. But this statement, so far as it was official, was the last of its kind. The Catechismus Romanus represents the grave of a doctrine which was maintained in the first half of the sixteenth century by the best Catholics. It brought to completion the Augustinian reaction, inasmuch as that reaction was not merely tolerated, or, for that part, contested, in the Church, but was recognised, and contributed very much to the regeneration of Catholicism. From that time there arose a struggle against Augustine, in which the “Churchmen” par excellence, the Jesuits, took the leading part. This struggle was not to cease till “the last enemy” lay on the field helpless, though not slain, and the worldly practice of the confessional could prescribe to dogmatic its law.² Yet it would be unjust to assert that on the one side laxity merely prevailed, on the other side religious earnestness. In the ranks of the opponents of the Augustinians there were also men of pure Catholic piety, while many of the Augustinians struck out on courses which really diverged from the Catholic ecclesiasticism.

The struggle about Augustinianism was waged, not in Germany, but on Romanic and Belgian soil. The first stage was represented by the names of Bajus and Molina.³ In

1 In this connection the letter of advice is very interesting which Bellarmin addressed to the Pope in the year 1602, see Döllinger, Beiträge III., p. 83, Döllinger und Reusch, Selbstbiographie des Cardinals Bellarmin, p. 260. This great Curialist ventured—it was in a dogmatic question, no doubt, which concerned him very closely—to take the upper hand with the Pope, and to remind him that he might not decide the controversy on his own responsibility, otherwise there would be trouble both to the Church and himself.

2 Protestantism took almost no part whatever in this inner Catholic movement. Leaving dwindling exceptions out of view, the Catholic Augustinians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries adopted against Protestantism as decided an attitude of opposition and self-defence as the representatives of the prevailing Church practice; nay, Augustine was even utilised with the view of being able to combat the Reformations more strenuously.

3 Linsemann, Michael Bajus und die Grundlegung des Jansenism, 1867. Schneemann, Entstehung der thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse (cf. also other relative
different writings and in his lectures, Bajus, Professor in Louvain (1544-1589), without undertaking a strictly systematic development, presented in a sharply definite way the Augustinian doctrine of sin and unfreedom, with the view, not of coming to terms with Protestantism, but of combating it. As early as 1560 the Sorbonne condemned a number of his propositions, which were submitted to it in manuscript. Thereafter he was arraigned before the Pope on the ground of smaller writings which he had made public. Jesuits and Franciscans were his enemies. They took offence above all at his unconditional rejection of the doctrine of the immaculate conception of Mary. In 1567 Pius V. issued the Bull "Ex omnibus afflictionibus," which, without mentioning Bajus' name, rejected, or at least took objection to, 79 of his positions. Only when he raised difficulties against yielding was the Bull published. Twice over was Bajus forced to retract, after the new Pope, Gregory XIII., had confirmed the adverse judgment of his predecessor. In Bajus Augustine himself was struck at in the sharpest possible way, though by means of the sentence, "although some opinions might possibly be sustained on a certain understanding," the Curia had left a back door open for itself. A large number of the propositions censured were, in form and content, Augustinian, so that in their rejection the renunciation of the authority of the great African was apparent. The main thoughts of Bajus were, (1) that grace is always only grace through Jesus Christ, (2) that God could only create man good, and did create him such, that, consequently, everything "naturally" good would have fallen to him, had he continued in goodness, but that for


1 "Quas quidem sententias stricto coram nobis examine ponderatas, quamquam nonnulla aliquo pacto sustineri possent, in rigore et proprio verborum sensu ab assertoribus intento hereticas, erroneas, suspectas, temerarias, scandalosas, et in pias aures offensionem immittentes respective . . . damnamus"; see Denzinger, l.c., p. 208.

2 "Quamquam nonnulla sententiae aliquo pacto sustineri possent."

3 I pass over anything peculiar to him that has no relation to Augustinianism or that contradicts it.

4 See Propos. 1 in the Bull "Ex omnibus afflictionibus"; further, 2-7, 9.
that very reason the Fall entailed not only the loss of a "super-
added gift" ("donum superadditum"), but the entire ruin of
human nature,\(^1\) (3) that through sin the will of man has become
unfree, and hence man must necessarily sin, though with his
will, is absolutely incapable of the good, and can produce
nothing good out of himself,\(^2\) (4) that accordingly all works of
unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices,\(^3\)
(5) that original sin is real sin, and this is not less true of con-
cupiscence,\(^4\) (6) that all human beings, inclusive of Mary, are
sinners, and suffer death by reason of their sins,\(^5\) (7) that in no
sense are there human merits in the sight of God; God, rather,
anticipates all merit by changing the bad will into a good, and
thus producing Himself all good merits (through the merit of
Christ).\(^6\) In the doctrines of justification and the Sacraments

\(^1\) See the Propos. 1-7, 9, 11, 21, 23: "Absurda est eorum sententia, qui dicunt,
hominem ab initio dono quodam supernatiali et gratuito, supra conditionem nature
suae fuisse exaltatum, ut fide, spe et caritate deum supernataliter coleret," 24, 26, 78.

\(^2\) See the Propos. 20: "Nullum est peccatum ex natura sua veniale, sed omne pecca-
tum meretur praeam aeternam." 27: "Liberum arbitrium sine gratie dei adjutorio
nonsi ad peccandum valet." 28, 30, 35, 37, 39: "Quod voluntarie fit etiamsi
necessary fit, libere tamen fit." 40, 41: "Is libertatis modus qui est a necessitate,
sub libertatis nomine non reperitur in scripturis, sed solum nomen liberatis a peccato." 46:
"Ad rationem et definitionem peccati non pertinet voluntarium, nec definitionis
questio est, sed causae et originis, utrum omne peccatum debeat esse voluntarium.
65, 67.

\(^3\) See Propos. 25: "Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata et philosophorum virtutes
sunt vitia."

\(^4\) See Propos. 47: "Peccatum originis vere habet rationem peccati sine ulla ratione
ac respectu ad voluntatem, a qua originem habuit." 48, 49, 51: "Concupiscientia
et prava eius desideria, que inviti sentiunt homines, sunt vera legis inobediencia.
52, 53, 74, 75, 76.

\(^5\) See Propos. 73: "Nemo præter Christum est absque peccato originali: hinc b.
virgo Maria mortua est propter peccatum ex Adam contractum omnesque ejus afflic-
tiones peccati actualis vel originalis." 72.

\(^6\) Propos. 8: "In redemptis per gratiam Christi nullum inveniri potest bonum
meritum, quod non sit gratis indigno collatum." 10: "Solutio poenæ temporalis,
que peccato dimisso ssepe manet, et corporis resurrectio proprie nonnisi meritus
Christi adscribenda est." 22, 29: "Non soli fures ii sunt et latrones, qui Christum
viam et ostium veritatis et vitae negant, sed etiam quicunque aliunde quam per ipsum
in ian justitie (hoc est aliquam justitiam) conscendi posse docent." 34: "Dis-
tinctio illa duplicibus amoris, naturalis vid., quo deus amatur ut auctor nature et
gratuiti quo deus amatur ut beatificator, vana est." 36: "Amor naturalis, qui ex
viribus naturæ exortur, ex sola philosophia per relationem presumptionis humanae
Bajus held substantially to the prevailing ecclesiastical type. But although in accordance with this type he recognised righteousness in real perfection, yet he laid a much greater weight on forgiveness of sin than the Decrees of Trent allowed of; it is true, no doubt, that for him forgiveness of sin is ideal, and is really not righteousness, but in point of fact our active righteousness comes to exist only through constantly having as its complement the forgiveness of sins which God reckons as righteousness. Forgiveness of sins is for him not only an initial act, but a parallel to the “operation of virtue” (“operatio virtutum”).\(^1\) That, however, is still Catholic. Augustine’s doctrine of predestination Bajus seems to have rather thrown into the background.

While not intending it, Bajus came close in his teaching to the fundamental evangelical thoughts, though these were strangely mixed up by him with Catholic doctrines. But owing to his retraction, the effect of his far-reaching propositions was lost. On the other hand, the opposition between Dominicans and Jesuits continued. The characteristic doctrines of the opponents were rejected from both sides (the “Directions for Study” of the Jesuit General Aquaviva rejected 17 Thomistic propositions; the Dominicans carried on an effective opposition against these Directions, and condemned the positions regarding predestination of two specially audacious Jesuits—Lessius and Hamel). But the controversy was only fanned into full flame when the Jesuit Luis Molina had, in the year 1588, published his work, “Liberi arbitrii cum gratiæ donis, divina præscientia, providentia, prædestinatione et reprobatione concordia.”\(^2\) This work starts with the power of the natural man to dispose himself for grace (see the Tridentine Decree), and with amazing Scholastic energy\(^3\) tries to unite the divine

\(^1\) Remarkable theses on justification are found in 42, 43, 44, 63, 64, 68, 69, 70. It is manifest that irrelevant material is introduced into the theses formulated regarding the Pope.

\(^2\) The second edition, 1595, is substantially unaltered.

\(^3\) The old efforts to find varieties in the knowledge of God were continued by
causality, and even the Augustinian theses, with Semi-Pelagianism, or to subordinate the former to the latter. That, of course, could not succeed. But the mere undertaking was, from his Church's point of view, meritorious, and everything can be forced together in words. In point of fact, Augustinianism was here discarded (God only aids), and that, too, in such an overt way that even Scotists took offence at the book. It cannot fall to us to describe the tragi-comedy which now followed in an unlimited succession of acts. Yet it illustrates in a very instructive way the fact that dogma, as dogma, had long been buried; for the way in which this Thomistic-Molinistic controversy was carried through—or was not carried through—at Rome furnishes the clearest evidence that dogmatic interest had been supplanted by the interest of the holy Chair and of the various Orders. There was hesitation, a demanding of silence, a deciding, and a not deciding in so important a question, because the matter of main concern was not doctrine at all, but was the peace of the Church and the gratification of the ambition and lust of power of the parties. How far this last was carried is excellently shown by e.g., the attitude of Bellarmin. There was not only a threatening of the Pope and an endeavour to intimidate him when he seemed to favour the Dominicans too much; the most zealous papists even laid hands on the central supports of the system. The Commission at first appointed, which characterised many positions of Molina as inadmissible, was obliged to give way to a new one, that famous "Congregatio de auxiliis gratiae," which continued its sittings from 1598 to 1607, and could never come to a decision, because Dominicans and Jesuits were represented on it. In this controversy the Scholastic terminology was added to in an

Molina, and he turned them to account in carrying out his task: by help of the "scientia media" God foresees the possible, which, under given circumstances, becomes the actual. Into the details of Molina's style of doctrine I cannot enter. In judging of it, moreover, it must be kept in view that the Catholic Church was no longer Augustinian, and that what Molina undertook was to give rational expression to what was actually held valid. If Molina is to be reproached for writing about the doctrine—i.e., for writing from the standpoint of the rational critic instead of describing justification as the sinner has experienced it—that is not a reproach that falls on him alone; it also falls on the Tridentine Decree, and on official Catholicism in general.
immeasurable degree ("prædeterminatio physica," "gratia efficax efficacitate connexionis cum consensu," etc.), though there was no success in making a dogma out of the contradictio in adjecto (contradiction in terms). In the sitting of 28th August, 1607, at which Paul V. himself presided, the Jesuits declared the doctrine of physical predetermination to be Calvinistic and Lutheran, hotly opposed a decision eventually come to to suspend Molina's book ("until it be corrected" ["donec corrigeretur"]), and assailed the Dominican dogmatist Bañez as a heretic. Of the other members of the Congregation almost every one had a different opinion as to what was to be done. Thereupon, on the 18th September, the Pope, no doubt acting on the advice of the Jesuits, dissolved the assembly, declaring at the same time that he would, at his own time, give a decision ("at a fitting opportunity His Holiness would publicly give the declaration and decision that were expected")! till then no party must either "characterise" the other, or "visit it with any censure" ("aut qualificare aut censura quapiam notare"). Thus the controversy, which had really been long before decided—for it was the controversy between Augustine and Pelagius—ended with an admission of complete helplessness.3

In purer form than by Bajus, whose general theological position is a problem, Augustinianism was revived by Cornelius Jansen, Bishop of Ypres. The movement that is connected with his name, or with his work "Augustinus," published in 1640, after his death, entered deeply into French history in the seventeenth century, and carried its influence into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; it has still a living monument at the present day.

1 "Fore ut sua sanctitas declarationem et determinationem, quæ exspectabatur, opportune promulgant."

2 See Döllinger u. Reusch, l.c., p. 273 f. In the year 1611 the Pope induced the Inquisition to issue the order that all books that treated of the material de auxillis should first of all be submitted to it for its approbation. Schneemann, the Jesuit, is quite entitled to be proud of the fact that the Molinistic doctrine of grace really won the victory—the doctrine at which even Bellarmin took offence because it exalted human freedom far too much at the cost of grace, and which was adopted not without alteration even in the Decree of the Jesuit General Aquaviva of the year 1613 (l.c., p. 274 f.).
in the old Catholic Church of Utrecht. At one time the Huguenots had been the "Friends of Religion" in France, i.e., they included among them almost all who had a living sense of the seriousness of religion and who took a stand against the secularised Court-Church. Through the Counter-Reformation, Catholicism again became a spiritual power even in France. It was restored in such a way that the spirit of piety again found a home in it, in spite of Ultramontanism and Court Churchism. But with the lapse of time it became always the harder for this good Catholic, pious spirit to tolerate the lax morality which was really justified by the theology of the Jesuits, and which, through the confessional, poisoned both clergy and people. It was observed that this lax morality was a consequence of that Nominalistic-Aristotelian Scholasticism which had already desolated the Church in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and which was of one blood with Pelagianism. But at the same time the earnestly disposed found it more difficult from year to year to reconcile themselves to that Court and State Christianity which again established itself in spite of the frightful struggles of the sixteenth century. This Christianity was at bottom the deadly foe of Jesuitism; but it excelled it in frivolity and worldliness of spirit. Thus the pious Catholics saw the Church of Christ in a most lamentable position. Protestantism was threatening from without; internally, the Church was devastated by two enemies, united in their immorality and their endeavour to lead forth the Church into captivity, otherwise standing apart, the one agitating for a despicable Court Christianity, the other driving Christianity into blind dependence on the Roman confessional: "Behold the Fathers, who take away the sins of the world!" ("Ecce patres, qui tollunt peccata mundi!").

From this state of things the powerful Jansenist movement is to be understood. As relates to the impulses of true piety, it

1 The literature on Jansenism is very abundant; see Ranke, Franz. Geschichte, St. Beuve, Port Royal, 1840 f., Reuchlin, Gesch. von Port Royal, 2 vols., 1839 f., and in Herzog's R.-E. the articie Jansen; further, the Monographs on Paschal and the Arnaulds; Schill, Die Constitution Unigenitus, 1876, Schott, Art. Port Royal in Herzog's R.-E., Henke, Neuere Kirchengesch. II., p. 87 ff. For the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Church History of Nippold and Friedrich's Gesch. des Vatik. Concils.
was far superior to the French Conciliar movement of the 15th century. When it sounded forth the appeal to return to the ancient Church, that which it thought of was not only—was, in the first instance, not at all—a change of constitution; it was an inner regeneration of the Church through repentance and faith, religious awakening and asceticism, as these were understood by Augustine. Once again in the history of Catholicism there was, in France, a close adherence to the great African, after adverse judgment had been pronounced on Luther and Calvin. With the deepest sympathy we follow the effort, so full of blessing, and yet so devoid of any prospect of success, to emancipate the Church from the Church, faith from a Christianity of use and wont, the moral life from a subtly-refined and lax morality. As if that had been possible by a mere reaction in the lines of Augustine! Certainly, if Catholicism could be corrected by Catholicism, this would have taken place at that time in France, when the deepest, most earnest, and noblest spirits in the nation crowded together for reform, and one of the greatest orators and rhetoricians of all ages, Pascal, broke silence to awaken the conscience of the nations against the Society of Jesus. But in the end everything disappeared in the sand. It was not merely that the movement was violently suppressed; the movement itself ended, like every Catholic movement for reform, in the renunciation of opposition and in fanaticism.

The work of describing the course of Jansenism falls to Church history. New factors requiring to be considered in the history of dogma did not make their appearance in the controversy; hence in this connection the interest attaches mainly to the answer to be given to the question—In what measure did the official Catholicism see itself compelled, in face of this movement, to repudiate Augustine and to strengthen itself in its Nominalistic-Pelagian attitude? Immediately after the appearing of Jansen’s "Augustine," the Jesuits did the shrewdest thing it was in their power to do; though themselves the party assailed, they assumed the offensive. Jansen’s book really contained pure Augustinianism, incomparably purer than in the restoration attempted by Bajus, while no concessions were made
to Protestantism.\(^1\) Hence the doctrine of predestination certainly occupies a very prominent place in Jansen.\(^2\) Through the influence of the Jesuits with the Curia, Urban VIII., after referring to the censure pronounced upon Bajus, confirmed the prohibition of the book, on the ground of its containing heresies. It was now that the struggle broke out in France—a struggle about *religion*, with, at the same time, the undercurrent of a struggle for the rights of personal conviction over against the despotism of the Pope and the papal Mamelukes. But these last-mentioned succeeded in obtaining from the Pope the Bull "Cum occasione" (1653), in which five propositions were described as subject to condemnation, and were, at the same time, represented—though not with entire clearness—as propositions of Jansen. These are the terms of them:\(^3\)—(1) "Some precepts of God cannot be fulfilled by good men, whose wish and effort are according to the measure of strength they at present possess; they have the further need of grace that shall render obedience possible." (2) "Inward grace is never resisted in the state of fallen nature." (3) "In order to the existence of merit and demerit in the state of fallen nature there is not required in man a liberty that is the absence of necessity; it is enough if there be the liberty that is the absence of constraint." (4) "Semi-Pelagians admitted the necessity of inner prevenient grace for single acts, also for the origination of faith, and they were heretical in this, that they wished that grace to be of such a kind that it should be possible for the human will to resist or obey." (5) "It is Semi-Pelagian to say that Christ died, or that He shed His blood, for all men without exception."\(^4\) Looked at

\(^1\) Jansen's doctrine of justification is strictly Catholic.

\(^2\) What makes an account of Jansenism unnecessary is just that Augustine's doctrines of sin, grace, and predestination are so correctly reproduced in it.

\(^3\) See Denzinger, l.c., p. 212 f.

\(^4\) "Aliqua dei præcepta hominibus justis volentibus et conantibus secundum presentes quas habent vires sunt impossibilia; deest quoque illis gratia, qua possibilia fiant." "Interiori gratiae in statu nature lapsæ nunquam resistitur." "Ad merendum et demerendum in statu nature lapsæ non requiritur in homine libertas a necessitate, sed sufficit libertas a coactione." "Semi-Pelagiani admitten tant prævenientis gratie interioris necessitatem ad singulos actus, etiam ad initium fidei, et in hoc erant heretici, quod vellet eam gratiam talem esse, cui posset humana voluntas resistere et obtemperare." "Semi-Pelagianum est dicere, Christum pro omnibus omnino hominibus mortuam esse aut sanguinem fudisse."
apart from the roots from which they sprang, these propositions are not Jansenist, even though they can be almost literally established from Jansen, for dogmatic is not a series of equations from which one may select as he pleases. The Jansenists, therefore, had certainly a right to raise the "question du fait," and to require proof that Jansen so taught. The real aim of their opponents was to separate off the extreme conclusions of Augustinianism and give them an isolated formulation, that thereby it might be possible to reject these without touching Augustine, but that thereby also Augustinianism might be slain. But the Jansenists were placed in an extremely unfavourable situation, because their Catholicism did not allow of their openly questioning the authority of the Pope in matters of doctrine. Their conceding that the Pope had a right to decide whether the question of fact was determined weakened their attitude; and where is the line to be drawn between questions of right and questions of fact? As early as the year 1656 the declaration was made by Alexander VII. in the notorious Bull "Ad sanctam b. Petri sedem": "We determine and declare that those five propositions extracted from the afore-mentioned book of Cornelius Jansen, and understood in the sense intended by the same Cornelius Jansen, have been condemned." ¹ When the Chief Teacher declared in a cold-blooded way that he had also to decide in what sense something had been understood by someone, what objection could be raised, if there was the general admission made of his absolute authority? So the same Pope took the further step (1664) of issuing a formula for subscription, in which all clerics and teachers were not merely enjoined to reject the five propositions, but were required to confess upon oath that these were condemned "as meant to be understood by the same author" ("in sensu ab eodem auctore intento"). In this way the Pope already ventured to lord it over consciences; and yet two more centuries had to run their course before his infallibility could be proclaimed. For the time, certainly, the Curia gave relief so far to the Jansenists, by remaining satisfied with "submissive silence" ("silentium obsequiosum") (Pax Clementis IX.,

¹ "Quinque illas propositiones ex libro præmemorati cornelii Jansenii excerptas ac in sensu ab eodem Cornelio Jansenio intento damnatas fuisse, definitus et declaramus."
1668); but when the Crown began to view the Augustinian party, who certainly did not take the attitude of unqualified advocates of Gallican liberties, first with indifference, and then with deepening hatred, and finally made a sacrifice of them to the Jesuits, Clement XI., in the Bull "Vineam domini Sabaoth" (1705), gave fresh confirmation to all the severe Bulls of his predecessors against Jansenism, and again made the demand that there should be a recognition of the definition of Jansen's intention given by Alexander VII. Port Royal was now forcibly broken up.

Yet once again, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was a powerful revival of Augustinianism; not yet had it been distinctly indicated that in attacking Augustine, what was aimed at, and what was inevitably involved, was an attack on the Apostle Paul also. The Oratorian, Paschiasus Quesnel, had published a "gnomon" to the French New Testament, which very rapidly found circulation as a book of devotion—inciting to meditation—and was highly prized on account of its simple Catholic piety. Even Pope Clement XI. had pronounced the most favourable judgment upon the book; the great king, who was already assuming an unpleasantly pietistic air, had let himself be touched by its warmth and simplicity; the Cardinal Archbishop Noailles of Paris had recommended it. But this very recommendation gave occasion to the Jesuits for preparing a double blow—for attacking at the same time the Cardinal whom they hated and the book that was offensive to them from its inwardness of spirit. Agitations against the book, in which the secret poison of Jansenism was said to lurk, were got up among the clergy, and in the end a sketch of a damnatory Bull was sent to Rome. What seemed incredible succeeded. The feeble Pope, Clement XI., issued the "Constitution" Unigenitus (1713), in which Romanism repudiated for ever its Augustinian past. It was against all precedent to single out from a book like that under notice 101 propositions, and to place these emphatically under ban, in a way, too, in respect of form, extremely maladroit. But for the Church of the Jesuits the Bull Unigenitus has come to be of incalculable value; for with this Bull in its hands it has been able to combat all attempts at
an inner regeneration of the Church, and even in the future this
manifesto of the infallible Pope will be capable of rendering the
best service, if Augustine and Plato, who can never be quite
slain, should venture again to threaten the serenity of the
Church. The immediate effect of the movement was to create

1 See the Constitution in Denzinger, p. 243 ff. This second last great pronounce-
ment of the Roman Church is in every respect a miserable production. It reveals
above all the levity of the procedure followed with regard to dogma (in the
narrower sense), which had now become a corpus vile. It is characteristic that here
as elsewhere—for it had already become use and wont—there is only a venturing now
upon negative propositions. On the "thorny field of the doctrine of grace" the
Church merely goes on to indicate what must not be believed. Whether between the
contrary propositions that are rejected there still remains anything at all that can be
believed, or is worthy of belief, is a question with which the Church takes little con-
cern. As a matter of fact there has found expression in the constitution a system of
faith that is no longer faith, but a shrewd morality. Among the rejected theses the
following may be singled out:—Thesis 2: "Jesu Christi gratia, principium efficax
boni cujuscumque generis, necessaria est ad omne opus bonum; absque illa non solum
nihil fit, sed nec fieri potest." 3: "In vanum, domine praeipsi, si tu ipse non das,
quod praeipsis" (this is an unqualified condemnation of Aristotle). 4: "Ita, domine,
onnia possibilia sunt ei, cui omnia possibilia facis, eadem operando in illo." Add to
this Theses 5-7. Thesis 8: "Nos non pertinemus ad novum fcedus, nisi in quantum
participes sumus ipsius nove gratiae, quae in nobis operatur id, quod deus nobis pra-
cipit." 9: "Gratia Christi est gratia suprema, sine qua confiteri Christum nunquam
possimus, et cum qua nunquam illum abnegamus." 26: "Nulle dantur gratiae nisi
per fidem." 27: "Fides est prima gratia et fons omnium aliarum." 28: "Prima
gratia, quam deus concedit peccatori, est peccatorum remissio." 38: "Pecator non
est liber, nisi ad malum, sine gratia liberatoris." 40: "Sine gratia nihil amare
possimus, nisi ad nostram condemnationem." 42: "Sola gratia Christi reddit homi-
nem aptum ad sacrificium fidei." 44: "Non sunt nisi duo amores" (i.e., love for
God and love for one's self). 46: "Cupiditas aut caritas usum sensuum bonum vel
malum faciunt." 49: "Ut nulnum peccatum est sine amore nostri, ita nulnum est
opus bonum sine amore dei." 60: "Si solus supplici timor animat pænitentiam,
quod haec est magis violenta, eo magis ducit ad desperationem." 62: "Qui a malo
non abstinet nisi timore poene, illud committit in corde suo et jam est reus coram
deo." 68: "Dei bonitas abbreviavit viam salutis, claudendo totum in fide et preci-
bus." 69: "Fides est donum purae liberalitatis dei." 73: "Quid est ecclesia nisi
coeus filiorum dei, manentium in ejus sinu, adoptatorum in Christo, substinentium in
ejus persona, redemptorum ejus sanguine, viventium ejus spiritu agentium per ejus
gratiam et expectantium gratiam futuri seculi?" 74: "Ecclesiae sive integer
Christus incarnatum verbum habet ut caput, omnes vere sanctos ut membra." Theses
79-86 condemn the universal use of Holy Scripture. 91: "Excommunicationis in-
justae metus nunquam debet nos impedire ab implendo debito nostro; nunquam exi-
mus ab ecclesia, etiam quando hominum nequitia videmur ab ea expulsi, quando deo,
Jesu Christo atque ipsi ecclesiae per caritatem affixi sumus," (cf. 92). Thesis 94:
"Nihil pejorem de ecclesia opinionem ingerit ejus inimicis, quam videre illic domina-
a new, great crisis in France—it was the last. All who had
still piety or a sense of shame bestirred themselves. Accept-
ants and Appellants stood face to face with each other. The
Appellants, however, were not Huguenots, but Catholics, whose
conscience was troubled by every rebellion against the Pope.
Thus by the law invariably regulating such change in the Middle
Ages, the opposition was changed—into surrender, and into
fanaticism and ecstacy. The iron fence of Catholicism allowed
of no swerving aside. If one was unable to rise above it, that
despair resulted which submits with wounded conscience or
breaks out into wild fanaticism. As a note appended to the
Bull Unigenitus, we read in Denzinger the dry historic account :
“This dogmatic constitutio was confirmed by Clement XI.
himself in the Bull against the Appellants, ‘Pastoralis Officil,’ of
date 28th August, 1718, in which he distinctly declares all
Catholics to be aliens from the bosom of the Roman Church
who do not accept the Bull ‘Unigenitus’; it was adopted by
Innocent XIII., in the Decree of 8th January, 1722, by Benedict
XIII. and the Roman Synod in 1725, by Benedict XIV. in the
Encyclical ‘ex omnibus Christiani orbis regionibus,’ of 16th
October, 1756, by the Gallican clergy in assemblies in 1723, 1726, 1730, by councils at Avignon in 1725, and at Ebrène in 1727, and by the whole Catholic world." The author might have added that these confirmations and acceptances describe the history of the victory of the modern Jesuit dogmatic over the Augustinian, that they are the last word in the Catholic history of dogma (in the sense of system of Christian doctrine), and that they represent at the same time the triumph of the Church over numberless consciences—over piety indeed—in France. The Huguenots were expelled, the Jansenists broken or annihilated; the French people now belonged to Voltaire and the Encyclopædists. They hated the Jesuits; but as the fear of God can very well be driven out, but not anxious concern about God, this nation henceforward belonged to that very Jesuit Church which it hated and ridiculed. Besides, Benedict XIV. (1756) relaxed the fetters of the Constitution Unigenitus. Every one was to be regarded as a Catholic who should not offer a public resistance to it. But this concession only came when the Bull had already done its work, and merely served to smooth the way of return for crushed spirits, when it was no longer to be feared that they could be troublesome. Jansenist clerics there have afterwards been in France, as there have been Gallican; but the former have been of very much less account than the latter. Jansenism as a factor was already annihilated in the eighteenth, Gallicanism not until the nineteenth century. Under the reign of Pius IX. it was still held necessary to search out and dispose of the last remnants of the two parties. At the same time the new dogma of the immaculate conception of Mary (Constitution "Ineffabilis deus," of 8th December, 1854) set the seal to the rejection of the Augustinian-Thomistic

1 "Hæc constitutio dogmatica confirmata est ab ipso Clemente XI. per bullam 'Pastoralis Officii' 5. Cal. Sept. 1718, contra Appellantes, in qua quoscumque Catholicos, qui Bullam Unigenitus non susciperent, a Romane ecclesie sinu plane alienos declarat; ab Innocentio XIII. decret. d. 8, Jan. 1722, a Benedicto X111. et synodo Romano, 1725, a Benedicto XIV. per encyclicam 'Ex omnibus Christiani orbis regionibus,' 16. Oct. 1756, suscepta est a clero Gallico in comitiis 1723, 1726, 1730, a conciliis Avenionensi 1725, ab Ebredunensi 1727, et ab universo mundo Catholic."
doctrine of sin and grace. Henceforward Augustinianism was scarcely any longer possible in the Roman Church; but that Mysticism cannot certainly be banished which at one time is called Quietism, at another time “Spurious Mysticism”; for the Church continually gives impulses towards the origination of this kind of Christianity, and can itself in no way avoid training it, up to a certain point. Indeed, the Jesuit Order has made efforts that have not been fruitless to furnish occupation for the irrepressible tendency to inwardness, contemplation, and Christian independence by sensible means of all sorts, by play-things and miracles, as well as by brotherhoods, disciplinary exercises, and rules for prayer, and thereby to keep it bound to the Church. The “Spurious Mysticism” which adapts itself with painful reluctance to ecclesiasticism seems to become always rarer, just because there has been a learning to make the Church more of a home for it, and the Church itself, unfortunately, as Catholic, has an innate tendency towards religious self-indulgence and towards miracle. The glorious revival and

1 The Catholics need have little hesitation in regarding Mary as free from original sin; for what is original sin to them? On the other hand, there is something that suggests putting on a bold front, when, a hundred times over, they have recourse to the apologetic device in dealing with Protestantism: “You modern men have least occasion to stumble at our dogma, for you do not at all believe in original sin.” The setting up of the new dogma in the year 1854 had three purposes, (1) to prepare the way for the Vatican Decrees, (2) to give the final despatch to the Thomistic doctrines of sin and grace, (3) to glorify Mary, to whom Pius IX. devoted an extravagant worship. The new dogma runs in these terms, (Denzinger, p. 324): “Definimus doctrinan, que tenet, beatissimam virginem Mariam in primo instanti sua conceptionis fuisse singulari omnipotentis dei gratia et privilegio, intuitu meritorum Christi Jesu salvatoris humani generis, ab omni originalis culpæ labe præservatam immunem, esse a deo revelatam (when? to whom?) atque idcirco ab omnibus fidelibus firmiter constanterque credendam.”

2 It might seem advisable to deal here with the Quietistic movement which ran parallel with the Jansenist, with Molinos, Madame Guyon, with the controversy between Bossuet and Fenelon, the Propositiones LXVIII. M. de Molinos damnatae ab Innocentio XI. (“Coelestis Pastor,” 1687), and the Catholic-Mystic movements of the nineteenth century; but they have had no palpable result within the history of dogma. The Church, too, allows the most disorderly Quietistic courses on the part of the monks, and even of the laity, provided no sovereign claims are set up in connection with them, and they are pursued ad majorem ecclesiae gloriam. So it is not here a question of principles.

3 Notice the course of development from Sailer to Clemens Brentano, and—to Lourdes.
the lofty intuitions of the "awakened" in the present century ended with Anna Katharina Emmerich and the Holy Coat of Trèves.  

(3) The controversy with regard to Probabilism belongs to the history of ethics. But ethics and dogmatics do not admit of being separated. The juristic-casuistic spirit of the Roman Church had already in the Middle Ages influenced ethics, and along with it dogmatics, in the most unfavourable way. The Nominalistic theology had one of its strong roots in juristic casuistry, i.e., in Probabilism. This was adopted by the Jesuits, and cultivated in such a way that the Popes at times, and even the members of the Order itself, were filled with alarm. It will perhaps be found impossible to convict the Jesuits of any single moral enormity which had not been already expressed by some mediæval casuist from the Mendicant Orders; but the Jesuits have offered to hold themselves responsible in the world's history for having systematised and applied in the Church what existed before their time only in the shape of hesitating attempts, and was checked by strong counter influences. By the aid of Probabilism this Order understood how in particular cases to transform almost all deadly sins into venial sins. It went on giving directions how to wallow in filth, to confound conscience, and, in the confessional, to wipe out sin with sin. The comprehensive ethical handbooks of the Jesuits are in part monstra of abomination and storehouses of execrable sins and filthy habits, the description and treatment of which provoke an outcry of disgust. The most shocking things are

\[1\] Yet there is blessing even in the Heart-of-Jesus worship, the adoration of Mary, etc., where they are carried on with humility, and with an upward look to the God who redeems. As, apart from the confessional, with its power to foster concern, they are the only embodiments of living piety, even sincere Christian feeling finds a refuge in these things; for the Church which transacts on equal footing with the States, and makes dupes of them, cannot certainly impart vigour to piety, but only to an undevout arrogance. As the heart that seeks to rise to God is not restrained by doctrinal formule, but can transform even what is most alien to it into a means of comfort, this same spirit cannot be quenched by idols, but changes them into gracious signs of the God who, in all signs, reveals nothing but His renewing grace.

here dealt with in a brazen-faced way by unwedded priests as men of special knowledge, not with the view of calling down with prophetic power upon the burden of horror a heavier burden of judgment, but often enough with the view of representing the most disgraceful things as pardonable, and of showing to the most regardless transgressors a way in which they may still always obtain the peace of the Church. We are told that they were personally blameless, highly honourable, and even saintly men who gave the most revolting confessionary advices for ascertaining the most disgusting forms of vice and for cleverly pacifying conscience regarding fornication, adultery, theft, perjury, and murder. That may have been so; there were certainly excellent Christians even connected with this fraternity. But all the greater appears the confusing influence of the religious system of which they were the servants, when it was capable of producing such licentious subtleties and such a perverse estimate of the moral principles and the meannesses of their fellowmen! And all this too in the name of Christ, the sootheings of conscience as the fruit of His death upon the cross, and, what was almost worse still, for the greater glory of the Church! (in majorem gloriam ecclesiae), for one of the interests lying at the basis of this system of immorality—no one can deny it—was to maintain and strengthen the external grasp and power of ecclesiasticism. The only excuse, if there can be such here, is this,¹ that that casuistic mode of procedure had already had a long history in the Church, when the Jesuits raised it to a method for the entire guidance of souls, as well as for the theoretic and practical shaping of religion in general. As a good thing from becoming customary can thereby deprive itself of its power, so a bad thing that has become customary may delude the individual as to the force of error and sin that inheres in it. It might be said, indeed, that this Jesuit morality belongs to history and not to the system! Much of what was most

¹ Or may we assume in the case of some of the worst propositions that they were the product of a daring casuistic sport, which had never any practical importance? This solution will not apply, at any rate, to some of the very vile confessionary advices; for history teaches that they were translated into deeds. Or had overdrawn reports found their way to the Pope? Even this, alas, is not easily proved.
revolting has really disappeared, and that an earnest and philanthropic spirit managed to intermingle itself with the most lamentable secrets of the confessionary directions is not to be denied. But the method has continued unchanged, and it exerts to-day its ruinous influence on dogmatics and ethics, on the consciences of those who receive, and of those who make confession, perhaps in a worse degree than at any period. Since the seventeenth century forgiveness of sins in the Catholic Church has become to a large extent a highly refined art; one learns how to receive confession and give the fitting absolution, as one learns the art of speculation in the exchange. And yet —how imperishable this Church is, and how imperishable is a conscience that seeks for its God! God can be found by such a conscience even in the idol, and it hears His voice even where it hears at the same time all the voices of hell!  

1 The severe criticism of the casuistic morality, fostered chiefly by the Jesuits, and of their confessionary counsels, must not hinder the impartial historian from recognising what they have achieved, and still achieve. What would modern Catholicism be without them? They are the active squad of the Church, who work and reap the fruit that is produced by all work. With the exception of some outstanding German scholars, the Catholic authors who are not Jesuits are a quantité négligeable. The sober judgment which Leibniz pronounced upon the Order 200 years ago is still substantially correct: "That the Jesuits have so many enemies within their own communion [how far that still holds good to-day, I leave undiscussed], is due, for the most part, to the fact that they take a more prominent and influential position than others. . . . It is not to be doubted that there are honourable and valiant people among them. At the same time, however, they are often too hot-headed, and many among them are bent upon serving the Order per fas et nefas. But it is not otherwise all round; only it is more noticeable among the Jesuits than among others, because they, more than others, are before the eyes of people." But Leibniz did not observe that the Jesuits are still, at the present day, "Spanish priests," and are most strongly opposed to the German religious spirit. Their founder, on whom a German Protestant national economist, Gothein, has undoubtedly written the most impartial and best book (if only the Jesuits would show freedom of spirit enough to write the most impartial book upon Luther, instead of leaving Luther to be scurrilously dealt with by narrow-minded and fanatical chaplains!), Ignatius de Loyola, impressed his Spanish spirit for all time upon the Order. Nothing great has been done by them in anything they have since added to or subtracted from this. That Spanish spirit, however, though outrun by the development of spiritual culture in morality, religion, and science, still continues to be a dominant force in public and political life. In the war of 1870 a celebrated man was right in saying: "We fight against Louis XIV." That war has come to an end. But we have also the struggle to wage against the Jesuits and the Counter-Reformation, and the end of this war cannot be foreseen.
The Spanish Dominican, Bartholomäus de Medina, was the first to describe and defend Probabilism "scientifically," this being done by him in his Commentary on Thomas's Prima Secundæ (1577). The thing itself had long existed, but the formula for it had not yet been found. It ran in these terms: "If an opinion is probable, it is lawful to follow it, though the contrary opinion is more probable."¹ Seldom has a saying shown at once the kindling power of this one, and seldom has a saying continued to work so mightily: it was the emancipation of morality from morality, of religion from religion, in the name of morality and religion. Many Spanish Dominicans—Thomists, that is to say!—and Augustinians seized on the new watchword at once, and even in the last decennium of the sixteenth century several theologians could write, the Jesuit Gabriel Vasquez being among them, that Probabilism was the prevailing view among contemporary theologians.² From that time onwards, down to the middle of the seventeenth century, Probabilism spread without opposition through the whole domain of ecclesiastical life. Within the province of faith it revealed its destroying influence (1) in "Laxism" with regard to the granting of absolution; (2) in "Attritionism," that is, in the view that the fear of hell is enough in itself to secure forgiveness of sins through the Sacrament of Penance, that the love of God, therefore, is not requisite.³ With regard to both these points, Dominicans made common cause with Jesuits in showing that the defence of their Thomistic doctrine of grace was now only a duty imposed upon them by their Order, and was no longer the outcome of inward interest in the matter itself. What the fruits were that ripened from Probabilism—towards which the attitude of the Popes was that of easy toleration—

¹ "Si est opinio probabilis, licitum est cam sequi, licet opposita sit probabilior," Dollinger u. Reusch, p. 28 ff.
² The watchword was not at once eagerly adopted by all Jesuits; Bellarmin, e.g., viewed it with disfavour. For the attitude the Jesuits assume towards this fact see l.c. p. 31 f.
³ Attritionism, again, has itself different degrees, according as it is defined negatively or positively, or according as it relates to temporal or eternal penalties, to penalties or to strong displeasure against sin itself, etc.; on its history cf. Stückert, Die Kath. L. v. d. Reue (1896), p. 53 ff., 58 ff., 62 ff.
on to the middle of the seventeenth century, has been recently described to us in a simple but startling way.\(^1\) Then Jansenism arose in France. Jesuistic Probabilism, even more than Semi-Pelagianism, was the enemy against which this movement directed itself. Against it Pascal raised his voice: the Provincial Letters represent the most formidable attack which a ruling ecclesiastical party has ever in history had to endure. It is not hard to convict the great man of the use of rhetorical devices—he was a Frenchman and a Catholic; we must not lay it down that he ought to have written as Luther did in the year 1520; but in their way the Letters are perfect. "That in the beginning of the second half of the seventeenth century a turn of things set in, and Probabilism ceased to be the reigning view, must be placed in the first instance to the credit of Pascal—and of the unskilful attempts of the Jesuits to reply to the Letters, published by him in 1656—and of his friends, especially Arnauld and Nicole."\(^2\)

There now followed a struggle, lasting for more than half a century, that seemed to terminate in a growing suppression of Probabilism.\(^3\) Even by Innocent X. and Alexander VII. a

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\(^1\) Döllinger u. Reusch, l.c., pp. 97-120.

\(^2\) L.c., p. 35 f.

\(^3\) A number of varieties now developed themselves. Beginning with the most lax, and passing on to the most strict, we have the following:—(1) One may follow the less certain opinion, even when it is only tenuiter, nay, even when it is only dubie or probabiliter probabiliis, that is to say, when there are only some grounds to be adduced for it, or when it is not certain that there are no grounds to be adduced for it, (the laxest Probabilism); (2) one may follow the less certain opinion, even though it is less probable, provided only it can be supported by good grounds (genuine Probabilism); (3) one may follow the less certain opinion, if it is almost as probable as the contrary opinion (rigorous Probabilism); (4) one may follow the less certain opinion when it is as probable as the more certain (Æquiprobabilism); (5) one may follow the certain opinion even when it is less probable; the less certain opinion may be followed only when it is more probable than the contrary opinion (Probabiliorism); (6) one may only follow the less certain opinion when it is the most probable of all (lax Tutiorism); (7) the less certain opinion is never to be followed, even if it is the most probable, i.e., in the case of doubt all action is to be avoided; the conscience has always to give the verdict, even when the most probable reasons testify against what appears to be duty (strict Tutiorism); see l.c., p. 4 ff. The last-mentioned view, which alone is moral, is regarded as Rigorism, and was expressly condemned by Alexander VIII. on the 7th December, 1690 (see Denzinger, p. 236: "Non licet sequi opinionem vel inter probabiles probabilissimam."). This Probabilistic method
number of books of lax theological morality were proscribed, some of them unconditionally, some of them "until they were
corrected" ("donec corrigitur"). The latter even contem-
plated the publication of a Bull against Probabilism. But he
satisfied himself with condemning, in the years 1665 and 1666,
a number of the worst positions of the Casuists, and, with
regard to Attritionism, with dictating the already familiar
course, namely, that the contending parties should not condemn
each other, until the Holy Chair had come to some decision in
this matter. His successor, Innocent XI., condemned, in the
year 1679, sixty-five other propositions of the Probabilists,
among which some samples of genuine villainy are to be found.

recalls the monstrous haggling, that is, the Probabilism, of the Pharisees and Talmu-
dists in the expounding of the law. That is probably not accidental, for the method
had its beginning in the thirteenth century, i.e., in a period in which Jewish science
probably exercised an influence on the theologians of the Mendicant Orders. Güde-
mann (Jiid. Litt.-Blatt, 21 Jahrg., 29th Oct., 1890) has taken offence because in the
first edition I had spoken of the "monstrous haggling about moral principles among
the Talmudists," whereas it was only what was ritual that was in question. He will
find now, in place of the expression objected to, the more general expression "about
the law." But that haggling, moreover, had by no means to do merely with what
was ritual, and was the ritual so different in Judaism of the old school from what
was enjoined as moral?

1 See Denzinger, p. 213 f. I refrain from reproducing these abominable theses, but
direct attention to 1, 2, 6, 15, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26, 28, 40, 41.

2 Decree of 5th May, 1667, in Denzinger, p. 217: "De materia attritionis non
audentis aliquius theologicae censure alteriusve injuriae aut contumelie nota taxare
alteriussententiam, sive negantem necessitatem aliquis dilectiones dei in praesta
attrizione ex metu gehennese concepta, quae bodie inter scholasticos communi
vindetur, sive asserentem dictae dilectionis necessitatem, donec ab hac sancta sede fuerit alicujus
hac in re definitum."

3 Denzinger, p. 218 f.; one would need to sum up and transcribe the whole of
them in order to give a picture of this moral desolation. I content myself with
adding those relating to faith —4: "Ab infidelitate excusabitur infidelis non
credens ductus opinione minus probabile." 5: "An pecesset mortaliter, qui actum,
dilectionis dei semel tantum in vita elicet, condemnare non audemus." 6: "Pro-
babile est, ne singulis quidem rigorose quinquennis per se obligare preceptum
caritatis erga deum." 7: "Tunc solum obligat, quando tenemur justificari, et non
habemus aiam viam, qua justificari et qua justificari possimus." 10: "Non tenemur
proximum deligere actu interno et formali." 11: "Præcepto proximum diligendi
satisfacere possimus per solos actus externos." 17: "Satis est actum fidei semel in
vida elicere." 19: "Voluntas non potest efficere, ut assensus fidei in seipso sit magis
firmus, quam mereatur pondus rationum ad assensum impellentium." 20: "Hinc
potest quis prudenter repudiare assensum, quem habet, supernaturalem." 21:
One must study these rejected propositions in order to see that among the Romanic peoples both the "morality" and the immorality of the eighteenth century had one of their strongest roots in the doctrine of the Jesuits. But the doctrine itself was worse than both; it sought to show that the low-type moral code of cultivated society in the times of Louis XIV. was positive Christianity, provided only one did not renounce connection with the Church (by means of the confessional). Still, the worst extreme seemed to be now averted by the enactments of the Pope, by the complaints of the best Frenchmen, by the protests of many monks, and indeed of entire Orders. Within the Jesuit Order itself Thyrsus Gonzales took his stand against the Probabilist doctrine. And while his confères succeeded, although Gonzales had become their General (1687), in emasculating his great work against Probabilism before it was allowed

"Assensus fidei supernaturalis et utilis ad salutem stat cum notitia solum probabili
 revelationis, imo cum formidine, qua quis formidet, ne non sit locutus deus." 22:
"Non nisi fides unius dei necessaria videtur necessitate mediis, non autem explicita
 remuneratoris." 23: "Fides late dicta, ex testimonio creaturarum similemo moto ad
 justificationem sufficit." 56: "Frequens confessio et communio, etiam in his qui
 gentiliter vivunt, est nota praedestinationis." 57: "Probabile est sufficere attributionem
 naturalem, modo honestam." 58: "Non tenemus confessorio interroganti fateri
 peccati alicujus consuetudinem." 60: "Penitenti habenti consuetudinem peccandi
 contra legem dei, nature ant ecclesie, eti emendationis spes nulla apparet, nec est
 neganda nec differenda absolutio, dummodo ore proferat, se dolere et proponere
 emendationem." 61: "Potest alicundo absolv, qui in proxima occasione peccandi
 versatur, quam potest et non vult omittere, quinimo directe et ex proposito querit aut
 ei sei ingerit." 62: "Proxima occasio peccandi non est fugienda, quando causa
 aliqua utilis aut honesta non fugiendi occurrit." 63: "Licitum est quaerere directe
 occasionem proximam peccandi, pro bono spirituali vel temporali nostro vel proximo." 64:
"Absolutionis capax est homo, quantumvis laboret ignorantia mysteriorum fidei,
 et etiam si negligentiam etiam culpabiliem nesciat mysterium sanctissimae trinitatis,
 et incarnationis domini nostri Jesu Christi." 65: "Sufficit illa mysteria semel credi-
desse." If this is not a veritable "issue" of dogma, then there is no such thing at all.
What did it matter that this particular thesis was rejected by Innocent if it was
nevertheless the expression of a general view that was never rejected by the Popes?
With regard to the 61st thesis, it is to be remarked that Tamburini even imparts the
advice to the father-confessor: "If thou observest that the penitent before thee is
very much addicted to some sin, do not require of him an act of contrition for this
special sin; for there is a danger that, if he is expressly reminded of it, he will not
abhor it from the heart, while he will have little or no difficulty in abhorring it in a
general way, and when it is taken together with other sins" (Döllinger u. Reusch,
p. 63 f.).
to appear (1694), its power was broken at the beginning of the eighteenth century, especially after Alexander VIII. in his Decree of August, 1690, had rejected two of the worst propositions of the Probabilists (regarding philosophic sin). Yet at bottom Jansenism and Anti-Probabilism were solidarically united. If the former was struck down (Constitutio Unigenitus), it was only a question of time for Probabilism to raise its head again. And as for the doctrine of attritio, the Popes had only reached the point of neutrality regarding it. What did it avail, therefore, that in the first half, and in the middle, of the eighteenth century, Probabiliorism prevailed among the French clergy and elsewhere—except in Spain? From Attritionism as a source Probabilism was bound to issue forth again. “At the very time when the Society of Jesus was crushed, God raised up a new champion for Probabilism, and ensured for the Society a triumph in the future on which human foresight could not have reckoned.” This champion was the founder of the Redemptorists, Alphonso Liguori (1699-1787), the most influential Roman theologian since the days of the Counter-Reformation. Liguori, the Blessed (1816), the Holy (1829), the Teacher of the Church (1871), is the true counterpart to Luther, and in modern Catholicism he has stepped into the place of Augustine. Throughout his whole life “a restless man of scruples” and a rigid ascetic, all doubts and all self-mortifications merely involved him more deeply in the conviction, that it is only in the absolute authority of a Father-Confessor—here the absolute comes in then—that any conscience can find rest, but that the Father-Confessor must apply the holy law of God according to the principles of æqui-Probabilism—as applied by Liguori, it is not different from Probabilism. By Liguori complete ethical

1 The parts referring to Gonzales have been treated with special fulness in the work published by Döllinger and Reusch.
2 Denzinger, p. 235 f. It is true, on the other hand, that in the Decree of December, 1690, very excellent propositions are condemned (against Jansenism, but they were in favour of the Probabilists); see d. 3, 5-9, 10-15 (14: “timor gehenne non est supernaturalis”). 26: “Laus quæ defertur Maris ut Maris vana est.”
3 Liguori and Voltaire were exactly contemporaries; among the Romanic nations they became the most influential men, the guides of souls.
4 Cf. the instructive section in Döllinger u. Reusch, pp. 356-476.
scepticism was again established in the morality, and indirectly in the dogmatics, of the Church. Though Liguori does not go so far as the most shameless Probabilists of the seventeenth century, yet he fully accepted their method, and in a countless number of questions, inclusive even of adultery, perjury, and murder, he knew how to transform the vile into the venial. No Pascal took his stand against him in the nineteenth century; there was a strengthening rather from decennium to decennium of the authority of Liguori, the new Augustine, and to-day he is supreme in all Orders, in all seminaries, in all manuals of doctrine. Any remnants of Augustinianism that succeeded in surviving till the nineteenth century Liguori suppressed. The casuistic morals, together with Attritionism, have thrown dogmatic entirely into the background. Probabilism and Papalism have broken it up; it is to-day, as circumstances may require, a rigid or an elastic legal order—a prison from which, if the interests of the Church require it, one is not delivered until he has paid the last farthing, and again a building, into which one need never enter, if he only holds himself under dutiful subjection to the Church.

1 Cf. the most widely-used manual—that by Gury.

2 This utilising according to inclination of given factors reveals itself in the numerous decisions of the Curia with regard to theological disputes of the nineteenth century, especially in Germany, but also in France; compare the judicial processes recorded by Denzinger relating to Lammenais (p. 310 f., 311 f.), Hermes (p. 317 f., 321 f.), Bautain (p. 319 f.), the Traditionalists (p. 328 f.), Günther (p. 329 f., 330 f., 331 f.), Frohschammer and other German theologians (p. 332 f., 338 f.). Of greatest interest are the theses against “Traditionalism,” i.e., against faith, of 11th June, 1855 (p. 328 f.). Here the following is taught: “Ratiocinatio dei existentiam, animæ spiritualitatem, hominis libertatem cum certitudine probare potest. Fides posterior est revelatione, proindeque ad probandum dei existentiam contra atheum, ad probandum animæ rationalis spiritualitatem ac libertatem contra naturalismi et fatalismi sectatorem allegari convenienter nequit.” “Rationis usus fidem praedit et ad eam hominem ope revelationis et gratiae conductit.” “Methodus qua usi sunt Thomas, Bonaventura et alií post ipsos scholastici non ad rationalismum ducit neque caus a fuit, cur apud scholas hodiernas philosophia in naturalismum et pantheismum impingeret.” Reason is brought into service when one needs it, and dismissed when it causes disturbance. The same course is followed with Holy Scripture, tradition, and faith.
(3) The Vatican Decrees.

After what has been set forth in the two foregoing sections, the proclamation of Papal Infallibility must appear as the necessary outcome of the development. If all authorities, the authority of the bishops, the authority of the Councils, the authority of tradition, the authority of Augustine, the authority of conscience, are demolished, then in a Church that is based on authority a new authority must arise. That work of abolishing could only be carried on so victoriously because the new single authority was long held in petto, and there was an acting in view of it. All that was now required was that by a solemn act—an act of this kind could not, unfortunately, be avoided—the Universal Bishop, the living tradition, the Teacher of faith and morals who could not be deceived, the absolute Father-Confessor, should also be proclaimed as such. Those were mistaken who were strongly of opinion that the period was not yet ripe for such a proclamation; no, the time was fulfilled. All lines of development, those within and those from without, converged upon this goal. The former lines we have taken account of; the latter were given in the Romanticism and the reaction in the first decennia of the new century, in the timidity and weakness of those governing, in the indifference of those who were governed. With scarcely a word our century accepted what dared not have been offered to the spirit of any other century without calling into the lists an armed Europe, Catholic and Protestant.¹

For students of the history of dogma the preparations for the Council of 1869-70, and the course followed at it, have no interest whatever. There were in Catholicism two parties; the one was in favour of the infallibility of the Pope, the other was opposed to it, but did not know exactly what was to happen if it was rejected. That is the whole. Endless efforts of a political kind were at the same time put forth on both sides,

¹ The way had already been prepared by the Syllabus (Denzinger, p. 345 ff.), which condemned, in addition to many bad things, the good spirit also of the nineteenth century.
instructive for the historian of politics, of no consequence for any one who wishes to follow the history of dogma.¹ The Scheme of Faith of 24th April, 1870, contains in its introduction and four chapters nothing new; faith means the recognition of Scripture and of tradition, the holding all as true that is written therein, and the holding it as true in the sense in which it is understood by the Church, which alone has the right to expound. What was new was brought forward in the Scheme of the Church (18th July, 1870) “Pastor æternus,” or rather the formulating as dogma was new.² Christ has given to Peter a place above all the Apostles, that there may be a real unity in the Episcopate. The primacy of Peter and his successors is therefore real and direct; it has not been committed to Peter by the Church. It is, further, a primacy of jurisdiction over the whole Church; accordingly there belongs to Peter the “ordinary and direct power” (potestas ordinaria et immediata) as “plenary and supreme” (plena et suprema) over the whole Church and over each individual Christian. This “power of jurisdiction” is also in the full sense Episcopal, i.e., there belong to the Pope everywhere all Episcopal prerogatives (Chap. III.: “if anyone shall say that the Roman pontiff has only the duty of inspection or direction, but not the plenary and supreme power of jurisdiction over the whole Church . . . or that he has only the greater part, but not the entire measure of this supreme power, or that this power of his is not ordinary and direct over all the Churches and each one singly, or over all pastors and believers and each one singly, let him be anathema.”³) Thus the Pope is the

¹The proceedings of the Council have been summed up by Friedberg; the fullest statement has been given by Friedrich, 3 vols., 1877 ff.; compare Frommann’s, Hase’s, and Nippold’s descriptions. Interesting information in Friedrich’s Journal, and in Lord Acton’s work, “On the History of the Vatican Council,” 1871. For the Council as viewed in the light of the history of dogma, see Janus, Der Papst und das Concil, 1869. Ultramontane account by Cardinal Manning (German translation by Bender, 1877).

²Friedberg, Proceedings, p. 740 ff.

³“Si quis dixerit, Romanum pontificem habere tantummodo officium inspectionis vel directionis, non autem plenam et supremam potestatem jurisdictionis in universam ecclesiam . . . aut eum habere tantum potiores partes, non vero totam plenitudinem hujus supremae potentiae, aut hanc ejus potestatem non esse ordinariam et immediatam in omnes et singulas ecclesias, sive in omnes et singulos pastores et fideles, anathema sit.”
universal bishop; he is the supreme judge, the infallible authority. "We teach and declare it to be a divinely revealed dogma: that the Roman pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra, _i.e._, when, in discharging his office as pastor and teacher of all Christians (under what recognisable conditions is that the case?), he in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority defines, by the divine assistance promised to the blessed Peter, the doctrine regarding faith and morals that is to be held by the whole Church, exercises that infallibility by which the divine Redeemer wished His Church to be instructed in the definition of the doctrine regarding faith or morals, and therefore such definitions of the Roman pontiff are of themselves, but not through the assent of the Church, subject to no amendment. But if any one shall presume to contradict this our definition, which may God forbid, let him be anathema!" (Chap. IV.)

The recollection of the past, the preparation of the Church's future, are thereby delivered over to the Pope, or rather to the papal Curia. Even dogma is by this Constitution reckoned, so to speak, to the papal domestic estate. What a victory! All great controversies of the four preceding centuries are at one stroke waived aside, or at least condemned as of no importance. There is no longer any Episcopalism, and whoever appeals to the old tradition as against the new is ipso facto condemned! All the conflicts that had at one time made up the life of mediæval Catholicism are set aside, "they make a solitude and call it peace" ("solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant"). The Church has one infallible lord; it need concern itself no more about its history; _the living man alone is in the right._

History reaches its ends in strangely circuitous ways. Was this Constitution of the year 1870 perhaps to become in the

1 "Docemus et divinitus revelatum dogma esse declaramus: Romanum Pontificem, quum ex cathedra loquitur id est quum omnium Christianorum pastoris et doctoris munere fungens pro suprema sua apostolica auctoritate doctrinam de fide vel moribus ab universa ecclesia tenendum definit per assistantiam divinam, ipsi in beato Petro promissam, ea infallibilis poterit, qua divinus redemptor ecclesiam suam in definitenda doctrina de fide vel moribus instructam esse voluit, ideology ejusmodi Romani pontificis definitiones ex sese, non autem ex consensu ecclesie irreformables esse. Si quis autem huic nostræ definitioni contradicere, quod deus avertat, presumpsset anathema sit."
future the means by which the Church should gradually free itself from the load of its past, from the Middle Ages and antiquity? That would be an inversion of development such as is not unknown in history. Will the Constitution "Pastor eternus" become perhaps the starting point of a new era of Catholicism, in which the mediaeval dogma that is already condemned as of no importance, will more and more disappear, and there will develop itself from the Heart-of-Jesus worship and from the living devotion of believers, a new faith, which, again, may admit of being formulated without difficulty? On the basis of the complete reduction of all things to an ecclesiastical level, which the new dogma represents—for what is a bishop or archbishop to-day alongside the Pope, and on the other hand how much importance attaches to-day in Catholicism to a layman who has a warm feeling for his Church!—will there perhaps develop itself a living Christianity of the congregational order, such as the Church has never yet possessed? And will the Pope himself perhaps find a means, at the close of this development, for renouncing again the fictitious divine dignity, as a means was found in the sixteenth and in the nineteenth centuries for obtaining deliverance from the most sacred tradition?

Foolish hopes, one will say; and certainly the signs of the times point in an entirely different direction. As yet the process does not seem to have run its course; with infallibility, it appears rather to have reached only the beginning of the end. Not to refer to the fact that nothing whatever is said in the Decree of the personal qualities of the Pope (can he not be

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1 To that side of the papal infallibility on which it means the authority of the personal element as against the rigid authority of the letter and of tradition, and, at the same time, represents the factor of progress in the Church, I need surely only advert. So long as the objective authority of the letter and of tradition is held to be divine, the personal element also must have the authority of the divine, that concurrence may be possible.

2 Gregory VII. already claimed for the individual Popes (not merely for the Roman Church) infallibility, nay, complete personal holiness; for they possessed all that Peter had. According to him the Pope's word is simply God's word (see Mirbt, Publicistik im Zeitalter Gregor's VII., p. 565 f.). But at that time everything had yet a certain uncertainty attaching to it, and even the absolute assertion had still something about it that was not binding.
declared to be sinless, to be holy, can there not be ascribed to him a special miraculous power, can he not be regarded as a peculiar incarnation of the Godhead, can there not be attributed to him a connection of a unique kind with the Holy Virgin or with the Holy Joseph, etc.?—at all events there lies in the “when he speaks ex cathedra” and in the “when he defines the doctrine concerning faith and morals to be held by the whole Church,” a sting of uncertainty which must still be extracted. Many signs suggest that this is desired in authoritative quarters, and therefore may very well be done in the future. It is possible, nay necessary, that the “faith or morals” includes everything which the Pope according to his opinion needs in order to be Pope, that there is included, therefore, e.g., the ecclesiastical State. Let there be observed what in this regard the acute Jesuit, Paul Graf Hoensbroech, has stated in his book “Der Kirchenstaat in seiner dogmatischen (!) und historischen Bedeutung” (1889), p. 74 f.: “... thus the entire teaching Church, Pope and bishops, solemnly announce: Under the circumstances of the present time the secular supremacy of the apostolic chair is necessary for the free guidance of the Church. To be in doubt of that, namely that this has been announced by the Pope and bishops, is impossible. As supreme pastor and teacher, the Pope addresses himself to the whole Church. The bishops of the entire earth accept the word of the teaching Pope and communicate it to believers; and on the other hand as the supreme shepherd and teacher the Pope sanctions what the bishops have done. Hence we are entitled to conclude that this declaration of the necessity of worldly possession contains infallible truth; consequently, every Catholic is forbidden to doubt this necessity, or to contest it.” To one reader or another this conclusion may perhaps at first sight seem strange. The declaration as to the necessity of worldly possession is to contain infallible truth? Does this necessity, then, belong to the treasury of revealed truth, and will one raise the declarations of the

1 I allow this quotation from the first edition to stand, although the author has since become a Protestant: in the dissertation there speaks, not Graf Hoensbroech, but the Order itself, although it does not regard everything as necessary doctrine which the author has set forth.
Pope and the bishops regarding this to a dogma, to a real article of faith? Neither the one nor the other. But yet what we have said still holds true. To the Church of Christ there has been promised by its divine founder infallibility, inerrancy, in the case of all decisions that have as their subject the truth revealed by God by means of Scripture or tradition. To this truth of revelation contained in Scripture or tradition there does not belong—we repeat it—the declaration as to the necessity of earthly possessions; and in so far as only a truth of revelation can become, properly speaking, an article of faith, a dogma, a decision as to this necessity never forms a dogmatic doctrinal position. But in order that the Church may be in a position to decide with infallible certainty on what are, properly speaking, truths of faith, it must evidently be able to pronounce its judgment with the same inerrancy upon everything which has an inner, necessary connection with these truths of faith. But the earthly possession of the Popes stands in such a connection with the real truths of faith. For it is a truth of faith that to the Church, or, in other words, to the Pope, there rightfully belongs perfect freedom in guiding the flock committed to his care. But this freedom is, in its exercise, dependent on outward circumstances; it requires the use of outward means, and these means have therefore an inward, naturally necessary connection with the freedom itself. Thus the Church can also with infallible certainty (note the fine distinction: “infallible certainty,” not dogmatic infallibility!) specify those means which, according to the circumstances of the time, are useful or necessary, as the case may be, for the exercise of its divinely-intended freedom. Now for the present times the Church has declared earthly possessions to be necessary for maintaining the freedom that ought to belong to it, and the entire Catholic world honours in this claim unerring truth.”

At the present time this last is not yet really done by the whole Catholic world; but that is a matter of indifference. Unquestionably the “yes and no” of this argumentation leads up to the doctrinal position: “The Church places also the

1 Thus the “infallible certainty,” or the “unerring truth,” of papal claims, which is really equivalent to dogmatic infallibility, is here made out even for provinces which are not de fide et moribus.
outward and temporary means which it declares necessary for the exercise of its divinely-intended freedom under the protection of the infallibility proclaimed in the year 1870.” In this way the words “doctrine concerning faith and morals” (“doctrina de fide et moribus”) are to be understood. What perspectives are not only opened up by but included in this interpretation, does not require to be demonstrated: the Pope declares his politics to be infallible, and the Church-State comes, in a circuitous way, to be as much a dogma as the Trinity. This interpretation, which is a perfectly legitimate conclusion from the principle, has not yet been sanctioned in the highest quarters; but how much time must elapse ere it, too, shall be drawn? What significance that has for dogma is quite obvious; by the declaration of papal infallibility all dogmas are ideally threatened, by formally placing on a level “temporary” political requirements and doctrines of faith every dogma is materially emptied of its meaning. Of course it will always be added from that side: “The Pope receives no new revelations,” “faith and morals stand at an unattainably high stage,” “the tradition and dogma of the Church remain unchangeably the same,” “we speak only of ‘infallible certainty,’ not of dogmatic infallibility, when we declare the papal policy authoritative,” etc. But what person of insight will drink poison for wine, because the labels of the bottles still retain the old inscriptions? There are still other dogmas in the air. If one will learn what they are, he must study the doctrines which the Jesuits foster as probable opinions of their Order. I am not aware, for example, that the opinion that all Jesuits will be saved has been departed from.¹ Nor, so far as I know, has the report been contradicted that prayers to the Pope have appeared in print.²

We must not let ourselves be misled as to the true state of things by the Catholic systems of dogmatic which are still being constantly written, and by the general reflections on dogmas which may be read there. Besides, there constantly appear even there—in the assumption of implicit and quasi

¹See Döllinger u. Reusch, Moralstreitigkeiten, I., pp. 524-534.
²By the Oratorian, Faber, if I am not mistaken.
implicit dogmas (dogmata implicita et quasi implicita), in the way in which a distinction is drawn between entire, half, and quarter dogmas, and, finally, in the scope given to the mere negation of doctrines—on the one hand scepticism, and on the other hand dogmatic politics.

1 See the article "Dogma" by Heinrich (Wetzer und Welter III. 2, Col. 1879 ff.): "Both in material and formal dogmas, whether these truths be declared or not, other truths of faith can be contained, and these truths, so long as they are not in some way divested of their hidden character, or explicated, are called dogmata implicita. They are taught by the Church and believed by the faithful in the explicated dogmas, that is, they are taught and believed implicitly. But there are two possible causes of the hidden character of such so-called enclosed dogmas; the cause may lie in this, that while the truth in question is declared in Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition, or is declared directly in a doctrinal deliverance of the Church, it is not declared with such clearness that every believer, or at least the well-instructed and discerning believer, is able to perceive it with ease and certainty. In this case this truth, while immediately revealed and set forth by the Church, is not revealed and set forth with sufficient clearness. There is here, as the theologians term it, a revelatio et propositio formalis et immediata, sed confusa et obscura; such a truth has also been described as quasi implicita. For in the strictest and most proper sense implicita dogmata are those truths which are contained not directly and formally in revelation and ecclesiastical deliverance, but only as it were in their principle, from which they are . . . deduced by a logical operation. . . . On the question how far the infallibility of the Church extends in regard to such conclusions, and whether and how far such deductions drawn by the Church are the object of fides divina and therefore dogmas in the strictest sense," etc. Compare also the distinctions between propositiones haereticæ, erroneæ, hæresi vel errori proxima, temerarie and falsæ.
CHAPTER III.

THE ISSUES OF DOGMA IN ANTITRINITARIANISM AND SOCINIANISM.

1. Historical Introduction.

No Protestant Christian will read the prefaces that are prefixed to the Racovian Catechism (1609 lat., cf. the edition: Irenopoli post annum 1659) and to the German edition of that work (Rackaw, 1608, 1612) without being stirred to inward sympathy. The former certainly contains a splendid confession of the freedom of faith, and the latter connects itself with the work
of Luther, and gives a place to the Socinian Catechism in the
history of the Reformation movement which began with
Luther. But both belong to that epoch in the development of
the Socinian Church, during which it was already strongly
influenced from without; that Latin preface shows the influence
of Arminianism, and the German preface does not represent the
original attitude of the Unitarian-Socinian movement.

Socinianism, however, is itself a secondary product, and
Faustus Sozzini was an Epigone; but an Epigone as Calvin
and Menno Simons were Epigones. As Calvin was the first to
give to the Romanic Reform movement its form, its force, and
its attitude, and as Simons formed a Church out of the Baptist
movement in the Netherlands and North-West Germany, so
there belongs to Faustus Sozzini the great merit of introducing
qui quid occulseritis, recludere nemo quae et quicquid recluseritis, nemo valeat
occludere? Cur non meministis, unicum dumtaxat esse magistrum nostrum, cui ista
competunt, Christum: nos vero omnes fratres esse, quorum nulli potestas ac dominium
in conscientiam alterius concessum est? Etsi enim fratrum aliis sint doctores,
libertate tamen et jure filiationis omnes sequales sunt." On the Catechism having
undergone changes since its first appearing, the redactors express themselves thus:
"Non erubescendum putamus, si ecclesia nostra in quibudam proficiat. Non
ubique clamandum credimus 'sto in filio, hic pedem figo, hinc me dimoveri ne
tantillum quidem patiar?' Stoicorum enim est, omnia mordicus defendere et in
sententia praefracte atque obstinato animo permane. Christiani philosophi seu
sapientiae illiis superne venientis candidati est, oris esse esse non aithyn,
persuaderi facilem esse, non pertinaciter sibi placentem, paratumque cedere sententia,
ubi alia vicerit mellor. Hoc animo semper nostra edimus."

Preface addressed to the illustrious University of Wittenberg: "For the further
reason that we consider it proper, that the holy truth of the gospel, which originated
in this illustrious University with the excellent man, Dr. Luther, and went forth from
thence into the whole of Christendom, should return to it with interest and in greater
perfection and be laid before it for its consideration. But if anyone thinks that God
was to repair in so few years, through Dr. Luther and others helping him, all the
injury done by Antichrist during so many centuries, he fails to take account of God's
way of acting and of His wisdom in all such matters—that all things, namely, are
not revealed by Him at once, but that the revelation is by little and little, that human
weakness may not be overturned and crushed by the perfection of His revelation.
God revealed so much to men through Dr. Luther that devout hearts received great
help. . . . But because beyond this many other doctrines still remained that may be
great hindrances to men's obtaining the same salvation, it has been God's will
gradually to point out these also through His servants, and in place of the detestable
and wearisome error to bring to view more perfectly from day to day His saving truth.
We believe, moreover, that in accordance with His deep counsel He has used our
congregations in Poland also," etc.
order into the wild, fermenting elements, and reducing them to the unity of Church life.

Viewed from the standpoint of Church history and the history of dogma, Socinianism has as its direct presuppositions the great mediaeval anti-ecclesiastical movements. Out of these it developed itself; it clarified them, and combined them into a unity. It had itself, however, its main roots in the most sober and judicious critical movements of the past. Just on that account it succeeded in bringing under restraint what was wild, extravagant, and fanciful. Anyone who examines even rapidly the characteristic features of the Socinian system of doctrine will meet at once with a Scotistic-Pelagian and with a critico-Humanistic\(^1\) element. On closer inspection he will perceive also the remnants still of an Anabaptist element; on the other hand there is an entire absence of Pantheistic, Mystical, Chiliastic, and socialistic elements.

That Socinianism represents an issue of the history of dogma will be disputed by no one. All that could be disputed is that it belongs to the universal history of dogma at all. This objection has already been replied to above (p. 23). A movement that was the precipitate of most of what had been occurring in vague form alongside the Church throughout centuries, but above all a movement in which the critical thoughts of the ecclesiastical theology of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had come to unfold themselves freely, and which at the same time gathered into itself the impulses of the newer age (Renaissance) dare not be regarded as a movement of secondary importance. What is characteristic of the Antitrinitarian and Socinian movements of the sixteenth century lies in this, that they represent that destruction of Catholicism which could be effected on the basis of what was furnished by Scholasticism and the Renaissance while there was no essential deepening or quickening of religion. In Antitrinitarianism and Socinianism the Middle Ages and the newer period stretch forth hands to each other across the Reformation. That which was regarded in the fifteenth century as so incapable of being formed, an alliance between

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\(^1\) Even externally this Humanistic element is shaped in an extremely characteristic way, e.g. in the Latin Preface quoted in part above.
Scholasticism and the Renaissance, here appears concluded—in extremely different ways as regards particular points. Just for that reason there is inherent in these movements a prophetic element also. Much is already anticipated in them with wonderful definiteness, which appears, after brief advances, entirely suppressed within the Evangelical Churches for the time, because the interest in religion in the form that had been once adopted here absorbed everything for more than 150 years, and in an incredibly short time became enveloped in Scholasticism. Historians of culture and philosophers for whom religion is a matter of indifference or a disturbing element, have therefore every reason to be deeply interested in the Antitrinitarians and Socinians, in the "Enthusiasts" and pantheists, and, in contrast with them, to deplore the melancholy half-measures of the Reformers. But it does not follow from this that, on the other hand, one who recognises in the Reformation the true progress of history, is entitled to pass by these parties unsympathetically or with disapproval. The critical elements which they developed brought profit not only to science, but ultimately to religion also, and they themselves only disappeared after Protestantism had included within itself in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries all that they could furnish of abiding substance.\(^1\)

We give in what follows a sketch from the point of view of the history of dogma of the religious movements which accompanied the Reformation in the sixteenth century, and conclude with an account of Socinianism (Unitarianism), which alone issued in the formation of a distinct Church.\(^2\) The breach with history, the despair about the Church as it already existed, the conviction regarding the divinely-given rights of the individual, were common to all the parties. Just on that account they cannot be sharply separated from each other. Starting from the most

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\(^1\) The rapid development of the Reformation State Churches and National Churches—the friendly attitude assumed towards the Lutheran Reformation, first by the Elector of Saxony, and then by other Princes—also brought it about, certainly, that there was a rapid keeping clear of all that one was not necessarily obliged to adopt.

\(^2\) The formation of the Mennonite Church does not belong to the history of dogma, because in the matter of Christian doctrine—it is otherwise as regards ethics—it fell back mainly on the definitions of the Ancient Churches.
different points (Chiliasm, Mysticism, Rationalism) they arrived not infrequently at the same results, because the spirit by which they were influenced in dealing with history was the same.

1. One group of parties attached themselves to the pantheistic Mysticism of the Middle Ages, but at the same time to the new culture of the Renaissance, steeped in Platonism, and by having it as their aim to study, not words, but facts in religion and science, represented the extreme opposition to "Aristotle," i.e., to the hollow Nominalistic Scholasticism of the Church. They destroyed the old dogma formally and materially. Formally in so far as they not only abandoned respect for the decisions of the Church, but also addressed themselves to setting aside the Bible as a law of doctrine (norma normans),¹ and to adding to or placing above it the "inner light," i.e., the personally experienced revelation of God and the speculation of the emancipated spirit; materially, inasmuch as the dogmas of the Church (Trinity, Christology) began to be pantheistically re-interpreted by them, or to be allowed to drop as being erroneous. It is well-known that that was not new; as long as ecclesiastical dogma had existed, i.e., from the fourth century, such tendencies had accompanied the Church, partly in concealed, partly in open, form. But it was new that among those representing these tendencies, psychological observation, nay, experience in general, began to play an important part, and that there developed itself a distinctive self-consciousness (in the religious, the moral, and the secular). In this way they attracted to themselves elements that raised their work high above what was merely fanciful. Certainly the most of those who are to be

¹ That Augustine also (see Vol. V., p. 99 f., 125 f. note) exercised an influence here—at least on Seb. Franck—has been pointed out by Hegler in his Monograph, p. 283 f., note. The same applies to the view stated by Thamer, that a thing is not true because it is in the Bible, but *vice versâ*. But I cannot see that the right standpoint against verbal inspiration is found in the perception that "Scripture is an eternal allegory." That was already the view of very many Mystics of the ancient and medieval Churches, and just on their account an evangelical Reformation was necessary. That proposition, rather, is nothing but the unveiling of the inspiration dogma. There is more "historical criticism" involved in Luther's position towards Scripture ("Prefaces") than in the attitude of the most enlightened enthusiasts who reject the letter. While saying this, I have no wish to underrate the wonderful greatness of the lonely thinker, Sebastian Franck.
included within this group knew as little as their Catholic opponents did of what evangelical religion is. They confounded it with the lofty flights of metaphysics, and just for that reason they still stood with one foot within the condemned circle of the dogma which they contested. But in spite of their hostile attitude towards ecclesiastical Protestantism, some of them undoubtedly came under the influence of Luther. Determined by him, but at the same time freed from the burden of the past, rich and courageous in thought, possessed of strong and warm feelings, they were able in forward movements to raise themselves above all their contemporaries. But their religion, as a rule, lacked the weight of simple and earnest simplicity; their science—some of them were discoverers, but at the same time charlatans—lacked sobriety and restraint, and a restless temperament made it appear as if they were not to be confided in. With this group, which has a great importance in the history of philosophy, there were connected—nay, there directly belonged to it in part—on the one hand Schwenkfeld, Valentine Weigel, Giordano Bruno—the last mentioned shows by his appealing to the "divine" Cusanus, where the ultimate source is to be sought for—on the other hand, Sebastian Franck, the Reformer, strongly influenced by Luther, and, for a time, Theobald Thamer, the former in more than one respect citizen of a future Evan-

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1 At the close of his life, Thamer really became a Catholic again, and Schwenkfeld would rather have become Romish than Lutheran. That is significant.

gelical Church that is to discard the Catholic law of the letter.1

2. A second group, the limits of which cannot be determined, had its strength in its opposition to political and sacramental Catholicism, and brought into the field against this a new socio-political order of world and Church, Apocalypticism and Chiliasm, or contented itself with discarding everything "external," and adhering to a "Biblical Christianity"—but with a constitutional order for the true Christian communities. This group also simply continued the mediaeval opposition to the Catholic Church, while it was evidently the ideal of the Francisca Spiritaules, or the ideals akin to it of the Waldensians and Hussites that were regulative here.2 But the spirit of a

1 Among other things, it is to be conceded to Dilthey that the modern speculative theology (the religious universal theism and pantheistic determinism), which developed itself out of Mysticism, has more distinct precursors in some sectaries of the Reformation period than in Luther with his "positivistic penetration." But what, in my opinion, has more significance is that they drew practical and theoretical conclusions from their piety to which Luther was unable to force his way. What was still held in common, the old dogma, he utilised with the view of showing Christians again the way to God. Of the fact that this common element was just at that time beginning to be broken up through the operation of forces that asserted themselves outside the doctrine of salvation, he had scarcely any inkling, or he shut himself entirely up from the impression of this. The tragedy of this historical fact is deeply moving; but when did it happen otherwise in history? (see Dilthey, l.c. pp. 385 ff.).

2 Ritschl has directed attention to this. The regulative principles that Christianity must be realised as fellowship among the actively holy, that inability to sin may be attained, and that the Church has only a meaning as the product of the actively holy, derive their character from the Middle Ages, or say, from the ancient Church. In numerous investigations, last of all in the dissertation, "Die Anfänge der Reformation und die Ketzer schulen" (Vortr. und Abhandl. aus der Comenius-Gesellschaft, 4. Jahrg. Stück 1 u. 2, 1897). Keller has endeavoured to show that the Anabaptists and the kindred sects stood in direct and exclusive connection with the Waldensians (only the importance they attributed to late baptism is represented by him as having been a novelty). Along some lines he has really demonstrated this connection, but not its exclusiveness, and, in my opinion, he has also over-estimated the positive importance of the "Heretical Schools." A good and very complete sketch of the history of the Baptists has been furnished by A. H. Newman, "A History of Anti-Pedo-Baptism from the Rise of Pedobaptism till 1609," Philadelphia, 1897. One after another of these strong, worthy, martyr-spirited figures passes before us: most of them contemplate joyfully the sure prospect of a violent death. Among the numerous monographs of which Newman gives a list, pp. 394-406, the works of Loserth are conspicuous: for the Pre-Reformation period, see the works of Haupt. Only when we have a history of the Inquisition in Germany, and of the German martyrs from the
new age reveals itself among them, not only in their entertain-
ment in many ways of Reformation thoughts, but also in the
stress they lay on Christian *independence*. It is with this in
view that their opposition to infant baptism is to be understood,
which was a protest of the independent individual believer
against the magic of redemption and the sacramental "char-
acter." From the standpoint of the history of dogma this
opposition was the main characteristic of the Anabaptists; for
all other features do not belong to the whole group. With
regard to dogma some of them are good Catholics, others are
Lutheran or Zwinglian, others again are pantheistic and anti-
trinitarian. It is very remarkable that the antitrinitarian ele-
ment was not more strongly developed among them; for it
would seem as if the sharp antagonism to the reigning Church
should necessarily have driven them to Antitrinitarianism, since
the doctrine of the Trinity and Christology form the chief part
of the old detested Catholicism, and the discard of infant
baptism involves the dissolution of the Church as understood in
ancient times. In this vastly great group also, which had its
representatives during the sixteenth century in Germany, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Venice, Moravia, Poland, Livonia,
and Sweden, and had connection with the Waldensians (and
"Bohemians"), the modern spirit displayed itself in close asso-
ciation with the mediæval. Not only did the perception find
frequent expression here also that the use of the Bible as a law-
book is Catholic and a check upon religion—though, on the
other hand, certainly, it was just among the Anabaptists that
the most rigid Biblicism had its fanatical supporters—but even
the simple evangelical spirit, which sought in religion for nothing
but religion, and the conviction of the freedom of conscience,
found a home in Anabaptist communities. We owe it to in-
vestigations carried on during recent years that the pictures of
excellent Christians, from the circles of the Anabaptists, have
been presented to us, and not a few of these figures, so worthy of

thirteenth to the seventeenth century, shall we be able to estimate the struggle that
was carried on for well-nigh five hundred years against Christian faith and freedom
by the Confessional Churches.
honour and so full of character, have become more intelligible to us than the heroic Luther and the iron-willed Calvin.1

3. A third group—whose representatives are almost entirely men of learning, natives of Italy moreover—brings before us the thorough-going development of Nominalistic Scholasticism under the influence of Humanism. Only as long as Nominalistic Scholasticism maintained an attitude of submission to the Church, and just on that account sought with the one hand skilfully to rebuild, or to uphold, what with the other hand it had demolished, was a union impossible with the critical culture of the Renaissance. But as soon as it withdrew from the Catholic Church, and kept simply to its own points of departure, independence of rational thought, theism, and autonomous morality, and thus really abandoned what its rational reflection had abandoned long before (Catholic Dogma, Sacraments, etc.), modern culture could combine with it. That culture contributed the historic element, the return to the

1 After the Anabaptists had sunk into oblivion, and even Gottfried Arnold had not succeeded in awaking interest in, and intelligent appreciation of, their memory, the recollection of them has been revived in our days on different sides and in different ways. In connection with this exaggerations were inevitable (Hagen, Deutschlands litt. u. relig. Verhältnisse i. Ref.-Zeitalter, 1841 ff.; Keller, Die Reformation und die älteren Reformparteien, 1855). But the estimate of them has certainly undergone a change, having become much more favourable than it was in former times, and along with Cornelius, Kampschulte, and especially the historians of the Netherlands, Keller has contributed much to this. The more closely the history of the Reformation in particular provinces and towns has been studied, the more apparent has it become that these Baptists, entering frequently into alliance with Waldensian and Hussite elements, or falling back on former medieval movements, formed the soil into which the Reformaiton was received, and that for many decennia they continued closely inter-connected with it in many regions. The strict conception of the evangelical principle which Ritschi has emphasised is certainly legitimate from a dogmatic point of view; but it must not be summarily applied to the phenomena of the Reformation period, otherwise the risk is run of choking the springs from which living water flowed. Again, we must not treat the "inner word" of the "enthusiasts" as a bugbear to be brought helplessly to the ground by the sword of the "Scripture-principle"; for however certain it is that real "enthusiasm" promoted itself by means of the "inner word," it is equally certain that the "inner word" was also the expression for a religious freedom which Luther in his day knew very well, but of which he never so expressed the title that it became in his hands a dogmatic principle limiting the Scripture-principle. The testimonium spiritus sancti internum which was left behind to the Epigones did not supply the want; yet it is an important germ for a future that is still to be looked forward to in Protestantism.
sources, the appreciation of philology, the respect for the classical in everything that comes under the category of antiquity. In no period have the Italians distinguished themselves by a high degree of speculative capacity. So it is not to be wondered at that intellectual Humanism formed the means by which they delivered themselves from dogma in the sixteenth century. A real religious interest also was at work in this mode of emancipation; where religion is not a concern for heart and conscience, there is no endeavour to improve its public expression. But the religious motive, in the strictest sense of the term, the motive that asserts itself within the Christian religion as the power of the living God, before whose Holy Spirit nothing that is one's own retains its independence, was very remote from these Italians. Nor did they succeed in bringing about a popular movement even in their own native country; they continued to be officers without an army.  

1 We have no exhaustive account of this entire school. Reference has still to be made to Trechsel, Die protest. Antitrinitarier vor F. Socin (2 vols., 1839, 1844) and the special studies in Socinianism. Yet see the valuable historic hints which Ritschl has given (Rechtsert. u. Versöhn., 1st ed., I., p. 311): "The fact that Faustus affirmed of the hypothesis of Duns (God could also have redeemed us through a mere man) that it represented the real and necessary, presupposes a radical breach with the universal faith of the Church. To this breach his uncle (Lelio), as well as himself and many other Italians, were led by the state of Christian society in Italy. Here the empire had not recovered the authority it had lost in dealing with Gregory VII. and Innocent III.; here the Roman Church appeared as the only possible form of Christian society. The Church dominated the masses of the people, whom no expectation of ecclesiastical reform prepared for receiving the Reformation influences from Switzerland and Germany. It was for the most part only men of literary culture who were accessible to these influences. But owing to the state of public opinion and to the unbroken power of the ecclesiastical organs, these men were almost everywhere hindered from the beginning from making a public appearance in the congregations, and were forced to form themselves into secret societies. Their interest in the Reformation, even if it was originally directed to its ethical core, found there neither the requisite fostering nor the requisite control that are furnished by giving practical expression in public to the general religious consciousness. Hence it was that among so many Italians who attached themselves to the Reformation, what was nourished was not the Church spirit, but, on the contrary, either the Anabaptist Sectarianism or the inclination to subject all dogmas to Scholastic criticism, or both together. For the Scholastic interest finds it as natural to deal critically with the doctrines of the Trinity and reconciliation as to frame the correct notion of justification."
4. The circles described under 1 and 3 represent in many respects contrasted positions, in so far as the former had a strong leaning to speculative Mysticism, the latter to sober intelligent thought. Yet not only did Humanistic interests throw a uniting bond around them, but out of speculative Mysticism there developed itself in connection with experience, to which value was attached, a pure thinking also; and, on the other hand, the sober Italian thinkers threw off, under the influence of the new culture, the bad habits of that conceptual mythology in which the earlier Nominalism had indulged. Thus the two schools converged. The most important representative of this coalescence was the Spanish thinker—distinguished also for his deeply pious spirit—Michael Servede. In him we see a union of the best of everything that came to maturity in the sixteenth century, if the Evangelical Reformation be left out of account. Servede had equal distinction as an empirical investigator, a critical thinker, a speculative philosopher, and a Christian Reformer in the best sense of the term. It is a paradox of history that Spain, the country that was least affected in the sixteenth century by the ideas of the newer age, and in which at the earliest date Catholicism was restored, produced this unique man.¹

Within the history of dogma there are two main points that must be kept in view in order to determine the importance of these movements: (1) their relation to the formal authorities of Catholicism; (2) their relation to the doctrines of the Trinity and of Christ.²

As to the first point, the statement can be quite brief: the authority of the presently existing Church as teacher and judge was renounced by them; but they contested also the doctrinal power of the Church of former times. At the same

¹ On Servede see the numberless works by Tollin, whose intention was to illustrate the whole Reformation history "Servetocentrically"; Kawerau in the Theol. Stud. u. Krit., 1878, III.; Riggenbach in Herzog's R.-Encykl.², Vol. XIV.; Trechsel, l.c. I., p. 61 f ff.

² It is important also to observe that a large number of the Reformers had a leaning to Apokatastasis, and that they most hotly contested the Catholic notion of the Sacraments.
time the relation to Holy Scripture continued almost everywhere vague. On the one hand Scripture was ranged against Church tradition—nay, there was here and there a clinging with unprecedented legalism to the letter; on the other hand, the authority of Scripture was subordinated to that of the inner revelation, indeed, as a law for faith it was even entirely set aside. Nevertheless, it can easily be seen that the efforts that were made to discard, along with the authority of the Church, the absolute authority of the Bible, continued without any considerable result. Even those who brought forward the “spirit” against the “letter” had no thought in many cases of taking objection to the unique validity of Holy Scripture, but only wished to introduce a spiritual interpretation of Scripture, and to secure recognition for the good title belonging to the free spirit that is guided by the Spirit of God. The absolute authority of Scripture passed forth victorious in the end from all the movements that accompanied the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. After some slight hesitation, Socinianism took its stand firmly on the ground of Scripture. There was no serious attempt made by the Reformers of the sixteenth century to shake this rock—if we keep out of view some excellent men, who really understood what the freedom of a Christian man is.\(^1\) It was not due, or at least not in the first instance due, to them therefore, if a relation of greater freedom towards Scripture was subsequently secured in the Evangelical Church. This was rather a fruit of the \textit{inner} development of Protestantism; the continued influence of the ideas of Franck, Weigel, and Böhme scarcely had to do with this result. By their holding to the Scriptures, as gathered together and made the subject of

\(^1\) Here Hans Denck, and above all Seb. Franck, are to be mentioned with honour; on Denck compare Keller, Ein Apostel der Wiedertaüfer, 1882, p. 83 ff., and elsewhere. Denck holds fast to the word of God in Holy Scripture, but disputes the legal authority of the letter, and is of opinion that only the spirit can discern the spirit of the divine word. Franck treated the whole question with still greater thoroughness and freedom, see Hegler, l.c., p. 63 ff., Henke, Neuere K.-Gesch. I., p. 403: “In the rejection of the ‘formal principle’ there was much that was more scriptural than the doctrine that the Spirit is only given through the \textit{verbum externum}.” This is correct; but Luther did not contend for the historical Christ under the rigid integument of the \textit{verbum externum}. The “\textit{inner word}” and the Christus ex \textit{scriptura} \textit{sacra} \textit{predicatus} are not mutually exclusive.
by the Church, the Reformers gave testimony to
their common ecclesiastical character; but they certainly
shattered the foundations of the dogma; for this rests, not on
Scripture alone, but on the doctrinal authority of the Church,
and on the sole right of the Church to expound Scripture.
While the Reformers vindicated this right for themselves and
for every Christian man, yet even on their part there was no
passing (here, certainly, they went hand in hand with early
Protestantism) beyond the contradiction, of asserting the
authority of an extensive collection of books as an absolute
norm, while the understanding of these books was left by them
to the efforts of individuals.

As to the second point: in all the four groups described
above, Antitrinitarianism developed itself, but in different
ways. In the first group it was not aggressive, but rather
latitudinarian. A latitudinarian Antitrinitarianism of the
kind, however, was not wanting in the ancient Church also, and
even, indeed, among the Fathers of dogma; it belongs in a
certain sense to dogma itself. To soften by mystic pantheistic
means the rigid dogma, to reduce the Trinity to “modes”
(“modi”) and to intertwine it with the thought of the world, to
see in Christology a special instance of a constantly repeated
occurrence, to contemplate the union of the divine and human
natures in Christ as a perfect fusion, which has its ultimate
ground in metaphysics, to recognise in all dogmas encasements
of truth, etc.—all these things were no novelties. Therefore even

1 Trechsel, l.c., whose method and classification, however, leave much to be
desired. The Antitrinitarians are dealt with also by Baur and Dorner in their works
on the history of the doctrines of the Trinity and Christology (cf., also the latter’s

2 Even a proposition like that of Seb. Franck, who, by the way, was in no sense an
Antitrinitarian: “The Christ after the flesh has served His time,” had no bad meaning
attaching to it, and has not the old ecclesiastical tradition against it (see also St.
Bernard, Vol. VI., p. 13). Franck, who entered very deeply into speculation about
the “flesh” of Christ, only intended to suggest by this that we must not abide by the
flesh, but must lay hold of the Spirit, the deity (see Hegler, l.c., p. 185 ff., 190 ff.).
Many similar statements are to be found among the Reformers, and it is with injustice
that they are frequently construed as heresies. That the spiritualistic tendency makes
itself felt also in connection with the Christological dogma is not to be denied, yet
there was really no injury done by this. Taken as a whole, the criticism of the two-
nature doctrine was cautious and mild; radical criticism was always the exception.
Schwenkfeld, Weigel, G. Bruno, and their followers were not Antitrinitarians in the strictest sense of the term, although their doctrines, by continuing to work as a ferment, served to break up the old dogma.\(^1\)—Within the second group Antitrinitarianism forms only \textit{one} factor in the opposition to the state of things in the Church—which is entirely identified with Babylon—a factor, moreover, which for long did not make its appearance everywhere, and which, even where it asserted itself in conjunction with the rejection of infant baptism and with spiritualism and the doctrine of the apokatastasis, had very different motives underlying it. Denck, perhaps the most excellent of the Anabaptists, scarcely touched upon Antitrinitarianism in his book, “Ordnung Gottes und der Creaturen Werk” (God’s order and the work of His creatures). He was concerned about more important things than the polemic against the doctrine of the Trinity; of the deity of Christ he never had any doubt. If he says in one place: “Omnipotence, goodness, and righteousness—these constitute the threefoldness, unity, and trinity in unity of God,” this assertion is certainly not to be understood as directly Antitrinitarian. It was merely his purpose, as it was Melanchthon’s in the first edition of his “Loci,” to withdraw attention from the Scholastic forms and fix it on the matter itself.\(^2\) His associate, Hätzer, a man of impure life, spoke incidentally of the “superstition of the deity of Christ,” God being only one; but it would seem that he himself afterwards attached little weight to this divergence, and his denial exercised no influence.\(^3\) The doctrine of the

\(^1\) Just as the men to be mentioned in the following group carried on a polemic against the “external” conceptions of reconciliation (the satisfaction dogma); cf. Ritschl, Rechfert. u. Versöhnung, 1st ed., I., pp. 305-311. Münzer accentuated in a genuinely medieval way only the example of Christ, but was silent as to what was meant by His being the Reconciler. Denck’s misunderstanding of a doctrine of Luther became the occasion of his entirely rejecting the idea of a general reconciliation by Christ. Hence in his circle the doctrine of the deity of Christ became open to question.

\(^2\) See Keller, l.c., p. 90. Trechsel, l.c. I., p. 13 ff. Yet Trechsel’s account has come to be out of date since Keller wrote. Henke I., p. 418 ff.

\(^3\) Trechsel, l.c. I., p. 13 ff. Keim in the Jahrbb. f. deutsche Theol., 1856, II., and in Herzog’s R.-E., Vol. V. One who shared the views of Hätzer was Kautz of Bockenheim.
Trinity was more strenuously combated by Campanus in his book, "Wider alle Welt nach den Aposteln" ("With the Apostles against all the world"), a book that led Melanchthon to declare that the author deserved to be strung up (des "lichten Galgens" für würdig erklären). Yet the positive discussion of the question ("Divine and Holy Scripture restored and amended"), in which the doctrine of two divine Persons was maintained, the Son being declared consubstantial with the Father, and yet subordinate to Him, remained a singular phenomenon.\(^1\) In connection with a philosophy of history (three Ages), David Joris subjected the Trinity to a Sabellian treatment, representing it as a threefold revelation of God.\(^2\) The restless traveller, Melchior Hoffmann, drew up a system of Christology resembling that of Valentinian,\(^3\) while the Venetian Anabaptist, Pietro Manelfi, proclaimed Christ to be the divine man, the child of Joseph and Mary,\(^4\) and succeeded in securing acceptance for this doctrine at an Anabaptist Synod (1550).\(^5\) This happened in Italy; for there alone (in some measure also in Southern France, under the influence of Servede) was there really a development of Antitrinitarianism. There alone did it come to be, not one moment in conjunction with other moments, but the really critical moment. That took place within the third group described above. The union of Humanism with the Nominalistic Pelagian tradition in theology gave a place in Italy to Antitrinitarianism as an actual factor in the historic movement.\(^6\) Here the doctrine of the Trinity was broken up; indeed, the discarding of it was regarded as the most important means for securing purity and freedom for religion. Its place was taken by the doctrines of the one God and the created

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\(^1\) Trechsel, l.c., pp. 26-34.


\(^3\) Zur Linden, M.H., ein Prophet der Wiedertaeter, 1885.


\(^5\) Manelfi ultimately became a Catholic again.

\(^6\) Cf. the entire 2nd Vol. of Trechsel's work. In his estimate of Socinianism Dilthey lays stress on the Humanistic element, the product of the new Hermeneutics, while not denying the presence of the Scotistic element (Archiv. f. Gesch. der Philos., Vol. 6, p. 97 ff.).
Christ. There remained uncertainty about the latter doctrine: it assumed at one time an Arian, at another time an Adoptianist form; nor was a Sabellian element entirely absent. A noteworthy parallel to the history of the old Adoptianists in the Church presents itself here. Like the old Theodotians in Rome, these new Theodotians also were equally interested in the Bible and in sober philosophy; like the old Theodotians, they formed only a school, in spite of all attempts to found a Church; like the former, they worked with grammar, logic, and exegetical methods, and, as the former probably gave a subordinate place to the consciousness of redemption, so the latter were interested chiefly in religious illuminism (Aufklärung) and in morals. The more one enters into details (compare also the proof from Scripture) the more striking does the kinship appear. Italy produced a whole crowd of Antitrinitarians in the middle of the sixteenth century.¹ Mention is chiefly to be made of Camillo Renato, Gribaldo, Blandrata, Gentilis, Occhino, and the two Sozzinis.² This is not the place to give the history of these men, but the general course of the Antitrinitarian movement deserves consideration. These Reformers were not able to hold their ground in Italy; they were obliged to leave their native land, and they accordingly endeavoured to secure a settlement on the borders of it, in the Grisons, and in Southern Switzerland. Here they were brought into contact with what had been produced through Calvin's influence. It was a time of great importance in Church history when Antitrinitarianism, coming from Lyons in the person of Servede, from the South and from the Grisons in the persons of the men named above, sought to obtain the rights of citizenship in Geneva, where a large Italian colony existed, and in Switzerland. The decision lay in the

¹ I do not enter into Servede's doctrine, for although this Spaniard was the most outstanding Antitrinitarian in the sixteenth century he did not succeed in exercising a permanent influence. What distinguishes him from most of the Italian Antitrinitarians is that his opposition to the doctrine of the Trinity was ultimately based on pantheism. Modalistic, Gnostic, and Adoptian elements furnished him aid in building up his Christology, which was constructed on Neoplatonic premises. Henke, I., p. 423 ff.

² Only the most important names are given here; see many others in Trechsel, II., p. 64 ff. On Occhino see the Monograph by Benrath, 1875.
hands of Calvin, and Calvin had allowed himself at one time to speak very disparagingly about the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed. Nevertheless, he certainly did not act against his conviction when he took up the most antagonistic attitude towards the Antitrinitarians. Although a narrowing of his standpoint was forced upon him by his opposition to the Genevese "libertines," yet the logical carrying out of his system of faith itself required him to adopt the sharpest measures. He had Servede burnt, and by his powerful words the other Swiss Cantons, where there was originally (especially in Basle) a more liberal judgment, were kept from showing toleration and were

1 From the beginning the Reformed congregations did not take their stand so strongly as the Lutheran on the doctrine of the Trinity and the Chalcedonian Christology, the reason being that they thought of the Reformation not as merely distinguishing them from the Catholic Church, but as meaning a breach with the Church. Just on that account it was much more difficult there to find sufficient grounds for a strict adhesion to ecclesiastical antiquity, especially when some passages of Scripture were allowed to create the conviction that the matter was not so plainly and unquestionably contained in the Bible. How many men there were in Switzerland about the middle of the sixteenth century who, along with the other Catholic doctrines, gave at least a subordinate place to those about the Trinity also! Among the Reformed enormous weight was attached to the argument that it does not befit a Christian to use expressions that are not to be found in Scripture. Even men like Vergerio were very favourably disposed towards the Antitrinitarians (see Trechsel, II., p. 117 ff.). It was really the case that in some of the Swiss National Churches Antitrinitarianism came very near being approved. How great the crisis was between the years 50 and 60 is shown by the numerous letters on the Trinitarian question written at that time by Epigones of the Reformation. The pressure brought to bear by the Lutherans would scarcely have been strong enough to drive the free congregations in Switzerland from the path of freedom. The decision lay in Calvin's hands, and he declared Antitrinitarianism heretical. This settled the matter for Geneva, Switzerland, the Palatinate, and indeed for all the regions that were under the iron rule of the great lawgiver. If the question is simply dealt with by itself, it must be deeply lamented that the Reformation, with a great advance immediately before it, did not take the decisive step. Yet if we consider that the most prominent Antitrinitarians had no discernment of Luther and Zwingli's conception of faith, and were satisfied in part with moralism and illuminism, our conclusion must be that the toleration of them in the sixteenth century would probably have meant the dissolution of evangelical faith, in the first instance within the area of Calvin's influence. By his draconian measures against the Antitrinitarians Calvin protected faith—i.e., Luther's faith.

2 See Köllner, Symbolik, I., p. 48: "patres Nicænos fanaticos appellat—s. Nicænum battologias arguit—carmen cantillando magis aptum, quam confessionis formulam."
brought round to accept his strict principle. The Antitrinitarians had meanwhile found an asylum in Poland and Transylvania. That the Italians were attracted to Poland cannot be explained merely from the great freedom that prevailed there in consequence of the permanent anarchy (sovereignty of the great landed proprietors); we must rather remember that there was perhaps no other country in Europe in the sixteenth century whose towns were so Italian as those of Poland. Poland did not, like Germany, pass through a Renaissance of its own; but the direct intercourse between Italy and Poland was of the liveliest kind: Italian master builders erected the splendid structures in Cracow, Warsaw, etc., and the more recent publications on Polish Humanists show us how active an intercourse of a mental kind there was between Poland and Italy. It was in part owing to these relationships that the Italian Reformers came to Poland; they found their way to Transylvania, no doubt, simply because it lay on the confines of Christendom, and the general disorder prevailing there was in their favour. So also they found their way to England in the days of Edward VI., when the religious state of things there seemed to be undergoing a complete dissolution.

In Transylvania and Poland there arose Antitrinitarian congregations; indeed, in Transylvania the energetic Blandrata succeeded in securing formal recognition for the Antitrinitarian Confession as the fourth Christian Confession. Within the anarchy freedom of conscience also found a home. Blandrata's positive confession, which he had kept concealed so long as he was in Switzerland and Lesser Poland, was strictly Unitarian. He did not recognise the eternal Godhead of Christ, but saw in Christ a man chosen by God and exalted to God. But the Unitarian Church soon became separated into a right and left. The latter went on to reject the miraculous birth of Jesus, and to deny His claim to divine worship (Nonadorantism). Its chief representative was Franz Davidis. To help in opposing this

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1 In our literature we possess as yet no monograph on Blandrata; his "confessio antitrinitaria" was re-issued by Henke in 1794, cf. Heberle in the Tüb. theol. Ztschr. 1840, IV. An Italian monograph appeared in Padua in 1814: Malacarne, Commentario delle opere di Giorgio Biandrate, nobile Saluzzese.

2 He is regarded at the present day as the father of Transylvanian Unitarianism, and
section, Fausto Sozzini came to Transylvania (1578), and with his aid Nonadorantism was really successfully suppressed. In Poland the Antitrinitarians mingled at first with the Calvinists. Beyond the country where it originated, Calvinism appeared to be the most liberal confession, because it expressed itself in the strongest language against Romanism. Yet even in Poland discussions arose between the Calvinists and the "Arians," especially after the Synod of Petrikau (1562), which led to a definite breach. From that time there existed in Poland what were strictly speaking Unitarian congregations, which had, however, no fixed order. Anabaptist, Socialist, Chiliastic, Liberatorial and Nonadorantist tendencies here found room for themselves and sought to assert their influence. At this point Fausto Sozzini made his appearance. With the clearest insight into what was for him the truth, he united the most determined force of will and the gifts of a born ruler. Out of the seriously endangered, unorganised communities he created a Church. In Poland arose a counterpart—poor enough, certainly, as a Church—to that Church in Geneva, which had expelled Antitrinitarianism. It was quite especially to the credit of Sozzini that a new Confession developed itself from Unitarianism, the Christian character of which cannot be denied, and which, after a history rich in dramatic incidents, found a place for itself in England and America and produced excellent men.

But with all regard for the personality of Sozzini, it cannot be

as such is held in high esteem even by the English and North American Unitarians; on him see the arts. in Ersch and Gruber's Encycl. and in the Kathol. Kirchenlex. III.; also Fock, Socinianism, I., p. 157 ff., 258 ff. The subdivisions which followed, ranging from Nonadorantism to the borders of Judaism, are of no importance historically, though interesting.

1 As also in Transylvania and England. Within the sphere of Calvin's influence Antitrinitarianism could be checked only by a prohibition supported by force. On Antitrinitarianism in the Calvinistic Palatinate, see Henke, I., p. 433 f.

2 On the consolidation of Polish Unitarianism into Socinianism see the account of Fock (Socinianism, 1st Vol., 1847) pp. 137-183. Fock's book is an excellent piece of work, which, however, were it to appear to-day, would be branded as heretical. On the elder Sozzini, see E. Burnat, Lelio Socin., Vevey, 1894.

denied that his faith was very different from the Evangelical, and that the criticism to which he subjected the Church doctrine shows itself to be a logical carrying out of the Scotistic theology. That has been pointed out in a masterly way by Ritschl. The Italian Reformer, who only found a field for his activity beyond the confines of the Roman Empire, placed himself also outside the general ecclesiastical faith and outside the Church. He did not merely correct, as on superficial view he seems to have done, the ecclesiastical doctrine, he ignored the correct tendencies which led the Church to the doctrines of the Godhead of Christ, the Trinity, and satisfaction. One can agree almost everywhere with the formal criticism to which the Socinians subjected the orthodox doctrine and yet hold that the representatives of the latter displayed a much surer understanding of the gospel than their opponents. But the expression in which this understanding of theirs was embodied—dogma—no longer satisfied. It was ripe for dissolution, and the Socinians put an end to it. That this refutation of it in the seventeenth century had a comparatively slight effect was due not only to the special circumstances of the times, but in a still higher degree to the resistance every religion makes to being driven from its positions by a criticism arising from without.

2. The Socinian Doctrine.

We have a comprehensive and detailed account of the doctrine of the Socinians in the Racovian Catechism (1609). The way in which this work is laid out and the fulness of its detail are in themselves characteristic. Religion is the perfect and correct knowledge of the saving doctrine. Here the Socinians are at one with the Epigones of the Reformation, who also had it in view to make out of the Church a School. This principle,
when logically carried out, leads to denying the Christian religion of all who have not this knowledge. Some Lutherans in the seventeenth century went so far as this. Yet Faustus is willing to assert the thought, that there are other Christian Churches besides his own: *he is tolerant.* Side by side with the definition which restricts the Church to those who have the "sacred doctrine" stands the recognition of the other Churches. But wherein, then, consists that "doctrina salutaris," if the greatest opposition exists between Socinianism and the doctrine of the other Churches? Faustus has omitted to point that out.

The way in which the Catechism is drawn up is as Scholastic as possible. It is a course of instruction for producing theologians. After the definition: "The Christian religion is the way of attaining to eternal life that is pointed out by God through Jesus Christ,"\(^1\) it begins with the question as to where we learn this way, and answers: "From the Holy Scriptures, especially of the New Testament."\(^2\) The foremost position is now assigned to the New Testament in the doctrine of religion. All fanatical elements are suppressed. That the New Testament is the sole regulative authority, source, and norm of religion cannot be declared more positively and dryly than by Socinianism. The *Christian religion is the Theology of the New Testament.* In this there is the basis of the positive character which Faustus was led to give to his creation—a positiveness, certainly, which is astounding, as soon as we begin to reflect upon what religion really is. All knowledge of the divine is produced from without, and it is *simply* included in the book that has once for all been given. It is not that Christ is the revelation in the book; but "*in the book* God has made manifest Himself, His will, and the way of salvation" (p. 5). If we recall here the fact that similar expressions are to be found in Calvin, we must not forget that as little as any other of the Reformers did Calvin ever leave it out of view, that the Bible is given to *faith.* But of this we find nothing in Faustus. There

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1 "Religio Christiana est via a deo per Jesum Christum monstrata vitam æternam consequendi."

2 "Ex sacris litteris, præsertim Novi Testamenti."
is not even an approach made to discovering lines of connection between the outward revelation contained in the Bible and the nature of religion; what we have, rather, is—on the one hand the book, on the other hand the human understanding. The latter is really the second principle in the Socinian dogmatic, which has been not incorrectly described therefore as Supernatural Rationalism. There is set over against the revelation contained in the Bible—not the man who longs after God, who, sunk in sin and guilt, has no peace or blessedness—but simply man, as a mortal, but rational being, who is on the outlook for eternal life. Religion is a matter of interest for rational man. Faustus does not carry his conception of religion beyond this undoubtedly correct, though extremely general perception. In this, and in his Biblicism, he reminds us of the Antiochene theologians.

Section I. of the Catechism is entirely devoted to Holy Scripture. In the first chapter the "certitude of Holy Scripture" ("certitudo sacrarum litterarum") is treated of (pp. 1-10). Here external proofs, some of them of an extremely doubtful kind, are first adduced for the trustworthiness of Holy Scripture. Then an appeal is made to its being inconceivable that God should have allowed the falsifying of a book in which He revealed Himself, His will, and the way of salvation. Yet an attempt is certainly made in the end to prove the credibility of the book from the truth, rather, of the Christian religion: the book is true, because it is the only source of the true religion. But why is the Christian religion true? Because its founder was divine (divinus). How can that be proved? From His miracles, which are attested even by the Jews, and which cannot have been demonic, because Christ was an enemy of the devil, and from His resurrection. The resurrection, again, is to be established on the testimony of those who saw Him and went to death for this faith. We have only the choice—of regarding the disciples and all Christians who have lived afterwards as of unsound mind—or of believing in the Resurrection of Christ. But, further, the history of the Christian religion furnishes a proof of its truth; how could so many, relinquishing all earthly goods, and with the sure prospect of distress, shame, and death
before them, have adopted it, if the Resurrection of Christ were not a truth? Finally, the truth of the Christian religion is proved by the nature of the religion itself (ex ipsius religionis natura); for both the commands and the promises of this religion are so lofty, and so transcend the spirit of man, that they can only have God for their author; “for the former contain the heavenly sanctity of life, the latter the heavenly and eternal good of man.”1 Hereupon still further grounds for the truth of this religion are derived from its “beginnings, progress, power, and effects” (“initiis, progressu, vi et effectis”). But with regard to its “power and effect” the Catechism knows of nothing else to say than this: “first, because it has been impossible to suppress this religion by any counsel or craft, by any power or might of men; then because it put an end to all the old religions, with the exception of the Jewish, in which it recognised a character showing that it had proceeded from God, although it was appointed to flourish only till the advent of Christ, the Master, so to speak, of a more perfect piety.”2 All this applies only to the New Testament. The trustworthiness of the Old Testament is proved in the briefest way in the last paragraph: the genuine writings of the New Testament attest the Old Testament, therefore it is equally trustworthy. In the whole of this abstract line of statement, there is almost nothing that has religious worth save the distinguishing between the Old and New Testaments. But even this is cancelled again in the end. Evidently Faustus had not the courage openly to reject the Old Testament; neither had he the capacity to show how Old and New Testaments represented different stages. On closer inspection, however, the rational demonstration of the absolute worth of Holy Scripture is extremely uncertain and therefore irrational. It is the first, and therefore it is an important attempt to establish the authority of Holy Scripture, without making an appeal to faith: the “service” (λατρεία) is to

1 “Nam illa quidem celestem vitæ sanctimoniam, haec vero celeste et aeternum hominis bonum comprehendunt.”

2 “Primo quod haec religio nullo consilio nec astu, nulla vi nullaque hominum potentia supprimi potuerit; deinde quod omnes priscas religiones sustulerit, excepta Judaica, quam illa pro eusmodi agnovit quæ a deo profecta fuerit, licet ad Christi tamquam perfectoris pietatis magistri adventum solummodo vigere debuerit.”
show itself as “reasonable” (λογικός), but unfortunately only as “reasonable.” What an undertaking it was for a Church to provide itself with such a Catechism: we must go back to the times of Abelard, nay, even, of the Apologists, to find something similar in Church history! Only to our age does this wisdom appear trivial, after its having reproduced itself in manifold forms in the eighteenth century. It was certainly not trivial at the beginning of the seventeenth century; but it was devoid of all religious spirit, and at bottom not more “logical” than the Catechisms of those on the other side.—The two following chapters (“on the sufficiency and perspicuity of Holy Scripture,” pp. 11-17) are treated according to the same method. Scripture is sufficient, because the faith which worketh by love is contained in it “as far as is sufficient” (“quantum satis”). To the question, how far that applies to faith, the reply is given: “In Scripture the faith is most perfectly taught, that God exists and that He recompenses. This, however, and nothing else is the faith that is to be directed to God and Christ.” Who does not recall here the Nominalistic theologians, and those Popes (Innocent IV.) who asserted that the Christian only needs to have faith in God as the recompenser, while with regard to the rest of the doctrines fides implicita is enough! The fides implicita is thrown aside—Sozinianism has reached its maturity! In what follows the commands regarding love are entirely co-ordinated with faith; but then the question is raised, whether reason is necessary in religion, if the Bible contains everything in perfect form. To this the reply runs: “Yes, indeed, the use of right reason is great in things that pertain to salvation, since without it it is impossible either to grasp with certainty the authority of Holy Scripture, or to understand those thing that are contained in it, or to deduce some things from other things, or, in fine, to recall them that they may be applied. Therefore when we say that Scripture is sufficient for salvation, we not merely do not exclude right reason, but we altogether include it.”1

1 “Immo vero magnus rectæ rationis in rebus ad salutem spectantibus usus est, cum sine ea nec sacrarum litterarum auctoritas certoprehendi, nec en, que in illis continentur, intelligi, nec alia ex alitis colligi, nec denique ad usum revocari possint. Itaque cum sacras litteras sufficere ad salutem dicimus, rectam rationem non tantum non excludimus, sed omnino includimus.”
a childlike way clear understanding is here introduced into religion! Certainly it belongs in some way to it, and it means an advance in theology that has significance for the world’s history, when there is the desire to throw off all the burdens that had been heaped up by the old world on the Christian religion, its mysticism, its Platonism, its total-world-knowledge, in order to justify the religion—as it is to be derived from its classic source—before the human understanding alone. But a more naïve form of expression cannot be used than that employed in the Catechism: “We include reason.” With what do we include it? what kind of reason is it which must not be excluded? where does it come in? and what scope must be allowed to it? It is only since Kant’s time that men have begun to answer these questions. Previous to that time the controversy between the Socinians and their opponents was a nyktomachy (battle in the dark). After this the Catechism discards the “traditions,” and at the same time carries on a polemic against the Romish Church. In the section on the perspicuity of Holy Scripture, there is importance in the distinction drawn between what is essential to salvation and what is not. Altogether there appears here the advantage of reasonable reflection.¹

Section II. (pp. 18-23) treats of the way of salvation. In spite of his reason man was unable to find out this way of himself, because he was mortal (here the element characteristic of the ancient Church appears in unconcealed form). The Catechism places the greatest weight upon the fact (compare the Nominalist doctrine) that Adam was created as a mortal man, subject to all ills. The image of God consisted simply in dominion over the lower creatures (the strongest opposition here to Augustine, Thomas, and Luther, at the same time a view which sets aside every religious thought). The Scripture passages which represent death as having come into the world through sin were got quit of by a process of exegetical juggling:

¹ On religion, Holy Scripture, and reason, see Fock, l.c., pp. 291-413. Because the Bible and reason (the latter as a receptive and critical organ) are represented as the foundations of the Christian religion, it was a current dictum among the Socinians that Christianity is supra, not contra rationem. The Nominalistic doctrine had taught the “contra rationem.”
Rom. V. 12. treats, not of mortality, but of eternal death. Only in the second place is attention directed to the Fall: man is also made liable to death for the reason that Adam transgressed a manifest commandment of God. "Whence it further came about that he involved his entire posterity along with himself in the same sentence of death, there being added, however, in the case of each adult, his own sin, the gravity of which is then increased owing to the manifest law of God which men had transgressed." 1 The exposition is not clear here. To the question, again, why then man, though he be mortal, could not himself find out the way of salvation, an answer is given which betrays at once the Scotistic conception of God: "because both so great a reward and the sure method of attaining it depended entirely on God's judgment and counsel; but if God Himself does not reveal them, what man can search out and know with certainty His counsels and decrees?" 2 This answer has a very religious ring; but the great moralists left quite out of sight here the moral law: the way of salvation is simply determined by the absolute will of God. But what is the nature of this way? 3 The Catechism answers quite evangelically with John XVII. 3. But wherein consists the knowledge of God and Christ? "By that knowledge we understand, not some bare knowledge of God and Christ, consisting only in speculation, but the knowledge conjoined with its effect, i.e., with the life conformed to and agreeing with it"; 4 for so it is taught in 1st John II., 3 f. Compare with this Luther's exposition of this passage, in order to

1 "Unde porro factum est, ut universam suam posteritatem secum in eadem mortis jura traxerit, accedente tamen cujusvis in adulteribus proprio delicto, cujus deinde vis per apertam dei legem, quam homines transgressi fuerant, aucta est."

2 "Quia et tantum premium et certa illud consequendi ratio ex solo dei arbitrio ac consilio pependet; dei autem consilia ac decreta ipso non revelante quis hominum indagare ac certo potest cognoscere?"

3 The way of salvation has as its goal the vita eterna; as man is by nature mortal, God has led him by the Christian religion into a new mode of being. That would have been necessary, even if sin had not entered. We have here a perfect reproduction of the doctrine of Theodore (of Mopsuestia) of the two Katastases; see Vol. III., p. 280 f.

4 "Per cognitionem istam non nudam aliquam et in sola speculatione consistentem dei et Christi notitiam intelligimus, sed—cum suo effectu, h. e. vita illi conformi ac conveniente conjunctam."
feel convinced that Socinianism has nothing in common with the Reformation. It is Ultra-Catholicism that it here teaches; there is nothing whatever said of faith (of fear, love, and trust); everything applies simply to the knowledge of God and Christ (notitia dei et Christi) and a holy life.

Section III. (pp. 23-45) treats of the knowledge of God as "the Supreme Lord of all things" ("supremus rerum omnium dominus"). Here we meet everywhere with Scotistic thoughts. The idea that God is the absolutely arbitrary One, and that this attribute is the highest that can be asserted of Him, cannot be more strictly formulated than in the sentence (p. 23): "The right, and the supreme power, to decree whatsoever He wills, as concerning all other things, so also concerning us, even in those matters with which no other power has to do, as, for example, our thoughts, hidden as these may be in the innermost recesses of our hearts, to which He can give laws and appoint rewards and penalties according to His own judgment." ¹ How much higher is Thomas’s position with regard to the conception of God! The thought that God is the Being in whom we may confide was unknown to the Socinians. On the other hand, the doctrine of the Unity of God is very distinctly wrought out—although with Tertullian’s (see the Treatise adv. Prax.), or the Arian limitation, which is meant to prepare the way for the Socinian Christology (p. 25): "Nothing renders it impossible that one God should share that dominion and power with others, and has shared it, though Scripture asserts that He alone has power and dominion." ² The attributes of God are then dealt with in quite an external way, i.e., apart from any relation to faith. Here the old Scholastic method has become

¹ "Jus et potestas summa, ut de ceteris rebus omnibus, ita et de nobis quiquid velit statuendi, etiam in iis, ad quas nulla alia potestas pertingit, ut sunt cogitationes nostræ, quamvis in intimis recessibus cordis abdita, quibus ille pro arbitrio leges ponere et premia ac penas statuere potest."

² "Nihil prohibet, quominus ille unus deus imperium potestatemque cum aliis communicare possit et communicaverit, licet Scriptura asserat, eum solum esse qui sit potens ac dominator." See also p. 32, where it is correctly shown that in Scripture the word "God" has a double meaning, (1) as principle and Lord of all things, (2) "eum denotat, qui potestatem aliquam sive celestem sive in terris inter homines summan, aut qui potentiam virtutemque omni humana majorem ab uno illo deo habet t sic deitatis unius illius dei aliqua ratione particeps est."
entirely without substance: God's eternity is His being without beginning or end; His omnipotence has its limits merely in contradictions in terms (contradictio in adjecto) (p. 26). To the question, how far the knowledge (notitia) of the divine attributes is essential to salvation, a number of answers are given, all of which are only loosely related to faith. It is a poor—indeed an objectionable—thesis that is laid down when it is said (p. 27), that to believe that God is “supremely just” (“summe justus”) is necessary to salvation, because thereby we are persuaded that He will hold to His promises, or when (p. 28) the belief in God’s higher wisdom is held necessary “that we may have no doubt that even our heart, than which nothing is more difficult to explore, from which, moreover, our obedience is chiefly estimated, is forthwith and without ceasing scrutinised and known by Him.” On the other hand the doctrine of the Trinity is held as not necessary, but only as “extremely useful” (“vehementer utile”) for salvation—a bad concession (p. 30). The proof that is brought forward against this doctrine is in the first place rational proof (essentia = persona), in the second place scriptural proof. Here the Socinians did excellent work, and delivered exegesis from the ban of dogma. The arguments, especially the exegetico-polemical, are for the most part unanswerable. But on the other hand, the Socinians entered as little into the fundamental confession which dominates the utterances of Scripture, as into the religious tendencies which determined the ecclesiastical doctrine. The concluding line of proof, which aims at showing that the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity is dangerous, and the Socinian doctrine of God “very useful for salvation,” is not invalid, but very pithless. In

1 “Ut nihil dubitemus, etiam cor nostrum, quo ad perscrutandum nihil est difficilius, illi prorsus et semper perspectum atque cognitum esse, e quo etiam obedientia nostra potissimum estimatur.”

2 See also p. 40: “haec opinio (the doctrine of the Trinity) damnare non videtur eum, cui nulla erroris suspicio mota est.” That is also a Catholic thought (not the material heresy, but only the formal, condemnns).

3 See Fock II., pp. 454-477, whose criticism, however, of the ecclesiastical doctrine and of Socinianism were determined by Hegel’s philosophy.

4 “Ista opinio primum unius dei facere convellere et labefactare potest . . . secundo gloriam unius dei, qui tantum pater Christi est, obscurat, dum eam ad alium, qui pater non est, transfert; tertio ea quae deo illi uno et summum sunt indigna continet,
the short chapter immediately following, on "the will of God," the placing together of what men knew of the divine will prior to the law (ante legem) and what they knew through the law (per legem) is instructive. Prior to the law they already knew (1) the creation of the world by God, (2) the providence of God with regard to particular matters (!) (providentia dei de singulis rebus), (3) the rewarding of those who seek Him (remuneratio eorum, qui ipsum quærunt). "Under this third point there is included a certain knowledge of those things which are well-pleasing to God, and by attending to which He is obeyed, while it is fitting that no one of those things that were known of old and prior to the law should have been omitted from the law of Moses" (p. 42 sq.). Through the law (per legem) they became acquainted with the decalogue. Thus faith in the providence of God was included by the Socinians also in Pre-Christian knowledge.

In Section IV. (pp. 45-144) there follows the knowledge of the person of Christ. On this much-disputed point the Catechism goes most into particulars. What the Nominalists had spoken of as hypothetical—that God could also have redeemed us by a man—is regarded, now that the authority of ecclesiastical tradition has disappeared, as actual. In point of fact Socinianism has no ground in its own premises for recognising the Godhead of Christ, and if the gospels are brought in to determine the alternative, was Christ a God or a man, the answer cannot be doubtful. But Socinianism did not go on to deal with a deeper inquiry—namely, whether Christ does not so bring us to God that it is implied "that God Himself acts," and whether He has
deum seil. illum unum et altissimum alicujus esse filium vel spiritum et sic habere patrem et sui auctorem, etc. . . . denique alienis a religione Christiana magno est ad eam amplectandam impedimento" (pp. 38 sq.).

1 "In hoc vero tertio membro comprehenditur cognitio quaedam eorum, quae de graata sunt et quorum observatione ipsi obeditur, quorum olim et ante legem cognitorum nullum in ipsa lege Mosis fuisse praetermissum consentaneum est." To the question why it is necessary to know that God created the world the brief and curt answer is given: (1) "quod deus velit, ut id credamus eaque res ad summam dei gloriam pertineat," (2) "quod nisi certo id nobis persuasum esset, nullam causam haberemus credendi, talem esse de rebus omnibus dei providentiam, qualem ante diximus atque ea ratione animum ad ei obedientium non induceremus." The first is Scotistic; the second is at all events not spoken from the standpoint of faith.
not become that One in whom God has made Himself apprehensible in human history. Besides, in this section upon Christ it has not drawn up its positions from the standpoint of the community redeemed by Christ from death and sin. The negative criticism is here again almost at every point unanswerable, in some places masterly; the positive assertions as to what Christ is to His own fall short in respect of substance of the most attenuated doctrines of the most arid Scholastics: Christ is a mortal man, who has become immortal, but no ordinary man; for from the beginning He was, through the miraculous birth, the only begotten Son of God, was sanctified by the Father and sent into the world, endowed with divine wisdom and might, raised again ("thus, as it were, begotten anew, especially as in this way He issued forth like unto God in His immortality"), and finally invested with a power equal to God's. Even while dwelling on earth He was "God" (by reason of the divine might and power the radiance of which appeared in the mortal); but He is God now in a much higher degree. It is evident that these declarations, so far as they are a description of Jesus, coincide pretty much with the biblical testimonies; but it is equally manifest that they are entirely worthless, because they lay down simply the product of exegesis, and are imposed upon faith as a law. The much shorter and much simpler testimony of Paul, "No one can call Jesus Lord but by the Holy Ghost," is of immeasurably greater value, because it knows only of a confession of Christ that is divinely wrought, and thereby assigns to Christology its proper place. Socinianism, however, proceeds as the old School did. It establishes the doctrine of the person of Christ chiefly from Scripture; for this the old School used Scripture and tradition, and therein had an advantage; for from tradition it obtained guiding lines. Socinianism merely occupied itself with bringing out the

1 "Sic denuo veluti genitus, præséritum cum hæc via immortalitate deo similis evaserit."

2 Dilthey (Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Philos., Vol. VI., p. 90): "The Socinian Christology is conditioned by the religious horizon of the Humanistic system of culture, according to which messengers of God of different degrees of dignity are to be recognised as witnessed to by reports of ancient history."
Scripture doctrine exegetically and with avoiding at the same
time too sharp a conflict with reason.

If we take a combined view of the Socinian doctrines of the
person and work of Christ, it may be expressed briefly as
follows: By virtue of a free decree God has determined that
mortal men shall be raised to a new condition, foreign to their
natural being; that is, that they shall be guided to eternal life
(second katastasis). For this, likewise by a free decision, He
has raised up the man Jesus, whom He equipped through the
miraculous birth with divine powers. This man has, as Prophet,
brought the perfect divine legislation, inasmuch as he explained
the decalogue and gave it a deeper meaning; he further dis-
distinctly announced the promise of eternal life, and, finally, gave
the example of the perfect moral life, which he ratified in his
death. "He transcends the limits of the Old Testament, inas-
much as he reformed the Mosaic law, added to it new moral
precepts and sacramental appointments, gave a strong impulse
to the observance of these by the promises of eternal life and
the Holy Spirit, and assured men of the general purpose of
God to forgive the sins of those who repent and seek to reform
themselves. It is admitted that no man can perfectly fulfil the
divine law; and justification, therefore, results not from works,
but from faith. But faith means that trust in the law-giver
which includes in itself actual obedience to Him, so far as that is
practicable to men. Now Christ, by his resurrection, by his
having obtained divine power, guarantees to all those who in
faith as thus meant attach themselves to him, in the first in-
stance actual liberation from sin according to the measure in
which they follow the impulse he gives them to newness and
betterness of life, and, further, the attainment of the supernat-
ural end set before them; and also by the Holy Spirit, which he
bestows, the previous assurance of eternal life, while with the
commencement of this life the forgiveness of sins of the indi-
vidual is complete."1

1 Ritschl, l.c., I., p. 315 f. Ritschl very correctly goes on to say: "In this we
have a palpable indication of the practical antithesis between Socinianism and Church
Protestantism. In the latter the forgiveness of sin is regarded as the primary
principle, in the former as the more remote result of the Christian life. The
The following particulars are worthy of note: (1) In the doctrine of the person of Christ the divinity of Jesus is asserted, His divine nature rejected (p. 48: "if we understand by the terms divine nature or substance the divine essence itself, we do not in this sense recognise the divine nature in Christ") and the ecclesiastical view is argued against on the ground of reason and Scripture. The Socinians found special difficulties here in the passages of Scripture which assert pre-existence of Christ. They sought to show that many passages when looked at closely do not contain pre-existence, and that others can be explained by assuming that Christ (like Paul) was caught up during his earthly life into heaven, and there beheld the eternal life and heard the perfect commands, so that John could say of Him that he came from heaven; finally, it is to be observed that much is said in Scripture "figuratively" ("figurate") (see pp. 48-144, in particular p. 146 sq.).

2. The doctrine of the three offices lies at the basis of the Socinian account of the work of Christ. The prophetic office, however, is dealt with most fully (Section V. and VI., pp. 144-316). In fact, the whole work of Christ, so far as it was clear to the Socinians, was placed under this heading, and we can easily see that it was an accommodation to the old doctrine when they added the kingly and high-priestly offices. Socinianism can really gather up everything in the proposition, that Christ has perfectly revealed to us the divine will. The scheme opposition of Socinianism to the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction, which lies at the foundation of the former view, thus admits of explanation from this point; but this Socinian estimate of the forgiveness of sins as an accident of the Christian life is at the same time an indication that in Christ the founder merely of an ethical school is discerned, and not the founder of a religious fellowship. And if this contrariety does not always show itself with clearness, if rather it must be allowed that Socianism nevertheless establishes peculiar religious aims, regulative principles, and conditions, the circumstance is to be accounted for from the fact that Socinianism, as being the first attempt at the exhibition of Christianity as an ethical school, was still exposed to the influences of a view of Christianity, which up to that time had exclusively prevailed, and from which it had in principle withdrawn itself.”

1 "Si naturae seu substantiae divine nomine ipsam dei essentiam intelligimas, non agnoscemus hoc sensu divinam in Christo naturam."

2 It should always be remembered that the Socinians were the first to liberate themselves in dealing with the Christological passages of the New Testament from the ban of the Platonising dogmatic.
of the high-priestly office is mainly made use of for controverting the Church doctrine.

3. For the prophetic office of Christ the following scheme is obtained (p. 148): "it comprehends, first, the precepts, then the perfect promises of God, then, finally, the way and manner in which we ought to conform ourselves both to the precepts and promises of God." This is at the same time regarded as the content of the New Covenant, so that faith is not even mentioned. The first chapter now treats of the commands which Christ has added to the law (pp. 149-209); for the divine commands consist of the decalogue and the commands which Christ and the apostles added to it after discarding the ceremonial law. This discarding is looked upon as the transformation of the severity and rigour of the law (severitas et rigor legis) into grace and mercy (gratia et misericordia). Yet the commands that relate to the righteousness of civil government are still kept in force; "nay, even the Church of Christ implies the State, since it is nowhere congregated save in the State." But it is quite certain that Socinianism did not yet rise above the mediæval suspicion of the State and its legal ordinances, as can be seen especially from p. 194 sq. After this the decalogue is now expounded (p. 154 sq.), into which (under the first commandment) an exposition of the Lord's prayer is introduced. Christ added the Lord's Prayer to the first precept; and he still further added to this precept the injunction that he should himself receive divine worship. The worship of Christ as divine is vindicated at length (pp. 164-176) in opposition to Nonadorantism. In the second chapter (pp. 209-221)

1 "Comprehendit tum praecpta, tum promissa dei perfecta, tum denique modum ac rationem, qui nos et preceptis et promissionibus dei conformamur debeat.

2 "Quin et ipsa Christi ecclesia rempublican supponit, cum non alibi quam in republica congregetur" (p. 153).

3 "Ipsum etiam dominum Jesum pro eo, qui in nos potestatem habeat divinam, istoque sensu pro deo agnosce ac porro ei confidere ac divinum honorem exhibere tenetur." The honour that is to be given to Christ consists (p. 165) both in adoratio and invocatio. This is established from Holy Scripture, and from the conviction of faith that he is our Lord, who can and will help us. The section relating to this is among the best the Catechism contains. Of those who are not willing to worship and invoke Christ it is said on p. 172 sq.: "eos, qui id facere nolunt, Christianos hactenus non esse, quamvis alioqui Christi nomen profiteantur et doctrinae illius se
there follows the statement of the special commands of Christ, so far as these have a *moral* character. The Catechism distinguishes here three commands: (1) trustful and constant joy in God, unceasing prayer in the name of Christ with the sure belief in the divine help, and hearty thanksgiving, (2) abstaining from love of the world, *i.e.*, from the lust of the world, and the pride of life, (3) self-denial and courageous patience. Especially regarding the commands of the first class the Catechism understood how to say beautiful things; but what it sets forth here was placed in no definite connection with Christ and with faith. In the third and fourth chapters (pp. 221-228; 228-243) there follows the statement of the special commands of Christ so far as these have a *ceremonial* character, that is, of the commands connected with Baptism and the Lord's Supper. This mode of view decides at once as to the meaning Socinianism attributes to these observances. Baptism is defined (p. 221) as "the rite of initiation by which men, after obtaining knowledge of the doctrine of Christ and acquiring faith in him, become bound to Christ and his disciples or are enrolled in the Church, renouncing the world . . . *professing*, besides, that they will regard the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as the only guide and master in religion, and in the whole of their life and conversation, and by their ablution and immersion and emersion, *declaring*, and as it were *exhibiting*, that they lay aside the defilement of sin, that they are buried with Christ, that they desire henceforth to die with Him and to rise to newness of life, and pledging themselves that they will really carry this out, *receiving* also at the same time at which this profession is made and this pledge taken the *symbol and sign* of the remission of sins, and *even the remission itself*."

The words *adhibere dicant.* There then follows a repudiation of the Catholic Mary and saint worship.

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1 "Ritus initiationis, quo homines, agnita Christi doctrina et suscepta in eum fide, Christo auctorantur et discipulis ejus seu ecclesiæ inscribuntur, renunciantes mundo . . . *profidentes* vero se patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum pro uno duce et magistro religionis totiusque vitae et conversationis suæ habituros esse ipsaque sui ablutione et immersione ac remissione declarantes ac veluti *representantes*, se peccatorum sordes deponere, Christo conselpelli, prouinde commori et ad vitae novitatem resurgere velle, utque id re ipsa præsent sese obstringentes, simul etiam hac pro-
that are added quite at the end—entirely unexpectedly and with nothing to introduce them—indicate an accommodation.\(^1\) Baptism is in reality a confession, an undertaking of obligation, and a symbol. Infant baptism is rejected, but tolerated.\(^2\) Its toleration was due to the fact that little importance generally was attached to all that was ceremonial. It is a serious error to associate regeneration with baptism. Socinianism therefore resolved to have nothing to do with the Sacrament as Sacrament. As in baptism immersion was accentuated, so the greatest stress was laid in the Eucharist on the breaking of bread, and it cannot be denied that Socinianism made a praiseworthy attempt to restore to this sacred observance its original meaning. But here also it avoided in a latitudinarian way uttering the last word; or, it avoided a complete separation between the ceremony and the forgiveness of sins, which are united in the words of institution.\(^3\) Of the word in the Sacrament it took no account; here also, under the influence of its Biblicism and its obedience to the arbitrary commands of God and Christ, it was ready to believe and do what was prescribed. Thus the Socinians appear here also as mediæval Christians, although they have struck out the Sacraments. The definition of the "breaking of bread" is as follows (p. 228):

fessio et obligatione facta symbolum et signum remissionis peccatorum ipsamque adeo remissionem accipientes."

\(^1\) The suspicion can scarcely at all be suppressed that many Socinians expressed themselves more positively than they had a right to do. Did they really estimate the formal authority of Holy Scripture so highly that they held everything as true that was contained in Scripture, even when it threw ridicule on their exegetical skill? I cannot persuade myself that this assumption is true, and believe that the "illuminist" element was more strongly developed among them than their writings would lead us to suppose. The philologist, Justus Lipsius, a man of no character but of keen insight, has in his famous characterisation of the Christian Confessions of his day described the Socinians as "hypocrite docti." Faustus at all events was an exception.

\(^2\) See p. 222: it is not according to the mind of the Apostles; but it is also no true baptism, for the form is not immersion; "quem tamen errorem adeo inveteratum et pervulgatum, presertim circa rem rituales, Christiana caritas tolerare suadet in iis, qui certeroquin pie vivant et alios, qui huic errori renuntiariunt, non insectentur, donec veritas magis magisque patescat."

On the words "for the forgiveness of sins" the Catechism is simply silent. In the case of baptism they are at least referred to.
"It has been appointed by Christ the Lord that those believing in Him shall together break and eat bread and drink of the cup, with the view of remembering Him or of proclaiming His death; and this must continue until He returns."¹ Christ instituted this rite, because the remembrance of His death is the remembrance of the most arduous part of His saving work. The Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinistic doctrines of the Supper are expressly characterised as erroneous (p. 231), are controverted at length, and in opposition to them the symbolic doctrine is shown to be the correct one (p. 238 f.). Nowhere is any prominence given to a religious element; the ceremony of breaking of bread is the confession of Christ and the remembrance of Him. There now follow—still under the head of the prophetic office—the two chapters on the promise of eternal life (pp. 243-248) and the Holy Spirit (pp. 248-259). The forgiveness of sins here occupies only a subordinate place; for it is simply a result of the Christian life. The proposition: "in eternal life there is included at the same time forgiveness of sins"² (p. 243) corresponds with ancient Christianity as it developed itself from the days of the Apologists, but it is opposed to the Pauline-Lutheran thought: "Where forgiveness of sins is, there is life and peace." On the other hand, it is a primitive Christian thought, for the assertion of which great credit is due to Socinianism, that the obtaining of the Holy Spirit (consecutio spiritus s.) precedes eternal life (vita aeterna) and produces it. Faustus re-discovered this thought as a biblical theologian, and gave an excellent formal unfolding of it. But how can the meaning of this "obtaining of the Holy Spirit" be correctly and impressively stated, if forgiveness of sins is still left entirely out of view, or is taken account of only as a factor in eternal life?³ This life itself is described (p. 245) in the most super-

¹ "Est Christi domini institutum, ut fideles ipsius panem simul frangant et comedant et ex calice bibant, ipsius commemorandi seu mortem ejus annunciandi causa: quod permanere in adventum ipsius oportet."

² "In vita aeterna simul comprehensa est peccatorum remissio."

³ Certainly at p. 244, and previous to the description of eternal life, a definition of forgiveness of sins is given, which seems to embrace very much. But, first, it quite hangs in the air (it is given without any indication of the connection with what precedes or what follows); and, secondly, it entirely omits any reference to Christ
ficial way—it appears as the dregs of the old ecclesiastical dogmatic: "a life that is at no time to come to an end, that is to be spent evermore in delight and divine happiness in heaven itself with God and Christ and the blessed angels." \(^1\) Eternal life cannot be described otherwise, if it is not estimated by the dread and unrest of the soul which, without Christ, finds in the thought of God only death. Instead of entering into the religious meaning of eternal life, the Catechism occupies itself with the juvenile Scholastic questions, whether eternal life was already promised in the Old Testament, whether even the men living before Christ could attain to blessedness, etc. On the other hand, in the section on the gift of the Holy Ghost, there is pointed out by Faustus in the New Testament much more than he was himself in a position to understand. There is an infringement of his scheme—"the outer word of Scripture and reason"—when it is said (p. 251) that even the former can indeed give rise to a certain confidence in God, "nevertheless for implanting in our souls a firmer and more certain hope, in the power of which we shall be able to continue unsubdued amidst all temptations, it seems required that the promise set before us from without by the Gospel shall be sealed within by God through the Holy Spirit." \(^2\) But how disillusioned we are by what immediately follows, which shows that the Holy Spirit is only given to him who already believes the Gospel (p. 252). Faith therefore is man's own peculiar work, and is always something preliminary: for faith the Holy Spirit is not necessary. Here again we have the clearest evidence that the fundamental spirit of the Socinians is Catholic, and this impression is not weakened when immediately afterwards a keen polemic is

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1. "Vita nullo tempore finienda, gaudio ac voluptate prorsus divina in ipsis coelis cum deo et Christo beatissque angelis agenda."

2. "Veruntamen ad inservandam animis nostris firmiorem et certiorum spem, ejus virtute in omnibus tentationibus invicti subsistamus, videtur requiri, ut ea promissio exterius per evangelium proposita, interius a deo in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum obsignetur."
carried on against Catholicism on the ground of its regarding the Holy Spirit as a person (p. 253 sq.).

Very loosely attached to these discussions of the commands and promises of Christ, as forming the content of His prophetic office, are five excursus, “on the confirmation of the divine will” (pp. 259-261), “on the death of Christ” (pp. 261-288), “on faith” (pp. 288-293), “on free will” (pp. 293-316), and “on justification” (pp. 316-319).1 We see here distinctly the effort to bring the whole material under the head of Christ’s office as Teacher. The corroboration of the revelation of the divine will is to be sought for (1) in the sinlessness of Jesus, (2) in His miracles, (3) in His death. The necessity for His death is proved (p. 261 f.) on various grounds, from which—Scripture being followed—there are not absent His “having died for our sins” (“mortuum esse pro peccatis nostris”), the establishment of faith in the forgiveness of sins, and the preservation of men from the heaviest penalties. But the chief thing is, that Christ had to demonstrate His doctrine under the most difficult circumstances, and on that account sealed it by the most ignominious death. But from this point the line of argument passes at once to the resurrection; the death of Christ yields “confirmation of the divine will” (“confirmatio divinae voluntatis”), only because the death was followed by the resurrection. To the objection, “I perceive that in the work of our salvation more depends on the resurrection than on the death of Christ,”2 the reply is given (not without ground in Scripture), “to this extent, certainly, that the death of Christ would have been useless and ineffectual, unless it had been followed by Christ’s resurrection.”3 But why, then, does Scripture frequently derive everything from the death? “Because even the death of Christ, the Son of God, in itself, when the re-awakening by resurrection takes place, has henceforth a pre-eminent and unique power in procuring for us salvation, as we have shown

1 “De confirmatione divinae voluntatis,” “de morte Christi,” “de fide,” “de libero arbitrio,” “de justificatione.”
2 “Plus in resurrectione quam in Christi morte situm esse in nostrae salutis negotio, perspicio.”
3 “Hactenus sane, quatenus mors Christi inutilis et inefficax futura fuisset, nisi eam consecuta fuisset Christi resurrectio” (p. 267).
(but that has been shown only very vaguely). Then, because it was the way to the resurrection and exaltation of Christ; for the former could not be attained by Him without death, owing to the nature of the case, nor could the latter, owing to the counsel and arrangement of God. And, lastly, because among all the things which God and Christ did for the sake of our salvation, Christ's death was by far the most arduous work, and the most evident token of the love of God and of Christ for us.”

This solution is by no means obvious; why is death a proof of love? The Catechism does not enter more minutely into this, but now directs itself against the doctrine of penal satisfaction (p. 268 sq.). It is well known that this point was brought out in the keenest light by the Socinians.

In his “Praelectiones theologicae,” Faustus has contested in an exhaustive way the necessity and possibility of satisfaction, i.e., he has controverted the thought in the same way in which it had been formerly framed. Just here, however, he only required to continue the work of the later Scholasticism, to which nothing had become more uncertain than the rational interpretation of the value of Christ’s death by the thought of a strictly necessary equivalent. Faustus contested the necessity of satisfaction from the basis of his Scotistic conception of God: God is by no means required by His nature to punish sin, and on that account to impose a penalty in all cases, even though it be on the innocent; He stands, rather, above all compulsion, and in virtue of His absoluteness can act as He will. Even Scripture says that He is sometimes wrathful, sometimes pitiful, but in the New Testament His unfathomable mercy is proclaimed. Least of all can we deduce satisfaction from His

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1. “Propterea quod et ipsa per se Christi filii dei mors, resurrectione animata, eximiam prorsus et singularem vim habet in comparanda nobis salute, ut ostendimus. Deinde quod via fuerit ad resurrectionem et exaltationem Christi. Ad illum enim per rei naturam, ad hanc per dei consilium et constitutionem sine morte pervenire non poluit. Denique quod ex omnibus, quæ deus et Christus nostræ salutis causa fecit, mors Christi opus fuerit maxime arduum et caritatis erga nos dei et Christi evidentissimum argumentum.”

2. See Fock, l.c., p. 615 ff. Ritschl, l.c., p. 316 ff. In his system of Christian doctrine, Strauss adopted almost all the arguments of the Socinians. In more recent times Philippi especially has tried to controvert in detail the Socinian theses.
righteousness; for to punish the innocent for the guilty is unrighteous. Neither can a necessity for penalty be derived from the nature of sin; for in relation to God sin is an injury done to His honour; but such injury can be unconditionally overlooked. But the idea of satisfaction is, further, an impossible one, as it leads to pure contradictions; for (I.) remission and satisfaction are mutually exclusive; if God has remitted sin, He requires no satisfaction; if He accepts satisfaction, there is no need of remission, since, in this case, the debtor is only under an illusion; (II.) but even assuming that remission and satisfaction could exist together, yet in this case satisfaction in the sense of substitution is excluded; for (1) one can take over fines imposed on another, but not penalties that are personal, and that culminate in the penalty of death; in this case transference is unrighteousness. No doubt innocent persons frequently suffer with the guilty; yet if that has not been brought about through being involved in the sin of the guilty, such suffering is not penal suffering. But neither can it be asserted that Christ suffered as the representative and head of humanity; for He did not as yet bear that character during the period of His earthly life, nor has His suffering death exempted anyone from death; (2) Christ’s positive fulfilment of the law can have no substitutionary worth, for to this Christ was morally bound, and His fulfilment of the law secures exemption for no one; (3) the supposition that Christ both suffered substitutionally, and fulfilled the law substitutionally, contains contradictory elements, for if the one thing took place, there was no further need of the other taking place; (III.) but even if the vicarious penal suffering were possible, it would not attain its end, i.e., it would not provide an actual equivalent; for (1) an individual equivalent can always have validity only for an individual case, not for the guilt of all men; a single death is a substitute only for one death; (2) it was necessary that the representative should really die the eternal death, but Christ was raised up; (3) if it is urged against this that Christ was God, and therefore His suffering has an infinite worth for God, it must be said that on that assumption there was no need that God should subject Him to so much distress, because even the smallest suffering of
the God-man would in that case have been enough; but the appeal to the Godhead of Christ is lacking in force, because the Godhead is not capable of suffering. If the Godhead of Christ is nevertheless taken into the calculation, yet we may not on that account deify also the suffering itself, which was displayed in temporary and finite acts. This suffering must be estimated as finite, and hence it would have been necessary that the Godman should take upon Him an infinite number of satisfactions; (IV.) the notions of vicarious satisfaction and of imputation are mutually exclusive; that is to say, where the former has been rendered, everything further is excluded, the acceptance (acceptatio) is itself implied in the satisfaction; if the orthodox doctrine asserts in reply to this, that God accepts the work of Christ on our behalf by an act of grace (acceptilatio), then His work is no satisfaction; for there is “acceptilatio” only where no equivalent work is offered. Therefore the doctrine that God reckons the satisfaction of Christ only to faith destroys the whole scheme of vicarious penal suffering; for Christ by no means wrought a perfect satisfaction, if it has only conditional validity; (V.) the doctrine of vicarious penal suffering blunts the conscience, leads easily to moral laxity, and checks the efforts of the will to fulfil the divine law; (VI.) this doctrine is not contained in Scripture, and is in antagonism to clear passages of Scripture (Cat. p. 270: “The Scriptures testify everywhere, but especially in the New Testament, that God gratuitously remits to men their sins; but nothing is more opposed to gratuitous remission than a satisfaction of such a kind as they wish”¹). On the other hand, Faustus, like Duns and the Nominalists, will not exclude the thought of the merit of Christ as bearing upon our guilt. This merit, however, does not come within the system of duty and action which is imposed upon us.² Faustus was not confuted by the orthodox, in so far as

¹ “Scripture passim deum peccata hominibus gratuito remittere testantur, potissimum vero sub novo foedere: at remissioni gratuitae nil adversatur magis, quam ejusmodi qualem volunt satisfactio.”

² See Ritschl, l.c., p. 319, whom I have followed also in reproducing the criticism of the satisfaction doctrine by Faustus: “If the strict sense of the conception of duty is to have its validity maintained, then—for Faustus—all merit of Christ for Himself and for us is excluded. ‘Nihil fecit, quod ipsi a deo injunctum non fuisset. Ubi
he demonstrated the worthlessness of the *juristic* thought-material with which they worked. But even in other respects his contemporaries were unable to controvert him, because they themselves did not clearly discern the tendencies of the form of doctrine that had come to them traditionally, and hence were as little able to correct the mistakes in their mode of building up doctrine as to bring its excellences successfully to view. In falling back upon the position that the qualities of righteousness and mercy exist in God with equal claims, they guarded, indeed, the holiness of the law of the good, but did not find escape from contradictions.

The appended section *on faith* is introduced with the idea, that, now that the commands and promises have become known, a statement must follow on the way in which one has to "adjust" himself to them. This way, it is said (p. 288), is *faith*, "by which we both embrace with our soul the promises of Christ, and henceforth seek, to the best of our ability, to keep His precepts." Yet the Catholic notion of faith forthwith appears in what is added: "which faith both makes our obedience more acceptable and well-pleasing to God, and supplies the defects of our obedience, provided it is sincere and earnest, and brings it about that we are justified by God." Thus it is the actual obedience debitum, *ibi nullum verum et proprium meritum*. Thus it is only in a sense different from the proper one that the conception can be applied, what is presupposed being a particular divine decree and divince promise. Now as the latter adds nothing to what is understood as dutifulness of action, it can only give rise to the conception of merit when in estimating action, not the dutifulness, but—by way of exception—the voluntariness is taken into account. This thought comes to coincide substantially with the definition of the conception given by Duns and by Calvin. And although Faustus opposes the latter, in so far as he relates—as Thomas did—the proper conception of merit to the legal estimation of an action, yet he was at one with Calvin in actually admitting the merit of Christ. This is a new proof that the conceptions of the merit and of the satisfaction of Christ are derived from quite different modes of view. Satisfaction is derived from the presupposition of a reciprocal relationship that rests upon a purely legal order; merit from a reciprocal relationship which is moral, but is not conceived of from the highest point of view of law and duty."

1 "*Per quam et promissa Christi animo complectitur et porro praecepta ejus pro virili exsequimur.*"

2 "*Quae fides et obedientiam nostram deo commendationem gratioremque facit et obedientiae defectus, modo ea sit vera ac seria, supplet, utque a deo justificemur efficit.*"
that is the matter that mainly decides. This view is carried out in the strictest possible way. No trace is to be found of the evangelical attitude; for the appended remark, that God overlooks the deficiency of obedience for the sake of faith, also contains a good Catholic thought. Catholicism puts in place of this, submission to the Church, the fides implicita. This was discarded by Socinianism; but it, too, substitutes for it a performance—the performance, namely, of faith. Thus it does not pass beyond the Catholic system of things. This system it endorses even in the details of its doctrinal deductions; e.g. (p. 288): "faith in Christ is taken in a two-fold sense; for sometimes it denotes that faith on which alone, unless something still further is added, salvation does not follow; sometimes that faith on which alone salvation follows."1 In the first case there is meant faith without obedience, in the second case faith and the works of love. The section on free will is here inserted, in order to place over against the God of absolutism man with his empty freedom, and in order to abolish the Augustinian-Thomistic doctrines of predestination and original sin.2 In

1 "Fides in Christum duplici ratione sumitur; interdum enim notat eam fidem, quam solam, nisi adhuc aliquid alius accedat, salus non consequitur; interdum eam quam solam salus consequitur."

2 See p. 294: "Lapsus Adae, cum unus actus fuerit, vim eam, qua deprivare ipsam naturam Adami, multo minus vero posterorum ipsius posset, habere non potuit ... non negamus tamen assiduitate peccandi naturam hominum labi quaedam et al peccandum nimia proclivitate infectam esse, sed eam peccatum per se esse negamus." As in the case of the Nominalists, the divine factor is only admitted as divinum auxilium, as exterius (Holy Scripture), moreover, and interius. The way in which the doctrine of the ordo salutis is wrought out quite resembles the way strenuously maintained at that time by the Jesuits in opposition to Thomism. Of the doctrine of predestination it is affirmed (p. 300): "totam religionem corrure facit et deo multa inconvenientia attribuit." The chief passages usually appealed to in support of predestination are minutely treated in the Catechism, and got rid of in the desired way by exegetical art. The criticism of the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination became everywhere the starting-point during the last third of the sixteenth century, when what was contemplated was to weaken the confessional system of doctrine and to make the demand for a real toleration arising from the nature of the subject itself. See Coehnbert's criticism as quoted by Dilthey (Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Philos., Vol. 5. p. 491 ff.), Arminius and his disciples, etc. Yet it must not be forgotten that even the consciousness of election itself gave rise, in one branch of the believers in it, to the idea of toleration, or of the rights of the individual. Only the former, however, saw it to be demanded that religious peace should be established "through setting up universal principles of right and providing a simplified, general church theology."
the section on justification it is not the Catholic conception that makes its appearance, though that was necessarily to be expected after the explanation given of faith, but—strikingly enough—an evangelical view, deteriorated in the direction of laxity, and sadly perverted (p. 316): "there is justification when God regards us as righteous, or deals with us as if we had been quite righteous and innocent (!). But His way of doing this under the new covenant is by remitting our sins, and giving us eternal life."¹ This definition seems to fall entirely out of the lines of the fundamental Socinian view. Yet we must remember here, that even Pelagius paid reverence to the special character of the Christian religion. The Socinian proposition can only be understood when we (1) consider that the Socinians could not entirely break with Paulinism, and (2) take into account that justification meant very little for them. The chief thing is the obedience which gives proof of itself in fulfilment of the law. Side by side with this stands—as a special feature of the Christian religion—the promise of God to overlook certain defects in that obedience on the part of Christians. At this point the contact with Paulinism is sought for, and the term justification, as denoting forgiveness of sins, is introduced. More than this, however, is not done by the Catechism. It is satisfied when in three lines it has in a way included justification in its inventory. To say anything more regarding it is deemed unnecessary; for the two pages which are elsewhere devoted to justification, deal with the unimportant question as to whether even the Pre-Christian fathers were justified.

4. The brevity of the chapters that still follow ("on the priestly office of Christ," pp. 320-331, "on the kingly office of Christ," pp. 331-339, "on the Church," pp. 340-355),² is in itself a proof that the religious doctrine has been virtually concluded when there has been explained the prophetic office of Christ ("praeepta et promissa dei"). But as these headings had to be taken up (according to holy Scripture), much is set forth

¹ "Justificatio est, cum nos deus pro justis habet seu ita nobis cum agit, ac si justi et innocentes plane fuissemus. Id vero ea ratione sub novo foedere facit, ut nobis et peccata remittat et nos vita aeterna donet."

² "De munere Christi sacerdotali," "de munere Christi regio," "de ecclesia."
which does not fit into the doctrine, but as Biblical material traverses it. This is especially apparent in the section on the high-priestly office. Here the Catechism has not only emphasised the perpetual priesthood of Christ on the ground of the Epistle to the Hebrews (p. 320 f.), but has also adopted the thought of the perpetual "expiation of sins by Christ in Heaven"\(^1\) (p. 321 sq.): "Jesus carries on in Heaven the expiation of our sins, inasmuch as He liberates us from the penalties of sins by the virtue of His death, which he endured for our sins according to the will of God. For a victim so precious, and an obedience so great as that of Christ, have the perpetual power before God of defending from the penalties of sins (as in Catholicism, the penalty, not the guilt, is the heaviest burden) us who believe in Christ and who have died with Christ that we may not live unto sin; further, inasmuch as He perpetually guards us by His power, which He obtained in its fulness and absoluteness from the Father, and by His intercession wards off from us the wrath of God, which was wont to be poured out upon the wicked, this being what Scripture designates His appearing for us; then He frees us from the slavery of sin itself, inasmuch as He binds us over to Himself, partly by that same death which He suffered for us, partly by showing us in His own person what is obtained by him who has avoided sin."\(^2\)

It is expressly emphasised that only through His rising again has Christ become the heavenly Priest in the full sense. In the section on the kingly office it is first shown that Christ did not raise Himself (p. 333 sq.). This proof claims—very suggestively—the largest space; it is followed only by unimportant explanations as to the nature of the resurrection body of Christ, the

\(^1\) "Expiatio peccatorum per Christum in caelis."

\(^2\) "Jesus in caelis expiationem peccatorum nostrorum peragit, dum a peccatorum poenis nos liberat virtute mortis sua, quam pro peccatis nostris ex dei voluntate subiit. Victima enim tam preciosa tantaque Christi obedientia perpetuum coram deo vim habet, nos qui in Christum credimus et Christo commortui sumus, ne peccatis vivamus, a peccatorum poenis defendendi; porro dum potestate sua, quam a patre plenam et absolutam consecutus est, perpetuo nos tuetur et iram dei, quam in impios effundi consuevit, intercessione sua a nobis asce, quod scriptura interpellationem pro nobis appellat; deinde ab ipsorum peccatorum servitute nos liberat, dum nos sibi mancipat, partim morte idem illa sua quam pro nobis perpessus est, partim in sua ipsius persona nobis ostendendo, quid consequatur is qui a peccando destitit."
ascension, and the sitting at the right hand of God. In a few
words the dominion of Christ over all beings and things is then
described. Finally, the last section—on the Church—falls into
four short chapters. In the first, the visible Church is defined
(p. 340) as "the community of those men who hold and profess
the saving doctrine," i.e., as a School. Every other mark is
expressly set aside; "there is no reason why thou shouldst
inquire into the marks of the Church" (with the exception of
the saving doctrine.) The question as to what the true doctrine
is, is answered by pointing to this Catechism with all that it
contains. In the second chapter the government of the Church
is dealt with (p. 342), "that order rests on the offices of persons
to whom the Church of Christ is committed, and on carefully
seeing and observing that individual persons fulfil their offices."
There are now distinguished, in accordance with Scripture,
Apostles, Prophets, Evangelists, Teachers, Pastors (Bishops),
Presbyters and Deacons. In the course of exposition the
offices of Teachers, Bishops and Presbyters are dealt with as
one, and it is said of the Apostles, Evangelists, and Prophets,
that with its cause their existence has ceased. Hence only
Pastors and Deacons remain. The doctrine of Episcopal succes-
sion is combated (p. 346); nothing is said of Ordination. In the
third chapter ("de disciplina ecclesiae Christi") follows a state-
ment of the main principles of ecclesiastical discipline, well
established from the Bible, which ends by showing that the
power to bind and loose is to be regarded as the "right of de-
claring and announcing according to the Word of God, who are,
and who are not worthy to be in the Church, or to be members
of it" (p. 351). The Catechism closes with the chapter

1 "The Italians have a liking for free unions and academies of a socio-scientific
character." During the whole time of its existence Socinianism had mainly the form
of a theological academy.
2 "Nihil est, cur de notis ecclesie queras" (excepta salutari doctrina).
3 The current orthodox idea of the Church in Protestantism, and the Socinian, are
therefore identical.
4 "Ordo situs est in officis personarum, quibus ecclesia Christi constat, et in
accurata animadversione et observatione, ut singulae personae officis suis fungantur."
5 "Jus declarandi et denunciandi secundum dei verbum, qui sit dignus, qui non,
ut sit in ecclesia seu membrum ecclesie."
“on the invisible Church” (p. 352 sq.). Here again the Catholic mode of view is very striking. The exposition begins by saying, that Holy Scripture “scarcely anywhere” distinguishes a company of truly pious men (“coetus vere piorum hominum”) from the visible Church, since all truly pious men also belong to the visible Church; yet it is to be admitted that the latter is often spoken of as being everything it ought to be, while really it is not. Therefore we can frame the conception of a Church as denoting “a certain multitude of truly pious men, together with the union that is among them, which, in a certain figurative and metaphorical sense may be legitimately called a Church, for truly pious men, scattered here and there or even remaining hid, if indeed true piety allows them to be hid (!), can only in an improper sense be called a Church.”\(^2\) Taken in this guarded way, the conception of the invisible Church is accepted. With regard to it the assertion is made, that by it, that is by all who truly believe in Christ and obey Him, is represented in the most perfect way the body of Christ. This Church, however, is invisible, because faith and true piety cannot be seen with the bodily eye; but even from “outward actions” (“factis exterioribus”) it can only be established that one is not a member of Christ, but not that he is. With this the Catechism concludes, there being added the exhortation (p. 355): “I have now set before thee all things that could conceivably be said by me regarding this matter; what remains for thee is that, having honestly come to perceive them and know them, thou shalt fix them in thy mind and regulate thy life in the way prescribed by them.”\(^3\)

\(^1\) Of course if every vere pius must be a schoolmaster it is unlikely that he will remain hidden.

\(^2\) “Quedam hominum vere piorum multitudo ac eorum inter sese conjunctio, quam per similitudinem quandam et metaphoram ecclesiam appellare liceat, nam vere pius hinc inde dispersi vel etiam latentes, si modo vera pietas latere sinat, non nisi improprie ecclesia dici possunt.”

\(^3\) “Jam omnia quae a me compendio dici hac de re potuere tibi exposui: tum est ut iis probe perceptis atque cognitis ei menti infigas et secundum eorum prescriptum vitam instituas.”
In modern Catholicism we have the neutralising, in Socinianism the *self-disintegration* of dogma; the preceding course of exposition will have shown that in its fundamental nature the latter is nothing else than the Nominalist doctrine, with its principle logically carried out. As the Anabaptists and the pantheistic mystics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are mediæval phenomena, though they are not unaffected by the spirit of a more modern age, the Socinians are not the "Ultra's of the Reformation," but the successors of the Scotists.

But the development of dogma along Nominalistic lines has here come to its conclusion; dogma is dissolved. Certainly as in every case of disintegration there are not wanting residuary products. Adoptian, Arian, Pelagian motives and doctrines, which seemed to have been subdued by dogma, make their appearance again, and the strict holding to Scripture as the source and authority for faith and for the system of Christian doctrine, makes it seem even as if Socinianism held a very conservative attitude. Nevertheless the breach with history, and with what had hitherto been called dogma is evident. Nominalism adhered to the living authority of the Church, *indeed in this adherence it gave expression to its religious conviction*, even though the validity of this conviction had to be purchased by renouncing a homogeneous view of God and the world. Socinianism overcame the scepticism of Nominalism that sprang from religious requirements; it is no longer, like Nominalism, divided within itself—it is *dogmatistic* indeed—; but while throwing off the authority of Church and tradition, it at the same time greatly lost power to understand and to feel what religion is: its "doctrines of faith," so confidently proclaimed, are, so far as they are homogeneously and strictly drawn up, nothing else than the dogmatism of the so-called sound human understanding, to which the Bible commends itself, when it is dealt with rationally.

And yet Socinianism is by no means simply a mediæval, or, for that part, only a pathological phenomenon; it is seen also, rather, to be a product of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and represents a powerful advance in the history of religion, though it is only an indirect one. We can sum up what it
accomplished in the following theses: (1) it acquired the laudable courage to *simplify* the question as to the nature and import of the Christian religion, to throw off, in spite of Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists, the burden of the past, to reduce to fragments by means of the understanding the system of dogma, itself the work of mis-directed understanding,\(^1\) and to restore to the individual the freedom to interrogate in the controversy about the Christian religion simply the classic records and himself; (2) it relaxed the close relationship between religion and world-knowledge which had been formed by the tradition of the ancient Church and sanctioned by dogma, and sought to substitute ethics for metaphysics as a foil for religion. Certainly it had poor enough success in that; metaphysics as a matter of fact was only attenuated, not improved or checked by it. Nevertheless it was certainly a powerful antagonist of the Platonism of the Church doctrine, and made its own contributions towards breaking the supremacy of that system; (3) it helped to prepare the way for its being perceived that religion may not find its expression in unintelligible paradoxes and contradictions, but that it must reach the point of well-defined and approved declarations, which derive their force from their clearness;\(^2\) finally (4) it delivered the study of Holy Scripture from the ban of dogma and itself made a good beginning with a sound, historical exegesis. It is not difficult, certainly, in view of all these merits of Socinianism enumerated here to prove also the opposite, *i.e.*, to show how through the same tendencies it rather strengthened old errors. But it is enough to reach the certitude that all these merits really belonged to it. Its having restricted, and in some measure cancelled, their power, must not hinder us from attributing them to it. Chiefly through the medium of Arminianism, but also directly, it helped to

\(^1\) The history of dogma cannot, as a history of "illuminism" may do, stop short with the negative achievements of a school. Were that allowed, then Socinianism, with its methodical criticism and its freedom from prepossessions regarding all Church tradition, could not be too highly praised.

\(^2\) Dilthey, l.c., Vol. 6, p. 88 f.: "What was epoch-making in Socinianism lies in the clear, sharp, and distinct carrying out of the principle, that the new Protestant Christianity must *justify* itself before the Humanistic, Erasmic, 'historico-critical, formal and moral reason of the great century eager for progress."
introduce Illuminism (Aufklärung), in the good, and in the bad sense of the word, into Protestantism.

In the history of religion—taking the expression in the strictest sense—Socinianism was on the other hand simply a step backwards. For so far from its having to be placed here alongside Protestantism, it was rather a further under-bidding of Catholicism, even of the poorest form of it. That the Christian religion is faith, that it is a relation between person and person, that it is therefore higher than all reason, that it lives, not upon commands and hopes, but upon the power of God, and apprehends in Jesus Christ the Lord of Heaven and earth as Father—of all this Socinianism knew nothing. Along with the old dogma Christianity as religion was well-nigh completely set aside by it; guilt and repentance, faith and grace were conceptions that were not entirely discarded, merely from a happy want of logical thoroughness—and on account of the New Testament. It is in this logical inconclusiveness that the Christian quality of Socinianism mainly lies.
CHAPTER IV.

THE ISSUES OF DOGMA IN PROTESTANTISM.

(i) Introduction.¹

At the close of the first chapter of this Book (E.T. Vol. V., Chap. I.) it has been pointed out in what sense, and to what extent, the Reformation has to be treated within the lines of the history of dogma; it must be dealt with as the issue of dogma, and as its legitimate issue too. In the two issues brought under notice up to this point, the real religious interests which cooperated in giving an outline and shape to dogma had serious injury done to them—in Catholicism, in so far as they were completely overborne by the domination of the empirical church—in Socinianism, in so far as they were almost absorbed by moralism. In the one case the dogma was conserved, but the personal, conscious faith, which was to correspond with it, was weakened by submission to the Church; in the other case dogma was discarded, but there was at the same time a failure

¹In the Neue Kirchliche Zeitung, 1891, Part I., Kübel (†) has subjected to a keen criticism the sketch of the Christian and theological position of Luther that was given in the first edition of this book. I have found no reason on that account to alter my statement, but herewith refer readers to that criticism. On the details of Luther's doctrines I shall not enter, partly because that would not be in keeping with the aim of this work, partly because my theological interest does not lead me so far as to follow all these discussions with personal sympathy, or with criticism. Besides, I see that Luther's decisive importance easily becomes lost to view, when an effort is made to describe all his "doctrines." The concise and accurate way in which Loofs, in his History of Dogma, has delineated a number of Lutheran doctrines in their growth, is worthy of all admiration. In Herrmann's Book, "The Communion of the Christian with God, described on the lines of Luther" (1880, 1st ed.; 1896, 3rd ed.), and in Thieme's work, "The Impulsive Moral Power of Faith, an Inquiry into Luther's Theology" (1895), we have two model instances of the way in which the details of Luther's thought can be made intelligible and suggestive when looked at from a comprehensive point of view.

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to recognise the peculiar character of religious faith. Post-
Tridentine Catholicism and Socianism are in many respects modern phenomena; but this is not true of them when we deal with their religious kernel; they are rather the further conclusions of medieval Christianity. The Reformation on the other hand, as represented in the Christianity of Luther, is in many respects an Old Catholic, or even a medieval phenomenon, while if it be judged of in view of its religious kernel, this cannot be asserted of it, it being rather a restoration of Pauline Christianity in the spirit of a new age.¹

In making this statement there is assigned to the Reformation (the Christianity of Luther) its position in history, while at the same time its relation to dogma is determined. From here also we can see why the Reformation cannot be estimated simply by the results which it achieved for itself during the two first generations of its existence. How can any one deny, then, that Catholicism, after it had roused itself to become a counter-Reformation, and that Socianism stood, for more than a century, in a closer relation to the new age than Lutheran Protestantism did?² They worked in alliance with all the culturing influences of the period; and poets, humanists, men of learning, discoverers, kings, and statesmen, soon felt where their proper place was if they were nothing else than scholars and statesmen. At the cradle of the Reformation, certainly, it was not sung that it would one day lag behind the times. It was rather greeted at its birth with the joyful acclamations of the nation, encircled with the shouts of humanists and patriots. But this its more immediate future was already foreshadowed in him from whom alone its future was to be expected—namely,

¹ "In the spirit of a new age"—this also means that primitive Christianity was not copied, nay, that there was a passing beyond its lines at important points.

² Hence, too, the numerous instances of Protestants, especially of learned Protestants, reverting to Catholicism, down to the days of Christina of Sweden, and indeed after that time. The first Continental Protestant who had the distinct feeling that the Confession had become seriously marred was Calixtus of Helmstadt, who had travelled much. But even the mystics among the Lutherans in the first half of the seventeenth century make it apparent that they felt the Scholastic narrowing of the Confession to be burdensome (see Ritschl, Gesch. des Pietismus, Vol. II.). But neither they nor Calixtus found the right means of deliverance.
in Luther. It is not the furthest possible advance beyond the average of an age that makes the truly great man, but the power with which he can awaken a new life in existing society.¹

What is at least a very one-sided and abstract view of Luther is taken, when we honour in him the man of the new time, the hero of an aspiring age, or the creator of the modern spirit. If we wish to contemplate such heroes, we must turn to Erasmus and his associates, or to men like Denck, Franck, Servede, and Bruno. In the periphery of his existence Luther was an Old Catholic, a mediæval phenomenon. For a period, certainly—it was only for a few years—it seemed as if this spirit would attract to itself and mould into a wonderful unity all that at the time had living vigour in it, as if to him as to no one before the power had been given to make his personality the spiritual centre of the nation and to summon his century into the lists, armed with every weapon.

Yet that was only a splendid episode, which for the time being came rapidly to an end. Certainly those years from 1519 till about 1523 were the most beautiful years of the Reformation, and it was a wonderful providential arrangement that all that was to be achieved, the whole task of the future, was taken in hand forthwith by Luther himself and was close on being accomplished by him. Still, this rich spring-time was followed by no abundant summer. In those years Luther was lifted above himself, and seemed to transcend the limits of his peculiar individuality—he was the Reformation, inasmuch as he summed up in himself what was at once implied in the return to Pauline Christianity and in the founding of a new age. At that time the alliance also was concluded between Protestantism and

¹ The complement of this observation is to be found in the beautiful words Dilthey has applied to Luther (Archiv. f. Gesch. der Philos., Vol. V., Part 3, p. 355 f.): "Nowhere as yet has history spoken in favour of the ideal of a morality without religion. New active forces of will, so far as we observe, have always arisen in conjunction with ideas about the unseen. But the fruitful novelty within this domain always arises from the historical connection itself, on the basis of the religiousness of a departing age, just as one condition of life emerges from another. For it is only when dissatisfaction arises for the genuinely religious man from the innermost and deepest religious and moral experience within the existing union, on the basis of the altered state of consciousness, that an impulse and direction are given for the new. So it was also with Luther” (see also l.c., p. 368).
Germany. It is true, no doubt, that evangelical Christianity has been given to mankind, and, on the other hand, that the German spirit is even to-day far from having surrendered itself yet to Protestantism; nevertheless, Protestantism and Germany are inseparably connected. As the Reformation saved the German Empire in the sixteenth century, so it still continues always to be its strongest force, its permanently working principle and its highest aim.

But it is given to no man to accomplish everything, and every one whose work is lasting and who does not merely blaze forth like a meteor, must retire within the limits appointed to his nature. Luther also retired within those peculiar to him. Those limits were not merely slight integuments, as some would have us believe, so that for his having become narrowed we should have to throw the whole blame on Melanchthon and the Epigones with their want of understanding; Luther felt them to be with other things the roots of his power, and in this character allowed them to have their effect.

But when the problem is contemplated of giving a picture of this peculiar individuality of Luther, and reckoning up as it were the sum of his existence, it must be said that no one as yet has perfectly fulfilled this task. A representation of Luther can only be given when he is allowed himself to speak and to express himself in every line of his spiritual constitution; this Luther can be reproduced within us in sympathetic feeling, so far as this is possible for more limited spirits; but the attempt to analyse seems to involve us in insoluble contradictions. Yet the attempt must be made, if the complicated and in part confused legacy he has left behind is to be rightly understood, and if we are to master the problem that is forced upon those coming after him by his appearing in an age in many respects foreign to him.

He was only in one thing great and powerful, captivating and irresistible, the master of his age, marching victoriously ahead of the history of a thousand years with the view of inducing his generation to relinquish the paths that were being followed and to choose paths that were new—he was only great in the re-discovered knowledge of God which he derived from the gospel, i.e.,
from Christ. What had once been one of the motives in building up dogma, but had become unrecognisable in dogma, what had thereafter, from the time of Augustine on through the Middle Ages, accompanied dogma, vague in its expression, and with a vaguely recognised title, namely, the living faith in the God who in Christ addresses to the poor soul the words: “I am thy salvation” (“Salus tua ego sum”), the firm assurance that God is the Being on whom one can place reliance—that was the message of Luther to Christendom. The old Lutheran theologians introduced into their voluminous systems a chapter “on the vocation of Luther” (“de vocatione Lutheri”). For that they have been severely handled. But if we must read in a system of Christian theology about Adam, Abraham and David, we have a much greater right to welcome a paragraph about Luther.1

For what he restored was nothing less than the religious way of understanding the gospel, the sovereign right of religion in religion. In the development that had preceded him there had not been merely the making a mistake here and there; there had been a betrayal of religion to its enemies and to its friends. Luther spoke himself of a Babylonian captivity, and he was

1 At lofty moments of his life Luther spoke like a prophet and evangelist. All intermediate conceptions and intermediary persons were transcended: “Your worshipful Highness the Elector knows, or if he does not know, let it be hereby declared to him, that I have the gospel, not from men, but only from heaven through our Lord Jesus Christ, so that I might very well have gloried in being, and written myself down as, a servant and evangelist, which I mean henceforward to do.” Such self-consciousness almost awakens misgivings; but it must not be overlooked that it is united with the greatest humility before God; it did not arise suddenly, much less in a visionary way, but it slowly developed itself from dealing with scripture and the religious possessions of the Church; it only makes its appearance, finally, in connection with the spirit, “If God is for us, who can be against us?” and does not intrude into the empirical ecclesiastical sphere to dictate laws there. It must be recognised, therefore, as the genuine expression of a religious freedom, of the kind described by Clement of Alexandria as the temper of the true Christian, and of the kind which the mysteries of all ages have sought in their own way to reach. But we search in vain throughout the whole of church history for men who could write such letters as that one to the Elector, and for writings like those composed by Luther in Coburg. I can very well understand how Catholic critics should find in those letters an “insane arrogance.” There really remains only the alternative that we pass this judgment upon Luther, or that we acknowledge that there belonged to him a special significance in the history of the Christian religion.
right in seeing this captivity both in the domination of an earthly, self-seeking ecclesiasticism over religion, and in the clinging around religion of a moralism that crushed its life. It may be remarked here at once, that he did not with equal distinctness perceive the deplorableness of that captivity into which religion had been brought by the Old Catholic theology. That was not merely because his historic horizon extended only to about the time of the origin of the Papal Church—but above all because dogma, the historic legacy of the period between the second and seventh centuries, was no longer the more immediate source from which there had flowed the wrong conditions he had to contend with in the present. In his day the old dogma was a thing lying dead, as has been sufficiently shown in the account we have already given. No one vitalised it for faith. When Luther therefore attacked the errors of theology, he directed himself almost exclusively against the Schoolmen and the Mediæval Aristotle. When he rated and ridiculed reason, it was these people as a rule whom he had in view; when he severed the baleful bond between religious doctrine and philosophy, he was turning his weapons against the Jesuits. In combating theology he combated the theology of the Middle Ages, and even this he combated only in so far as it ignored the honour of God and of Christ, the rights of God and the wrong done by the creature. Keeping out of view his controversy with the Anabaptists, he knew of no other controversy with reason than the controversy with self-righteousness, and with the shifts of the man who makes use even of religion to escape from his God.

What a wonderful linking together of things! The same man who delivered the gospel of Jesus Christ from ecclesiasticism and moralism strengthened its authority in the forms of the Old Catholic theology, nay, was the first to impart again to these forms meaning and importance for faith, after they had for long centuries remained inoperative. From the time of Athanasius there had been no theologian who had given so much living power

1 See Fr. Nitzsch's valuable study, Luther and Aristotle (1883). Pupper of Goch was a precursor of Luther in the radical rejection of philosophy and Scholasticism.
for faith to the doctrine of the Godhead of Christ as Luther did; since the time of Cyril no teacher had arisen in the Church for whom the mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ was so full of comfort as for Luther—"I have a better provider than all angels are: He lies in the cradle, and hangs on the breast of a virgin, but sits, nevertheless, at the right hand of God, the almighty Father"; no mystic philosopher of antiquity spoke with greater conviction and delight than Luther of the sacred nourishment in the Eucharist. The German Reformer restored life to the formulæ of Greek Christianity; he gave them back to faith. It is to be attributed to him that till the present day these formulæ are in Protestantism a living power for faith—yes, only in Protestantism. Here there is a living in them, a defending or contesting of them; but even those contesting them understand how to estimate their relative title. In the Catholic Churches they are a lifeless possession.

There is certainly injustice done to the "entire Luther" when this side of his significance as a Reformer—which to his own mind was knit in an indissoluble unity with the evangelical side—is dropped out of view or under-estimated. Luther was the restorer of the old dogma. He forced the interests of this on the teaching of his time, thereby also compelling it to desert the lines of the Humanist, Franciscan and political Christianity: the Humanist and Franciscan age was obliged to interest itself in what was most foreign to it—in the gospel and the old theology.¹

Indeed we may go a step further: Luther would at any moment have defended with fullest conviction the opening words of the Athanasian Creed: "Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic faith"

¹There is, in my opinion, no difference to be found in Luther at different periods. What he wrote (1541) in his pamphlet "Wider Hans Worst" (Erl. ed., Vol. 26, p. 15) in full agreement with the mediaval view of the "Twelve Articles" he could have written twenty years earlier: "No one can deny that we hold, believe, sing, and confess all things that correspond with the Apostles' Symbol, the old faith of the old Church, that we make nothing new therein, nor add anything thereto, and in this way we belong to the old Church and are one with it. . . . If anyone believes and holds what the old Church did, he is of the old Church." See also p. 35: "So the life here can certainly be sinful and unrighteous, nay, unhappily is all too unrighteous; but the doctrine must be certainly and absolutely without all sin."
Issues of Dogma in Protestantism

("Quicunque vult salvus esse, ante omnia opus est, ut teneat Catholicam fidem.") Not only does the Confession of Augsburg ratify the old dogma in its first article, the Smalcaldic Articles also begin with it: "regarding these articles there is no controversy between us and our opponents, since we confess them on both sides" ("de his articulis nulla est inter nos et adversarios controversia, quum illos utrinque confiteamus"); and if in the immediately succeeding article "on the office and work of Jesus Christ" ("de officio et opere Jesu Christi") it is then stated: "To depart from this article, or to condone or permit anything against it, is not possible for any of the pious" ("de hoc articulo cedere aut aliquid contra illum largiri autmitterere nemo piorum potest"), the article is not meant to be raised by an addition of the kind above those formerly named: the former were regarded by Luther so much as settled matters that he did not think of such a remark regarding them as being at all necessary. Of this also there can be no doubt—that the gospel was for him "saving doctrine, doctrine of the gospel." ("doctrina salutaris, doctrina evangelii"), which certainly included the old dogmas; the attempt to represent the matter otherwise has in my opinion been a failure: the gospel is sacred doctrine, contained in the Word of God, the purpose of which is to be learned, and to which there must be subjection.

How is it to be explained that in an age which had thrown dogma into the background, and in which the spirit of science and of criticism had grown so much stronger that it was already combated from various sides, Luther appeared as a defender of dogma and restored it to life again? To this question more than one answer can be given; one has been already stated: Luther fought against the abuses and errors of the middle ages. This answer can be still further expanded; Luther never contended against wrong theories and doctrines as such, but only against such theories and doctrines as manifestly did serious injury to the purity of the gospel, ("puritas evangelii") and to its

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1 One of the strongest passages is to be found in the "Kurzes Bekenntniss vom hl. Abendmahl" (1545. Erlangen Edition, XXXII, p. 415): "Therefore there must be a believing of everything, pure and simple, whole and entire, or a believing of nothing" (he refers to his doctrine of the Eucharist).
comforting power. The statement of this carries with it the other thing—namely, that there was no alliance between him and the bright-visioned spirits whose aim was to amend theology, and thereby to introduce a truer knowledge of the world and its causes. There was entirely wanting to him the irrepressible impulse of the thinker that urges him to secure theoretic clearness: nay, he had an instinctive dislike for, and an inborn mistrust of every spirit who, guided simply by knowledge, boldly corrected errors. Any one who thinks that here again he can at the present day be a defender of the "entire Luther," either does not know the man, or throws himself open to the suspicion that for him the truth of knowledge is a matter of small importance. That was the most palpable limitation in the spiritual nature of the Reformer,—that he neither fully made his own the elements of culture which his age offered, nor perceived the lawfulness and obligation of free investigation, nor knew how to measure the force of the critical objections against the "doctrine" that were then already asserting themselves. There may seem to be something paltry, or even indeed presumptuous in this remark; for Luther has indemnified us for this defect, not only by being a Reformer, but by the inexhaustible richness of his personality. What a wealth this personality included! How it possessed, too, in heroic shape all we have just found wanting at the time—a richness of original intuition which outweighed all the "elements of culture" in which it lacked, a certainty and boldness of vision which was more than "free investigation," a power to lay hold upon the untrue, to conserve what could stand the test, as compared with which all "critical objections" appear pointless and feeble; above all, a wonderful faculty for giving expression to strong feeling and true thought, for being really a speaker, and for persuading by means of the word as no prophet had done before! Yet all these powerful qualities were still incapable of securing for the coming generation a pure culture, because in Luther's own case they were not produced by the impulse to know things as they are. Certainly he had greater things to do than to correct science and promote general culture in the full breadth of its development; and we may be devoutly
thankful that we have had experience of such a man, who made all his activity subservient to the knowledge of the living God. But it is pure Romanticism and self-delusion when one devoutly admires the limitations of Luther's special individuality as being the best thing in him, and it is something worse than Romanticism and self-delusion when what was allowed in a hero, who did not reflect, but did what he was obliged to do, is raised to a general law for an age which, when it frankly and without hesitation applies itself to know the truth, likewise does what it is under obligation to do. And then—who really ventures to restore again the "entire Luther," with the coarseness of his medieaval superstition, the flat contradictions of his theology, the remarkable logic of his arguments, the mistakes of his exegesis and the unfairness and barbarisms of his polemic? Shall we forget, then, all that has been learned by us, but that was unknown to Luther—the requisite conditions of a true knowledge that is determined only by the matter dealt with, the relativity of historic judgment, the proportion of things and the better understanding of the New Testament? Is it not the case that the more strictly Christianity is conceived of as spiritual religion, the greater is its demand that it shall be in accord with the whole life of our spirit, and can it be honestly said that this accord is secured by the Christianity of Luther?

Yet it was not only his defective theoretic interest that led Luther to stop short before the old dogma, nor was it only his vague knowledge and imperfect understanding of the old Catholic period; the old dogma itself, rather, joined hands with the new conception of the gospel which he enunciated.1 Here also,

1 It has also been pointed out, that from the time of Justinian the old dogma introduced the book of civil law, that the legal protection which it promised was extended only to orthodoxy, and that, accordingly, every attack on the Trinity and Christology was at that time necessarily regarded as anarchism and threatened with the heaviest penalties. That is certainly correct, but I cannot discover that Luther ever thought of the serious consequences that would have followed for himself and his followers from opposition to the old dogma. So far as I see, he never went so far as to feel concerned about this, seeing that he adhered to the old dogma without wavering. Had the case been otherwise, he would certainly have shown the courage that was exhibited by Serveede. The same thing, unless I am mistaken, cannot be said of Melanchthon and Calvin. As to the former, it was also anxious reflections about matters of ecclesiastical and civil polity that led him to avoid those whose attitude
therefore, as everywhere, he was not regulated merely by external authorities; the inward agreement, rather, which he thought he found between his faith and that dogma prevented him becoming uncertain about the latter. In “faith” he sought only the honour of God and Christ; that was also done by the old formulæ of faith. In “faith” he would hear nothing of law, work, achievement and merit; the formulæ of faith were silent regarding these. For him the forgiveness of sins, as creating a holy Church and securing life and peace, was the main part of religion; he found these things holding a commanding place in the old formulæ. Jesus Christ was apprehended by him as the mirror of the fatherly heart of God, and therefore as God, and he would know of no other comforter save God Himself, as He appeared in Christ and as He works through the Holy Spirit; the old formulæ of faith bore witness to the Father, Son and Spirit, to the one God, who is a Triunity, and said nothing of Mary, the saints, and other helpers of the needy. His soul lived by faith in the God who has come as near to us in earthly form as brother to brother; the old formulæ of faith testified to this by their doctrine of the two natures in Christ. Like Paul he armed himself against the assaults of the devil, the world and sin with the assurance that Christ by His death has vanquished the powers of darkness and cancelled guilt, and that He sits now as the exalted Lord at the right hand of God; the old formulæ of faith bore witness to the death on the cross, the resurrection and exaltation of Christ. While, under the rubbish-heaps of the middle ages, he rediscovered the old faith of Paul in the New Testament, he discovered this faith also in the old dogma: the Church possessed it, confessed it daily, but no longer paid regard to it, knew no longer what it had imported into the mutterings of its priests, and thus in the midst of its possessions forgot what it possessed. Over against this Church, why should he not honour, along with the New Testament, the

towards the old dogma was open to suspicion; and Calvin can scarcely be freed from the reproach that he would have taken a different attitude towards the old dogma, and would have treated the Antitrinitarians otherwise, if he had been less political. See information about the civil and political side of the question in Kattenbusch, Luther's Stellung zu den ökumenischen Symbolen, p. 1 ff.
old dogma which witnessed to the Word of God! And in one very important respect he was certainly entirely in the right—this old dogma was really an expression of the religion of ancient times: that which those times maintained together with this, and by means of which they delimited dogma, was not introduced into dogma itself. Only in the middle ages did law, merit and achievement find a place among the doctrines of faith and in worship. As compared with the mediaeval, the Old Catholic Church had impressed on it more of a religious character; in its faith and in its worship it confessed what God has done, and what He will do, through Christ.

But was he not altogether right? Was there not really the most beautiful harmony between his faith and the old dogma? This is still asserted at the present day, and an appeal is made in support of it to the apparently strongest witness—to Luther himself, who had no other idea in his mind. According to this view, the shaping of dogma in the ancient Church, down to the sixth and seventh centuries, was "sound"; the only thing lacking to it was justification by faith. This supplement was added by Luther, while at the same time he purified—or cancelled—the false development of the Middle Ages. Over and above this there is a talk about a "reconstruction," a "re-modelling" of dogma, that was undertaken by Luther; but there is difficulty in explaining what such terms are intended to mean: additions and subtractions are not equivalent to reconstruction. Hence the terms are not employed seriously; they

1 See Thomasius-Seeberg, l.c., II., p. 748: "The third Period gives us the re-modelling of dogma by the Reformation. Here the evangelical faith in justification is taken as the centre. Proceeding from this the mediaeval conception of Christianity is broken through at its most determinative points, and from this centre, while the results of foregoing dogma-constructions that are sound and that are guaranteed by the records of original Christianity are retained, a reconstruction of dogma is undertaken." The expression "guaranteed by the records of original Christianity" is, moreover, in the first place quite modern, and hence from Luther's point of view extremely objectionable, and in the second place it represents a renunciation of all that the Church has learned during the last 150 years with regard to the New Testament and the earliest history of dogma. Still more distinctly has Kahnis expressed his view as to the relation of the Lutheran Church to the Roman (Die Sache der Luth. Kirche gegenüber der Union, 1854, p. 90). After taking note of the fact that both Churches recognise the Ecumenical Symbols, and that the Lutheran Church assumes
suggest rather the admission that Luther's notion of faith in some way modified dogma as a whole. How that took place there is, of course, difficulty in stating, for the moulding of dogma in the ancient Church was "sound." From this point of view the whole development of Protestantism from the end of the seventeenth century till the present day must necessarily appear a mistaken development, nay, an apostasy. It is a pity, only, that almost all thinking Protestants have apostatised, and, for the most part, differ from each other only according to the clearness and honesty with which they admit their apostasy.

We have to inquire whether or not Luther's conception of faith, i.e., what admittedly constituted his importance as a Reformer, postulates the old dogma, and therefore, also, is most intimately united with it. 1

With this in view, we shall first gather together the most important propositions in which he set forth his Christianity. Then we shall adduce the most decisive critical propositions which he himself stated as conclusions from his religious conception of the Gospel. On the basis of these investigations it will then appear whether, and to what extent, the general attitude which Luther assumed towards the old dogma was free from contradictions. If this can be determined, the final question will arise, whether it is still possible for the Church of the present day to take up the same attitude.

(2) The Christianity of Luther. 2

In the cell of his convent Luther fought out the spiritual battle, the fruit of which was to be the new and yet old evan-

1 What is dealt with here is simply the question as to the inner connection between Luther's Christianity and the old dogma. As to his having cancelled the validity of the external authority of dogma, see above, p. 23 ff.

2 Full accounts of the theology of Luther have been given us by Köstlin, Theod. Harnack, and Lommatzsch. From the point of view of the history of dogma Plitt's "Einleitung in die Augustana" is of importance. For Luther's theology in its initial shapings the works of Köstlin, Riehm, Seidemann, Hering, Dieckhoff, Bratke,
gelical knowledge. Inward unrest, anxiety about his salvation, had driven him into the convent. He had gone there in order that—in a genuinely Catholic way—he might, through multiplied good works, propitiate the strict Judge, and "get for himself a gracious God." But while he used all the means the mediæval Church offered him, his temptations and miseries became more intense. He felt as if he was contending with all the powers of darkness, and as if, instead of being in the society of angels in the convent, he was among devils. When in after days at the height of his active career depression came upon him, all that was required in order to regain strength was to remember these convent horrors. In the system of Sacraments Ritschl, Kolde, and Lipsius claim special consideration. A reliable account—though presented in the light of the theology of the Epigones—has been furnished by Thomasius-Seeberg, l.c., II., p. 330-394. In what follows, my lecture: "M.L. in seiner Bed. f. d. Gesch. d. Wissenschaft u. d. Bildung," 1883, is made use of.

Loofs makes the very accurate remark, l.c., p. 345: "Luther's development in itself teaches that the Lutheran Reformation did not spring from a criticism of the ecclesiastical doctrine, that it was more than a revision of the ecclesiastical doctrinal system."

Compare very specially the "Brief Answer to Duke George's latest book" (Erl. Ed. XXXI., p. 273): "If ever a monk got into heaven by monkery, I too would have found my way there; all my convent comrades will bear me out in that." According to Catholic opinion, of course, Luther made an entirely false beginning in the convent, and proved by his pride that he was not in his proper place. But his pride consisted simply in this, that he was more in earnest about the matter than his companions.

See one of the most characteristic passages, l.c., p. 278 ff.: "And after I had made the profession I was congratulated by the Prior, convent, and Father-confessor on the ground of being now an innocent child, returning pure from baptism. And certainly I could most willingly have rejoiced in the glorious fact that I was such an excellent man, who by his own works (so that was the popular view in spite of all the dogmatic warnings against it), without Christ's blood, had made himself so beautiful and holy, and that so easily too, and in such a short time. But although I listened readily to such sweet praise and splendid language about my own deeds, and let myself be taken for a wonderworker, who in such an easy-going way could make himself holy and could devour death and the devil to boot, etc., nevertheless there was no power in it all to sustain me. For when even a small temptation came from death or sin I succumbed, and found there was neither baptism nor monkery that could help me; thus I had now long lost Christ and His baptism. I was then the most miserable man on earth; day and night there was nothing but wailing and despair, so that no one could keep me under restraint. . . . God be praised that I did not sweat myself to death, otherwise I should have been long ago in the depths of hell with my monk's baptism. For what I knew of Christ was nothing more than that He was a stern judge, from whom I would have fled, and yet could not escape."
and performances to which he subjected himself he failed to find the assurance of peace which he sought for, and which only the possession of God could bestow. He wished to base his life for time and for eternity upon a rock (the mystic's fluctuation between rapture and fear he had no experience of, for he was too strict with himself), but all supports that were recommended to him fell to pieces in his hands, and the ground trembled beneath his feet. He believed he was carrying on a conflict with himself and his sin; but he was in reality contending against the religion of his Church: the very thing that was intended to be to him a source of comfort became known to him as a ground of terror. Amid such distress there was disclosed to him—slowly and under faithful counsel—from the buried-up ecclesiastical confession of faith ("I believe in the forgiveness of sins"), and therefore also from Holy Scripture (Psalms, Epistles of Paul, especially the Epistle to the Romans), what the truth and power of the gospel are. In addition to this, Augustine's faith-conception of the first and last things, and especially his doctrine of "the righteousness which God gives," were for him in an increasing degree guiding stars. But how much more firmly he grasped the essence of the matter. What he here learned, what he laid hold of as the one thing, was the revelation of the God of grace in the gospel, i.e., in the incarnated, crucified, and risen Christ. The same experience which Paul had undergone in his day was passed through by Luther, and although in its beginning it was not in his case so stormy and sudden as in the case of the Apostle, yet he, too,

1 As far as we can follow back Luther's thoughts in connection herewith—that is, to the first years of his academic activity in Wittenberg—we find that for him the gratia of God is forgiveness of sins, which God grants sine merito.
3 Especially also Augustine's doctrine of the entire incapacity of fallen man for the good, and accordingly also his predestination doctrine (see the information Luther gives of himself from the year 1516 to the year 1517).
4 For Augustine there is ultimately in the salvation which grace bestows something dark, indescribable, mysteriously communicated; Luther sees in it the forgiveness of sins—that is, the God of grace Himself; and he substitutes therefore for a mysterious and transforming communication the revelation of the living God and "fides."
5 The way in which Luther gave expression to his faith during the first period shows...
learned from this experience that it is God who gives faith: "When it pleased God to reveal His Son in me." In Luther's development down to the year 1517, there was an entire absence of all dramatic and romantic elements: that is perhaps the most wonderful thing in this wonderful character, and is the seal of its inward greatness. From Mysticism, to which he owed much, and the speculations of which he not unfrequently followed in connection with particular questions, he was separated by the entirely unmystical conviction that trust in God on account of Christ ("propter Christum") is the real content of religion, which nothing transcends, and the limitations of which can be removed by no speculation. Trust in the "truth" of God and in the work of Christ formed for him a unity, and he knew no other way of approaching the Being who rules heaven and earth than by the cross of Christ (per crucem Christi).

That, however, which he had experienced, and which, with ever-increasing clearness, he now learned to state, was, in comparison with the manifold things which his Church offered as religion, above everything else an immense reduction, an emancipating simplification. In this respect he resembled Athanasius— with whom in general he had the most noteworthy affinity—and was very unlike Augustine, who never controlled the inexhaustible riches of his spirit, and who stimulated, therefore, rather than built up. That reduction meant nothing else than the restoration of religion: seeking God and finding God. Out of a complex system of expiations, good deeds and comfortings, of strict statutes and uncertain apportionments of grace, out of magic and of blind obedience, he led religion forth and gave it a strenuously concentrated form. The Christian religion is living assurance of the living God, who has revealed

us plainly that he learned not only from Augustine but also from the medieval mystics (from Bernard onwards). The linking together of surrender to God with surrender to Christ is for the first time clearly apparent in them; for Augustine it was much more vague. In this sense Luther's faith stands in a distinct historic line; yet the originality and force of his experience as a believer is not thereby detracted from. Even in the domain of religion there is no generatio aequivoca.

1 See Loofs, I.e., p. 348.

2 See Vol. III., p. 140.
Himself and opened His heart in Christ—nothing else. Objectively, it is Jesus Christ, His person and work; subjectively, it is faith ("faith is our life" ["fides vita nostra est"]); its content, however, is the God of grace, and therefore the forgiveness of sins, which includes adoption and blessedness. For Luther, the whole of religion was contained within this circle. The living God—not a philosophical or mystical abstraction—the God manifest, certain, the God of grace, accessible to every Christian. Unwavering trust of the heart in Him who has given himself to us in Christ as our Father, personal assurance of faith, because Christ with His work undertakes our cause—this became for him the entire sum of religion. Rising above all anxieties and terrors, above all ascetic devices, above all directions of theology, above all interventions of hierarchy and Sacraments, he ventured to lay hold of God Himself in Christ, and in this act of his faith, which he recognised as God's work, his whole being obtained stability and firmness, nay, even a personal certainty and joy, such as no mediaeval man had ever possessed.

From perceiving that "with force of arms we nothing can,"

1 Larger Catechism II., 3 (p. 460, Müller): "Neque unquam propriis viribus pervenire possemus, ut patris favorem ac gratiam cognosceremus, nisi per Jesum Christum dominum nostrum, qui paterni animi erga nos speculum est, extra quem nihil nisi iratum et truculentum videmus judicem."

2 It has been very specially shown by Theod. Harnack in his work, Luther's Theologie (see particularly the 2nd Vol.), that Luther's whole theology is Christology.

3 The fullest, most distinct, and truest account of Luther's religion is to be found in Herrmann's book referred to above, "The Communion of the Christian with God; a discussion in agreement with the view of Luther," 3rd ed., 1896. Dilthey also makes the excellent remarks (l.c., p. 358): "The justification of which the mediaeval man had inward experience was the descending of an objective stream of forces upon the believer from the transcendental world, through the Incarnation, in the channels of the ecclesiastical institutions, priestly consecration, sacraments, confession, and works; it was something that took place in connection with a supersensible régime. The justification by faith of which Luther was inwardly aware was the personal experience of the believer standing in the continuous line of Christian fellowship, by whom assurance of the grace of God is experienced in the taking place of a personal faith, an experience derived from the appropriation of the work of Christ that is brought about by the personal election of grace." What Dilthey adds is correct: "If it necessarily resulted from this that there was a change in the conscious attitude towards dogma and in the basing of faith thereon, this change did not touch the matter of the old ecclesiastical dogma."
he derived the utmost freedom and force; for he now knew the power which imparts to the life steadfastness and peace; he knew it, and called it by its name. Faith—that meant for him no longer adherence to an incalculable sum of Church doctrines or historical facts; it was no opinion and no action, no act of initiation (actus initiationis) upon which something greater follows; it was the certainty of forgiveness of sins, and therefore also the personal and continuous surrender to God as the Father of Jesus Christ, which transforms and renews the whole man.¹

That was his confession of faith: faith is a living, busy, active thing, a sure confidence, which makes a man joyous and happy towards God and all creatures,² which, like a good tree, yields without fail good fruit, and which is ever ready to serve everyone and to suffer all things. In spite of all evil, and in spite of sin and guilt, the life of a Christian is hid in God. That was the ground-thought of his life. As included within this, the other thought was discerned and experienced by him—the thought of the freedom of a Christian man. This freedom was not for him an empty emancipation, or a licence for every

¹ Compare August. c. 20: "Admonentur etiam homines, quod hic nomen fidei non significet tantum historiae notitiam, quales est impis et diabolo, sed significet fidem, que credit non tantum historiam, sed etiam effectum historie, videlicet hunc articulum, remissionem peccatorum, quod videlicet per Christum habeamus gratiam, justitiam et remissionem peccatorum." Compare the exposition of the 2nd Main Article in the "Kurze Form" (manual for prayer): "Here it is to be observed that there are two kinds of believing: first, a believing about God, which means that I believe that what is said of God is true. This faith is rather a form of knowledge or observation than a faith. There is, secondly, a believing in God, which means that I put my trust in Him, give myself up to thinking that I transact with Him, and believe without any doubt that He will be and do to me according to the things said of Him. Such faith, which throws itself on God, whether in life or in death, alone makes a Christian man."

² Preface to the Epistle to the Romans (Erl. Ed. LXIII., p. 124 f.): "Faith is a divine work in us, through which we are changed and regenerated by God. . . O, it is a living, busy, active, powerful thing faith, so that it is impossible for it not to do us good continually. Neither does it ask whether good works are to be done, but before one asks it has done them, and is doing them always. But anyone who does not do such works is an unbelieving man, groggs and looks about him for faith and good works, and knows neither what faith is nor what good works are. . . Faith is a living, deliberate confidence in the grace of God, so certain that for it it could die a thousand deaths. And such confidence and knowledge of divine grace makes joyous, intrepid, and cheerful towards God and all creation."
kind of subjectivity; for him freedom was dominion over the world, in the assurance that if God be for us, no one can be against us; for him that soul was free from all human laws which has recognised in the fear of God and in love for and trust in Him its supreme law and the motive principle of its life. He had learned, certainly, from the old Mystics; but he had found what they sought for. Not unfrequently they remained imprisoned in sublime feelings; they seldom attained to a lasting sense of peace; while at one time their feeling of freedom rose to oneness with God, at another time their feeling of dependence deepened into psychical self-annihilation. On Luther's part there was a struggle issuing in active piety, and in an abiding assurance of peace. He vindicated the rights of the individual in the first instance for himself; freedom of conscience was for him a personal experience. But for him the free conscience was a conscience inwardly bound, and by individual right he understood the sacred duty of trusting courageously to God, and of rendering to one's neighbour the service of independent and unselfish love.

Of trusting courageously to God—because he feared nothing, and because, in his certainty of God, his soul overflowed with joy: "It is impossible for one who hopes in God not to rejoice; even if the world falls to wreck, he will be overwhelmed undismayed under the ruins." Thus he became the Reformer, because through his joyous faith he became a hero. If even in science knowledge is not enough, if the highest things are achieved only where there is courage, how should it be otherwise in religion? What Christian faith is, revealed itself to the Germans in Luther's person. What he presented to view was not new doctrine, but an experience, described at one time in words strongly original, at another time in the language of the Psalms and of Paul, sometimes in that of Augustine, and sometimes even in the cumbrous propositions of the scholastic theology. The critical application of his faith to the state of things existing at the time, to the Church as it was, Luther

1 "Impossible est, ut non laetetur, qui sperat in domino, etiam si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruine." Operat. in Psalm (1519-1521), Weimarer Ausgabe T.V., p. 182.
never desired; it was forced upon him because his opponents observed much sooner than himself the critical force of what he declared.

In Luther's view of faith there was implied his view of the Church. For him the Church was the community of the saints, i.e., of believers, whom the Holy Spirit has called, enlightened and sanctified through the Word of God, who are continually being built up by means of the gospel in the true faith, who look forward confidently and joyfully to the glorious future of the sons of God, and meanwhile serve one another in love, each in the position in which God has placed him. That is his whole creed regarding the Church—the community of believers (saints), invisible, but recognisable by the preaching of the Word. It is rich and great; and yet what a reduction even this creed is found to contain when it is compared with what the mediæval Church taught, or at least assumed, regarding itself and the work assigned to it! Luther's creed was entirely the product of his religious faith, and it rests on the following closely united principles, to the truth of which he constantly adhered. First, that the Church has its basis in the Word of God; second, that this Word of God is the preaching of the revelation of God in Christ, as being that which creates faith; third, that accordingly the Church has no other field than that of faith, but that within this field it is for every individual the mother in whose bosom he attains to faith; fourth, that because religion is nothing but faith, therefore neither special performances, nor any special province, whether it be public worship, or a selected mode of life, nor obedience to ecclesiastical injunctions, though these may be salutary, can be the sphere in which the Church and the individual give proof of their faith, but that the Christian must exhibit his faith in neighbourly service within the natural relationships of life, because they alone are not arbitrarily chosen but provided, and must be accepted therefore as representing the order of God.

With the first principle Luther assumed an antagonistic attitude towards the received doctrine both of tradition and of

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1 One easily sees that this definition has an Augustinian basis, and that it is modified by the determinative position given to the factors "word" and "faith."
the power belonging to the bishops and the Pope. He saw that previous to his time, the question as to what is Christian and what the Church is had been determined in a way quite arbitrary and therefore also uncertain. He accordingly turned back to the sources of religion, to Holy Scripture, and in particular to the New Testament. The Church has its basis in something fixed, something given, which has never been wanting to it—in this he distinguished himself from the “enthusiasts”—but this thing that is given is not a secret science of the priesthood, nor is it a dreary mass of statutes under the protection of the holy, still less papal absolutism; but it is something which every simple-minded Christian can discern and make proof of: it is the Word of God as dealt with by the pure understanding. This thesis required the unprejudiced ascertain-ment of the really literal sense of Holy Scripture. All arbitrary exposition determined by authority was put an end to. As a rule Luther was in earnest in complying with this demand, so far as his vision carried him. He could not, certainly, divine how far it was to lead. Yet his methodical principles of “interpretation,” his respect for language, laid the foundation for scripture-science.

The second principle distinguishes Luther both from the theologians and from the ascetics and sectaries of the Middle Ages. In thinking of the Word of God they thought of the letter, of the inculcated doctrines, and the miscellaneous promises of Holy Scripture; he thought of what formed the core. If he speaks of this core as being “the gospel according to the pure understanding,” “the pure gospel,” “the pure Word of God,” “the promises of God” (“promissiones dei”), but, above all, as being “Jesus Christ,” all these expressions as understood by him are identical. The Word of God which he constantly had in his mind, was the testimony of Jesus Christ, who is the Saviour of souls. As faith has only to do with the living God and Christ, so also the authority for faith and for the Church is only the effectual Word of God, as the Christ who is preached.\(^1\) Accordingly the Church doctrine also is nothing

\(^1\) Here, according to Luther’s view, office also has its place in the Church; it is the “ministerium” in word and sacrament, instituted in the Church (not the
but the statement of the gospel, as it has created and holds together the Christian community, the sum of the "consolations offered in Christ" ("consolationes in Christo propositæ").

But if the Church has its basis simply in these "consolations" and in the faith that answers to them, it can have no other sphere and no other form than those which the Word of God and faith give to it. Everything else must fall away as disturbing, or as at least unessential. In this way the third principle is obtained. The conception of the Church is greatly reduced as compared with the mediæval conception, but it has thereby gained in inner force, and has been given back to faith. Only the believer sees and knows the holy Christian community; for it is only he who perceives and understands the Word of God; he believes in this Church, and knows that through it he has attained to faith, because the Holy Spirit has called him through the preached Word.¹

individual congregation) with a view to leading the individual to faith. The creator of this office is, of course, God, not the Church, much less the individual congregation, and it has its field simply in the administration of the means of grace with a view to the establishment and maintenance of faith. (See Art. 5 of the Confession of Augsburg: "Ut hanc fidem consequamur, institutum est ministerium docendi evangelii et porrigendi sacramenta"). That it is occupied exclusively with this aim is shown in the subsequent part of the article. But in order to obviate a false fanatical conclusion it is said in Art. 14: "De ordine ecclesiastico docent, quo nemo debeat in ecclesia publice docere aut sacramenta administrare, nisi rite vocatus."

The vocatio legitima is of course a function that is tied to legal ordinances, and thereby is withdrawn, both from the order of salvation and from arbitrary self-determination.

¹ See the Larger Catechism (Müller, p. 455): "Spiritus sanctus sanctificationis munus exsequitur per communionem sancorum aut ecclesiam Christianorum, remissionem peccatorum, carnis resurrectionem et vitam aeternam; hoc est primum nos ducit spiritus s. in sanctam communionem suam, ponens in sinum ecclesie, per quam nos docet et Christo adducit. . . . Ecclesia est mater et quemlibet Christianum parturit ac alit per verbum, quod spiritus s. revelat et praedicat et per quod pectora illuminat et accendit, ut verbum accipiant, amplificantur, illi adherescant ineque eo perseverent." See also the Kirchenpostille, Predigt am 2. Christstage (Erl. Ed. X., p. 162): "The Christian Church keeps all words of God in its heart, and revolves them, maintains their connection with one another and with scripture. Therefore anyone who is to find Christ must first find the Church. How would one know where Christ is and faith in Him is, unless He knew where His believers are? And whoever wishes to know something about Christ must not trust to himself, nor by the help of his own reason build a bridge of his own to heaven, but must go to the Church, must visit it and make inquiry. Now the Church is not wood and stone, but the company of people who believe in Christ; with these he must keep in connection,
Finally, the fourth principle had, outwardly, the most far-reaching consequences; if everything depends upon faith, both for the individual and for the Church, if it is God's will to transact with men only through faith, if faith alone is acceptable to Him, there can be no special fields and forms of piety and no specific pious ways of life as distinct from other ways. From this it followed that the demonstration and practical exercise of faith had to be within the great institutions of human life that have their origin in God (in marriage, family, state, and calling). But all that was included in worship now appeared also in quite a different light. If it is an established fact, that man has neither power nor right to do anything in the way of influencing God, if the mere thought of moving God to alter his feeling means the death of true piety, if the entire relation between God and man is determined by the believing spirit, i.e., by and see how those believe, live, and teach who assuredly have Christ among them. For outside of the Christian Church there is no truth, no Christ, no blessedness." Into Luther's view of the congregation I do not enter, partly because what is dogmatic in it is simply an application of his conception of the Church, partly because the application was by no means a definite one, Luther having expressed himself very differently on the relation of the particular congregation to the Church, on the powers of the particular congregation, and on the latter as empirical and as representing the true Church. Sohm's able exposition (Kirchenrecht, 1892, I., p., 460 ff.) has been justly described as one-sided. There is correspondence with a frequently expressed thought of Luther in what Sohm writes, p. 473: "Christian faith knows of no congregations within the Ecclesia (Christendom) in a legal sense, but only of gatherings of believers, which do not as such exist in a legal capacity, but are subject to change in their existence; but which, nevertheless, have this quality, that they represent entire Christendom, the Church of Christ, with all its power and gifts of grace." But besides that this conception is not the only conception of Luther that bears on this matter, when Sohm (p. 479) represents Luther as distinguishing between "human order" and "legal order" ("there may be human order in the Church of Christ, but it is never legal order, and can therefore be instituted in any case only as an order simply to be voluntarily observed, never as an order to be enforced by outward compulsion ") this distinction I would not be disposed to regard as in accordance with Luther's views, and the rigid definition also of law by which Sohm is everywhere guided ("enforced by outward compulsion") I regard as overstrained in its application to ecclesiastical law. There is surely still a third thing that lies between "voluntary" and "outward compulsion"—namely, the dutiful recognition of a salutary order, and the sum of what is to be recognised in the Church as dutiful has always been described as being also ecclesiastical law.—The general priesthood of all believers (see especially the Address to the Christian Nobles) was never surrendered by Luther; but in its application to the empirical congregations he became very much more cautious.
firmly established trust in God, humility and unceasing prayer, if, finally, all ceremonies are worthless, there can no longer be exercises which in a special sense can be described as "worship of God." ¹ There is only one direct worship of God, which is faith; beyond this there is the rule that cannot be infringed, that God must be served in love for one's neighbour. Neither mystic contemplation nor an ascetic mode of life is embraced in the gospel.

The inherent right of the natural order of life was for Luther as little an independent ideal as was freedom from the law of the letter. Like every earnest Christian he was eschatologically determined, and looked forward to the day when the world will pass away with its pleasure, its misery, and its institutions. Within it the devil in bodily form continues to ply his daring and seductive devices; therefore there can be no real improvement of it. Even in one of his most powerful treatises, "On the freedom of a Christian man," he is far from making the religious man, the man of faith, feel at home in and be contented with this world, and far from saying to him that he must find his satisfaction and ideal in building up the Kingdom of God on earth by ministering love. No, the Christian awaits in faith the glorious appearing of the Kingdom of Christ, in which his own dominion over all things, shall be made manifest; meanwhile, during this epoch of time, he must be a servant in love and bear the burden of his calling. Yet whether we are disposed to regard this view of Luther as a limitation or as the most correct expression of the matter, it is certain that he transformed, as no Christian had done before him since the age of the Apostles, the

¹ See the exposition of the 2nd and 3rd Commandments in the Larger Catechism (p. 399): "Hic enim rectus nominis divini cultus est, ut de eo omnem nobis omnium malorum levationem et consolationem polliceeamus quamque ob rem illum imploremus; ita ut cor priss per fidem deo suum honorem tribuat, deinceptis vero os honorificae confessione idem faciat." See also the famous passage, p. 401: "Ceterum, ut hinc Christianum aliqum intellectum hauriamus pro simplicibus, quidnam deus hoc in præcepto (scil. tertio) a nobis exigat, ita habe: nos dies festos celebrare, non propter intelligenes et eruditos Christianos, hi enim nihil opus habent ferialis." See also Conf. of Augs. (p. 60): "Omnis cultus dei, ab hominibus sine mandato dei institutus et electus ad promerendam justificationem et gratiam, impius est." The whole Reformation of Luther may be described as a Reformation of "divine worship," of divine worship on the part of the individual and on the part of the whole community.
ideal of religious perfection, and that at the same time it fell to him to transform also the moral ideal, although it was only on the religious side that he was able firmly to establish what was new.\(^1\) If we will make clear to ourselves the significance of Luther, his breach with the past, we must keep his new ideal of the Christian life and Christian perfection as much in view as his doctrine of faith, from which that ideal originated, and his freedom from the law of the letter and of Church doctrine and Church authority. What an extraordinary reduction is represented also by Luther's new ideal! That which was hitherto least observed under the accumulation of fine-spun and complicated ideals—lowly and assured confidence in God's Fatherly providence and faithfulness in one's calling (in neighbourly service)—he made the chief matter; nay, he raised it to the position of the sole ideal! That which the mediaeval period declared to be something preliminary, knowledge of God as Lord and Father and faith in his guardianship, he declared to be the main part of practical Christianity: those only who belong to

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\(^1\) To Ritschl belongs the great merit of having—it may be said for the first time—clearly and successfully demonstrated the importance of the Reformation from the transformation of the ideal of religious and moral perfection. Yet in doing this he has not, in my opinion, given sufficient weight to the eschatological tendency in Luther. But he has restored their significance to the expositions in Aits. (2), 16, 20, 26, 27 of the Augs. Conf.: "Damnant et illos, qui evangelicam perfectionem non collocant in timore dei et fide, sed in deserendis civilibus officiis, quia evangelium tradit justitiam aeternam cordis. Interim non dissipat politiam aut oeconomicam, sed maxime postulat conservare tamquam ordinationes dei et in talibus ordinationibus exercere caritatem." . . . "Jam qui scit se per Christum habere propitium patrem, is vere novit deum, scit se ei curae esse, invocat eum, denique non est sine deo sicut gentes. Nam diaboli et impii non possunt hunc articulum credere, remissionem peccatorum. Ideo deum tamquam hostem odeerunt, non invocant eum, nihil boni ab eo expectant." Of the past time it is said, chap. 26: "Interim mandata dei justa vocationem nullam laudem hабехан; quod pater familias educabat sobolem, quod mater pariebat, quod princeps regerat rempublicam, hæc putabantur esse opera mundana et longe deteriora illis splendidis observationibus." 27: "Perfectio Christiana est serio timere deum et rursus concipere magnam fidem et confidere propter Christum, quod habeamus deum placatum, petere a deo et certo espectare auxilium in omnibus rebus gerendis justa vocationem; interim foris diligenter facere bona opera et servire vocationi. In his rebus est vera perfectio et verus cultus dei." A radical and keen criticism was applied to monachism prior to Luther's time by Pupper of Goch in his Dialogue (see O. Clemen, l.c., pp. 167–181); he, however, could not sever himself from the ideal of evangelical poverty in the form of the vita communis.
Christ have a God; all others have Him not, nay, know Him not.\footnote{1} That which the mediæval age looked upon with mistrust, worldly calling and daily duty, was regarded by Him as the true sphere of the life that is well-pleasing to God. The effects were immeasurable; for at one stroke religion was now released from connection with all that was foreign to it and the independent right belonging to the spheres of the natural life was recognised. Over the great structure of things which we call the Middle Ages, over this chaos of unstable and inter-blended forms, there brooded the spirit of faith, which had discerned its own nature and therefore its limits. Under its breath everything that had a right freely to assert itself began to struggle forth into independent development. Through his thinking out, proclaiming, and applying the Gospel, everything else was to fall to the Reformer. He had no other aim than to teach the world what the nature of religion is; but through his seeing the most important province in its distinctive character, the rights of all others also were to be vindicated; \textit{science} no longer stands under the ban of ecclesiastical authority, but must investigate its object in a secular, \textit{i.e.}, in a "pure" way;\footnote{2} the \textit{State} is no longer the disastrous combination of compulsion and need, so constructed as to lean for support on the Church, but is the sovereign order of public social life, while the home is its root;\footnote{3} \textit{law} is no longer

\footnote{1} Larger Catechism, P. II., 3, p. 460: "Proinde ii articuli nostræ fidei nos Christianos ab omnibus alis, qui sunt in terris, hominibus separat. Quicunque extra Christianitatem sunt, sive gentiles sive Turcae sive Judæi aut falsi etiam Christiani et hypocrites, quanquam unum tantum et verum deum esse credant et invocent, neque tamen certum habent, quo erga eos animatus sit animo, neque quidquam favori aut gratia de deo sibi polluceri audent aut possunt, quamobrem in perpetuam manent ira et damnatione. Neque enim habent Christum dominum neque ullis spiritus sancti donis et dotibus illustrati et donati sunt."

\footnote{2} See \textit{e.g.} the Treatise "On Councils and Churches" (Erl. Ed., Vol. 25, p. 386): "Of the schools I have ... frequently written, that we must hold a firm and decided opinion about them. For although in what the boys learn, languages and arts, we must recognise what is heathenish and external, yet they are certainly of very great service." The conclusions, it is true, were not drawn by Luther. He had as yet no independent science confronting him, or at least only approaches to it.

\footnote{3} "On Councils and Churches" (p. 387 f.), after a brief sketch of "Home," "State," and "Church": "These are three hierarchies, ordained by God, and there must be no more; and we have enough, and more than enough, to do in securing that in these three we shall live rightly in opposition to the devil. ... Over and
an undefinable thing lying midway between the power of the stronger and the virtue of the Christian, but is the independent norm of intercourse, guarded by the civil authorities, and a divinely ordained power, withdrawn from the influences of the Church; marriage is no longer a kind of ecclesiastical concession to the weak, but is the union of the sexes, instituted by God, free from all ecclesiastical guardianship, and the school of the highest morality; care for the poor and active charity are no longer a one-sided pursuit carried on with a view to securing one's own salvation, but are the free service of one's neighbour, which sees in the real giving of help its ultimate aim and its only reward. But above all this—the civil calling, the simple activity amidst family and dependents, in business and in office, is no longer viewed with suspicion, as an occupation withdrawing the thoughts from heaven, but is the true spiritual province, the field in which proof is to be given of one's trust in God, one's humility and prayerfulness—that is, of the Christian character that is rooted in faith.

These are the fundamental features of Luther's Christianity. Any one who takes his stand here and becomes absorbed in Luther's conception of faith, will at once find difficulty in holding the view that, in spite of all this, Luther only supplemented the old "sound" dogma by adding one, or one or two, doctrines. He will be inclined rather to trust here the Catholic judgment, according to which Luther overthrew the system of doctrine of the ancient and mediæval Church and only retained portions of the ruins. At the same time it must not be denied that the steps towards constructing on principle a new ideal of life were not developed by critical force to the point of clearness. For this the time was not yet ripe. In an age when life still continued every day to be threatened by a thousand forms of distress, when nature was a dreaded, mysterious power, when legal order meant unrighteous force, when terrible maladies of all kinds abounded, and in a certain sense no one was sure of his life—in such a time there was necessarily no rising beyond above these three lofty, divine forms of government, over and above the three divine, natural, and secular spheres of law, why should we have to do, then, with the blasphemous, juggling laws or government of the Pope?"
the thought that the most important earthly function of religion is to give comfort amidst the world's misery. Assuagement of the pain of sin, mitigation of the evil of the world—this Augustinian mood remained the prevalent one, and assuredly it is neither possible nor intended that this mood should ever disappear. But the task that is set to Christian faith to-day is no apocryphal one because it has not on its side a tradition of Church history. It must be able to take a powerful part in the moulding of personality, in the productive development of the dominion over nature, in the interpenetrating of the spiritual life with the spirit, and to prove its indispensableness in these directions, otherwise it will become the possession of a sect, in disregard of whom the great course of our history will pass on its way.

It is advisable that we should submit to a brief treatment the most important of the particular doctrines and theological conceptions which Luther made use of, and should present them here in the sense in which they were utilised by him in support of his new way of apprehending faith. We have to consider them, accordingly, only in their newly-moulded, positive significance. Yet it must be said here at the outset that Luther exercised a very great freedom in the use of theological terminology, and Melanchthon followed him in this down to the time of the Apology. That alone which to Luther appeared worth dealing with in theology was the divine action in Jesus Christ and the experience of faith in this action. Just because it was not a mere doctrine that occupied his attention, he used very freely the doctrinal formulæ, employed the numerous expressions which Scripture the old Symbols, and Scholasticism furnished, but very frequently treated them as synonymous. Not a few have felt that they have been required by this to draw up complicated schemes for Luther's doctrine, and so at the hands of the Epigones the theology of Luther has assumed the same complicated and unimpressive form which the Pauline doctrine has received in Biblical Theology. It would appear as if theologians alone among historians and biographers were still unaware, that there is the most radical failure in the
endeavour to get an entire view of a great man when the effort is made to reduce all his utterances to an artistic unity and to spin them out to a further point of development. From these utterances the movement must be, not forwards, but backwards, i.e., the miscellaneous and divers-coloured propositions must as far as possible be simplified, and run back as far as possible into a few fundamental thoughts. The fact that light breaks into different colours is not to be explained from the light, but from the different media through which it passes. In order to understand, however, the theology of Luther, we must be guided above all by the perception, that for him the Christian doctrine was no jointed puppet, which can be taken to pieces, and have members withdrawn or added. The traditional theological schemes were dealt with rather by Luther in view of the fact that in each of them, when properly understood, the whole doctrine found expression. Whether it be the doctrine of the three-one God that is treated, or Christology, or the doctrine of reconciliation, or of justification, or the doctrine of sin and grace, of repentance and faith, or the doctrine of predestination and free will, what he contemplates is the setting forth of the whole of Christianity. Kattenbusch has gained merited distinction from having shown and proved this in connection with two cardinal doctrines, the Trinitarian and the Christological (Luther's Stellung zuden oecumenischen Symbolen, 1883). Only by keeping this observation distinctly in view can an account of the theology of Luther be successful, so far as that theology constituted a whole.\(^1\) That there were many other things besides which Luther retained as fragments admits of no dispute.

1. Under the doctrine of God, a double set of attributes disclosed themselves for Luther according as God was conceived of apart from Christ or in Christ. But each of these groups is summed up in one single thought; on the one hand there is the awe-inspiring judge, with whom there can be associated nothing but penalty; on the other hand the gracious Father, who has turned His heart towards us. As they are looked at in Christ, the attributes of God's truth, justice, grace (veritas, justitia, 

\(^1\) Compare also Gottschick, Luther als Katechet, 1883.
gratia dei), etc., are all identical; for they are all contemplated from the point of view of the promises of God (promissiones dei); but these latter have no other content than the remission of sins (remissio peccatorum). As contemplated in Christ, God has only one will, which is our salvation; apart from Christ there is no certainty at all with regard to God's will.

2. God, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit are objects of faith. But God is Himself an object of faith, i.e., of hearty trust and childlike fear, only in so far as He has revealed Himself outwardly and once for all among men, and continues to reveal this revelation through His spirit in Christendom to individuals. A stricter unity cannot be thought of; for it is by no means God in Himself in whom faith believes—God in Himself belongs to the Aristotelians—it is the God revealed in Christ, and presented to the soul through the revelation of the Holy Spirit. For him in whom the Holy Spirit enkindles this faith there is here no mystery and no enigma, least of all is there the contradiction between one and three; in Christ, “the mirror of the Father's heart,” he apprehends God Himself, and he knows that it is God, that is, the Holy Spirit, who has enkindled such faith and creates the comfort of sin forgiven.

3. Thus also the first article of the Symbol is for Luther a statement of the whole of Christianity; for when man sets his trust on God as his gracious Creator, Preserver, and Father, and in no state of need has any doubt of Him, he can attain to this only because he looks to Christ, and is in the position of one whose sins are forgiven; but if he is able to do this he is a perfect Christian.

4. Of Jesus Christ faith knows, that “all the tyrants and jailers are now driven off, and in their stead has come Jesus Christ, a Lord of life, of righteousness, of all that is good and blessed, and He has snatched us poor, lost men from the jaws of hell, has won us, has delivered us, and restored us to the Father's grace and favour, and has taken us, as His possession, under His guardianship and protection, so that He now rules us

1 Compare the two passages quoted above, p. 184 and p. 189 from the Larger Catechism.
2 See the splendid exposition of the 1st Article in the Larger Catechism and in the "Kurze Form der 10 Gebote, des Glaubens und des Vater-Unders" (1522).
by His righteousness, wisdom, power, life, and blessedness."¹ That is the knowledge of Jesus Christ which alone answers to faith, and which faith alone can obtain; for Christ can be known only from His "office" and "benefactions"; in these benefactions the real and true faith in Christ is embraced.² These benefactions are summed up in the atonement which He has made, i.e., in the forgiveness of sins which He has procured by His life and death: "He was truly born, suffered, and died, that He might reconcile the Father to us, and be a sacrifice, not only for original guilt, but also for all actual sins of men."³ This is the chief part of the Gospel, indeed it is the Gospel itself, to which faith directs itself. The whole person of Jesus falls for faith simply within this view, all deeds of Jesus and all His words; Luther indeed would rather do without the former than the latter, for the former need no exposition. The heart can only forget its dread of God, the terrible Judge, when it looks on Christ, whose death guarantees that the law and justice of God have been satisfied, and in whose word and lineaments the gracious God Himself lays hold of us through the Holy Spirit. Just for that reason it is certain that Christ is something more for us than merely our brother, that He is a true helper, who has suffered penalty and wrath for us, and in whom God Himself offers Himself to us, and becomes so little and lowly, that we can lay hold of Him and enclose Him in our heart. Where there is this knowledge, neither the deity nor the humanity of Christ is a problem for faith; nor is the interblending of the two a problem; there is here rather the clearest and most comforting certainty: *God's grace is only manifest in the historical work of the historical Christ.* On the one hand we see in Christ, that "God has entirely emptied Himself and kept nothing which He could have given to us"—so there is the firmest assurance of the full deity of Christ,—on the other hand

¹ Larger Catechism, II., 2, p. 453.
² See the motto from Luther's works prefixed to this vol., and Melanchthon's famous sentence in the Introduction to the first edition of his Loci: "Hoc est Christum cognoscere, beneficia ejus cognoscere, non ejus naturas, modos incarnationis contueri."
³ "Vere natus, passus, mortuus, ut reconciliaret nobis patrem et hostia esset non tantum pro culpa originis, sed etiam pro omnibus actualibus hominum peccatis," Conf. of Augs. 3.
we see Him in the manger and on the cross. The two, however, are not side by side with each other, but in the abasement faith sees the glory. Confessing the deity of Christ could never become doubtful for him who knew—in the sense of believing in—no God at all save in Christ. Loofs is right in pointing out (Dogmen-Gesch., 3rd ed., p. 358), that within the history of dogma the old religious Modalism stands nearest to Luther's view. The speculation about natures is here rejected by Luther on principle. It was quite impossible for him to arrive at it

1 On Luther's Christology compare Schultz, Lehre von der Gotheit Christi (1881), p. 182 ff. The great reform which Luther effected, both for faith and theology, was that he made the historical Christ the sole principle of the knowledge of God. Only by him were Matth. xi, 27, and 1 Cor. i., 21-25; ii., 4-16 restored to a commanding position, the effect of which, however, was that the roots of the dogmatic Christianity were severed. "We must neither worship nor seek after any God save the God who is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ; in this true God Christ also is included." "Anything that one imagines of God apart from Christ is only useless thinking and vain idolatry." "When one loses Christ, all faiths (of the Pope, the Jews, the Turks, the common rabble) become one faith (see passages in Theod. Harnack's Luther's Theologie, I., p. 371 ff.). "Begin by applying thy skill and study to Christ, there also let them continue fixed, and if thine own thoughts or reason or some one else guide and direct thee otherwise, only close thine eyes and say: I must and will know of no other God, save in my Lord Christ. . . . See, there open there to me my Father's heart, will, and work, and I know Him, and this no one will ever see or come upon in any other way, however high he soars, speculating with his own clever and subtle thoughts. . . . For, as I have always said, that is the only way of transacting with God, that one make no self-prompted approach; and the true stair or bridge by which one may pass to heaven, that one remain below here and keep close to this flesh and blood, ay, to the words and letters that proceed from His mouth, by which in the tenderest way he leads us up to the Father, so that we find and feel no wrath or dreadful form, but pure comfort and joy and peace." On John 17, 3: "See how Christ in this saying interblends and unites knowledge of Himself and knowledge of the Father, so that it is only through and in Christ that we know the Father. For I have often said that, and will still go on saying it, so that even when I am dead people may think over it and guard against all teachers whom the devil rides and guides, who begin at the highest point to teach and preach about God, taking no notice whatever of Christ, just as up to this time there has been in the great schools a speculating and playing with His works above in Heaven, with the view of knowing what He is, and thinks, and does by Himself." In a similar way Melanchthon in the first edition of his Loci (1521) set aside the entire Scholastic doctrine of God. But how much time elapsed before this doctrine returned? Even in Protestantism there again came to be a speculating like that of "the Pope, the Jews, Turks, and the common rabble," a laying down with Origen two sources of divine revelation, the book of nature and the book of Holy Scripture, and an introduction of Christ into both books as a section.
from his view of saving faith; for when this was the starting point, neither did the deity of Christ come within his horizon as "nature," nor did the oneness of Christ admit of speculation as to the conjunction; for conjunction presupposes in some way a being separate.—It is further manifest that Luther's Christology closes the line of development represented by Tertullian, Augustine, Bernard, the Franciscan Mystics.

5. Of sin faith knows, that it consists supremely and therefore solely in the want of fear, love and trust towards God. Just on that account all men before Christ and apart from Christ are sinners, because (through their guilt certainly) they do not know God, or at least know Him only as an awful Judge—do not know Him therefore as He desires to be known. No one before Luther took so serious a view of sin as he did, the reason being that he measured it by faith, that is to say, took a religious estimate of it, and did not let himself be disturbed in this view by looking upon sins as the graduated manifestations of immorality, or upon virtues as the manifold forms of worldly morality. He alone seized again on the sense of the Pauline proposition, that whatsoever is not of faith is sin. Thus also the opposition between sin and holiness was first strictly reduced again by Luther to the other opposition—that namely between guilt and forgiveness. The state of the natural man is guilt, which expresses itself in dread of God, the state of the new man is forgiveness of guilt, which shows itself in confidence in God. As understood by Luther the contrast, however, can be viewed still more simply: to have no God, and to have a God. The sin in all sin and the guilt in all guilt is godlessness in the strictest sense of the word, i.e., the unbelief which is not able to trust God.¹ And on the other hand the highest among all forms of

¹ Besides the defectus of faith Luther and the Augs. Conf. mention also concupiscence, but they constantly accentuate in this the pride of the heart, as also the lust of the world, and the selfishness of the spirit. Luther broke with the idea that had become acclimatised from Augustine's time—that sexual pleasure is the original sin, and the root of all sin, and thereby corrected the error that had led to the most disgusting explanations and to the most dangerous training of the imagination. These sentences—which appeared already in the 1st ed.—I feel I must adhere to, notwithstanding Dilthey's objection (Archiv f. Gesch. der Philos., Vol. V., p. 359), that Luther and Melanchthon's doctrine of original sin (see Art. 2 of Conf. of Augs.) lays equal stress on concupiscence, and so is not substantially different from the
goodness is confidence in God as a true helper. Inasmuch as
man is created to and for God, the "original righteousness" 
("justitia originalis") is accordingly fear, love and trust, nothing 
more and nothing else, and the fall, which had its source in 
unbelief, had the entire loss of original righteousness as its con-
sequence. Hence the original righteousness is by no means a 
supernatural gift in the sense that it was added to man as being 
mature, independent within his limitations and for certain ends 
perfect; but it is the essential condition, under which and in 
which alone man can reach the goal set before him by his 
Creator. As in the beginning only God himself could produce 
this original righteousness by His revelation, so also He alone 
can restore it; but that has taken place through Christ, who 
has cancelled guilt and brought to men the God of grace.

6. What Luther wrought out here under the scheme of sin 
and cancelling of sin he expressed also in his doctrines of 
predestination and the enslaved will. As contrasted with the 
mediaeval view his fundamental thought is this—that God has 
not merely brought into existence objective provisions for 
salvation, to which there must then correspond a subjective line 
of action that is in a way independent, and of which the evidence 
is given in penitence and faith, but that He bestows faith and 
creates penitence. The mediaeval theology—even that which 
took the most severely strict view of the thought of predestina-
tion—is known to have always relaxed this thought precisely in 
the really religious aspect of it; for all the definitions, both of 
the Thomists and of the Scotists, issue in the end in a more or

Augustinian-Mediaeval doctrine in so far as by it also original sin and sexual enjoy-
ment are brought into union. For this opinion a number of passages written by the 
Reformers can certainly be appealed to—what mediaeval doctrines connected with the 
doctrine of salvation do not find a support in their writings?—yet the view that the 
physical impulses are in themselves sinful was certainly transcended by them, not 
only in principle, but in countless different connections. That Luther's view of 
"faith" and "unbelief" cancels this view, even Dilthey will not deny, as I do not 
deny that the historical theory of original sin had necessarily the effect of always 
leading the theologians back again in a disastrous way to concupiscence as the cog-
nisable vehicle of sin.

Hence original sin is really the chief sin, i.e., this is true of unbelief. Just on 
that account it is to be believed that Christ cancels all sin, because he takes away the 
guilt lying in original sin.
less refined synergism; or rather conversely, the divine agency appears only as an "aid" ("auxilium"). But for Luther the religious aspect continued to hold its central significance; it is God, that is to say, who works faith, who plants the good tree and nourishes it. That which when viewed from without appears to be something subjective, and is therefore regarded by reason as an achievement of man, appeared to him, from his keeping in view the real experience as he had passed through it, as the really objective thing, produced within him from without. This is perhaps what gives to Luther his highest significance in theology, and on this account his work on the enslaved will ("De servo arbitrio") is in one respect his greatest. 

That significance lies in this, that he completely broke with the idea that the religious experience is composed of historic and sacramental acts, which God performs and holds in readiness, and of subjective acts, which somehow are an affair of man's. So to describe this experience meant for him the depriving it of its force and the handing it over to reason; for the latter can then "objectively" register, describe, and reckon upon the divine acts, and in the same way it can then fix and prescribe what is to be done by man. That this was the falsely renowned art of the Schoolmen, the doctrine of reason and of the devil, was perceived by Luther, and therein consists his greatness as a theologian. He put an end both to the arrogant pseudo-theology of "objective" calculations and to the morality that gave itself out as religion, but that in its deepest basis was godless. He did away with the severing of the objective from the subjective, of the divine factor from the human factor in the experience of faith. In this way he produced a complete confusion in religion for every one who approaches it from without, because such an one must relinquish all thinking if he is forbidden to take into consideration at one time the acts of God and at another time the doings of man; but it was just in this way that he made religion clear to the believer, and restored to it the view in which the Christian believer has at the first, and continues to have, his experience of it. Nothing is more instructive here than the drawing a comparison between Luther's work mentioned above, "De servo arbitrio," and the treatise to which it is the
reply, the work of Erasmus. What a fineness of judgment, what a power to look all around, what an earnest morality does the author of the latter develop! One is justified in regarding his diatribe as the crown of his literary work; but it is an entirely worldly, at bottom an irreligious treatise. Luther, on the other hand, takes his stand on the fundamental fact of Christian experience. It is here we have the root of his doctrine of predestination as the expression for the sole efficiency of the grace of God. Certainly Luther had not yet recognised in all its consequences the significance of the perception that the objective revelation and the subjective appropriation must not be separated, that accordingly the awakening of faith itself belongs to revelation; 1 otherwise it would have become clear to him that this perception nullified all the foregoing scholastic efforts of theology, and hence forbade also conclusions such as he drew in his speculations regarding original sin, and in his book "De servo arbitrio." For when Luther here reflects on what the "hidden God" ("deus absconditus") is, as distinguished from the God who is "preached" ("praedicatus"), when he admits a double will in God, and so on, that is only a proof that he has not yet rid himself of the bad practice of the scholastic understanding of treating theological perceptions as philosophical doctrines, which one may place under any major premises he pleases, and combine in any way he may choose. Yet with his doctrines of predestination and enslaved will he in the main clearly and distinctly discarded metaphysic and psychology as the basis on which Christian knowledge is to be built up. That "hidden God," moreover, who was left to him by Nominalism he allowed to become always vaguer, or he came to identify Him with that dread judge whom the natural man must recognise in God. While in this way he gave back religion to religion, he also vindicated the independence of the knowledge reached through faith, by setting up the experience of the revelation of God in the heart, i.e., the production of faith,

1 See Herrmann’s beautiful expositions in the book mentioned above; it is an important circumstance that Luther himself spoke of the revelation through the Holy Spirit (Larger Catechism, p. 460: "neque de Christo quidquam scire possemus, si non per spiritum sanctum nobis revelatum esset").
as a noli me tangere, to the Jews a stumbling-block and to the Greeks foolishness. But who understood him! In his knowledge there was seen the old predestination doctrine and nothing else, as a specially intractable doctrine standing side by side with other doctrines, and soon there began in Protestantism the huckstering and higgling over this, Melanchthon leading the way.

7. But Luther was also able to describe the whole of Christianity under the scheme of law and gospel; nay, at a very early date he embodied his new knowledge in this scheme. Receiving an impulse here from Augustine, but passing beyond him (for the sovereign place of faith [fides] in the gospel is not fully recognised by Augustine), he attached himself so closely to Paul that it does not seem necessary to state his view in detail; nor did he shrink even from the Pauline paradoxes, nay he strengthened them; the law is given that it may be violated. Yet by this he only meant to say, that neither the commandments, nor even the pleasantest doctrines, can be of help to man; they rather increase his godlessness. Help can come only from a person—here the person is Jesus Christ. That was what was in Luther's mind, when he set down "gospel," "promises of God," etc. as = Christ. For him the contrast between law and gospel was not merely the contrast between a commandment that worketh death and a promise; in the last resort it was rather the contrast between a burdensome husk and the thing itself. If the gospel as it is preached were only an announcement or a making salvation possible, according to Luther it too would be a "law"; but it is neither the one nor the other, but something much higher, because it is quite incommensurable with law; that is to say, it is redemption itself. Where Luther, undisturbed by any shibboleth, gave expression to what was really his own Christianity, he never reflected on the gospel "in itself"—that was for him a Jewish or heathenish reflection, similar to the reflection on God "in Himself," atonement "in itself," faith "in itself"—but he kept in view the gospel together with its effect, and only in this effect was it for him the gospel: the God in the heart recovered in the person of Christ, faith. To this faith there applies: "in an easy, compendious way the law is
fulfilled by faith” (“facili compendio per fidel lex impletur”). Just on that account he was able to teach Christendom again what a fundamental distinction there is in respect of principle between law and gospel: it was he who first gave stability to the work of Augustine here also, as with regard to predestination and the bondage of the will. Hence it was, too, that he could never have any doubt that it is only the Christian overmastered by the gospel who can have true penitence and that the law produces no true penitence: terror and dread (attritio, or contritio passiva, i.e. a sorrow wrung from one, brought about through being crushed from without) the law causes (unless it be hypocrisy); but should the gospel not intervene, these take the direction only of unbelief and despair, that is, of the greatest ungodliness. If in not a few passages in Luther’s works that appears to be otherwise, then it is in part only apparently so—for the gospel takes even the law into its service (see the Smaller Catechism; the gospel expounds the law, and holds to view also its punitive operation; in this sense—that is, as embraced within the gospel—it is not cancelled),

1 Nay, it is necessary for the Christian to measure himself by the law, and to see daily that through acquaintance with it the old man is being destroyed. This operation of the law precedes also the penitentia evangelica and can therefore be described as “the fundamental experience in connection with the rise of faith.” Yet the God who cheers the broken heart must nevertheless take a part even here; for otherwise the effect of penitentia legalis would necessarily be either hypocrisy or despair. Loofs (Dogmengesch., 3rd ed., p. 355): “For him who knows Christ’s cross, contemplation of the law and despair of self are (according to Luther) salutary; opus alienum dei (i.e., the occidere lege) inducit tandem opus ejus proutum, dum facit peccatorem, ut justum faciat; mortificatio et vivificatio run parallel with each other in the Christian life: the Christian takes upon himself the ‘conterei lege’ (‘contritio passiva’) as a cross, so that in this way contritio passiva and contritio activa merge into each other here. In accordance with his own experiences, Luther presupposes that every one, before he understands grace, experiences in himself, and must experience, the ‘conterei lege,’ the ‘alienum opus dei’; but from this condition of mere ‘conterei lege’ he with all his energy struggles forth.” In these words, according to my opinion, Luther’s normal attitude to the question of repentance (the efficacy for this of gospel and law) is correctly indicated; see the controversy between Lipsius (Luther’s Lehre v. d. Busse, 1892) and Herrmann (Die Busse der evang. Christen, in the Ztschr. f. Theol. u. K., 1891, Part 1). Lipsius has convinced me that in following Ritschl I have not done justice to Luther’s doctrine of the law in its bearing on repentance. But I cannot agree with all that he sets forth, and chiefly for this reason, that—however clearly we can see what Luther ultimately wished with
and it is in part due to the paedagogic reflection produced by the very justifiable doubt as to whether the man of common and coarse type is to be regarded as a Christian or not (see below). The Epigones soon came to quarrel about the law, as they quarrelled about free will, because the main principle of the new view was no longer recognised by them. Luther himself did not find his proper position in these quarrels; for he always showed a very remarkable want of resource when controversies arose within the circle of Protestantism, and in such cases he was always inclined to regard the most conservative view as the right one. A “third use of the law” (usus tertius legis) cannot be attributed to him; for the positive relations of believers to God are, like their whole course of conduct, to be determined by the gospel.

8. But the whole of Christianity also presents itself to view, finally, in justification. Just because it is usual to see Luther's importance exclusively in this—that he formulated the doctrine of justification, it is of service to point out on the other hand that Luther's Christianity can be described while this term is not made use of. What he understood by justification has

his distinction between law and gospel—the Reformer's expositions are not found when we go into detail to be harmonious. Hence on the one hand it is left to the subjective judgment to select those that may be held as the most important; on the other hand Luther himself has in certain connections of thought given special prominence to ideas that secure for the law a special, independent importance in perpetuum. But is it not a duty to represent the Reformer in accordance with his most original thought?

1 This, however, means something else than what is conveyed in Dilthey's statement (Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Philos., Vol. VI., p. 377 ff.): “I deny out and out that the heart of the Reformation religion is to be found in the restoration of the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith.” Yet a mutual understanding is not impossible, for in the fine analysis of the Christian system of the Reformers with which Dilthey has followed up his statement (l.c., see also Preuss. Jahrb., Vol. 75 Part I., p. 44 ff.), the decisive importance of the “breaking up” by Luther of the “egoistic motives,” which had still a place even in the highest and most refined Catholic religion, is brought out as distinctly as the emancipation from the hierarchy, and as the fundamental feature of Lutheran faith, as trust in God and the firm consciousness of “being taken up, guarded, and hidden in the unseen connection of things.” If Dilthey introduces these and other momenta into the history of the general spiritual, and especially Germanic, development, this is entirely correct; neither is any objection to be made even from the point of view of the history of dogma to the repeated reference to the fact, that what is in question is not merely a rejuvenation of the
indeed found expression everywhere in what has preceded here, not as a single doctrine, but as the fundamental form of the Christian’s state. It was with the view of describing this state that Luther most frequently made use of the Pauline expression; if any other view is taken, there will be a failure to understand Luther’s meaning. What is new is not that in a scrupulous and scholastic way Luther separated the justificatio and sanctificatio, and regarded the former as a forensic act (actus forensis), taking place once for all;¹ that is the wisdom of the Epigones, who were always great in distinctions;—what is new lies in this, “(1) that with few exceptions the receiving of life (vivificatio) or justification (justificatio) is seen ultimately in nothing but in the being redeemed from sin without merit (sine merito redimi de peccatis), in the non-imputation of sin (non imputati peccatum) and the imputation of righteousness (reputari justitiam alicui), (2) that in connection herewith grace (gratia) is identified with mercy (misericordia), with grace for the remission of sins (gratia in remissionem peccatorum), or with truth (veritas), i.e. the fulfilment of the promise (impletio promissi) in the historical work of Christ, and (3) that in consequence hereof faith (fides) appears—though a distinct terminology is still wanting—as trust in God’s truth (veritas) and in Christ’s work for us: faith = believing in God = the wisdom of the cross of Christ (i.e. the understanding that the Son of God was incarnated and crucified and raised again for our salvation) = being well-pleasing to God in Christ (fides = credere deo = sapientia crucis Christi [scil. intellegere, quod filius dei est incarnatus et crucifixus et

¹ See on this the fine studies of Loofs and Eichhorn (Stud. u. Kritik., 1884, or 1887); they deal with the moulding of the thought of justification in the Apology, but they are less applicable to Luther’s doctrine. The observations made on the other side by Franck (Neue Kirchl. Zeitschr., 1892, p. 846) do not touch the main subject.
suscitatus propter nostram salutem] = deo satisfacere in Christo). On these three equations, as the regulators of religious self-appraisement, Luther’s piety rests.”

Under the scheme of justification Luther, accordingly, gives to the following thoughts pre-eminently a special clearness and the most distinct expression: (1) that for us all attributes of God combine in the attribute of His righteousness, with which He makes us righteous (which is therefore at the same time grace, truth, mercy and holiness), (2) that it is God who works and not man, (3) that our whole relation to God rests on the “for Christ’s sake” (“propter Christum”); for God’s righteousness unto salvation (justitiae ad salutem) is His action through the gospel, i.e. through Christ; it is the righteousness of Christ (justitia Christi), in which He beholds us and which he imputes to us (“imputes the righteousness of Christ” [“imputare justitiam Christi”] or “for the sake of Christ” [“propter Christum”]); (4) that the righteousness of God (justitia dei), as it appears in the gospel, effects both things—death and life—that is to say, judgment and death of the old man, and the awakening of the new; (5) that justification takes place through faith—that is, through the producing of faith: the latter is not so much the human answer to a divine acting, it is the means, rather, by which God works out justification and carries it home; (6) that justification is nothing else than the forgiveness of guilt, and that in this forgiveness everything is included—that is to say, life and blessedness—because there are in all only two states—that of conscious guilt and misery and that of gracious standing and blessedness; (7) that justification is therefore not the beginning, but is at the same time beginning, middle and end; for as it has existence only in faith, it is subject to the law of faith, which every day makes a beginning, and is therefore every day new, because it must always lay hold anew of the gracious remission (gratuita remissio), but is also the full and entire faith, if in sincere penitence it finds comfort in its God; (8) that justification is both in one—namely, a being righteous and a becoming righteous; it is the former, inasmuch as by the faith which attains forgiveness man is really righteous before God; it is the

latter, *inasmuch as the faith that has become certain of its God, can alone bring forth good works*. In this sense faith is undoubtedly an act of initiation, *i.e.*, the beginning of the work of the Holy Spirit on the soul; yet that is not to be taken as meaning that in man inwardly, or by a new process, something has to be added to faith; faith, rather, is the beginning in the same sense in which the good tree is the beginning of good fruit. Luther never thought of the relationship otherwise when his thoughts were clear to his own mind, or rather he connected faith with good works still more closely than is represented by the metaphor here employed; for to him faith itself was already regeneration (regeneratio), the latter not being merely a consequence of the former, so that there at once takes commencement along with faith that practical *life* also and that unresting joyous activity, in which one seeks to serve God as a happy child ("good works perform themselves unbidden"). If "fearing, loving, and trusting" are not merely results of faith, but faith itself, therefore to some extent the fruit is already implied in and given with the tree. Luther never thought of a faith that is not already in itself regeneration (regeneratio), quickening (vivicatio) and therefore good work (bonum opus); but on the other hand—in all doubt, in all uncertainty and dependence, refuge is found, not in the thought of the faith which is regeneration, but only in the faith which is "nothing but faith" ("nil nisi fides"); in other words: "we are justified by faith alone" ("justificamur sola fide"), *i.e.*, only by the faith which lays hold on the forgiveness of sins. That continued to be the *chief matter* for Luther; for only this faith secures *certainty of salvation*. This expresses the ultimate and highest thing which Luther wished to say in describing the state of the Christian as a state of justification, and which, under no other scheme, he could make the subject of such impressive preaching: man in his poverty, stricken in conscience and therefore godless, can only find rest in what is highest, in possessing God Himself—that was known by Augustine also—but he finds this rest only when he is absolutely *certain* of God, and he becomes certain of God only through *faith*—both these things were unknown to Augustine. What enabled Luther to carry beyond
themselves and bring to finality all the Reform movements of the Middle Ages, was that he had found what they sought, and was able to express what he experienced: the equivalence of certainty of salvation and faith.¹ No other faith, however, than the faith that fixes itself on the historic Christ can win the strength of sure faith.² Thus Luther again made the fundamental thoughts in the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans the rock-basis of religion. Nowhere, therefore, can we see more distinctly than here his opposition to Catholic piety also. The ultimate question of this piety was always, how is the sinful man made capable of doing good works in order to become acceptable to God? and to this it gave long-winded replies, constructing at the same time an immense apparatus, made up of the sufferings of Christ, sacraments, the remnants of human virtues, faith, and love. Here Luther had no question at all to ask, but described powerfully and joyfully what the experience consisted in through which the grace of God had conducted him. This experience was for him the certainty that in faith in Jesus Christ he had a gracious God. He knew that all that succeeded with him, all real life and blessedness, so far as he possessed it, was the outflow of that certainty; he knew that certainty as the source of his sanctification and his good works. Thereby for him the whole question as to the relation of faith to good works was in its essence solved.³ That

¹ In this way Luther transcended mysticism; cf. Hering, Die Mystik Luther's im Zusammenhang seiner Theologie, 1879.

² Justification bases itself, in Luther's view, on satisfaction, i.e., on the exchange between Christ and the sinner. See Th. Harnack, l.c., II., pp. 288-404.

³ On the relation of faith and works see especially Thieme's book referred to above (1895). Besides the view of faith which is determinative and by which Luther's thinking is directed—the view that sees in it that which produces good works unbidden, there are to be found in Luther other views also, which do not, however, claim to have equal importance. There is this view in particular—that good works, i.e., moral conduct, represent thankfulness to God, who has awakened faith in us. Thankfulness is conceived of here, not as requital, but as the conduct that corresponds with the gift, i.e., as the longing that asserts itself for fuller realisation of fellowship with God, so that this scheme really runs back into the first-named, only that the free action comes to view here prominently as joyful recognition of duty to be fulfilled. On the question as to what scope belongs (according to Luther) in moral conduct to the contemplation of one's neighbour as a direct end, or, in other words, to love for one's neighbour, see Thieme, l.c., p. 20, 298, Herrmann, Verkehr
there must be progress in holiness, conflict and struggle, that also he knew; but when he grew weary in good works, he broke into the prayer, Increase my faith! The exclusive relation of forgiveness of sins, faith and assurance of salvation is the first and last word of Luther's Christianity. Where the knowledge of God is, there is also life and blessedness—that is the old confession of the Church. But what the knowledge of God is that is here meant—on this there was no clearness of thought: future knowledge, philosophical knowledge, intuitive knowledge, mystic-sacramental enjoyment of God, knowledge through the Logos—all these mistaken ways were adopted, and as no certainty of God was found, no blessedness was found. Luther did not seek a knowledge, it was given in his Christian standing, God in Christ; “where forgiveness of sins is, there is life and blessedness.”¹ But in this faith he also acquired religious independence and freedom over against all that was not God; for only independence and freedom is life. The freedom which his opponents had left in a place to which it does not at all belong he did away with; but as a substitute for the noxious remnant which he discarded, he reaped the freedom which Paul glories des Christen, 3rd ed., p. 259 ff. Herrmann remarks that Luther did not fulfil the task of showing how neighbouring love springs from faith (fellowship with God), i.e., how faith itself gathers up its own impulses in the strenuous resolve to love one’s neighbour, and how there dare be no moral motives that transcend this. Thieme adheres to a relative independence of moral work and intercourse with the world. The monistic religious attitude, for which Herrmann is an advocate, will, however, only stand the dogmatic test, if the homogeneous structure (faith working by love) can be built up also from the side of neighbourly love; for, according to the gospel of Jesus Christ, love of one’s neighbour is not subordinated to love to God, but is—owing to the double position of man—the given whole under the point of view of time, while the love to God is the whole under the point of view of eternity. But even in Luther there are passages enough to be discovered, in which ministering love appears as the supernatural character of man in the same sense as trust in God’s providence and patience.

¹Loofs, l.c., 2nd ed., p. 230: “With the Greeks sin fell into the background behind φθορά. Ruin and redemption were physically conceived of; Augustine and Catholicism attached greater weight to sin, but behind sin stood concupiscence, in the main conceived of physically, behind righteousness the hyper-physical infusion dilectionis, etc.; hence Catholicism culminates in ascetic morality and mysticism; for Luther there stands behind sin (in the ethical sense) sin in the religious sense, i.e., unbelief, behind the being righteous the fundamental religious virtue, i.e., faith; Luther re-discovered Christianity as religion.”
in at the close of the eighth chapter of the Romans. With their "free will" the former had become slaves of the Church and of men; in his confession of "unfree will," i.e., in his certainty of justification by faith, Luther found freedom and courage to defy an entire world. That which is called the individualism of Protestantism, and to which a high value is justly attached, has its root here: the Christian is through his God an independent being, who is in need of nothing, and neither stands under bondage to laws nor is in dependence on men. He is a priest before God, taken charge of by no priest, and a king over the world.¹

(3) Luther's Criticism of the Ruling Ecclesiastical Tradition and of Dogma.

We shall place together here in brief form the most important critical propositions of Luther, that it may be seen to what extent the Reformer diverged from the ruling tradition.² In

¹ Compare here the Treatise, "De libertate Christiana."

² It is well known that the habit increased with him of describing himself and his adherents as the old Church, his opponents as the apostates and as the "new Church"; see "Wider Hans Worst" (Vol. 26, p. 12): "But how if I have proved that we have held by the true old Church, nay, that we are the true old Church; you, on the other hand, have become renegades from us, that is from the old Church, and have set up a new Church in opposition to the old Church." Luther now enumerates the points in respect of which he and his adherents have maintained the old, and those which his opponents have abandoned: (1) we have the old baptism, (2) we have the Eucharist as Christ instituted it and as the Apostles and primitive Christendom observed it, (3) we have the keys, as Christ appointed them, with the view of binding and loosing sins that are committed against God's commandments (no "New Keys," no commingling with political power), (4) our discharge of the office of preaching and our proclaiming the Word of God are marked by purity and fulness, (5) we have the Apostolic Symbol, the old faith of the old Church, (6) we have the Lord's Prayer and sing the Psalms with the old Church, (7) like those of old we pay respect to the secular authorities and yield them cordial obedience, (8) we praise and magnify the estate of marriage, as the ancient Church did, (9) we are persecuted as it was, (10) like it, we requite the shedding of blood, not with the shedding of blood, but with patience. From these ten points Luther makes it clear to himself that his reformation was the restoration of the ancient Church. On the other hand he shows that the papists are the new, false Church; for (1) they do not adhere to the primitive baptism, but teach rather that baptism is lost through sin, and that then one must
what way, and in what order he arrived at the separate propositions has already been frequently described. The process, too, is at all the principal points so obvious, and is at the same time so plainly the result of what he saw positively, that it seems unnecessary here to enter more minutely into the history of the development of the negative theses. But with a view to understanding his criticism three things must be premised: first, that the Reformer—differing in this from Zwingli—always passed from the centre to the circumference, i.e., from faith to institution; second, that down to the year 1521 his polemic against the Church was step by step forced upon him by his opponents; third, that his negative criticism was directed, not against doctrines in themselves, but against such doctrines as had a pernicious influence upon practice—taking the word in the most comprehensive sense. On this account there would not be much difficulty in describing the whole Reformation of Luther under the heading, "Reform of divine service" (see above, p. 191).

1. Luther's judgment has been reproduced by Melanchthon in the well-known sentence of the Apology, IV. (II., beginning):

make satisfaction with his own works, (2) they have brought in the indulgence as a kind of new baptism, (3) in the same sense they use holy water and salt, (4) and (5) in the same sense pilgrimages and brotherhoods, (6) they have introduced many detestable and scandalous innovations into the Eucharist, made it a "priests' sacrifice," divided it, severed it from faith, changed it by means of the masses into heathen idolatry and a lumber market (Grempelmarkt), (7) they have made "New Keys," which have to do with outward works (eating, drinking, etc.) and with political jurisdiction, (8) they have introduced new doctrines, human doctrine and lies (after the profanation of the Eucharist that is the second abomination), (9) over the Church, which is a spiritual Kingdom, they have placed a secular head (that is the third specially wicked abomination), (10) they have set up the worship of saints, "so that in this matter their Church has come to be in no way different from the Churches of the heathen, who worship Jupiter, Juno, Venus, Diana, and other dead ones;" you have a pantheon like the heathen, (11) they slander the estate of marriage, (12) they have introduced the novelty of ruling and carrying on war with the secular sword. Here Luther breaks off, but adds (p. 23): "There are still many more new matters." The attitude which he here assumes—of contending that the Reformation related merely to the innovations of the papists—it was by no means possible for him strictly to maintain, nor did he desire to do so. He knows very well, though he has not made it connectedly clear to himself, that the mistaken development of the Church had begun much earlier.
"Seeing that those on the other side\(^1\) understand neither what remission of sins is, nor what faith is, nor what grace is, nor what righteousness is, they miserably corrupt the topic of justification, and obscure the glory and benefits of Christ, and rob pious consciences of the consolations presented to them in Christ."\(^2\) This means a denial of the truth, not of one part only of the ruling doctrine of salvation, but of that doctrine itself; and every particular point of that doctrine, indeed, was assailed by Luther: (1) that doctrine of God which, instead of dealing with God only as He is in Christ, calculated in a "sophistical" way about His attributes, and speculated upon His will—the entire "metaphysical" doctrine of God was often enough denounced and ridiculed by him as a product of blind reason;\(^3\) (2) the Christology, in so far as one was content to speculate about the two natures, the incarnation, the virgin birth, etc., instead of fixing attention on the office, the commission, and so, on the benefits of Christ;\(^4\) (3) the doctrine of the truth, righteousness, and grace of God, inasmuch as the comfort furnished by these themes was not recognised, from their being restricted by reason through a regard to law and to what man does, and deprived of their evangelical significance; (4) the doctrines of sin and of free will, because a Pelagian self-righteousness lay hidden behind them; (5) the doctrines of justification and faith, because they did not at all touch the point that is of sole importance—the having a God—there being set up in place of this, uncertainty and human desert, (6) the doctrine of good works, because, first, it showed no knowledge of what good works are, and therefore no truly good works were ever performed, and because, second,

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\(^1\) That is, the Scholastic theologians, whom Luther for a long time distinguished from the official Church and regarded as a kind of sect who had overmastered the Church: "The Aristotelicans."

\(^2\) "Adversarii quum neque quid remissio peccatorum, neque quid fides neque quid gratia neque quid justitia sit, intelligant, misere contaminant locum de justificatione et obscurant gloriam et beneficia Christi et eripiunt piis conscientiis propositas in Christo consolationes."


\(^4\) Compare the motto placed at the beginning of this vol.
these "good works" were put in the place that belongs exclusively to faith.

2. In closest connection with this Luther attacked the whole Catholic (not only the mediæval) ideal of Christian perfection. In combating monachism, asceticism, special performances, etc., he combated that "foremost lie" ("πρῶτον ψευδός") of the moralistic-Pelagian view, that there is something else that can have value before God than Himself. Just on that account he abolished to its last remnants the notion of a double morality, and represented the faith ("vivificatio et sanctificatio") that finds comfort in forgiveness of sins to be the Christian perfection. It was just this, however, that enabled him also to rise above the eschatological temper of the old ideal of perfection; for it was involved in the nature of that ideal that it was only beyond this earth—in heaven—that it could be fully realised. During this present state of existence the angelic life can only consist in first beginnings. This kind of eschatology Luther broke with and put an end to, without surrendering the longing for the life that comes through vision. It was a new conception of blessedness which he set up in opposition to his opponents; in thinking of blessedness they thought of an enjoyment experienced by sanctified senses and sanctified powers of knowledge; he thought of the comfort experienced by a pacified conscience. They knew only how to speak of it as something fragmentary; for at the most they had only experienced it for short periods; he could bear witness of it as a child does of the love of his father by which he knows himself to be wrapped round. In spite of all the flood of feeling that overwhelmed them, they continued poor and unstable and distressed; he saw in all that only the old hell by which the sinner is pursued, and, convinced of this, he demolished monachism, asceticism, and everything in the shape of merit. As at every other point, so also in connection with the ideal of blessedness, he exterminated the subtle dualism which runs through the whole Catholic view of Christianity.

From these attacks on the doctrine of salvation and on monastic perfection there necessarily followed, for him, his attacks on the sacraments, on priestism and churchism and the
ecclesiastical worship of God; but besides this also, his attacks on the formal authorities of Catholicism and of the Catholic doctrine.

3. Luther not merely denied that the number of the Sacraments was seven—that was the matter of least importance—he cut the root of the whole Catholic notion of the Sacraments by his victorious assertion of the three following propositions: (1) that the Sacraments are of service for the forgiveness of sins and for nothing else, (2) that they do not “become efficacious in their being celebrated, but in their being believed in” (“non imple tur dum fiunt, sed dum creduntur”), (3) that they are a peculiar form of the saving Word of God (of the self-realising promise of God [promissio dei]), and therefore have their power from the historic Christ. In consequence of this view Luther reduced the Sacraments to two (three)—nay, at bottom, to one only, namely, the Word of God. He showed that even the most enlightened Church Fathers had only vague ideas about this matter of primary importance—“Augustine has much to say about Sacrament, but little about Word”—and that by the Schoolmen the subject was completely obscured. He directs himself both against the magic of the “opus operatum” and against the mistaken transference of the saving effect of the Sacrament into the human disposition; he puts an end both to the mystic vagueness that accompanies a revelling in Sacraments, and to the scandalously godless calculation of their market value; he annihilates the convenient and yet so meaningless thought of portions of grace, and places in the Sacrament the living Christ, who, as the Christ preached (Christus praedicatus), vanquishes the old man and awakens the new; he reduces to ruins nothing less than the whole system, and goes back again to the one, simple, great act, constantly repeating itself in every Christian life, of the production of faith through the offer of grace. It was above everything else by setting aside the Catholic doctrine of the Sacraments, that Luther abolished in principle the error originating in the earliest times, that what the Christian religion concerns itself with is a good, which, however lofty it may be, is still objective. That doctrine had its root in the fundamental notion that religion is the remedy for
man's finitude—in the sense that it deifies his nature. This thought was no doubt already shaken by Augustine's doctrine, but only shaken. As the fore-runner of Luther, Augustine had already made the Sacraments serviceable to an inner process; they were to produce, increase, and perfect righteousness. But as with this end before him he contemplated them from the stand-point of "infused grace" ("infused love"), he did not carry his view beyond the point of regarding them as instruments of various kinds, in which only a special power resides, and which in the last resort are not what they represent. The Church afterwards followed him upon this track. By moulding itself into the Sacrament-Church, it really deprived the Sacrament of its worth; for it is not that which it seems to be; it merely makes that possible which it seems to contain; but in order that this possible thing may become actual, something else must be added. For Luther, on the other hand, the Sacraments are really only the "visible word" ("verbum visibile"), but the word which is strong and mighty, because in it God Himself works upon us and transacts with us. In the last analysis it is a contrariety in the view of grace that comes out with special distinctness here. According to the Catholic view, grace is the power that is applied and infused through the Sacraments, which, on condition of the co-operation of free will, enables man to fulfil the law of God and to acquire the merits that are requisite for salvation. But according to Luther grace is the Fatherly disposition of God, calling guilty man for Christ's sake to Himself and receiving him by winning his trust through the presentation to him of the picture of Christ. What has Sacrament to mean here?

That the particular Sacraments which Luther retained should have to receive a new treatment in accordance with this was a matter of course. How he desired to have Baptism and the Eucharist regarded he has indicated in the four propositions about the former,¹ and in the parallel propositions about the

¹ "Baptism is the water viewed in the light of God's command and united with God's Word." "It works forgiveness of sins." "This is not done, certainly, by the water, but by the Word of God, which is with and beside the water, and by the faith which trusts in such Word of God in the water." "Baptism means that the
latter, which he introduced into the Smaller Catechism. What lies beyond these propositions, or does not agree with them, will be dealt with in the next section. Most deeply incisive is seen to be his conception of repentance—it is nothing else than the daily return to baptism (reditus ad baptismum)—as compared with the Catholic Sacrament of penance, the centre and heart of the mediæval Church. First of all, for the inner penitent temper, the confession of sin, and the satisfaction, he substituted repentance alone; not as if he had simply abolished confession (confessio) and “satisfactio operis”—to the former he attached great value, and even for the latter he could allow a certain title, but nothing else must be placed side by side with sincere repentance; for only to it belongs value before God, because He creates it through faith; secondly, true repentance was strictly conceived of by him as contrition (contritio), i.e., as the crushed feeling about sin awakened by faith, or, more correctly, as hatred of sin; that which the law can work is at most attrition (attritio), but this attrition of the Schoolmen is, if there is nothing beyond it, of no value, because it is not wrought by God, and therefore leads to hell. He thus brought back repentance from the region of morality and of arbitrary ecclesiastical order into the sphere of religion: “against thee only have I sinned”; thirdly, he made a demand for constancy of penitent disposition, as being the fundamental form of genuine Christian life in general, and thus declared penance performed before the priest to be a special instance of what

old Adam must be drowned in us day by day through daily sorrow and repentance . . . and that there must daily come forth and arise a new man.” The same in the case of the Eucharist.

1 Let it only be remarked here that Luther's original fundamental principle with regard to the Eucharist—see his treatise De captiv. Babyl. (Erl. Ed. Opp. var. arg. V., p. 50)—which lays the basis for his doctrine of the Sacraments, is expressed in these terms: “Jam missa quanto vicinior et similiior primæ omnium misse, quam Christus in cena fecit, tanto Christianior.”

2 In the sense in which it was understood by his opponents satisfactio was entirely discarded by Luther; see Erlang. Ed., Vol. 26, p. 17 (“Wider Hans Worst”): “And this thing, satisfactio, is the beginning and origin, the door and entrance to all abominations in the papacy; just as in the Church baptism is the beginning and entrance to all graces and to the forgiveness of sins.” See also p. 55; “For one knows now that satisfaction is nothing.”
should be a perpetual habit and practice; fourthly, he therewith cancelled the necessity for priestly co-operation, whether in connection with confession (confessio)—auricular confession as confession of all sins is impossible, as self-revelation to a brother it is salutary—or in connection with absolution: one Christian can and should forgive another his sin, and thereby, as Luther boldly expresses it, become to him a Christ; fifthly, he laid the strongest emphasis on contrition having combined with it absolution: it is only as belonging to each other that these two exist, and nothing must disturb or interfere with their union; but they belong to each other because they are both included in faith (fides); in faith, however, confession does not, strictly speaking, consist, to say nothing of "satisfaction"; sixthly, he removed all abuses that had become connected with the Sacrament; by relating forgiveness exclusively to the cancelling of eternal guilt, he made an end of the calculations of reason, so dangerous to souls, with regard to mortal sins and venial sins, eternal guilt and temporal guilt, eternal penalties and temporal penalties, and in this way also delivered the Sacrament from being mixed up with the regard to temporal profits which had been the necessary result of reflection upon temporal penalties; by restricting the effect of absolution to eternal guilt, he was led, in harmony with his insight into the nature of sin, to deal with this last much more earnestly than the Schoolmen did: the Schoolmen wrought with venial sin and with attrition, and showed great skill in reducing sins in general to the former, and in making attrition acceptable to God; in this matter he knew only of his infinite guilt and his God; seventhly, along with those abuses he expressly set aside the subtly refined doctrines of purgatory, of the applied merit of saints and of indulgences. Between the contrasted opposites of guilt and forgiveness, hell and heaven, there is nothing intermediate, hence there is no purgatory; merits of saints are a Pelagian invention, and so they can be placed to no one's credit; just for that reason indulgences are a foolish fancy, while the practice of them is a subversion of Christ's honour and of penitence;¹

¹ It is well known that on the 31st Oct., 1517, Luther had not yet completed his criticism of indulgences.
they merely relate to arbitrary church ordinances, they do not belong at all to religion.—By his overturning the Catholic Sacrament of penance and substituting for it the thought of justification by faith, Luther abandoned the old Church and came under the necessity of building a new one.

4. From the stand-point of faith he likewise overthrew the whole hierarchical and priestly Church System. His negative criticism in this department does not suffer from the slightest want of clearness. Through justification by faith every Christian is a Christian with full rights and privileges; nothing stands between him and his God; the Church, again, is the community of believers, visible through the preaching of the Word—nothing else. To this Church the “Keys” are given, i.e., the application of the divine Word; they are given to it, because they are given to faith. These propositions have the effect of excluding both a spiritual class to whom believers are bound, and the jurisdictional power of the Church. But this strikes at the heart, not merely of the mediæval Church, but of the ancient Church as well, at least from the time of Irenæus. And with what inexorable energy Luther drew the conclusions here, including even the inference that the Pope is Antichrist; what sport he could make with the “grease, tar and butter” with which the Church anointed its sorcerers and hypocrites; in what language he could describe the Church Order, the canonical law, the power of the Pope as the abomination of desolation in the holy place! If it is asked what the power was that here brought the words of wrath to his lips, the answer must be that it was the knowledge the confession of which is felt to be so hard to-day even by keen-sighted Protestant theologians—the knowledge that the power of faith is as much enfeebled by added burdens as by false doctrine. Why should it not be possible that there should exist in Christendom a Pope, a priesthood, an episcopal constitution, a jurisdictional power of the Church extending over all realms? There is nothing that forbids such an order, if it is serviceable, and there is more than one cogent reason recommending it. But to demand this order in the name of the gospel, or even to let it continue to appear that it is the outcome of the gospel itself, means to impose a
burden on religion that crushes it. Luther felt and saw that. The bishops, the councils and even the Pope he would willingly have allowed to continue, or at least would have tolerated, if they had accepted the gospel; to what states of things would not this man of inward freedom have readily adjusted himself, if the pure Word of God was taught! But they appealed on behalf of themselves and their practices to the Word of God, and declared they were as surely to be found there as the forgiveness of sins; and so he made havoc of them, and pilloried them as men who sought for all possible things, only not for the honour of God and Christ.

5. Not less radical was his attitude towards the ecclesiastical worship of God. Here also he broke down the tradition, not only of the mediaeval but also of the ancient Church, as this is traceable by us back to the second century. The Church’s public worship of God is for him nothing but unity in divine worship in respect of time and place on the part of individuals. By this proposition all the peculiar halo—simply pagan, however, in its character—which surrounded public worship was dissolved; the special priest and the special sacrifice were done away with, and all value was taken from specific ecclesiastical observances participation in which is saving and essential. Not as if Luther failed to recognise the importance of fellowship—yet even on this matter he betrays uncertainty here and there;1 how highly he estimated preaching and divine service (ministerium divinum)! But public divine service can have no other aim, no other course, no other means, than the divine service of the individual has; for God treats with us simply through the Word, which is not exclusively attached to particular persons, and He requires from us no other service than the faith that unfolds itself in praise and thanksgiving, humility and penitence, firm trust in God’s help amidst all need, therefore also in fidelity in one’s calling and in prayer. What is contemplated therefore in public divine service can be in no way different from this: the building up of faith through proclamation of the divine Word and the offering in prayer of the common

1 It frequently seems as if public divine service were only a provision for training the imperfect, and this does not in every case merely seem to be the meaning.
sacrifice of praise. In so far, however, as it is the Christian liturgy that is at bottom the true service of God, public worship always maintains in relation to this the character merely of something particular. That Luther took up towards the Catholic mass an attitude of strong repugnance and repudiated the monstrous irregularities that turned divine service into a means for securing profane profit, is denied by no one. That he here set aside numberless abuses is a manifest fact; but the seemingly conservative attitude he assumed in making his corrections in the Manual for Mass, and his declinature to undertake an entire reconstruction of divine service, led many "Lutherans" in the sixteenth century, as well as in the nineteenth, to fall back on extremely objectionable views as to a specific (religious) value of public worship, as to the purpose of worship and its means. How un-Lutheran that is—because it is possible and necessary here to correct Luther by Luther himself—and how the evangelical idea of the worship of God differs toto coclo from the Catholic, has been excellently shown quite recently. The question is of special importance within the lines of the history of dogma, because Luther's attitude towards worship has the most exact parallel in his attitude towards dogma.¹

¹ See Gottschick, Luther's Anschaunungen vom christlichen Gottesdienst und seine thatsächliche Reform desselben (1887); compare the discussion on p. 3, where at every point one might substitute for Old Lutheran Liturgy Old Lutheran dogmatic: "We should less require... to be concerned did we find that the old Lutheran Liturgy was an even relatively genuine product of the peculiar spirit of the Reformation, the spirit which we cannot throw off without losing our very selves. That could only be the case, however, if Luther had derived the highest positive, the so to speak creative principle of his new liturgical ordinances from the new views that had been acquired by him of Christianity as a whole. But in point of fact Luther attached himself to the order of the Roman Mass, and reshaped this only in certain particulars, on the one hand excluding what was directly contrary to the gospel, on the other hand introducing certain points of detail.—Besides, he had so little interest in liturgy, was so little guided by the thought of an inner, vital law controlling the arrangement of divine service, that in connection with nearly every part of the Catholic legacy he makes the remark, that this is of little importance, and the matter might be equally well dealt with otherwise. Under these circumstances we do not actually underestimate the merit Luther acquired in connection even with reform of divine worship, when we do not conceal from ourselves the necessity for our attempting a really new construction in this field, taking the principles lying in Luther's Reformation view as our guide. But as in other fields so here also the matter stands thus—that Luther himself has already developed the really evangelical principles for the reconstruction
6. Luther annihilated the formal, outward authorities for faith, which had been set up by Catholicism. That here likewise he not merely attacked mediæval institutions, but set aside the old Catholic doctrine, is beyond dispute. As this has already been dealt with above (p. 23 ff.), let us only sum up here what is most essential. Catholicism, whose mode of view always led it in the first instance to separate into parts the religious experience, that it might then submit it to be dealt with by the understanding, had also introduced here the distinction between the matter itself and the authority. This distinction corresponded with its method of drawing distinctions generally, a method which proceeded by differentiating at one time between necessity, possibility, and reality, at another time between form and matter, at another time between effect and saving effect. All these extremely confusing arts of reason are lacking in Luther's original theses. Neither is there to be laid on him the weight of responsibility for distinguishing between a formal and a material principle;¹ for the matter was for him the authority, and the authority the matter. But the matter is the Christ of history as preached, the Word of God. From this point he gained the insight and courage to protest against the formal authorities of Catholicism as against commandments of men. Thereby, however, he threw overboard the whole system of Catholicism, as it had been elaborated from the days of Irenæus; for the inviolability of this system rests simply on the formal authorities; the faith that Fathers and Schoolmen appealed to was obedience to the Church doctrine, an obedience that is certain of what it holds, because those authorities are represented as inviolable. But

from his fundamental view of religion, and to a much greater extent, too, than can be discovered from his acts as a Reformer and from the writings that bear upon these." The sure proof of this is given in the dissertation itself.

¹ See Ritsch in the Zeitschr. für K.-Gesch. I., p. 397 ff. Following on this article there is an increasing tendency to discontinue recognising in Luther the distinction between a formal and a material principle. Thus it is even said in Thomasius-Seeberg, II., p. 345: "The principle of Protestantism is faith in Christ as the only Saviour, the faith that justifies, that is witnessed to by Holy Scripture, that is wrought by the Word of God (by the Holy Spirit)." But in what follows there is again a denial in some measure of this perception in favour of the Scripture principle.
Luther protested against all these authorities, the infallibility of the Church, of the Pope, the Councils, and the Church Fathers, both with regard to Christian doctrine and with regard to exposition of Scripture, against the guarantee which the constitution of the Church was alleged to furnish for truth, and against every doctrinal formulation of the past as such—on the ground that in every case they themselves required to be proved. But—when so bravely carrying on his battle against the authority of the Councils—Luther took up at the same time an adverse attitude towards the infallibility of Scripture; and how could he do otherwise? If only that is authority which is also matter—the position of the Christian as both bound and free postulated this—how could there be authority where the matter does not distinctly appear, or where even the opposite of it appears? The content of a person who gives himself to be our own, never can be coincident with a written word however clear and certain it may be. Thus Luther necessarily had to distinguish even between Word of God and Holy Scripture. It is true, certainly, that a book which represents itself as the sure word of Christ and as apostolic testimony, makes in the highest sense the claim to be regarded as the Word of God. But yet Luther refused to be dictated to and to have his mouth stopped even by the apostolical—and that exactly at the most trying time, when the formal authority of the letter seemed to be most of all required by him. What limitations and losses he subsequently imposed upon himself is a question to be dealt with afterwards; but there can be no doubt that the position Luther took up towards the New Testament in his "Prefaces," and even in special discussions elsewhere, was the correct one, i.e., the position corresponding to his faith, and that by his attitude towards its formal authorities Catholicism was abolished by him from its historical beginnings.

7. Finally, there is still a very important point to be adverted to. In very many passages Luther has indicated with sufficient distinctness, that he merely conceded to his theological opponents the theological terminology, and made use of it himself merely on account of traditional familiarity with it, and because the employment of incorrect words was not necessarily of
evil. He so expressed himself with regard to the most important terms. First of all he had an objection to all the different descriptions of justification: to justify, to be regenerated, to sanctify, to quicken, righteousness, to impute (justificare, regenerari, sanctificare, vivificare, justitia, imputare), etc., etc.; he felt very much that the mere number of the terms was a serious burden upon his conception, and that no single word completely answered to his view. Secondly, in a similar way he objected to the word satisfaction (satisfactio) in every sense; as used by his opponents he will only let it pass. Thirdly, he stumbled at the term "Church" (ecclesia); for it obscured or confused what should simply be called Christian community, gathering, or—still better—a holy Christendom. Fourthly, he observed very clearly the objectionableness of the word "Sacrament"; what he would have liked most would have been to see that the use of it was entirely avoided, and that for the ambiguous formula "Word and Sacrament," there was substituted the Word alone, or that if the term Sacrament was retained there should be a speaking of one Sacrament and several signs. Fifthly, he himself declared such a term as ὁμοούσιος to be unallowable in the strict sense, because it represents a bad state of things when such words are invented in the Christian system of faith: "we must indulge the Fathers in the use of it . . . but if my soul hates the word homousios and I prefer not to use it, I shall not be a heretic; for who will compel me to use it, provided that I hold the thing which was defined in the Council by means of the Scriptures? although the Arians had wrong views with regard to the faith, they were nevertheless very right in this . . . that they required that no profane and novel word should be allowed to be introduced into the rules of faith." In like manner he objected to and

1 Erlang Ed. Opp. var. arg. V., p. 21: "tantum tria sacramenta ponenda . . . quamquam, si usu scripture loqui velim, non nisi unum sacramentum habeam et tria signa sacramentalia."

2 "Indulgendum est patribus . . . quod si oit anima mea vocem homousion et nolim ea uti, non ero haereticus; quis enim me coget uti, modo rem teneam quae in concilio per scripturas definita est? ets Arianis male sensorunt in fide, hoc tamen optime . . . exegerunt, ne vocem profanam et novam in regulis fidei statui liceret.

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rather avoided the terms "Dreifaltigkeit," "Dreiheit," "unitas," "trinitas" (threelfoldness, threeness, oneness, trinity). Yet, as is proved by the words quoted above, there is this difference observable here—that he regarded the terminologies of the medieval theology as misleading and false, the terminologies on the other hand of the theology of the ancient Church as merely useless and cold. But from still another side he objected most earnestly to all the results of theological labour that had been handed down from the days of the Apologists; and here in still greater degree than in his censure of particular conceptions his divergence from the old dogma found expression, namely, in that distinguishing between "for himself (itself)" and "for us," which is so frequently to be found in Luther. Over and over again, and on all occasions, the definitions given by the old dogmatic of God and Christ, of the will and attributes of God, of the natures in Christ, of the history of Christ, etc., are set aside with the remark: "that He is for himself," in order that his new view, which is for him the chief matter, nay, which constitutes the whole, may then be introduced under the formula "that He is for us," or simply "for us." "Christ is not called Christ because He has two natures. What concern have I in that? But he bears this glorious and comforting title from the office and work which He has taken upon Him . . . that He is by nature man and God, that He has for Himself." ¹ In this "for himself" and "for us" the new theology of Luther, and at the same time his conservative tendency find clearest expression. Theology is not the analysis and description of God and of the divine acts from the standpoint of reason as occupying an independent position over against God, but it is the confession on the part of faith of its own experience, that is, of revelation. This, however, puts an end to the old theology with its metaphysic and its rash ingenuity.² But if Luther now

¹ Erlang. Ed., Opp. var. arg. V., p. 505 sq. See also the Augsburg Confutation (Art. 1), whose authors observed very clearly what was heretical in these words.

² See Theod. Harnack, Luther's Theologie, I., p. 83: "Yet revelation guarantees a true and saving knowledge of the essential Godhead in itself." Nay, Christians alone are able to speak of this and have this divine wisdom. It is true, no doubt, that revelation lays down definite conditions for theology and imposes limits upon it,
nevertheless allows those old doctrines to remain under the terms "God in Himself," "the hidden God," "the hidden will of God," they no longer remain as what are properly speaking doctrines of faith. About this no doubt can arise. But that they were not entirely rejected by him has its cause on the one hand in his believing they were found in Scripture, and on the other hand in his failure to think out the problems in a comprehensive and systematic way. With this we shall have to deal in the following section.

In view of what has been set forth in the last two paragraphs with regard to the Christianity of Luther and his criticism of the ecclesiastical dogma, it cannot but be held that in Luther's Reformation the old dogmatic Christianity was discarded and a new evangelical view substituted for it. The Reformation was really an issue of the history of dogma. The positive and negative elements of Luther's Christian doctrine are most intimately connected; the latter are the effect, the former the cause. If he still concurs with this or that formulation of the ancient or the medieaval Church, then, with what we have considered before us, that is partly apparent only, and it is partly a free concurrence, which can never have had its cause in an a priori surrender to tradition. The formal authorities of dogma were swept away; thereby dogma itself, i.e., the inviolable system of doctrine established by the Holy Spirit, was abolished. But it is by no means the case that dogma re-emerges in the old form —now, however, as the content of devout faith; there appears rather the pure doctrine of the Gospel (pura doctrina evangelii) as a new dogmatic opposed to the old; for there was a setting aside of all those intellectual dividings up of the content of faith, by which that content was separated into metaphysic, natural theology, revealed doctrine, sacramental doctrine and ethic. In but these do not consist in that arbitrary and comfortless separation between God's essence and His revelation; they are partly objective, implied in the content, measure and aim of revelation itself, and they partly relate subjectively to the principle involved in the object itself and to the nature and tendency of theological knowledge as thereby conditioned."
this way the revision extended itself back beyond the second century of the history of the Church, and it was at all points a radical one. *The history of dogma*, which had its beginning in the age of the Apologists, nay, of the Apostolic Fathers, *was brought to an end*.

*Thereby the work of Augustine was finally brought to completion;* for, as we have shown in our second Book, this great man, by going back to Paulinism, began the work of breaking down and powerfully re-casting the ruling dogmatic tradition and of restoring theology to faith. But the sceptic stopped short before the formal authorities of Catholicism, and the Neoplatonists would not cease revelling in the All-One; besides, Augustine knew not yet how to enter into sure possession of the power given through faith in God as the Father of Jesus Christ. Thus his Church received from him, along with a problem, a complex and confused inheritance—the old dogma—and, running parallel with this, a new inward piety, which moved in thoughts quite different from dogma. This attitude is revealed at the very beginning of the Middle Ages by Alcuin, and from the time of Bernard onwards, Augustinianism, augmented in some degree by valuable elements, continued to exercise its influence. Certainly Luther stands in many respects closer to an Irenæus and an Athanasius than to the theologians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; but in many respects he is further removed from the former than from the latter, and this is a clear evidence that the inner development of Christianity in the Middle Ages was by no means merely retrograde or entirely mistaken. If Luther had to break even with a Tauler or a Bernard, how much more was a break necessary with Augustine and Irenæus! The Reformation is the issue of the history of dogma because it brings about this issue in the line of the origination of it *within the history of piety* by Augustine, and of its subsequent preparation during a period of a thousand years. *It set up the evangelical faith in place of dogma, this being done by its cancelling the dualism of dogmatic Christianity and practical Christian self-criticism and life-conduct.*

But what it placed at the centre of practical Christian self-criticism and life-conduct was just faith itself and its certainty.
Thereby it gave to the theoretic element—if one may so describe the sure faith in revelation, *i.e.*, in the God who manifests Himself in Christ—a direct importance for piety such as was never known by mediaeval theology. "Let this be the sum of the matter: our love is ready to die for you, but to touch faith means to touch the pupil of our eye."\(^1\) Hence nothing is more incorrect than the widely prevalent opinion that the cancelling of dogmatic Christianity by Luther was equivalent to a neutralising of all "faith that is believed" ("fides quæ creditur"): all that is required is simply pious feeling. A more foolish misunderstanding of Luther’s Reformation cannot be conceived of; for precisely the opposite rather is true of it: *it only restored its sovereign right to faith, and thereby to the doctrine of faith*—in the sense of its being nothing but the doctrine of Christ—*after the uncertainties of the Middle Ages, which had reached their highest point at the beginning of the sixteenth century; and to the horror of all Humanists, Churchmen, Franciscans, and Illuminists set up theology, *i.e.*, the true theology of the cross (theologia crucis), as the decisive power in the Church. Dogma, which always taught merely how religion is possible, and therefore could not at all stand at the centre of piety, was detached from that proclamation of faith which itself produces and builds up faith, and therefore claims as its right the sovereign position in religion. Luther passed back from the Middle Ages to the ancient Church, in so far as he again reduced the immense material forming the system of Christian faith to Christology. But he distinguished himself from the ancient Church in this, that he undertook so to shape faith in the revelation in Christ that the revelation should appear not merely as the condition of our salvation, but—objectively and subjectively—as the sole efficient factor in it.

But if this describes the revolution of things, then it can be very easily understood how the great task, the fulfilment of which was contemplated, could not be carried out in a thoroughly strict way by Luther himself. A superhuman spirit would have been required in order here to think out and arrange everything

\(^1\) "Summa esto: charitas nostra pro vobis mori parata est, fides vero si tangitur, tangitur pupilla oculi nostri."
correctly; for there were two tasks in view, which almost seemed contradictory, though this was not actually true of them: to place the importance of faith as the content of revelation in the centre, in contradistinction to all opinion and doing, and thus to bring to the front the suppressed theoretic element, and yet on the other hand not simply to adopt that faith which the past had developed, but to exhibit it rather in the form in which it is life and creates life, is practice, but is religious practice. From the greatness of this problem there is also to be explained the survival in Luther's theology of those elements which confuse it and have necessarily shaken the conclusion that the Reformation is the issue of the history of dogma.

(4) The Catholic Elements retained by Luther along with and within his Christianity.¹

Whether the Catholic elements contained in Luther's Christianity be few or many, so much at least is certain from what has been already brought to view—namely, that they belong certainly to the "whole Luther," but not to the "whole Christianity" of Luther. Following in the line of Neander Ritschl,² and many others, Loofs too expresses this opinion,³ "So far as the history of dogma is concerned, the Lutheran Reformation would have completed itself otherwise than it

¹ Against the misunderstanding that my criticism of Luther in the following section is unhistorical and over-acute I am not able to protect myself. I know as well as my opponents that for Luther's consciousness his faith and his theology formed a unity, and that the greater part of what is represented here as limitation in Luther's doctrine was the necessary result of the historical position he assumed and of the way in which he set about his great task. But by our seeing this we are not forbidden, if the "entire Luther" is set up as a law of faith for the Evangelical Church, to show what there was in the sum of his conceptions that was simply derived from the history of the times or was traditional. It must also be taken into consideration that he clung to a negative attitude towards certain conclusions deducible from his own religious principles, and towards perceptions that already existed or were making their appearance in his age. But here also the question for history is not what ought to have been, but what was.

² See above p. 27.

ultimately did, if the conclusions that follow from Luther's fundamental thoughts had been established by him in their entirety and by a thorough-going comparison with the whole tradition. The fragments of the old that remained restricted even for Luther himself the validity of the new thoughts, and, in the case of those who came later, impoverished them.” The question as to whether between the years 1519 and (about) 1523 Luther did not take a step of advance that had the promise in it of more thorough reforms, has as a rule been answered negatively by the most recent students of Luther, after H. Lang¹ and others had in an incautious and an untenable way answered it in the affirmative. Yet in my opinion the negative answer can only be given with great reservations.² What is in question according to my judgment, as was remarked above (p. 169), is not so much whether there were two periods in the reforming activity of Luther, as rather whether there was a great episode in this work of his during which he was lifted above his own limitations. Yet this point need not be further discussed here. In this connection it falls to us in the first instance to discover the grounds that made it possible for Luther to retain so much of the old, nay, to retain even the old Catholic dogma itself, along with the new, and to interweave the one with the other. In aiming at this we can find a point of departure in our discussions above, p. 168 ff. We shall then have to state and illustrate briefly the most important groups of the old dogma doctrines to be found in Luther.

I. 1. Luther took his stand on the side of faith as opposed to every kind of work, on the side of the doctrine of the gospel (doctrina evangelii) as opposed to the performances and processes which were represented as making man righteous. Hence he stood in danger of adopting or approving any kind of expression of faith, if only it appeared free from law and performance, work and process (see the proof above p. 177 f). Into this danger he fell. Accordingly confusion entered into his conception of the Church also. His conception of the

¹ M.L., ein relig. Characterbild, 1870.
² I am pleased to observe from indications in Weingarten’s Zeittafeln und Ueberblicke, 3rd ed., pp. 167-170, that he holds a similar opinion.
Church (fellowship in faith, fellowship in pure doctrine) became as ambiguous as his conception of the doctrine of the gospel (doctrina evangelii).

2. Luther believed he was contending only against the abuses and errors of the Mediaeval Church. He declared, no doubt, not infrequently that he was not satisfied with the "dear Fathers," and that they had all gone astray; yet he was not clear-sighted enough to say to himself that if the Church Fathers were in error, their decrees at the Councils could not possibly contain the whole truth. In no way, it is true, did he feel himself any longer externally bound by these decrees, nay, we can see brilliant flashes of incisive criticism, e.g. in his treatise on Councils and Churches; yet these continued on the whole without effect. He always fell back again upon the view that the wretched Pope was alone to blame for all the evil, and that all the mischief, therefore, was connected with the Middle Ages only. Thus from this side his prepossession in favour of the faith-formulae of the Ancient Church—on the ground that they did not take to do with works and law—was only further strengthened; indeed there was exercising its influence here, unconsciously to himself, a remnant of the idea that the empirical Church is authority.

3. Luther knew too little of the history of the Ancient Church and of ancient dogma to be really able to criticise them. No doubt, when all comes to be put together that formed a subject of careful study for him, we shall be astonished at the amount he knew; yet he certainly could not know more that his century knew, and there were many who were his superiors in Patristic studies. He never entered deeply into the spirit of the Church Fathers; on the other hand an abstract criticism was at all times quite remote from him; under these circumstances, therefore, there remained for him only a conservative attitude. This attitude Luther really definitely renounced only when he saw the Fathers following the paths of Pelagius.  

1 See the quotation given in Vol. II., p. 7, note.
2 The wish here expressed has recently been fulfilled in an excellent way by the comprehensive and thorough investigation by E. Schäfer, Luther als Kirchenhistoriker (Gütersloh, 1897).
3 I must assume from p. 3 of Schäfer's work just referred to that he regards him.
4. Luther always includes himself and what he undertook within the one Church which he alone knew, within the Catholic Church (as he understood it).¹ He declared that this Church itself gave him the title to be a Reformer. That was right, if it was right that the empirical Church is only the Church so far as it is the fellowship of faith; but it was wrong, in so far as the Catholic Church was already something quite different—namely a State resting upon definite holy statutes. This Catholic Church, however, was viewed by Luther as a temporary, though already very old malformation, which could possess no rights whatever. So he believed that he could remain in the old Church, nay, that—though it might be only with a few friends—he was himself the old, true Church. This remarkable view, which is to be explained from the idealism of faith, made it possible for Luther to abandon the old Church and reduce it to ruins, but at the same time to assert that he himself stood within the old Church. If in holding this attitude he was so strong in faith that it gave him no concern how large or small the number might be who did not at the time bow the knee to Baal, yet he had the highest interest in its being shown that he represented the Church that had existed from century to century. Hence there arose the duty of proving that he stood within a historic continuity. But from what could that be more definitely proved than from the faith-formulae of the Ancient Church, which still retained their authority?

5. Luther never felt strongly impelled to start from the innermost centre of the new view of the whole of Christianity which he had obtained, and from thence to furnish a systematic statement of the whole, indicating exactly what remained and what had dropped away. He assumed a commanding air in theology, as a child does in the home, summoning forth old and new and always having in view merely the nearest practical end. The correction of theoretical errors as such gave him no concern as having refuted the judgment indicated above, which is not, however, the case. What he brings forward to illustrate Luther’s knowledge and opinions regarding Church history was in the main known to me; nothing follows from it that conflicts with the view expressed in the text.

¹ See especially his treatises “Von den Conciliis und Kirchen” and “Wider Hans Worst.”
whatever; he had no longing whatever for the clearness of a well-arranged system of doctrine; but on that account his strength became also his weakness.  

6. Luther used the old doctrines in such a way that expression was given to the whole of Christianity under each scheme, i.e., he interpreted each scheme in the sense of his view of the whole of Christianity; what was included in the formula beyond this gave him little trouble though he might let it retain its validity. This peculiar attitude made it possible for him to adapt himself to what was very foreign. (See above p. 196.)

7. In principle Luther prepared the way for a sound historical exegesis; but how far the principle was from being really applied as yet by his century and by himself! In dealing with particulars he is still almost everywhere a mediæval exegete, fettered by all the prejudices of this exegesis, by the typology, and even, in spite of counter-working principles, by the allegorism. Although in principle he demanded that the understanding of Scripture should be free from the authority of ecclesiastical tradition, he still continues himself firmly bound by this tradition. He broke through it where justification was in question; but he then broke through it also in connection with passages containing nothing whatever of the doctrine of justification or of faith, or containing only something foreign to these doctrines. Under such circumstances it cannot surprise us that he found the doctrines of the Trinity, of the two natures, etc., in Holy Scripture, and even indeed in the Old Testament. But still more must be said here—he had altogether as little understanding of history as the majority of his contemporaries had. History in the highest sense of the word was for him a closed book. He showed no perception either of the relativity of the historical or of the growth and progress of knowledge within history. How could it be possible under such circumstances to ascertain accurately what Scripture contains as a historic record? But how can a pure form of expression for the essence

1 We have here the strict parallel to his way of estimating worship, which has already been spoken of above, p. 221 f.

2 While this opinion is held, it must not be forgotten of course that his genius as a hero enabled him to see what was correct at decisive points.
of Christianity be expected if this condition is not fulfilled?

The foregoing considerations have almost in every case indicated limitations that were involved in the peculiar attitude of the Reformer as a Reformer, or in the spiritual condition of the age, and which it was therefore absolutely impossible to transcend. But Luther's entire attitude was also determined by limitations which by no means come under this view, but were rather opposed to his attitude as a Reformer. These, if I see correctly, were chiefly the following: 1

8. His perception as a Reformer that the *Word of God* is the foundation of faith was not so clear as to put an end entirely to Biblicism: he continued, rather, to be involved here in a flagrant contradiction, for while he criticised Scripture itself, he certainly on the other hand set up the letter as the Word of God, in so far as he adopted without test the Rabbinic-Catholic idea of the verbal inspiration of Holy Scripture. In many cases, no doubt, he counterbalanced this contradictory procedure by interpreting the gospel itself into the letter under consideration; but apart from this, he certainly as a rule allowed the particular Bible narrative, the saying selected, whatever it might be, to have effect, directly and literally, as the Word of God.

9. Just as little did he rise clearly above the view of the Ancient Church and the Middle Ages in the question of the Sacrament. It is true, certainly, that he not only took steps towards breaking through this view, but really cancelled it by his doctrine of the *one* Sacrament, the Word; yet there still lingered with him a hidden remnant, a real superstition (superstitio), with regard to the Sacrament, and therefore also with regard to the "means of grace," and this superstition had

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1 I should prefer not to embrace a reference under the following scheme to the great extent to which Luther was dominated by coarse superstition, and that, too, in all possible fields. I do not include within this his belief in the devil, for that belongs to another sphere, incommensurable for my experience. But in determining his entire attitude as the founder of a Confession, the fact cannot certainly be left out of view that he was more superstitious than many of his contemporaries, nay, that in many respects he was as superstitious as a child. Those who constantly bring forward the "whole Luther" are responsible for its being necessary to mention such things.
the gravest consequences for his construction of doctrine. Though with him error and truth lie closely side by side here, yet it cannot be denied that he gave scope for serious errors.

10. No one assailed the Nominalistic theology more keenly than Luther; but his opponents forced him to theologise, and to answer their way of putting the question. In this connection he adopted the Nominalistic sequences of thought, and developed them more fully as his own. But even apart from this he did not discard the remnants of Nominalistic Scholasticism; indeed they reappeared in great strength, after he had passed in the doctrine of the Eucharist beyond the limit of what were really his own thoughts; but even in his doctrine of predestination he furnished scope for the errors and over-acuteness of Scholasticism.¹

11. After Luther had come into conflict with the "Enthusiasts" and Anabaptists, he acquired a distrust of reason, which passed far beyond his distrust of it as a support for self-righteousness. In many respects he really hardened himself into an attitude of bold defiance towards reason and then yielded also to that Catholic Spirit which worships in paradox and in contradiction of terms (contradictio in adjecto) the wisdom of God and sees in them the stamp of divine truth. Like Tertullian he could harp on the "certum est, quia ineptum est" ("it is certain, because it is absurd"), and take delight in the perplexities in which the understanding finds itself involved. He never, indeed, revelled in mystery as mystery, and in his paradoxes there was unquestionably an element of religious power, the secret of heroic spirits, and the secret of religion itself, which never lets itself be made perfectly transparent. Yet no one disparages reason and science with impunity, and Luther himself had to suffer for the obscurities to which he subjected his conception of faith; still greater, however, was the penalty for those who adhered to him, who degraded to a new Scholastic wisdom what he had defiantly proclaimed.

¹ See the dissertations that deal with Luther's Nominalism in connection with the criticism of his doctrine of predestination: Lütkens, Luther's Prädestinationslehre, 1858; Theod. Harnack, L.'s Theologie, I., p. 70, and elsewhere; Kattenbusch, L.'s Lehre v. unfreien Willen u. v. d. Prädést., 1875; Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Versöhn., Vol. I.
In connection with these reflections what is of greatest importance must not be passed over: the position which the Reformation took up towards the Anabaptists, and towards others who had affinity with them, became most disastrous for itself and for its subsequent history. At the present day we are passing through a phase of descriptive history of the Reformation, which does little in estimating the weight of this fact, because it is—for good reasons—most immediately interested in what is of primary importance—Luther’s faith and Luther’s ideal of life. There are in fact also many considerations that make it fully intelligible why the Reformation simply rejected everything that was offered to it by the “enthusiasts.” Yet, however many more explanations and excuses for this may be brought forward, the fact remains unaffected thereby, that the unjust course followed by the Reformers entailed upon them and their cause the most serious losses. How much they might have learned from those whom they despised, although they were forced to reject their fundamental thoughts! How much more decisively did many of these men put an end to the magic of the sacraments, how much more strictly and accurately they defined the significance of the written Word, how much more clearly they frequently discerned the real sense of Scripture passages, advocating at the same time a sounder exegesis, how much more courageously they drew many conclusions regarding the doctrine of the Trinity, Christology, etc., how much more resolutely did some

1 The Confessionalist description of history had little insight into, and little love for, the “sects” of the Reformation period. But since at the same time it did no even clearly discern the real importance of the Reformation, it was necessary in the first instance that this should be brought to light. That was done by Ritschl, and his disciples follow the directions given by him. And yet even with this done there has not been a passing beyond a very stiff, and almost indeed a narrow view of the Reformation, and little faculty has been shown for understanding the excellences which the “Enthusiasts” unquestionably possessed at peripheral points—some of them by no means merely at peripheral points. It must be admitted that the way in which many dilettante “historians of culture” have looked at things and shown their blindness to the true nature of the Reformation could not but have a strongly repellent effect; even such an enthusiast as Keller was unable to produce conviction. Yet from him much certainly could have been learned, and, above all, the guiding star for the writing of history—even the history of the Reformation—ought not to have been kept out of view—that real truths are never disparaged with impunity.
of them take their stand for outward, as a consequence of inward freedom! No doubt one says even here, "timeo Danaos et dona ferentes" ("I fear the Greeks even when they bring gifts"), and certainly these people's presuppositions were foreign as a rule to the evangelical. But no one escapes responsibility for carefully considering a truth, because the adversary brings it, and recommends it also on bad grounds. And there is something more to be added: not a few of the demands of the Enthusiasts were already the product of the secular culture, science and insight which had obtained even in the sixteenth century a certain independence. But it is a bad way of developing theological firmness—though it has again its unshrinking advocates at the present day—to hold that perceptions of that kind may be simply ignored. In many respects the Reformers fenced themselves off from secular culture where this touched the declarations of faith. In this sense they were mediæval, and did nothing to bring about an understanding between revelation and reason, leaving that great task to a succeeding century, which was by no means still firmly established in evangelical faith, and was thus much worse prepared for the solution of the problem. Even if one could succeed in fully justifying this procedure of theirs, and in showing, perhaps, that even the slightest adoption of "Enthusiast" knowledge would have meant at that time the death of the Reformation, it would in no way alter the fact that the Reformation buried under injustice and hatred many better perceptions which the age possessed and thereby made itself chargeable with the later crises in Protestantism. The French Church exterminated the Huguenots and Jansenists; it received in place of them the Atheists and Jesuits. The German Reformation banished the "Enthusiasts"; it received in place of them the rationalists and modern "Positivism."

II. The consequence of holding this attitude was that, so far as Luther left to his followers a "dogmatic," there was presented in this an extremely complicated system: not a new structure, but a modification of the old Patristic-Scholastic structure. But it is then apparent after what has been already explained, that in this regard Luther gave no final expression to evangelical Christianity, but only made a beginning.
First, there rests with him responsibility—not only with Melanchthon—for the inclusion within the doctrine of the gospel (doctrina evangeli) of all theoretic elements of Christian speculation which it was believed must be retained. It is true, certainly, that he never ceased regarding these elements as manifold testimonies to what is alone important in Christian faith; but at the same time he undoubtedly gave to them also an independent value, because he held them to be perfect testimonies, and therefore to be faith itself. There were causes leading him to adhere the more firmly to this course, in his opposition to the Enthusiasts, and in the huge task of training a nation in Christianity; and thus, without observing it, he passed over to the view, that the Church, because it is the fellowship that is based simply on God's revelation, and on the faith answering to it, is just on that account fellowship in the pure doctrine, as including all that is embraced in the correct theology.  

1 Correct and false elements lie close together here. If the Christian is a positive religion, it is above all necessary to see clearly and maintain purely its content: "Fides si tangitur, tangitur pupilla occuli nostrī." Further, what Luther has wrought out in the Sermon on the 35th chap. of the 1st Book of Moses (Erlang. Ed., Vol. 34, p. 241 f.) with regard to doctrine and life is correct: "Therefore I have often given the admonition, that one must be far from separating from each other life and doctrine. The doctrine is that I believe in Christ, regard my work, suffering, and death as nothing, and serve my neighbour, and beyond this take no further account of what I ought to be. But the life is that I choose this or that course and act accordingly. Thus there is not nearly so much dependent on life as on doctrine, so that, although the life is not so pure, yet the doctrine can nevertheless continue pure, and there can be patience with the life. . . . It is true that we ought to live thus; but let me live as I may, the doctrine does not therefore become false . . . anything higher I cannot preach than that one must slay the old Adam and become a new man. You say: Yes, but it is nevertheless not done by you. Answer: I certainly ought to do it, yes, even if God gives it to me; but no one will ever attain to this height; there will still be many defects here. Therefore let the life remain here below on earth, raise the doctrine aloft to heaven." This seemingly objectionable explanation at once becomes clear when we observe what Luther here introduces into the conception "doctrine"; it is the disposition corresponding to the doctrine. For that reason the content given to doctrine here is simply "believing in Christ, regarding my own work as nothing and serving my neighbour," or "slaying the old Adam and becoming a new man." It is obvious that this "doctrine" is nothing but religion itself; the life, however, means the constantly defective earthly embodiment. Yet over and over again, led astray by the word "doctrine" and by opposition to legal righteousness, Luther simply identified with this "doctrine" all articuli fidei of the old tradition (this being due also to the fact that he understood the art of pointing out in each of
which justifies (or, in other words, the right doctrine), and the sum of the particular articuli fidei appeared almost as identical. But in this way there was introduced a narrowing of the notion of the Church, compared with which even the Roman notion of the Church appears in many respects more elastic and therefore superior, and as the result of which Lutheranism approached to the Socinian view. The Church threatened to be transformed into a School—into the School, namely, of pure doctrine. But if the Church is a School, then in its view the distinction between those who know and those who do not know comes to be of fundamental importance, and the resolute aiming at life passes into the background; in other words, there arises the Christianity of theologians and pastors and there develops itself a doctrinairism which becomes lax in sanctification. So far as Luther himself was concerned, he ever again broke through this view, indeed it was never wrought out with entire strictness even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as is proved, e.g., by the sacred poetry. Yet the fundamental evangelical view of Christianity as a whole—not as a sum of separate portions of doctrine—became obscured, and the practical aim of religion became uncertain. Consequently instead of there being given to the future clear and unambiguous guidance with regard to faith, doctrine and Church, there was set to it rather a problem,—namely, of giving a high place to "doctrine" in the Lutheran sense, while freeing it at the same time from everything that cannot be adopted otherwise than by means of spiritual surrender, and on moulding the Church as the fellowship of faith, without giving it the character of a theological school. The incorrect view of faith (contemplated as assent to a sum of many articuli fidei of equal value) became especially disastrous for the evangelical doctrine of justification. This doctrine necessarily appeared now as the correct statement of a particular dogma—nothing more. As soon as this came about, the doctrine lost its true them that "doctrine" properly so called). But if in the explanation quoted above one applies "doctrine" to all "articuli fidei," while he either does not at all think, or scarcely thinks any more, of the preaching that requires him "to slay the old Adam and become a new man," than the necessary consequence is an evil doctrinairism and a lax feeling about what is moral. For the fact that this consequence actually ensued Luther was not really without responsibility.
significance and thereby its practical design. If it was encroached upon from the one side by the "objective dogmas," it was only natural that from the other side it should be restricted by a complicated doctrine of sanctification, mystic union (unio mystica), etc. How much it became impaired and impoverished under this pressure has been shown to us by Ritschl in his account of the preparation in history for Pietism. But we need only glance at the history of the German Confessional, in order to see what desolation was caused by Lutheranism in narrowing faith to "pure doctrine." As no earnest Christian can continue to be satisfied with correct theology as the ideal of Christian perfection, it was only a natural consequence, nay a real redemption, when Catholic ascetic criteria were again set up in the practice of Lutheranism. But as time went on there could not be satisfaction even with this; for it was the evangelical faith, of course, that one held, and hence what was attained was only a feeble imitation of Catholicism. Thus the evangelical ideal of life also remained a problem for the evangelical Church. 

1 With another main problem that asserted itself from the first within the doctrinal history of Protestantism I cannot here deal, as it would lead to an entering deeply into the development of Protestantism—I mean the relation of the new system of faith, as first formulated in Melanchthon's Loci, to the system of natural theology. This system, after it had been prepared for by Nominalism, introduced and developed itself almost unobserved as a "natural child" from the union of Classical Humanism with certain perceptions of the positive theology. The devotion to antiquity showed itself in this, that the Ciceronianism, which had partly supplanted the worn-off and misused Aristotelianism, was clothed with the authority of the universally human, the innate, the reasonable, as there could not of course be given to it the authority of revelation. This natural "system," having its ultimate source in the Stoa, and used only unconsciously or sparingly by Luther, was increasingly turned to account by the Preceptor Germanice even in specific theology, and under the hard shell of Confessional systems of faith began even in the sixteenth century the struggle for the sole supremacy, a supremacy which it was to achieve in the eighteenth century after it had acquired strength from the new science of nature. So long as it remained in combination with other modes of thought, it produced, as a universal principle, very different effects. At one time it strengthened the Scholastic form of the doctrines of faith, at another time it weakened particular dogmas that were paradoxical or that were constructed from a strictly religious point of view. At one time it really gave dogmatic theologians the consciousness of possessing a system of securely founded truths, and surrounded even particular doctrines of the faith with the halo of universal human reason, at another time it appeared as the stern adversary of these doctrines. Taken as a whole it was a transitional phase, absolutely necessary, from the cognition that was purely ecclesiastical, determined by the world beyond, and dependent on
Secondly, Luther left behind him an unspeakable confusion as regards the significance of the old dogmas in the strictest sense of the word. No bridge leads to them from his justifying, saving faith, not because this faith does not reach to them, but because those dogmas do not describe the being of God in so wonderful and comforting a way as evangelical faith is able to do from its knowledge. This statement can be tested at every point where Luther gives direct and living expression to his Christianity. Christ is not to him a divine Person, who has taken to Himself humanity, but the man Jesus Christ is the revelation of God Himself; and Father, Son and Spirit are not three Persons existing side by side, but one God and Father has opened His Fatherly heart to us in Christ and reveals Christ in our hearts by His Spirit. What has this view of faith to do with the speculations of the Greeks? How much more akin these speculations are to the natural understanding, if only it has granted certain premises, than Luther's view is! A philosopher is able to provide himself with the means for discerning profundity and wisdom in the dogmas of the Greek Church; but no philosopher is in the position for feeling any kind of relish for Luther's faith. Luther himself failed to see the gulf that separated him from the old dogma, partly because he interpreted the latter according to his own thoughts, partly because he had a remnant of respect for the decrees of the Councils, partly because it pleased him to have a palpable, definite, lofty, incomprehensible cardinal article with which to oppose Turks, Jews and fanatics. Only tradition, to the knowledge that is critical, historical, and psychologically determined, and for two hundred years it kept alive scientific problems under the most various forms and modifications, and united the clearest and best heads. On Melanchthon's relation to this system and on the influence it exercised on the oldest formulation of the Protestant system of faith see Dilthey's Article in the Archiv. f. Gesch. der Philos., Vol. VI., pp. 225-256, 347-379; Trötsch, Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Johann Gerhard und Melanchthon, 1891; Paulsen, Gesch. des gelehrten Unterrichts, 2nd Ed., 1st Vol., 1896. The doctrine of predestination and the "System of Nature" accompany the development of the Protestant system of faith. The two can coalesce, from both there can develop itself a "religious universal Theism," that directs itself against the positive theology, or that exercises a strongly repressive influence upon it. But until the time of Spinoza predestinarian determinism was rather the protector of the positive theology, while the "System of Nature" wrought continuously in the direction of broadening it.
when the doctrines of the Trinity and Christology are viewed as leading articles in Luther's sense is justice done to them; to him they were not merely loci, to which other doctrinal loci were attached, they were doctrines from which he knew how to develop evangelical Christianity: God in Christ. But what continued to have vitality when dealt with by him and taken in his sense was not thereby protected for the future; and he himself, as a mediaeval man, could not resist the temptation to speculate about these formulæ in the direction already indicated by the way in which they had been framed. Since at the same time he would not surrender his fundamental thoughts, he became involved in speculations that were no whit behind the most daring and worst fancies of the Nominalistic Sophists. They were different from these only in this, that Luther built up this thought-world with childlike faith, while the former, half believingly, half sceptically, went in search of dialectic problems. From the doctrine of the Eucharist (see below) Luther derived a specially strong impulse to reflect in the old style upon Christology. But as he conceived of the unity of deity and humanity in Christ with a strictness that had characterised no theologian before him, it was inevitable that within the lines of the two-nature doctrine he should find himself in the midst of those miserable speculations about the ubiquity of the body of Christ which are carried on at the supreme heights of scholastic absurdity. The melancholy consequence was that Lutheranism—as nota ecclesiæ—received at once in Christology the most fully developed scholastic doctrine ever received by an ecclesiastical community. Owing to this Lutheranism was for almost 200 years thrown back into the middle ages. Hence the Reformation terminates here also in a contradiction, which furnished for subsequent times a problem: it gave to the new Church the faith in God, Christ and the Holy Ghost of which Paul made confession in Rom. VIII. and which was still witnessed to by Paul Gerhardt in the hymn, "Ist Gott für mich, so trete gleich Alles wider mich" (If God be on my side, let all things be my foes); but it gave to it at the same time the old dogmas as the unchangeable cardinal article, together with a christological doctrine, which did not negate the fundamental evangelical interest, but which had
received an entirely scholastic shape and had therefore the inevitable effect of confusing and obscuring faith. The blame rests upon Luther, not upon the Epigones, if in the Evangelical Church at the present day every one must still let himself be stigmatised as a traitor who declares the doctrine of the Trinity and the Chalcedonian formula to be an extremely imperfect doctrine, harmonising neither with evangelical faith nor with reason (the latter was to be true of it, however, as understood by its authors). This practice was handed down by the same Luther who otherwise knew very well what unbelief is in the sense of the gospel. But Luther, as we have shown, had great excuses for his error; the same cannot be said for those of the present day. They have, no doubt, other excuses—a regard to the orthodoxy that already prevails among the congregations, the traditional custom of fostering piety by means of these doctrines—what is there that cannot be used for fostering piety in this or that person? even the Song of Solomon, even amulets!—and ignorance of the history of dogma.  

1 How great this last is may be gathered from the fact that there are those at the present day who simply place their imaginary notions about Christology—the Kenotic theory for example—under the protection of the ancient dogma, i.e., who really rule out the latter, but nevertheless play the part of vindices dogmatis. The position of things is not essentially different as regards the doctrine of the Trinity. A speculation is evolved from one's inner consciousness, which has in common with the old dogma the contradiction between one and three, but is otherwise different from it toto coelo, and then one describes himself as orthodox, his opponents as heretical. As if it were not an easy thing for each of these heretics to garnish his criticism of the old dogma with similar fancies! If they could produce real satisfaction in this way, they would certainly be under obligation to do so. But these adornings have supplanted one another with astonishing rapidity—for a number of years they have almost ceased to be attempted; no one of them really gave satisfaction, each one served at the best to delay the crisis. No further notice is taken to-day as to how one comes to terms with the old dogma, indeed one shrugs his shoulders beforehand in contemplating his attempt. But that one does come to terms, even although it be by the fides implicita tenuissima, which means that one has no wish to disturb what the Church believes—that is enough. Thus from the days of Schleiermacher there is a living within the ositive theology so to speak from hand to mouth. But even with that we should have to reconcile ourselves—our knowledge being in part—were it not that the old dogma has a fettering, burdening, and confusing influence on the faith of the nineteenth century. Because that is undoubtedly the case, what must be done is to contend one's self against the whole world for the simple gospel. The strongest argument urged from the other side is in these terms: "Observe that it is only where the old dogma is that there is to be found at the present time in Protestantism deep know-
they derive their life, not from the fundamental thought of the Reformation, but from Catholic reminiscences, is most distinctly shown by the fact that when for this or that reason one has once lost confidence in the old dogma, the almost invariable result is that he declares that doctrine is not after all a matter of so much importance. Against this Franciscan-Erasmic attitude too strong a protest cannot be made. If it were possible to enter into a compact with truth at all, the old dogma would still be much to be preferred to that indifference towards doctrine; for such indifference leads inevitably to Catholicism, and is as inimical as possible to evangelical Christianity. Everything as a matter of fact depends upon the right doctrines of God as the Father of Jesus Christ and of the old and new man. Just for that reason the alternative: the old dogma, or mere “practical Christianity” must be answered with a neither-nor. Evangelical faith knows only of “doctrines” which are at the same time dispositions and deeds; these, however, are for it, with Luther, Christianity.

But Luther not only took over the old Greek dogma as evangelical doctrine (doctrina evangeli) and law of faith (lex fidei); he also took over the Augustinian doctrine of original sin, the doctrine of the primitive state, etc., and thus imposed upon faith a not less oppressive burden, in so far as he imported into faith a view of history made up of questionable exegesis, undiscerning criticism, and varied speculation. These he corrected, no doubt, according to his own principles, and if the factors themselves had remained, one might have been content with this theory for want of a better; but when looked at from

ledge of sin, true repentance, and vigorous ecclesiastical activity.” To this objection the following reply must be given: First, that this self-estimation has a Pharisaic and evil ring about it, and that the judgment as to knowledge of sin and repentance falls, not to the ecclesiastical press, but to God the Lord; second, that “vigorous ecclesiastical activity” affords no guarantee for unadulterated evangelical faith; were that alone decisive, Luther was wrong when he brought a revolution upon the old Church, for a long time elapsed before the Lutheran Churches were on a level in respect of vigorous activity with the Post-Tridentine Catholic Church; third, that it is no wonder that the others are in a leading position, who take control of the power of tradition and of all means of rule in the most conservative corporation that exists—in the Church. For the rest, the Christian must find out the good and holy, whatever be the quarter in which it may present itself.
the point of view of justifying faith, it was certainly a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος to formulate articles of faith about these things, and this μετάβασις was and is not without danger. It is true, no doubt, that from the standpoint of evangelical faith one comes to see that all sin is unbelief and guilt before God, and that everyone on the first inquiry finds such guilt already resting upon him. Yet the dogma of original sin contains more and less than this conviction represents, because it springs from "reason." It contains more, because it transforms a proposition based on Christian self-criticism into a piece of general historical knowledge about the beginnings of the human race; it contains less, because it will always give one occasion for excusing his own guilt. To this connection belong also the partly Nominalistic, partly Thomistic view of the doctrine of predestination and the doctrine of the double will of God, because they pass beyond the doctrine of faith.

The third contradiction which Luther left behind to his followers is to be found in his attitude towards Scripture. If he lacked power to free himself entirely from the authority of the letter, the lack was still greater on the part of those who came after him. Besides adhering to the Word of God, which was for him matter and authority, there was an adherence even on his part to the outward authority of the written word, though this was certainly occasionally disregarded by him in his Prefaces to Holy Scripture, and elsewhere as well. It was probably his opposition to the Anabaptists, some of whom admirably distinguished between Word of God and Holy Scripture, that led him again to hold to the old Catholic identification of

1 Yet see above, p. 223 f. The question with regard to the doctrine of predestination is as to the relation in which one places it to religion. It is manifest that while Luther associated it with, and subordinated it to, the doctrine of the gratia gratis data, he nevertheless allowed it also a range beyond this, in correspondence with a special "theology" ("deus absconditus") which is not lighted up by faith. That, though otherwise influenced by Nominalism, he here passes over to Determinism is no doubt to be explained from his reading Augustine. His reading Thomas and the later Thomistic Augustinians is scarcely to be thought of here. Yet he may have received an impulse from Laurentius Valla, to whom his attention had long been directed (see Loofs, Dogmengesch., 3rd ed., p. 376).

the two. How disastrous this adherence was is a question that need not be discussed; for we are still under its effects to-day; indeed, it may be said that no other surviving Catholic element has restricted the development of Protestantism so much as this. The requirement that the pure sense of Holy Scripture should be ascertained, was simply deprived of its force by regarding Scripture as the verbally inspired Canon. On the one hand the evangelical doctrine of salvation had the burden of a hundred and one foreign materials imposed upon it; on the other hand, there was a disregarding of Scripture even where it ought to have been made use of, because one necessarily had to find in it, as the infallible authority, simply what was already held on other grounds to be pure doctrine. In this way precisely the same state of things came to exist again in Protestantism which prevailed in Catholicism; that is to say, Scripture was subordinated in all points of importance to the rule of faith (regula fidei), its essential, historical import was accordingly not sufficiently taken account of; and, on the other hand, Scripture was made a source of burdens and snares. This is always the paradoxical, and yet so intelligible, result of adopting the belief in an inspired Scripture Canon: in what is of chief moment this inspired Canon subjects the gospel to the ecclesiastical "rule of faith," and at the same time it produces incalculable and confusing effects upon faith in matters of secondary importance. So we see it to be even in Protestantism. But that which the same Luther taught: "We have the right

1 Loofs' assertion is not correct (Dogmengesch., p. 373) that the placing of Holy Scripture and Word of God on the same level was nowhere assailed at that time.

2 It has been correctly pointed out that its being required that the allegorical exegesis should be departed from only made the thing worse. This kind of exegesis was able to get quit of the letter should it not stand at the highest level, and thus corrected the dangerous principle of verbal inspiration. The literal sense of Holy Scripture and verbal inspiration: this combination first came to exist as a consequence of Lutheranism. The absurd thesis could not of course be really applied in a thoroughly logical way; besides, there was created—happily, it may be said—by the exposition of Holy Scripture according to the analogia fidei, i.e., according to the Lutheran system of doctrine, a new allegorism; but the number of cases—by no means inconsiderable—in which the literal sense of particular passages, valuable only as historical, was treated as furnishing dogmatic guidance created the most distressing difficulties and burdens for the Lutheran Churches (even for Luther himself indeed).
touchstone for testing all books, in observing whether they witness to Christ or not," could not certainly continue without its influence. Nevertheless, it was not this that gave rise to the historical criticism of books in Protestantism. That was a consequence of the advance made in secular culture. It was because this was its origin that the evangelical Church took up, and still continues to take up, towards it an attitude of strong resistance. But if the Church has not the courage and the power to carry on criticism with Luther against Luther in the interests of faith, it is itself responsible if criticism is forced upon it from without, and if, as necessarily follows, it serves, not to strengthen the Church, but only to weaken it. Here also, then, Luther left a problem to the time coming after, as his own attitude was rendered uncertain by a disastrous survival of the Catholic view: along with the other external Catholic authorities the evangelical Church must also discard the external authority of the written Word, regarded as infallible; but it must at the same time take up its position within the system of Christian doctrine where faith takes it, namely, beside the person of Christ, as luminously presented in the Gospels, and witnessed to by His first disciples.

Fourthly, in the doctrine of the sacraments Luther abandoned his position as a Reformer, and was guided by views that brought confusion into his own system of faith, and injured in a still greater degree the theology of his adherents. In his endeavour to withstand the Enthusiasts, while starting from the point that denotes a specially strong side in his conception of faith, he was led by a seemingly slight displacement to very objectionable propositions, the adoption of which resulted in a partial relapse. In addition to the vagueness that continued to exist regarding the attitude towards Scripture, the falling back in the view taken of the means of grace became the real source of evil for Lutheranism. If we think of the doctrinairism, the Scholastic Christology, the magical ideas about the Sacrament, etc., that have developed themselves, it is here that we have to seek for the real beginnings of these defects.

From the fixed and exclusive aspect in which Luther set before him God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, faith, and justification
(grace), he came to see that the Holy Spirit is bound to the Word of God, i.e., that the Spirit and the Word of God have an inseparable and exclusive relation to each other. What is contemplated by this principle is, first, the establishment of the certain efficacy of the Word; and, secondly, the distinguishing of revelation as in the strict sense external, because divine, from all that is merely subjective. Hence the words occur in the Smalcaldist Articles, P. III., a. 8: ¹ "And in those things that relate to the spoken and external word, it must be steadfastly held that God bestows upon no one His Spirit or His grace except through the Word and along with the Word, as external and previously spoken, that so we may defend ourselves against enthusiasts, i.e., spirits who boast that they have the Spirit prior to the word and without the word and accordingly judge, twist, and pervert Scripture or the spoken word according as they please. . . . Wherefore we must steadfastly adhere to this, that it is not God's will to transact with us except through the spoken word and sacraments, and that whatever boasts itself without the word and sacraments as Spirit, is the devil himself." ² This equating of Spirit and Word is undoubtedly correct, so long as there is understood by the Word the Gospel itself in the power of its influence and in the whole range of its validity and application. Yet even the exchange of this Word for the narrower conception, "vocal word and sacraments," is not unobjectionable. When, however, all that is to be held true of the Word is then forthwith applied to the limited conceptions, "vocal word and sacraments," so that these are in every respect

¹ Müller, p. 321 f. Compare the treatise "Wider die himmlischen Propheten" (Erlang. Ed. XXIX., p. 134 ff., especially p. 208 ff.), Art. 5 of the Augs. Conf.: "Per verbum et sacramenta tanquam per instrumenta donatur spiritus sanctus, qui fidem efficit" and the principle so often stated by Luther: "Deus interna non dat nisi per externa."

² "Et in his, quae vocale et externum verbum concernunt, constanter tenendum est, deum nemini spiritum vel gratiam suam largiri, nisi per verbum et cum verbo externo et precedente, ut ida praemuniamus nos adversum enthusiasm, i.e., spiritus, qui jactitant se ante verbum et sine verbo spiritum habere et ideo scripturam sive vocale verbum judicant, flectunt et reflectunt pro libito. . . . Quare in hoc nobis est constanter perseverandum, quod deus non velit nobiscum aliter agere nisi per vocale verbum et sacramenta, et quod, quidquid sine verbo et sacramentis jactatur ut spiritus, sit ipse diabolus."
and in all their properties "the Word," the relapse into magical conceptions is inevitable. Luther wished by his doctrine of the means of grace to offer sure comfort to troubled consciences, and to guard them against the hell of uncertainty about their standing in grace—an uncertainty which the Enthusiasts seemed to regard as of no account. Therefore he preached without ceasing that it is as certain that the grace of God is given in the Word as that Jesus Christ Himself acts; therefore he contended against the Scotist doctrine of a mere co-existence of forgiveness of sins and sensible (audible) signs; therefore he attached so decisive a weight to the "objectivity of the means of grace," and had the anxious desire that it should be declared of them, that even in every part of their administration and in respect of all that Scripture taught, or seemed to teach, regarding them, they were equally important and inviolable.

Yet not merely through separating out particular observances as means of grace did Luther retreat within the narrow, forsaken circle of the Middle Ages—the Christian lives, as he himself knew best, not on means of grace, he lives through communion with his God, who lays hold of him in Christ—but in a still greater degree by undertaking, first, to justify infant baptism as a means of grace in the strict sense; second, to conceive of penance as also the gracious means of initiation; third, to declare the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist to be the essential part of this Sacrament. Probably the mere retaining of the term, "means of grace," would not of itself have had a disturbing effect on evangelical doctrine; for ever again Luther too distinctly emphasised the fact, that the means of grace is nothing else than the Word, which awakens faith and gives the assurance of forgiveness of sins. But that threefold undertaking brought back upon the Church of the Reformation the evils of the Middle Ages, and hindered

1 Schmalkald. Art. P. III., a. 5 (p. 320): "Non etiam facimus cum Scoto et Minoritis seu monachis Franciscanis, qui docent, baptismo ablui peccatum ex assistentia divina voluntatis, et hanc ablutionem fieri tantum per dei voluntatem et minime per verbum et aquam."

it for many generations from effectively expressing along with the *spiritual* character of the Christian religion its deep earnestness; for the earnestness of religion is reduced when the opus operatum makes its appearance and the strict relation between gospel and faith is relaxed or encumbered.

A. As regards the first point—infant baptism—the question is quite clear for anyone who does not believe himself required on "practical" grounds to confuse the matter. If the fundamental evangelical and *Lutheran* principle is valid, that grace and faith are inseparably inter-related (Larger Catechism IV., p. 496: "In the absence of faith, baptism continues to be only a bare and ineffectual sign"), then infant baptism is in itself no Sacrament, but an *ecclesiastical* observance; if it is in the strict sense a Sacrament, then that principle is no longer valid. This dilemma can be escaped neither by a reference to the faith of the sponsors, parents, etc. (thus Luther himself at the first)—for that is the worst form of *fides implicita*—nor by the assumption that in baptism faith is given; for an unconscious faith is an almost equally bad species of that *fides implicita*. It would only have been in accordance, therefore, with the evangelical principle, either to do away with infant baptism, as it was only in later times that the Roman Church did away with infant communion, or to declare it to be an ecclesiastical observance, which only receives its true import afterwards (inasmuch as that which is given in baptism has existence at all only on condition of there being the knowledge of sin). Yet neither of these courses was followed; Luther retained infant baptism rather as the sacrament of regeneration, and while, according to his views, it should have been at the most a symbol of prevenient grace, he conceived of it as an efficacious act. Thus, although there was an unwillingness to observe it, there was a return to the opus operatum, and the relation between gracious effect and faith was severed. If in the time that came after the voice of conscience was too audible against

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1 "Absente fide baptismus nudum et inefficax signum tantummodo permanet."

2 Larger Catechism IV., p. 494: "Puerum ecclesie ministro baptizandum appor-ramus, hac spe atque animo, quod certe credat, et precamur, ut dominus eum fide donet."
the absurd assumption that there can be a new birth without the knowledge of this birth, then the solution that was resorted to was almost worse still than the difficulty from which escape was sought. Justification and regeneration were separated; in the former there was seen the "objective" (the abstract divine act of justification, the forensic justifying sentence, which declares the sinner [impius] righteous), in the latter the subjective. In this way the most splendid jewel of evangelical Christianity became robbed of its practical power—became, that is, of no effect. The forcibly effected distinction of justification from regeneration led the evangelical system of faith into labyrinths, greatly reduced the importance of justification—as in Catholicism, justification threatened to become a dogmatic Locus standing side by side with other Loci—and, through the interpolation of new dogmas, negatived the practical bearing of justification on the practical moulding of Christian life.

B. This disastrous development was (secondly) still further strengthened by an erroneous conception of penitence. Here, also, Luther himself gave the impulse, and therefore quietly allowed that to happen which contravened his original and never abandoned ground principles. That the mediæval Catholic view also continued to have its influence upon him ought not to be denied. With his whole reforming doctrine and practice, Luther had on principle taken his stand on the soil of faith; within the experience of the believer he had not asked, how do the heathen and Turk become Christians, but, how have I attained to faith, and what are the powers by which my faith is sustained? From this point it was certain to him that it is the gift of faith (or, otherwise expressed, the Gospel) that establishes and maintains the Christian standing, and that faith works repentance, which is the negative side of faith itself, the "daily dying." The two are inseparably related, and yet in such a way that faith is the logical prius. From this it follows that only such repentance has value before God as springs from faith (the Gospel), and that it must be as constant a temper as faith. Through such faith and such repentance the Christian lives in the constant forgiveness of sin; that is to say, this is the sphere of his existence, whether that be thought of as the continuous
grace of baptism to which one daily returns, or the ever-repeated appropriation of justification (forgiveness of sins). That is a view, certainly, which can easily transform itself into the dreadful opposite—easy security, and a penitent disposition (with the corresponding sanctification of life) that never on any occasion strongly asserts itself. If men are told that they must constantly repent, and that particular acts of repentance are of no use, there are few who will ever repent. And yet, the corruption of what is best is the worst corruption (corruptio optimi pessima); the danger that attaches to a truth can never be a reason for concealing the truth. It is true, no doubt, that training in the truth cannot begin with presenting to view its entire content, its seriousness and freedom; but the system of faith must not on that account be corrupted. Yet in Lutheranism it became corrupted very soon, and in the end, as is always the case, that was not reached which these corruptions were intended to reach, namely, the checking of laxity and indifference. These last, rather, only took occasion to derive pleasant comfort for themselves from the new formulation gradually introduced. This new formulation goes back to thoughts belonging to "natural theology," or, say, to thoughts belonging to the ancient Church, which Luther himself never wished to eradicate. Its root was the assumption adhered to in spite of certainty of the abolition of the law (as a demand, to which there always answers only a performance), that the law contains the unchangeable will of God, and in this sense has its own permanent range of action side by side with the Gospel (as if the latter did not contain this will implicitly!). If that was once granted, then it was necessary to find room in the Christian state for the law. This room is first proved to exist from the experience of the terrors of conscience (terrores conscientiæ) which everyone must pass through. Even here much depends on the emphasis that is laid upon this fact and the measure in which it is subordinated to what is properly the act of faith. Yet the law as the unchangeable will of God does not yet attain here its full expression; for the "repentance" that arises through the law is to be translated into the true repentance which the Gospel works. Now that idea of the law would have justice done to it if the Gospel itself
were conceived of as the law divested of the "legal" forms and clothed over with mercy; yet this thought, which already comes close to phenomenalism, could at the most be touched on by so rugged a thinker as Luther. No, the law as law is certainly abolished for the Christian—he who makes the attempt by means of the law takes the path to hell—but for God it still continues to exist, i.e., God's will remains as before expressed in it, and he must take cognisance of the law's fulfilment. Where this thought comes in, Luther becomes uncertain as to the nature of the application and force of the work of Christ (see Loofs, l.c., 3rd ed., p. 380), i.e., this work ceases to be regarded as a work once for all done and completed, and receives an enlargement, in so far as it is subjected to a view that breaks it up, that view being that for every particular case of sin on the part of the baptised, Christ must interpose anew with His obedience, i.e., with a vicarious fulfilment of the law; for otherwise satisfaction is not made to the law of God. This thought was not transformed into a theory, but it occurs not infrequently in Luther; for it was the inevitable result of the requirement imposed upon God that He shall have compensation made to Him for every particular transgression of the law. The retained attritio (contritio passiva) and the uncertainties regarding the nature and result of the work of Christ thus flow for Luther from one source, namely, the idea that the law contains also the will of God, and therefore has an independent place side by side with the Gospel. The only means of removing this enormous difficulty would be the decided recognition of the phenomenal view, namely, that in the law God presents himself to view as what the sinner for his punishment must feel and think of Him as being.

To go back to repentance, this view of the law had as its result that in the course of instruction law was placed before Gospel. That was the plan adopted by Melanchthon, with the consent of Luther, in the "Unterricht der Visitatoren" (Directions for those visiting).1 At the same time there were grounds

1 Corpus. Ref. XXVI., p. 51 sq.: "Although there are some who think that nothing should be taught before faith, and that repentance should be left to follow from and after faith, so that the adversaries may not say that we retract our former
for earnestly enforcing ecclesiastical confession, that a check might be put upon the worst forms of sin. In this lies the explanation of the fact that theory also became obscure: within the lines of this view (under other conditions the original view was still retained in force by Luther and Melanchthon) repentance and forgiveness became the conversion of the ungodly, or of the backsliding sinner; as such they were either identified with justification or placed side by side with it, but in both cases they were united most closely with the ecclesiastical confessional. The ungodly attains for the first time or again to faith, when his sin is forgiven him on the ground of repentance (but this repentance can no longer be distinguished from the Catholic attritio), i.e., when God absolves him anew “in foro”; unfortunately, there was also an increasing tendency here to think of the intervention of the minister, whom the “man of coarse and degraded character” certainly needed. But what else is that than a doublette to the Catholic Sacrament of penance, with this difference only, that the compulsory auricular confession and the satisfactions have been dropped? In this way a most convenient arrangement was come to about the matter, and how comfortably things were adjusted by the help of this Catholic Sacrament of penance, minus the burdensome Roman additions, is suggestively indicated by Lutheran orthodoxy when at the height of its influence, and by the reaction of Spener and Pietism. Under this view the idea of justification, as has been already pointed out above, was shrivelled up into an act of initiation and into an entirely external action of God, the natural effect of which was the blunting of conscience. Here also it was inevitable that the Catholic doctrine should now appear to have superior worth; for according to this view of doctrine, yet the matter must be (thus) viewed:—Because repentance and law belong also to the common faith—for one must first believe, of course, that there is a God who threatens, commands, terrifies—let it be for the man of coarse and degraded character that such portions of faith (according to this, then, faith has “portions,” contrary to Luther’s view) are allowed to remain under the name of precept, law, fear, etc., in order that they may understand the more discriminately the faith in Christ, which the Apostles call “justifying faith,” i.e., which makes just and cancels sin, an effect not produced by faith in the precept and by repentance, and that the man of low character may not be led astray by the word faith and ask useless questions."
what takes place, the holding to the "faith alone" ("fides sola") necessarily resulted in dangerous laxity. What would really have been required here would have been to lead Christians to see that only the "fides caritate formata" has a real value before God. Hence one cannot wonder—it was rather a wise course under such assumptions—that Melanchthon afterwards abandoned the "sola fides" doctrine, and became the advocate of a fine Synergism. But by the task of uniting the old evangelical conviction with this doctrine of repentance, while at the same time avoiding Melanchthon's synergism, the theology of the Epigones was involved in the most hopeless confusion. The question was really that of inter-relating two "justifications," the justification of the sinner (justificatio impii) (on the ground of the law and of repentance), and justification as the abiding form of the Christian state. To this there was further added as the third "justification"—it was dependent again on other conditions—the justification of baptised children: one is justified by repentance, which is produced by the law and then becomes faith; one is justified by the faith which the Gospel effects; one is justified by the act of baptism! These contradictions became still more violent as soon as attention was directed to regeneration, and they led back to the most hopeless scholasticism. And out of this scholasticism, as in the case of the old scholasticism, out of all kinds of troubles and painful efforts there arose—under disguise, but in a form quite recognisable by an eye familiar with Luther's Christianity—the two fundamental Catholic errors, the assumption of an efficacy of the means of grace ex opere operato, and the transformation of the evangelical notion of faith into a meritorious performance; for there must come in somewhere personal responsibility and personal activity. Now if one has persuaded himself that everything that suggests "good works" must be dropped out of the religious sequence, there ultimately remains only the readiness to subject one's self to faith, i.e., to the pure doctrine.

Neither the opus operatum nor the meritoriousness of faith, but certainly the confusion of the decisive question, already comes to view in the Confession of Augsburg. It has been very
correctly pointed out by Loofs\(^1\) that the twelfth Article is a shadowy companion of the fourth, and his wish in directing attention to this is undoubtedly to show the objectionableness of this reduplication. But the twelfth Article itself is no longer, in its construction, in harmony with the evangelical conception;\(^2\) for it has approximated to the Catholic Sacrament of Penance. The reference to the Ecclesia is in this connection an at least misleading concession, and the division of repentance (poenitentia) into "contrition" and "faith," the former being put first, while only the latter is expressly traced back to the gospel, is very objectionable. But what is most objectionable is, that the Article favours the Catholic view, by suggesting that every time the Christian falls he falls from the state of grace, and must then be restored to it by the sacrament of repentance. If this view were clearly and unmistakably at the basis of this Article, its effect would be to deny what is central in evangelical faith. This faith makes no distinction between sin and sin, as the Catholic doctrine does, and it knows that "every day we sin much." If the cancelling of the state of grace had to be thought of as always united with this, we should be taken back again into the heart of Catholicism, and it would be a matter of entire indifference whether we should adopt the other Catholic doctrines or not. For in the Evangelical Church there must be no departure from the Article, that God forgives His child, the justified Christian, his sins, that, accordingly, not merely does forgiveness of sins and justification constitute the "justification" of the sinner, but the Christian lives upon the forgiveness of sins, and, in spite of sin and guilt, is a child of God. This cardinal thought, that the Christian does not fall from grace, if he comforts himself in thinking of the God who forgives sins, and accordingly has the feeling of hatred towards sin, has at least

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\(^1\) Dogmgesch., 2nd ed., p. 262.

\(^2\) "De poenitentia docent, quod lapsis post baptismum contingere possit remissio peccatorum quocunque tempore, quam convertuntur, et quod ecclesia talibus redeuntibus ad poenitentiam absolutionem impertiiri debeat. Constat autem poenitentia proprie his duabus partibus. Altera est contritio seu terrores incussi conscientiae agnito peccato; altera est fides, quæ concipitur ex evangelio seu absolutione, et credit propter Christum remitti peccata, et consolatur conscientiam et ex terroribus liberat. Deinde sequi debent bona opera, quæ sunt fructus poenitentiae."
been veiled by the Augsburg Confession in the twelfth Article, while elsewhere, certainly, the thought forms the basis of many of its most important expositions. How, then, could all those things be right which the Confession teaches so impressively about the constant trust in God, if the Christian might not comfort himself constantly with the thought of his being God's child? But how sadly has this thought been obscured, in order to escape the danger of laxity, which, however, only comes in from another side in a worse form; how obscure it is even yet in Protestantism, and how difficult it is to persuade the accredited teachers of the Christian people that blunted consciences can have the seriousness of the gospel exhibited to them only by setting before them the love of God!

C. The third point is Luther's doctrine of the Eucharist. In countless passages Luther declared that Word and Sacrament are the means of grace, because they contain the forgiveness of sins, and that it is in this alone that their value is entirely contained. "With stern contempt" he often enough discarded all fanciful ideas that lead astray from what alone can afford the Christian comfort. Accordingly, his doctrine of the Eucharist could only run in these terms:—that the Word of God, which is in and with the eating, brings forgiveness of sins, and thereby procures life and blessedness. Hence the question about the body and blood of Christ in the Sacrament must not become in any way a theological question—"theology" being taken as Luther understood it—or, if it does, it must be discussed in strictest connection with the historic Christ; for only through the work of the historic Christ is the Word of God the word of forgiveness of sins. That being so, no doubt could arise that the body and blood of Christ was just that which he had yielded up to death, i.e., his natural, human body. Only in this way, too, could His disciples understand Him. But if the body which He gave to His disciples to eat was His natural body, then it is at once clear that as regards His body it was only a symbol

that was in question, while faith receives the forgiveness of sins by no means merely in a symbolic way. It is then still further clear, that the Christian is not brought into a more intimate, mystical union with Christ through the Eucharist than through the Word, while this Word is not a mere empty sound about Christ, but the power which proceeds from His historic work. But, finally, the idea of a “more intimate, mystical” union of the Christian with Christ is, when viewed in the light of Luther's conception of faith, altogether the worst kind of heresy; for it places in question the sovereign power and adequate efficacy of the Word of God for the sake of a vague feeling, and thereby robs conscience of the full comfort the Word of God can impart. There must, therefore, be the strictest adherence to the position, that while the various sensible signs under which the Word is presented are by no means, it is true, matters of indifference, and while in various ways they bring the work of the historic Christ close to the heart, yet they are unable to add anything to the power of the Word.

If in what follows another view must be stated as having been held by Luther, it must always be remembered that the one just developed was always most strenuously represented by him and never abandoned; for it runs quite clearly even through writings that can be legitimately quoted in favour of another view. No passages require to be brought forward in proof of it; for in the Smaller Catechism, for example, it and it alone finds expression. Certainly an appeal cannot be taken against it to the word “true” in the sentence: “It is the true body,” though it may be unquestionable that Luther here had in his mind his opposition to Zwingli. Even as regards the \textit{Word} what is in question is the “true,” \textit{i.e.}, the historical Christ, and \textit{not merely} the Word, but the Word \textit{alone} has, according to Luther, the power to give the heart a realising sense of the true Christ who died for sinners.

And yet in contemplating the Eucharist he went on to “supplement” the view of faith, and this supplement he defended in the most obstinate way, and pronounced it an article involving the existence or non-existence of the Church (\textit{articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae}). In this way he brought
in a host of evils connected with the creation he left behind him: the doctrine of the Sacrament in general became confused, a door was opened for the conception of the opus operatum, doctrinairism was strengthened, the evangelical Christology was led into the melancholy paths of the abandoned Scholasticism, and thus an orthodoxy was framed which was bound to become narrow-minded and loveless. These were the grave internal consequences. The outward results are well enough known; Protestantism was rent asunder. Yet these latter results were not the worst; indeed it may be said on the contrary here, that the isolating for a time of the Lutheran Reformation was necessary and salutary, if it was not to lose itself in fields foreign to itself. Had Luther yielded in the question of the Eucharist, the result would have been the formation of ecclesiastical and political combinations, which, in all probability, would have been more disastrous for the German Reformation than its isolation, for the hands that were held out to Luther—Carlstadt, Schwenkfeld, Zwingli, etc.—and which to all appearance could not be grasped simply on account of the doctrine of the Eucharist, were by no means pure hands.\(^1\) Great political plans, and dangerous forms of uncertainty as to what evangelical faith is, would have obtained the rights of citizenship in the German Reformation. Under these circumstances the doctrine of the Eucharist constituted a salutary restraint. In its literal import what Luther asserted was not correct; but it had its ultimate source in the purpose of the strong, unique man to maintain his cause in its purity, as it had presented itself to him, and to let nothing foreign be forced upon him; it sprang from the well-grounded doubt as to whether these people had not another spirit. In the choice of the means he committed an error; in the matter itself, so far as what was in question was the averting of premature unions, he was probably in the right.

This gives us already one motive for his "completing" the doctrine of the Eucharist, and perhaps the strongest. Luther

\(^1\) The reference here is not to morality; I expressly mention this, because the expression "pure hands" has been misunderstood. The connection should have made it impossible for a false understanding to arise.
had the fear, or he perceived, that his opponents, including Zwingli, underrated in general the means of grace, that they preached the “spirit,” without discerning the importance of the Word. The temptation was very great to teach the presence of the bodily Christ in the Eucharist, because it appeared that thereby the certainty of the inter-connection of Spirit (saving benefit) and means was most conclusively demonstrated. To this temptation Luther yielded, though his yielding was always corrected again by him by means of his original ideas. Secondly, the letter of Scripture seemed to him to admit of no other interpretation, and by this letter he felt himself bound. Accordingly even before the year 1524 he had formed the conviction, that in the Sacrament of the altar forgiveness of sins is so contained that it is conveyed through the outward presentation of the real body and blood of Christ (to be eaten and drunk). The perception of this was first made use of against Carlstadt,\(^1\) whom he sought to counter-work by means of letters. From the year 1525 he turned indirectly, from the year 1526 directly, against Zwingli also, whom he suspected, not quite without ground, of making common cause with the enthusiasts. Zwingli certainly removed the ground of that charge and even by that time held substantially to the doctrine of salvation by justification—not the least cause of this being Luther's writings;—but in order to understand Luther's attitude towards Zwingli, we must keep this suspicion before us. In the correspondence that now began between the two Reformers Luther expounded his view, and when pressed by Zwingli, became ever more deeply involved in Scholasticism.\(^2\) First of all he let himself be

\(^{1}\) Carlstadt had taught that by means of the τῳδον Christ had pointed to his actual body in which He sat before His disciples.

persuaded that the true body must be the body of the exalted Christ; for the historical body ceased of course to have an existence owing to the death on the cross. If it was objected, however, that it was impossible for the glorified body of the Exalted One to be in the bread and wine, his reply was that he extended to the Exalted One the idea of the inseparable unity of deity and humanity in the historical Christ, and in order to make this conceivable, called in the aid of Occam’s Scholasticism. “The Sophists” (his old enemies!)—so he declares now—"speak rightly on this matter when they say:—There are three ways of being in a place, locally or circumscriptively, definitely, repletively (localiter, circumscriptive, definitive, repletive), and, that this may the more easily be understood, I will explain it thus in German.”¹ There then follows a long discussion, in-

Also various letters, more especially the one addressed to the Strassburgers of date Dec., 1524 (see also his opinions about the “Bohemians”) with the famous sentence: “I confess that if Carlstadt or any one else had corrected me five years ago by showing that in the Sacrament there is nothing but bread and wine he would have done me a great service. . . . But I am taken captive and cannot escape; the text is too powerful, and no words can drive it from my mind.” What first brought Zwingli into the Eucharist controversy was his letter to Alber (Nov., 1524). Then followed his “Commentarius,” his “Klare Underrichtung” (1526), his “Amica exegesis” (1527), the “Fründlich Verglimpfung” (friendly persuading to believe) “that these words shall have eternally the old sense” (1527). Letters and writings of the theologians in south-west Germany played an important part in the controversy. The greatest weight attaches to the treatise of Ecolampadius “de genuina verborum domini, etc., expositione liber.” Zwingli regarded the “est” in the words of institution as being “it signifies,” took John VI. as a commentary on the words of institution, allowed therefore only a symbolical explanation of the body and blood of Christ in the sacrament, displayed no assurance and decision in conceiving of the sacrament as a peculiar mode of giving form to the “Word,” thought of the observance substantially as sacrificial (nota ecclesiae, recollection) and yet allowed himself to be led by Luther into the Scholastic-Christological region, where he not only won no laurels by his doctrinaire conception of the two-nature doctrine and his separation of the natures in a way approaching Nestorianism, but betrayed a remarkable lack of religious insight into the problem, together with a wonderful reliance on the significance of sophistic-scholastic formulae. The theologians of south-west Germany, so far as they did not, with Brenz, adhere to Luther, spoke in favour of a mystical conception of the Eucharist, which united the defects of the Lutheran with the defects of the Zwinglian conception, and was afterwards embraced by Calvin and Melanchthon. But Ecolampadius did excellent service with his account of the Patristic doctrine.

¹ Bek. v. Abendmahl (XXX., p. 207 ff.). How differently he still expresses himself in the treatise of the year 1519 (XXVII., p. 38): “There are some who exercise their skill and ingenuity in trying to see where the bread remains when it is changed
tended to give further proof of the possibility and certainty of the presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist. So this Scholasticism is requisite in order to establish the Christian faith! In following this course he became more and more involved in the Catholic view, that the Eucharist must be conceived of as the parallel to and guarantee for the Incarnation. This comes out most distinctly in the last of his writings, where it is at the same time apparent how, as the consequence of holding his doctrine of the Eucharist, the evangelical saving faith became for Luther resolved into "parts," although he made efforts to avoid this result. 3

into Christ's flesh, and the wine into his blood. Also how the whole Christ can be included under so small a portion of bread and wine. It is of no consequence if thou dost not seek to understand that; it is enough for thee to know that it is a divine sign that Christ's flesh and blood are truly present; let the how and the where be left to Him."

1 From this point the Lutheran doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum then took its issue.

2 Undoubtedly Zwingli with his Nestorianism led him on this track.

3 Kurzes Bekenntnis, p. 413: "Oh dear man! if any one will not believe the article on the Eucharist, how will he ever believe the article on the humanity and deity of Christ in one person? And if it stumbles thee that thou shouldest receive with thy mouth the body of Christ when thou eatest the bread from the altar... it must surely stumble thee much more (especially when the hour comes) that the infinite and incomprehensible deity, who in His essence is and must be everywhere, should be shut up and enclosed in humanity and in the Virgin's body. And how is it possible for thee to believe how the Son alone should have become man, not the Father nor the Holy Ghost, since the three Persons are nothing but the one God in the supremely one being and nature of the one Godhead. Oh, how they shall most of all grow excited and reel and make their voices heard, when they come to this! Here they will find something to explain, as indeed I hear that they already march about confidently and courageously with their Eutychianism and Nestorianism. For that was my thought, and I have stated it too, that this is what they must come to; the devil cannot go on holiday when he has made one heresy, he must make more, and no error remains alone. When the ring is severed at one place it is no more a ring, it no longer holds together, but goes on breaking. And although they make a great ado about their believing this article on Christ's person and have many words about it, believe them not, they are assuredly liars in all that they say of it. The Turk glories in the name of God, but when they die they know who their God is. For it is certain of every one who does not rightly believe an article, or will not believe it, that he believes no article seriously. Hence the word must be, a belief of all, pure and complete, whole and entire, or a belief of nothing. The Holy Ghost does not allow himself to be severed or divided, so that he should let one part be taught and believed truly and another falsely."
It was not enough that it should be merely asserted that the true body is in the Eucharist, if this proposition was to describe a miraculous, external fact, that holds good even apart from faith. It was necessary to show how the corporeal Christ is present and is partaken of in the Eucharist. Here also Luther adopted hypothetical speculations of the Nominalists. The whole Christ is in the elements; but the elements are not transsubstantiated; neither is there a mingling of the elements with Christ; nor again are the two merely side by side, unconnected and apart; both remain what they are, but are as perfectly blended in their properties (idiomata) as Godhead and humanity are blended in the incarnation. Accordingly when Melanchthon went to Cassel to hold conferences with Butzer (1534) Luther could give him the following instruction: “That in and with the bread the body of Christ is truly partaken of, that accordingly all that takes place actively and passively in the bread takes place actively and passively in the body of Christ, that the latter is distributed, eaten and masticated with the teeth.” The most objectionable thing here was, that while, according to Luther, the body and blood of Christ were present in the Eucharist only for enjoyment, the unbeliever and the heathen were also to receive them. Thereby there was again introduced the Catholic doctrine of the Sacrament, with its distinction between the “objective” significance of the Sacrament, and the saving influence in the Sacrament. But at the same time there was in point of fact a restoration through this separation of faith in the efficacy of the Sacrament ex opere operato. It is not to be wondered at that thereafter, in later Lutheranism, this faith took the form of a reliance on the objective Sacrament.

1 See above, Vol., VI., p. 238. In a treatise as early as the de captivitate babyl., Luther indicates that Occam’s doctrine of consubstantiation was known to him, and that he was inclined to favour it, without however attaching weight as yet to the question of the modus of the presence.

2 As early as in the “Bekenntniss” (1528) he vindicated the opponents of Berengar (XXX., p. 297): “Therefore the enthusiasts are wrong, as is also the gloss in the ecclesiastical law, when they blame Pope Nicolas for forcing upon Berengar a confession that he enclosed and masticated with his teeth the real body of Christ. Would to God that all Popes had acted in all matters in as Christian a way!”

3 Hence no adoration of the Sacrament; see the Treatise of the year 1523.
On the other hand there was a reintroducing in this way of the "awful mystery" (mysterium tremendum) for faith. Whether the effect was indifference or awe of mystery, in both cases the original thought connected with the sacred observance, and the Evangelical view of it, became obscured.

Only with regard to one point Luther himself stood firm, or at least only touched on a view that was foreign to him, and that was the certainty that what is contemplated in the whole observance is only the forgiveness of sins. Yet what he touched on, others, though not quite at the beginning, emphasised more strongly. That is not to be wondered at. If it is to be of fundamental importance for this observance that Christ is present here, not for faith merely, but corporeally, then a presence of such a kind—the receiving of the bodily Christ—must have also a specific effect. But in what else can this effect be found than in the incorruptibleness of the body of Christ, the enjoyment of which makes our bodies in a mysterious way incorruptible, or in a mystical union with Christ, which is something still higher than the forgiveness of sins and adoption?

Owing to the way in which Luther conceived of the doctrine of the Eucharist he involved himself in responsibility for the fact, that in its Christology, in its doctrine of the sacraments, in its doctrinairism and in the falseness of the standard by which it judged of divergent doctrines and pronounced them heresies, the later Lutheran Church threatened to become a miserable doublette of the Catholic Church. That this was an impending danger for this Church, and that even yet it has not been altogether averted, no one of insight can fail to see. If we look at the Christianity of Luther and compare it with Catholic Christianity, we observe that what separates them is real; the link that binds them together consists only in words. But if we look at Lutheranism in the form in which it developed itself—not without Luther's influence—from the second half of the sixteenth century, it must be said that in many important particulars it is only by words that it is separated from Catholicism, while what unites them is reality; for Catholicism is not the

1 The rudiments of another view have been pointed out by Köstlin and others; Loofs (l.c., 2nd ed., p. 253) refers to Erlang. Ed. XXX., p. 93 f., 116 ff., 125, 141.
Pope, neither is it the worship of saints or the mass, but it is the slavish dependence on tradition and the false doctrines of Sacrament, of repentance and of faith.

In the theology of Melanchthon, who stands beside Luther the evangelist as the teacher of Ethics, we find the attempts to correct Luther's theology, and Melanchthon, moreover, was guided at every point by the endeavour, first, to secure the freedom, responsibility and seriousness of moral effort that were threatened by the religious quietism that could arise, and, as is well known, did arise from Luther's doctrine; secondly, to strengthen in accordance with this the bond uniting religion and morality; thirdly, to prevent the rise of the sacramentarianism that is akin to religious quietism. These honest and salutary aims, which brought him closer to Calvin, and in themselves contained a tendency to bind together all evangelicals in a powerful practical sympathy, were not asserted with energy by Melanchthon in points of decisive importance; he was no prophet,—he rather felt himself hampered by the demand made upon him to be the guardian of Lutheranism, and the Lutherans are not to be reproached if in the first instance they were more disposed to go astray with the heroic Luther than to be kept in the leading strings of the faint-hearted Melanchthon. Besides this, the humanistic impulses by which, in addition to those of a religious kind, Melanchthon allowed himself to be influenced, were instinctively felt to be something foreign, requiring to be excluded. So at first Lutheranism repelled "Philippism," the founder of which was never popular. It had to pay dearly for this renunciation, and thereafter to learn Melanchthonian truths by a long and bitter discipline. Yet it may be made a question whether that renunciation in the sixteenth century was a misfortune. Would Luther's notion of faith have continued to be maintained in a Lutheran-Philippistic Church? and was the powerful practical exercise of faith in the Germany of that day placed under restriction merely from following a one-sided development of doctrine? was it not above all held in check by-
the wretched ecclesiasticism and the general political situation? Is there a substantial difference, then, between the Philippistic National Churches of Germany and the Lutheran, and was the development, always becoming more one-sided, of evangelical religion into quietistic doctrine and sacrament-faith, not itself an effect of the restrictive elements in the situation? These questions must certainly be answered in the affirmative; but nevertheless the Lutheran Church had to pay dearly for turning away from "legal righteousness," "sacrifice," and "satisfactions." Through having the resolute wish to go back to religion and to it alone, it neglected far too much the moral problem, the "Be ye holy, for I am holy."

5. Concluding Observations.

In the four preceding sections (p. 168 ff.)—an attempt has been made to state as clearly as possible Luther's attitude towards the Catholic tradition and the old dogma. Our task has not been to describe Luther's theology in the whole breadth of its development. The more difficult problem had to be solved of bringing out the significance of Luther—and thereby of the Reformation—within the history of dogma.¹ It has been shown, I hope, that Luther (the Reformation) represents an issue of the history of dogma as much as, in other ways, Post-Tridentine Catholicism and Socinianism. We cannot be made uncertain about this judgment by what has been brought to view in the fourth section; for it has been shown that the new view of the gospel taken by Luther forms a complete whole, and that the elements of the old which he retained are not in accord with this whole, nay, that at all points at which he allowed what was Catholic to remain, he at the same time himself indicated the main features of a new structure.

This complete whole, however, which he outlined with a firm hand, rises superior, not merely to this or that particular dogma, but to dogmatic Christianity in its entirety: Christianity is

¹ Compare Berger, Die Kulturaufgaben der Reformation, Einleitung in eine Lutherbiographie, 1895.
something else than a sum of traditional doctrines. Christianity is not Biblical Theology, nor is it the doctrine of the Councils; but it is the spirit which the Father of Jesus Christ awakens in hearts through the Gospel. All authorities which support dogma are abolished; how then can dogma maintain itself as infallible doctrine; but what, again, is a dogma without infallibility? Christian doctrine establishes its rights only for faith; what share, then, can philosophy still have in it? but what, again, are dogma and dogmatic Christianity without philosophy? Of course one can appeal here to Luther against Luther, yet only in the same way in which one can raise up Augustine to reply to Augustine, and in the same way in which every genius can easily be made away with when a rope to despatch him has been twisted out of his imperfections and out of what he shared with his age. The history of dogma comes to a close with Luther. Any one who lets Luther be Luther, and regards his main positions as the valuable possession of the evangelical church—who does not merely tolerate them, that is to say, under stress of circumstances (per angustias temporum) —has the lofty title and the strict obligation to conclude the history of dogma with him.¹ How can there be a history of

¹ In the treatment of the history of dogma from a universal historical point of view Zwingli may be left out of account. Anything good that was said by him as the Reformer, in the way of criticising the hierarchy and with regard to the fundamental nature of the new piety, is to be found in him as it is to be found in Luther, and his arriving at greater clearness regarding it he owed to Luther. The points in which he diverged from Luther belong to the history of Protestant theology. There were many particulars which he understood how to express more lucidly than Luther, and many negations of the traditional were more definitely shaped by him. But he was not less doctrinaire than Luther; he had that quality rather in a higher degree; and he did not always make a beneficial use, for the system of faith, of his fine Humanistic perceptions. Calvin, again, is, as a theologian, an Epigone of Luther.—These sentences of the 1st edition—into which at one point a little more precision is introduced—have been objected to by several critics; Dilthey in particular has espoused the cause of Zwingli and Calvin in his articles referred to above (Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Philos., Vol. V., p. 367 ff.; Ueber Zwingli's religiös-universellen Theismus, p. 374 ff.; Zwingli's Ergänzung der ausschliesslich religiösen Moral des Urchristenthums durch sittlich-politische Bemühung und Bedeutung dieser That für die Umgestaltung Europas, Vol VI., p. 119 ff.; Zwingli's Schrift de providentia und der Einfluss der Stoa auf seine Lehre, die sich als Panentheismus, Determinismus und die Schranken der positiven Religion übersteigenden religiösen Universalismus darstellt, Vol. VI., p. 523 ff.; Ueber die Bedeutung der
dogma in Protestantism after Luther's Prefaces to the New Testament, and after his great Reformation writings? A history there has been of work carried on with a view to a right understanding of the Gospel, and for about 150 years this work was prosecuted within the lines and forms of the old dogma. But how do 150 years count for the Church! The Roman Church needed more than 300 years to advance from the Tridentine to the Vatican Decrees, and how little apparently was required even about 1550 to bring the Vatican formula within reach! But Protestantism—some one objects—had a creed-constructing period; during that period it gave expression to its Schrift Zwingli's de vera et falsa religione, Vol. VI., p. 528 ff.: Fundamental und epochemachende Bedeutung von Calvin's Institutio als synthetische Entwicklung des ganzen religiösen Stoffs aus dem Wirken Gottes auf den Menschen nach dem in seinem Rathschluss enthaltenen Zusammenhang seiner Functionem. Yet after some hesitation I feel that I must adhere to my position and place the two Reformers outside the boundary lines which I regard as serviceable for the history of dogma. About these lines there is room for discussion; but if they are correctly drawn, Calvin at any rate must be left out of view, for there can be no dispute about his being an Epigone. But he is to be described as such, not merely when the chief dogma of justification is placed at the basis of his teaching—as Dilthey asserts—but as regards the whole sum of what presents itself to view in the new and higher kind of personal religion, of which Luther had the experience, and to which Luther had given expression, before Calvin (including all important points of theological doctrine). That he possessed the incomparable faculty of creating out of this a system, and a principle that entered powerfully into the institutions of life and revolutionised them, will be denied by no one, and so in the history of the Church, and in the general history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, he stands in some respects on a level with Luther and in some respects above him; but in the history of dogma he stands beside Melanchthon, though certainly in the power to shape doctrine he far excelled him. But as regards Zwingli, Dilthey has taught me anew that the conceptions in respect of which he distinctly and throughout differs from Luther characterise him, not as the Reformer, but as the thinker and theologian, while at the same time these conceptions are not specially original and did little in determining the nature and course of Reformation work in the period following. Of course in this question a value-judgment is partly at work: what worth are we to attach to the determinism, or, say, the Panentheism of Zwingli and, again, to his Humanistic religious universalism? My opinion is that we may regard history as teaching us here that these did not become decisive factors in the great ecclesiastical course of development. So far, on the other hand, as they unquestionably contain elements that must be taken account of if a tenable Christian theory of the world is to be framed—for such a theory cannot be obtained merely from the isolated individual experience of faith that is in accord with Pauline-Lutheran principles—the problems for solving which they furnish the guiding lines belong to the Philosophy of Religion. The elements in Zwingli which Dilthey brings to view show that he stands on the line, partly of Sebastian Franck,
faith as *dogma*; this period accordingly must also be included within the history of dogma. To this the reply must be: (1) all Lutheran Symbols, with the exception of the Form of Concord, were not thought of at all originally as being symbols in the sense of being regulative doctrinal forms, but were only raised to the position of symbols at a later period, and that position, moreover, was always given to them only by a section of Lutheran Protestants,¹ (2) it was not the Lutheran Church that turned them into symbols, but the Empire (1555) and the Princes, the latter having it specially in view to check the quarrelsomeness of theologians, (3) it is as little the case that there have ever been Lutheran Symbols by which all Lutherans have been bound, as that there have ever been Reformed Symbols by which all the Reformed have been united into one, (4), the breach with belief-according-to-symbol within Protestantism which has taken place in the 18th and 19th centuries, can be described by no one as a breach with the Reformation, and as a matter of fact even the modern orthodoxy of our days judges the breach very mildly, knowing as it does partly of Melanchthon (inasmuch as he also was a Ciceronian), partly of mediaeval reformers like Wyclif. Nothing is less contemplated in this criticism than a disparagement of the Zürich Reformer; it will always continue, rather, to be the most noteworthy providential arrangement in the history of the Reformation, that the new knowledge of God made its appearance simultaneously, and in an essentially independent way, in Luther and in the brave Swiss. It is evident that as regards being free and unprejudiced, Zwingli in many respects surpassed Luther (his divergencies from Luther were by no means merely due to mediaeval motives, they are rather to be traced as much to the ideas of an advancing age), and that he had also a greater faculty for direct organising action, though this last is not to be regarded simply as a product of his religious force. Who will be disposed to estimate in the history of Protestantism what he owes to Luther and what to Zwingli and Calvin? Without the two latter Protestantism might perhaps have ceased altogether to exist! Or what an unspeakably poor form it might have assumed! On Zwingli cf. the Histories of Dogma by Loofs and Thomasius-Seeberg. A. Baur, Zwingli's Theol., 2 vols., 1885 ff. Zeiller, *Das theol. System Z.'s*, 1853. Sigwart, u. Zwingli, der Character s. Theol. u. s. w., 1855. Usteri, Zwingli u. Erasmus, 1889. R. Stähelin, *Huldr. Zwingli, Leben u. Wirken*, 1st vol., 1895.

¹ In what a dim light the Augsburg Confession appears when it is contemplated as the symbol of Lutheranism; but what an excellent historic record it is, when the estimate formed of it corresponds with what alone it intends itself to be—a statement, in view of opponents, indicating how much harmony with them still exists in spite of the new elements.
that it has itself drifted too far away from the symbols.\(^1\) If these statements are correct,\(^2\) then the "creed-constructing period" during which the "Lutheran Church" declared its "definitive will" is a fable convene. "This Lutheran Church has never existed at all as an outward whole, and the spokesmen of the strictest 'Lutheran party' have been precisely the worst enemies of such a unification. . . But those who have crowded around the Book of Concord have always been merely a section, though a strong one, of the Lutheran Church, and even among them it has been regarded as a doctrinal law only for particular national churches." But even though this plain historical fact did not admit of being established, yet the opinion would remain true, that the period of the Epigones was not the period of the classic formulation of the evangelical faith, but a noteworthy episode.\(^3\) If one should wish to hold another opinion, he would

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\(^1\) This does not prevent it placing before its opponents in an entirely arbitrary way this or that portion of the Creeds, which it regards itself as still adhering to, as outwardly authoritative, while silence, however, is regularly maintained as to its having no wish whatever to deal similarly with other portions.

\(^2\) A very lucid account of things has been given by K. Müller in the Pfeuss. Jahrb., Vol. 63, Part 2: "Die Symbole des Lutherthums." Observe in particular the very excellent concluding words, p. 146 ff. Ritschl's dissertation on the Rise of the Lutheran Church (Ztschr. für K.-Gesch., I., p. 51 ff., II., p. 366 ff.) is of fundamental importance, yet in my opinion the variance of view between Luther and Melanchthon is overdrawn here.

\(^3\) Müller, l.c. : "According to the testimony of its own Fathers, the Church of the Reformation wishes to be regarded as in the first instance a religious, not a legal, magnitude. As religious, however, it cannot find its unity guaranteed by external arrangements of a legal character, but only by the distinctive religious possession which was the basis of its origination and once for all indicated to it its course. But that can never hold good of particular writings, however high they may stand in the estimation of believers. On the soil of the Reformation that holds good simply of the view of Christianity witnessed to by these and numerous other writings, \textit{i.e.}, of the gospel. But through the influence mainly of Melanchthon the gospel lost its original practical-religious character, and, by means derived from a religious age that had been transcended, it was made the subject of theoligico-philosophic knowledge, and was rent into parts and in some measure perverted. The period of the Epigones, again, rapidly brought this stage to completion (Melanchthon himself not being without blame for this), and in a course of development which constantly repeats itself in the history of Christianity imposed the products of that theological activity on the Church of the Reformation as a law of faith." But this Church distinguishes itself from the Catholic Church in this, that it possesses the capacity and the means—I should like to continue always without doubt of this—to cast off again the law that has been imposed on it.
require, not only to think of the 18th and 19th centuries as the period of the Church’s apostasy from the Reformation, but also to blot out Luther’s Christianity; for that Christianity cannot be forced into the scholastic theology of the symbols. Hence there are only the two things possible, either to conclude the history of dogma with Luther’s Reformation, or to attach to it, as a second part, the history of Protestant theology down to the present day. But this enormous supplement would be something quite different from history of dogma, because while what would be dealt with in it at the beginning would certainly seem extremely like the old dogma, it would appear as we proceeded that the question was rather about understanding the gospel in opposition to dogma. It would come to view that even Pietism and Rationalism had a requisite share in the development of this understanding, that the understanding was materially developed at important points by Zinzendorf and Wesley, that it was most powerfully promoted by Schleiermacher, and that it grew in many respects even within the Pietistic-Confessional reaction of the 19th century. It would appear, finally, that in his description of the gospel, the most disdainfully treated theologian of the age—Ritschl—has given expression in a powerful way—though within the limitations that belong to every individual—to the outcome of two hundred years’ work on the part of evangelical theology in endeavouring to understand the Reformation, and to the products of criticism of doctrinaire Lutheranism.

The Gospel entered into the world, not as a doctrine, but as a joyful message and as a power of the Spirit of God, originally in the forms of Judaism. It stripped off these forms with amazing rapidity, and united and amalgamated itself with Greek science, the Roman Empire and ancient culture, developing, as a counterpoise to this, renunciation of the world and the striving after supernatural life, after deification. All this was summed up in the old dogma and in dogmatic Christianity. Augustine reduced the value of this dogmatic structure, made it subservient
to a purer and more living conception of religion, but yet finally left it standing so far as its foundations and aim were concerned. Under his direction there began in the Middle Ages, from the 11th century, an astonishing course of labour; the retrograde steps are to a large extent only apparent, or are at least counter-balanced by great steps of progress. But no satisfying goal is reached; side by side with dogma, and partly in opposition to it, exists a practical piety and religious self-criticism, which points at the same time forwards and backwards—to the Gospel, but ever the more threatens to vanish amid unrest and languor. An appallingly powerful ecclesiasticism is taking shape, which has already long held in its possession the stolid and indifferent, and takes control of the means whereby the restless may be soothed and the weary gathered in. Dogma assumes a rigid aspect; it is elastic only in the hands of political priests; and it is seen to have degenerated into sophistry; faith takes its flight from it, and leaves the old structure to the guardians of the Church. Then appeared Luther, to restore the “doctrine,” on which no one any longer had an inward reliance. But the doctrine which he restored was the Gospel as a glad message and as a power of God. That this was what it was, he also pronounced to be the chief, nay the only, principle of theology. What the Gospel is must be ascertained from Holy Scripture; the power of God cannot be construed by thought, it must be experienced; the faith in God as the Father of Jesus Christ, which answers to this power, cannot be enticed forth by reason or authority; it must become a part of one’s life; all that is not born of faith is alien to the Christian religion and therefore also to Christian theology—all philosophy, as well as all asceticism. Matthew XI. 27 is the basis of faith and of theology. In giving effect to these thoughts, Luther, the most conservative of men, shattered the ancient church and set a goal to the history of dogma. That history has found its goal in a return to the gospel. He did not in this way hand over something complete and finished to Christendom, but set before it a problem, to be developed out of many encumbering surroundings, to be continuously dealt with in connection with the entire life of the spirit and with the social condition of mankind, but to be solved
only in faith itself. Christendom must constantly go on to learn, that even in religion the simplest thing is the most difficult, and that everything that is a burden upon religion quenches its seriousness ("a Christian man's business is not to talk grandly about dogmas, but to be always doing arduous and great things in fellowship with God" Zwingli). Therefore the goal of all Christian work, even of all theological work, can only be this—to discern ever more distinctly the simplicity and the seriousness of the gospel, in order to become ever purer and stronger in spirit, and ever more loving and brotherly in action.

1 "Christiani hominis est non de dogmatiis magnifica loqui, sed eum deo ardua semper et magna facere."

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