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THE APOLOGY

OF PLATO,

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES,

AND A DIGEST OF PLATONIC IDIOMS,

BY THE

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M.DCCC.LXXVII.
COMPLETE in itself, this volume is yet but a fragment of a larger undertaking. In the Oxford series of Plato's works, which commenced with Mr. Poste's edition of the Philebus in 1860, the Apology, Crito, Phædo, and Symposium were undertaken by Mr. Riddell. Had he lived, all four would probably have appeared together. The Digest of Idioms, founded on an examination of all the writings of Plato, which he had prepared to accompany his edition of these dialogues, would not have seemed out of proportion to the other contents of such a volume. His death on the 14th of September, 1866, left the undertaking incomplete. The preparations which he had made for the Crito, Phædo, and Symposium, though extensive and valuable, had not received their final shape. But the Apology seemed to be ready for the press. Its text was settled, a critical and exegetical commentary was written out fair, and a full introduction had been provided, together with an appendix
on the δαίμόνιον of Socrates. The Digest of Idioms also, to which frequent reference was made in the commentary, appeared to have been transcribed for the printer, although a few pencil notes (which have been printed in this volume at the foot of the pages to which they belong) showed that additions would have been made to it, if the writer had lived to print it himself, and perhaps in some instances a different expression would have been given to the views which it contains. Under these circumstances it has been thought advisable to publish the Apology and the Digest of Idioms by themselves. My task has been only, in conducting them through the press, to remove clerical errors and to verify references.

It may be convenient to state that Plato is cited in this volume according to the pages of Stephanus. In reference to the Orators the sections of Baiter and Sauppe's Zurich edition have been given together with the pages of Stephanus in the minor Orators and Reiske in Demosthenes. In the Dramatists Dindorf's numbers are followed as they stand in the edition of the Poetæ Scenici published in 1830. With regard to quotations, the text of the Zurich editions has been used both for Plato and for the Orators, the text of Dindorf (from the edition of 1830) for the Dramatists. Wherever a reading is quoted which is not found in these editions, I have endeavoured to indicate the source from which it has been derived.
ADVERTISEMENT.

The text of the Apology itself is in the main that of C. F. Hermann. Even the punctuation is his. Some of the brackets found in his edition have been silently omitted: but, with this exception, every instance in which he has not been followed is mentioned in the commentary.

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June 8, 1867.
INTRODUCTION.

PART I.

THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES.

1. Nature of the Proceeding.

The trial of Socrates took place before a Heliastic court, according to the forms of an ordinary γραφὴ δημοσία. The indictment (ἐγκλήμα) is called ἀντωμοσία 19 B, 24 B, and ἀντιγραφὴ 27 C,—terms which allude to the proceedings of the ἀνάκρισις before the Archon Basileus, before whom both the indictment and the plea in answer to it were presented in writing and confirmed severally by oath. And the terms ἀντιγραφή, ἀντωμοσία, proper at first to the defendant, came to be used of the prosecutor, and even were transferred to the indictment (ἐγκλήμα) itself, thus presented in writing and sworn to.

2. The Accusers.

The indictment was preferred by Meletus; see below the form preserved by Diogenes Laertius, and compare Plato's Euthyphro 2 B. Hence it is Meletus who is called on by Socrates to answer arguments as to its words and meaning in the Apology. Hence again Socrates asks why did not Meletus bring witnesses (34 A), and again observes (36 A) that the penalty for not obtaining ½ of the votes would have fallen on Meletus. Little account can be taken of the statement of Maximus Tyrius, Disp. xxxix. p. 228, Μέλιτος μὲν ἐγράψατο Ἀντός δὲ εἰσήγαγε Λύκων δὲ ἐδώκε. For authors vary on this distinction, and the continuation of the passage—κατεδίκασαν δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔδησαν δὲ οἱ ἐνδεκα ἀπέκτεινε δὲ ὁ ὑπηρέτης—shows that these words are, as Stallbaum says, magis oratorie
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quam vere dicta. See Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Proces, p. 709. n. 19.

Of Meletus, the ostensible prosecutor of Socrates, in reality little more than the tool of Anytus, we only know that he was a young tragic poet. He is characterised by Plato (Euthyphro 2 B) as νεός τίς καὶ ἄγνως, and is ridiculed as a poet by Aristophanes (Ran. 1302). The Meletus (Andoc. de Myst. 94. p. 12) who was one of the four who arrested Leon (Apol. 32 C) may have been this Meletus' father, who bore the same name, but there is nothing to show it.

Lycon, a rhetorician, is mentioned by Aristophanes (Vesp. 1301) with Antipho.

Anytus was by far the most considerable of the three accusers, whence they are described (Apol. 18 B) as τῶν ἄμφι Ἀνυτος, and Socrates is called by Horace (Sat. II. iv. 3) Anyti reus. He was a leather-seller (Xen. Apol. Soc. 29), and had been a rich man. As a sufferer and worker for the popular cause he had earned a reputation second only to Thrasybulus. With Thrasybulus he had fled from Attica, and the Thirty had confiscated his estates and included him in the decree of banishment (Xen. Hell. II. iii. 42). He held a command in the camp at Phyle (Lys. xiii. 78. p. 137), and at the restoration was joint author with Thrasybulus of the Act of Amnesty (Isoc. xviii. 23. p. 375). Plato (Meno 90 B) represents him as high in popular favour. His was nevertheless (Athenaeus XII. p. 534 E) not a spotless character. Aristotle moreover (acc. to Harpocration on the word δεκάζων) says that he was the first man who bribed an Athenian court; and Diodorus, who repeats this (xiii. 64), adds that it was on his trial for treason (Zeller, Philos. der Griech. II. p. 142 n.). As Anytus was the most influential accuser, so there is reason to think he was the most inflamed against Socrates. Meletus and Lycon were actuated at most by a class-prejudice,—if indeed we should not rather regard them as mere tools of Anytus. All three however belonged to classes¹ which Socrates had offended by his incessant censure

¹ Socrates is made by Plato (Apol. 23 E) to represent his three accusers as all actuated by class-feeling in their attack upon him. Ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μήλητα μοι ἐπίθετο καὶ Ἀνυτος καὶ Δύκαν, Μήλητος μὴν ὕπερ τῶν ποιητῶν ἄχθόμενος, Ἀνυτος δὲ ὕπερ τῶν ἰδιομοιο-γῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Δύκαν δὲ ὕπερ τῶν ῥητόρων. The contrast which is implied in this sentence between ῥή τορες and πολιτικοί shows that the words severally denote definite classes
of those who exercised professions of the principles of which they could give no intelligent account. Nowhere is this cause of offence traced more connectedly than in the Apology itself of Athenian citizens. There seems no ground for thinking with Wiggers (Sokrates p. 97) and others, who have followed in this view Petitius' Comment. in Legg. Attic. Lib. III. Tit. iii. that there was any order of ῥήτορες, ten in number, appointed yearly, and deriving their origin from Solon. Any such institution could not but have interfered with the ἰσημορία which even to the time of Demosthenes was the cherished charter of Athenian democracy. On the contrary, even the precedence which was allowed by Solon in the assembly to speakers above the age of 50 seems to have fallen into abeyance. But we find that in the time of the Orators or earlier (see the latter part of Cleon's speech in Thucyd. III. 40) these ῥήτορες had attained a mischievous importance. Eschines speaks of them (iii. 3. p. 54) as δυναστείαι λαυτοί περιποιοῦντες, and in Alcib. II. 145 A it is said that ὅσα δή ποτε ἡ πόλις πράττει πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν ἡ αὐτή καθ' αὐτήν, ἀνά τῆς τῶν ῥήτορῶν ἐμβολίας ἄκαντα γίγνεται. To be a ῥήτορ had become a regular profession. A new art had arisen, designated by the name ῥητορική, which is seen to have been itself a new word from the way in which it is used in the Gorgias (448 D)—τὴν καλομένην ῥητορικήν. In their capacity of συνήγοροι the ῥήτορες were brought into prominence (Heeren, Polit. Hist. of Anc. Greece, c. 13. p. 232 of Eng. Transal.) by the frequency of state trials in the time succeeding the Peloponnesian war. But it was no less as σύμβουλοι to the Assembly that the ῥήτορες were in requisition. In all questions of legislation and of policy the debate was mainly in their hands. The epoch of this ascendency is dated by Isocrates (viii. 121. p. 183, where he calls it τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ βῆματος δυναστείαν) from the Decelean war, or subsequent to Pericles (ib. 126. p. 184). The two species, συμβουλευτική and δικανική, of Aristotle's triple division of ῥητορική in his treatise correspond with this double scope of the ῥήτορ's profession. The πολιτικὸν as a class must have emerged at the same time as the ῥήτορες. In itself πολιτικὸς means no more than 'Statesman' in the sense in which this term might have been applied to Pericles. But an Athenian of Plato's time, speaking with reference to Athens, would mean by πολιτικόν that class of men who made public business their profession,—τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λεγομένου, Plat. Politic. 303 C. Our conception of the πολιτικὸν will be best completed by comparing them with the ῥήτορες. Down to Pericles' time there would be no distinction. He united both characters like the great men before him. But afterwards the debates came into separate hands, and the speakers in the Assembly were for the most part no longer the great commanders in the field and the bearers of the highest offices. The fact and the reasons are stated by Aristotle (Pol. V. v. 7), νῦν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς θυγαμίνης οἱ δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγούσι μὲν δι' ἀπειρίαν δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἐπιθύμεται. At the same time, inasmuch as counsel as well as action was needed for the conduct of the state, those who were engaged in the different branches of this common work were not absolutely contradicting: cf. Plato, Gorg. 520 A, Phdr. 258 B, and the general terms in which the ῥήτορες are described—e. g. by Lysias (xviii. 16. p. 150) as οἱ τὰς πόλεως πράττουτες.
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(21 C—22 C). Illustrations occur also abundantly elsewhere. We see from the Ion (533 E) how poets were brought under this censure for parading inspiration as the substitute for reason. The rhetoricians 2 again as in the Gorgias were censured for producing persuasion without knowledge. Yet stronger and yet more incessant was the denunciation of the mischievousness and presumptuousness of undertaking politics ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου (Xen. Mem. IV. ii. 3), or without knowledge of principles (Aleib. I. 113 C). But Anytus was actuated, over and above such a class-feeling, by personal animosity. One ground of this has been said to have been his "amor spretus Alcibiadæ":’ so Luzac and Wiggers. Plato further (Meno 94 E) makes him threaten Socrates with mischief in bewilderment and mortification at being told, in effect, that in teaching his son the family business he had done nothing towards his real education. These personal motives, however, remained in the background; and so again, if he entertained yet another grudge against Socrates as the teacher of Critias, the avowal of it was incompatible with the Act of Amnesty. Therefore he made the attack under cover of defending the democracy. The ἐπείκεια of the restored people did not last long (Plat. Epist. VII. 325 B), and was naturally succeeded by a sensitive and fanatical zeal for their revived popular institutions.

3. NUMBER OF THE JUDGES.

The statement of Wiggers (Sokrates p. 132 note), and of Matthiae (Miscell. Philol. vol. I. p. 252. note 35), that the number of the judges on Socrates’ trial was 556 or 557, has been repeated without question even by Mr. Grote (Hist. Gr. vol. VIII. p. 654, chap. 68). It is, however, as Dr. Cron’s remarks (in his note on Apol. 36 A), merely an assumption from the false reading τρεῖς in this passage, taken in connection with the

3 The enmity of the rhetoricians extended itself after Socrates’ death to the Soeratists (Luzac de Dig. Soer. Sect. II. § 4).

3 The story of this "amor Alcibiadæ" rests on the testimony of Plutarch and of Satyrus apud Athenæum, but is unlikely in itself, and because Plato and Xenophon are wholly silent about it.—Zeller II. p. 141 note.

statement of Diogenes Laertius (II. v. 40), κατεδικάσθη διακοσίως ὑδοήκοντα μιᾷ πλεώσι ψῆφοι τῶν ἀπολυτουσῶν, whence the numbers are supposed to have been 281 for condemnation, 275 for acquittal.

There is no reason (as Mr. Grote allows) for mistrusting the precise statement of Diogenes, nor is there any more reason, if we have regard to Greek habits of expression, for doubt that the 281 represented the aggregate majority, not the amount by which it exceeded the minority.

Hence, accepting the reading τριάκοντα here, the whole number cannot have been 556 or 557. An independent argument against such a number would be that it resembles no other recorded numbers on trials. Those which we find, such as 200 (Dem. in Mid. 223, p. 585), 500 (frequently), 700 (Iseor. xviii. 54. p. 381), 1000 (Dem. in Mid. 223, p. 585), 1500 (Plutarch. Vit. Perielix, 72), 2000 (Lysias, xiii. 35. p. 133), 2500 (Din. in Dem. 52. p. 96), 6000 (Andoc. i. 17. p. 3), even if they are only approximate, must stand for something near multiples of 100.

Now Pollux (VIII. 48) mentions 401 and 201 as the numbers in two different cases of φάσις, and elsewhere 1001 and 1501. This affords the clue to a conjecture of much probability (Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Process, p. 140), that this was a provision not exceptionally but uniformly for an odd number of judges, (frustrated sometimes, it would appear, by the default of individuals at the last moment), but that the common way of indicating the number was, for brevity’s sake, to mention the variable constituent, omitting the invariable 1. And Heffter (Athen. Gerichtsverfassung, p. 55) clenches this by a passage from Ulpian’s Commentary on Demosthenes’ oration against Timocrates: δία τούτο δὲ ὁ εἰς προσετίθετο ἀπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν ἡμᾶς ἡ ίδιαι γένους ἢ ψῆφοι. Thus a Heliastic court always consisted of some multiple of 100, + 1.

Accordingly, if we take the total number of Socrates’ judges

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4 [Ulpian’s note is on the words δικαστηρίων δυο εἰς ἑνα καὶ χιλίων ὑψηφισμένων (Dem. c. Timoc. 9. p. 702) and stands as follows: εν τοις μεγάλους καὶ ἐπονομασιν πράγματον εὐθύγοντο ἵνα δύο δικαστηρίων πλη−ροῖτες ἄρθις καὶ ἑνα. διὰ τούτο δὲ ὁ εἰς προσετίθετο ἀπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν ἡμᾶς μὴ ἱσα ἐμμονάδων τῶν ψῆφων ἢ ἱσα ἀνθλετῶν τῶν δικαίων ἀλλὰ ἱκεῖν δένης κινήν καὶ ἔν ὁ εἰς προσετίθεν.]
as 501 (which is also Heffter's conclusion), and the number of those for condemnation as 281, we have 220 for his acquittal. Then 31 exactly, or 30 in round numbers, changing sides, would have effected his acquittal. Cron, not allowing for the odd 1, reckons 219 for acquittal.

4. FORM OF INDICTMENT.

Plat. Apol. 24 B. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείρων κοι θεοὺς οὐ δὲ τὸ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζων ἐτέρα δὲ δαιμόνια κανά.

Diog. Laert. Π. 40. ἢ ἀνωμοσία τῆς δίκης εἶχε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀνάκειται γὰρ ἐτί καὶ νῦν, φησὶ Ψαβωρίνος, ἐν τῷ Μητρώῳ. Τάδε ἐγράφατο καὶ ἀνωμόσατο Μέλητος Μελήτου Πιθεύς Σωκράτες Σωφρωνίσκον Ἀλωπεκίδην Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὐδὲ μὲν ἢ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἐτέρα δὲ κανά δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα βάνατος.

5. PROCEDURE AT THE TRIAL. ORDER OF THE PLEADINGS.

From Αριστοκλ. (iii. 197. p. 82) we learn that in a γραφὴ παρανόμων the time assigned for the trial was divided into three equal lengths: ἐγχείται τὸ μὲν τρόπον ὑδώρ τῷ κατηγόρῳ . . . . τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ὑδῶρ τῷ τῆς γραφής φεύγοντο καὶ τοῖς εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα λέγοντι (i.e. τοῖς συνηγόρους, not the witnesses whose examination was extra to the time allowed for the pleadings: cf. Lys. xxiii. 4, 8. pp. 166, 167, καὶ μοι ἐπιδαμβέ τὸ ὑδὼρ) . . . . τὸ τρίτον ὑδώρ ἐγχείται τῇ τιμήτι καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς ὅργῆς τῆς υπετέρας (i.e. for the prosecutor to speak again on the amount of penalty, and the defendant to reply, and the judges to vote).

The second of these lengths then would be occupied by the defence of the accused and his συνήγορος, represented by the main part of the Apology, i.e. as far as 35 E. The Xenophonian Apology says (22) that speeches were made ὑπὸ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναγορευόντων φιλῶν αὐτῷ, but the Platonie manifestly would have us think of Socrates defending himself alone.

Then would follow the taking of the votes of the judges, and the announcement of the result, by which the charge is declared proven.

The third length then begins with the second speech of the

7 [Favorinus wrote a work on Socrates in the time of the Emperor Hadrian.]
prosecutor in advocacy of the penalty he had named; and the remainder of it would be occupied by Socrates' ἀντιτύμησις, where the Apology again takes up the thread (35 E—38 C). It was open to the prosecutor to ask now for a lighter penalty than that which he had named in the indictment. It was in the defendant's speech on the ἀντιτύμησις that he brought forward his wife and children ad misericordiam.

Then would follow the voting of the judges upon the amount of the penalty.

Here the formal trial would end, and the condemned person would be led away by the officers of the Eleven (cf. Apol. 39 E). This is the moment, however, to which the concluding portion of the Apology (from 38 C) belongs. Whether or not the indulgence of such a concluding address was historically conceded to Socrates, there must have existed sufficient precedent for it to give verisimilitude to the ascription of it to him. The Xenophontean Apology (24) agrees here.

The raised platform, called βῆμα, served for accuser and accused in turn as well as for their witnesses, whence the phrase ἐγὼ παραχώρω, Apol. 34 A, and similarly Andoc. i. 26. p. 4, καὶ σωπῶ καὶ παραχώρω εἶ τις ἀνυβαίνειν βούλεται, and Ἀσχ. iii. 165. p. 77, παραχώρω σοι τοῦ βῆματος ἐως ἀν εἴης.


We find that speeches were made by all the three. Compare for Meletus Apol. 34 A, and for the other two Apol. 36 B, ἀνέβη Ἀντός καὶ Λύκων. It is implied however that Meletus spoke first.

Grote (VIII. 647. c. 68) conjectures that they made a partition of their topics, "Meletus undertaking that which related to religion, while Anytus and Lycon would dwell on the political grounds of attack." More accurately, Meletus' business would be to support the indictment proper, while the political charges and insinuations would be dwelt on by Anytus as carrying with him ἡθικὴ πίστις in this topic, and by Lycon as familiar with it in his capacity of ῥήτωρ. The only citation in Plato's Apology which is referable to one accuser rather than another is the saying ascribed to Anytus (29 C), εἶ διάφευγεται Σωκράτης, ἤδη ἃν υἱῶν οἱ νικῆς ἐπιτηθεύουτες ἄ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παινάπασι διαφθαρήσουται· ἢ οὔ τὸν ἄρχην οὖκ
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εδεί Σωκράτη δεύρο εἰσελθεῖν ἡ ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθεν οὐχ οἶον τῇ ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι.

The other citations are general; e.g. 17 A, χρὴ ύμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἐξαπατηθῆτε ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγεω, and 33 B, καὶ τούτων ἔγὼ εἶν τις χρηστός γλύρεται εἶνε μὴ οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχωμι—an allusion to the alleged deterioration by him of Critias and Alcibiades, which was made much of by the prosecution according to Xenophon.

In the Memorabilia of Xenophon likewise the citations are all ascered in general terms to ὁ κατήγορος. Mem. I. ii. 9, Ἀλλὰ τῇ Δίᾳ, ὁ κατήγορος ἐφη, ὑπερορᾷ ἐποίει τῶν καθεστῶν νόμων τοὺς συνόντας, λέγων ὡς μωρὸν εἰ τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἀρχοντας ἀπὸ κυνάμον καθιστάναι. . . . τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτους λόγον ἐπαιρεῖν ἐφη τοὺς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθεστώτης πολιτείας καὶ ποιεῖν βιαίους. Iβ. 12, Σωκράτει ὡμιλητὰ γενομένα Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδος πλείστα κακὰ τίν πόλιν ἐποιησάτην. Iβ. 49, Σωκράτης . . . τοὺς πατέρας προπλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε πειθῶν μὲν τοὺς συνώντας αὐτῷ σοφωτέρους ποιεῖν τῶν πατέρων, φάσκων δὲ κατὰ νόμων ἐξείναι παρανοίας ἐλώνα καὶ τῶν πατέρα δήσαι, τεκμηρίων τούτῳ χρώμενος ὡς τῶν ἀμαθέστερον ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφωτέρου νόμου μὲν εἰς δεδείθην. Iβ. 51, καὶ ἄλλος συγγενεῖς ἐποίει ἐν ἀτμίᾳ εἶναι παρὰ τούς αὐτῷ συνώντας, λέγων ὡς οὐτε τοὺς κάμινονς οὔτε τοὺς δικαιομένους οἱ συγγενεῖς ὁφελοῦσιν ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν οἱ ἱσαρὶ τοὺς δὲ οἱ συνδικεῖς ἐπιστάμενοι. ἐφὴ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν φιλῶν αὐτῶν λέγεω, ὡς οὐδὲν ὁφελεῖς εἴναι εἰ μὴ καὶ ὁφελεῖς δυνήσονται μόνον δὲ φάσκειν αὐτῶν ἐξίσου εἶναι τιμῆς τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐμπνεύσεσα δυναμένους. ἀραπεθώντα οὖν τοὺς νέους αὐτῶν ἡ αὐτῶς εἰπὶ σοφότατος τε καὶ ἄλλους ἰκανότατος ποιήσαι σοφοὺς, οὐτω διατίθεναι τοὺς αὐτῷ συνώντας ὡστε μᾶθαι μοῦ παρ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι πρὸς αὐτῶν. Iβ. 56, ἐφὴ δ’ αὐτῶν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξῶν ποιητῶν ἔκλεγόμενον τὰ ποιητρᾶτα καὶ τούτως μαρτυροῖς χρώμενον διδάσκειν τοὺς συνώντας κακούργους τε εἶναι καὶ τυραννικοὺς, Ἡσίοδος μὲν τὸ

"Εργον δ’ οὐδὲν οὐνείδος ἀγρειγί ὅ τ’ οὐνείδος·

tούτῳ δὴ λέγεων αὐτῶν ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς κελεύει μηθενῷ ἐργον μὴ τῇ ἄδικῳ μήτε αἰσχρῷ ἀπέχεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἑπὶ τῷ κεραύνῳ . . . τὸ δὲ Ὅμηρον ἐφή ὁ κατήγορος πολλάκις αὐτῶν λέγειν ὅτι Ὅμηρος·

"Οντων μὲν βασιλῆα κ. τ. λ.
tauta de auton exgethousai ws o pohtis epainoio palesathai toyous hemotasa kai penetas.


(i.) The Defence.

Socrates speaks in presence of a large audience of Athenians over and above his judges (cf. Apol. 24 E, where he speaks of oidei oikrouatai in pointed distinction from oidei dikastai), but he is addressing professedly his judges alone8 (cf. Apol. 17 C, eis umais eliisenai, 18 A, dikastoun mev gar authe areteth). It is therefore these alone who are designated by the anores 'Athenatoi at the opening and throughout: Steinhart observes that the appellation o anores dikastai is reserved until the final address to be applied only to the judges who vote for acquittal. For mention of such audiences cf. Lysias xii. 35. p. 123, pollloi kai toyon auton kai toyon exeon ekousin eliismenoi tina gynomy peritoyon exeis, Aesch. i. 117. p. 16, oroun pollous mene toyon neopteron

8 The dikastai were very animated listeners. They answered speakers on being appealed to: cf. Aesch. iii. 202. p. 82; so Andoc. i. 33. p. 5, ei mev oin umaini iskous peri toyon apoaleugontai elhasonati moi ina proshuromeran peri toyon allon apologistai. Or they stopped a speaker to put a question: cf. Andoc. i. 70. p. 10, ei ti ti inum pothei anastata uprosmata, and Aesch. ii. 7. p. 29. They used the interpellation of katafa Aristoph. Vesp. 979. It seems to have been a common practice not only of political but even of judicial assemblies to express their pleasure or displeasure at what was said. The general word for such expressions of feeling was throbos. That it was a word media significations we see from Plato, Legg. 876 B, diakathefia x...x...x... xan poiote thia epanoynata te boj kai yfounta toyon inerarow en mirai kryn, and Aeschines ii. 51. p. 34, thorefyxantan in' auti toyon menei os deisw tis epi kai synymatos toyon de pleitos oux pozyma kai phovros. The word occurs in an unavourable sense in Plato, Protag. 319 C, katanellwai kai thorerboi, Andocides ii. 15. p. 21, Lysias xii. 73. p. 126, thorebeitei ou poieontes taute, 74. p. 127, eisieni sti ou meli aitou toy exetéron thorerbo. It was unrestrained in its nature: cf. Aesch. i. 83. p. 11, meta yeleustos thorerboi, 164. p. 23, polelai krawh para toyon dikastow autor apantistatai, i. 122. p. 70, krawh polelai kai thorerboi, Isocr. xv. 272, thorerboi kai boiis atan evpikhsate to dikasthron. On the other hand it expressed applause unequivocally: cf. Isocr. xii. 264. p. 288, oux thorerbhsan ou poiein elidassai ev tois xarines dieulebemoi all' anexefhoun ws ioperbaei ton eirnkontos. The thorbos which Socrates deprecates was of the unavourable kind. This is implied by his urging that it is not his fault if the truth is unpalatable. Thorerboi would thus seem to be confined to the dikastai, not joined in by the ekrouatai. The word is applied to Meletus in Apol. 27 B merely in the sense of interrupting by making irrelevant remarks instead of answering.
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It has been questioned by C. F. Hermann whether Plato intended the reader of the Apology to imagine any introduction of witnesses to take place. It can hardly be doubted that he did: it is part of the verisimilitude which characterises the whole speech. At 19 D Socrates, wishing to appeal to the judges as witnesses, employs the common formula for doing so —μάρτυρας δ' αυτούς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι. Cf. Aesch. ii. 122, p. 44, καὶ τούτων ὑμεῖς οἱ τὴν ψήφον μέλλουσιες φέρειν ἐστέ μοι μάρτυρες. Similarly, when at 21 Α—καὶ τούτων πέρι ὧν ἄδελφος ὑμῶν αυτοῦ ὤντος μαρτυρήσῃ, ἐπειδή ἐκείνος τετελεύτηκε —he uses the very circumstantial formula commonly in use in such a case, he must intend us to go on to fill up the picture with the actual production of the witness. And at 32 Ε καὶ τούτων ὑμῶν ἐσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες must mean that the production of the witnesses is to follow, coming so near as it does to the common formula τούτων δ' ὑμῶν τοὺς μάρτυρας παρέξομαι (cf. e. g. Antipho v. 20. p. 131, and Lysias x. 5. p. 116). The future consistently used in the two last cases (contrast the present in the first case) would not suit the supposition of mere reference to persons who are not to be produced. Again, 34 Α, τούτων όν τῶν τούναυτῶν εὑρήσετε is very like an implied promise to produce evidence. Lastly, the employment against Meletus of the common topic (34 Α)—'Why did he not call witnesses who if what he said was true could not have failed to establish it?—and the subjoining of the conventional challenge εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο νῦν παρασχέσθω ἕγω παρακεφαλωρ would be suicidal in a speaker who forbore to call witnesses himself.

Interrogation of the accuser.

In accordance with the law (Demosth. e. Steph. B. 10. p. 1131, τοὺς ἀντιδίκους ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρύψαθαι ἀλλήλους τῷ ἑρωτόσενον μαρτυρῶν δὲ μή), and with the common practice (cf. Lysias xiii. 30, 32. p. 132, where spaces are left for a
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formal ἘΡΩΤΗΣΙΣ, as for ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ elsewhere, and add Lys. xii. 24, 25. p. 122, where a specimen is given at length), Meletus is questioned by Socrates in 24 C and the following paragraphs. In 25 D Socrates himself appeals to the law in support of his right to put such questions—ἀπόκρωμαι, ὡ γιαθέ- καὶ γάρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

(ii.) Ἡ ἀντιτίμησις.

In the Xenophontean Apology (23) it is denied that Socrates made any ἀντιτίμησις—οὕτε αὐτὸς ὑπετιμήσατο οὕτε τοὺς φίλους εἶσεν ἄλλα καὶ ἐλεγεν ὅτι τὸ ὑποτιμᾶσθαι ὀμολογοῦντος εἶν ἀδικεῖν. The Platonic ἀντιτίμησις, both of the σίτης ἐν πρυτανείᾳ and of the 30 mina, is (waiving the question of its being historical or not) wholly ironical: there could be no serious expectation that such an offer would be accepted. Diogenes Laertius says that this ἀντιτίμησις turned 80 more of the judges against him—καὶ ὁ διάνατον αὐτοῦ κατέγνωσαν προσθέετε ἄλλας ψήφους ὑγιοῦκοιτα.

(iii.) The last words.

The latter part from τοῦτο ἀποψήφωσαμένοις (29 E) we are to imagine as spoken ἐν ψε ὁ ἄρχοντες ἁσχολίαν ἔγον, and only those who chose would hear it (cf. παραμένατε τουσοῦτον χρόνον, ibid.).
PART II.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE APOLOGY.

1. ITS ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.
   i. Its employment of commonplaces (τόποι).
   ii. The "old accusers."
   iii. The Delphic response.
   iv. The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.
   v. Its dramatic framework.

2. HOW FAR CHARACTERISTIC OF SOCRATES.

3. ITS ADEQUACY AS A DEFENCE.

   1. ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.

   A close examination of the structure of the Apology resolves the question how far it preserves to us the actual defence made by Socrates. The criticism of Wiggers and Schleiermacher, that the Apology is the purest extant relic of Socrates, falls to the ground before the internal evidence which the Apology itself supplies. Xenophon (Mem. IV. viii. 5) tells us that Socrates turned his thoughts away from the preparation of any defence—νὴν μον ἐπίθεσις φρουτίσαι τῆς πρὸς τῶν δικαστῶν ἀπολογίας ἴμαντιόθη τῷ δαμόνιον. Now the Apology is artistic to the core, whether in respect of the recurrence of received τόποι of Attic pleaders, or of the arrangement and outward dress of the arguments (observe especially the artifice of "the old accusers," of which presently), or of the tripartite dramatic arrangement of the whole. The art and the manner, worthy as they assuredly are of Plato, are also distinctively characteristic of him. The subtle rhetoric of this defence would ill accord with the historical Socrates, even had the defence of Socrates been as certainly as we know it not to have been the offspring of study and preméditation.
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(i.) Employment of commonplaces.

We may trace this in detail through the defence or the first of the three parts of the oration.

The exordium may be completely paralleled, piece by piece, from the Orators. The imputation of conjoint falsity and plausibility, the denial of being δεινὸς λέγειν (cf. Lys. xix. 1, 2. p. 152, Isæus x. 1. p. 79), the asking pardon for λόγους πολὺ τῶν εἰδυμένων λέγεσθαι παρ’ ὑμῖν ἐξηλλαγμένους (as Isoer. xv. 179 expresses it), the plea of unfamiliarity with law-courts (Isoer. xv. 38. p. 318, οὕτως ἀπέχομαι τούτων ὡς οὐδὲς ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν), the begging for an impartial hearing (Lys. xix. 2, 3. p. 152), the depreciation of θόρυβος (cf. e. g. Εσθ. ii. 24. p. 31, ἐπαινῶ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὑμᾶς, δὲ ἄνδρες, σὺ στίγμα καὶ δικαίως ἤμων ἀκούετε), the disclaiming a style unbefitting an old man (cf. Isoer. xii. 3. p. 233, ἡγούμαι γὰρ οἷς ἄρμαστεν),—these topics, of which the exordium of the Apology is wholly made up, occur continually in the Orators.

Next, in meeting the judges' prejudices, advantage is taken of another common topic—allegation of the existence of διαβολον (cf. Lysias xix. 5. p. 152). The way in which the charge of being a σοφὸς is dealt with has many parallels: cf. e. g. Isoer. xv. passim. No accusation was more indiscreminately launched than this, and the answers to it assumed consequently, in great measure, the character of commonplaces.

Socrates twits Meletus with having instituted the whole of the proceedings for his own amusement (24 C); so Lysias xxiv. 18. p. 170; and again with presuming on the inadvertence or obtuseness of the court; cf. Lys. xxvi. 5. p. 175, ταῦτα χρὴ ύπολαμβάνειν μὴ ἐνθελεῖς αὐτῷ εἶναι δοκῆτε.

Socrates alleges (32 A), though in a refined way, the meritorious acts of his past life;—a common τόπος. Cf. Lys. xvi. 13, xxi. i. pp. 146, 161.

Compare again ἔγω δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδεὶς πῶς τι εγενόμην (33 A) with Isoer. xv. 8.5, ἔγω δὲ τῶν μὲν ἢσσωτῶν οὐδένα πόσοτε φανήσομαι παρακάλεσας ἐπ’ ἐμαυτὸν τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅλην πειρᾶμαι πελεῖν τοιούτου πράγματιν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐξ ὧν αὐτοὶ τε εὐδαιμονίαν τουσα κ.τ.λ.

The answer to the charge about perverting the young is
paralleled by Isocrit. xv. 240, τούς πατέρας ἄν ἐσώμετε τῶν συνόντων ἵματι καὶ τοὺς οἰκέους ἀγανακτούντας καὶ γραφομένους.

The particular form of challenge is paralleled by Andoc. i. 35. p. 5, τούτων τοινυ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐ μὲν ἠκούσι καὶ εἰς ἐνθαδέ τῶν ὑπὸ ἀποθανόντων εἰσὶ πολλοὶ προσήκουτε· ὅ ὅσις βούλεται ἐν τῷ ἔμω λόγῳ ἀναβάς ἐν ἐλευθαρίᾳ.

The argument (34 Α) καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔκω ἵματι εἰπεῖν ὅτι τω ἐχόν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐαυτῷ λόγῳ παρασχέσαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα is a stock argument against an adversary who does not produce witnesses. Cf. Arist. Rhet. I. xv. 17. The avowal of disclaiming to solicit compassion is to be compared with Isocrit. xv. 321. p. 345, and Lys. xviii. 24, xx. 35. pp. 151, 161.

The leaving the event to God (19 Α), τούτο μὲν ἐτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, and (35 D), ἵματι ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίνειν περὶ ἐμύ is not characteristic of Socrates, for it occurs in the typical oration of Antipho (i. 20. p. 113, ἡ δ' αἰτία······ἐξει [τα ἐπίσκεψα], ἐὰν ἴματι τε καὶ οἱ θεοὶ θέλωσιν, and ibid. 25, 31. p. 114), though indeed sparingly in the Orators generally. The Gods are invoked at the outset of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown (p. 225).

(ii.) “The old accusers.”

Aristotle in his Rhetoric (III. xv. 1.) remarks, περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ὧν ἂν τῆς ὑπόλυθε τοῖς ἀπολύσαι ὁὐθέν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἶτε εἰπόντως τινὸς, εἶτε μῆ.

An artifice in the Apology which demands separate notice is the way in which the prejudices of the judges are dealt with. The attack on them is so carefully masked that its point might be missed by a cursory reader. The strength of the prejudice which existed against Socrates demanded that a substantive and prominent portion of his defence should be directed specially against it. He could not hope to combat the charges of his prosecutors on their own merits in presence of a general aversion which was in harmony with these charges. Worst of all, this aversion was too well reflected by the Court itself. It was matter of exigency, therefore, to deal with it at once, and so we find it succeeding the exordium almost hurriedly. But to this was joined the necessity of avoiding both the direct imputation of it to the judges, which would have been to offend
them further, and the designation of it at once as a vox populi, which would have been to acknowledge its weight.

It is therefore introduced to the judges under a disguise. Their attention is drawn to it not as the attitude of their own minds, not as matter of common fame, but as emanating from certain individuals who with time and perseverance have done their work. The calumny, now so wide-spread and influential, is all traceable to them. It is not possible to single them out ("except perhaps a certain play-writer"); in default of which, —the only fair method,—they are individualised in imagination. They are marked off by a special designation,—"the original accusers,"—and their calumny is made more tangible by throwing it into the form of a technical indictment supposed to be preferred by them and read before the Court.

Οἵ πρῶτοι κατῆγοροι are but a figure for ἦ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολῆς, and what makes the neutralising of this διαβολή at once so necessary and so delicate a matter is that it is that ἦν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἐσχέτε. But these two identifications emerge in one or two places only. Twice only is the reference to the judges pointedly disclosed,—"I hope, if possible, to convert you from a prejudice which you" (the repeated pronoun is emphatic) "have so long harboured" (19 A, 24 A). Immediately, however, after these disclosures, the argument resumes its disguise. In like manner once only, considerably later (28 A), when he notices the inferior importance of the charges of Meletus, which he has just answered, to the older charges, he acknowledges these as vox populi—ἦ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολῆς τε καὶ φθόνος.

The seriousness of tone which marks the answer to "the old accusers," the μικῆ πίστει which is thrown into it, and the absence of irony, contrast sharply with the banter with which the charges of the real indictment are met immediately afterwards. This earnestness and almost anxiety of tone, the prominent position of this portion of the Apology, the irrelevance of its ostensible reference, the very technicality with which it is drawn up, forbid a more literal acceptance of its drift, and constrain us to find in it a signal exercise of rhetorical art.

(iii.) The Delphic response.

Again, as the objective prominence given to "the old
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"accusers" is a rhetorical cloak for an attack on the prejudices of the judges, so the prominence given to the Delphic response (20 F. sqq.) is a device of a semi-rhetorical character under cover of which Socrates is enabled to avoid an avowal of the real purpose which had animated him in his tour of examination,—which was to effect an intellectual revolution by substituting a sounder knowledge for the prevalent pretensions to knowledge, of the hollowness of which he entertained the deepest conviction. Such an explanation would, to say the least, not have been appreciated. What is to be noticed is, that he does not plead the oracle, (the authenticity of which there is no ground for doubting), as an after excuse for his necessarily unpopular mission,—which would have been natural enough. But he goes beyond this, and represents the oracle as the cause of his engaging in that mission; whereas (as Zeller observes) he must have already been committed to this and already been a marked person, before any such question as that put to the Pythia by Chaerophon could have had any point or elicited any such remarkable answer. The representation of the oracle as giving him the first suggestion of his crusade against fictitious knowledge, as having throughout been the lodestar to which he shaped his course, and as having sustained him in the thankless labour of years, is unhistorical; but Socrates employs it in the exposition of his antecedents in a semi-rhetorical spirit, to bring the audience a certain distance on their way without the offence which a direct avowal of his purpose would have aroused in their minds.

(iv.) The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.

Every care has been taken to marshal the topics of the defence to the best advantage. The answer to the indictment itself is placed in the middle of the speech, where least attention naturally falls upon it. The arrangement is the same as that of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown, but the reasons are different in the two cases. In both the technical argument is introduced, where it will least challenge attention; but there because it is the weak point of Demosthenes' case, here because, though easily established, it is comparatively immaterial to the issue. The real effort of the defence needed
to be exerted first in combating the general prejudices which
affected Socrates as a reputed Philosopher and Sophist, and
secondly in offering a somewhat more particular personal jus-
tification of Socrates. Accordingly the portions of the defence
which are concerned with these two points, as they are the
fullest and most earnest, are also the most conspicuous by
position. The first confronts us at the outset, and the other
engages us after Meletus has been dealt with.

(v.) Dramatic framework.

The customary procedure of an ἀγών τιμητός has prompted
Plato to crown the Apology of Socrates with a further artistic
completeness. The oration becomes a drama. An action in
three stages passes before us; the tone changes with the
action; there is even some change in the dramatis personae.
We take our stand among the listeners who crowd the court.
The first Act comprises the defence, with the dialogue between
Socrates and Meletus, the voting of the judges, and the decla-
ration of their verdict. The second comprises the τίμησις of
the prosecutor, Socrates’ ironical ἀντιτιμήσις, the intervention
of Plato and other friends of Socrates, the first suspense, and
then the final verdict. In the third Act the judges appear
before us distinguished into two separate bodies, addressed
separately by Socrates, the one his friends, his true judges,
the other divested of the name and doomed to the conse-
quences of their unrighteous deed. The tone of apologetic
argument in the first Act is succeeded by dignified irony in
the second, and this again in the third by a strain of lofty
prophecy.

2. How far is the Apology characteristic of
Socrates?

Zeller (II. 134, note) insists that there is an absence in the
Apology of that free artistic handling which characterises the
Dialogues, and claims this as an evidence that Plato has bound
himself to follow the line actually taken by Socrates. But
the strength of this position is diminished by several con-
siderations. In the first place we have seen how great an
amount of art has found its way into the structure of the
Apology; we have seen too how that same art has not been
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restricted to the arrangement and outward dress of the speech, but so penetrates its very substance, that even here it is impossible to ignore or definitively to limit the rhetorical element. It is only with this considerable abatement that Zeller's assertion of the absence of free artistic handling can be admitted. But, in the second place, so far as the fact remains,—and to a certain extent it does,—it is referable to more obvious causes than that of fidelity to the speech of Socrates. The conditions which Plato had to fulfil were those of a speech in a court of justice, pronounced on a definite historical occasion; he had to consult the exigencies of forensic verisimilitude, and to embody a reply to the definite charges of a well-known indictment. And although with him (as with Xenophon in the Memorabilia, though in a different manner,) the main object certainly was the ultimate one of presenting to the world a serious and adequate justification of his adored teacher, yet he was none the less under the necessity of adopting for his framework the circumstances of the actual trial. In the third place,—in presence of little or no independent testimony as to what Socrates actually said,—we have the fact before us that the Platonic Apology was not alone in the field as a professed record of the great teacher's defence. The Xenophontean Apology, devoid as it is of authority, being perhaps a compilation from Xenophon's Memorabilia I. i, ii, IV. viii (see Steinhart's Anmerkungen I. 2 in Platon's Sämtliche Werke überetzt von Hieronymus Müller, Leipzig 1851), is a case in point. Had the Platonic Apology been a record of confessed history, is it possible that the Xenophontean Apology should have been so framed as to differ from it not only as to what was said but as to what was done,—as for instance in the statement (22) that Socrates' friends spoke at the trial as συνήγοροι, and again (23) that Socrates refused ῥήτοραμαι altogether, both which statements conflict with the Platonic representation? But there were yet other Apologies extant besides these. Aristotle in the Rhetoric (II. xxiii. 13) quotes from a Socratic Apology of Theodectes, as containing the following passage, εἰς ποιόν τερῶν ἴστεβηκε; τίνας θεών οὖ τετύμηκεν οὖς ἡ πόλις νομίζει; and besides in the same chapter he quotes the following passages without mention of their authors but obviously from similar compositions; μέλάτε δὲ κρίνειν οὖ
perι Σωκράτους ἄλλα περι ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρή φιλοσοφεῖν (18),
and τὸ δαμώδους οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἡ θέως ἡ θεοῦ ἔργον καὶ τοιο
όστις οἷτει θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἰκεθαί καὶ θεωὸς
eiναι (8). Once more, it is probable enough, that the story9 of
Lysias having offered Socrates for use on his trial a defence of
his own composing grew out of his having written an elaborate
posthumous Socratic Apology.

It is then too much of an assumption, though countenanced
by Zeller and Mr. Grote as well as by many older writers on
the subject, that we can rely on the Platonie Apology as a
substantial reproduction of the speech of Socrates. Inde-
pendently of Plato's representation we know not what So-
erates said, or whether he said much or little, or how far he
concerned himself with a direct reply to the charges laid
against him; nor, when we have studied that representa-
tion, do we know these things any the better. Even if the
studied speech of Plato embodied authentic reminiscences
of the unpremeditated utterances of his master, to disen-
geage the one from the other is more than we can assume
to do.

Notwithstanding, we can seek in the Apology a portrait of
Socrates before his judges and not be disappointed. Plato has
not laid before us a literal narrative of the proceedings and
bidden us thence form the conception for ourselves; rather he
has intended us to form it through the medium of his art.
The structure is his, the language is his, much of the sub-
stance may be his; notwithstanding, quite independently of
the literal truth of the means, he guarantees to us a true con-
ception of the scene and of the man. We see that "liberam
contumaciæ a magnitudine animi ductam non a superbia"
(Cic. Tusc. I. 29), and feel that it must be true to Socrates,
although with Cicero himself we have derived the conception
from Plato's ideal and not from history. We hear Meletus
subjected to a questioning which, though it may not have been
the literal ἐρωτησις of the trial, exhibits to us the great ques-
tioner in his own element. We discover repeated instances
of the irony, which, uniting self-appreciation with a true and
unflattering estimate of others, declines to urge considera-

I. 54, Quintil. Inst. II. xv. 30, XI. i. VII. 56.
which lie beyond the intellectual or moral ken of the judges. Here we have that singularity of ways and thoughts which was half his offence obtruding itself to the very last in contempt of consequences. Here we have that characteristic assertion of private judgment against authority which declares itself in the words ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φίλῳ, πείτομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ τῇ ὑμῖν (29 D). Here we have also his disapproval of the existing democracy of Athens which he rather parades than disguises. And lastly, the deep religiousness which overshadowed all his character breathes forth in the account he renders of his past life, in his anticipations of the future, and in his whole present demeanour.

Thus while the problem of the relation of the Apology to what Socrates actually said must remain unsolved, there is no doubt that it bodies forth a lifelike representation; a representation of Socrates as Plato wished us to conceive of him, yet at the same time as true to nature as the art of Plato could render it.

3. THE ADEQUACY OF THE APOLOGE AS A DEFENCE.

That the Apology aims at much more than a refutation of the indictment of Meletus is already sufficiently evident. We have seen that the avowed answer to Meletus is that part of the speech which by its position least challenges attention, and which is least characterised by an air of serious concern. The statement is besides repeatedly made, that the real strength of the prosecution lies outside of the indictment, and requires a commensurately wider effort to meet it.

The worth, then, of the Apology as a defence must be measured, in the first instance, if we will, by its sufficiency as an answer to Meletus, but chiefly and ultimately by its sufficiency as a justification of Socrates' whole manner of life.

It will not much affect our estimate, whether we regard the Apology as no more than a defence adapted to the historical occasion of the trial and to judicial ears, or as a posthumous justification of the great master in the eyes of the Hellenic world. Though the more comprehensive aim is doubtless the real one, yet public opinion had undergone so little change

10 As a matter of fact, the Athenians never repented of Socrates' death. The story of their passionate remorse being evoked by the repre-
in favour of Socrates since his death, that the justification which was most calculated to satisfy it was identically that which would have been most to the purpose at the trial.

First, then, what sort of an answer is offered to the indictment of Meletus?

That indictment divides itself into two allegations, under the heads respectively (as we should say) of religion and of morality. The mischief to morality is the perversity of the youth; the offence against religion is the setting forth of strange gods in the place of those of the state.

Now though these are put into the form of specific charges against Socrates, they are so (all but that of the καυὰ δαμωνία) in appearance alone; they are really selected from the string of imputations currently brought against Philosophers and Sophists. The Philosophers, i.e. Physicists, were popularly associated with atheism, the Sophists with perversity of the youth. The allegations of "the old accusers," to which the Apology first addresses itself, are drawn from the same repertory, and arraign Socrates in like manner under the two heads of religion and morality as Philosopher and Sophist. It is true that the particular complaints there expressed are not the same; but it is not that the charges put forward here are less general than those. They are only omitted there because they were to come under consideration here. In the Clouds both these and those are put forward against Socrates, one after the other. And in the Apology itself (23 C—D) "the old accusers" are represented as eventually appending both "perversity of the youth" and "atheism" to their other charges.

The indictment therefore of Meletus contained no charge, save that of δαμωνία καυὰ, which would not be met (so far as might be) by the explanation Socrates had rendered of the deeper and wider and older prejudices, personified in "the old accusers," or by the justification he might be able to offer of the general method of his life.

sensation of Euripides' Palamedes (41 B. n.) is fabulous. Euripides deceased Socrates by 7 years. Xenophon and Plato would have made the most of any such change of feeling; whereas we find Xenophon, five years after Socrates' death, dealing with the allegations against Socrates as if still in full possession of the popular mind. See Zeller, II. p. 138, note.
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Here therefore Soerates contents himself with a dialectical victory over Meletus; instead of entering into the merits of the question with him, he disposes of him summarily by adding him to the list of pretenders. If the charge of δαιμόνια καυτά is subjected to the same treatment,—a treatment characterised by Döllinger as little better than sophistical,—it is because that charge is itself a sophistical one. It wrests τὸ δαίμονιον into δαιμόνια, the divine agency of which Socrates consistently spoke into divine beings. Socrates therefore is only returning Meletus' sophism upon himself, when he treats the δαιμόνια of the indictment as if it had been δαιμόνια πράγματα. His whole dealing with the question of heterodoxy has an observable air of carelessness. Though he explicitly disavows atheism, and calls the sun and moon gods, yet he nowhere commits himself to a distinct recognition of the state gods, any more than he repudiates belief in any others. But it must be remembered that in those days few could have cast a stone at Soerates for such reticence: and that if a man's practice was religious, there was little enquiry into his opinions; and that Soerates' character as a religious man, his strictness and frequency in religious observances, was beyond doubt and made proof superfluous,—though the Xenophontean Apology enters into it at length. From the personal imputation of irreligion, in short, Soerates had little to fear, and he could afford to deal with it lightly; whereas to that of perverting the youth he addresses himself twice elsewhere, in addition to the dialectical refutation of it here.

Thus what was really formidable in the indictment of Meletus resolved itself into the more general imputations which connected Soerates with those two suspected classes of men, the Philosophers and the Sophists; and, keeping in view the fact that the Apology addresses itself elsewhere in full to those imputations, any fuller treatment of them under the head of the indictment can be spared.

The remainder of the defence is taken up with two lines of argument: the first, at the outset of the speech, deals with the general prejudices, which existed against Soerates as Philosopher (Physicist) and Sophist; the other, which follows the special reply to the indictment, offers a particular justification for Soerates' manner of life as a citizen.
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In the earlier portion Socrates does what he can, first to separate himself from those two suspected classes, and then to explain how the prejudice arose in the public mind, and how it became strengthened by personal animosity.

It is hardly necessary to show that the imputations of "the old accusers" contain nothing of an individual character, but are (as Socrates alleges) mistakenly transferred from the popular notion of the Philosophers and the Sophists. The title σοφός ἀνήρ, which Socrates takes such pains to disclaim, is the appellation originally bestowed on the Ionic philosophers, as men whose speculations had fathomed the universe, and from this association was matured that distinction between it and φρώνιμος which we find in Aristotle (Ethic. Nic. VI. vii. 5, Θαλήν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρωνίμους ἀδ᾽ ὧν φασίν εἶναι). It was in connecting Socrates with a supposed class of speculative men that the force and odiousness of the designation σοφός ἀνήρ consisted. The imputation contained in the words τὰ μετέωρα φροντίζων or ἤπτων, i.e. τὰ οὐράνια, is equally general. The Scholast on Aristoph. Nub. 96 says, κοινῶν τῶν φιλοσοφῶν ἄπαντων ἐγκλῆμα. In 431 B.C. Diopeithes, a fanatical Rhetor, carried the law εἰσαγγέλλασθαι τοὺς τὰ θεία μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρητῶν διδάσκοντας (Plutarch. Vit. Pericl. 169 D, Aristoph. Vesp. 380). Eupolis (Fragm. Com. ed. Meineke, II. p. 490) says of Protagoras, ἄλαξονευτα μὲν, ἀλητίριος, περὶ τῶν μετεώρων. Once more, the reference in τῶν ἠττω λόγων κρείττων ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα ταύτα διδάσκων is palpably general. The earlier Sophists, as teachers of pleading, first incurred and perhaps courted the imputation of τῶν ἠττω κ.τ.λ., and from them the imputation was derived to others. Isocrates (xiv. 15. p. 313) speaks of the charge being made against himself, ὥσ ἐγὼ τῶν ἠττων λόγων κρείττων δύναμαι ποιῶν, and again (30. p. 316), ὥσ διαφθείρω τοὺς νεωτέρους λέγειν διδάσκον καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἄγοσι πλεονεκτεῖν. Odium also attached to the profession11 of an instructor in speaking. Hence Ἀσχίνης' designation (i. 94. p. 13) of Demosthenes as λογογράφος, and (117. p. 16) ό τῶς τῶν λόγων τέχνας κατεπαγγέλλομεν τοὺς νέους διδάσκειν, crowned by the

11 Λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν (Xen. Mem. I. ii. 31) was a law of the Thirty Tyrants against liberty and freedom of speech. How came the suspicion of λόγων τέχνη to survive the Tyranny?
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designation σοφιστής (125. p. 17): cf. ii. 165, iii. 173. pp. 50, 78. Hence, weightier for its dispassionateness, a remark of Thucydides (VIII. 68) about Antiphon ὑπότως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, τοὺς μέντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν ἄδημῳ πλείστα εἰς ἀνήρ, ὅσοις ἐξισοβολεύσατο τι, διιάμενος ὑφελεῖν. This odium, in which the profession was held, was akin to fear; Isocrates (XV. 230) explains it thus, ἡ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δεινότης ποιεῖ τοῖς ἀλλατρίοις ἐπιβολεύειν.

Thus the charges recited present us with nothing individually characteristic of Socrates, but only (as he himself calls them 23 D) τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πρόχειρα. These were the materials for the popular representation of Socrates, which accordingly (like the caricature in the Clouds) is a compound of the conventional lineaments of the Philosopher (Physicist), and of the Sophist. The μετέωρα φροντίζων is due to the Philosopher, and the τὸν ἡπτῶ λόγον κ.τ.λ. to the Sophist, while the title σοφός ἀνήρ stands alike for the one and the other.

To relieve himself from the yoke of these imputations Socrates fairly draws attention to the want of connection between himself and these two suspected classes. Of those speculative studies he denies any knowledge, and as to his having ever discoursed on them to others he courts further the testimony of his judges, of whom many had frequented his society.

The line of argument which he takes in distinguishing himself from the Sophists seems less cogent than it might have

12 Plat. Apol. 20 Α, Evenus is ἀνήρ Πάριος σοφός, Xen. Mem. II. i. 21, Πράδεκας δ′ σοφός is mentioned; as on the other hand σοφιστής is borrowed to express Philosopher.

13 There is no want of harmony between Socrates' disclaimer here and what he tells us in the Phaedo of his having taken up physical speculation in early life. He had given it up forthwith, on finding no satisfaction in it; and he could truly say (Apol. 19 C), ἵπται τούτων οὔδὲν μέτεστι. Nor again is his disclaimer at variance with the fact, that he used to call attention to the evidence of design in nature as a help to piety (Xen. Mem. VI. III. 3 sqq.), that he is in fact (as Zeller remarks, II. p. 117) the parent of the teleological idea which has given unity and ideality to the study of nature ever since his days. This half-religious view of his had nothing in common with those inadmissible hypotheses, which the Physical Philosophers tried in turn to fit to the universe.
been. He dwells on the most external difference alone. He points to the Sophists giving courses of lectures on various subjects, professing to turn out finished politicians, pleaders, debaters, and the like, pursuing this as a regular trade, and flourishing by it; he flatly disclaims any such characteristics (for even these, it seems, had been attributed to him, et tivos ἀποκόμετε κ.τ.λ. 19 D), and so passes on. Here certainly was a sufficiently palpable dissimilitude, demanding no acuteness to appreciate it; but why was it not worth while to clench the argument by going more thoroughly into the contrast? We miss the manifold and deep divergence which might have been traced between a system which relied on the attainment of objective certainty, and one which, while it questioned received opinions, had no interest in either substantiating these, or establishing truer ones in their place; between a system which opened out a method of truth-seeking investigation, and one which, had it prevailed, would have made philosophy thenceforth an impossibility (Zeller, II. p. 130); between a system which proposed to place all human action on an intelligible principle, and one which professed to furnish the intellect alike for any use, regardless of principles. All this and more could have been pleaded in evidence of the wide gulf which separated Socrates from the Sophists; we can only suppose that the Court, or the people of Athens (to which ever we suppose for the moment the justification to be directed), were incapable of appreciating the fundamental unlikeness, and that the dropping of the subject here is at once true to the Socratic irony, and at the same time suggests that the real position of Socrates was never understood by the mass of his countrymen or by their compendious representative the Heliastic Court.

The sequel of this disclaimer of the popular identification is a setting forth of the facts which were the occasion of it. A man who himself exercised no practical profession, was ever showing himself dissatisfied with received empirical rules and maxims, and ever requiring from others a reason for tenets which they had never questioned, while in doing this he evinced matchless dialectical powers and forced a confession of ignorance from men known to be perfectly self-satisfied,—such a man answered sufficiently well the description of Philosopher
and Sophist when once Aristophanes⁴ has given the hint. This was the naked explanation of the popular identification, and this it is in fact which lies couched under Socrates' parables of the wisdom which consisted in knowing his own ignorance, the Delphic Response, and the tour of questioning (Apol. 20 D—E, 23 A—B). And this account, which has all the appearance of truth, must stand good, in our estimate of the defence, as a plea which ought to have commanded attention. The speaker himself indeed despair of its obtaining entrance into minds preoccupied; it was likely, he says (20 D), to sound to them like a jest. But the cause for despair lay not in the insufficiency of the plea, but in the invincibility of the prejudice to be combated. Nor has the whole strength of that prejudice yet been indicated. Had Socrates been really a Philosopher or a Sophist, there would have been nothing to be added; the supposed mischiefs of his teaching would have been alone in the scale. But so far as popularity was concerned, the difference between Socrates and Philosophers or Sophists told against him and not in his favour. The moral suspicion harboured against what he was supposed to be was aggravated by personal animosity against what he was. The ever busy talker, the merciless questioner, who avowed the exposure of self-deceived pretenders to be the mission of his life, and pursued this mission uncompromisingly for a quarter of a century and more in such a narrow society as was comprised within a Hellenic state, without ever even stirring from the midst of them, encountered enmities which never lighted on the head of Philosopher or Sophist; a specimen of which is the individual grudge which Anytus is said to have borne Socrates.

It is then a mistaken moral prejudice, intensified and quickened by the actual smart of personal affronts,—the former refuted to no purpose, the latter absolutely intractable,—which here threatens to overbear the defence. It is this aggravated prejudice, the working of which is foreshadowed in those discerning words (28 A), καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅ ἐμε αἴρησε, ἐάνπερ

⁴ Zeller remarks that the fact of the Aristophanic caricature having stuck to Socrates to the end of his life shows that Aristophanes hit the popular conception. May we not rather suppose that he led it, and regard the Apology here as elsewhere as true to facts?
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On Socratic principles, a defence had discharged its office when it had set before the Court not grounds of feeling but rational grounds for its acceptance. Socrates has hitherto disproved (as fully as the range of the popular mind admitted) the mistaken identification of him with Philosophers and Sophists. He has given the explanation of the mistake, and he has pointed out how that very explanation accounts for the confirming of the mistake irrationally through personal animosity. He has exhausted his armoury; against this animosity itself he has no weapons; if his judges or the public will allow it to affect their verdict, it cannot be helped—ταύτη ἐστιν ἡμεῖς, οἱ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τάληθή, . . . . καὶ τοι οίδα σχέδου ὅτι τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀπεχθάνομαι (24 Α).

Beyond the reply to Meletus' indictment we find a fresh branch of the defence before us. Socrates is no longer overtly answering charges, old or recent, but rather directly justifying the usefulness of his life. He takes a view of himself, as it were from further off, and reviews his whole attitude as a citizen.

The question arises, how this part of the speech serves any direct purpose of the defence.

Of the strong points on the side of the prosecution, one has remained hitherto almost untouched: it is not one which appears in the indictment proper, or in that of "the old accusers;" nor again has it that stamp of inveteracy which would have marked it had it been part of the Aristophanic caricature. But it was the moving cause of the present indictment being preferred at all.

15 The mob who in 1791 sacked Dr. Priestley's house at Birmingham in consequence of his espousal of the principles of the French Revolution, of which the news had just reached England, proceeded to threaten all with whom Priestley had been associated not in politics or religion but merely by a common devotion to chemistry and invention. "A common cry among the mob was, 'No "Philosophers;' 'Church and King for "ever!' And some persons, to escape "their fury, even painted 'No Phi-
"losophers' on the walls of their "houses! . . . Boulton and Watt were "not without apprehensions that an "attack would be made on them, as "the head and front of the 'Phil-
"osophers' of Birmingham.'—Smiles "Life of Boulton, ch. 20."
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It is tolerably clear from the accounts of the speeches for the prosecution that political charges entered freely into them. See Xen. Mem. I. ii. 9, 12, &c. To Socrates was there ascribed the evil done to their country by Critias the oligarch and Alcibiades the demagogue; the strange doctrine that the poorer private citizens were a fair mark for ill usage; the unfriendly criticism on election to offices by lot,—which was probably made use of as a special ground in support of the accusation of perverting the youth, since the ventilation of such doctrines tended to make them disloyal or insubordinate. A line of Hesiod was alleged to have been wrested by him to a like purpose, as countenancing rapacity.

There were indeed independent and domestic proofs alleged for perversion of the youth, but those which have been noticed were political. All these topics had been employed by the prosecution, and it is scarcely likely that in addition to them Socrates' abstinence from public affairs, his relations to Charmides, another of the Thirty, and to Xenophon, the friend of Sparta, and under sentence of banishment at the time, and perhaps his deprecating mention of the tradesmen in the Ecclesia (Xen. Mem. III. vii. 6), were not also brought up against him. Such charges and insinuations as these were indeed foreign to the indictment, but they were calculated to have considerable weight with the Court.

For one characteristic of the moment was the keen feeling with which since the restoration of the democracy the Athenians cherished their particular conception of political loyalty. That conception was somewhat narrow and exacting. The primary requisite was not only 'assent and consent,' but enthusiasm towards the letter of the constitution; and second only to this, as the natural reaction from the depression which the usurpation had caused, was a devotion to the material interests of the state, and the display of energy in amassing wealth.

The prosecutors, or at least the leading spirit among them, were no doubt actuated in their institution of the proceedings by the same political sensitiveness which they sought to inspire in the judges and betrayed in their speeches. Anytus was a man of strong political convictions; he had lost a fortune through his fidelity to the cause of freedom. And if he
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was partly animated by a personal grudge against Socrates, he was none the less the person to take up a political grievance against him.

There must have come to the surface some fresh element for the old prejudice so to pronounce itself. As Sophist or Philosopher, Socrates' cup had long been full; nor was there any reason in that point of view for its overflowing now if it had not before. Aristophanes\(^{16}\) had ceased to attack him. As a mark for personal enmity\(^{17}\) he had been more prominent and defenceless either in connection with the Hermæ trials or after the battle of Arginusæ. It would be a difficult problem, why the extreme step was taken now and not till now, did we not take into account the\(^{18}\) political sensitiveness which, as the offspring of the restored democracy, formed a new element in public opinion as it affected Socrates.

We shall not be unprepared, then, to find that the remaining part of the defence is in some sense political,—as much so, as that of a non-political man could be. It is the defence of a reformer, though not of a political reformer. To ignore the political charge altogether in the defence would have been either a confession of weakness or a dangerous oversight, however fully the indictment might have been disposed of. But, moreover, political insinuations had been pressed into the service of the indictment itself in connection with the charge of perverting the youth.

It is obvious, that Socrates was precluded from meeting these charges in the way which would best have pleased his judges. He could have said that he had never transgressed the laws; he could say (as in fact he does say) that he loved his countrymen intensely; but for the existing constitution he could profess no enthusiasm. Yet here we must observe, that his coldness did not arise from frank political dislike of democracy, nor is his dissatisfaction to be measured by the one or two well-known criticisms which he passed upon it. He cared

\(^{16}\) [So Stallb. Prolegg. ad Plat. Sympos. p. 28. Zeller (II. p. 150) asserts the contrary and appeals to Aristoph. Ran. 1491 sqq.]

\(^{17}\) Cf. Zeller, II. p. 142.

\(^{18}\) Cf. Zeller, II. p. 152. The usur-
for politics only as involving the interests of the individual (Xen. Mem. III. iv. 12), and it is to his view of individual well-being that we must look, if we would understand the degree or the significance of his reserved attitude towards the constitution. Its faults connected themselves in his mind with other faults at once further from the surface and far graver. To him the alarming symptoms were such as these,—that this system extolled as so perfect could coexist with an utter abeyance of principles; could be carried on by men, who, in knowledge of it, were mere empirical adventurers; that it neither undertook nor directed education; that much might be going wrong within it, without its giving any check or warning; that morality might share the general wreck and not be missed;—and that, all this while, the Athenian mind should throw itself without misgiving into such a system, and find all its wants satisfied, and its self-complacency encouraged; that, while intolerance was stimulated, the belief in any unwritten law of right beyond and above the positive enactments of the state had all but died out, and a belief in divine sanctions was scarcely felt (Apol. 35 D).

It was for these deeper reasons that Socrates was totally out of harmony with the political optimism of his countrymen. Here was the cause of the gravest manifestation of his irony. The discord was the more complete, because it turned upon considerations of the well-being of individuals rather than upon political predilections and fancies. And out of those considerations there rose up before his mind a clear vision of a great need, and of the remedy which would remove it, and of an obligation upon himself to be the applier of that remedy.

The discord had jarred upon the sensitive ear of restored democracy, and filled it with a feeling of offence which presently found interpreters in Anytus and others. The whole deep disharmony did not strike them; but, conscious of its presence, they detected and treasured up superficial results of it, such as the detached adverse criticisms upon the government, and perhaps followed with a like jealousy the abstinence from public life; and they added to these other irrational aggravations, such as the connection with Critias and Alcibiades, and the well-known cry of perversion of the youth. It was the
same offended sense which prompted the decisive step and
brought Socrates to trial; and which, while the charges
brought were the old and staple cries against the Philosophers
and Sophists, aggravated these with a new political stigma.

But it is time to return to Socrates, and to the part of the
Apology which still remains to be considered. We are now in
a position to judge of it as a political defence, if such it shall
turn out to be.

Of the particular political charges we find Socrates here
only touching upon one, and that allusively,—the charge of
being answerable for the misconduct of Critias and Alcibiades
and perhaps others (33 B). The line he mainly follows is
general.

We have analysed the attitude of Socrates towards the state
of which he was a citizen into the following parts;—first, dis-
satisfaction, chiefly on moral grounds, with the prevalent state-
theory; secondly, conception of the remedy to be applied to
it; and, thirdly, conviction that the application devolved upon
himself. And in a full general justification of himself in a
political point of view, he would have had to expound all these
points seriatim. We find him however reticent as to the first
point: at most he only hints at it in the simile (30 E) of the
high-bred horse, whose greatness of frame makes him somewhat
sluggish, and who needs some gadfly to stir his spirit, and
in the remark (31 A) that it is an extreme boon to be so
roused. He interweaves the second point with the third, yet
sparingly, and only in the way of explanation. It can hardly
be said that the conception of the remedial plan is completely
unfolded; though we find notices of it in the doctrine (29 D
sqq.) that the care and improvement of the soul, and the pur-
suit of wisdom, truth, and virtue, are to be ranked infinitely
above the pursuit of riches; the doctrine (36 C) of the need
of consciously-possessed principles of individual and political
action, tested (29 E, also 38 A) by self-examination; and the
doctrine (33 A) of the imperative duty of adhering to what is
just, alike in public and in private life. It is the third point,
the assumption by himself of this mission, into which the
speaker throws his strength: with this he starts, and to this
he limits his justification. His first and paramount plea in this
justification is that (28 B sqq. and 33 C) the work was under-
taken in obedience to the above-mentioned divine call, i.e. was an indefeasible duty, and therefore to be performed without respect of consequences, or counter-inducements, or human inhibition (29 D)—the proof of the divine call, i.e. of the reality of the obligation, being that nothing else would have sustained him in such a course of self-sacrifice (31 B). His other plea is that his assumption of this work was an incalculable benefit to his countrymen. In what remains he sets forth, in answer to supposed objections, first, that to have entered public life in preference to dealing with individuals would have been neither a practicable nor an effective method of pursuing this mission (31 C sqq.); and, secondly, the innocent tendency of his work (inoculating righteousness, not training for professions or imparting knowledge, 33 A), excluding the suspicion of perverting the youth,—a suspicion which is also refuted independently (33 C).

To have enlarged upon the first point would obviously have stood Socrates in little stead. He could not have done so without appearing to admit the political allegations of his accusers in their entire force; and thus the vindication of himself as a reformer lacks the support which it would have gained from a premised statement of the need of reform. But, to pass on from this first drawback to its effectiveness, the actual vindication offered must in itself have seemed to the majority of the Athenians partly paradoxical and partly visionary. In representing himself as having done good service by urging on them the care of their souls, by unswervingly insisting on righteousness in them and in himself, Socrates was traversing ground where they could not follow him. These things had for them no meaning. They required devotion to the letter of their constitution, they were on the verge of a panic at the appearance of disaffection; and this was their righteousness. With this they were content, when the substance of the old religion and the old morality were really departed from them. They were necessarily far from believing that it could be any man's duty or mission to set himself up among them as a preacher of righteousness,—as he himself says expressly in the ἄρτεταιμος (37 E—38 A). To us there may seem to be nothing so far out of the common in the moral work of which Socrates claims to be the sole promoter, as to
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elevate him to a position of singularity. But it was a novel work enough to his contemporaries. It is a difficulty throughout in the way of appreciating Socrates, that positions, which ever since his time have been household words, not in moral philosophy merely but in common life, were in his mouth, to the men of his generation, original and novel; and that the simple principles he lays down here, so far from being commonplace to his audience, must have rather transcended their moral apprehension.

Nor must it be forgotten that their old distrust of the Sophist came in to the aid of their distaste for the reformer. So far from believing in his principles of moral reformation, they were confusedly identifying these with the old sophistical teaching. Hence it is that the disclaimer ἐγὼ διδάσκαλος οὐδενὸς κ. τ. λ. finds place here.

There were ample reasons, then, why this part of the defence should fail. Socrates stood before his countrymen a confessed reformer, and they were strangers to the idea of reformation except in a political sense,—a sense in which the Athens of the day had no room for reformers.

But the failure of the defence here urged by Socrates upon his countrymen is to be laid not to his charge but to theirs. The point upon which our whole judgment must turn is this. Was the need of a reformation so urgent as Socrates supposed it to be? If so, then Socrates was no less in the right, no less a benefactor, because they failed to feel the need, and they in crushing him were no less guilty of a national hypocrisy.

There is no need to sum up at any length the results of our

19 It is a poor sophism to urge that the stages of an ἀγὼ πειράτης, or the venality of Athenian jailors, made Socrates' death his own act,—an eventuality which his accusers themselves never contemplated. This last assumption (which Köchly espouses) is directly at variance with the Apology, which (29 C) makes Anytus responsible for the argument that it were better Socrates should never have been tried, than that he should escape with his life. To excuse the judges as having been after the first step unwilling instruments of a legally unavoidable catastrophe, is a plea which we never think of allowing to the eastern despot, who after betraying his righteous minister "laboured " till the going down of the sun to deliver him." The justice or injustice of the catastrophe is involved in that of the first step. The whole responsibility fell upon the judges from the moment when, in affirming the accusation Ἐκκράτης ἀδικεῖ κτλ., they gave their voice against the truth.
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inquiry into the worth of the Apology as a defence. Its art is consummate; its statements are (as the exordium promised) unalloyed truth; its reticences are condescensions to the audience with whom it deals. It is exhaustive; it lays open by turns all the motives and influences which were at work against Socrates; and the more pains we are at to represent these to ourselves by means of an independent investigation, the more reason we shall find to acknowledge that the true clue lay all the while close to our hand in the Apology.

20 That the Sophists had no hand in bringing about the condemnation of Socrates is clear. Anytus was the enemy of Sophists. The Sophists had no political influence, and were themselves too much under the same suspicion with Socrates to have dared to inflame that suspicion. Cf. Zeller, II. p. 139.

ABBREVIATIONS IN TEXTUAL COMMENTARY.

V = Vulgar text, settled originally by Stephanus.
B = Bekker.
S = Stallbaum.
Z = Zurich editors.
H = Hermann.
Oxon. = the Bodleian MS. known as 'Codex Clarkianus.'

[Dr. Gaisford first published the readings of this MS. in 1820. Mr. Riddell collated the Apology anew for this edition, and also the Crito, Phædo, and Symposium.]
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

I. Ὁ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθησε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ ὁδαί· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὁλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καὶ τοι ἀληθὲς γε, ὡς ἕπος εἰπεῖν, 5 οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὁν ἐφεύσαντο, τούτῳ ἐν ὧν ἔλεγον ὡς χρῆν ύμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δει- 10 νοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθῆσονται ἐργοῦ, ἐπειδὰν μηδ' ὄπως- 15 τιον φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τούτῳ μοι ἐδοξεῖν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρα δεινὸν κα- λόστιν ὄντοι λέγειν τὸν τάληθη λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τούτῳ λέγοντιν, ὀμολογοῦν ἀν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τοῦ- 20 τοὺς εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὕτοι μὲν οὖν, ὀσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, 15

5. ὡς ἕπος εἰπεῖν] This qualifies the οὐδὲν following, making it equivalent to ἥ τι ἦν οὐδὲν below.
8. μὴ — ἐξαπατηθῆτε] This sentence is not affected by the tense of the main construction, because the contingency it expresses remains still future at the moment of its being al-

luded to by the speaker. Digest of Idioms, § 90.

14. οὐ κατὰ] A thorough litotes: 'far above these.' ‘a far greater orator than they.’
Cf. Hdt. i. 121, πατέρα καὶ μη- 20 τέρα εὑρήσει; οὐ κατὰ Μιτραδά- την τε τὸν βουκίλου καὶ τὴν γυ- ναίκα αὐτοῦ.
1. ἢ τι ᾧ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν· ύμεῖς δ’ ἐμοῦ ἀκοῦ· σέσυ μέντοι μα ἄλτε, ὡ τινος Ἀθηναίοι, κεκαλλιετημένον γε λόγους, ὀσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήματι τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμής·

2. οὐ μέντοι] Opposed to ἀκούσατα τ. τ. ἀλ.—You shall have the truth entire, but not drest up. This contrast is only carried as far as ὀνόμασι· after which the idea of the contrast between truth and falsehood is resumed (that is, πιστεύω γὰρ κ.τ.λ. gives the rationale of ὑμεῖς δ’—ἀληθείαν’) and continues to εἰσέπραξα·—since πλάτων λόγου refers not to artificial language but to falsification; a μερώμα, to hide a fault, uses falsehood and not rhetoric.

3. ὀσπερ οἱ] The noun, is the regular construction, where the noun brought into comparison can be made the subject of the clause introduced by ὀσπερ. The attracted construction, exemplified by ὀσπερ μερώμα below, is less common. Dig. 176.

4. ῥήματι . . . ὀνόμασι] What do these two terms mean here? For in Sophist. 262 a, b, they distinctly mean ‘verb’ and ‘noun,’ in Cratyl. 399 b, c, as distinctly ‘expression’ and ‘word’ (Δέφιος the ὀνομα). Now the conjoint phrase seems to have had a familiar rhetorical signification; cf. Symp. 198 b, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ τελευτὴς τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων τίς οὐκ ἀν εξεπλάγῃ ἀκοῦαν; 199 b, ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήματι, 221 c, τοιαῦτα καὶ ῥήματα καὶ ῥήματα’ whence we may conclude that the association here is similar. And if we compare passages of rhetorical criticism in the Oration, where these words occur, we shall find the meaning approaches to that in Cratyl. rather than that in Sophist.: cf. Ἀσχιν. iii. 72, p. 64, οὐ γὰρ ἐφ’ ἐπι (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ῥῆμα μεμερημαί ὡς εἰπε, διὰ τὴν ἀρδεία τοῦ ὀνόματος) ἀπορρήσες τῆς εἰρήνης τήν συμμαχίαν—where the ῥῆμα is the whole expression, the ὀνόμα is ἀπορρήσα. Further, as Socrates could not speak without ‘expressions’ and ‘words,’ it is the artistic use of them he here disclaims; which, in the case of ὀνόματα, would consist in what Ἀσχιν.—ii. 153, p. 48—calls ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων σύσβεσις, and also in tropes and other figures of speech, and choice of unusual words, cf. Ἰσορ. ix. 9. p. 190, μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔχεις τά δὲ κανόνι ὑπέτασσε ἀλλ’ ῥήματα would extend to whole expressions, cf. Ἀσχιν.’ caricature, iii. 166. p. 77, τὰ μιμαρὰ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀνίθανα ῥήματα.
17. μένους, ἀλλ' άκούσεσθε εἰκή λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπίτυχοις ὄνομαίνει πιστεύει γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἀ λέγω, καὶ μηδείς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὔδε γὰρ ἄν δήποτε πρέποι, δ' ἄνδρες, τῇ δὴ ἡλικίᾳ ὀσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσίεναι. καὶ μὲν-5 τοι καὶ πάνω, δ' ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τούτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρέμας εάν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητε μου ἀπολογομενέων, δ' οὔπερ εἴσωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, δ' καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτε θαναμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τοῦτον ἡν ἔνεκα. ἐξεί γὰρ οὕτως. νῦν ἐγὼ προῖτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἐπὶ γεγονός πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα.

12. πλείω] Hermann's note may satisfy us here: "Πλείω vel contra Oxon. cum VBS retinere quam cum Turicensibus omittere

with it (30 d, 31 e, 35 b, c).


 lesbians] ἕμων πολλοῦ] ἕμων is emphatic. As Stallb. remarks, the frequenter of the τραπεζαί would be of the richer class.


ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ατεχνός οὖν ξένως εἶχο τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὁσπερ ἐν ὁνειρίας ἠν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον οὖν, ἐννεπεγγώ-
σκετε δήπον ἂν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, εὐ ὁσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν
τοῦτο ὑμῶν δόμαι δίκαιων, ὡς ἢ ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν
τρόπον τῆς λέξεως εἶναι ὅσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ὅσως
de βελτίων ἂν ἐγὼ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τοῦτῷ
tὸν νῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μὴ δικαστῶν
μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετὴ, ρήτορος δὲ τάληθη λέγειν.

Π. Πρότων μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογηθήσασθαι,
ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μου ψευδὴ κατη-
γορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγόρουσ, ἐπειτα δὲ
πρὸς τὰ ὑστερα καὶ τοὺς υστέρους. ἔμοί γὰρ πολλοὶ
kατῆγοροι γεγονασι πρὸς ύμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἦδη
ἐτη καὶ οὖδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὖς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον
φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἄμφι Ἀνυτοῦν, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ

malui, quia doctius additamentum est quam quod ad interpolato-
rem referamus. Immo facile ejici poterat propter Crito. 52 c,
videturque jam Apollodoro ignotumuisse, qui apud Diog. La. II.
§ 44. ipso septuagesimo ante mortem anno natum statuit; at
duos ut minimum annos adjiciendos esse seire Boeckhii Corp.
Inscr. II. p. 341 probavit, nosque mox comparato Synes. Calv.
Encom. c. 17 confirmavimus; cf. de theor. Deliac. p. 7." Zeller
agrees, but makes 72 years the extreme limit.

5. δίκαιον] 'I request this
of you as a piece of justice.'
Cf. 41 d, χρὴ...τοῦτο δια-
νοεῖσθαι ἀληθὲς, Legg. 795 c,
ταῦτα δὴ τοὺς...ἐν τοῖς ἀλ-
λοις πάσιν χρὴ προσδοκᾶν ἀρθῶν
'as the right thing.'
6. ἵσως μὲν γὰρ] The reason
urged is a general one. The
consideration of style, if al-
lowed at all, will be operative
just in those cases where it
is better or worse than the
case deserves,—just where it
will interfere with true judg-
ment.
9. αὕτη] This represents
the preceding clause αἵτω—
'ἡ ἀρετή' in fact τοῦτο, at-
tracted into the gender of
ἀρετή. Dig. 201.
14. καὶ πάλαι] This καὶ only
emphasises πάλαι. Dig. 133.
And in καὶ οὖδὲν—λέγοντες we
have the common καὶ after πολ-
λοι.—It was 24 years since
the Clouds were represented:
Forster.
18. τούτων δεινοὺς: ἀλλ' ἐκείνωι δεινότεροι, ὁ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παῖδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὕτων ἄλλησις, ὡς ἐστι τίς Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστής καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἀπαντα ἀνεξήκοντος καὶ τοῦ ἢττῳ λόγῳ κρείττω ποιῶν. οὕτω, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεύασαντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶ μου κατηγοροῦν: οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἥγοντας τοὺς ταύτα ἔστοιντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἐπειτὰ εἰσιν οὕτωι οἱ κατηγοροῦν πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἢδη κατηγορηκότες, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἡ ἄν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες, ἐνιοὶ οἱ ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογούμενου οὐδενός. ὁ δὲ

3. μᾶλλον] BS omit: Z retain, and rightly; for the rhythm would be intolerable without it, or without (which Hermann would prefer) the three words μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἄλλησις.

2. τοὺς πολλοῖς] Closely with ἐκ παῖδων. They ἐπειθόν all, but only most, not all, as children. Cf. below c, παῖδες οὕτε, ἐνιοὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

3. μᾶλλον] With ἐπειθόν and κατηγόρον: just in the same way as πολὺ μᾶλλον [κατηγόρον] below, c. Here it is intended to balance the comparative δεινότεροι—'were more busy in accusing me and trying to persuade you.'

4. σοφὸς—ποιῶν] This "accusation," both as given here, and as repeated with mock formality 19 b, is nothing more than a vivid way of representing, for a rhetorical purpose, the popular prejudice, in which the court shared. See Introd. p. xxiii. The charges it contains are two-edged, being borrowed partly from the vulgar representation of the Philosopher, partly from that of the Sophist: the μετέωρα φροντ. points to the Philosopher, the τῶν—ποιῶν to the Sophist. The title σοφὸς ἀνήρ would at once be understood as a class-appellation,—cf. 23 a, 34 c; in it the meaning and associations of Philosopher are uppermost, yet not so as distinctly to exclude those of Sophist. See Introd. p. xxxii. n. 12.

13. παῖδες . . . μειράκια] We should have reversed the order, and said, 'when you were all of you young, and most of you mere children.'

14. ὁ δὲ—ὅτι] This is not a changed but an abbreviated
πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὔδὲ τὰ ὄνοματα οἷόν τερ. 18
αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἴπειν, πλὴν εἰ τις κοιμοθοποίοις
tυγχάνει ὁν' ὅσοι δὲ φθόνος καὶ διαβολῆ χρώμενοι
ümās ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἂλλοις
5 πειθοῦτες, οὕτω πάντες ἀποροτάτοι εἰσιν' οὔδὲ γὰρ
ἀναβιβάσασθαι οίον τ' ἕστιν αὐτῶν ἐμπιστοί οὐδ'
ἐλέγχαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἄτεχνος ὅσπερ σκια-
μαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδὲν ἀπο-
κρυμένου. ἀξίωσάτε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὅσπερ ἐγὼ
10 λέγω, διπτοὺς μοι τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἐτέ-
ρους μὲν τοὺς ἅρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς
πάλαί, οὗς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἴηθετε δεῖν πρῶς ἐκεῖνος
ἐπρῶτον με ἀπολογήσασθαι καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων
πρῶτον ἠκούσατε κατηγοροῦντον, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον

2. κοιμοθοποίοις] V1; κοιμοθοποίοις BSZ with 2 MSS. B quotes
Fischer mistakenly asserting that at Phaedo 7ο c all the MSS.
have κοιμοθοπ.; but this is untrue for Oxon. and 6 others.
Meris' assertion that κοιμοθοποίοις is the Attic and the other
the common form does not bind us.

construction. In full it would
be ὁ δὲ πάνων εἴσιν ἀλογώτατον,
ἔστι τούτο, ὅτι. Dig. 247.

2. εἰ τις] Aristophanes is
named below, 19 c, and is
doubtless chiefly meant, but
not exclusively. Eupoli had
said (Meincke ii. p. 553), μισῶ
δ' ἐγὼ καὶ Σωκράτης, τῶν πτωχῶν
ἄδολεχρων, οὐκ ἁλλὰ μὲν πεφρῶ-
tικείς, ὤπεδεν δὲ καταβαγεῖς ἔχων
Τούτων κατημέρης. And a play
of Ameipsias, represented with
Aristophanes' Clouds, was called
the Connos, and the Chorus
was of Phrontistæ (Athens. v.
p. 218). It is likely enough
(Zeller, ii. p. 41, note 3), that
Ameipsias introduced the same
fact, or the same fiction, as
Plato (Menex. 235 c, Euthyd.
272 c), and made the music-
master Connus Socrates' in-
structor.

3. ὅσοι δὲ includes all but
the εἰ τις' that is, ὅσοι stands
for ὅσοι ἂλλοι. Cf. Theæt. 159 b,
where πάντα ἂ is equivalent to
πάντα τάλλα ἂ. This ὅσοι [ἀλ-
λοι] is then subdivided into
[oί μέν] φθόνῳ χρώμενοι καὶ oί
dede—πειθοῦτες. The oί μέν is
supplied from oί δὲ by ana-
strophe; Dig. 241. The ἂλ-
lοις πειθοῦτες is put in to make
the sense clear, but virtually
repeats the idea of ὑμᾶς ἄνε-
πειθοῦν it does not affect the
regularity of the construction.
18. ἦ τῶν τῶν ὑστερον. εἰεν' ἀπολογητέων δή, ὡ ἀν-
19. δρες Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐπιχειρήτεον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν
dιαβολήν, ἦν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην
ev οὕτως ὁλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλούμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο
οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἰ τι ἀμείνων καὶ ὑμῶν καὶ εἰμόι, καὶ
πλέον τι με ποιήσας ἀπολογούμενον' οἴμαι δὲ αὐτῷ
χαλεπῶν εἰναι, καὶ οὐ πάνω με λανθάνει οἰον ἐστιν.
Ὀμοὶ τούτο μὲν ἰτο ὅτι τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ
πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

III. Ἀναλάβομεν οὖν εἷς ἄρχῆς, τὸς ἡ κατηγο-
ρία ἐστίν, εἷς ἣ ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολή γέγονεν, ἡ δὴ καὶ
b πιστεύον Μέλητος μὲ ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην.
εἰεν' τῇ δῇ λέγοντες διεβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες;
ἀσπέρ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγω-

3. ἔσχετε] BZΠ; ἔσχε V. The preposition ἐν would be strange
with ἔσχετε if the meaning were 'have entertained during so long
a time.' ἐν means rather 'within the limits of;' and so, with
respect to the further limit, 'at the distance of.' Thus ἔσχετα
exactly falls into its place; 'ye first came to have so long
ago.'
4. ἐν οὕτως] Though this collocation is rarer than
οὕτως ἐν ὕλ.; yet it occurs; e.g. below 24 a (where this passage
is alluded to); Isæus vi. 33: p. 59, ἐν πάνω ὁλίγῳ χρόνῳ, Lysias,
xix. 8. p. 152, ἐν οὕτῳ δεινῷ καθεστήκες. The rhythm probably
determines the order. There is no need for the οὕτως of V.

2. τῆς διαβολῆς] Not the
name of σοφός (cf. 20 d, τὸ τε
ὄρομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν, and again
23 a); nor 'calumny' simply
(cf. below, ἡ κατηγορία . . . εἷς ἥ
ἤμε διαβολή); but calumny
believed, i.e. 'prejudice.'
7. οὗ πάνω here as elsewhere
retains its meaning of 'hardly,'
'scarcely;' but this is to be in-
terpreted as a litotes:—'I can
hardly say I do not know.'
Dig. 139.
11. ἦ δὴ] The antecedent of
ἡ is διαβολή. Cf. 28 a, καὶ τοῦτ'
estin ὡ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, . . . οὐ Μέλη-
tος, . . . ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δια-
βολῆς.
13. διεβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες
This fulness of expression is
common in Plato, and gives
the air of deliberateness. Dig.
262.
14. ἀσπέρ qualifies not only
κατηγόρων but also ἀντωμοσίαν
and ἀναγωγάς. They are quasi-
prosecutors; it is a quasi-in-
dictment; and Socrates makes
believe to read it.

ἀντωμοσίαν] So 24 b. This
ναι αὐτῶν. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζη- 
τὸν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια, καὶ τὸν ἢττο λόγον 
κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων. εἰ 
τοιαύτη τίς ἐστι’ ταῦτα γὰρ ἔσωτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν 
τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτης τών εἰκε περι-
φερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀερόβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολ-
λῆν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦτα, ὃν ἐγὼ οὔδεν οὔτε μέγα 
οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἑπαίω. καὶ οὐχ ὃς ἀτιμάζων λέγω 
τήν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἰ τίς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων 
τοσοφός ἐστι’ μη πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσάυτας

2. καὶ οὐράνια) So Z; VBSII καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια. 8. μικρῶν] 
According to Muir, σμικρῶς is Attic. Yet in Ἀσχίν. and Isoer. 
μικρῶς occurs uniformly. Below, d, all the MSS. have σμικρῶν. 
But to press uniformity would be arbitrary. See Lobeck, Pa-
thol. Pars II. De Orthogr. Gr. inconst. § 1, who instances pas-
sages in which both forms occur in close neighbourhood or even 
xx. pp. 506, 507. He quotes from Apollonius (Pron. 63) the 
general principle οὐκ ἔξωμιλστα τὰ τῶν διαλέκτων καὶ μᾶλιστα τὰ 
tῶν Ἀττικῶν. Cf. Phædo, 90 a. Rhythm must be in some degree 
a guide.

term, like ἀντυγραφή 27 a, is 
used to designate the ἔγκλη-
μα. Both ἀντωμοσια καὶ ἀντι-
γραφή were properly said of 
the defendant's plea, presented 
in writing and sworn to, in 
the ἀνάκρισις, or preliminary 
proceeding before the Archon 
Basileus. But as the ἔγκλημα 
was likewise then presented in 
writing and sworn to, the same 
words came to be applied to it 
also. See Introd. p. ix.
7. ἐν ἐγὼ] The antecedent 
of ἐν must be the matters in 
the ἀντωμοσια, not the imme-
diately preceding words.
οὔδεν οὔτε μέγα] Accus. cog-
nate, not accus. of the object; 
Dig. 6. ἐπιαίω is intransitive. 
8. καὶ οὐχ ὃς—ἐστι] This is 
well-marked irony. Socrates 
delays here to pronounce, 
before an audience who would 
have welcomed it, a condem-
nation of studies against which 
at other times he had freely 
declared himself, on the double 
ground (1) that human nature 
ought to be studied first, Xen. 
Mem. I. i. 12, and (2) that the 
Physicists got involved in ques-
tions which were really beyond 
the powers of the human mind, 
ib. 11, and arrived moreover 
at impotent conclusions, ib. IV. 
vii. 6, 7.
10. τοσάυτα] 'Upon so grave 
a charge' as that of pronounc-
ing upon things of which he
19. δικαίος φύγομεν ἄλλα γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοὺτον, ὥς ἄνδρες ἀ' Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδέν μετέστη. μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοῦς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἄξιον ὑμᾶς ἄλληλον διδάσκεις τε καὶ φράζεις, οὐκ έμοι πῶς τούτο ἃ ἦκόστα διαλεγομένον πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τινοὐτοι ἐστὶ: ὧν φράζετε οὖν ἄλληλοι, εἰ πῶς η σμικρον ἡ μέγα ηκουσε τις ὑμῶν ἐμοὶ περὶ τῶν τινοὐτων διαλεγομένου καὶ εἴ τοῦτο γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαύτ' ἐστι καὶ τάλλα περὶ ἐμοὶ ἄ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὕτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ γ' ὑπὸ τίνος ἄρκησάτε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεεύειν ἐπιχειροῦ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττειν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄληθες. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἶος τ' εἴη παιδεεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὁσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ

3. τοῖς] H. brackets. But if we read αὐτοῖς just before, following the weight of MSS., τοῖς is required by the Greek.

was ignorant,—the fault he himself so strongly reprobad in others.

1. ἄλλα γὰρ] 'But the truth is.' Dig. 147.


ἄλληλοι διδάσκεις τε καὶ φράζεις] This is a hysteron proteron: Dig. 308. With φράζεις is to be supplied of course ἄλληλοι, dropped by an idiom of abbreviation: Dig. 233.

14. ὁσπερ Γοργίας] Gorgias is spoken of by Isocrates as having made greater profits by teaching than any other man of his profession. Yet the sum was but small: ὦ δ' πλείστα κτησάμενον ὑμεῖς μημονεύομεν, Ἵν Gorgias ὁ Δεονίνος, though a single man and unburdened by Liturgies, χιλιόν μόνον στατήρας κατέληπτε. Isocr. xv. 155. p. 83. The ἐποκρατεῖ, he says, ib. 157, made much greater fortunes. Nor indeed is Socrates saying that the profits made by the Sophists were great. The sum which Socrates mentions below, 20 b, as Evenus' price, 5 minae (500 francs), seems to have been above the average: Isocrates, xiii. 3. p. 291, speaks of 3 or 4 minae (3-400 fr.) as a common price. Isocrates has been said, it is true, to have taken as much as 10 mine for his rhetorical course; Gorgias and Prodicus even 100. But what made the frequenting of Sophists' courses expensive was that people never thought they had had enough of them.

E. 2
the construction is changed from the infin. to a finite verb. Dig. 277. The change of construction is not gratuitous, but expresses (ironical) admiration. The passage in Theages, 128 a, is a reminiscence of this passage, including the change of construction.

6. προσεδέναι] The πρός stands compounded in its adverbial and not in its propositional sense. Dig. 129.

7. ἐπεὶ καὶ] The connecting thought is—'and at Athens there is quite as good a field for professed teachers as elsewhere.'

8. δν ἐγὼ ἥσσομαι] Socrates implies that he speaks from hearsay when he states ἐστιν ἐσθεία.

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 53

20. σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τήν τῶν νῦεν κτῆσιν. ἐστὶ τις, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἦν οὐ; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὡς. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσον διδάσκει; Εὐήνος, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνών καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐήνον ὁ ἐμακαρίσα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ ὁυτός ἐμελεῖ διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμεν τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμεν ἄν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην ταῦτα. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

V. Ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὕμων ἱσως, ἀλλ' ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ σοῦ τί ἐστι πράγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι αὕται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δῆπον σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἐπείτα τοσαῦτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν εἰ μὴ τι ἐπρατετέροι ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ. λέγε οὖν ἢμῖν, τί ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἥμεισ περί σοῦ αὐτοσχεδίαξομεν. ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δικαίαι λέγεων ο λέγων, κἂν ὕμων πειράσομαι ἦποδείξαι, τί ποτ' ἐστι τούτῳ ο ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τὸ τε

6. ἐγὼ οὖν] So Oxon. and 2 other MSS. ἐγώ is not wanted here.

9. Ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν] Here Socrates, though still ostensibly occupied with 'the old accusers,' passes from the denial of the imputations current against him as a reputed sophos to an account of the personal dislike which had befallen him individually. See Introd. p. xxxiv.

10. πράγμα] In the sense of pursuit, or plan of life or study or the like. Cf. Crito 53 d, τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα, Euryd. 304 a, τοστὸ τοῦ πραγματοσφῶν, ε. χαρίν γε τι πράγμα ἐστιν ἡ φιλοσοφία. The order of the words in this clause gives emphasis to σοῦ 'What is it, then, that you (since we are not to identify you with the sophoi) have been about?'

13. εἰ μὴ—πολλοὶ] This clause is the double of σοῦ γε—πραγματευομένου: an instance of the widely extended idiom which I have ventured to call Binary Structure: Dig. 207. Very parallel is Thuc. V. 97, καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλέ τοῖς διὰ τοῦ καταστραφῆναι ἐν παράσχετο . . . ., εἰ μὴ περιγενισώθη,—where εἰ μὴ περιγενισώθη repeats διὰ τοῦ καταστραφῆναι. Cf. also Hom. Od. ii. 246, Εἴπερ γὰρ k' Ὄδυσσεις κ.λ., ἀλλὰ κεν αὐτοῦ ἄδεια πότιον ἐπίσπου, Ἐπί πλόνεσσα μάγεται.
όνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δὴ. καὶ ἱσως μὲν ρ. 26
dόξω των ύμων παίζειν, εἰ μέντοι ἵστε, πάσαν ύμῖν
tὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρόν· ἐγώ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, δι'
onδέν ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τούτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐσχῆκα. 5ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ὑπὲρ ἑστίν ἱσως ἄνθρω-
pίνη σοφία. τὸ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι
σοφός· οὕτω δὲ τάχ' ἄν, ὑσ ἄρτι ἐλεγον, μείζω τινὰ c
ἡ κατ' ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἴεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί
λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐγὼν αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὅστις
10 φησὶν ἑυδεταί τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολή τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ
μου, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, μὴ θορυβησθε, μηδ' ἐὰν
dόξω τι ύμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν

1. ἴσως]. Of σοφός. See note on σοφός, 18 b.
5. ὑπὲρ κ.τ.λ. Ὃ My wisdom is precisely (περ) that only wis-
dom, as I believe (ἰσως), which
is possible to man:' namely
(21 d, 23 b), knowledge of his
own ignorance. Socrates speaks
of this as knowledge because it
implies two things;—(1) the
possession of a standard or
ideal of knowledge, with the
conception of a method for at-
taining it; and (2) self-know-
ledge, such as would result
from the Socratic system of
self-examination (cf. 38 a,note),
revealing the amount of actual
short-coming. This is know-
ledge until the positive know-
ledge is attained, and if that
ever can be, then this is the
only knowledge. Socrates' faith,
however, in the partial attain-
ableness of positive knowledge
never wavered, and his mis-
giving here must be restricted
to the possibility of complete
attainment.

8. ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω] 'Or
some wisdom that—I know
not how to characterise it.' It
is some predicate, alternative
with μείζω ἡ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, which
Socrates affects to be at a loss
for. The idiom is an expe-
dient for abbreviation; the
sentence is hurried to its con-
clusion after its point has been
expressed, by a clause super-
seding the enumeration of fur-
ther particulars: cf. Dig. 257,
where the present passage is
especially compared with Ὅργ.
494 d, (A) Πημί τῶν κνώμουν
ἡδεῖς ἢν βιώναι. (B) Πότερον εἰ
tὴν κεφαλήν μόνον κυριαί, ἢ ἢ ἐτ
177 a, ἢ μέν μοι ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου
ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἑυριστίδου Μελανι-
pυν' οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὦ μέθος ἀλλὰ
Φαιδροῦ τοῦδε. Cf. also Ale. I.
113 c. The verse in the Me-
lanippe was οὐκ ἐμὸς ὦ μέθος ἀλλὰ ἐμὸς μητρὸς πάρα. So Eur.
Hel. 513, Λόγοι γὰρ ἐστὶν οὐκ
ἐμὸς, σοφοὶ δ' ἔστος.
3. μάρτυρα—Δέλφους | "There is no need (says Zeller, Phil. der Griechen II. p. 45, note 2),
to deny the authenticity of the
oracle, but we cannot regard
it as having given the primary
impulse to Socrates' tour of
enquiry. Socrates must have
been already a known per-
sonage for Chærephon to have
put his question to the Pythia,
or for her to have taken it up."
It is therefore semi-rhetorically
that the oracle is here repre-
sented as the cause of Socrates'
eccentric and unpopular pro-
ceding. The Iambic form,—
σοφός Σοφοκλής &c.,—in which
the response appears in Diog.
II. 37, and Suid. σοφός, is a
later invention—an expansion
of the Pythia's simple negative
recited here.
6. καὶ ὑμῶν—κατηλθὲς] This
allusion to Chærephon's ante-
cedents is added not without
purpose,—to dispose the court
to hear more indulgently the
story which is to follow.
In detail:—The full point
of the phrase πλήθει ἑταῖρος is
to be found in the contrast of
the adherents of the Thirty;
more especially the ἑταῖρος of
the oligarchical clubs, and the
body of 3000 hoplites organ-
ised by the Thirty from their
partisans. φυγή refers to the
subsequent expulsion of all
not included in the 3000 from
Athens, and their withdrawal
presently after (when they
found no safety in Attica) to
Thebes, Megara, Oropus, Chal-
cis, Argos, &c. This flight, as
an event still vividly remem-
bered, is called ταύτην, 'the re-
cent.' So Isocr. matches it with
the old troubles under the Pi-
sistratidae;—τὴν δημοκρατίαν ...
εἰς ἄδη καταλήθειαν, καὶ τὰς φυγάς
tὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τυραννῶν καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ
tῶν τραίνων γενομένα, viii. 123.
p. 184. With κατηλθὲ cf. Lyrias,
x. 4. p. 116, ἐξ ὀτιν ἡμῖν κατε-
ληθάθησα: it is the recognised
description of the restoration of
democracy and end of the eight
months' reign of the Thirty,
signalised by the solemn return
of Thrasybulus and the exiles
from Piræus to Athens.
σοφότερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν p. 215 αὐτοῦ οὔτος μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν.

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὅν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω: μέλλω b 5 γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδαχεῖν, ὦθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτωσι: τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιθα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὑν. τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἔμε σοφότατον εἶναι; οὔ γὰρ ἀδίπτου ψευδεταί γε' οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἦπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει, ἐπείτα μόνιμα πάνω ἐπὶ ξητησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινα ἑτραπόμην. ἡλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ε ἐνταῦθα, εἰ πέρ που, ἐλέγεξον τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀπο- 10 φανὼν τὸ χρησμῷ ὅτι οὕτωσι ἐμοῦ σοφότερος ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἐφησία. διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—ὁνόματι γὰρ οὔθεν δέομαι λέγειν, ἢν δ' τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς οὖν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτον τι ἐπαθον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—καὶ διαλεγόμενοι αὐτῷ, ἐδοξέ οὐ δοτο— 15 σαν ἀνήρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἀλλοις τε πολλοῖς

1. ἀδελφὸς | Chærecrates: Xen. Mem. II. iii. 1.
2. μαρτυρήσει | The μαρτυρία is to be supposed to follow at once. Introd. p. xviii.
17. τῶν πολιτικῶν | In itself this word means no more than 'statesman,' in the sense in which it might have been applied to Pericles, and is applied, Lcgg. 693 a, to the old law- givers and settlers of Hellas. But an Athenian of Plato's time speaking of Athens would mean by πολιτικόν that class of men who made public business a profession,—τοὺς πολιτικούς λεγομένους (Politic. 303 e). As distinguished from the ρήτορες, they were men who sought appointments to public offices, while the ρήτορες were pro- fessional speakers in the Ecclesia. Cf. 23 e, and see Introd. p. x. note 7.
19. διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἐδοξέ μοι | This inversion of government is of common occurrence among the forms of changed construction: Dig. 271. ἐδοξέ is 'I came to think,' as 32 b.
21. ἀνδρόποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ’ οὗ καπεῖται
ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἰκίτο μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς,
εἰ δ’ οὗ. ἐνεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηθόμην καὶ πολ-
λοίς τῶν παρόντων, πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ’ οὖν ἀπίων ἐλο-
γιζόμην ὅτι τούτῳ μὲν τοῦ Ἀνδρόπου ἐγὼ σοφῶ-5
τερός εἰμί· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ήμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν
καλὸν κάγαθον εἰδέναι, ἀλλ’ οὗτος μὲν οἰδεῖ τι εἰδέ-
ναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δὲ, ὡσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ
οἴομαι· έικα γοῦν τούτῳ γε σμικρῷ τωι αὐτῷ
τούτῳ σοφότερος εἶναι, ὅτι τὸ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι το
εἰδέναι. ἐνεῦθεν ἐπ’ ἄλλον ἦν τῶν ἐκείνου δο-
e κοῦντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταῦτα ταῦτα
ἐδοξε· καὶ ἐνταῦθα κακίνῳ καὶ ἄλλους πολλοῖς
ἀπηθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ’ οὖν ἥδη ἐφεξῆς ἦν, αἰσθανόμε-15
νος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηθανόμην,
ὁμος δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ
πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι· ἵτεον οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησ-
μόν, τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἄπαντας τούς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι.

22. καὶ νῦ τῶν κύνα, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι! δεὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἡ
ύμας τάληθη λέγειν· ἡ μὴν ἐγὼ ἐπαθὼν τι τοιούτων
οί μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἐδοξάζω μοι ὁλίγον δεῖ
τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεικνυτί κατὰ τὸν θεὸν,
ἄλλου δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεἰκείστεροι εἶναι
ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεὶ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἡ
ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδειξάω ὡσπερ πόνους τινὰς ποιοῦν-

20. νῦ τῶν κύνα] What was meant by this oath is clear
from Gorg. 482 b, μὲ τῶν κύνα
tῶν Διομήτων θεῶν,—that is, the
dog-headed or, more correctly,
jackal-headed Anubis. In Plato
this oath is only found in the
mouth of Socrates. In Ari-
stroph. Vesp. 83, a slave, Sosias,
uses the same oath.

23. τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεικνυτί] Cf.
Euthyd. 292 e, τοῦ ἑνὸν ἡμῖν
ἔνδει ἡ ἐπὶ πλείονος.
tos, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ π. 23 γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἦν ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τῶν τραγωδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἅλλους, ὁς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ’ αὐτοφόρῳ καταληψόμενος ἑμαυτῶν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκεῖνον ὤντα. ἀναλαμβάνων ὁὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἦ ὁ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πε- πραγματεύσθαι αὐτοῖς, δημότων ἄν αὐτοὺς τι λέ- γοιεν, ἦν ἀμα τι καὶ μανθάνομι παρ’ αὐτῶν. αὐχύ- νομαι ὁὖν υἱῶν εἰπεῖν, ὁ ἄνδρες, τάληθη ὦμος δὲ ἐν ῥητέον. ὅσο ἐπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγων αὐτῶν ἄπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἀν βέλτιον ἐλέγοι περὶ ἄν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποι- ήκεσαν. ἐγνὼν οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ

1. καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος] H’s conjecture καὶ ἐλεγκτός (1) is mere con- jecture; (2) would not give the sense he wishes, since ἐλεγκτός is not ‘contradicted’ but ‘admitting contradiction’; and (3) if it did, would spoil the general meaning, since Socrates’ leading principle throughout is that the oracle must be true, and that the proof of this would come out simultaneously with the true sense. 12. ἐν ὀλίγῳ] H’s conjecture ἐν λόγῳ is needless. For ἐν ὀλίγῳ means the same, viz. ‘in short,’ not ‘in a short time;’ just like ἐν βραχί, Symp. 217 a, ἐν ἀλαχίστῳ, Isocr. i. 40. p. 11. Of course ἐν λόγῳ occurs also, e. g. Lysias, xiii. 38. p. 133; and H might have argued something from the variation of reading between κατ’ ὀλίγον καὶ κατὰ λόγον, Thuc. vi. 34. med.

1. ἐν μοι — γένοιτο] ‘With the object of finding positively unimpeachable proof of the divine declaration.’ A double meaning is wrapped up in μοι, —it is both ‘by my agency’ and ‘for my satisfaction.’ καὶ signifies the superaddition of demonstration, which all the world must accept, to the cer- tainty which had been in So- crates an exercise of faith. μαντεία signifies (1) the process by which oracles are obtained, or (2), as here, and 29 a, the fact oracularly communicated. This signification still remains distinct from that of μαντείων, which was the form of words in which the oracle was given; μαντεία is the meaning of the μαντείων; a distinction to feel which we have only to remem- ber that to get at the meaning from the words was in the case of oracles a process in- volving exactly that degree of difficulty which suited the god or his prophet.

11. οἱ παρόντες] With Stallb, and against Wolf, we must take this to mean ‘those pre- sent at each several time,’ and not ‘the present audience.’
ἈΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 59

22. τούτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοὶν ἢ ποιοὶν, ἀλλὰ φύσει ετινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὡσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοφοδοὶ καὶ γὰρ οὕτωι λέγονσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἵσασι δὲ οὕδειν ὃν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτον τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεποινθότες· καὶ ἄμα σῳθὸμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τάλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ᾧ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπὴν οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἡμαὶ 10 ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ ἔννηδειν οὐδέν ἐπισταμένως, ὡς ἐπος εἴπειν, τούτους δὲ γ' ἤδειν ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλά ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐνεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἣπίσταντο ά έγῳ οὐκ ἤπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτη σοφότεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὥ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταύτων 15 μοι ἐδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἁγαθοὶ δημιουργοὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργαζόμεθα ἐκάστος ἦξιον καὶ τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφωτάτως εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν άυτὴ ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην εἰς τὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν ὥστε ἐμὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερω- 20

20. ἀποκρύπτειν] This is the reading of one MS. Φ. The dominant reading of the MSS. (including Oxon.) is ἀποκρύπτειν. The editors have espoused ἀπεκρύπτειν but such a text would not account for such a variant as ἀποκρύπτει in the best MSS. Ἀποκρύπτει itself is scarcely possible (on the principle of πεπραγ.

The usage of the orators proves this; cf. Antipho ii. A. a. 9. p. 116, and (esp.) γ. 5. p. 118, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὅτι στόι τῶν παρ-ώτων οὐκ ἄν ἀπεκρύπτερος . . . ἤν. Lysias uses in the same meaning, but without the same possibility of question, οἱ παραγε-νόμενοι. The expressions used, whether for the audience or for the court, are different;

e. g. Antipho vi. 14. p. 143, πολλοὶ τῶν περιστώτων τοῖς ταῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασιν, Ανδρ. i. 139, p. 18, ὥσπερ τάς καθημένους οἴκεις ἐν ἐπιτρέψει.

16. ἐδοξαν] The nom. is καὶ οἱ ἁγαθοὶ δημιουργοὶ. The force of the aor. is, as in 21, ἐδοξε, 'I came to see.'

18. τὰ μέγιστα] Politics are especially meant.
which experiments further supplied the key to the intensity of the prejudice against Socrates individually, in the personal enmities which they had excited;

IX. 'Εκ ταυτης δὴ τῆς ἔξετάσεως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαὶ μοι γεγονασὶ καὶ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. ὅταν γὰρ μὲν ἐκάστοτε ὁ παρόντες τάντα αὐτῶν εἶναι σοφὸν, ἀ ἄν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω τὸ δὲ λόγουνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὑπὲρ τὸ θέος σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τὸν λέγεν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπινὴ σοφία ὁλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὖν λέγεν τὸν Σωκράτην, προσκεκρήσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενον, ὦσπερ ἂν ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τοῦτο ὑμᾶς ἄν ἄνθρωποι, σοφότατος ἐστιν, ὅστις ὦσπερ Σωκράτης ἐγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἀξίος ἐστὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μάτευμα, ἀπέφηκα, Πάνδορος 99 ő, ὀρδῷ ib. 98 ὁ; but points to ἀποκρύπτει, which is to be governed by ἔδοξε understood from ἔδοξαν, which gives also the best sense.

6. ταυτης] The –ις is not always strictly δεκτικοῦ. Lob. Path. Pars Π. p. 230, “Sepe Oratores, etiamsi de absentibus loquantur, quos modo designarunt et auditoribus quasi spectandos proponunt, iota demonstrativo utuntur, et sexplus etiam negligent, si de presentibus.” Cf. τοῦτο, 37 ε. ἔξετασεως We cannot follow Oxon, and 3 other MSS, in reading ἔξετας, which is the result of an old contraction misread. 15. τοῦτ οὖν] This conjecture of F. A. Wolf we must needs adopt for τοῦτον of the MSS.

9. ὀνόμα δὲ—ἐναὶ] Lit. ‘and I am called by this name, that I am wise.’ The subject of ἔγενοβα is [ἐγαὶ], not ὄνομα. And σοφὸς ἐναὶ is by attraction for τὸ] εἶναὶ με σοφίαν.

11. τὸ δὲ] Accus. of pronoun neuter, standing for the whole sentence immediately following: Dig. 19.

14. καὶ οὐδενὸς—nothing: the καὶ is disjunctive.


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23. μὲν ἐτί καὶ νῦν περιών ξητῶ καὶ ἑρευνῶ κατὰ τῶν θεῶν, καὶ τῶν ἄστων καὶ ξένων ἄν τινα οἶωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι καὶ ἐπειδὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ ἀφεὶ βοηθῶν ἐν- 

deiktymai ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφὸς. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὗτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραξαί μοι σχολῆς 

γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὗτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ 

μυρία εἰμὶ διὰ τήν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαι.

c. Χ. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, 

οἷς μάλιστα σχολὴ ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, 

ἀυτόματοι χαίροντες ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν 

ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμε μημοῦται εἶτ 

ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν κάπετα, οὕτως ἐν-

ρίσκοντι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι 

ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὁλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐνευθεῖν οὐν 

οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζομένοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὖν 

αὐτοίς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τῆς ἑστὶ μιαρῶ-

tatos καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους καὶ ἐπειδὰν τῆς

1. μὲν ἐτί] Oxon. gives μὲν ἐτί, but in the hand of a re-

storer, and not on the traces of the old letters. (Gaisf. wrongly 

represents ἐκων as the reading. ἐχων would be redundant, like 

ἐφανείς, &c.) 2. καὶ εἴνων] So Oxon. and 3 other MSS. 

Edd. καὶ τῶν εἴνων. But the variation is in the spirit of Plato: 

cf. Dig. 237, and add Phed. 85 a, αὐτή ἡ τε ἀρδῶν καὶ χελδῶν καὶ 

ὁ ἐπον. 11. μημοῦται] So Oxon. &c. μημοῦνειν is a con-

jecture of Hermann.

4. ὑπὸ ταύτης] Later, 31 c, he gives a second reason for 

abstaining from public life.


677 c, the beautiful expression 

μυρία τινα φοβερῶν ἐρμίων, Rep. 

520 c, μύρια βελτίων. 

For the fact, with respect 

to Socrates, cf. with Staibbaum 

Xen. Econ. ii. 3.

11. καὶ αὐτοὶ—ἐξετάζειν] For-

ster compares Rep. 539 b, οἱ 

μεγακάκους, ὅταν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου 

γείωνται, ώς παιδα αὐτοῖς κατα- 

χρωνται, ώς εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρω-

μενοι, καὶ μημοῦνειν τοὺς ἐξελέ-

χοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους σαγροῦσι.

. . . καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοὶ τε 

cαὶ τὸ ὄλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι εἰς 

tοὺς ἄλλους διαβίβασθαι.

ἐμε μημοῦται] By practising 

upon each other.
αύτούς ἑρωτᾷ, ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὃ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσιν p. 23 μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἀγνοοῦσιν, ὅνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πρὸ- χειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, οὓκ ἄν ἐθέ- λοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίγνονται προσποιοῦ- μενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδὲν. ἄτε οὖν, οἶμαι, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοὶ, καὶ ἐπιτε- ταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἕμοι, ἐμπεπλή- κασιν ἕμοιν τὰ ὁτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς δια- βάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἑπέθετο καὶ


4. ταῦτα] Latin ista; idiomatically expressive of con- tempt, Dig. 318.

ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα] Understand ἔτι or the like, by com- parison of 19 b.

12. ἐκ τούτων] 'It is upon this footing'—namely that of an old general prejudice, ag- gravated by supervening per- sonal animosity,—'that I am now attacked by' &c. The meaning 'in consequence of' would be too strong, both for the sense here, and for the idiomatic use of the phrase; cf. Dig. 116: the meaning 'upon the strength of' would also exceed the warrant of the Greek, though not of the sense, cf. 19 a, γὰρ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέ- λητος κ.τ.λ.

καὶ Μέλητος—ῥήτορον] For an account of Socrates' three accusers and their motives, and of the classes of persons called here πολιτικοὶ and ῥήτορες, see Introd. p. x. note i.

The ἐπιμονήργοι are here joined with the πολιτικοὶ, because Any- tus represented a trade himself, and herein was but one of many instances of the same conjunc- tion of pursuits in those times at Athens. Socrates was wont to speak slightly of mechanical arts (Xen. Ἐκον. iv. 3), —a view which would seem to connect itself with his praise of σχολὴ (Diog. ii. 31, Ἑλ. Var. x. 14): and a conversation, in which he pressed an uncom- mercial view of education upon Anytus himself with reference to his son, seems to have been among the causes of Anytus' personal hatred of Socrates. (See again Introd. p. xii.)
23. Ἀνυτοσ καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀρχόμενος, Ἀνυτοσ δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ρήτωρόν ὡστε, ὑπὲρ ἀρχόμενον ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζομι ἃν εἰ οίος τι ἐτύχῃ ἐγὼ ύμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν ὑπό τῶν ὅλης χρόνος οὕτω πολλῆς γεγονυῖαι. ταύτ' ἐστὶν ύμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθη, καὶ ύμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ἀποκρυφάμενον ἐγὼ λέγω ὑπὸ ὑποστειλάμενος. καὶ τοι ὁδὰ σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεθάναμαι· ὦ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἄληθη λέγω ἓ καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἰτία ταῦτα ἐστὶ. καὶ εὰν τε νῦν εὰν τε αὐθίς ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν δὲν οἱ πρῶτοι μου κατηγοροῦν κατηγόρον ἡ ἐστὶν ἱκανή ἀπολογία πρὸς ύμᾶς. πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολις, ὥς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ύστερους μετὰ ταύτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὕθες γὰρ δή, ὡσπερ ὑπέρ τούτων ὑστεροῦν κατηγοροῦν, λάβωμεν αὐτήν τὴν τοῦτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δὲ πῶς ὅδε· Σωκράτης φησίν ἂδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοῦς οὐ γὰρ ἡ πόλις νομίζει ὧς νομίζοντα, ἔτερα δὲ δαίμονα καινα. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλήμα τοιοῦτον ἐστὶ· τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος

1. ὑπὲρ] We are to understand, not that the accusers were acting on behalf of their respective classes, but merely that they were to be regarded as representatives of the feelings of those bodies.

9. τοῖς αὐτοῖς] Lit. 'through the same things;' that is, in stating the facts I am virtually reiterating and attesting the charges.

11. ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἑμὴ] Emphasis is of course on διαβολὴ. 'This is,'—i.e. 'in this consists—the prejudice against me.'

16. ἀγαθὸν] 'Public benefactor.'

PIATONOS

a. Perversion of the youth.

even ekastou, e'xetásowmen. phiâi gar ðy tou's néous P. 
' akiein me diaphêironta. ègô de, ò 'andrës 'Athenaiou, ì akiein phiâi Mèlhtou, òti spoudh chraniêtïeita, 
radîos eis âgônas kaiustas ânthrâpous, peri pragi- 
5 mátoun prospouîmenos spoudázew kai kýdeisai, òn 
ou'dèn toutô pòspote èmêlhesten. òs de toutô ou'tos 
èxei, peirásomai kai òmèn èpídeizei.

XII. Kaì moì deúro, ò Mèlhtse, eixe : állo ti 
ù peri polloû poiëi, òpoûs òs béltisoi òi neîteroi d 
10 èsontai ; 'Egoge. 'Idi ò ðe ùnè eixe toutous, tis av- 
tous béltious poiëi; ìhîlon gár òti òìsthâ, mélon yé 
soi. tòv mèn gár diaphêironta èxeurop, òs phi's, 
ème èisâgèis toutoisì kai katêgorês tòv òe ðê bélt- 
tious poioudta òdi eixe kai múnyson avtois, tis èstwn.
15 órâs, ò Mèlhþe, òti sigâs kai ouk èxeis èsipèin; kai 
toi ouk aiôkhron soi dòkei èïnai kai ikandón tekôrion 
nû ðe ègô lègew, òti soi ou'dèn meûlékhen; ãlll' eixe, 
ò' gâthê, tis avtous ãmeinous poiëi; òi noûoi. 'Alll' e 
où toutô èrwtô, ò béltisê, ãlllà tis ânthrâpôs, 
20 õstis prôtous kai avtò toutô oide, tout's noûous. 
Oûtoi, ò Sôkrateis, òi dikastai. Pôjès légeis, ò

3. spoudh chraniêtïeita] Oxymoron: 'is playing off a jest 
under solemn forms.' The 
machinery of the law, with all 
its solemnity of circumstance 
and all its serious consequences, 
is set in motion by him for his 
mere amusement. Cf. chraniê- 
27 ñômenos in the same sense 27 
a, where it is explained by 
paiçontos.

8. Kaì moì k.t.l.] The ex- 
amination of Meletus by So- 
crates, which now follows, 

though it naturally affords 
scope for exhibiting Soocrates' 
characteristic talent, is legally 
speaking the customary èpô- 
tiçai, to which either party 
was bound to submit at the 
requisition of the other. In- 
trod. p. xviii.

18. ãmeinous] 'Better citi-
zens,'—better toward others: 
whereas béltious above means, 
strictly speaking, better in 
themselves.
24. Μέλητε; οἴδε τούς νέους παιδεύειν οἴοι τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίων ποιοῦσι; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἀπαντεῖς, ἢ 
οὶ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ οὐ; "Ἀπαντεῖς. Εὖ γε νὴ τῇν 
Ἑραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὀφελοῦν-
25. των. τί δὲ δή; οἴδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίων ποιοῦσιν, 
ἡ οὐ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταὶ; Καὶ οἱ βου-
λευταί. Ἀλλ' ἂρα, ὃ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, 
οἱ ἐκκλησιασταὶ, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ 
κἀκεῖνοι βελτίων ποιοῦσιν ἀπαντεῖς; Κἀκεῖνοι. Πάν-
τες ἂρα, ὡς ἕοικεν, Ἀθραίοι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ποιοῦσιν 
πλὴν ἐμὸν, ἔγω δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; 
Πάνω σφόδρα ταύτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γὰ' ἐμὸν κατ-
έγνωκας δυστυχῶν. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι ἢ καὶ περὶ 
ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἐξειν' οἱ μὲν βελτίων ποι-
οῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνθρωποί εἶναι, εἰς δὲ τις ὁ 
διαφθείρων; ἢ ναντίον τούτον πᾶν εἰς μὲν τοῖς 
βελτίων οἷς τ' ὅν ποιεῖν ἡ πάνω ὁλίγοι, οἱ ἵπποιγοι' 
οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ έάνπερ ἑυνῶσι καὶ χρωταί οἵππους, δια-
φθείρουσίν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὃ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ 
ἵππουν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἡμῶν; πάντως δὴ- 
πον, ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἀνυτός οὐ φήτε ἐάν τε φήτε: 
πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ 
eis μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὀφε-
λοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὃ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι 
ὅτι οὐδεπώπτετε ἐφροντίσας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς 
ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμέ-
ληκε περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰςάγεις.

24. ἀλλὰ γὰρ] 'But the truth 
is;' as above 19 c, &c. Dig. 
147.
26. ἀποφαίνεις—ἀμέλειαν] Be-
tween ἀμέλειαι and Μέλητε a 
play upon words is doubtless 
intended; see several instances 
in Plato collected Dig. 324. 
In this case the probability is 
strengthened by the constant
ΧΙΙ. Ἡ ἡμέν εἰπεῖ ὁ πρὸς Δίως Μέλητε, πῶτερον ἔστων οἰκείων ἁμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστῶν ἣ πονηρῶς; ὃ τάν, ἀπόκριμας οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπῶν ἐρ τῷ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἢ ἐὰν ἐγγυτάτω εὐαυτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ’ ἁγαθοὶ ἁγαθὸν τι; Πάνω γε. Ἡ ἐστίν οὖν ὅστις βουλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγυτῶν βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ὁφελείσθαι; ἀπόκριμας οὐκ ἠγαθεὶς καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἄποκρίμενσθαι. ἔστι ὅστις βουλεῖται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δὴ. Φέρε ἰδί, πῶτερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεύρῳ ὡς διαφθείρουτα τοὺς νεατέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκῶντα ἡ ἀκούστα; Ἐκόντα ἐγὼγε. Τί δή, ὁ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἑμοὶ σοφότερος εἰ τηλικοῦτον ὄντος τηλικόδε ὄν, ὡστε σὺ μὲν ἐγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται ἢ ἐὰν τῶν μάλιστα πλησίον εὐαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἁγαθοὶ ἁγαθῶν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἁμαθίας ἡκὼ, ὡστε καὶ τοῦτ’ ἁγνῶθι, ὅτι, εάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ἐγγυτῶν, κυνικεύσω κακόν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ὡστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὸν ποιῶ, ὡς φήμη σὺ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὁ Μέλητε, οὕμα δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ’ ἡ ὁν π. διαφθείρω, ἡ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἁκών, ὡστε σὺ γε κατ’ ἀμφότερα ψεύδει. εἶ δὲ ἁκῶν διαφθείρω, тῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκοινών ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεύρῳ νόμος εἰσάρχειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ἤδη λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νοθητείν·

recurrence of the juxtaposition; see 24 c above, and 26 b below.

1. εἰπὲ — Μέλητε] The address ὁ Μέλητε has suffered tmesis by the interlacing of εἰπὲ πρὸς Δίως with it: Dig. 288. See also Rep. 332 c. τι

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8. ο νόμος] See note, 24 c.
13. τηλικόδε] Meletus was a very young man: cf. Euthyph. 2 b, c, and below 26 e extr.—Stallb.
26. δήλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παῦσομαι ὃ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ἐγυγενεύσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἐφυγες καὶ ὦν ἡθέλησας, δεύρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμοι ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ’ οὐ μαθήσεως.

ΧΙV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὥς ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, τούτῳ μὲν δήλον ἡδὴ ἔστιν, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὃτι Μελήτῳ τούτων οὐτε μέγα οὐτε σμικρὸν πόσποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὁμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς διαφθείρειν, ὃ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἡ δὴ λέγε ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, ἣν ἐγράψα, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὗ ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἑτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καὶ· οὗ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείροι; Πάνυ μὲν οὐν σφόδρα ταύτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοῖνυν, ὃ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὃν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἔστιν, εἰτε ἐτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοί καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τουτοσι. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναι τινας θεοὺς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς, καὶ ὦκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀθεός οὐδε ταύτη ἀδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι οὔσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστιν ὁ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἑτέρους’ ἡ παντάπασι με φῆς οὔτε αὐτῶν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὅς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις

2. ἐφυγες] ‘Didst decline.’
Cf. Ar. Ach. 717, Κάβελανείν χρῆ τὸ λατόν, καὶ φῆγγ τις ζημών. With Plato, however, this meaning of the word is more common in the compound διαφύγειν. Cf. Symp. 174 a. ἐφυγες and οὐκ ἢ form a hysteron proteron, though not a strongly marked one.

7. οὕτε — σμικρῶν] Accus. cognate after ἐμέλησεν, not nom. to ἐμέλησεν. Dig. 6.

14. δὸν τέ] ‘Whom the argument at present concerns;’ equivalent to οὐς λέγομεν as distinguished from περὶ δὸν λέγομεν. — Stallb., rightly. Cf. Soph. 263 a, σὺν ἐγρον δὴ φράξειν περὶ τ’ ἐίτι καὶ ὅτον ὁ λόγος. Legg. 678 a, πάλιν καὶ πολίτειας περὶ καὶ νομοθεσίας, δὸν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν παρετήκειν, ... μνήμην εἰναι.
θεούς. Ὡθαυμάση Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταύτα λέγεις; ρ. 26 οὐδὲ ἦλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἁρα νομίζω θεούς εἶναι, ὅσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μὰ Δί, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τῶν μὲν ἦλιον λίθον φησίν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην 5 γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου ο��εί κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἱ αὐτοῖς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὅστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαῖομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταύτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνονται, ὁ ἐξεστιν εὕστη, εἰ πάνω πολλοῦ, δραχμῆσεν.

3. Μὰ Δί! [Understand ὰ νομίζει.
5. Ἀναξαγόρον] Xen. Mem. IV. vii. 7, makes Socrates refute the alleged opinion of Anaxagoras, τῶν ἦλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι. Anaxagoras' formula was μῦδρον διάπυρον, which others took to mean a mass of iron. Of the moon he asserted that it had οἰκήσεις, λόφους, φάραγγας, whence that he believed it to be γῆ was an inference.
8. βιβλία] "Is secundum Iaert. II. iii. 8, et Clem. Alex. ibi ab interpr. laudatum, philosophorum primus βιβλίον ἐξίδωκε συγγραφής, librum a se scriptum vidit. Hoc tamen de Anaximandro aliis, aliis de Pherocyde Syro dicunt."—Forst.
9. καὶ δή καί] Ironical: 'and so then.'
10. ὁ—πραμένον] The doctrines, not the books. εὐστη: that is, if they should happen to see a play in which these doctrines are promulgated, as in Eurip. Orest. 982, μόλις τῶν οὐρανοῦ μέσον χθονός τε τεταμέναι αὐτόμησε πέτραν ἄλυσευσι χρυσέως, φερομέναν δικαιο, βαθον ἐπὶ ὀλυμποῦ. Dacier, as Stallbaum observes, curiously mistook the sense of this passage, and imagined that a volume of Anaxagoras might be bought at that time for a drachma. But in fact the price of paper itself was then excessive at Athens. Emile Egger, in a letter to Firmin Didot (Revue Contemporaine du 15 Septembre, 1856), mentions fragments of an account rendered by certain Athenian officers in 407 B.C., in which the price of sheets of paper (χάρται), for writing copies of these accounts (ἀντίγραφα) upon, was 1 drachma and 2 obols each, i.e. 1 fr. 20 cent.—a sum which, according to Boeckh's computation, accepted by Egger, would be equivalent to 4 fr. 80 cent. now.
ei πάνω πολλοῦ] 'At the most': the same expression occurs Alcib. 1. 123 ε, ἄγεος μὲν πεντήκοντα εἰ πάνω πολλοῦ, Gorg. 511 d, εἰν πάμπολο, ... δύο δραχμαῖς ἐπιράζετο. The ut-
most the θεατρώνης could demand for any place was a drachma; the price for an ordinary place was two oboli. See Borcekh, Public Economy of Athens, translated by G. C. Lewis, p. 223. n. 315 of 2nd edition.

2. ἄλλως τε καί] Which the youths must know are not mine, 'to say nothing of their singularity,' which would make the theft still more glaring. Steinhart has well observed that the meaning of ἄτοπα is not 'absurd,' but 'uncommon' or 'peculiar;' etymologically, what cannot be assigned to any known place or origin. He further remarks that neither Socrates nor Plato would have rejected these notions as 'absurd.' Cf. the striking passage in Legg. 886 d, where Plato declines to controvert these positions although he would uphold the gods.

3. οὐτωσί — εἰναι] The two sentences οὐτωσί σου δοκῶ and οἴδειν — εἰναι are both descriptions of the same fact, the restatement being the more precise; οὐτωσί σου δοκῶ stands by a sort of attraction for οὐτωσί σου δοκῆι peri ἐμοί, of which the filling up in the re-statement would have been ἐμε οἴδειν— εἰναι. Dig. 207, 208.

5. "Ἀπιστός κ. τ. λ." The question Meletus had answered affirmatively was, not whether Socrates was an atheist, but whether it was his opinion that Socrates was an atheist,—οὐτωσί σου δοκῶ; Socrates' comment on this is 'Very well; nobody else will believe that, and I am pretty sure you do not yourself,' i.e. I am pretty sure you are saying what you know to be untrue.
ὁσπέρ ἀϊνιγμα ἔννυθεντι διαπειρωμένη, ἀρα γνώστε- p. 27 ταὶ Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμὸν χαριετικομένου καὶ ἐναντί ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἡ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκοῦοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμὸν φαίσνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὠσπέρ ἢν εἰ εἶποι; ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἄλλα θεοὺς νομίζων. καὶ τοι τοῦτο ἐστὶ παίζοντος.

XV. Συνεπικέφασθε δὴ, ὥ ἄνδρες, ἡ μοι φαίνονται ταῦτα λέγειν. ἐν δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὃ Μέλητε, ύμεῖς δὲ, ὁσπέρ καὶ ἁρχαὶ ύμᾶς παρηγηγάμην, μέμην- b σθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, εάν ἐν τῇ εἰσόδῳ τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. ἐστιν ὡστις ἀνθρώπων, ὃ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκριεύσθω, ὥ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω. ἐσθ' ὡστις ἰπποὺς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, ἰππικά δὲ πράγματα; ἡ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει, αὐλητικά δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἐστιν, ὥ ἄριστε ἄνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς

1. διαπειρωμένη] 'He is like one, who, by framing a mock-riddle, is trying (as he says to himself) whether will Socrates,' &c. We have here one participial clause (ὁσπέρ — ἐνετέθ.) within another (δια- πειρ.).; as Rep. 555 c, τῶν ἣν ἐπείκειται ἐνεστε ἀργύριον τριθο- σκοπεῖ. Notice, that it is ὡσ- πέρ α insurer, 'a mock-riddle,' one which has no answer.

2. ἐμὸν χαριετικ.] The use of the genitive, after verbs of knowing, seeing, and shewing, seems to be limited in Attic Greek to a noun joined with a participle. After verbs of mentioning, it is not so limited. Dig. 26. Cf. Lobeek on Soph. Λ. 136.

15. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα] Similar expressions are—Euthyd. 273, ἀλλὰν καὶ ἄλλαν ἀποδέκτεσιν, Phdr. 235 a, ὡς οὐδὲ τε ἤν, ταῦ- τα ἄτερως τε καὶ ἄτερως λέγων, ἀμφοτέρως εἰπέν ἁριστα, 271 d, ἐστιν οὐν εἶδο τόσα καὶ τάσα, καὶ τῶα καὶ τῶα, Legg. 721 b, χρή- ματα μὲν τόσοις καὶ τόσοις, τῇ καὶ τῇ δὲ ἄτιμα, Phileb. 24 d, τὸ εἰς αὕτε τε καὶ αὐτίς.

16. θορυβεῖτω] Merely by making irrelevant remarks instead of answering;—brawling, as we might say.
27. ἄλλως τούτοις. ἄλλα τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦτο γε ἀπόκριναι· ε ἐσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαιμόνια δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὔκ ἐστιν. Ὡς ὁμησας, ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τοῦτοι ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φής μὲ καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἰτ' 5 οὖν καὶ ἐίτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνια γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαιμόνια δή· που πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μὲ ἑστίν· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δή· τίθημι γὰρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαιμόνες οὐχί ἦτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγούμεθα ἥ θεῶν παῖδας; φής ἡ οὐ; Πάνω γε. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαιμόνες ἡγούμαι, ὡς σὸν φής, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τίνες εἰσιν οἱ δαιμόνες, τοῦτ' ἀν εἰτ' ὁ ἐγὼ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεύτεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμαι· 15 μενον φάναι εἰμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαιμόνας ἡγούμαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαιμόνες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσὶ νόθοι τίνες ἡ ἕκ νυμφῶν ἡ ἕκ τινων ἄλλων, ὅν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἀν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῦτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μὴ; ὦμοιως γὰρ ἀν ἄτοπον εἰ, 20 ε ὠσπέρ ἀν εἰ τις ἐπὶ ποιὸν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῦτο ἤ καὶ ὄνων

6. δαιμόνια γε] To make the reasoning sound, δαιμόνια here and δαιμόνια πράγματα above ought to mean the same; which it must be acknowledged they do not. It must be observed, however, that the original perversion lay with Meletus, whose charge of δαιμόνια καὶ να was based simply on Socrates' τὸ δαιμόνιον. Now by this Socrates meant a divine agency, but Meletus had wrested it into the sense of a divine being. So that here the equivocation of Meletus is simply returned upon himself. Contrast, where Socrates is speaking uncontroversially of his monitor, the distinctly adjectival θεῖον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον 31 c. See Appendix A, on τὸ δαιμόνιον.

8. ἀντιγραφῇ] The ἔγκλημα is so called, as it has been already called ἀντιφωσία. See 19 b note.

18. ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων ὧν] That is, ἐκ ἄλλων ὧν τινῶν.
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[toûs ἡμιόνους], ἢπποις δὲ καὶ όνους μὴ ἡγούτο εἶναι. p. 27

άλλ', ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἐστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρόμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψῳ [τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην] ἡ ἀπορῶν ὃ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἔμοι ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ἵππως δὲ σὺ τίνα πείθοις ἀν καὶ σμικρὸν νῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖται, καὶ αὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαιμόνια μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἡρώως, οὐδεμία μηχανῆ p. 28 ἐστιν.

XVI. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἑγὼ οὐκ ἄδικον κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἄλλ' ἵκανά καὶ ταῦτα: ὥς δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐλεγον, ὃτι πολλὴ μοι ἀπεχθεία γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εἴ ὦστε ὃτι ἀληθὲς ἐστι. καὶ τούτ' ἐστιν ὃ ἐμε ἄριστε, εἳπτε αἰρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἀνυτος, ἄλλ' ἢ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνοις. ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ άλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἤρθεν, οἴμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ. ἵσως δ' ἄν οὖν εἴποι τις'

6. πείθοις ἀν ὡς οὖ] The οὖ is not simply pleonastic, as in the case of two negatives in the same clause, but it is irrational. It is a confused anticipation of the coming negative οὐδεμία. Dig. 264.

18. οὐδεν—στῆ] 'The rule is in no danger of breaking down in my case.' This use of οὐδὲν δεινὸν is idiomatic; cf. Gorg. 520 d, οὐδὲν δεινὸν ἀντὸ μὴ ἀδικηθῇ, 'we need not apprehend for him any injury,' Phaedo 84 b, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῆν, 'we need not apprehend that the soul will have to fear.' The 'apprehension' is supposed to affect the speaker and his hearers, as interested in the contingency under discussion. So here Socrates is speaking half ironically, interesting himself, as it were, for the rule, against himself. στῆ is also idiomatically used, as a quasi-impersonal; —that is, a vague nominative, such as 'the course of events,' is understood. See Dig. 97; where among other parallels is given Λρ. Εθ. Νε. VI. ix. 9, στῆει ταῖ γάρ κακί. στῆ is literally 'come to a stand-still.' Stalb. is wrong here.
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28. εἲτ οὖν αἰσχύνει, ὃ Σωκρατεῖς, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖς; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλὸς λέγεις, ὃ ἀνθρωπε, εἰ οἱ δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζην ἡ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅπου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος 5 ἔστω, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἑκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖ, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἡ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἄνδρος ἀγαθοῦ εὖρα ἡ κακοῦ. φαίλοις γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἴεν τῶν ημιθέουν ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελεύτηκασιν οἱ τε ἀλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος νῦν, ὁς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κυν-10 δύνου κατεφρονήσας παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὡστε ἐπειδὴ εἴπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἐκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς ὤσα, οὔτωσι πῶς, ὥσ ἐγν- 15 μαί ὁ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλος τῷ ἑταίρῳ τῶν φόνων καὶ Ἐκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ αὐ- τικά γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ᾽ Ἐκτορα πότμος ἐτοίμος· ὁ δὲ ταῦτ ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλγυφάρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσα τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὦν δ καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτικά, φησί, τεθναίν δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἄδικοντι, ἣν μὴ ἐνθάδε μὲνον κατα-20 γέλαστος παρὰ νυνὶ κορωνίσων ἄχος ἀροῦρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἱ φροντίσασθα θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὔτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὃ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὐ ἂν τις ἐαυτοῦ τάξη ἡ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἡ υπ' ἀρ- χοτος ταχθῇ, εὐταύθα δεῖ, ός ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα 25

4. ὑπολογίζεσθαι] See below, d note.
5. ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν] 'A man of any worth at all.' This idiomatic concurrence of καὶ with σμικρὸν τι is frequent: Dig. 132.
10. ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος] The same illustration is used Symp. 179 e. The reference in what follows is to Hom. Il. xviii. 90.
23. οὗ ἂν τις κ.τ.λ.] The former ἂν in this sentence is hyperbolically postponed to οὗ- τον τάξη, which in sense is included under it. Dig. 290*.
κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε p. 282
άλλο μηδέν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

XVII. Ἔγω οὖν δεινὰ ἄν εἶναι εἰργασμένος, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἀρχιτεκτονίς ἐπαττοῦν, σὰρκὰς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἀρχεῖν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτίδαιᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμαρίλλω καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸς τάτοτος, ὥσ ἐγὼ φῆσθαι τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντα με δεῖν ἔφη τε καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτόν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς p. 291
ἐν τῇ θάνατον ἐν τῷ ὀτιόν πρᾶγμα λίπομι τῷ τάξιν.
δεὶν μὲν ἄν εἰ, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ἁν μὲ δικαίως εἰσάγοι τὸς εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδώς θάνατον καὶ οἴμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὁν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδิναί, ὡς ἄν· ὁδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἥ δοκεῖν σοφόν εἶναι μὴ ὑπάτη· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἁ οὐκ ὁδειν. οἴδα μὲν γὰρ ὁδεῖς τὸν θανάτον οὐδέν εἰ τυχάναι τῷ ἄνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὅν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίαις ד' ὡς εὗ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ. καί b τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμβαθία ἐστὶν αὐτή ἡ ἐπονειδιστος, ἡ

1. ὑπολογιζόμενον] 'Giving any countervailing weight to;' literally, 'reckoning per contra.' The ὑπὸ conveys no image of subtraction, according to our notion of the operation, but the signification of meeting from an opposite direction: see Dig. 131.

2. Ποτίδαια—Δηλίω] At Potidaea (see Charm. init., Symp. 219, 220) between 432 and 429 b.c., Socrates rescued Alcibiades but resigned in his favour his claim to the reward of bravery. Delium, 424 b.c., witnessed his famous retreat, (Syrp. 221 a, b, Lach. 181 b). Of his campaign before Amphipolis, 422 b.c., we know less.

10. ἐνταῦθα δὲ] ἐνταῦθα repeats τοῦ θεοῦ τάτοτος κ.τ.λ.—δὲ marks the apodosis.

20. καὶ τοῦτο . . . . αὕτη] Not pleonastic; but 'what is this but that very same reprehensible ignorance?' τοῦ ὁσκόμαν which follows is a genitive epexegetic of ἀμβαθία. Dig. 24.
2. τούτω καὶ κ.τ.λ.] 'In this province also [of the unseen] I believe I am distinguished from the mass of mankind herein, and if I were to say I was wiser in any point than any other person, I should say it was herein, that &c. The former as well as the latter toúto both relate to the same fact, to the same óti,—upon which a strong emphasis is thus made to converge. Cf. Gorg. 484 e, λαμπρός τ' ἵστιν ἤκαστος εν τούτῳ, κατά τούτο ἐπειγέτας, Νέμων τὸ πλείστον ἡμέρας τούτω μέρος, ἵνα αὐτῶν αὑτοῦ τυγχάνῃ βέλτιστος ὄν. The suppression after τούτῳ ἄν is a graceful evasion of self-assertion. See Dig. 255.

10. ἀπιστήσατος] 'Disbelieving' the representation urged by Anytus as the reason why Socrates should die; not 'refusing to follow Anytus' counsel' to put Socrates to death. It is therefore to be connected, not with the words immediately following (ὅς ἐφη—ἀποκτείναι με), but with those next to them (λέγων—διαφθαρήσωτα). Stalib. differs.

13. ἢδη ἄν] The construction of the fut. indic. with ἄν is abundantly established. ἄν here belongs to διαφθαρήσωτα, and to refer it to the part. ἐπιτίθεντος is a shift which will not apply to other passages (Dig. 58), and dislocates this. Observe, as to διαφθαρήσωτα itself, that its not being affected by the Oortio Obliqua is to be accounted for regularly; it is because the event it denotes is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by Socrates. Plato is never arbitrarily irregular in this class of constructions: Dig. 90. It might be said here, that διαφθαρήσωτα denotes an event equally in the future. But
then it is not an event which is assumed as about to happen at all.

4. ἐφ' οτε . . . . φιλοσοφεῖν] For constructions of relative pronouns and adverbs with the infinitive, see Dig. 79.

8. ἀστάζομαι καὶ φιλῶ] "Ἀστά
ζομα est aliquem salutare ita, ut cum ampectaris; φιλεῖν ita, ut cum osculeris."—Stallb. Here of course both words are used, by transference, for the feelings which those actions betoken. Note too, that the transference affects both: it is not that φιλῶ already expresses a feeling, and thus gives the turn to ἀστάζομαι their coordination in the phrase requires that they should enter into it homogeneously.

πείσομαι—ὑμῶν] The parallel is striking to the declaration of the holy apostles, Acts v. 29, πείθαρχε ἰδίᾳ θεῷ μᾶλλον ἡ ἀνθρώπων.

14. ἰχίῳ] Stallb., after Fischer, "de animi magnitudine et fortitudine."
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

p. 30. δέ, ούνειδιώ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου άξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τά δέ φανετερα περὶ πλείονοι. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρω καὶ πρεσβύτερω, ότι ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ξένω καὶ ἀστόφι, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστόις, ὅσοῦ μον ἑγχυτέρω ἐστέ γενεῖ. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὑρίσκει, καὶ ἐγὼ οἴσματι οὐδὲν πώς ἡμῖν μείζων ἀγαθῶν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ την ἔμην τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράπτον ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ἡμῶν καὶ νεωτέρως καὶ πρεσβύτερος μήτε σωμάτων

b επιμελείσθαι μητέρχρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὗτῳ σφόδρα ὧς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὥπωσ ὡς ἀρίστη ἐσται, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τάλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαιτοῦ καὶ ἱδιὰ καὶ δημοσία. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εὑρίσκεϊ, εἰ δὲ τίς μὲ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἡ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἂν, ὧς 'Αθηναίοι, ἡ πείθεσθε 'Ανύτω ἢ μη, καὶ ἡ ἀφίετε ἢ μη ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος c ἄλλα, οὔτ' εἰ μέλλων πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες 'Αθηναίοι, ἀλλ' εἰμείνατε μοι οἷς ἐδείχθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἄν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴσμα, ἀνήσετε ἀκούστε. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄτα υμῶν ἐρείν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἰσώς βοήσετε· ἀλλ' μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εἴ γὰρ ἑστη, ἑαν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοι- 25 οὗτον ὑμα, οὖν ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζων βλάψετε

15. ταῦτ' ἄν εἰς' 'If preaching virtue is perversion, then indeed I am a mischievous person; for I never rest from preaching it.' The ταῦτα is not identical with the ταῦτα of the line before, but is more comprehensive; it stands for the whole clause referred to in the phrase ταῦτα λέγων, and means 'this practice of mine.'

24. ἐθάνατον | A stronger expression of feeling than θορυβεῖν.
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η ύμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὖδὲν ἂν βλάψειεν ἡμᾶς, οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἀντως· οὔδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύνατον· δ' οὖ γὰρ οὖμαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνουν ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρων βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνει μὲντ' ἂν ῥήμας ἡ ζητέσειν ἢ ἀγαπάσειν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὖσας οἰσίν καὶ ἀλλὸς τὸς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οὖμαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἡ οὖσα νυνί ποιεῖ, ἀνδρὰ ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτείνυιναι. νῦν οὖν, οἵ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοὶ δὲν ἔγω ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὡς τις ἂν οὖσι, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητη περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμὸν καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐάν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτεῖνητε, οὐ βάδιος ε ἀλλοι τοιοῦτον εὑρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιοτέρων εἰπέτεν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡσπερ ἵππος μεγάλος μὲν καὶ γενναῖον, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νοθεστέρω καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μῦστος τινός· οἴον δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικεναι τοιοῦτον τινα, ὃς ύμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ όνειδίζων ἐνα ἐκαστον οὐδὲν πάνομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἡμῶν πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἀλλος οὐ βραδίως ύμῖν γενήσεται, ὃ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' εάν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείδεσθε μον' ύμεῖς δ' ἱστος ταχ' ἂν ἀχθώμενοι, ὡσπερ οἱ νυσταξόντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσατεσ

5. ἀτιμάσειν] ΠΠ substitutes a conjecture of his own, ἀτιμώσειν, quite needlessly; for ἀτιμάζω, though it properly means to treat or regard as ἀτιμός, while ἀτιμώς is to make ἀτιμός, yet also has this technical sense: cf. Legg. 762 d, περὶ τὰς τῶν νέων ἄρχης ἄτιμαθες πίστες. 23. κρούσατεσ] Another unhappy conjectural substitution of ΠΠ occurs here,—ἀφούσατεσ, because (he says)

13. εἰ καὶ γελοιοτέρων refers not to the words immediately succeeding, namely, προσκείμενοι—θεοῦ, but to the simile which follows them. 23. κρούσατεσ] 'With a single tap,'—as you would a μύσας.
κρούσαντες is 'deble pulsandi verbum.' Such a word however is just what was wanted.

10. καὶ εὶ μέντοι τι] H drops the τοι, probably for want of considering that the collocation is hyperbatical for καὶ μέντοι εἰ τι. Cf. 41 e.

14. οὖχ οἰοὶ τε] They would doubtless make the assertion, cf. 19 d: but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it. That is, grammatically speaking, the primary intention of the sentence ἀπαναισχυντήσαι — μάρτυρα lies in the participial clause, and not in the verb ἀπαναισχυντή
sai. See Dig. 303.

19. 'Ἰσως ἄν οὖν] The dominant reason of Socrates' abstinence from public affairs was not so much the impossibility of maintaining himself in a public position without sacrifice of principle or of life; but rather, that he felt his mission to be a moral and an individual one, and that from his point of view it was infinitely less important to rectify a
παραλληλόποιησις, όπως τον κατόρθωσε ο Σωκράτης, η δημοσίαν πρέπει να χρησιμοποιήσει ταμεία ανάλογα με τις προκαταλήψεις και τους αποτελέσματα των εκλογών, για να δημιουργήσει μια ανεξάρτητη και αορίστη δημοτική δύναμη.

2. ἡμοίοι [To the Phrygian party as a whole, the Phrygian farmers' complaints about the hardships imposed by the democratic reforms. Dem. de Cor. 169. p. 285.]

3. ἐν τῇ γραμμῇ [When he spoke of the "étera kaiwá daimó

νοι,—a perversion of the truth which Socrates characterises as a caricature by his use of the word ἐπικομοδών, which seems to mean 'selecting for caricature.' So skαόπτεν is to mock at, ἐπισκόπτεν to mock at some particular trait in a person.

particular policy, than by laying hold of individuals and making statesmen of them to raise the standard of statesmanship.

5. γίνεται φωνῇ] All MSS. have this φωνῇ, and all edd. except V bracket it. Needlessly; Fischer points out the parallel to the next sentence, τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἐκ παιάδος ἀρξάμενον φωνῇ τῇ γεγομενῇ. 9. τοῦτο οὐ ἄν] Edd. prefer τοῦτον. But ἀποτρέπει πράττειν τοῦτο is a construction borne out by Thaet. 151 a, εἶναι μὲν τῷ γεγομένῳ μου διαμόνον ἀποτρέπει ἔννοιαν. [Dem.] Procem. xx. p. 1431, άλογος ἀ τότε ἡμάρτητε, νῦν ἀποτρέψω ταυτά παθεῖν, and analogous constructions such as Xen, An. III. i. 20, παρίσεσθαι τά ἐπιθέσεις κατέχοντος ὡμάς. τοῦτο here is the reading of five MSS. besides Oxon. It is moreover less likely to have been invented than τοῦτο. 15. καὶ μοι μη] H alters this into καὶ μή μοι, comparing Phado 105 b. But καὶ μοι is a common commencement of a sentence in the Orators.
31. γὰρ ἐστιν ὅστις άνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὐτε ύμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλῆθει οὐδεὶς γνησίως ἐναντιοῦμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἀδίκα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἐστι τοῦ τῷ οὐτι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὄλγον χρῶνος σωθῆσεται, ἰδιωτεῦν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δὲ ἐγὼ γε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλὰ ὁ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ἐξυμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδήτε ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, τὸ μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἀμα κἀν ἀπολοίμην. ἑρῶ δὲ υμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικαικὰ, ἀληθὴ δὲ. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὃ Ἀθη-

11. ἄμα κἀν] This is Ast's conjecture. MSS. are chiefly divided between ἄμα καί ἄμα ἀν (which Oxon. exhibits), ἄμα καί ἀπολοίμην, and ἄλλα καί ἄμι ἀν ἀπ. Of the ced., VSZ have ἄμα καί ἄμι ἀν, Β ἄμι ἀν ἀπολοίμην, Η ἄμι ἀν καί ἀπολοίμην. It seems vain to find more than a shadowy justification for ἄμα καί ἄμα. The variants may easily have come from ἄμα κἀν, in the form ἄμα καί ἀν. My friend Mr. Campbell ingeniously proposes ἄλλα καί ἄλλα ἀν ἀπ., 'should be ready to meet death in sundry forms:' cf. Soph. O. T. 661, δ τι πάρατον ὀλοίμαν. 12. δικαικὰ] H conjecturally prefixes ὅ, observing "quis credat, Socratem, qui statim a principio se ξένοις ξένων τῆς ἐνδοῦ λέγεοι professus est, nunc judicialia verba promittere?" But equally how then should Socrates know that what he was going to say was not δικαικὰ? Besides, the speech in point of fact betrays abundant knowledge of technicalities; cf. 34 A, εἰ δὲ τότε κ.τ.λ. See Commentary below.

8. ὅ—ἔργα] 'What your body is wont to appreciate highly, the actions of a life.' ὑμεῖς (says Socrates),—not as individuals, but as representing Athenians generally, when acting as judges in the Ecclesia, or the Heliaea,—'you particularly are susceptible to such appeals.' Here appears, in a refined form, the common τόπος of rehearsing a man's past services in his defence; of which practice Lysias, xii. 38. p. 123, says, εἰ τῇ τῇ πολεί εἰσωμενοι ἕστι, πρὸς μὲν τὰ κατηγορημένα μηδὲν ἀπολογείονται, περὶ δὲ σφών αὐτῶν ... ὡς στράτωσαι ὀγδοῖ εἰσι κ.τ.λ. Whence again Socrates says just below, he is 'about to employ a topic of vulgar use, and one that savours of the law-courts.'

11. μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ] 'But would be ready to perish at once as the price of not yielding.'
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ναίοι, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἥρξα ἐν τῇ τ. 32
πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ καὶ ἐπιχεῖν ἥμισον ἡ φυλή Ἀν-
tιοχῆς πρωτανεύοντα, ὅτε ύμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς
tοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβοῦ-
λεσθε ἀλρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ
χρόνῳ πάσιν ὑμῖν ἐδοξεῖ. τὸτ' ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυ-
tάνεων ἡμαρτιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς

7. ὑμῖν is retained, in deference to weight of MSS., and with
every edd., against Oxon. and 2 other MSS.: although ἡμα-
ριώθην does not require a dative of reference, especially in a
description of formal proceedings.

stands here in its simple
meaning of 'vulgar' in the
sense of 'common,'—not as
implying (as Fischer and others
think) self-assertion or bad
taste; a meaning which (1)
would make ἅρω ὑμῖν sound
blunt even to harshness; (2)
does not harmonise with δικα-

υκά, for an arrogant tone is
not characteristic of persons
addressing their judges; and
(3) does not suit the parallel
passage Gorg. 482 e, εἰς τοιαῦτα
ἀγνοσιαν καὶ διημορμίαν... ἀ
φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἐστι καλά, νόμῳ δὲ,

dikainkai is likewise a colourless
word;—not 'lawyerlike' in
the sense of 'dry,' nor yet
'streitsüchtig' (Steinhart), but
simply 'characteristic of speak-
ers in courts of justice.'

3. τοὺς δέκα] Strictly only
eight; for Conon was not in-
cluded, and another of the ten
was dead. Xenophon, in one
of his accounts (Mem. I. i. 18),
speaks with more definite in-
accuracy of ἐν ταῖς στρατηγοῖς.

5. παρανόμως, in two re-
spects: (1) that they were tried

ἀθροι (see Thirlwall, Hist. Gr.
vol. IV. App. 2, where it is
shewn that this right of sepa-
rate trial is not to be traced
to the decree of Cannonus);
and (2) that they were not
heard in their own defence;
for in the assembly in which
the charge was brought first in-
formally, they only (Xen. Hell.
I. vii. 5) βραχία ἐκαστος ἀπελο-
γήσαστο, οὐ γὰρ προτέθη σφαίρω

άλογος κατὰ τῶν νόμων: and in
that in which they were con-
demned they were not heard
at all.

7. ἡμαρτιώθην... ἐναντία ἐνθ-
ροσίμῳ] What is the precise
reference of these expressions?
Was ἡμάρτιωθη a refusal to put
the question? This is left for
uncertain by Mr. Grote, who
says that upon Xenophon's
shewing 'it can hardly be ac-
counted certain that Socrates
was Epistates.' (Hist. Gr. ch.
64.) Again, to what act does
ἐναντία ἐνθροσίμῳ refer?

It may be well to give the
other accounts of this occur-
rence at length:—

(a) Xen. Mem. I. i. 18, βου-

λεύσας γὰρ ποτὲ, ἐπιστάτης ἐν
32. νόμους καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην, καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων

The historical fact before us disguised by Socratic irony.

That Soocrates was Epistates is at least a probable conclusion from (a), (b), and (d), to say nothing of (e); in further support of which, (b) and (d) imply that he carried his point, which he could not have done but as Epistates.

The reference of ἡ ῥαντιώδην must therefore be to Soocrates' refusal to put the question, which resulted, as (d) credibly relates, in the adjournment of proceedings to the next day, when a more pliable Epistates presided.

The other clause, ἐναντία ἐψηφ., is equally with ἡ ῥαντιώδην, in connection with μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων the structure of the sentence points to this inevitably. Now against referring this to the eventual voting in the assembly is (1) the unlikelihood that Soocrates should be the only one of the prytanes who voted in the minority, when few of them had come to see that the bill was illegal. And (2) what if he had been the only one? it was no marked distinction: the minority was large, and he and the rest of the prytanes would merely vote as individuals. So likewise to refer it to the stages immediately preceding that final voting, would be in contradiction with the mention made in the accounts of the opposition of others beside Soocrates. To refer it, again, to the debate on the bill in the council, before it was adopted as a
προβολέμα, would be to lay
the scene of it too far from that
of ἡμαρτίωθην ἵμιν with which
it is coupled, and would make
μόνος τῶν προτάνεων flat, since
the προτάνεις had no prominent
functions in the council. The
remaining alternative, and this
is in itself a plausible one, is
to refer it to the first stage of
proceedings in the assembly,
where, preparatorily to the προ-
βολέμα being read out by the
κήρυκε, it was handed to the
procœdi, who with the nomo-
thetæ had to pronounce whe-
ther it contravened any exist-
ing law. Here was the precise
moment at which legal pro-
vision had been made for enter-
taining the very objection taken
by Socrates. We may then,
with at least some probability,
refer ἐναπτί ἐφσασάμεν to So-
crates' condemning the bill as
illegal when it was referred in
due course to the joint con-
sideration of the procœdi and
nomothete. The hysteron
proteron is on Greek prin-
ciples natural: ἡμαρτίωθην—νό-
μον: precedes, because it, and
not the earlier opposition, was
the conspicuous and crowning
act in Socrates' whole proceed-
ing; Dig. 308.

With Socrates' more glo-
rious refusal to put the ques-
tion may be compared the
conduct contemptuously attrib-
uted to Demosthenes by Ἀσ-
chines, ii. 84. p. 40, ἀναγραφθέν-
tos τῶν ψηφίσματος, ἀνατάσ εἰ
tῶν προέδρων δημοσθένης οἷς ἐφῆ
tο ψηφίσμα ἐπιψηφίσεις βοῶτον
dὲ ἵμιν καὶ τῶν προεδρῶν ἐπὶ
tὸ βῆμα κατ' ὧνομα καλοῦντων,
oτὸς ἀκατὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ ψηφίσμα
ἐπιψηφίσθη.

The series of checks which
the forms of the Ecclesia im-
posed on bills in progress,
with a view to guard existing
laws, was as follows:—1. The
προβολέμα was handed to the
procœdi, who after conferring
with the nomothetæ pre-
nounced whether or not it
contravened existing laws; and,
if they passed it, it was read
out by the κήρυκε. 2. After
this, it was open to any citizen
to stop it by lodging an ὑπο-
μοσία in earnest of his inten-
tion to bring against its author
a γραφή παρακώμων. 3. Or the
Epistates might refuse to put
the question—under liability,
of course, to ἐνδειξι if he re-
fused improperly. 4. Or the
rest of the procœdi (by a ma-
jority, we may suppose,) might
in like manner refuse their
consent. See Ἀσχ. ii. 65, iii.
39. pp. 36, 59.—Schömann de
Com. Ath. ch. xi.

1. ἐνδεικνύομαι καὶ ἀπάγων· "To
procure my suspension or ar-
rest.' The processes of ἐνδειξις
and ἀπαγωγή are often men-
tioned in conjunction, as here,
and Dem. c. Timocr. 146. p.
745; Lept. 156. p. 594. Anti-
pho v. 8, 9. p. 130, &c., and
in the βολευτικὸς ὅρκος as it
stood after the amnesty. Amid
several divergent accounts of
these processes, the best is
Heßler's (Ath. Gerichtsverf.
p. 195). "Ἐνδειξις might be in-
stituted, among other cases,
against any who should hold
an office while he owed pub-
lie money; or (a luculent
instance) against any prytani or proedrus who in discharge of his function in an assembly of the people should depart from the form of proceeding prescribed by law (Dem. c. Timoc. 22. p. 707). In the latter case, offenders were liable to a fine, and to ἐνδείξις, which ἐνδείξις was not only an expedient for levying the fine, but had the immediate effect of suspending them from office until the fine was paid. The Thesmothetae had exclusive cognisance of ἐνδείξις. The statement of Pollux, that it pertained to the Archon Basileus, is unsupported; likewise his definition of ἐνδείξις, on which some writers rely,—that it was ὁμολογομένου αδικήματος, οὐ κρίσεως ἀλλὰ τιμωρίας ἔσο-μίνου,—is called by Hefter 'a mere jingle of words.' Ἀπαγωγή was of wider application than ἐνδείξις. Moreover, its object was the bringing the offender into custody, which in ἐνδείξις was not the rule. ἐνδείξις was an interdictory procedure, ἀπαγωγὴ a procedure of summary arrest. To be liable to it, a person must be taken ἐπ' αὐτοφόρῳ, in perpetration of an illicit act. The body which had cognisance in ἀπαγωγὴ was the Eleven, who registered (Hefter p. 210) the apprehension of the criminal and the cause of arrest (Lys. xiii. 86. p. 138), and who further, supposing the arrested person to be already under sentence of law, had charge of the execution of this sentence.

7. θόλον] The building where the prytanes, and while they lasted the Thirty, daily banqueted and sacrificed. It was near the council-chamber.

10. ἄφαλσα] This word, like imploare in Latin, is used idiomatically of communicating pollution; whence here 'implicate.' See for example Phaed. do 67 a; and cf. especially with the present passage Antipho, ii. Λ. a. 10. p. 116, συγκαταπλη- πλάνα τοῖς ἀνατίους.
d. [In answer to a supposed objection] that the innocent tendency of the reformatory doctrine, which was simply to teach uncompassionizing adherence to righteousness, and not to train for professions or impart knowledge, excluded the suspicion of perverting the youth,

10 XXI. 'Αρ' οὖν ἂν μὲ οἴσθηθε τοσάδε ἐτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἑπράττων τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἄξιως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθὸν ἐβούθουν τοῖς δικαίως καὶ, ὡσπερ χρῆ, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὁ ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίοι. οὖδε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεῖς. ἄλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε, εἰ π. 33 ποὺ τι ἑπράξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἴδια ὁ αὐτῶς οὗτος, οὐδέν πάπτοτε ἐγχωρήσας οὐδέν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλο ὀὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὔς οἱ διαβάλλοντες μὲ φασὶν ἐμοῦς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδᾶσκαλος μὲν οὖν δεύτερον πάπτωτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δὲ τὸς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπίθυμει ἀκούειν, εἶτε νεότερος εἶτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενί πάπτοτε ἐφθάνησα, οὖδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων b

9. ἰμῶν] So MSS. and edd. generally. ἰμῶν is a conjecture of H.

9, 10. [The manuscripts are supposed to follow here. Introduction p. xviii.

20. διδάσκαλος οὖν] He means (see b below) that he imparted no μάθημα,—no professional knowledge; even of καλοκαγαθία he never ὕπερχοθε διδάσκαλος εἶχα. Xen. Mem. I. ii. 3. Cf. his declining ἐπιμελεθῶν Nicias’ son, Laches 208 d. What he sought to impart was rather a habit of mind; “not to dispense ready-made truth like so much coin, but to awaken the sense of truth and virtue; not to force his own convictions on others, but to test theirs.” —Zeller.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 87

33. διαλέγομαι μη λαμβάνον δ’ οὐ, ἀλλ’ ὠμοίως καὶ πλούσιω καὶ πένητι παρέχο εἵματον ἐρωτῶν, καὶ εἶν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὃν ἀν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αὐτίαν ὑπέχουμι, ὃν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδὲν μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα: εἰ δὲ τις φησι παρ’ ἐμοί πώποτε τι μαθεῖν ἡ ἀκοῦσαι ἵδια ὃ τι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὐ ἱστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

XXII. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τῇ δῇ ποτε μετ’ ἐμοῖ χαίρονσι εἰς τινὲς πολὺν χρόνον διατριβοῦντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὥ ἀν δρεσ Ἀθηναῖοι πάσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὅτι ἀκούντες χαίρονσιν ἐξεταζόμενοι τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἰναι σοφοῖς, οὔσι δ’ οὐ εἴτε γὰρ οὐκ ἀνήδες. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτο, ὦς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παυτὶ τρόπῳ, ὁπερ τίς ποτε καὶ ἀλήθεια μοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ οἰοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὥ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστὶ καὶ εὐδελεκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐγὼ γε τῶν νεὼν τους μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρὴν δὴπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν προσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἐγνωσαν ὅτι νεός οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώποτε τι ἐνυβούλευσα, νυν αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ καθηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἡθελοῦν, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰ τῶν ἑκεῖνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ’ ἑπὶ


2. καὶ εϊν τις] This is a soft being interjected. Then ὅτι is way of saying, ‘And I am ready ‘because.’ See the examples to question him, if he chooses.’ which Stallb. quotes—Euthyphro 3 b, Rep. I. 332 a, III. 402 e, 410 d.
2. καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι] BS om.; VZ retain; H brackets. The likelihood is not great that the words have been inserted from the end of the former sentence (H brackets them there, by mistake); the rhythm almost requires them; and there is point in attributing the same vindictive feeling to the kinsmen as to the youths themselves. The repetition is like Brutus' repetition of 'for him have I offended,' in Shakespeare's Jul. Cæs. Act III. Scene ii.

4. Κριτοβούλου &c.] With Crito of Socrates holds conversation in Xen. Mem. I. iii, II. vi. He is mentioned also in Athen. V. 220a, with Ἀχίλλης, distinguished from others of the name as ὁ Σωκρατικός, the son of Lysanias (see Diog. Laert. II. 60), who afterwards became a teacher for money of the Socratic doctrines, and wrote Socratic dialogues (Schol. in Menex.). He was at variance with Aristippus (Lazac de Dig. Soc. sect. II. § 2), and there is a fragment of an invective written against him by Lysias, illustrating the enmity of the Orators against the Socrates: he is of the company named in the Phaedo (59 b). Epigenes is mentioned Xen. Mem. III. xii. 1, and Phaedo 59 b: his father Antipho is not otherwise known. Democritous, the father of Paralus and Theages, is an interlocutor in the Theages. Of Theages it is said, Rep. 496 b, εἰη δ' ἂν καὶ ο τοῦ ἡμετέρου έταίρου θεάγος χαλινός οὗο κατασχεί· καὶ γὰρ θείες τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα παρεσκευασται πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεισθεῖν φιλοσοφιας, ἡ δὲ τοῦ σώματος νοοτροπία ἀπείρουσα αὐτῶν τῶν πολεμικῶν κατέχει. Adimantus is an interlocutor in the Rep. (357-368, 548). Apollodorus appears in the Phaedo (59 a, 117 d) as passionately attached to Socrates, and in the Symp. says of himself (172 e), ἐγὼ Σωκράτης συνδιατριβή καὶ ἐπιμελές πεποίημαι ἐκάστης ήμέρας εἴδειν δ' τι δὲν λέγῃ ή πράττῃ, and is said (173 d) to have got τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὸ μανάκας καλεῖσθαι. Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Α' Εαντοδορας are only mentioned here.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 89

33. τετελευτηκεν, ὦστε οὔκ ἂν ἐκεῖνος γε αὐτοῦ κατα-

34. δεηθεῖ— καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὐ ἂν Ἰσέγης ἀδελφὸς ὅδε δὲ Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος,

οὐ ἀδελφὸς οὔτος Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαυτόδωρος, οὐ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφὸς. καὶ ἄλλως πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἐχὼ ύμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὥν τινα ἔχρην μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐαυτῷ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα·

εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάβετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παρα-

χώρῳ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἰ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ πᾶν τούναντιόν εὑρήσετε, ὥς ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ το

βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζό-

μένος τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὅς φασι Μέλητος καὶ Ἀντως. αὐτῶν μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάξιν ἂν λόγων ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσ-

βύτεροι ἢ ὥσ πέρα ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα; ἂν ἐξουσίος λόγῳ βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἂλλῇ ἢ τὸν ὀρθὸν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ἔχουσί τις Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευ-

dομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

XXIII. Εἰςτι δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἂ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμι ἂν ἀπολογείσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ ταύτα καὶ ἄλλα ἵσως τοιαύτα. τάχα ὃ ἂν τοῖς υἱῶν ἀγανικτήσεις ἰναμηθεῖσι αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τοῦ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτοῦ τοῦ ἀγοῦνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκεύουσι
tους δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δικρύων, παιδία τε αὐτῶν ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἰνα ὃ τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς, ἐγὼ δὲ

1. καταδεηθείη] The kata-

implies absence of all reserve

or modification: here in a bad

sense it expresses an unprin-

cipled act. Dig. 122.

8. ἐγὼ παραχώρῳ] The full

expression occurs Eschin. iii.

165. p. 77; παραχώρῳ σοι τοῦ

βήματος, ἐως ἂν ἐπιης. Note by

the way, that the examination

of witnesses was extra to the
time allowed for the pleadings;

cf. Lysias xxiii. 4. 8. pp. 160,

167, καὶ μοι ἐπιλάξα πᾶ τὸ ὕδωρ.

26. ἐγὼ δὲ ἢρα] ‘And then

finds that L.’
ouδέν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταύτα κινδυνεύων, p. 3

ός ἄν δόξασθο, τοῦ ἐσχάτου κινδυνοῦν. τάχ' οὖν τις
tαύτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἄν πρὸς με σχοίνη,
καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θείτο ἄν μετ' ὀργής
5 τῆν ψήφων. εἰ δὴ τις ύμῶν οὔτως ἔχει,—οὐκ ἄξιον d
μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼγε· εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπιεικῆ ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς
tούτοις λέγειν λέγων οτι ἐμοὶ, ὃ ἀριστε, εἰσὶ μὲν
ποὺ τινες καὶ οἰκείοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τό τοῦ
'Ομήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυνὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέ-
10 φυκα, ἀλλ' εἴξ ἄνθρωπων, ὡστε καὶ οἰκείοι μοι εἰσι καὶ
νιεῖς, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς 'Αθηναίοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιοιν
ηδη, δύο δὲ παιδία· ἀλλ' ὁμοι ὦδεν' αὐτῶν δεύρο
ἀναβιβάσαμενοι δεήσομαι ύμῶν ἀποφθηγμασθαι. τι
δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιξόμενος, ε
15 ὃ ἀνδρεὶς 'Αθηναίοι, οὐδ' ύμᾶς ἀτιμάξων, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν
θαρραλέως εἰγὼ ἐχὼ πρὸς θάνατον ἡ μή, ἀλλος
λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ύμῖν καὶ ὅλη
τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν
ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικῶνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἐχοντα,
20 εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθεῖς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον
γέ εἰστι τὸ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τιν τῶν πολλῶν

21. τὸ Σωκράτει] VBS τὸν Σωκράτη, ZP τὸ Σωκράτη, both with some MS. authority. The last is worst; for such an emphatic use of the name Socrates palpably requires the article. And

2. ὡς ἄν δόξαιμι] Refers to κινδυνοῦν, not to ἐσχάτον—'danger, as he would think it.'
5. οὐκ ἄξιον μὲν γάρ] γάρ refers to εἴ—'[I say if], for though I do not expect it of you, yet [making the suppo-
sition] if it should be so,'
6. ἐπιεική] 'Conciliatory.'
11. εἰς μὲν] Lamprocles
(Xen. Mem. II. ii. 1). διὸν Sophroneus and Menexenus
(Phaedo 116 b).
15. εἰ μὲν] 'Whether I can
look death in the face or not.'—Whewell.
19. τοῦνομα] The name of
σοφοῦς—cf. 20 d, and below, εἴτε σοφοῖς εἴτε κ.τ.λ.
against both this and τὸν Σωκράτη stands the consideration, that the
meaning would be 'people have made up their minds that
Socrates is to differ;' it is the form of a resolution which is to
take effect; whereas the meaning required is 'they have made
up their minds that Socrates differs' now. τὸ Σωκράτει leaves
this clear. It is the reading of Oxon. and three other MSS.;
and in accepting it we follow Bernhardy (Syntax. p. 94), who
supports it with parallels. See Dig. 183.

2. ἀνδρεία] Oxon. here has ἀνδρία, but is not consistent.
Dindorf (on Ar. Nub. 510) says ἀνδρεία alone is the true form,
—as proved (1) by the Ionic diacresis ἀνδριά; (2) by the fact
that in poetry it never occurs where the metre would require
ἀνδρία (except in Eur. Here. F. 475, πατρὶ ἐπίργου, μέγα φρονον
ἐπ' ἀνδρία, which Elmsley has emended εἰς ἀνδρία); (3) by the testi-
mony of Etym. M. p. 461. 53, that the traditional orthography
was ἀνδρεία till Apollonius invented ἀνδριά (4) by the prepon-
derating adherence of the MSS. to ἀνδρεία.

13. οὔτε ἵμας] VII ἵμας, BSZ (following 2 MSS.) ἵμας. H says "ἵμας com-
modum sensum præbet; nec plebem, modo aliquo loco haberi
velit, facere, nec si singuli faciant, permettere debere."

3. ἐσοφαὶ] 'If we are to
given a different turn to the
have such conduct on the part
of those,' &c. ἔνευ would have
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φιεύσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος ρ. 35 καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἁγοντος.

XXIV. Χωρίς δὲ τῆς δοξῆς, ὥς ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δικαιὸν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ τοῦ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ ἰδίακες καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστὴς, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα καὶ ὁμόμοκεν οὐ χαριεύσθαι ὧς ἢν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσεως κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκοῦν χρὴ οὐτε ἠμᾶς ἔδιξεν ύμᾶς ἐπιρκεὶν, οὐθ' ύμᾶς ἔδιξεσθαι οὐδὲτεροι γὰρ ἢν ἡμῶν εὐσέβοιεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτε με, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαύτα δεῖν πρὸς ύμᾶς πράττειν, ἀ μήτε ἡγούμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια,

15 ἄλλως τε μέντοι νῆ Δία πάντως καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύ- νοτα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτού. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείθουμεν ύμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζόμεθα ὁμομοκότας, θεοὺς ἢν διδάσκομεν μὴ ἠγείρθαι ύμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἄτεχνος ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροῦν ἂν ἐμαυτὸν ὡς

9. ὁμόμοκεν] Part of the judge's oath was ἢ μὴν ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶςεσθαι τῶν κατηγορούσων καὶ τῶν ἀπολογουμένων Ισοκρ. xv. 21. p. 314.

χαριεύσθαι] 'That he will not favour whomsoever he feels inclined to favour.'

10. ἠμᾶς] Defendants in general.

11. ἔδιξεσθαι] 'Allow yourselves to be habituated,' an instance of the semi-middle sense. Dig. 88.

15. ἄλλως—καί] 'But, by Zeus, especially, when I am on my trial at Melectus' instance for impiety.' A remarkable hyperbaton. The phrase ἄλλως τε πάντως καί is rent asunder to admit the μέντοι νῆ Δία (which is also a familiar sequence, Phaed. 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a), which could have found no other convenient place. What makes such a tmesis possible, without prejudice to perspicuity, is the very fact that ἄλλως τε πάντως καί is a sufficiently familiar phrase to admit of this dismemberment and yet be recognised: Dig. 294. Thus Bekker, in reading arbitrarily ἄλλως τε πάντως νῆ Δία μᾶλλον μέντοι καί, is wide of the mark.
35. θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοὺ δεὶ οὐτῶς ἔχειν νομίζω τε γάρ, ὃς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὖν δεῖς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμῶν ὅτι μέλλει ἐμοὶ τε ἀριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

5

XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὃς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μοι κατεψηφίσασθε, ἀλλὰ τέ μοι πολλὰ ἐμμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνελπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαναμάξω ἐκατέρω τῶν ψῆφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμὸν. οὐ γὰρ ὃμην ἔγωγε οὔτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺν νῦν δὲ, ὡς ἐσεικεν, εἰ τριάκοντα

12. τριάκοντα] So ZH; τρεῖς VBS. Of MSS., Oxon. with five others has τριάκοντα which also approves itself independently.

5. καὶ ὑμῖν] The defence of Socrates, which would occupy the second division of the pleadings, being thus concluded, there would follow here the voting of the judges, and the announcement of their verdict, declaring the charge proven. Then would begin the third division of the pleadings, consisting firstly of a speech on the side of the prosecution in advocacy of the penalty named, and secondly of Socrates' ἄντιψηφος, where the Apology again takes up the thread. Introd. pp. vi, xi, xvii.

8. καὶ αὐξ—τοίτο] The halting connection (grammatically speaking) between this clause and the preceding part of the sentence is idiomatic. The shortest way is taken to arrive at the particular which is the point of the sentence: Dig. 258. It is incorrect to supply, as Stallbaum does, καὶ [ἡ καὶ τοῖτο ὅτι] οὐκ, κ.τ.λ. Rather there is a substitution of a shorter form of expression, complete in itself, but not agreeing with the plan on which the sentence set out.

11. οὔτω παρ' ὀλίγον] Hyperbatic for παρ' οὔτος ὀλίγον. Dig. 298. Lit. 'up to so little' difference from the other quantity compared: i.e. 'so close;' Dig. 124.

12. τριάκοντα] The number of condemning votes was 281, out of a court of 501: so 30 in round numbers, or 31 exactly, changing sides, would have effected an acquittal. See, for the fuller discussion of this point, Introd. p. xii sqq.
μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη αὖ. Μέ- p. 36
λητον μὲν οὖν, ὃς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπεφεύγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοιῶτο γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἀνυτος καὶ Δύκων κατηγορή-

Σοντες ἐμοῖ, κἂν ὁφλε χελίας δραχμᾶς, οὐ μεταλα-

βῶν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

XXVI. Τιμάται δ’ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου.
εἶν’ ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ύμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὥδ’ ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναίοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἄξιας; τί οὖν; τί ἄξιος
τοι εἰμὶ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαις, ὥ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὖχ
ήμυν ῥόην, ἀλλ’ ἀμελήσας ὡσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ,
χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ
δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ἐννομοστῶν

The implication in μόναι that the majority was small would recommend the corruption of τριάκοστα into τρεῖα. In Andoc. iii. 4. p. 23, πεντήκοστα is a necessary emendation for πέντε. Cf. Taylor, Lectt. Lys. cap. vi.

2. ἀποπεφεύγα] Half in jest, in allusion to his accusers being three to one, Socrates represents the majority as obtained by the joint influence of the three: supposing then each accuser represented by one-third of the majority, Meletus gets less than 100, i.e. less than one-fifth of the whole. The indictment stood in Meletus' name, but the really formidable accuser was Anytus; see again Introd. p. x.

6. τὸ πέμπτον μ.] Not 'a fifth,' but 'the' indispensable 'fifth.'

10. παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσας] A technical legal expression; ἀποτίσας applies to a pecuniary penalty, παθεῖν to death, imprisonment, or the like. So Dem. Mid. 47.

p. 529, ὅτου ἦν καταγω ἡ ἡλια, τιμάτω περὶ αὑτοῦ παραχώρημα, ὅτου ἦν δοκῇ ἄξιος εἰναι παιδεῖν ἢ ἀπο-

τίσιον (part of the νόμος οὔδερσος), in Timocrit. 105. p. 733.

ὁ τι μαθῶν] 'For having taken it into my head, in the disposal of my life, to deny myself rest.' ἐν is not 'during.'

13. ἄλλων] Here is the idio-

matic use of ἄλλως for 'bes-

ides.' Dig. 46. ἄλλων agrees with all three genitives following: 'and what not besides,—magistracies, clubs, and fac-

tions.'

ἐννομοστῶν] These associa-

tions were as rife at Athens under the Thirty as in the Peloponnesian war.
The given text is in Greek and appears to be a page from a historical or philosophical work, possibly a speech or a dialogue. The text is not fully translatable into English due to the nature of the language and the context. Here is a brief attempt to transcribe and translate parts of the text:

36. καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησά-
cο μενος ἐμαυτῶν τῷ οὐντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὦστε εἰς ταῦτ’ ἵντα σοκίσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦν, οἱ
ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἐμμελλόν μηδὲν ὁφελὸς
eἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἱδία ἐκαστὸν ἰδὼν ἐπιεργεῖτει τὴν
megísthn ἐπεργεῖαν, ὥς εἰγὸν φημι, ἑνταῦθα ἦν,
ἐπιχειρῶν ἐκαστὸν ὑμῶν πείδειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε
τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπι-
μεληθείη, ὅπως ὅς βέλτιστος καὶ ἐφικμότατος
ἐσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πό-
λεος, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὐτως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
d ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτον ὡν;
ἀγαθὸν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν
ἀξίαν τῇ ἁληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι καὶ ταῦτα γε ἀγαθὸν
toioúton, ὁ τι ἄν πρέποι ἐμοὶ. τί οὖν πρέπει ἄνδρι 15
πείνητε ἐπεργείη, δεομένῳ ἁγεν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμε-
tέρα παρακελεῦσει; οὐκ ἐσθ’ ὦ τι μᾶλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναίοι, πρέπει οὐτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν
πρωτανείᾳ σιτείσθαι, πολύ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ τις ὑμῶν
ἵπτω ἢ ἧξυσφόβη ἡ ἓφυγε νενικηκεν Ὀλυμπιάςων. 20

5. ἐπὶ δὲ—ἐπεργείαν] This clause is repeated in the word ἐπιτάδα, and governed by ἦν and the ἰδὼν with ἐπεργεῖτει is a redundancy. (At the same time probably another clause is confusing itself with this in the speaker’s mind, to which ἰδὼν would be essential, namely, οἱ δὲ ἱδία ἐκαστὸν ἐμμελλόν ἰδὼν ἐπεργεῖτει, i.e. οἱ δὲ ἰδὼν ἐμμελλόν ἱδία ἐκαστὸν ἐπεργ.)

14. τιμᾶσθαι] ‘That I should lay the penalty.’

16. ἐπεργείη] Stallbaum cites Xen. de Vectig. iii. 11, Lys.
5 Ισως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταύτι λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὅστερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολῆσεως, ἀπανθαδικόμενος τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐστιν, ὡς Ἀθηναίοι, τοιούτοι, ἀλλὰ τοιῶνδε μᾶλλον. πεπεισμαί ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἄδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τούτῳ οὐ πείθω· ὁλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διελεγμεθα· ἐπεὶ, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὅστερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτον μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπεισθητε ἄν νῦν δ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὡλίγαρ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύσω. 

10 εσθαί. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἄδικεῖν πολλοῦ δεω ἐμαυτόν γε ἄδικησειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αυτός, ὡς ἄξιος εἰμὶ τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιούτῳ τινός ἐμαυτῶ, τί δείσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τούτο, οὐ Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται, ο φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακῶν ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι ὡν εὖ οὖν ὧτι κακῶν οὖντων, τούτῳ τιμησάμενοι; πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ᾧν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, ε δουλεύοντα τῇ ἄει καθισταμένη ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἐνδέκα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσωθαι ἐως ἂν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ

12. ἄλλως ἀνθρώπως] The Laecedemonians, for instance. See Thucyd. i. 132. 
21. ἐν—οὖν] Genitive of a noun with participle after verbs of knowing, &c.: Dig. 26. The clause however is complicated by the presence of ἄν, indicative of a momentary intention to adopt a finite instead of a participial construction: Dig. 279. 
23. τοῖς ἐνδέκα] εἰς ἄρ' ἐκαστη
tις φυλὴς ἐγίγνετο, καὶ γραμματεῖας ('secretary') αὐτοῖς συνηρμηνεύοι Poll. viii. 102. They had charge of the prisons, as well as of the execution of sentences.
37. ταυτών μοὶ ἐστίν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; ἢσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τοῦτο τιμήσατε. πολλή μὲν τ' ἂν με φιλοψυχίᾳ ἔχοι, εἰ δότως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι, ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολίται μου οὖν οἴοι τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλὰ ὑμῖν βαρύτερα γεγόνασι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦτερα, ὡστε ἐπιτείτε αὐτῶν νυν ἀπαλλαγὴν· ἄλλοι δὲ ἁρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ράδιος. πολλὸν γε δεῖ, ὃ Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἰ ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶς ἀνθρώπῳ ἀλλην ἔς ἀλλῆς πόλιν πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελανομένῳ ζην. εὖ γὰρ οἴδ᾿ ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἐλθὼ, λέγουσι εἰμοῦ ἀκροάσωμαι οἱ νεῶ οὕσπερ ἐνθάδε· καὶ μὲν τοῦτος ἀπελαίνω, οὗτοι ἔμε αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι, πείθουτες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· εάν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαίνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δὲ αὐτοὺς τούτους.

XXVIII. Ἡσως οὖν ἂν τις εἶποι σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἶος τ᾿ ἐσεὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζην; τοῦτι δὴ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον πεισά τινας ὑμῶν. εὰν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπεθείων τοῦτ᾿ ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἂγειν, οὐ πείσεσθε μοι ὡς εἰρωνευμένῳ· εὰν τ᾿ ἀδ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἄγαθον ὁν ἀνθρώπῳ τούτῳ, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἁρετής τοὺς λόγους ποι- εἰσθαί καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὃν υμεῖς ἔμοι ἀκούστε

I. ο ἀνεξάταστος — ἀνθρώπος

The interrogatory discipline which Socrates thus extols was that to which he sought to bring all with whom he conversed.

The subject, about which the answerer was questioned, was himself: which is the reason why Socrates always identified the process with the carrying out of the Delphic precept, 'γνῶθι σεαυτόν. The branches of enquiry to which it led were manifold:

(1) knowledge of one's own natural endowments and position, with a view to living for the greatest good of oneself and others:—

(2) review of the actual use to which one has been and is putting one’s life—Laches 187ε, διδόναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὅστις τρίστον νῦν τε ἐκ τῆς καὶ ὅστις τὸν παρελθόντα χρόνον βεβίωσεν and below 39ε, διδόναι ἐλεγχον τοῦ βιον'

(3) examination of one's opinions, — their coherence, their consistency, the history of their formation; of which the results are—consciousness of one's own ignorance, and consciousness of the grounds of one's knowledge: Xen. Mem. III. ix. 6, Soph. 230b—d:

(4) investigation of the principles of human life and action (for which the knowledge of one's own nature is a prerequisite:—Alec. I. 133c, ὅφ' οὖν μὴ γγυνώσκομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς ... δυναίμεθ' ἂν εἰδέναι τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν κακὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ.)—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16, περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀνεξάταστος βίος ὁ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπων, ταύτα δὲ ἀνεξάταστος βίος οὗ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπων, ταύτα δὲ ἀνεξάταστος — ἀνθρώπος]
38. ἔτι ἵπτων πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἔγω φημι, ὃ ἀνδρείς, πείθεων δὲ οὐ ῥίδιον. καὶ ἔγω αὖ ὤν εἰδωσμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἄξιον κακοῖς οὐ- δενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἢν μοι χρήματα, ἐπιμησάμην ἃν χρημάτων ὡσα ἔμελλον ἐκτίσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἃν 5 ἐβλάβην νῶν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἔγω δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσοῦτον βούλεσθέ μοι τιμή- σαι. ἢσος δ’ ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ὑμῖν μιᾶς ἀρ- γυρίων· τοσοῦτον οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἄπολλόδωρος κελεύσοι με τριάκοντα μιᾶς τιμή- σασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἐγγυᾶσθαι τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσοῦτον, ε ἐγγυηταί δ’ ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὐτοῦ ἄξιω- χρεφ.

κρείττον εἶναι ζην μᾶλλον ἡ τεθνά- ναι; and in the passage be- fore us.

And was there not a cause? The current opinions, drawn from men's practical exigencies, imperfect observation, and debased morality, were no sounder than their sources. It was abhorrence of this mass of error and conventionality (which meanwhile the Sophists were accepting as the material of their system), which impelled Socrates to seek to reconstruct human opinion on a basis of 'reasoned truth.'

3. καὶ ἔγω ἄμ’] A supple- mentary reason;—'Were si- lence possible, it would be no less a κακῶν which therefore I should decline imposing on myself.'

6. νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ] This com- bination of particles occurs always in setting aside a hy-

pothetical case which is the opposite of the existing state of the case. The δὲ and the γὰρ enter simultaneously into the combination, where there is no ellipse nor apopiosis. Dig. 149.


13. ἄξιω-χρεφ.] The third and last division of the pleadings being thus concluded, there would follow first the final voting and then the final ver- dict of the judges: by which the formal trial would be con- cluded.

After this, however, some 'last words' are still conceded to Socrates, who continues to address those of his judges.
C. Last reflections, addressed to the judges: a. to those who had voted for his condemnation;

XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ΄ ἕνεκα χρόνου, ὡς ἀνδρεί p. 3

Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλο-

μένων τὴν πόλιν λοιπὸν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτάνατε,

ἀνδρα σοφοῦ φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ

καὶ μὴ εἰμὶ, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὁνειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν

περιμείνατε ὁλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν

ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὅρατε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἥλικιαν, ὡτι

πόρρω ἥδη ἔστι τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω

δὲ τούτῳ οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ δ

καταψηφισμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τὸδε πρὸς

toὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἵσως μὲ οἰσθής, ὡς ἀνδρεί,

ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οίς ἂν ὑμᾶς

ἐπεισά, εἰ ὁμην δεὶ ἀπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὡστε

ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δει. ἀλλ' ἀπορία

μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμησ καὶ ἀνα-

σχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα,

οὐ ἂν ὑμῖν ἡδιστ' ἣν ἀκούειν, δρημοῦτος τὲ μου καὶ

ὁδυρομένου καὶ ἀλλὰ ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ ε

καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημί· οία δὴ καὶ ἐδιείθη

τούμεις τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε φήδην

who choose to remain and hear him.

Whether such a concession was actually made to Socrates, or whether it was only a suf-
ficiently common practice to give verisimilitude to the fic-
tion, is a question which can hardly be determined. See
Introd. p. xv.

1. οὐ πολλοῦ γ΄ ἕνεκα χρόνου] Socrates is telling the Athen-

ians that they would not have had to wait long to be saved

the reproach of putting him to death, by letting nature take

her own course. 'It was but

a brief space after all, by fore-
stalling which they were en-
tailing on themselves the re-
proach.' ἔνεκα marks here the
efficient not the final cause;
the meaning is not 'you will
incur reproach for the sake of
taking from me a brief re-
mainder of life,'—but 'a brief
space will be the cause of
your incurring it.' The 'brief
space,' accordingly, is not that
between the present moment
and his execution, but that be-
tween his execution and the
moment when he would have
died in the course of nature.
4. ἐκεῖνως] Understand ἀπολογηθομένος again.
12. μὴ... ἢ] An instance of the presumptive variety of the deliberative conjunctive. It is confined to negative sentences. Dig. 59 note.
13. θάνατον γὰρ θ. θεῖ] This refers to the reflex effect of wickedness on the evildoer’s soul, which it degrades and ruins. Cf. Crito 47 ε., ἀλλὰ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου (se. the soul) ἢρα ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένον, ὦ τὸ ἄδικον λαβῇται κ. τ. λ.; Gorg. 509 α., μεγίστον τῶν κακῶν ἔστιν ἡ ἀδικία τὸ ἄδικον. Between danger and death there is many a chance of escape, as Socrates has just before said; but none between the evil deed and its internal consequences. Stallb.,’s quotation of Odyss. viii. 329, Οἰκ ἄριτα κακαί ἔργα κινάει τοι βραδεῖς ὅλως, is not to the point.
18. ἐπὶ—ὡφθηκείσ] ‘Sens- tenced by Truth to receive the penalty of.’—Whewell.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

οφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ ῥ. 39
τιμήματι ἐμένω καὶ οὕτωι. ταύτα μὲν ποὺ ὅσω
οὗτω καὶ ἐδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἐχεῖν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ύμῖν χρη-
5 σμοδήσαι, ὃ καταψηφισάμενοι μοῦ· καὶ γὰρ εἰμὶ ε
ήδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν δὲ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι χρησμοδοῦσιν,
ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γὰρ, δὲ ἄνδρεσ,
οὶ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ύμῖν ἦξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ
tὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νη 'Δί' ἥ οἶαν
10 εἰμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργάσασθε οἰόμενοι
ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τὸν διδόναι ἐλεγχοῦ τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ

10. οἷόμενοι] After οἰόμενοι H inserts conjecturally μὲν, taking
this to be suggested by οἰόμενοι μὲ of some MSS., and by an
erased blank in Oxon. The erasure in Oxon. was probably μὲ,
for an accent has been erased also from —στ. This however
may have been an erasure by the original scribe; such as for in-
stance must have been that at Crito 53 d, where stands δὲ φθέρα
with an erasure between—δεφθέρα being plainly the true reading.

1. ἐγὼ τε ... καὶ οὕτωι] 'I
as well as they.' ἐγὼ has the
stress, and stands (in accord-
ance with Greek arrangement)
first for that reason. Dig. 307.
6. ἐν δὲ—χρησμοδοῦσιν] The
opinion, which connects pro-
phetic enlightenment with the
approach of death, has main-
tained its hold upon mankind
in all ages. Patroclus foretells
Hector's death, II. xvi. 851,
and Hector the death of Achil-
les, II. xxii. 358: instances to
which classical writers often
appeal; thus Xen. Apol. 30,
ὑπέθηκε μὲν καὶ ὁμήρος ἐστιν οἷς
tῶν ἐν καταλυτι τοῦ βίου προ-
γεγραμμένα τὰ μέλλοντα, βούλομαι
dὲ καὶ ἐγὼ χρησμοδησίαν τι, ὁικ.
De Div. I. 30, Facilius event
appropinquaunte morte ut animi
futura augurantur; ex quo et
illud est Calani, de quo ante
dixi, et Homeriici Hectoris qui
morientes propinquam Achilli
morte mortem denuntiát. So Shaks-
ppeare, Rich. II. Act II. Sc. i.
(Gaunt) "Methinks, I am a
prophet new inspir'd; And
thus, expiring, do foretell of
him.” And Sir H. Davy ("Re-
mainds,” p. 311) speaks of him-
self as “looking into futurity
with the prophetic aspirations
belonging to the last moments
of existence”—in a letter dated
just two months before his
death.

9. οἰῶν] Sc. τιμωραῖν. A
virtual cognate accusative after
ἀπεκτόνατε. Dig. 1.
11. διδόναι ἐλεγχοῦ] Namely,
under the process of εὐτασίας.
cf. 38 a note, and esp. Laches
187 e there quoted.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 103

39. ὕμιν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβῆσται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημ. πλεί-

δος ἢ σωτηρία, ὅπερ ἐν εἰς ἔλεγχον, ὑμεῖς ἰδοὺ ὑπὸ ἡσυχάζοντες· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἢ σωτηρία ὑμεῖς καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτηστε. εἰ γὰρ οὔσον ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχύσεις τοῦ ὑπείρακτον· ὑμῖν ὁτι ὑμῖν ὅρθως ὑπήτε, ὑμῖν ὅρθως διανοεῖτε· οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγή οὔτε πάντα δυνατή οὔτε καλή· ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλιστή καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ' ἐαυτὸν ἐκείνον παρασκεύαξεν ὅπως ἢσται ὣς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα ἢ σωτηρία ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἡ ἀπαλλάσσομαι.

XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισμένοις ἢδεως ἄν δια-

λεχθεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τούτου πράγματος, ἐν ὑμῖν ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσί καὶ οὐκ ἔρχομαι ὑμῖν ἡ ἠλθοῦντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὃ ἄνδρες, ἐπαραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογήσατε πρὸς ἄλληλους, ἔσος ἐξεστίν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὁ σίγλος οὕσιν ἐπιδείξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι ἐξιμβεβηκός τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἔμοι γὰρ, ὃ ἄνδρες δικα-σταί· ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὅρθως ἄν καλοῖν —θαυμάσιον τί γέγονεν. ἢ γὰρ εἰσβοῦλε μοι μαν-

τική ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάντων πυκνῇ ἄει ἵνα καὶ πάνω ἐπὶ σμικρῶις ἐναντίοις μενη, εἰ τι μέλλομι μὴ ὅρθως πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ 25

15. ὅ ἄρχοντες] That is, oi ἐνδοκε. 20. δικασταῖ] Steinhardt remarks that up to this point, where first the true and false judges are separated, the form of the address used has been ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. 22. ἡ εἰσβοῦλε] 'The direction I am wont to receive from the divine voice.' See App. A, on τὸ δαιμόνιον. 24. πάνω ἐπὶ σμικρῶις] ἐπὶ sepa-

rates πάνω from σμικρῶις, to which it belongs: Dig. 298.
5. μέλλοντι τι] This accurately represents the reading of Oxon.,

which stands μέλλοντι (τι being prima manu), importing that τι should follow μέλλοντι. Caisford here is inexact in his representation.

7. ταύτην] So VBH; αὐτήν SZ. It is impossible to find a clear meaning for αὐτήν, which is the reading of Oxon., and five other MSS. Cf. Phaedo 60 a, where Oxon. (alone) has ταύτην for αὐτήν.

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 105

1. τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθέντε εἰς ἀλλον τόπον.

2. καὶ εἰ γε μηδεμία αἰσθησὶς ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἴον ύπνος,

3. ἐπειδὰν τις καθεῦδων μηδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὥρα, θαυμά-

4. σιον κέρδος ἂν εἰη ὁ θάνατος. ἔγω γὰρ ἂν οἴμαι, εἰ
tινα ἐκλεξάμενον δει ταύτην τὴν νυκτα, ἐν ἂ οὕτως
cατεδαρθεν, ὡστε μηδ' ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας

5. νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ ἀντι-

6. παραθέντα ταύτη τῇ νυκτί δεόι σκεφάμενον εἰπεῖν,

7. πότασ ἀμείων ζς καὶ ἡδίον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης
tῆς νυκτὸς βεβλώκεν ἐν τῷ ἐαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἴμαι ἂν μη
e ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλεὰ εὐαρμυ-

9. τοὺς ἀν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτα πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ

10. νύκτας. εἰ οὐν τοιούτον ὁ θάνατος ἑστι, κέρδος ἐγὼγε

11. λέγω. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται

12. οὐτω δὴ εἶναι η μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ δίον ἀποδημηθέν
tις ὁ θάνατος ἐνθέντε εἰς ἀλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ

13. ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσὶν ἀπαντεῖς οἱ τεθ

14. νοεῖτες, τί μείζον ἄγαθον τούτον εἰη ἂν, ὁ ἄνδρες
dικασταί; εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς 'Αιδοῦ, ἀπαλ-

15. λαγεῖς τοῦτον τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρή-

16. σει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οὔτερ καὶ λέγονται

17. ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθος καὶ Αιακὸς

21. ὡς] So VBS; ZH omit. Oxon. has it above the line but in first hand. The ὡς is constantly added where it is a popular appellation of which the propriety is recognised, and is frequently found after the article, as Phdr. 256 b, τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὄλυμπιακῶν, Rep. 345 ε, τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντα, &c., &c.

1. τῇ ψυχῇ] An intensified form of the dative of reference, equivalent nearly to a genitive: Dig. 28.
2. αὐτῶν] A resumption of οὕτως τινα and βασιλεία, after the intervention of εὐαρμυ. ἃν εὑρεῖν.

22. Μίνως τε—ἀλλοι] These nouns are in the nominative by attraction to the interpolated relative clause, as the nearest construction: Dig. 192.

Nowhere else does Triptolemus occur as judge of the dead (though in Hom. Hymn.
Demet. 153 he sits in judgment on earth. Also Plato is the only Greek who styles Æacus judge of the dead, here and Gorg. 523 e; though many Romans mention him thus. But the same principle accounts for the ascription of such a subterranean preeminence to these two, and to the remaining two more widely recognised judicial personages named here. All four were connected with the secret rites, or mysteries, of their native places; Minos with the Cretan mysteries, which through the Orphic influence were widely known. Rhadamanthus, his assessor, is his countryman. Æacus was the hero of Ægina, where there were (Pausan. II. 30, Origen adv. Cels. vi. 290. c. 22, Lucian, Navig. 15) mysteries of Orphic origin. And Triptolemus was connected, of course, with Eleusis. These judges are an instance of the fact that certain features of the Greek mythology were first the product of the mystery-worship, and thence made their way into the popular mind.—Döllinger, Gent. and Jew, Vol. I.

Bk. iii. p. 175. The same account may be assumed to hold of the ἄλλοι τῶν ἡμιθέων, who are subjoined to these four; for very many places had mystery-rites. Rhadamanthus is mentioned in Homer, (Od. vii. 323), and therefore antecedently to mysteries, as a judge, but on earth and not in the nether world.

6. ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῶν] I. e. 'I should have a pleasure peculiarly my own.'


ὁπότε—τεθνηκέ] This depends upon ἀντιπαραβαλλοῦτι. The whole sentence ὁπότε—ἀγές εἰ is a re-statement more at length of διατριβῇ ἃν εἰ ἡ διατριβή, which it follows asyndetically,—an instance of Binary Structure: Dig. 207.

9. ἀντιπαραβαλλοῦτι] Socrates' comparison of himself with Palamedes recalls the fable of the representation of the Palamedes of Euripides soon after Socrates' death, when, at the words ἐκάνετε ἐκάνετε τῶν πάντων σοφῶν, ὦ Δαυιδ, τῶν οὖν ἀλλήλων ἄρχονταν ἄρχονταν, τῶν Ἐλλήνων τῶν ἀριστών, the whole

6. ἀγοῦτα] Participle of the imperfect, which gives greater fullness and vividness than the aorist would have given. Cf. Legg. 635 a, καθισὺ πώς ἤν τὸν τότε διανοίας τοῦ τιθέντος αὐτὰ (meaning Lycurgus or Minos), 677 e, ὡς μὲν δ' ἦν ἐν πεδίῳ πόλεις . . . ἀρδην ἐν τῷ τότε χρῶς διαφθείρεσθαι (meaning at the Deluge).

7. η ἀλλος—ἐίποι] The desire for brevity in the summing up of the enumeration breaks off the legitimate plan of the sentence: Dig. 257.

16. ἀληθείς] 'As a verity.' See 18 a, note.


108 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

μάτων βέλτιον ἢν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ p. 41
ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἐγὼ γε τοῖς καταψηφίσα-
μένοις μου καὶ τοῖς καθηγόροις οὐ πάνω χαλεπάνων.
καίτω οὐ ταῦτη τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίσκοντό μου καὶ
κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ' οἵμοιοι βλάπτειν τοῦτο αὐτῶς ο
ἀξίου μέμφεσθαι. τοσόνδε δέομαι μέντοι αὐτῶν
τούς υἱεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἡβήσωσιν, τιμωρήσωσθε, ὦ
μέντοι, ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες, ἀπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύ-
pουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἡ χρημάτων ἡ ἄλλον του
πρῶτον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἡ ἀρετής, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσι τι
eῖναι μηδὲν ὑπερ, οὐνεδίζετε αὐτῶς, ὦσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν,
ὁτι οὐκ ἐπιμελεύονται ὃν δεῖ, καὶ οἴνονταί τι εἶναι ὑπερ
οὐδενὸς ἀξίων. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποῦγη, δίκαια πεπον-
θῶς ἐγὼ ἐσομαι ὑπ' ὑμῶν αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς.

10 ἀλλ' γὰρ ἡδὴ ὁρὰ ἀπιέναι, ἐμὸι μὲν ἀποθανομένοιρ,
ὑμῶν δὲ βιωσομένοις ὑπὸ τερον δὲ ὑμῶν ἐρχονται ἐπὶ
ἀμείων πράγμα, ἀδηλου παντὶ πλὴν ἦ τῷ θεῷ.

6. δέομαι μέντοι αὐτῶν] Edd. μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι, and so all MSS.
except Oxon. But which collocation most exactly suggests the
emphasis required? The position of μάτων has often to be referred
to a subtle ear. Cf. 31 b, καὶ εἶ μέντοι τι, and Dig. 294. 17. ἦ]
So edd., rightly. The weight of Oxon. with four other MSS.,
giving εἰ, is diminished by the itacism.

θεοφιλοὺς μοῖρας τετυχκέναι τοῦ
μὲν γὰρ βίου τὸ χαλεπότατον
ἀπέλπιε κ.τ.λ.

3. οὖ πάνυ] Here, as else-
where, οὐ πάνω marks only a
bare denial: Dig. 139. So-
crates is satisfied with saying,
'I have no sufficient cause
to be displeased.' His εἰρωνεία
would in no case have suffered
him to say, 'I am far from
being displeased.'

8. ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες] By
plying them unweariedly with
warning and remonstrance.

17. πλὴν ἦ] This combination
is exactly parallel to ἀλλ' ἦ.
The two particles enter the
combination coordinate, in-
troducing the exception to the
preceding universal negative in
their own several ways. πλὴν
implies 'it is known to none,—
saving that [in contradiction
to this] it is known to God;'
ἢ, less harshly, 'it is known
to none, or however [only] to
God.' See Dig. 148, and cf. Ar.
Nub. 360, ὡς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλω γ' ἐπ-
ακούσαμεν... Πλὴν ἦ Προδικής.
APPENDIX A.

Τὸ δαίμονιον.

The word δαίμων was used to denote either θεὸς or a spiritual being inferior to θεὸς. Its distinctive meaning as applied to either class is that it denotes such a being in his dealings with men. From Homer to Plato δαίμων is persistently marked by this meaning. Δαίμονιος therefore denotes a connection with divine agency; and τὸ δαίμονιον denotes sometimes such an agency, and sometimes the agent itself. So Aristotle (Rhet. II. xxiii. 8), τὸ δαίμονιον οὐδὲν ἕστιν ἀλλ' ἢ θεὸς ἢ ἄθεω ἔργον, and for this distinction we may compare Plato (Phdr. 242 e), εἰ δ' ἐστιν ὅσπερ οὖν ἃτι θεὸς ἢ τι θεῖον ὁ Ἐρως. When we read in Xenophon (Mem. I. i. 2), διευθυνθέτω ὄς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαίμονιον ἕαντο σημαίνειν ὅθεν δή καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκεόμεν αὐτών αἰτίαςσαθαι κακὰ δαίμονα εἰσφέρειν, both senses of the word are exemplified. Socrates meant by τὸ δαίμονιον a divine agency; Meletus wrested this into the sense of a divine being. In the Apology Socrates marks the position as a caricature by the expression ἐπικωμιωδῶν, and then gives the interpretation consistent with his own meaning—viz. δαίμων πράγματα. That Socrates is not speaking of a being is clear from other passages also, as when he says (Apol. 31 e), ὃτι μοι θεῶν τι καὶ δαίμονες γίγνεται, or (Phdr. 242 b), τὸ δαίμων τι καὶ τὸ εἰσθός σημεῖον γίγνεσθαι, or (Euthyd. 272 e), τὸ εἰσθός σημείον τὸ δαίμων, or (Theat. 151 a), τὸ γιγνόμενον μοι δαίμων. Nor does Plato, who recognises the common notion

1 In Plat. Symp. 202 d — 203 a, this view of δαίμων appears very distinctly, though there, as the doctrine held is that θεῶν ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μίγνυται, all μαντίκη is the province of the δαίμων.

2 Whence the phrase of Ἀσχίνης (iii. 117. p. 70) ἵσω δέ καὶ δαίμονιον τινὸς ἰδαμαρτάνειν αὐτῶν προαγομένον is indeterminate.
of a personal attendant δαίμων (Legg. 730 a, Tim. 90 a), ever give this name to the phenomenon in question. Even Theages (as Zeller remarks, II. 65. n. 2) gives no personality to τὸ δαίμονον. 'Τῇ φωνῇ ἡ τοῦ δαίμονον (Thaug. 128 e) is ambiguous. Plato's use is sometimes adjectival (e.g. τὸ δαίμονον σημεῖα), and sometimes elliptically substantival. Grammatically, Xenophon confines himself to the latter use only,—still merely in the signification of a divine agency. Zeller notices that the interpretation of Socrates' δαίμονον as a being remained peculiar to his accusers (Cicero translating it by divinium quiddam, Divin. I. 54, not by genius) until it was revived by Plutarch, the Neo-Platonists, and the Christian Fathers.

What then were the nature and function of this δαίμονον σημεία? Let us first consult Xenophon, in whom the chief passages are these:

Mem. I. i. 2—5, διεστρέφοντο γὰρ ὅσ φαίνει Σωκράτης τὸ δαίμονον ἑαυτῷ σημαινεῖ, ὅλιγ δὴ καὶ μᾶλλον μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι καὶ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν. ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν κανότερον εἰσφέρει τῶν ἄλλων, ὡς μαντικὰς νομίζουσε ὑώνοις τε χρῶνται καὶ φήμαις καὶ συμβολοῖς καὶ θυσίασι. οὕτοι τε γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὢν τοὺς ὄρνθας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀπαντῶναι εἰδεναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντεῖοι καὶ ἄλλα τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ σημαίνειν, καίκειον δὲ οὔτως ἐνόμιζεν. ἄλλοι οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι φασίν ὑπὸ των ὄρνθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντῶντων ἀποτρέποντες τοῖς καὶ προπρέπουσαν. Σωκράτης δὲ, ὡσπερ εὐγήρωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε. τὸ δαίμονον γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ σημαίνειν καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐννοῶντων προηγοῦσθε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαίμονον προσημαίνοντος. καὶ τοὺς μὲν πειθόμενοι αὐτῷ συνεφέρει, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθόμενοι μετέμελει.

IV. iii. 12—13, Σοῦ δ', ἔφη, δ' Σώκρατε, εἰδίκαιαν ἐτί φιλικότερον ἢ ἄλλοις χρήσατα [οἱ θεοὶ], εἰ γε μιᾶς ἐπερωτῶμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνοντι σοι ὑπὲρ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ, ὅτι δὲ γε ἄλλῃ λέγω καὶ σὺ, δ' Εὐθύμημε, γνῶσιν, ἢ μοι αἰνεῖς ἢν ἢς τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἵνα, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῇ σοι τὰ ἐγκα τούτων ὀργῶν σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς.

IV. viii. 1, φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαίμονον ἑαυτῷ προσημαίνειν ὑπὲρ δεός καὶ μὴ δέος ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος.

IV. viii. 5—6, Ἀλλὰ η δίᾳ τῶν Δία, φάναι αὐτῶν, δ' Ἐρμόγενες, ἢ δὴ μοι ἐπεχειροῦστα σφωτίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίαν ὄρνθοις τὸ δαίμονον, καὶ αὐτῶν εἰς, Θεαματα λέγεις. τὸν δὲ, Θεαμάζεις, φάναι, εἰ τῷ δὲ δοκεῖ δέκτοντα εἶναι εἰμὶ τελευτάν τῶν βίων ἡ; Η

IV. viii. 11, εὐσεβῆς οὕτως ὡςτε μιᾶς ἄνω τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν.

Symp. viii. 5, τοῖς μὲν τὸ δαίμονον προφασίζομενος οὐ διαλέγει μοι τοῖς δ' ἄλλοι καὶ τὸν ἐφίμενος.
Τὸ δαμόνιον.

To which must be added still from the Memorabilia, I. i. 19, ἡγείταπάνταμὲνθεούεἰδέναι,τατελεγόμενακαίπραπτόμενακαί
τάσείθεολευκόμενα,πανταχοῦδεπαρείναικαίσημαίνειντοῖςἀνθρώποις
περὶτῶνἀνθρωπεῖωνπάντων.

Thus we see that Xenophon tells us nothing as to the nature of
Socrates' δαμόνιον, save that it was the instrument through which
divine intimations reached him unsolicitedly. He adheres (unless
we admit as his the θεοῦμοιφωνῆφαίνεταιin§12 of the Xenop-
phoncean Apology) to the expression σημαινεῖν τὸ δαμόνιον, meaning
by this expression (as already said) that τὸ δαμόνιον is but the
instrument, while it is the gods who are the agents, whence in
other passages we have as equivalent expressions [θεοῦ] προσημαινοῦσι
(Mem. IV. iii. 12), τῶθεοῦ δοκεῖ (ib. viii. 6), θεῶν γνώμη (ib. 11). Its
intimations differ from those obtained by μαντικῇ in being given
spontaneously. Socrates is represented as having thought himself
singular, as a matter of fact, in possessing this gift. He did not
urge others to seek for a similar sign. Although he believed (Mem.
I. i. 19) πάνταμὲνθεούεἰδέναι ... πανταχοῦδεπαρείναικαίσημαίνειν
τοῖςἀνθρώποιςπερὶτῶνἀνθρωπεῖωνπάντων, he seems either to have
directed others to μαντικῇ (Mem. I. i. 6), or the oracle (Cie. de Divin.
i. 54), or to have given them the benefit of his own divine intima-
tions (Mem. I. i. 4). He however believed that if others had not
this gift, it was by their own fault (Mem. IV. iii. 13).

What its function was according to Xenophon, we gather from
the identification of its province with that of μαντικῇ, which is
defined in Mem. I. i. 6—9, ἀλλὰμὲνἐποίησεκαίταῦςἐπιστηδειῶν
τάμὲνγὰρἀναγκαῖασυνεβολέεινκαὶπράπετενὡςἐνίμιζενἀριστὴνπραχθῆ
ναι περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄδηλων ὅπως ἀποβῇ στὸ μαντευσμένων ἐπέμενεν εἰ τοιαύτα καὶ τοὺς μελλοντας ὑμοὺς τε καί πόλεις καλῶς ὁικήσεως μαντικῆς ἔφη
προσδείχαμαι τεκτονικῶν μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἀλκετεύκων ἡ γεωργίκων ἡ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικῶν ἡ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικῶν ἡ λογιστικῶν ἡ ὁικονομικῶν ἡ στρα-
pτηκῶν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθῆμα καί ἀνθρώπῳ γνώμῃ ὀρίτια
ἐνίμιζεν εἰναι τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τοιούτω ἔφη τοὺς θεοὺς ἑαυτοῖς κατα-
λείπεσθαι, ὃν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ... ἔφη δὲ δεῖν ἃ μὲν μαθοῦ-
tας ποιεῖν ἐδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνειν, ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ,
περάσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυθόμενασθαι τοῖς θεοῖς γὰρ οῖς
ἀν ωσίν ἰδίῳ σημαινεῖν.

This accords with Plato, Apol. 40 a, ἡ εἰσθήτα μοι μαντικῇ ἡ τοῦ
dαμονίου. It was no such guide in the matter of right and wrong
as conscience is; nor yet an universal oracle to reveal truths of
science or of futurity. Its function was on the one hand practical
—to pronounce upon a proposed course of action, of which Socrates had cognisance, either as himself a party to it or in the interest of his friends—, on the other hand it pronounced *not on the morality but on the expediency (in the Socratic sense of what was really for the best) of the proposed course. This would not exclude from its decision moral questions, where the obligation either was obscure or mainly depended on the consequences. It was not a mere pre-sentiment, a foreboding of chance misfortune or of chance success, the mere reflection of a man's own feelings of happiness or gloom while in spite of them he carries out his course of action. It stamped in Socrates' belief a definite character of expediency or inexpediency on the course intended, and he never disobeyed it.

In Plato the notable passages are these:—Apol. 31 c–d, τούτου δὲ αἰτίων ἔστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἔμοι πολλάκις ἀκηκώσε κολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θείων τι καὶ δαμόνιον γίγνεται φωνὴ, ὃ δὴ καὶ εἰ τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικοινωνῶν Μέλιτος ἐγράψατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτων ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνὴ τις γεγομένη, ἡ ὅτιν πέντε ἀποτέλεσε με τοῦτο, ὃ ἐν μέλλων πράττειν, προστέθη τε οὕτως. τούτων ἔστιν ὃ μοι ἐναντιότατα τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. 40 a–b, ἢ γὰρ εἰσοδίων μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαμόνιον ἐν μὲν τῷ πράσαθεν χρῆμα παντὶ πάνω πνευμάτι ἢ ἄν καὶ πᾶν ἐπὶ ξυμπλοῖον ἐναντιομένην, εἰ τι μέλλομαι ἐν ὅρθῳ πράξεωι. νανι δὲ ἔξωθεντες μοι, ἀπέρ ὅρθει καὶ αὐτῷ, ταυτί, ἢ γε ὅτι οἴδηθεν ὅν τὰς καὶ νομίζετα ἐσχάτα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὕτε ἐξωθεὶν ἐγόραν ἐναντιώθη τοῦ τὸν θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὐτε ἡνίκα ἀνεβαίνον ἐναντιοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστηριόν, οὐτὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοὶ μέλλουσι τι ἔργον καὶ τοῦ ἐνόλλοι λόγοι πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπείσχε λέγοντα μεταξὺ. νανι δὲ οὐδαμοὶ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξειν οὐτέ ἐν ἐργῷ οὐδεὶς οὐτὲ ἐν λόγῳ ἐναντιώσατα μοι.—Euthyd. 272 e, κατὰ θεοῦ γὰρ τῶν ἑκείνων καθήμενος ἐναντία, οὔτε σὺ με ἐδείκ, ἐν τῷ ἀποδιενεργοῦ μόνος, καὶ ἡθη ἐν νῷ εἴχαν ἐναντίαν ἀνισταμένου δὲ μοι ἐγένετο τὸ εἰσόδος σημείον τὸ δαμώδην, πάλιν οὖν ἐκείς ὁμόρροος.—Phdr. 242 b, ἡνίκε ἐμελλόν, ὅταν τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνεις, τὸ δαμώδην τε καὶ τὸ εἰσόδος σημείου μοι γέγραφαν ἐγένετο—ἀλλὰ δὲ με ἐπισκέψει τὸ ἐν μέλλω πράττειν—, καὶ τῶν φωνῶν ἐξύρτα τὸν αὐτόθεν ἀκούσα, ἢ μὲν οὐκ ἔκανεν πρὸν ἐν ἄρσομοσσώμα, ὅτι ἡ ἡμαρτήκατα εἰς τὸ θεῖον.—Alcib. I. init. 103 a–b, τούτου δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ τοῦ δαμώδου ἐναντίομα, οὐκ ὁ δὲ δικαίως ἐκαπνίσθη, τοῦτο προσελήνητα. εὐθεῖας δὲ εἴμι καὶ τὸ λαῦπὸν πολλὸν ἐναντιώσεθαι αὐτῷ.—Theseus. 151 a, ἐνίοτε μὲν τὸ γεγονόμενον

3 Wiggers and Zeller have noticed this. Remark the contrast in the *Apology*. The matter of duty—not to desert the post of preacher to the Athenian people—is thrown on the divine mission (28 e), the matter of judgment—to abstain from politics—is attributed to the δαμώδον (31 d).
Τὸ δαμόνιον.

μοι δαμόνιον ἀποκωλεῖ εὐνεία εἰνός δὲ ἐδ.—Rep. 496 c, τὸ δὲ ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον λέγει, τὸ δαμόνιον σημεῖον ὡς γὰρ ποῦ τιν ἄλλω ἢ οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμπροσθεν γίγνοι. The passages in the Theages consist in part of parrot-like repetitions of descriptions of the phenomenon culled from various dialogues, in part of inventions founded on these.

The account in these passages exhibits some additions and variations as compared with that of Xenophon.

As to the nature of the phenomenon, it is explained to be a sign, which consists of articulate words, and the use of which corresponds to the μαντικὴ of other men. It is represented as a gift almost peculiar to Socrates, though by him possessed from his childhood upwards.

Its function seems somewhat heterogeneous, compared with what we have found it in Xenophon. Besides giving warnings as to an intended course of action, it reminds of a duty unperformed (Phdr.); or an advantage accrues from obeying it, which has no rational connection whatever with the obedience (Euthyd.). The tales of the Theages dwell on the marvel exclusively; yet, while they leave the φανῆ unconnected with any act of the judgment, they leave room for supplying such a connection. Plato further tells us that its function was a negative one—ἀδὲ ἀποτρέπει προτρέπει δὲ οὕτω (Apol.). The importance of this limitation shall be considered presently.

From these data we may now seek to arrive at a conclusion for ourselves. According to both Xenophon and Plato the fact itself, which Socrates accounted for by the δαμόνιον σημεῖον, was a sudden sense, immediately before carrying a purpose into effect, of the expediency of abandoning it,—or, Xenophon would add, of prosecuting it. Meanwhile we are not bound to accept Socrates' account of the cause of this sudden feeling; first, because he was no psychologist, and, while in his own belief he was merely describing his own consciousness,—or, as Xenophon says, ὅπερ ἐγιγνώσκειν οὕτω καὶ ἄλεγε,—he was really importing into his description an inference of his own; secondly, because he rather diminishes the weight of his own testimony for us, not merely by his attention to dreams (Phædo 60 e), but more by his absolute faith in μαντικὴ and its use in obtaining for others the same divine guidance which he obtained unasked through the σημεῖον; and, thirdly, because while he believed himself to have detected divine agency here, he was perfectly unconscious of it in its more ordinary province, as the author of "all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works." If, then,
declining Socrates’ account, we are disposed to refer the phe-
omenon to ordinary psychological causes, we can do so satisfactorily,
provided we confine our attention to Xenophon’s account alone.
All Xenophon’s notices of it encourage the view, that it was a
quick exercise of a judgment informed by knowledge of the sub-
ject, trained by experience, and inferring from cause to effect
without consciousness of the process. In a mind so purified by
temperance and self-knowledge, so single of purpose and unper-
turbed by lower aims, endowed with such powerful natural faculties,
especially those of observation and of causality, the ability to fore-
cast and forejudge might become almost an immediate sense. But
it must be confessed that some of the features in Plato’s account
are a little embarrassing to this view. The singularity ascribed by
Plato (Rep. 496 c) to the gift need not rank among these diffi-
culties, since Xenophon mentions it as a singular characteristic of
Socrates (Mem. IV. viii. 11) that he was φρόνιμος ὁστε μη διαιμαρ-
tάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χείρο, μηδὲ ἄλλου προσδείωθαι ἄλλα αὐτάρ-
κης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνώσιν, which is the rationalised description
of this very phenomenon. But the statement that Socrates enjoyed
the gift from his earliest days is not fully consistent with the
explanation just put forward,—with any consideration, that is, of
the effect of observation, experience, moral training, or habit of
mind. Again, as we have seen, two of the instances of the occur-
rence of the σημείων which are related in Plato preclude the expla-
nation of an act of judgment. It is no judgment, however pene-
trating, which recalls Socrates from the stream he had purposed
crossing and brings him back to Phaedrus, or which forbids him to
leave his seat just before the fortuitous entrance of Euthydemus
and his companions. If we are to accept these features as his-
torical, we must give up all attempt to rationalise the phenomenon
at all, and fall back upon Socrates’ own account as final. But, first,
we have seen that there are reasons against accepting his account,
and, secondly, against the historical probability of these two instances
stands the fact that, though paralleled in Plutarch, they are unlike
any other instances given by Xenophon and Plato; for (setting
aside the Theages as apocryphal) in all the other instances it is
implied that the course of action forbidden by the warning is pre-
judicial, not through its fortuitous consequences, but through some-
thing amiss in itself, and that the course upon which the agent is
thrown back leads to the good result by a chain of means and not
by a chain of accidents.
Τὸ δαμόνων.

We must therefore adopt the alternative which involves less considerable difficulties, and regard Plato as less faithful than Xenophon in his illustration of the phenomenon. It is not difficult to suppose that by tracing it back to Socrates' boyhood nothing more may be intended than that his memory did not serve him to indicate the first beginning of those habits of observation and that moral and mental training from which the faculty grew. And as to the heterogeneous instances of warnings given by it, since as individual instances they are certainly inventions, part of the machinery of the dialogues in which they stand, it is doing no violence to Plato's genius to suppose, that as an inventor he has not scrupled to travesty the character which belonged to the actual and serious use of the gift, and to extend its operation playfully into the domain of chance.

There remains to be noticed in Plato's account the well-known restriction of τὸ δαμόνων to negative functions. In describing the sign as a voice, Plato adds (Apol. 31 d), ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει μὲ τούτο ὅ ἐν μέλλων πράττειν προστιγμὸν δὲ ὁποτε. One difficulty lies in the nature of the case. What kind of divine communication or what kind of judgment could that be which yielded only negative utterances? Certainly no act of judgment could be such: the same penetration which could discern the inexpediency of a course of action would serve for the discerning of the more expedient alternative. A divine communication might be imagined under any self-imposed restriction; still the restriction would, in proportion to its arbitrariness, discredit yet more this hypothesis, which we have already seen reason to abandon. Another difficulty lies in the conflict of testimony as to this peculiarity. Xenophon attributes to the sign an approving as well as disapproving force (Mem. IV. viii. 1, φαύκικοντος αἰτοῦ τὸ δαμόνων ἐκεῖ ἀποστημαίνει ἀ τε δέοι καὶ ἂ μὴ δέοι ποιεῖν· cf. I. i. 4, as quoted above). Cicero (De Divin. i. 54) simply echoes Plato. Plutarch (De Socr. Dæm. c. 11. p. 1015), agreeing with Xenophon, represents the sign as καλεῖν ἢ κακεῖν.

These are the two difficulties which have to be met. No attempt has been made to meet the first: the second has been met by swallowing the first whole, and supposing Xenophon to be in error in not distinguishing the actual communication made by the sign, and the inference which Socrates made from it, and which might (as in Apol. 40 a) be positive. But we shall meet both difficulties by some such explanation as the following. As to the reconcilement of authorities, when Plato makes Socrates say ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει μὲ, he
describes it by its most perceptible act, for its coincidence with an existing purpose would be superfluous and little noticeable. It was only when the presentiment ran counter to his will that Socrates became distinctly conscious of it. An illustration of this oversight occurs in the statement of some moderns concerning conscience, that it has only a negative function,—as if there were no such thing as “an approving conscience.” In this case also the origin of the misstatement is the same, the more acute and marked character of the negative function. Thus it is the statement of Plato which needs to be supplemented, while that of Xenophon, so far from needing qualification, is alone commensurate with the common sense of the case. As to the fact to which Plato’s notice points, the words προτείπει δὲ οὖποτε would seem not to be an idle tautology, a reiteration of what we have seen to be a defective statement, but to mark another feature in the case. The Voice was no impulse; it did not speak to the will, but had a critical or reflexive function; it did not contribute to form a purpose, but pronounced judgment on a purpose already in being. Motives, on the other hand, impel the will always in some direction; they cannot be negative. Thus the setting forth the first part of the statement on the negative side only is justified in a way by the antithesis. And the meaning of the two clauses together is, that the Voice is a reflexive judgment on purposed actions, but does not supply motives of action.

The fact which τὸ δαμόνον represented was an unanalysed act of judgment,—not on a principle, but on a particular course of action already projected; not on the morality of this, but on its expediency in the Socratic sense of the term. It was κριτική, not ἐπιτακτική. Whatever connection it might really have with the springs of the will would certainly be left out of the statement by one who could identify virtue with knowledge. It was Socrates’ substitute for μαντική. This implies that in the province where men are wont to supplement the failure of penetration by external preternatural aids, Socrates refused, for himself, such irrational expedients, and found, in many instances at least, a guide within himself. But to this guide, being (as we have seen) the outcome of an assemblage of unanalysed processes of thought and judgment, he in all good faith gave a religious name. His mental acts, so far as he could unravel them, were his own, were human; beyond his ken they were divine; and what really was of the nature of an immediate critical sense seemed to him an immediate inspiration.

No Christian would be startled by a view which recognised every
part of his mental processes as performed in dependence on God,—
nor on the other hand would he be shocked to hear them spoken of as independently and properly his own. So long as each view reached the whole way, he would be satisfied with it, and would comprehend it. What Socrates did was to halve each of these views, and to speak of his mental processes as human up to the point where he could still follow them,—beyond that as divine.
APPENDIX B.

DIGEST OF IDIOMS.

Idioms of Nouns:—Accusative Case, §§ 1—23.
Idioms of Nouns:—Genitive Case, §§ 24—27.
Idioms of Nouns:—Dative Case, §§ 28—29.
Idioms of the Article, §§ 30—39.
Idioms of Pronominal Words, §§ 40—55.
Idioms of Verbs, §§ 56—110.
Idioms of Prepositions, §§ 111—131.
Idioms of Particles, §§ 132—162.
Idioms of Comparison, §§ 163—178.
Idioms of Sentences:—Attraction, §§ 179—203.
Idioms of Sentences:—Binary Structure, §§ 204—230.
Idioms of Sentences:—Abbreviated Construction, §§ 231—261.
Idioms of Sentences:—Pleonasm of Construction, §§ 262—269.
Idioms of Sentences:—Changed Construction, §§ 270—286.
Idioms of Sentences:—Arrangement of Words and Clauses, §§ 287—311.
Rhetorical Figures, §§ 312—326.

§ 1. IDIOMS OF NOUNS:—ACCUSATIVE CASE.

Besides the Accusatives governed by Verbs Transitive, as such, occur the following, of a more Adverbial character.

A. Accusatives referable to the principle of the Cognate Accusative.

a. Direct and regular instances of the Cognate Accusative. It will suffice, as a notice of these, to point out that they are of two kinds only, viz.—

a. the Accusative of the Act or Effect signified by the Verb.
β. the Accusative of the Process indicated by the Verb.
**Virtual Cognate Accusatives, i. e. such as are cognate in sense only and not etymologically, are intended to be here included. The “Accusative of the General Force of the Sentence” is really an Accusative of Apposition. See below, F (§§ 10–12).

§ 2. b. Accusatives which must be analysed as Adjectives or Pronouns *in agreement* with an unexpressed Cognate Accusative. These are commonly neuter (not always; cf. Hdt. v. 72, κατέθησαν τιν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ).

Phaedo 75 b, ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τῶλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι—‘perform the other acts of the senses.’

Ib. 85 b, ἡγούμαι ... ὄν χείρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἐχειν.

Symp. 205 b, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις καταγρώμεθα ὄνομασιν, i. e. ‘in the other cases.’ Stallbaum takes this of ‘the other (idi) species of things’ which have to be named, ‘quod ad cæteras attinet formas.’ This might be; but the construction of the particular verb χρῆσαν leads us the other way; cf. Thuc. ii. 15, τῇ κρίνῃ ... ἐγών οὕτη τὰ πλείστον ἄξια ἔχωντο, Hdt. i. 132, χρᾶται [τοῖς κρίσεσι] δὲ τι μν λόγος αἱρείε.

Phdr. 228 c, (Λ)”Ως μοι δοκεῖς οὐ ὀνδαμός με ἀφήσειν κ.τ.λ. (B) Πάντα γάρ σοι ἀληθή δοκῶ.

Theæt. 193 c, δεξία εἰς ἄριστερα μεταρρυθμήσης.

Legg. 792 c, τοιτ' οὐκέτ' ἄν ἕγω ἔως αἰνεικοφήσαμ' ἄν—‘this is one step further than I can go with you.’ Exactly parallel are the Homeric τὸν ἰκάνεις, τάδε χύοει, &c.

Crat. 425 c, εἰ τι χρήσατον ἔδι αὕτα δειλίσθαι.

§ 3. c. Adjectives as well as Verbs are followed by a Cognate Accusative, or by one referable to the same principle.

Apol. 20 b, καλῶ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ τὴν προσφέρονσαν ἀρετῆν.

Ib. d, καθιθεύο [σοφίαν] ταύτην εἶναι σοφός.

Meno 93 b, ταύτην τὴν ἀρετήν, ἴν αὐτοί ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν.

Rep. 349 c, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀπερ ἄρωμοιν ἀγαθῶν [εἶναι λέγεις];—‘good at those things in which he is wise.’

Ib. 579 d, δοῦλος τῶς μεγίστας θωπείας καὶ δουλείας.

Laches 191 c, τοῦτο τοῖνυν αἰτίου ἐλέγον ὅτι ἕγω αἴτιος.

So Thucyd. i. 37, αὐταρκή βέσιν κεμένη, v. 34, ἄτιμους ἐποίησαν ἄτιμιοι τοιάνθε.

(B, C, and D, which follow, are to be regarded as very near akin to each other.)
§ 4. B. Accusatives of the part to which the action, or characteristic, is limited, as περὰν πόδα, βρύχειν ὀδόντας. (Lobeck). Adjectives as well as Verbs, of course, are followed by this Accusative.

Charmid. 154 c, θαυμαστὸς τὸ κάλλος.
Cf. Soph. O. T. 371, τυφλὸς τά τ' ἡσα τὸν τε νοῦν τά τ' ὁμματ' εἰ.

§ 5. C. Accusatives Quantitative (or, in all the instances following, Adjectives in agreement with such Accusatives), expressing how much of the subject is brought under the predication.

Legg. 958 d, ἀ δ' ἡ χώρα πρὸς τοῦτ' αὐτὸ μόνον φύσιν ἔχει, . . . ταύτα ἐκπληροῦν.
Ib. ε, ὡσα τροφὴν . . . ἢ γη . . . πέφυκε βούλεσθαι φέρειν.
Rep. 467 c, oi πατέρες, ὡσα ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς ἔσονται—'to the extent of human capacities.' It is hard to hit upon the exact ellipse, comparing other instances; but it cannot be wrong to look on the Accusative as quantitative.

Crito 46 c, οὐ γὰρ, ὡσα γε ταύθρωσεν, ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλεων ἀποθνῄσκειν αὔριον.
Ib. 54 d, ἀλλ' ἵσθι, ὡσα γε τά νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσα, εάν τι λέγης παρὰ ταύτα, μάτην ἐρεῖ.
Rep. 405 c, ἱματικὴ δείσθαι ὃ τι μὴ τραυμάτων ἐνεκα, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄργιαν.
Phdr. 274 a, οὐ γὰρ . . . ὀμοδοὐλες δεὶ χαρίζεσθαι μελετῶν . . . , ὃ τι μὴ παρέργων.
Tim. 42 c, ἄριστα τὸ θητῶν διακυβερνήσων ἔξων, ὃ τι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ γέγονοι αἰτίων.
Ib. 69 d, σεβόμενοι μαίνειν τὸ θέειν, ὃ τι μὴ πάσα ἤν ἀνάγκη.
Ib. 90 c, διὰ βραχέων ἐπιμηνησίων, ὃ μὴ τίς ἀνάγκη μηκένειν.

§ 6. Hither are also to be referred the following instances, with the distinction that here the quantitative accusative is applied metaphorically, as the measure of the degree of the act or process.

Legg. 679 a, οὐδὲ ἐν προσδέωνται σιδήρον. As we say, 'not one bit.'
Cf. τί δεῖ; ('what need?' not 'why is there need?') illustrated by Isæus, ii. 39, τί ἐδεί αἰτίων ὁμοῦναι . . . ; οὐδὲ ἐν δήπον.
Phædo 91 d, σῶμα γ' ἰ δι οἰκόλαμενοι οὐδὲν παύεται—'ceases not one bit.' To join it with σῶμα would ruin the sense. And cf. 100 b, ἄπερ . . . οὐδὲν πέπασμα λέγων, and Euthyphro 8 c, οὐδὲν μὲν οἷν παύονται ταύτ' ἄμφισβητοῦντες.
Phædo 99 c, ταύτων καὶ δέων ἐνυδέως καὶ ἐνυδέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται.

Euthyd. 293 c, ἢττον οὖν τι οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἰ; 

Charm. 174 c, ἢστῶ τι ἡ λατρικὴ ὑγιαίνειν ποιήσει; 

Crito 47 c, τῶν τῶν πολλῶν λόγων καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαίων. Note, 
that ἐπαίων is intransitive (as infra d, εἴ τις ἐστιν ἐπαίων), 
and therefore μηδὲν ἐπ. is not 'who understand nothing,' but 
'who do not understand one bit.' 

Apol. 19 c, δὲν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὐτε μέγα οὐτε σμικρὸν πέρι ἐπαίω.

Ib. 21 b, ἐγὼ ... οὐτε μέγα οὐτε σμικρὸν ξύνοια ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὁν.

Ib. 26 b, μελήτῳ τοιτῶν οὐτε μέγα οὐτε σμικρῶν πώστε ἐμελήσεως—
where, in accordance with the two last instances, οὐτε μέγα οὐτε 
σμικρὸν is not the Nom. to ἐμελήσεως, nor in regimen with τοιτῶν, 
but in agreement with the Acc. Cognate after ἐμελήσεως. In 
Crat. 425 c, οὐδὲν εἰδότες τῆς ἀληθείας, and Legg. 887 c, ὁσοι καὶ 
σμικρὸν νοῦ κέκριται, the case is different.

Crito 46 c, πλείον τῶν παρόντων ... ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται.

Phileb. 23 c, πολλὰ ἐσχισμένων.

Symp. 193 a, ἀπαντά εὐσεβείαν περὶ θεοὺς—'in all his acts to act 
piously towards the gods.'

Apol. 30 c, ἐμὲ μείζον βλάψετε.

Gorg. 512 b, εὐάρστω δύναται σώζειν.

Cf. Homer's πάντα, as in Od. iv. 654, τῷ δ' αὐτῷ πάντα ἐσκει, and 
the common expression τὰ μὲν—τὰ δὲ.

§ 7. D. Accusatives of the way, or manner—

Symp. 207 d, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον λόγον, ἡ μνήμη φύσις ζητεῖ ὁ δὲ εἶναι.

Politic. 296 c, τὸν ὄρον ... ὁ σοφὸς ... διοικήσει τὰ τῶν ἀρχο-

μένων. 

Rep. 416 b, τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εἰλαθείας παρεσκευασμένων—'on a foot-
ing of the greatest possible caution.' (τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εἰλαθείας 
like τὴν πλείστην τῆς στραταῖς, Thuc. vii. 3, &c.)

Cf. Ar. Pax 232, καὶ γὰρ ἐξελέια, γρώμην ἐμήν, μελλει.

§ 8. Refer to this the common phrase τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, &c.: and, 
probably, the "Accusative Absolute,"—'on such and such a footing.'

Protag. 314 c, δάξαν ἥμιν ταῦτα, ἐπορεύμεθα.

Critias 107 c, ἐκ δὴ τοῦ παραχώμα τῶν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρέπον ἢν μὴ 
δυνόμεθα πάντως ἀποδοῦναι συγγενώσκειν χρεών.

Phileb. 13 b, τὶ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ... ἐνοῦ, πάσας ἱδονὰς ἁγαθὸν εἶναι
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προσαγορεῖες; Cf. Andoc. i. 92. p. 12, σκέψασθε τι αὐτοίς ὑπάρχον ἐτέρων κατηγοροῦσι.

§ 9. E. Accusatives referable to the principle of the Accusative of Time or Space.

To designate them thus is not an idle periphrasis; it seems to include, together with the instances of an Accus. of Time or Space in the literal meaning, those in which the notions of Time or Space are applied metaphorically. Only the latter need be noticed here.

Phileb. 59 e, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἄρ’ οὐ μικρόναι αὐτὰς ἐπιχειρήτων;—where ‘after’ means in the order of discourse.

Soph. 259 b, τὸ δὲ ... μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίων οὐκ ἔστι—‘ten thousand times twice told’ for ‘in so many instances.’

Phdr. 241 d, οὐκέτ’ ἄν τὸ πέρα ἀκούσας ἐμοῦ λέγοντος—‘saying anything further’ for ‘saying anything more’;—a real metaphor, as discourse only metaphorically takes up space. As to the construction, τὸ πέρα is not governed, transitively, by ἀκούσας, but follows λέγοντος.

Symp. 198 b, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοῦ κάτοικος τὸν ὁνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων τίς οὐκ ἄν ἐξεπλάγγι ἀκούων; τὸ ἐπὶ τελ. is a metaphor from space, probably, rather than time. Either way, Stallb. is wrong in explaining the construction by his favourite ‘quod attinet ad.’

§ 10. F. Accusatives in Apposition with, or standing for, sentences or parts of sentences.

These Accusatives may be either (1) Noun-Phrases; see a below: or (2) Pronouns Neuter, agreeing with Nouns understood,—viz. either Relative Pronouns; see b below: or Demonstratives, &c.; see c below.

The doctrine here advanced asserts two positions, which are worthy of notice; viz.

§ 11. (i.) These Noun-Phrases and Neuter-Pronouns are Accusatives. The prevalence of the Neuter Gender makes this difficult to prove; but such instances as are decisive afford an analogy for the rest:—

Theañ. 153 c, ἐπὶ τούτων τὸν κολοφώνα, ἀναγκάζω προσβηθάξεσον κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Soph. O. T. 603, καὶ τῶν ἑλεγχοῦ ... πεύδου, and the Adverbs ἄρχην, ἀκρίν, τὴν πρῶτην, &c.

§ 12. (ii.) They represent, by Apposition or Substitution, the sentence itself. To say, that they are Cognate Accusatives, or in Apposition with the (unexpressed) Cognate Accus., would be inade-
§ 13.] **ACCUSATIVE CASE.** 123

quate to the facts. For (1) in most of the instances the sense points out that the Noun-Phrase or Pronoun stands over against the sentence, or portion of a sentence, as a whole; (2) in many of them, not the internal force but merely the rhetorical or logical form of the sentence is in view. It might be said that they are Predicates, while the sentence itself is the Subject.

§ 13. a. Accusative of Noun-Phrases in Apposition—

Legg. 736 a, τούτοις, δ' εἰσφημίας ἀπαλλαγῆν, δύομα ἀποκιαν τιθέ-μενος.

Crat. 395 d, ὃν καὶ τέλος, ἡ πατρὶς ἀντεράπτετο.

Crito 45 d, τὸ σῶν μέρος, ὃ τι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο πράξον. 

Soph. 260 a, τὸ μὲν μέγιστον, φιλοσοφίας ἂν στηριθέμεν. 

Apol. 25 b, ἥ τοιναντίον τούτον πᾶν, εἰς μὲν τις κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 691 a, τὸ μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ πολὺ, βασιλέων τοῦτο εἶναι νόσημα.

Politic. 293 a, ἐπόμενον δὲ τούτῳ, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀρχὴν δὲι ζητεῖν.

The Accusatives in the instances which follow characterise the logical or rhetorical form—

Symp. 205 d, τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον, ἐστὶ πάσα ἡ ... ἐπιθυμία ... ἔρως.


Theæt. 153 c, ἐπὶ τούτων τὸν κολοβώμαν, ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 66 e, δυνοῦ βάτερον, ὥς οἰδαμοῦ ἐστι κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι, ἡ κ.τ.λ.

Similarly 68 c (plural), and Charm. 160 b.

Illustrations from other writers begin with Homer: II. iv. 28, Λαον ἀγαπῶν, Πριμώφ κακά, 155, βάνατον νῦ τοι ὃρι' ἐταμον, ix. 115, ὅτι τι νεύδει ἐμὲ ἄτας κατελεξα, xxiv. 735, ῥίψε ... ἀπὸ πύργων, λυγρῶν ἄλεθρων, Od. xxi. 35, ἢγος ἄδεικε, Ἀρχὴν ἐξουσι-σινης. Æsch. Ag. 225, θυμῷ γενέσθαι δυνατός, γυναικοποιῶν πολίμων ἄρωγαί, 1406, νεκρὸς ... τήσδε δεῖξας χρείας ἔργων, Cho. 200, εἰχα συμπεπεθέν ἐμοὶ Ἀγαλμα τύμβοι, κ.τ.λ., 205, Καὶ μὴν στὶζοι γε, δεύτερον τεκμήριον, Ποδῶν ὁμοίοι, τοις τ' ἐμώνων ἐμφερεῖς. Eur. Or. 1105, Ἐλένην κτάνωμεν, Μενελαὶ λήπτην περάν. Ar. Acharm. 411, οὐκ ἵστα σχῦλος σκυίς. (So Virg. Æn. xi. 383, Proinde tona eloquio, solutum tibi.) Thucyd. iii. 111, πρόφασιν ἐπὶ λαχαι-νημάτων εξελθότερς (and similarly v. 80): cf. the Homeric precedent II. xix. 302, ἐπὶ δὲ στενάκισα γυναίκες, Πάτροκλοι πρόφασιν, σφῶν δ' αὐτῶν κῆδε' ἐκάστη (not, as Jel, Gr. Gr. § 580, πρόφασιν in Apposition to Πάτροκλοι). Ar. Vesp. 338, Τοῦ δ' ἐφεξιν, καὶ μάται, ταῦτα δρῶν σε βουλεύει; Antipho v. 63, p. 136, ἄλλ', αὐτό
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§ 14. The formula of Quotation falls under this head—

Alcib. I. 121 d, ἡμῶν δὲ γενομένων, τὸ τοῦ κωμῳδοποιοῦ, οὐδ' οἱ γείτονες σφύδρα αἰσθάνονται.

Apol. 34 d, καὶ γὰρ, τοῖτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ 'Ομήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυός κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 77 d, δοκεῖσ . . . δεδείκνυτο, τὸ τῶν παιδῶν, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς δ ἄνεμος κ.τ.λ.—where τὸ τῶν π. is not connected with δεδείκνυτο, but refers to the sentence ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτήν . . . διασκεδάζονς' that is, does not mean 'to fear, as children fear,' but 'to fear lest it be as children think it is, that the soul goes into the air.'

§ 15. b. Accusative of Relative Pronoun Neuter in Apposition, with a sentence following—

Protag. 352 c, τοῖτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἠδονῶν ἡπάσθαι—

'which is what men describe when they say they are,' &c.

Soph. 217 c, δι' ἐρωτησέων, οἷον ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδη χρωμάτω καὶ διεξόντι λόγους παγκάλου παρεγενόμην ἐγώ. The illustration which Socrates means to impress on the stranger is not simply Parmenides' use of ἐρωτήσεις, but the whole scene,—the λόγοι παγκάλου in which the ἐρωτήσεις were interwoven, and his own presence on these occasions. Cf. Thucyd. ii. 40, ὃ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν ἔραυσον λογισμὸς δὲ ὁκνὸν φέρει' and vi. 55, οἷς ὃς ἀδελφὸς νεώτερος ὄν ὑπόρθησεν ἐν ὃς οὐ πρῶτον ἐνεχώς ἀμφιήκει τῇ ἀρχῇ—where ἐν ὃς is not ὃς τοῖτο ἐν ὃς, but ὃς τοῖτο ὃς, i.e. 'in a predicament which was that of his not having,' &c. And in the common expressions ἀνθ' ἄνθ᾽ ἄντι τῶν, ὃ, and οὕσεκα ὡς ὃς τοῖ, ὃ, the Relatives ὃ and ὃ are instances of the same construction, agreeing with the sentence which they introduce.

Gorg. 483 a, ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ, τοῖτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανοηκόστη, κακουργεῖ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις—'and this is exactly how you, profiting by your knowledge of this subtlety, cheat in argument.'

Theaet. 158 b, (A) ὃρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀμφισβητήμα ἐννοεῖ . . . ; (B) τὸ ποιον; (A) ὁ πολλάκις σε οἴμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων, τι ἂν τὸς ἄρχαι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξει κ.τ.λ.—'that which is expressed by the question, which I dare say you have often heard, what,' &c.

Symp. 188 c, ὃ δὴ προστάτικαι τῇ μαντικῇ ἐπισκοπέω τοὺς ἐρωτας—where ὃ δὴ agrees with the whole of what follows—'And thus it stands, accordingly;—μαντικῇ is charged with the care of,' &c.


Syrmp. 222 b, ἀ δῆ, καὶ σοὶ λέγω μὴ ἔξαιπτάσθαι ἵπτο ταύτον—'and thus accordingly, I press upon you also not to be,' &c.

§ 16. So with the 'parenthetical' ὦν,—in Apposition with the entire sentence—


Euthyphro 13 a, λέγομεν γὰρ που,—ὥν φαμὲν ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπισταταί θεραπεύειν κ.τ.λ.

Politic. 267 c, ὦν οἱ ἐμποροὶ καὶ γεωργοὶ καὶ . . . διαμάχουν ἅν οὗτοι ἐξūπατεις κ.τ.λ.

Or with a portion of a sentence or a single word.

Phdr. 243 d, ποτίμῳ λόγῳ ὦν ἄλμυραν ἄκοι ἀποκλύσασθαι.

Politic. 277 c, τή ὦν τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τῇ συγκράσει τῶν χρωμάτων ἐνάργειαν.

Phædo 64 d, ἥδωνας τάς τοιάδε, ὦν σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν.

Ib. 73 c, (A) πῶς λέγεις ; (B) ὦν τὰ τοιάδε.

Ib. 78 d, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν ὦν ἀνθρώπων.

Ib. 83 b, κακῶν ἐπαθεῖν ἀπ' αὐτῶν . . . ὦν ἡ νοσήσας ἡ κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 40 c, δοὺν βατερῶν ἐστι τὸ τεβαναία· ἡ γὰρ ὦν μηδὲν εἰναι . . . τῶν τεθεωτα ἡ κ.τ.λ.

All these instances of ὦν show that it stands outside the construction of the sentence. But its being in a particular number and case still requires explanation, and the only explanation is, that it is in Apposition with the sentence or some portion of it. Note, that this ὦν has two shades of meaning, according as it introduces (a) a metaphor, when it means 'as it were;' or (b) an instance, when it means 'for instance.' A different analysis is required for ὦν δή, οία δή, οία, e. g. in

Critias 112 c, οίας δέρους, κατεχρώντο ἐπὶ ταύτα αὐτοῖς.

Syrmp. 203 b, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐδείπνησαν, προσαυτήσουσα ὦν δὴ ἐνωχίας οὕσης ἀφίκετο ἡ Πενία.

Here the same principle so far appears, that the Neuter Antecedent to which the Relative refers is (not a Cognate Accus. but) the whole clause,—viz. in the former instance, κατεχρώντο ἐπί ταύτα αὐτοῖς, in the latter προσαυτήσουσα. The Relative sentence is elliptical; cf. the use of Relatives generally with δή, and the fuller expression in

Phædo 60 a, τοιαύτ' ἀττα εἰπεν οία δή εἰσώθωσιν αἱ γυναῖκες.

1 The δοῦν in δοῦν οὐ stands exactly in the same position.
§ 17. c. Accusative of Neuter Pronoun (not Relative) standing for a sentence or portion of a sentence, expressed previously or immediately after.

a. For a previously expressed portion of a sentence—

Soph. 238 a, ἔτι γὰρ, ὥς μακάριε, ἔστι, καὶ ταύτα γε τῶν ἀπορίων ἡ μεγίστη—where ταύτα is the pronominal substitute for ἔτι ἔστι.

Legg. 630 c, ἀρετῆς μόριον, καὶ ταύτα τὸ φαυλόταγον—where ταύτα is the substitute for μόριον.

Euthyd. 299 d, (A) χρυσίων ἀγαθῶν δοκεί σοι εἶναι ἔχειν; (B) πάνυ γε, καὶ ταύτα γε πολὺ—where ταύτα is the substitute for χρυσίων ἔχειν.

Rep. 341 c, νῦν γοῦν ἐπεχείρησας, οὐδὲν ὡς καὶ ταύτα—where ταύτα = ἐπεχείρησας, which thus is brought close to οὐδὲν ὡς, with contemptuous emphasis.

Symp. 210 b, καταστήματος πάντων τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐραστήν, ἐνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα τούτο χαλάσαι—where τούτο stands for καταστήματος ἐραστήν, and therefore becomes endued with the capacity of governing ἐνὸς (for which cf. Legg. 723 d, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄμαρτος παντός δεὶ τὸ τούτου δρᾶν).

Phileb. 37 d, μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴ μὲν δόξαν ἐροῦμεν ἄν ὀρθότητα ἔχει; ταύτων δὲ ἡδονή; where ταύτων stands for μῶν οὐκ ὀρθὴν ἐροῦμεν ἄν ὀρθότητα ἔχει repeated from the other clause.

Gorg. 524 c, εἰ τινὸς μέγα ἢν τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἢ προφή ἢ ἀμφώτερα.

Phaedo 68 c, καὶ φιλοχρήστωτος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτο τὰ ἔτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφώτερα.

Hom. II. iii. 179, 'Ἀμφώτερον βασιλεὺς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερὸς τ' αἰχμήτης.

§ 18. B. For a previously expressed whole sentence—

Legg. 658 d, τῖς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἀν νεικηκῶς εἰπ,—τούτο μετὰ τούτο; ('the next question,'—as Protag. 323 c).

Theat. 189 c, λόγον οὖν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται . . . τούτο γὰρ μοι ἰδιδάλλεται . . ., οὐκ ἄλλα τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι.

Tim. 27 c, (A) σὸν οὖν ἔργον λέγειν . . ., καλέσατα κατὰ νόμον θεοῦ.

(B) 'ΑΛΛ', ὥς Σώκρατες, τούτο γε δὴ, πάντες . . . ἐπὶ παντὸς ὀρμή . . . πράγματος θεῦν δεὶ που καλοῦσιν.

(In the two last instances we have the Neut. Pron. τούτο, which stands for the previous sentence, connected with a sentence succeeding, in which the Pronoun is virtually restated at large. Thus, as to meaning, τούτο is placed between the two sentences as a
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symbol of equivalence: but as to grammar, its relations to each are different; it stands for the sentence preceding, and is in apposition with the sentence following. So in the instances which are subjoined)—

Politic. 262 e, (A) κάλλιον δὲ του κατ' εἰδὴ καὶ διὰ διαφορὰν ἥν, εἰ κ.τ.λ. (B) 'Ορβότατα: ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ, πῶς ἂν τις γίνοις καὶ μέρος . . . γνῶις;

Μενο 90 d, οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αἰλήσεως . . . τὸ αὐτὰ ταῦτα, πολλὰ ἄνοια ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. So Symp. 178 c.

Symp. 204 a, οὐδ' αὖ οἱ ἁμαθεῖς . . . ἐπιθυμοῦσι σοφοὶ γενέσθαι: αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο, ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἁμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα . . . δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι—

where αὐτὸ τοῦτο, standing for the sentence preceding, is in Apposition with τὸ μὴ ὄντα . . . εἶναι, which is also, as to meaning, the virtual re-statement of the Pronoun.

As to the construction of this sentence, τὸ μὴ ὄντα—εἶναι evidently contains the reason for ἐστὶ χαλεπῶν ἁμαθία: only that it is expressed not in the regular causal form, ὡς τις εὐκ ὄν . . . δοκεῖ αὐτῷ εἶναι, or παρὰ τὸ μὴ . . . δοκεῖν, but under the form of the Apologetic Infinitive (see § 85).

It follows, that the αὐτὸ τοῦτο introduces the preceding sentence as a reason. In other words, αὐτὸ τοῦτο here stands in three relations; (1) to the sentence preceding it is related Pronominally, as standing for it; (2) to τὸ μὴ ὄντα . . . εἶναι it is related Appositionally; and (3) to ἐστὶ χαλεπῶν ἁμαθία it is related causally.

The explanation of this last instance will apply to all which follow under this head:—the Neuter Pronoun introduces a preceding sentence in a causal relation to the principal construction of the sentence to which the Pronoun is joined. The cause is not necessarily re-stated, but, if it is, the Pronoun is in apposition to it—

Protag. 310 c, αὐτὰ ταῦτα ('this is just what it is') . . . ἣκω παρὰ σὲ ἴνα ὑπέρ ἐμοῦ διαλεξῆς αὐτῷ.

Euthyphro 4 d, ταῦτα δὴ οὐν καὶ ἁγανακτεῖ ὁ πατὴρ . . . ὡς ἐγὼ . . . τῷ πατρὶ φῶνου ἑπεξέρχομαι.

Symp. 174 a, ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἵνω.


§ 19. γ. For a sentence expressed immediately after—

Phaedo 105 a, ὥρα δὴ εἰ αὕτως ὀρίζει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο,—ὁ άν εὐπιφέρη τι ἐναντίον . . . ἐναντιότητα μηδὲποτε δέξασθαι.

Protag. 326 a, οὗ τ’ αὖ καθαρωτάτα, ἑτέρα τοιαύτα, σωφροσύνης ἐπιμελεῖται.

Rep. 334 b, τοῦτο μὲντο έμοιε γονεὶ ἐτί, ὠφελεῖ μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ.


Soph. 248 d, τὸ δὲ, ὦς τὸ γνωσκέον εἶπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὖ συμβαίνει πάσχειν.

Legg. 630 d, τὸ δὲ,—πῶς χρὴν ἡμᾶς λέγειν;

Ib. 803 d, τὸ δ’,—ἢν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὕτ' οὗν παιδία πεφυκυία οὕτ' αὖ παιδία.

Apol. 23 a, τὸ δὲ,—κυδνυεῖται . . . τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι.

Cf. St. Paul, 2 Cor. ix. 6, τοῦτο δὲ, ὁ σπείρων φειδομένος, φειδομένως καὶ θερίσει, St. Mark ix. 23, το, εἰ δύνασαι πιστεύσαι—(the τὸ throws emphasis on the succeeding words). Cf. also the common idiom τοῦτο μὲν—τοῦτο δὲ (each a pre-statement of the clause which it introduces).

§ 20. δ. Accusative of Neuter Pronoun (generally τὸς or ἄλλος) standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed—

Phaedo 58 c, τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τὸν θάνατον; τί ἢν τὰ λεχθέντα κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 204 d, (A) ὁ ἑρών τῶν καλῶν τί ἔρα; (B) Γενέσθαι αὐτὸ—where τί stands for a whole dependent sentence, thus; 'he who desires things beautiful desires that they should—what?' The dependent sentence is thus left unexpressed, but that τί stands for it is proved by the answer, which supplies one.

Exactly parallel is Ἀesch. Ag. 953, (A) Τί δ’ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι Πρίαμος, εἰ τάδ’ ἣνουσε; (B) Ἐν ποικίλοις ἂν κάρτα μοι βῆμα δοκεῖ. So St. John xxi. 28, Κύριε, οἴτος δε τί;—where τί is the implicit completion of the sentence.
On this principle are to be explained the phrases which follow.

Apol. 26 d, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; (similarly Symp. 205 a.)—There is no γίνεται to be supplied; τί in itself is the full represent-ative complement of the sentence; the actual complement is of course suspended in the interrogation.

Meno 86 e, εἰ μὴ τί (similarly Rep. 509 c), and Symp. 222 e, εἰ μὴ τί ἄλλο. The sentence is complete; the τί and the τί ἄλλο stand for full propositions.

Symp. 206 e, (A) οὗ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐστὶν ὁ ἔρως . . . (B) ἀλλὰ τί μὴ; (A) Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ. Here the τί refers back to the words τοῦ καλοῦ, and itself stands for a similar phrase; which is proved by the answer Τῆς γεννήσεως. Except on the principle now before us, the phrase would have been variable, and we should in the present instance have found (what Steph. conjectures) ἀλλὰ τίνος μὴ; Similarly 202 d. The phrase may of course equally stand for a whole sentence, as Rep. 362 d, 438 b (‘and what then?’). The same explanation holds of the τί in the phrase of polite assent, τί μὴ; ² (literally ‘if not, then what?’) The explanation of τί; in the sense of ‘why?’ is the same; and of the answering particle ὅτι, ‘because.’

§ 21. In the following instances the significance of the τί is hinted in an indirect interrogation following.

Phdr. 234 c, τί σοι φαίνεται ἃ λόγος;—οὐχ ὑπερφνῶς εἰρήσθαι;
Protag. 309 b, τί οὖν ταῦτα;—νὰ παρ’ ἐκάνου φαίνει;
Soph. 266 c, τί δὲ τὴν ἡμιτέραν τέχνην;—ἀρ’ οίκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικὴ φύσομεν ποιεῖν;
Phaeno 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . . ; ἢ ἡ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει, ἡ κ.τ.λ.; (The genitive τῶν—καλῶν is suspended in a loose construction, which the second interrogation superseded.)
Phileb. 27 c, τί δὲ οὐς [βύα] . . . . ;—ἐν τίνι γένει ἄν λέγειτο;
So probably Phaeno 64 d, (A) φαίνεται σοι φιλοσοφοῦ ἄνδρος εἶναι ἐσπουδακίνησι περὶ τῆς ἡδονᾶς καλομένας τὸς τουίσθε κ.τ.λ.; (B) ἤπιαστα. (A) Τί δὲ τῶν ἀφροδισδῶν; (B) ὑδαμώς. (A) Τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σώμα θεραπεῖς;—δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖόνθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; See more instances under Binary Structure (§ 207).
Legg. 630 c, οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς τὴν μγίστην ἀρτίην μάλιστα βλέπων

¹ Add τί μέλλει: as in Hipp. Mi. 373 d, Rep. 349 d. μέλλει can be invariable, though attracted sometimes into μέλλομεν.
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§ 22.  The Adverbial Interrogatives ἄλλο τι ἢ and ἄλλο τι are instances of the same principle; and may conveniently be discussed here once for all.

They have the following points in common: (1) as to their use, they both expect an affirmative answer: (2) as to their construction, the ἄλλο in both (as in the instances heretofore given) is used proleptically; and (as we have said) both are instances of the Neuter Pronoun Accusative standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed.

But from this point we must investigate them separately.

"ἄλλο τι ἢ challenges an affirmation with respect to some special portion of the sentence. It may be that it sometimes affects the whole; but (unlike ἄλλο τι) it can, and in most instances does, affect a particular portion of the sentence. And the interrogation is, in strictness, limited to the part affected.

Apol. 24 c, ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὁς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἐσονται; The interrogation is made as to περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ.

Rep. 372 a, ἄλλο τι ἢ σιτῶν τε ποιούντες καὶ ὑποδήματα; The interrogation is made as to σιτῶν τε π. κ. ὑποδήματα, to the exclusion of the Verb διατησκονταί.

Alc. I. 129 b, τῷ διαλέγει σὺ νῦν; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἔρωι; The phrase gets its meaning thus; the speaker, about to name a certain fact or thing, gives it emphasis by first asking whether any other ought to be named instead of it.

Some doubt might be felt whether ἢ is 'than' or 'or.' Certain phrases would point to 'or,' such as
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Gorg. 459 b, τούτο συμβαίνει ἡ ἄλλο τι;

Politic. 266 b, (A) μῶν ἄλλως πως πέφυκεν, ἡ καθίστηρ κ.τ.λ.; (B) οὐκ ἄλλος.

Legg. 683 e, βασιλεία δὲ καταλύται ἡ καὶ τις ἁρχὴ πώποτε κατελθῆ ἡ ἄλλος ὑπὸ τινῶν ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν;

Protag. 330 c, τίν' ἃν ψήφον θείο; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἡ ἄλλην;

But more decisive for 'than' are

Protag. 357 e, διὰ τὸ σικνθάν ἄλλο τι ἡ ἁμαθίαν εἶναι, and the variations,

Soph. 220 c, τὰ τοιαῦτα μῶν ἄλλο τι πλὴν ἔρκη χρη προσαγορεύειν;

Phaedo 91 d, ὅρα ἄλλη τῇ ταύτῃ ἐστὶ, ᾧ κ.τ.λ.; and the common formula οὗτ' ἄλλο η and τι ἄλλο η which are not ambiguous.

'ἄλλο τι challenges an affirmation with respect to the whole sentence which follows it.

Rep. 337 c, ἄλλο τι οὖν καὶ σφι οὕτω ποιήσεις;—you mean, do 'you, that you will do so?'

Ib. 369 d, ἄλλο τι γενομένος μὲν εἰς, ὃ δὲ οἰκοδόμος, ἄλλος δὲ τις ἠφαντής;—where the force of the ἄλλο τι cannot stop short of the whole sentence.

Gorg. 467 d, ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων,—εἰν τὶς τὶ πράττῃ ἑνικά του, οὐ τούτο βούλεται κ.τ.λ.;—where the interrogation must go on to the end; and, besides, the whole sentence is gathered up in the pre-announcing clause οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων.

Phaedo 79 b, (A) Φήρε δη, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτών τὸ μὲν σώμα ἐστι τὸ δὲ ψυχή; (B) οὗτ' ἄλλο.

Symp. 201 a, ἄλλο τι ὁ ἔρως κάλλους ἅν εἰπ᾽ ἔρως, αἴσχους δ᾽ ὕβ;

(In Euthyd. 286 c, ἄλλο τι ἡ ψευδή κ.τ.λ., the interrogation goes through several clauses: but here two MSS. omit ἐπ.;

Thus ἄλλο τι affects the whole of the sentence, like the French n'est ce pas que. The interrogation it makes is not restricted to any particular portion of the sentence.

But how does it come to have its meaning? For there is no colour for supposing that it stands for ἄλλο τι ἐπ.;

It represents an unexpressed sentence (according to the use of the Neuter Pronoun at present before us);—namely, 'any different' proposition from that about to be enunciated. The speaker, by ἄλλο τι, 'puts the question' about this shadow of a proposition, but anticipates the judgment by offering simultaneously for acceptance his own view. Thus the interrogation strictly speaking belongs to
the ἄλλο τι alone, though it spreads from it to the whole sentence beyond.

§ 23. The last use to be mentioned of the Neuter Accusative of ἄλλος as standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed, is in winding up an enumeration.

Symp. 176 α, ἡσαντας τῶν θεών καὶ τάλλα τα νομιζόμενα.

Thect. 159 b, καὶ καθέδουντα δὲ καὶ πάντα ἀ τῶν δήθλομεν. (I class this passage under the present head, because by the sense πάντα must stand for τάλλα πάντα. Cf. § 249.)

In neither of these passages can the Accusative be said to be Cognate, as if it were subjoined by καί to the unexpressed Cognate Accusatives of ἡσαντας and καθέδουντα; for it is really other participles that are added, co-ordinate with ἡσαντας in the one case and καθέδουντα in the other.

Thect. 145 a, ἦ καὶ ἑστρωνομικός καὶ λογοτητικός τε καὶ μοναδικός καὶ ὡσα παιδείας ἔχεται;

Phdr. 227 c, πέντε μᾶλλον ἡ πλονισίῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ἡ νεωτέρῳ καὶ ὡσα ἄλλα ἐμοὶ πρόεστοι.

Ib. 246 c, τῇ δὲ θεῖον καλὸν σοφῶν ἁγαθῶν καὶ πῶν ὧ τι τοιοῦτον.

§ 24. Idioms of Nouns:—Genitive Case.

A. Genitive of Exegetics.

Apol. 29 b, ἀμαθία . . . αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπονέιδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἰεσθαί εἰδέναι ἢ οὐκ οἴδεν.

Phædo 78 b, τοῦτο τὸ πάθος . . . τοῦ διασκεδάζουσαί. [So Oxon. and one other MS.]

Ib. 96 b, ὁ τῶς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούει καὶ ὄραν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί.

Ib. 97 a, αὐτὴ ἦρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο δόο γενέσθαι, ἡ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἄλληλων τεθύραι.

§ 25. B. Genitive of a Substantive with ὡς, loosely, denoting the agent to whom a particular effect is to be referred.

Symp. 212 c, καὶ ἐξαίφνης τιν ἀδελεον θύραν κρονομένη πολὺν ψόφον παρασχέτω ὡς κομαστών—where ὡς κομαστών does not closely follow ψόφον, but characterises the general effect produced.

[Under these three examples is written in the MS. “Proof to be subjoined that these are Accusatives.”]
§ 26.

Cf. Arist. Eth. I. xiii. 18, ὁτινός δῆ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς . . . . φαμέν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὀστερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν—(‘not in the sense in which mathematicians use the expression.’) Ἀσχ. Ευμ. 628, θανεῖν . . . . Τάξεις ἐκθέλοις, ὡστε 'Αμαζώνος, Cho. 990, ἕχει γάρ αἰσχυντήρος, ὡς νόμον, δίκην (the law being personified into an agent, as frequently elsewhere). Σοφ. Αι. 998, ὃς είναι γάρ σου βαῖξ, ὡς βεοῦ τωφός, Διήλθ᾽ Ἀχαίοις (‘like a βεος φήμῃ, that is.’) Τρα. 768, προσπέτασται Πλευραίους ἀρτικολλός, ὡστε τέκτων (‘like carver’s work.’) Ιβ. 112, πολλὰ γὰρ ὦστ᾽ ἀκάματος ἡ νότον ἡ βορεία τις κύματα . . . ιδοὶ—which points again to the Homeric τὸν ὅ ὀποτε κύματα λείπει Παντοίων ἄνεμωσ, Πλ. ii. 396.

§ 26. C. Genitive of a Noun with a Participle, after Verbs of knowing, seeing, shewing.

Ἀπόλ. 27 α, ἂρα γνώσται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δῆ ἐμοῦ χαρινείμειν; Ιβ. 37 β, δῶ εὐ οὖδ᾽ ὦτι κακῶν ὄντων.

Crat. 412 α, μηνύει ὡς φερομένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπομένης τῆς ψυχῆς.

Ῥεπ. 558 α, ἡ οὕτω εἴδες . . . αὐτῶν μενότων;

Cf. Ἁμ. Ι. iv. 357, Ἡς γνῶ χωρόμενοι. Ἀσχ. Π. V. 760, Ἡς τῶν ὄντων ὄντων τῶν καὶ μαθείν πάρα. Σοφ. Αι. 281, Ἡς δῆ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐπίστασθαι σε χρή. Εὐρ. Μεθ. 1311, Ἡς οἰκεῖτ' οὕτων σῶν τέκνων φρόνιμε δῆ.

Probably of the use of these Verbs with a Genitive unaccompanied by a Participle there is no clear instance in Plato.

In Χαρμ. 154 ε, ἐδεισάμεθα . . . τοῦ εἴδους, the Genitive is very possibly Partitive, as also in

Ῥεπ. 485 β, μαθήματος . . . ὃ ἐν αὐτοῖς δῆλοι ἐκεῖνης τῆς οὐσίας.

In Ῥεκ. 646 δ, καὶ τῆς περὶ τῶν οἰκίων ἄρα διατρῆς ἄσσαίτως διανοητέον, the Genitive has tacit reference to περὶ in the question previously put, οὐκοῦν χρή καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων περὶ διανοιήσας τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον;

In Ῥεπ. 375 δ, οὐδεν γὰρ ποι τῶν γενεαίων κυνῶν, ὃτι τοῖτο φύσει αὐτῶν τῷ ἡθος, κυνῶν is governed by ἡθος.

D. Genitive of a Noun, without any Participle, after Verbs of mentioning.

Μεν. 96 α, ἔχεις οὐν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὄτου οὐ πράγματος, οὐ κ.τ.λ.;—Why

1 The passage, Ῥεπ. 439 β, τοῦ τοῖτον εἰς καλῶν ἔχει λίγων ὥστι κ.τ.λ., is to be construed otherwise; τοῦ τοῖτον is governed by χιτίς. See under Binary Structure (§ 225).
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 27, 28.

this is not to be explained on the principle of Attraction of Antecedent to Relative, see under Attraction (§ 191.)

Legg. 804 c, καὶ οὐδὲν φοβηθεῖς εἶπομ’ ἃν τούτῳ τῶν λόγων οὔτε ἵππων οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὥς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρόπετον ἀν εἰ, ἵναιξι δὲ οὐκ ἃν πρόπετον.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 1236, Ποίον κύκραγας ἀνδρός ὀδῷ ὑπέρφρωνα; and ib. 1257, Ο. C. 355,'Α τοῦδ’ ἐχρήσθη σώματος, Trach. 1122, Τῆς μυτρός ἢ καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς φράσων.

In Homer, Verbs of knowing &c. also thus govern a Genitive of a Noun without a Participle.

I. xii. 229, Ἐδείξε τερμάοι, Od. xxi. 36, Γνώστην ἄλληλων, and so xxiii. 109, Γνωσόμεθ' ἄλληλοι. II. xiv. 37, ὅψείντες ἀυτή, xvi. 811, διδασκόμενοι πολέμιοι.

§ 27. E. Genitive of a Noun placed at the beginning of a construction, for the sake of premising mention of it, without any grammatical justification of the genitive.

Phaedo 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . ὡς κατὰ ταύτα ἵχει, ἡ κ.τ.λ.; Gorg. 509 d, τί δὲ ὅ τού ἀδικείων; πίτευρον . . . ἡ κ.τ.λ.;

Legg. 751 b, δῆλον . . . ὅτι . . . τοῦ πόλεων εὔ παρεσκευασμένην ἀρχής ἀνεπιθείδειος ἐπιστήσαι τούς καὶ κειμένους νόμοις, . . . οὐδέν πλέον εὔ τεθέτων [ἐστι].

Rep. 576 d, ἄλλω εὐδαιμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλίωτητος, ἄσσαυτως ἡ ἄλλως κρίνεις;

Cf. Aesch. Ag. 950, Τούτων μὲν οὕτως' and Eum. 211, Τί γὰρ γνω- κός ἢτις ἄνδρα νοσφίση; also Arist. Pol. I. iv. 1, ὁσπερ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἀριστουργεῖ τέχνης ἀναγκάοις ἡ ἐπὶ ἑπάρχει τὰ οἰκεία ὄργανα, εἰ μέλεις ἀποτελεσθήσεται τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομίων.

The principle seems to be that the intended mention of the thing is regarded from the side of the genitive as limited and occasioned by it. Near this use stands also

Legg. 969 c, τὴν πόλιν ἑαυτῶν τῆς κατοικίας.

§ 28. IDIOMS OF NOUNS:—DATIVE CASE.

Certain intensified uses of the 'Dative of Reference' are noticeable.

a. Where the Dative is only justified by making the notion of Reference concentrated enough to include Possession.

a. Dative of Nouns.

Apol. 40 c, μεταβαλή τε τυχόνειαι ὡντα καὶ μετοίκεσες τῇ ψυχῇ.

Phaedo 62 b, ἡμᾶς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.
§§ 29, 30.] DATIVE CASE. THE ARTICLE. 135

Phileb. 58 c, τῇ μὲν ἔκεινοι ἐπάρχειν τέχνη διδοὺς πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἄνθρωποις κρατεῖν.

Legg. 760 e, τῷ τόπῳ ἐκάστῳ τῇ ἐπιμελείαν εἰκας τοιάδε τιμᾷ.

Ib. 820 e, ἀστρων ... τὴν μάθησιν τοῖς νέοις.

β. Dative of Pronouns.

Charm. 157 e, ἡ πατρία ἤμιν οἰκία.

Legg. 624 b, ταῖς πόλεσιν ἤμιν θέσις τοὺς νόμους.

Theaet. 210 b, ἡ μακεντική ἤμιν τέχνη.

Phaedo 60 c, θεοὶ ... ἤσυνησθεν εἰς ταύτων αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς.

Ib. 72 e, ἢν ποι ἤμιν ἡ φυχή [Oxon.], and ibid. ἤμιν ἡ μάθησις.

Cf. Thuc. i. 6, οἱ προσβέπτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εἰδαμώνων. Isæus vi. 6.

p. 56, τῷ μὲν οὖν ἄδελφῳ αὐτῷ ... ἠτελευτήσατον.

§ 29. b. Where the Dative is justified by making the notion of Reference include that of the Object.

a. In the case of the latter of two Substantives.

Symp. 194 d, ἐπιμεληθῆρα τοῦ ἐγκωμίου τῷ "Εροτώ.

Rep. 607 a, ἤμονοι θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς.

Legg. 653 d, τὰς τῶν ἐορτῶν ἀμοιβάς τοῖς θεοῖς.

Ib. 950 e, ἄγονον τούτους τοῖς θεοῖς.

β. In the case of the remote Object after a Verb.

This usage is partly owing to the force of Attraction, and the instances are given under that head (§ 183).

§ 30. IDIOMS OF THE ARTICLE.

a. As a Demonstrative Pronoun Antecedent.

Theaet. 204 d, ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστὶ. So Protag. 320 d,

Phileb. 21 e.

Soph. 241 e, τεκνῶν τῶν ὅσα περὶ ταύτα εἰσί.

Phdr. 239 b, τῆς ὅθεν ἐν κ.τ.λ. (referring to συνονοσία.)

Ib. 247 e, ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστιν ὧν ὄντως.

Phileb. 37 a, τὸ ᾧ τὸ ἡδόμενον ἦδεται.

Tim. 39 e, τῷ ὅ ἐστι ζωὸν.

Critias 115 b, τῶν ὅσοι γνῶμοι (referring to καρπός.)

Legg. 761 c, περὶ τοῖς ὧν ἐπιμελοῦσαν.

Ib. 905 b, ἐκεῖνων τῶν ὑπὸ κ.τ.λ.
Phaedo 75 a, ἐκεῖνον ὄργεται τοῦ ὑ ὑστίν ἵσον.

Ib. 102 c, τῷ ὄτι Φαῦδων ὁ Φαῦδων ἑστίν.

Jelf, G. G. § 444, notices that "this idiom is peculiarly Platonic," adding however one or two instances from the Orators.

§ 31. b. Prefixed to Personal Pronouns, laughingly.

Theaet. 166 a, γίλωσα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπεδείξε.

Soph. 239 b, τὸν μὲν τοιῶν ἐμὲ γε κ.π.λ.

Phileb. 20 b, δεινὸν προσδοκῶν αἰδέν δεὶ τὸν ἐμὲ.

Ib. 59 b, τὸν μὲν δὴ σε καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φιληθῶν χρη συχνὰ χαίρειν εἶν.

Lysis 203 b, παρὶ τίνα τοὺς ὑμᾶς;

Phdr. 258 a, καὶ ὃς εἶπε, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λέγων, κ.π.λ.

Jelf, G. G. § 452, says "this construction seems to be confined to the Accusative."

§ 32. c. When the Substantive has a plurality of Adjectives qualifying it, the order is disturbed, with a view of relieving the heaviness of the term, in various ways.

a. By postponing the Substantive, when one of the Adjectives ought to have followed it.

Crat. 398 b, ἐν τῇ ἄρχαια τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φωνῇ.

Ib. d, τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν παλαιὰν φωνὴν.

Symp. 213 e, τὴν τούτων ταυτηρί τὴν θαυμαστὴν κεφαλὴν.

Legg. 732 e, τὸ θυμὸν πᾶν ζῶον.

Phaedo 100 a, τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων ἀντῶν [so Oxon. and seven other MSS.].—i. e. τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀντῶν ἀπάντων.

β. By bringing in the Substantive before its time.

Phileb. 43 a, τῶν λόγων ἐπιφερόμενων τούτων.

Legg. 659 d, τὸν ἐπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγων ὀρθῶν εἰρημένων.

Ib. 790 e, τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μέθων λεχθέντων.

Ib. 793 b, ὥ νῦν δὴ λόγος ἡμῶν ἐπιχειρεῖς.

§ 33. Upon these principles are to be explained the seeming anomalies which occur, in the Tragic Poets especially, in the collocation of Substantives with a plurality of epithets preceded by the Article.

a. Aeschyl. Cho. 496, ψίλτατον τὸ σῶν κάρα (for φ. κάρα τὸ σῶν), Suppl. 9, αὑτογενὴ τῶν φυζίνωρα γάμων (for γάμων τῶν φυξ.). Soph.
§ 34.

THE ARTICLE.

Phil. 133, 'Ερμης ο πέμπων δόλιος (for 'Ε. δόλιος ο πέμπων). Thuc. i. 126, εν τῇ τοῦ Δίως τῇ μεγίστῃ ἐορτῇ. Lysias vii. 24. p. 110, εν τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτου ἐμοὶ χωρίος. Λ. Εq. 1323, 'Ἐν ταῖς ισοτελώνοις οἰκεί ταῖς ἀρχαίασιν 'Αθηναίς (the last three instances from Jelf).

β. Έσχ. Agam. 1642, ὁ δυσφελείς σκότῳ Διός ξύνοικος (where Διός is anticipated), Eum. 653, τὸ μητρὸς αἱμ.' ὄμωμον (perhaps, for the αἱμ.' ὄμωμον might otherwise be regarded as virtually a single word, as in Άσχιν. iii. 78. p. 64, ὁ γὰρ μισότεκνος, καὶ πατήρ πονηρός, οἷκ ἀν ποτε γένοιτο δημαγωγὸς χρηστός, where πατήρ πονηρός is for the purpose of the sentence a single word), Suppl. 349, τῶν ἱκίτων φυγάδα περὶδρομον. Soph. Αj. 134, τῆς ἀμφιρύτων Σαλαμίνος . . . ἀγχώλον, ib. 1166, τῶν ἀείμηρητων τάφων εὐροέντα, Phil. 394, τὸν μέγαν Πίκτωλον εὐχρυσόν, Ο. Τ. 671, τὸ σῶν . . . στόμα 'Ελείνων, ib. 1199, τῶν γαμψφών νυχα παρθένων χρησμοφόν. Pind. Ol. V. 4, τῶν σῶν πολίων . . . λαστρόφον. Thuc. i. 96, ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεῖς, v. 11, πρὸ τῆς νῦν ἀγορᾶς οὕσης (these two from Jelf).

The anomalies which remain unexplained are those in which a Possessive Pronoun is concerned,—in all the instances ἐμός. Άσχ. Agam. 1226, τῷ μολὼντι δεισποτὴ Ἔμφ. Soph. Aj. 572, ὁ λυμεσίς ἐμός, Ο. Τ. 1462, Ταῖς δ' ἄδλεων οἰκτρῶν τε παρθένων ἐμάλ. Eur. Hipp. 683, Ζεὺς ὁ γεννήτωρ ἐμός. All that can be said in explanation of the exceptional form of these passages, is that they are exceptional in meaning. Generally, where there is a Possessive Pronoun attached to the Substantive, it is that which makes it definite; here the Substantive is perfectly defined in its application independently of the Possessive Pronoun.

§ 34. d. Omitted with the former of two Substantives in regimen. Observe, that a different shade of meaning results from this deviation from the common form; a shade of meaning which would be rendered equivalently by attaching the second Noun more loosely to the former.

Rep. 395 ε, δημοσυγγούς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως—'artificers of freedom for the city.'

Symp. 182 ε, συμφέρει . . . φρονήματα μεγάλα ἐγγίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχο- μένων—'that high-spiritedness in the ruled should be strongly developed.'

Ib. 196 b, περὶ μὲν οὖν κάλλους τοῦ θεοῦ—'beauty as attributable to the god.'

Theat. 175 a, ἀποτα αἰτῷ καταφάνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας—'a marvel in the way of minuteness.'
Crat. 391 b, ὁρθοσάτη τῆς σκέψεως—'truest manner of viewing'—
η ὁρθοσάτη would have been 'the truest part of the view.'

Hipp. Ma. 282 a, φθόνον τῶν ζωτών—'envy against the living.'

Cf. Thuc. iii. 82, τῶν τ' ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπία, vi. 76, ἐπὶ τοῦ Μῆδου τιμωρίᾳ. Hdt. ii. 19, τοῦ ποταμοῦ δὲ φύσιος πέρι (φύσιος being a topic of enquiry).

Different are addresses, as Legg. 662 c, ὃ ἀριστοῖ τῶν ἄνδρῶν, 817 a, ὃ ἀριστοὶ τῶν ἔνων, 820 b, ὃ βελτιστοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, where the Vocative supersedes the Article.

§ 35. c. Omitted with the latter of two Substantives in regimen. The meaning indicated by this peculiarity is the close union of the notions represented by the two Nouns.

Symp. 187 c, ἐν αἰτῇ τῇ συντάσει ἄρμονίας τε καὶ ῥυθμοῦ.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 92, τὸ ἐγχατον ἐγώνος. Hdt. i. 22, τὸ ἐσχατον κακοῦ.

§ 36. Different is the case where the latter Substantive is the name of a country or of the inhabitants of a country or city; for before such Nouns the Article is habitually omitted. This is worth observing, for the sake of precluding misapprehension of the construction, where there is a concurrence of Genitives.

Phaedo 57 a, οὔτε γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν Φιλιασίων οὐδέσι ἐπιχειρήσει τὰ ὑπὸ 'Ἀθήνας'—'for neither of the Phliasians does any citizen,' &c.

That is, Φιλιασίων is governed by οὐδέσι τῶν πολιτῶν.

Legg. 625 c, τῆς τῆς χώρας πᾶσης Κρῆτης φύσι—where Κρῆτης is governed by χώρας φύσιν.

Cf. Thuc. iii. 109, τῶν ἐνυπρατηγῶν Ἀκαρνάνων, vii. 30, διέφθειραν ... ὕμιν τῶν Βουστρεχῶν Σκηρφύωνδαν.

§ 37. f. Omitted after οὔτος preceding a Substantive.

Rep. 399 c, ταύτας δὲ ἄρμονιος.

Ib. 621 b, οὔτος, ὃ Γραύκων, μέθος ἐσώθη.

Symp. 179 c, τοῦτο γέρας.

Soph. 237 d, τὸ τί τοῦτο ῥήμα.

Gorg. 489 b, οὔτοσι ἀνήπ.

Ib. 505 c, οὔτος ἀνήπ.

Phileb. 16 c, ταύτην φόμην.

Tim. 52 d, οὔτος ... ἰδίῳ φῶς λόγος.

§ 38. g. Omitted before ἄνηπ or ἄνθρωπος standing (as Forster expresses it) "pronominis loco."
Phædo 58 c, εἰδαίμων γάρ μοι ἄνηρ [so Oxon. and three other MSS.]
ἐφαίνετο, ὁ Ἐξέκρατας—(ἄνηρ being the subject.)
Ib. 98 b, ἐπειδὴ προϊόν καὶ ἀναγγείλον ὅρω ἀνδρὰ τῷ μὲν νῷ οἰδὲν χρώμενον.


§ 39. h. (from Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 459) "Ταῖτὸν, βάτερον, sometimes take the Article, as, their original Article being lost in the Crasis, they are regarded as simple words:
Tim. 37 b, περὶ τὸ ταῖτὸν.
Ibid. ὁ τοῦ βατέρου κύκλος.
Ib. 44 b, τὸ τε βάτερον καὶ τὸ ταῖτὸν."

§ 40. Idioms of Pronominal Words.

Dialogue gives great occasion for the use of Pronouns, and Plato has imparted to his use of them a great appearance of freedom and variety. It is like a skilful chess-player's use of his pawns.

A. Use of Neuter Pronoun to represent a sentence, or portion of a sentence. This has been treated of at length under the Accusative Case (§§ 15-23).

§ 41. B. Use of Plural Neuter Pronoun to express a singular fact. This usage contributes to the enrichment of the style; firstly, by varying it; and secondly, by representing the fact as a complex phenomenon, an aggregate of many parts, the sum of many constituents, the meeting-point of many relations.

Ταῖτα is so constantly thus used, that it is only remarkable in particular juxtapositions:—

Protag. 323 c, ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . ἀποδέχονται κ.τ.λ., ταῖτα λέγω ὅτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., τοῦτο σοι μετά τοῦτο περιέρασαι ἀποδείξα.

Symp. 173 c, εἰ οὖν δεῖ καὶ ύμῖν διηγήσασθαι, ταῖτα χρή ποιεῖν.
Ib. 198 b, οὖχ οὖσ τε ἐσομαι οὐδέ εἶχον τοῦτων—where τοῦτων = τοῦ οἴσ τε εἶναι.

Ib. 204 b, "Ερωτα . . . μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθεῖς. αἰτία δ' αὐτῷ καὶ τούτων ἡ γένεσις.
Phædo 62 d, τὰς ἀν αἰθητὴν ταῖτα, φέντετο εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσποτοῦ.
§ 42. Αὐτά.

Phædo 105 d, τὰ μὴ δεχόμενοι ... τί νῦν δὴ ταῦτα [so Oxon. and Ven. Π] ὠνομάζομεν; Ἄναρτιον, ἐπί.

Tim. 87 b, ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ τρόπος ἄλλος λόγων.

Alcib. I. 109 c, πρὸς ταῦτ’ ἄρα, τὸ δίκαιον, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσει.

Legg. 864 a, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀριστον ὄξειν, ὀπίσπηρ ἂν ἔσεθαι τούτων ἡγήσωται πολίς εἶτε ἵδιωτα τνες.

Cf. Antipho vi. 1. p. 141, ἰδιατον ... μὴ γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ., καὶ εἰχόμενο ἂν τίς ταῦτα εὗξαι. Ἀσχιν. ii. 166. p. 50, ταῦτ’ ἐστιν ὁ προδότης καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὁμοί. And primarily Hom. Π. viii. 362, οὐδὲ τι τῶν μέμνηται, δ’ οἱ μάλα πολλάκις νῦν Τειρόμενων σώζοσκον.

§ 43. The same tendency is observable in the case of Adjectives which admit of it: a chance is represented as the sum of so many contingencies; a quantity as the sum of so many smaller units.

Tim. 69 a, οὐ δυνατὰ [ἐστὶ].

Alcib. I. 134 c, ὡς τὰ εἰκότα.

Legg. 828 a, εἰχόμενι ἐστὶ τάξασθαι ... ἔορτας.

Menex. 235 b, ἡμέρα πλείω ὡ τρεῖς.

Gorg. 512 b, ἑλάττω δύνασαι σώζειν.

Apol. 30 c, οὐκ ἔμε μεῖζον βλαφετε.


And primarily Homer.

§ 44. C. Use of Irregular Pronominal Correlatives.

As Pronouns form a prominent feature in contrasted or cor-
§§ 45, 46.] PRONOMINAL WORDS.  141

relative clauses, so they also contribute their share to the want of symmetry which such clauses often exhibit.

We find ὁ μὲν—ὁ ἐπερο—οἱ δὲ, &c. as Correlatives: or by Anastrophe the former Correlative is omitted. For instances at length see below under Abbreviated Construction (§ 241).

§ 45. (The heads which remain treat of the uses of particular Pronouns.)

D. a. Use of ἄλλος and ἐπερος.

Though these words are not equivalent, they are often interchanged by Plato. Every ἐπερος is an ἄλλος, though the converse is untrue: and, under this limitation, the words circulate into each other's place in every possible way. Wherever there is question of two parties or things, both words are liable to be called into requisition. Even when the number exceeds two, for the first two of the series either word is used. Or the whole former part of a series is thrown into an aggregate, to justify the use of ἐπερος in the latter part.

Legg. 872 a, εἰς βουλεύσῃ βίαιτάν τις ἄλλος ἐπερος (though equally we have 879 b, ὅς δὲ ἀν ἄκων ἄλλος ἄλλον τρώγη.)

Critias 109 b, τὸ μάλλον ἄλλοις προσήκιον, τούτο ἐπερον αὐτοῖς κτάσθαι.

Euthyphro 2 b, (Α) οὐ γὰρ ἑκύνι γε καταγρώσσημαι, ὡς σὺ ἐπερον [γεγραφθαι]. (B) οὐ γὰρ οὖν. (Α) ἄλλοι σὲ ἄλλος; (B) Πάνω γε.

Phileb. 61 d, ἠδονῆ... ἐπεροσ ἄλλη... ἀκριβεστέρα.

Politic. 262 a, τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐπερα τις εἶναι, τῶν δὲ αὐθρώπων ἄλλη τροφή.

Soph. 224 c, τὸ μὲν... ἐπερο, τὸ δὲ... ἄλλο προσρητέου [ἄνωματί].

Ib. 232 d, (Α) τὰ... περὶ τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν...(B) Καὶ πολλῶν γε ἐπερον.

Symp. 196 c, ἄ γὰρ τις ἢ μὴ ἐξεῖ ἢ μὴ οὕδεν, οὕτ' ἂν ἐπερο δοίη οὕτ' ἂν ἄλλον διδάξει. Here it is possible that the words would have lost appropriateness by being reversed; because a thing can be given only to one, while it can be taught to any number.

Theoct. 184 c, ὁ δὲ ἐπερα δυνάμεως οἰσθάνει, ἀδεικτάν εἶναι δὲ ἄλλης ταύτ' οἰσθάνεσθαι.

§ 46. β. ἄλλος, 'besides.'

Gorg. 473 c, πολίτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξίνων.

Apol. 36 b, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ ἀπραγμάτων καὶ δημιουργίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ εὐνομοστίων καὶ στασίων.
§ 47. E. Uses of αὐτὸς.

a. Αὐτὸ. The Neuter Singular of αὐτὸς is used peculiarly in Apposition to express the essential nature of a thing, sometimes in the Platonic and sometimes in a more popular sense.

Rep. 363 a, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιούντα ἐπανωθα. So 472 c.
Phaedo 65 d, φαμὲν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ αἰδέν.
Protag. 360 c, τί ποτ' εστίν αὐτὸ ἢ ἀρετή.
Crat. 411 d, αὐτὸ ἢ νόμας.

In the more popular sense, but not in the Platonic, αὐτὸς in Concord, and αὐτὸ τοῦτο in Apposition, are used also. E.g.

Phileb. 62 a, αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης.
Symp. 199 d, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα.
Phaedo 93 b, αὐτὸ τοῦτο... ψυχήν.

The remaining uses of αὐτὸς are not exclusively Platonic.

β. αὐτὸς in the sense of sponte.

The most noteworthy instances are with Semi-Impersonal Verbs, and will be found below (§ 99).

γ. αὐτὸς in the sense of solus.

Symp. 179 a, οἱ δὲ εἰς αὐτὸ κακὸς ὄντα εἰκ ἢν αὐτὸς ὁ "Ερως ἔνθεον ποιήσει πρὸς ἀρετήν.

Ib. 187 c, εὖ μὲν γε αὐτῇ τῇ συντάσσει ἄρμονίας τε καὶ ῥυθμοῦ οὐδέν χαλεπῶν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ διαγιγνώσκειν.

Ib. 198 d, τάληθη λέγει... ἐξ αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰ κάλλιστα ἐκλεγομένους ὡς εὐπρεπεῖστατα τιθέναι.

Apol. 21 d, σμερφὶ τινὶ αὐτῷ τοῦτο σοφώτερος.

Euthyd. 293 c, (Α) οἴκουν ἐπιστῆμων εἰ; (Β) Πάνυ γε, τούτου γε αὐτοῦ.

Legg. 836 b, αὐτῷ γὰρ ἐσμέν.

Rep. 437 c, αὐτὸ τὸ δεσπέρν... ἐπιθυμία... αὐτοῦ πόματος—'thirst, according to the simple notion of it:'—whence we see how Use a flows from this.

§ 48. δ. αὐτῶ (Adverbial) in the sense of 'on the same spot as heretofore.'

Symp. 216 a, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶ καθῆμενος παρὰ τοῦτω καταγενῶσα—i. e. not 'here' nor 'there,' but 'rooted to the spot.'

Ib. 220 c, ἱσυνομησα γὰρ αὐτὸδι ἐωδέν τι εἰστήκει σκοπῶν. (The order is hyperbatonic for ἱσυνομήσα ἐωδέν τι, αὐτὸδι εἰστήκει σκοπῶν)
—'stood without moving from the spot where he was.'
§ 49. PRONOMINAL WORDS.

Soph. 224 d, αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος εἰς πόλει.

Cf. Hom. II. ii. 237, τόνδε δ' ἐσμέν Αὐτοῦ ἐν Τροίῃ γέρα πεσομέν, 332, Ἄλλ' ἔγε, μίμητε πάντες, έσκηνιδες Ἀχαοί, Αὐτοῦ, εἰσάκειν ἄστυ μέγα Πράμοιν ἐλομέν. Thuc. iii. 81, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἰκετῶν διέβηραν αὐτοῦ εἰς τῷ ἱερῷ ἀλλήλους, viii. 28, καὶ εἰ τὴν Μίλητον αὐτοῦ Φιλιππον καθιστάσε.

§ 49. F. Use of ἐκεῖνος.

Instances occur frequently in Plato, in which the same object is designated successively, in the same sentence or contiguous sentences, by αὑτός or the oblique Cases of αὐτός, &c., and ἐκεῖνος. This mobility of language serves as an index of the onward movement of the thought, and helps and incites the hearer (or us the readers) to keep pace with it. As new objects are brought into the centre of the field of observation, the objects which were just now full in front drop behind.

(Two or three of the following instances are quoted by Stallbaum.)

Phaedo 60 d, λέγε τοινυν αὑτῷ... ὅτι αὐχ ἐκείνο βουλόμενοι... ἀντιπέχοι εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα. Here ἐκείνο is identical with αὑτῷ.

Ib. 68 ε, φοβοῦμεν ἐτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθήναι, καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν ἐκεῖνω, ἀλλων ἀπέχομαι ἐν' ἀλλων κρατοῦμεν. The ἐκεῖνα are identically the ἐτέραρ.

Ib. 73 ε, εἷν τις τι πρότερον ἡ ἒδων ἡ ἀκούσα... μη μύνον ἐκείνο γνώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτέρου ἐννοήσῃ.

Ib. 100 b, εἱ μοι δίδωσε τε καὶ ἐνγχωρεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα... Σκοπεῖ δὴ τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκεῖνωσ. Cebes' answer has intervened, and Socrates refers in ἐκεῖνωσ to the same things which he had just called ταῦτα.

Ib. 106 b, ἀρτιῶν μὲν τὸ περίττω μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἀρτίων, ὄστερ ὄμολογήται, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὑτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνων ἀρτίων γεγονέν. The αὑτοῦ and ἐκείνων both refer identically to τὸ περίττω, αὑτοῦ becoming ἐκείνων as ἀρτιῶν is brought forward.

Ib. III b, τὰς δὲ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν κράσιν ἔχειν τωάτην, ὡστε ἐκείνων ἄνοιγον εἶναι καὶ χρόνον ζῆν πολὺ πλέον τῶν ἐνθάδε—where αὐτῶς fades into ἐκείνως as mention τῶν ἐνθάδε approaches.

Crat. 430 ε, δεῖσαι αὑτῷ, ἄν μὲν τίχῃ, ἐκείνων εἰκόνα.

Laches 186 b, εἰ τις ἡμῶν... ἔχει... ἐπιδείξει τίνες 'Αθηναίων... δ' ἐκείνων ὄμολογομένως ἀγαθοὶ γεγονέαν.

Politic. 277 e, τῶν στοιχείων ἐκαστῶν ἐν ταῖς βραχυτάσις καὶ μάσταις τῶν συλλαβῶν ἰκανῶς διασθάνονται, καὶ τιληθῇ φράζειν περὶ ἐκείνων δυνατοί γίγνονται... ταύτα δὲ γε ταῦτα ἐν ἄλλαις ἀμφιγονεύετε
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 50—52.

k.t.l. The ἐκείνα gives notice that our attention is to be presently turned to ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐν ἄλλαις.

Cf. Ar. Eth. IX. i. 4, δω γὰρ δεόμενος τυχάνει, τούτως καὶ προσέχει, κάκεινον γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει—where ἐκείνον is identical in reference with the preceding τούτως,—and more capriciously, X. ix. 16, εἰτὶ τὸ καθόλου βαθίσασθαι εἶναι δόξειν ἄν, κάκεινο γνωρισθέν ὡς εννέχεσαι, εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦδ', αἱ ἐπιστήμαι—where first ἐκείνο and then τοῦτο refer to τὸ καθόλον.

§ 50. G. Uses of τοις (indefinite). In the sense of 'a particular this or that,' τοις is made to contribute to give liveliness and variety to the language. Thus

a. In illustrations τοις gives the force of 'for instance,' or rather the French 'par exemple.'

Symp. 199 d, εἴ [ἐρως] μητρώς τινος ἡ πατρώς ἐστί.
Phaedo 66 c, ἃν τινες νόσοι προστέωσαν.
Phdr. 230 d, θαλλὼν ἡ τινα κατάν προσείστηκεν.
Hipp. Ma. 292 a, δεσπότης τις σου ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστί;

§ 51. β. Or it draws the attention away from the particular illustration given to the kind of notion intended by it,—thus softening the effect of it.

Phdr. 261 c, εἴ μὴ Γοργίνα Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἡ τινα Θρασύ-
μαχών τε καὶ Θεόδωρον 'Οδυσσέα.
Phileb. 16 c, διὰ τινος Προμηθέως.
Cf. Ἀesch. Agam. 55, ὑπατος δ' ἅπλων ἡ τις 'Απόλλων ἡ Πᾶν κ.τ.λ.
Ar. Ran. 912, 'Ἀχιλλέα τις' ἡ Νιώβη κ.τ.λ.

§ 52. γ. In enumerations it has the force of 'this or that:' but, specially, added (capriciously, as one might say) to one member of the enumeration, it serves the purpose of creating variety, which in enumerations Plato specially affects for the purpose of keeping the attention alert.

Symp. 203 a, ὅ... περὶ τέχνας ἡ χειρουργίας τινας [σοφός] βάγανεσ.
Phaedo 65 c, μήτε ἄκον μήτε ὦσις μήτε ἀλγηθῶν μηδὲ τις ἡδονῆ. [So Hermann from Oxon.]
Apol. 27 d, εἴ αἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσὶ νόδοι τινες ἡ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἡ ἐκ τινων ἄλλων.
Phdr. 235 c, ἡ ποι Σαφτοῦς... ἡ 'Ἀνακρέωντος... ἡ καὶ συγγρα-
φέων τινῶν.
Polit. 305 b, μήθ' ἔπο τινος δόρων μήθ' ἔπο φύσων μήτε ὀικτῶν μήθ'
ἔπο τινος ἄλλης ἐχθρᾶς μηδὲ φιλίας.
§§ 53—55.] PRONOMINAL WORDS.

§ 53. H. Uses of τοιοῦτος.

a. Conversationally, for 'such as I am thinking of,'—but have not yet explained.

Syrmp. 210 d, ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιαύτην, ἥ ἐστι καλοῦ τοιοῦτο... δὲ γὰρ ἀν... παραδαγωγὴ... κατώτερα τι γνωματῶν τὴν φύσιν καλῶν κ.τ.λ.—the explanation of τοιαύτην beginning immediately after it, with ἥ ἐστι.

Phaedo 73 c,... ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνεται τρόπῳ τοιοῦτῳ, ἀνάμμησιν εἰναὶ. λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε [so Stallb. and Herm.] εἰν τις κ.τ.λ. The τοιοῦτῳ expresses that it is such as the speaker has in his mind; his explanation of it to others follows at λέγω δὲ.

§ 54. 8. As a mere substitute or symbol for a particular word preceding, to avoid repetition of the same sound.

Phaedo 67 a, καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι... μετά τοιοῦτων ἐσόμεθα—i. e. μετά καθαρῶν.

Ib. 80 c, ἐὰν μὲν τις χαριῶντος ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ εῖν τοιαύτη ἀφα—where τοιαύτη simply means χαριῶσῃ.

Ib. d, ἢ ψυχῇ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἔτερον οἰχάμενον—where τοιοῦτον ἔτερον means αἰεῖδη.

Ib. 84 a, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδάξαστον θεωμένη... οἴσται... ἐπείδαν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάξαται—where τὸ τοιοῦτον stands for τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδάξαστον.

Ib. 79 c, πλανάται καὶ παραίτεται κ.τ.λ. ὅτε τοιοῦτων ἐφαπτομένη—where τοιοῦτων is a substitute for πλανομένων καὶ παρατομένων.

Syrmp. 208 d, ἕπερ ἄρετῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοιαύτης δύσης.

Legg. 723 d, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄματος παντὸς δεὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δράν—where ἄματος is actually governed by τὸ τοιοῦτο δράν, because this is the substitute for προτεθέναι προοίμιον in the foregoing sentence: cf. Syrmp. 210 b, quoted above (§ 17).

§ 55. This Idiom extends to other kindred Pronouns.

Rep. 507 b, πολλὰ καλὰ καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἑκαστὰ οὕτως—where οὕτως personates πολλά.

Legg. 853 b, νομοθετεῖν πάντα ὑπόσα νῦν μέλλομεν τοιτὸ δράν—where τοιτὸ δράν represents εἰς δικαστὰς ἀγνίστω πολὺος τοιτὸ τουχόντων τυχόντων προειρέων.
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§§ 56, 57.

Cf. Hdt. iii. 82, ἀνέρος γὰρ ἤδος τοῦ ἀρίστου οὐδὲν ἀμενὸν ἀν φανεῖν γεωμή γὰρ τοιαυτὴ χρείανεσι—i.e. ἀρίστῃ. Ar. Eth. I. x. 11, ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητημένον τῷ εὐθαύριῳ καὶ ἐσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος—i.e. εὐθαύριως, and VIII. iv. 1, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσμον καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτο ἄλληλοι οἱ ἀγαθοί—i.e. χρήσιμοι. Add IX. vii. 6, ἤδιστον δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητοῖς ὁμοίως. Thuc. ii. 49, καὶ πολλοὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἔδρασαν εἰς φρέατα—i.e. ἐφῆαν σφάς αὐτοῖς, and iv. 64, καὶ τοὺς ἀλλούς δικαίω ταῦτα μοι παύσας, ὑφ᾽ ἤμων αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων τούτῳ παθεῖν—i.e. ἱσσάσθαι. Ar. Eth. IV. i. 11, φιλούνται δὲ οἱ ἐλευθέροι ὁφελέμοι γάρ, τούτῳ δ᾽ εν τῇ δόσει—where τοιτο stands for ὁφελέμοι εἰς, V. vi. 5, διὸ οὐκ ἐδωμέν ἀρχεῖν ἄνθρωπον, ὅτι ἠστή τούτῳ ποιεῖ [sc. ἄρχει], VIII. xiii. 7, ἡ δ᾽ ἡθική οὐκ ἐπὶ μοιτίως, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς φίλω δωρεῖται, ἡ ὀντιθέτοι ἄλλο.

§ 56. IDIOMS OF VERBS.

A. Mood.

a. Indicative Constructions.

a. The meaning assigned to Indicative Imperfects, Loris, or Pluperfects, with εἰ, depending on a similar Apodosis with ἄν, holds equally (1) when they depend on a simple Infinitive.

Crito 52 c, εἶχεν σοι φιλής τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἔθοιλοσ.

Ib. 44 b, οὐς τ᾽ ὄν σε σώζειν εἰ ἴδελον ἀναλαγκὼς χρήματα, ἀμελήσας.

Phedo 108 d, εἰ καὶ ἱστατάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεὶ . . . οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν.

Soph. 246 d, [δοκεὶ δεῖν] μάλιστα μέν, εἰ τη δυνατόν ἴν, ἔργος βελτίως ποιεῖν.

Legg. 790 c, οἴκειν [ξυμφέρει], εἰ δυνατόν ἴν, οἶνον αἱ πλεῖστας.

§ 57. (2) In clauses connected by a Relative Adverb or Pronoun with an Indicative of unfulfilled past contingency.—The principle of Sequence here illustrated has not been observed except in the case of Indicatives following Relative Adverbs: whereas (besides the other outlying instances which come before us here) the principle applies equally to the Optative (see below, § 72).

Euthyd. 304 e, ἄξων γ᾽ ἴν ἄκοισα κ.τ.λ., ἵνα ἱκουσας κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 d, εἰ γὰρ ὠφελον . . . οἴοι τε εἶναι κ.τ.λ., ἵνα οἴοι τε ἴσον κ.τ.λ.

Theav. 161 c, ἤθαμα πᾶτρι ὁ οὐκ εἴπες κ.τ.λ., ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς . . . ἴδρετο κ.τ.λ.

§§ 58, 59.]

VERBS.

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Gorg. 506 b, ἡδέως ἃν Καλλικλεί τοιῷ ἐτὶ διελεγόμην, ἦς αἵτῳ . . .
άπέδωκα κ.τ.λ.

Charm. 171 e, τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἃν, οὐ ἐπιστήμην εἶχον—'this would have
been that of which they had knowledge.'

In the next instance ὅν heads a second clause in a different
meaning.

Meno 89 b, οὐ ... ἃν ἐφιλάττομεν, ὅν μηδεὶς αὐτοῖς διέφθειρεν, ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν χρήσιμοι γίγνοντο.

In the next, ὅπος loses its power over the second of two clauses,
and the meaning is supplied by ἃν.

Legg. 959 c, ζωτί έδει βοηθεῖν, ὅπος ὁ τι δικαιώτατος ἃν καὶ ὅσιώτατος
ἐξὶ τε ζών καὶ τελευτήσας ἀπομένετο ἃν ἐγέρνετο.

Instances need not be multiplied: as an illustration, we may
notice in conclusion the virtually but not formally identical
construction in Soph. El. 1022, Εἰθ' ὄφελες κ.τ.λ. πάντα γὰρ κατεργάσω—
where consequently we need not suppose an ellipse of ἃν. The usage
begins with Homer: cf. Il. vi. 348, "Εὐθα μὲ κὺμ' ἀπόκρησε.

§ 58. 3. Future Indicative with ἃν.

Rep. 615 d, οὐχ ἦκε, οὐδ' ἃν ἦξε δεῦρο.

Apol. 29 c, ἥδη ἃν . . . ἐπιστρεφόντες διαφθορήσονται.

Symp. 222 a, ἵδων ἃν τις . . . εὑρήσει.

Euthyd. 287 d, καὶ κίνην οὐδ' ἃν ὀτιοῦν ἀποκρινεῖ;

Phdr. 227 b, οὐκ ἃν οἶει με καὶ ἀσχολίας ἐπέτεραν πράγμα ποιήσεσθαι;

The Future exceptionally retains this ἃν in Oratio Obliqua.

Legg. 719 e, τὸν αἰτῶν ἃν ἐπανέσοι.

Cf. Isæus i. 32, προσιτελήσεν ὃτι δηλώσοι πορ' ἃν.

§ 59. b. Conjunctive Potential Constructions.

The Conjunctive Potential has always a deliberative meaning,
which however admits of further distinctions, according to various
kinds of sentences.

a. In matters of abstract opinion, it is 5 Presumptive.

In matters in which the will is concerned, it is

β. Deliberative (in a more special sense) when the sentence is
interrogative:

γ. Hortatory or dehortatory, when the sentence is not inter-
rogative.

Only the first of these heads requires illustration by examples here.

5 This use is confined to negative sentences.

I. 2
a. Presumptive use.

With μη.

Gorg. 462 c, μη ἀγροικότερον γ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπέν. Rep. 603 c, μη τι ἄλλο γ παρὰ ταῦτα; Symp. 194 c, ἀλλὰ μη οὐχ οὗτοι ἤμεισ ὅμειν.

Apol. 39 a, μη οὐ τούτ’ γ χαλεπῶν.

The Indicative is also used with μη and μη οὐ similarly: e. g. Euthyd. 298 c, μη οὐ λίνων λίνῳ συνάπτεις; and (not interrogatively) Protag. 312 a, ἀλλ’ ὅρα μη οὐχ ἐπολαμβάνεις—‘but perhaps, then, you do not suppose.’

With ὅπως μη.

Crat. 430 d, ὅπως μη ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν γ τοῦτο, . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὑπόμασιν οὐ.

The Indicative is also used with ὅπως μη.

Meno 77 a, ὅπως μη οὐχ οὕς τ’ ἔσσομαι.

Phædo 77 b, εἰσέστηκεν δ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε . . . ., ὅπως μη . . . . διασκεδάζονται ἡ ψυχή.

§ 60. With οὐ μη.

Passing by the common use (Aorist), we have the Present with οὖ μη in

Rep. 341 c, οὐ μη οὕς τ’ ἔσ.

Phileb. 48 d, οὐ μη δυνατός ὅ.


The following is only a variation of the use with οὖ μη, πολλοῦ δεῖ standing as a mere Adverb for οὖ.

Gorg. 517 a, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ μηποτε τις τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται.

§ 61. c. Conjunctive Subjunctive Constructions.

The following alone need be mentioned.

a. After σκοπεῖν, ὄρνυ, and the like, with μη. (This is as it were the Oratio Obliqua of b. a.)

Phdr. 260 a, σκοπεῖν μη τι λέγωσι.

Gorg. 512 d, ὅρα μη ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναίον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν γ.

§ 62. This use is frequent in the Indicative: e. g.

La. 179 b, ὄρῳμεν μη Νικίας οίεται τι λέγειν.
§§ 63—65. VERBS.

Soph. 235 a, διστάζομεν ἄντι μὴ τιγχάνει κ.τ.λ.
Ly. 216 c, σκέψωμεθα μὴ ... λαηθῶμεν κ.τ.λ.
Ib. 218 d, φοβοῦμαι ... μὴ ... ἐντετυχήκαμεν.
Phaedo 84 e, φοβίσατε μὴ δυσκολώτερον ... διάκειμαι.

§ 63. β. After πρίω, without ἂν, in negative sentences.
Phaedo 62 c, μὴ πρόστερον αὐτῶν ἄποκτισνώσαν δείν, πρίω ἀνάγκην τινά ὁ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψα. [So all the MSS.]
Theaet. 169 b, τὸν γὰρ προστίθοντα οὐκ ἄνις πρίων ἀναγκάζης ... προσπαλαίσαι. [So all the MSS.]
Legg. 873 a, οὐδὲ ἐκπληθον εἴδεις γένεσθαι τὸ μιαθέν πρίων φῶνον φώφο ὁμίορ ὁμισον ἡ δράσασα ψυχὴ τίηθι.

§ 64. γ. After σκοπέων, ὅραν, and the like with ἄν.
Crito 48 e, ὥρα τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἄνω καὶ ἰκανῶς λέγηται.
Phaedo 100 c, σκόπει δις τὰ ἐξής ἑκάνοις, ἄνω καὶ ξυνοθῇ ὡσπερ ἐρῶ.
Gorg. 510 b, σκόπει δις καὶ τὸδε ἄνω καὶ δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν.
Charm. 157 b, σκέψαι ἄν τι περὶ αὐτῶν εἰπορώτερος φανής ἐρω.
Cf. Lysias xv. 5. p. 144, σκέψασθε ἄν ἰκανῶς γένηται τεκμήριον.
Andoc. i. 37. p. 6, αὐλαμμήνησκεσθαι ἄνω ἀληθῆ λέγω. And primarily Homer (Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 877), ll. xv. 32, "Οφρα ἵδη, ἢν τοι χραίσῃ.

What is worth noticing upon this usage is, that ἄν gives a different shade of meaning from the more usual οἱ. The question submitted is represented by it as a perfectly open one; whereas οἱ would hint the speaker’s foregone conclusion, and give a certain appearance of positiveness. ἄν is therefore chosen for the sake of expressing more perfect courtesy, in contexts such as those just given, which relate to the conduct of the dialogue.

§ 65. δ. With ὅς ἄν.

The different shades of meaning presented by ὅς with the Indicative and ἄν with the Conjunctive are parallel with those just pointed out in the case of οἱ and ἄν after σκοπέων. The meaning of ὅς ἄν bears upon a doubtful reading in Phaedo 96 a, presently to be mentioned.

Ly. 217 c, οἶνον ἄν ἔ το παρόν, τουτα ἐστι—where οἶνον ἄν ἔ leaves it quite indetermined of what kind το παρόν is.
Phaedo 98 c, ἐρῶ βέλτιον διδόκεια οὐδείδε καθήσαι, καὶ δικαιῶτερον παραμένων ἑπίκεχε τὴν δίκην ἦν ἦν κελεύσωσι. Here it is not that ἦν ἦν κελεύσωσι has any future force, for the penalty had
been awarded: but it gives the meaning 'that it is right to stay and abide the penalty, whatever it be, which they have awarded.'

Phaedo 96 a, ἂν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνεται ὡν ἄν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθω περὶ ὧν ἄν λέγης χρήσει (taking for granted here the reading ὧν ἄν λέγης)—'you can apply it to satisfying yourself with respect to your objections, whatever they be.' It is true that the objections had preceded; but this only makes the instance parallel to the last: and what ὧν ἄν intimates is, that Socrates does not wish to bind Cebes to the precise case he has stated. As just before he had said εξεπήθης πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ὥσ µή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἰ τέ τι βούλει προσβῆς ἢ ἀφελῆς,—to which Cebes had guardedly replied ἀλλ’ ὀδηγεῖ ἐγώ εἰν τῷ παρόντι οὔτ’ ἀπελεύν οὔτε προσθέσειν δέομαι,—he now, by giving a general turn to the sentence, leaves a loophole open for future qualification.


a. Without ἄν, expressing simple possibility.

Legg. 777 c, πρὸς ἂ τις ἀπαντᾷ Μέλαις διαπορῆσεις.

Euthyd. 298 e, (A) οὐκοῦν τὸν σαυτὸν πατέρα τύπτεις; (B) Πολὸ µέντοι δικαίοτερον τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτοιµι.

Gorg. 492 b, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀσχολοῦν καὶ κάκιον εἰή;

Phaedo 88 c, µὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον εἰµὲν κραταί, ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὕτα ἀπαντᾷ ἢ—where the Optative, as distinguished from the Conjunctive, denotes a transitory as opposed to a permanent contingency.

§ 67. β. Without ἄν, this being understood from a preceding coordinate sentence.

Rep. 360 b, οὐδεὶς ἄν γένωτο, ὡς δόξειν, οὕτως ἁδαμάντινος. Cf. Thucyd. vi. 89, δημοκρατίαν . . . οὐδενὸς ἄν χεῖρον [γιγνώσκωμι], ὅσω καὶ λαοδιόροσαμι.

Symp. 196 c, κρατοῦντ’ ἄν ὑπὸ ἐρωτῆς, ὅ δὲ κρατοῖ.

Phaedo 99 a, εἰ . . . λέγωι, . . . ἁλθῆ ἄν λέγωι ὡς µέντοι . . . ποιῶ, . . . πολλῆ καὶ μικρὰ ῥαθυμία εἰς τοῦ λόγου. [So Oxon. and three other MSS.]

Charm. 174 e, (A) . . . ὁφελοῦ ἄν ἡμᾶς. (B) Ἡ καὶ ὑγαῖνειν ποιῶ;
§§ 68—70.]

VERBS.

Rep. 382 d, (A) πότεραν διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιῶν ἂν ψεύδοτο; (B) ... (A) Ἄλλα δεδιόω τοὺς ἑχθροὺς ψευδοτο;

§ 68. γ. With ἂν in clauses where the ἂν adheres closely to the Verb, and not to the Relative Pronoun or Particle by which the clause is introduced.

Symp. 187 d, ὡς ἂν κοσμιότεροι γίγνοιτο ... δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι.

Id. 190 c, δοκῶ μοι ἐχεῖν μηχανήν, ὡς ἂν εἰεν κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 230 b, ἀκμὴν ἐχεῖ τῆς ἀνθής, ὡς ἂν εὐνοδέστατον παρέχω τὸν τόπον.

Gorg. 453 c, ἵνα οὕτω προῆν, ὡς μᾶλιστ' ἂν ἥμιν καταφανές ποιοί.

Hip. Ma. 283 c, οὐχ οἶος ἂν ἥσαν πείθειν, ὡς ... ἂν ... ἐπιδίδουν.

Phaedo 82 e, δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἑστίν, ὡς ἂν μᾶλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος εὐληπτώρ εἶν.

Protag. 318 e, εἴβουλία ... ὡς ἂν ἀριστα διοικοί.

Ly. 207 e, προθυμοῦσαι ὡς ἂν εἰδαμονοῖς.

Crat. 395 a, κωδυνεῖτι τοιοῦτός τις εἶναι ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων οἶος ἂν δόξειν αὐτῷ διαπονεῖσθαι.

Id. 398 e, οὖδ' εἰ τι οὐκ ἂν εἶπη εἰρεῖν, οὐ συνεῖνω.

Legg. 700 e, ἥδου' εἰ τῇ τοῦ χαρῶντος, εἰτε βελτίων εἰτε χείρων ἂν εἶπῃ τις, κρίνοτο ὀρθώτατα.

Cf. Antipho i. 17. p. 113, εἴβουλεύτε ἡ ἀνθρωπος ὡς ἂν αὐτοῖς τὸ φάρμακον δοῦν, πότερα πρὸ δείπνου ἡ ἂπο δείπνου.

It may be noted, that these clauses are not Subjunctive, and that this difference marks off these instances from such as Rep. 412 d, φιλοί, ... ὡς ἂν οὕτῳ κ.τ.λ., Legg. 661 c, ἔλατον [ἐστι κακόν] ἂν ὡς ὁλίγιστον ὁ τοιοῦτος χρόνον ἐπιζώῃ, which must be separately accounted for.

§ 69. δ. With ἄν, equivalently for the Future.

(δ') Following a Future in the Protasis.

Phaedo 107 c, ὃ κύδωνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἰ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσῃ.

Apoll. 35 a, εἰ ... ἐσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἶπῃ.

§ 70. (δ”) Following a Consecutive with ἄν in the Protasis.

Rep. 556 a, ἄν τις προστάτη ... ἥρματιζων ἄν. So 402 d.

Symp. 200 c, ὡς ἂν τις λέγῃ, εἴποιμεν ἄν.

Phdr. 244 b, ἄν δὴ λέγωμεν ... μηκένοιμεν ἄν.

Phileb. 55 c, ἄν τις ... χαρίζῃ ... φαίλον ... ἄν γίγνοιτο.
§ 71. (δ') Following an Indicative, involving a Future meaning.

Symp. 208 c, εἰ ἔθλεις εἰς τὴν φιλοτητίαν βλέψας, θαυμάζουν ἢ ... , εἰ μὴ εἰνοεῖς κ.τ.λ.—where εἰ ἔθλεις βλέψας is a virtual Future.

Apol. 37 c, πολλὴ ἢν μὲ φιλοψυχίᾳ ἔχοι, εἰ οὗτος ἀληθιστὸς εἰμὶ κ.τ.λ. because the fact is not so as yet.

Protag. 349 c, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζομι, εἰ ... ἔλεγες—because I do not know the fact as yet.

Crat. 428 b, εἰ μεντοῦ ἔχεις τι σὺ κάλλιον τούτων λέγειν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζομι.

Laches 186 c, εἰ δὲ Νικίας ... μεμάθηκεν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαμη.

§ 72. c. Optative Subjunctive Constructions.

a. Under principal Optative sentence with or without ἂν (see above, §§ 66, 67)—the Subjunctive sentence being

(a') Relative.

Gorg. 512 c, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τούτον ὑν μέλλων χρόνων βιώναι ὃς ἄριστα βιώῃ;

Meno 92 c, πῶς οὖν ἂν εἰδεῖς περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος ... , οὗ παντάπασιν ἄπειροι εἴης;

Cf. Hom. Od. xiii. 291, Κερδάλεως κ' εἶη ... ὡς σε παρελθοί, ἴν. 222, ὦς τὸ καταβριδεῖν ... οὐ κεν βίδοι, xv. 358, Λευγαλέως θανάτω, ὡς μὴ θάνοι ὡς τίς ἐμοιγε ... φίλος εἴη.

§ 73. (α') Adverbial.

Legg. 730 c, μετόχος εἴη, ἢν ὡς πλείστουν χρόνων ἀληθῆς ὁν διαβιοί.

Meno 98 c, ὠφελεμίαν ἄνδρες ἂν εἴεν, ... ἐτερ εἴεν.

Rep. 541 a, ὡς ἂν γέινοίτο, ἐτερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο, δοκεῖσ εὐ εἰρήκεναι.

Polit. 295 c, εἰπώμεν ... ἱστρὼν μελλοντα ... ἀπέσεσθαι ... συχρόν, ὡς οἴκιστο, χρόνου, ἂν ἔθλειν κ.τ.λ.;


§ 74. β. Under principal Indicative sentence, when the dependent Verb is intended to belong to all time—the Subjunctive sentence being

(β') Relative.

Legg. 759 b, οἰς μὴ καθεστήκοι καταστάτειν [ἐστίν] ἱερέας.
§ 75. (3ρ) Adverbial.

Rep. 410 c, οὔς οὖν εἶναι τινς εἰσίναι καθεστάσει, ἢν . . . θεραπεύοντο.
Euthyd. 296 e, οὖν ἐξω ἤμιν πῶς ἀμφισβητήσῃ . . . ὅπως οὖν πάντα ἐπίσταμαι.
Gorg. 448 e, οὔτες ἐρωτά, ποία τίς εἰπ̣ η Γοργίου τίχνη. [So most if not all of the MSS.]
Alc. I. 135 a, τυραννωῦντι δὲ, ὡς μηδὲ ἐπιπλήττο τις αὐτῷ, τί τὸ συμ-βησάμενον;

§ 76. (3ρ) Adverbial with εἰ.

Meno 80 d, εἰ εὐπέχως αὐτῷ, πῶς εἰς εἰς τούτῳ ἐστίν;
Hip. Ma. 297 e, ὃς γὰρ, εἰ . . . τούτῳ φαίμεν εἰναὶ καλόν.
Legg. 642 a, ὁράτε τί ποιώμεν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἔσωσμεν κ.τ.λ.
Ib. 658 c, εἰ . . . τὰ πάντα συγκάρα κρίνοι παιδία, κρίνοις τὸν τὰ θαύματα ἐπιδεικνύση.
Charm. 173 c, εἰ δὲ βουλοῦσιν γε . . . συνγχαρήσωμεν κ.τ.λ.
Phado 91 a, οὐ γὰρ ὅπως . . . δόξει ἄληθεν εἰναὶ προδιδήσῃμοι, εἰ μὴ εἰπ̣ πάρπαργον. Cf. the same phrase, but under an Infinitive sentence, Rep. 411 c; and Ar. Eth. Nic. V. iv. 5, λέγεται ὡς ἀπλός εἰπὶς εἰπ̣ τοῖς τούτοις, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισιν αἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἰπ̣, τὸ κέρδος.

§ 77. γ. Under an Infinitive sentence—which necessarily leaves the time of the Dependent Verb, as under the last head, undefined.

Charm. 164 a, εἰ δοκεῖ τις ὥφειλμα καὶ ἐαυτῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐκεῖνῳ ὃν ἔστω.
Lysis 212 d, εἰ ὁ ἐμπόρος φιλοὶ, φιλοὶ εἰναὶ ἄμψω.
Theet. 164 a, δὲι γε μέντοι [τούτο φάναι], εἰ σώσουμεν τῷ πρῶτῳ λόγῳ.
Phaedo 95 d, προσήκεις φύς φοβείσται, εἰ μὴ ἄνωτος εὖ, τῷ μὴ εἰδώτε.

Protag. 316 c, οὕτως τοῦτο γενέσθαι, εἰ σοι ἐυγγένειον.

Legg. 927 c, τῶν νοῶν, ὥς καὶ βραχὺς ἐνείπη, προσέχοντα εὐεργετεῖν.

Phaedo 85 d, κινδυνεύοντα διαπλέοιται τῶν βλών, εἰ μὴ τις δύνατον ἀρφαλεστέρον... διαπορευθήραι.

Cf. Hom. Π. iv. 262, σῶν δὲ πλείου δέπας αἰεὶ Ἑστηχ, ὅσπερ ἐμοί, πιέειν ὅτε θυμός ἄνωγοι, Od. xxiv. 253, Τοιοῦτο δὲ Τοιαίας, ἐπεὶ λούσαιτο φάγοι τε, Εὐδέμεναι μαλακῶς. Thuc. 1. 120, ἀνδρῶν σωφρόνων ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῦντο ῥητικαίνειν.

§ 78. Note that the principle of the Optatives classified under (β) and (γ) is the same essentially. Hermann (De Part. &v) notices the usage under (γ): but the extent of the principle has not attracted attention.

§ 79. f. Infinitive Constructions.

Infinitive after Relative Pronouns and Adverbs.

Rep. 415 c, εἰναία... τοιαύτας, οίας χειμώνος τε στέγειν καὶ βέρους ἰκανός εἶναι.

Gorg. 457 d, εἰπόντες τοιαύτα, οικα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἀπεδείσασθαί.

Protag. 334 c, χρῆσθαι ἐλαίω ... ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβήσαι.

Theaet. 161 b, οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον, πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἐτέρου σοφοῦ λαβέιν.

Protag. 330 c, φάναι τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια εἰναι ὅστως ἔχοντα... ὡς οὐκ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 213 a, παραχωρήσῃ τὸν Σωκράτη ὡς ἐκείνον καθίζειν.

Euthyd. 306 c, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ... ἀλλόκοτος εἶναι, ὡς γε πρὸς σε τάληθες εἰρήσθαι.

Apol. 29 c, ἀφίερειν σε, ἐφ' ὅτε μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν.

Phldr. 269 d, τὸ δύνασθαι ὡστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι.

Protag. 338 c, ἀδύνατον ὑμῖν ὡστε Πρωταγόρον τοῦτο σοφότερον τινα ἐλέσθαι.

Politic. 295 a, ἰκανός γένοιτ' ἀν... ὡστε ἐκάστῳ προστάτειν τὸ προσήκον.

Phaedo 103 c, ἔστω ὁ περὶ ἑνα τῶν τοιούτων, ὡστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος ἀξιοῦσθαι κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. 1. 2, νεμόμενοι τὰ αὐτῶν ἑκαστοί, ὅσον ἀποδοξ. And likewise
§§ 80—82.]

VERBS.

Soph. Ant. 303, Χρώσες πότε ἐξετάζων ός δούναι δίκην, Αρ. 378, Οὐ γὰρ γένοντ' ἐν ταῖθ' ὡσει, οἷς ὥσ' εἶχεν, 924, 'Ως καὶ παρ' ἐκθέοις ἄξιος θρήνων τυχεῖν.

§ 80. g. Infinitive Uses.

a. Future following οἷς τε, δυνατός, &c.

Phaedo 73 a, οὐκ ἄν οἷς τῇ ἡμᾶς τούτῳ ποιήσεις.

Phdr. 277 d, οὐ πρότερον δυνατόν τέχνη ἔστησαι.

Cf. Lysias xxvii. 2. p. 178, ὅποτε ἄν δοκώσαν αὐτοί εἶναι ψυφεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς. Isocr. xiii. 2. p. 291, ἡμῖν ἐνδείξεσθαι βουλόμενοι. [The Zurich editors give ἐνδείξεσθαι.]

§ 81. β. Aorist equivalent in meaning to Future.

Symp. 193 d, Ἀπίδας παρέχεται [ἡμᾶς] εὐδαιμονίας ποιήσαι.

Euthyd. 278 e, ὡφανὶ ἐνδείξεσθαι τὴν προτρητικὴν αφίλαι.

Protag. 316 c, τοῦτο δὲ οἷοί οἱ μάλιστα γενέσθαι, εἰ σοι ἐνγένεστο.

Cf. Hom. II. ix. 230, ἐν δοιῇ δὲ σασσαίμεν ἢ ἀπολέσαι Νῆςα, xiii. 666, Πολλαίς γὰρ οἱ ἔσετε γέφυρον ἀγάθος Πολύδος Νουσή ὡς ἀργαλέα φθείρα, xxii. 119, ὄρκον ἐλομαῖ. Μή τι κατακρύψεις ἄλλ' ἄνδηκα πάντα δάσασθαι, Od. ii. 171, φήμη τελευτήθηκε ἄπαντα, iv. 253, ἤμοσα μὴ μὲν πρὶν ... ἀναφέρα, ix. 496, φῶσιν αὐτόθ' ἁλίσθαι.

Thuc. i. 26, προείπον ... ὅσοι πολεμίως χρήσασθαι, 81, εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίοις ... μὴ τῇ γῇ δούλευσαι (so with οἷος iii. 10, iv. 85, viii. 46), iii. 46, τίνα οἴσθε ἥστινα οὐκ ἄμεινον παρασκευάσασθαι; v. 22, οἱ δὲ ... οὐκ ἔφαγαν δείξασθαι, ii. 3, ἐνσωματεῖν ἐπιθεμένου ῥαδίως κρατήσα, iv. 63, τὸ ἐλλιπτε ... ἱκανὸς νομίσαστε εἰρχθήναι, i. 126, τῷ Κίλλων ... ἀνέλειν ὁ θεός, καταλαβεῖν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν. Ἀθην. Pers. 173, ἵσθι ... μὴ σε δις φράσα, Agam. 1262, ἐπευχεταὶ ... ἀντιστάσασθαι (not 'prays but 'boasts'). Soph. Phil. 1329, παύλην ἵσθι τύχε μὴ ποτ' ἐντυχεῖ Νόσου, Αρ. 1082, Ταῦταν νόμιζε τὴν πόλιν χρῶν ποτὶ Χ' οἰρίων δραμοῖσαν εἰς βυθὸν πεσεῖν (not aor. of custom, as Herm. and Linw.). Eur. Andr. 311, Σὲ μὲν γὰρ ητείες θεῶς βρέτας σώσαι τόδε. Hdt. i. 53, προλιγοῦσα ... μεγάλην ἀρχὴν μιν καταλίσα, vi. 62, τὰ ἄλλα ἐφ' καταλίσαι. Lysias xiii. 15. p. 131, οὐκ ἔφασαν ἵπτρυψαι, ib. 32. p. 132, οὐ γὰρ οἰμά σε ἐξαφον γενέσθαι, xxxiii. 2, ἤγησατο τὸν ἐνδίδε σύλλογον ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι. [So Bekker: the Zurich editors have γενέσθαι.] Ar. Nub. 35, ἐνευκρισάσθαι φασιν.

§ 82. γ. Present equivalent in meaning to Future.

Crito 52 c, ὠμολογεῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεῖσθαι.

Gorg. 520 ε, μὴ φαίναι συμβολίσεις, εάν μὴ τις αὐτῷ ἀργύρων διδὼ.
§ 83. 8. Infinitives following certain Verbs (of saying, thinking, 
&c.) sometimes contain a Dictative force. They are in fact Infinitives Oblique of the Deliberative Potential. In consequence of this force of the Infinitive in these cases, the governing Verb gets a different and a stronger meaning: to 'say' becomes to 'recommend' or to 'pray:' to 'think' becomes to 'think fit,' or to 'give counsel.' But it is through the Infinitive, as being an Infinitive of the Potential, that the meaning of the governing Verb is strengthened; and not vice versa.

Protag. 346 b, Σιμωνίδης ἡγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς . . . τύραννον . . . ἐπαινέσα—'thought fit'—lit. 'thought it-was-incumbent-on-himself-to-praise.'

Crat. 399 d, ἤνχρω λέγεις ἐπανεύσασθαι.

Hep. Ma. 291 a, ἥμιοι δοκεῖ . . . ἥμας μᾶλλον φάναι κ.τ.λ.—not 'that we say' but 'that we should say.'

Plhdeo 83 e, οἱ δικαιοὶ φιλομαθεῖς κόσμοι τ' εἰσί καὶ ἄνδρειοι οίχ ὅν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐνεκά φασί. Here the meaning is not 'for the reason which the world attributes to them,' but 'for the reason for which the world says people ought to be [temperate].' That is, φασί is followed by κοσμίους εἶναι understood, and this εἶναι contains the Dictative force.

Ib. 104 e, ὁ τούτων ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι—'what I proposed that we should define.'

Cf. Hom. Il. iii. 98, φρονίω δὲ διακριθήμεναι ἢδη Ἀργείους καὶ Τρῶας ('I think good'). Thucyd. iii. 44, νομίζω περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς βουλεύεσθαι, ἰ. v. 86, οὐδὲ ἵσαρή τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, v. 42, νομίζας, οίχ οὐν τε εἶνα . . . οὐδὲ παθεῖν ὅπερ Νικίας ἐπιθέν (where the Dictative force is possessed by the second Infinitive only), ii. 42, τὸ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἐγγυημένοι ὑ το κ.τ.λ., v. 40, ἡγούμενοι, ὅπη ἐπὶ ἕνυχωρή, ἡσυχίαν.
§§ 84, 85.]

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εἰμί, i. 40, ἀντίτομον, τοὺς προσήκοντας ἐξυμάχοντες αὐτῶν τινα κολάζειν, v. 46, λέγω... τὸν πολέμον ἀναζύλλεσθαι, iv. 99, ἀπεκρίνατο... ἀποφέρευθι τὰ σφίτερα (‘answered, Carry off your dead’), vi. 13, γεφυρίζεσθαι τοῖς Σικελιώτασι καθ’ αὐτοὺς ἔξυμφερεσθαι.  Ἀσχ. Choeplh. 143, Λέγω (‘I pray’) φανήσι σοι, πάτερ, τιμῶρον.  Soph. Trach. 543, 'Εγὼ δὲ ευμοῦσαθι μὲν οἷς ἐπίσταμαι (‘do not know that one ought to be angry’).

§ 84. ε. Infinitive as a Noun Substantive, without the Article.
Apol. 23 a, ὅσομα δέ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφός εἰμι.
Protag. 323 b, δ ἐκεί σωφροσύνην ἠγούντο εἰμαι, τάληθε λέγεω.
Under government.
Rep. 429 b, κύριον ἂν εἶλεν ἦ τοῖαν αὐτῆς εἶναι ἦ τοῖαν.
Symp. 209 b, εἰποτέρει λόγον περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ εἰὼν χρῆ εἰμαι τὸν ἄλφα.

§ 85. ζ. An Accusative7 of the Infinitive, with the Article, sometimes occurs subjoined in justification of some expression of feeling just preceding. The “τὸ indignantis” is included in this use (it is exemplified in the first two passages following); but a more commensurate designation would be the ‘Apologetic Infinitive.’
Phædo 99 b, πολλὴ δὲ καὶ μακρὰ φατοκία εἰπ τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διαλίθαια οἷον τ’ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.
Symp. 177 a, οὐ δεινὸν, ἄλλου μὲν τοσὶ θεών ὕμνους κ.τ.λ.; ... Ἡρακλέως καὶ ἄλλων ἑπάνως ... ἄλες ἑπάνων ἡκοῦται ... καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ ἰδεῖς ἄν ἐγκεκαμμαζέα. τὸ οὖν τοιούτων μὲν περὶ πολλῆν ὁπονήν ποιήσασθαι, ἐρωτα δὲ μηδένα τὸ ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ.

The speaker justifies the warmth with which he has spoken by subjoining a studiedly dispassionate statement of the case.
Compare Eur. Med. 1051, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑκῆ κάκης, Τὸ καὶ προίσθαι μολοδικοὺς λόγους φρενιν' and, exactly parallel, Alc. 832, ἀλλὰ σοῦ, τὸ μὴ φράσαι κ.τ.λ.
Phædo 60 b, ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε [τὸ ἣδε] πρὸς... τὸ λυπηρὸν, τὸ ἀμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. The τὸ ἀμα κ.τ.λ. (taking for granted the reading here) is the justification of the expression ὡς θαυμασίως. [τὸ is the reading of Oxon. and one other MS.]

7 If an opinion must be hazarded as to the force of this Accusative, it must be that it is Causal.  See § 18 above.

Symp. 204 a, αὐτὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐστὶ χαλεπῶν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα καλῶν καγώδων μὴ δὲ φρύνην δοκεῖν αὐτῷ ἐσταὶ ἰκανόν. Here τὸ μὴ κ.τ.λ. contains the reason for ἐστὶ χαλεπῶν ἀμαθία: but, put as it is not in the common Causal form, but under this apologetic form, it also justifies the tone of impatience in which ἀμαθία has been mentioned.

§ 86. 9. The Accusative of the Infinitive, expressing the result, in negative clauses, is common. Apol. 36 a, τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτείν ... ἄλλα τε μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλ- λεται κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 74 d, ἦ ἐνδεί τι ἐκεῖνο τὸ μὴ τουεύτων εἶναι; [So Hermann without MS. authority.]

This use would seem to be confined to negative clauses. Lach. 190 c, ἐκὼ αἰτίως ... τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνεται μὴ τούτο δ ἀναού- μενος ἡρώμεν ὄλλ' ἐτερον, is no exception, since the negative is but postponed.

The Genitive of the Infinitive expresses the cause or purpose primarily, rather than the result, in both affirmative and negative clauses.

§ 87. B. Voice.

a. "Third sense of Middle Voice." The ascription to the Middle Voice of this meaning,—'to get a thing done by another,'—is proved to be erroneous, and that in its favourite exemplification (διδάσκεσθαι), by some passages in the Meno. Meno 93 d, ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοα ὧτι Θεομυκτοκῆς Κλεάφαντος τῷ υἱῷ ἵππεα μὲν ἐκδιάζετο ἄγαθον; and, just after, ἐπαιδεύσατο—where the whole point of the passage lies in the education of the son by the father himself distinctively.

On the other hand, we have Meno 94 c, Θουκυδῆς αὖ δῶν νιεῖς ἔδρεψε ... , καὶ τούτοις ἐπαίδευσε τὰ τε ἄλλα εὖ καὶ ἐπιλαμβαν καλλιστα 'Αθηναῖων τῶν μὲν γὰρ Ἑλληνίδαι ἐδώκε τῶν δὲ Ἐλλήνωρ—where the Active ἐπαίδευσε is as distinctively used of the father's getting his sons taught by others. Similarly ib. b, d, ἐδώκε.
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As the favourite example, διδάσκεσθαι, thus* falls to the ground, so do the rest. Δανείσθαι, for instance, is 'to take a δανεῖον,' as Δανείσθαι is 'to give a δανεῖον' that is, the general meaning of the Verb being 'to deal in δανία,' the Middle means 'to deal in them for oneself.' So it is with other Verbs expressing transactions to which there must be two parties: χρῄζω and χρήσθαι express the active and passive side of 'dealing in oracles.' So, rather differently, 'bringing a man to justice' becomes, on the disinterested side, the office of the judge, κρίνων, and, on the interested side, the office of the prosecutor, κρίνεσθαι.

The fact is, that the Active Voice is quite as susceptible as the Middle of the meaning 'to get a thing done by another;' neither Voice, however, by any proper inherent force, but in virtue solely of the common principle that "qui facit per alium facit per se."

Examples of the Active Verb having this meaning may be found in Ἀesch. Ag. 594, "Ομος δ' ἐθνον," where Clytemnestra attributes to herself the same action which was in ν. 87 described by the words περίπεμπτα θυσκυνέις,—in Hdt. iii. 80, [ἀνὴρ τύραννος] κτείων ἀκρι- τους, &c.

§ 88. b. There is a genuine inherent sense of Verbs, which deserves more distinct notice than it has received. It stands half-way between the Middle and the Passive.

'To allow oneself to be,' 'to expose oneself to be,' 'to get oneself,—subjected to this or that, may be designated the Semi-Middle sense. The following are examples.

Crito 48 d, ἔξαγοστε καὶ ἔξαγωμενοι—'allowing ourselves to be carried across the border.'

Phædo 67 a, ἀνασπασμέθα—'allow ourselves to be infected.'

And so Hip. Ma. 291 a.

Soph. 253 b, [φθόγγοις] τοὺς συγκερανθείνους τε καὶ μή—'which allow themselves to be united'—i. e. 'which harmonise.'

Meno 91 c, μηδένα ... τοσαύτη μανία λάβοι, ἄστε παρὰ τούτους ἀδόντα λαβηθήναι—'get himself into disgrace.'

Phileb. 58 c, ἀπεχθησέi Γοργία—'you will incur the hatred of Gorgias.'

* διδάσκασθαι also means 'to take a pupil.' So Pind. Ol. viii. 77, τὸ διδάσκασθαι δὲ τοῦ εἴδοτι βίτερον, Simonid. ap. Gaissf. Fr. liv. p. 377, διδαξάμενοι χορὸν ἀνδρῶν, Arist. Nub. 783, 'Τὸλείι' ἀπίπρ', οւς δὲ διδαξάμενα σ' ἐτι (Socrates speaks.)
Apol. 35 c, ἐὰν οὕτε ἡμᾶς ἑβιζεῖν ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, οὐδὲ ἡμᾶς ἑβιζεῖσθαι.

Equally marked is the existence of this use in other authors.

Hom. Od. ii. 33, ὁνήμενος—'one that earns a benefit,' iv. 373, ὦς δὴ δήθ' ἐν νὶςφω ἐρύκεια—'allowest thyself to be detained' by Calypso. Thuc. i. 77, ἐλασσούμενοι ἐν ταῖς ἐμβολαίαις δίκαις, 'letting ourselves be curtailed of our due,' similarly iv. 64, ὅτων εἰκὸς ἱππόσαβαι. Eur. Phæm. 602, (A) Καὶ σε δεύτερον γ' ἀπαιτῶ σκηπτρα καὶ θρόνους χθωνός. (B) Οὐκ ἀπαιτούμεσθα. Soph. Aj. 217, νίκτεροι Αἰας ἀπελομήθη. Dem. de Cor. 277. p. 318, τὴν ἐμὴν δευνότητα... εὑρίστετε πάντες ἐν τοῖς κοινῶς ἐξεταζομένην ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἄει, c. Dionys. 14. p. 1287, ἡγούμενοι δὲν ἐλαπτοῦσθαι τί καὶ συγχωρεῖν. Λαδ στεφανοῦσθαι, so common in Pindar (e.g. Ol. vii. 15, Nem. vi. 19) for 'winning a crown.'

Hence also the double sense of Verbs in -τός, as γνωστός, from γνωρίσκειν, 'known:' γνωστός, from γνωρίσκεσθαι, 'capable of being known' (lit. 'allowing itself to be known'). And in privatives—ἀλυτος, from λύειν, 'unbroken;' ἀλυτος, from λύεσθαι, 'that does not allow itself to be broken,' 'unbreakable.'

The same sense extends into Latin. Livy iii. 42, Natura loci ac vallo, non virtute aut armis, tutabantur, lit., 'let themselves be protected by the strength of their position'—i.e. 'were fain to let their natural and artificial defences protect them.' So Juv. xv. 157, defendier isdem Turribus, Virg. Æn. ii. 707, cervici imponere nostræ. So juris consultus is 'one who lets himself be consulted in matters of law.'

§ 89. C. Tense.

A Dependent sentence following a Main Past Construction is not affected (in Tense or Mood) by the Tense of the Main Construction in the following cases.

a. When a fact contemplated in the Dependent clause as already extant continues so at the time of its being alluded to by the speaker.

Phædo 98 b, ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος ψυχὸμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ ὅρῳ αὐθά τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον κ.τ.λ. The fact of which Socrates had become aware was one which, with its consequence of disappointed hopes, still remained in full force at the time at which he was speaking.

1b. 99 d, ἐδοξε τοῖνυ μοι μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ δύτα σκοπῶν,
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κ.τ.λ. The pursuit then already renounced had never since been resumed.

Apol. 21 b, ἡπόρον τί ποτε λέγει. The judgment of the Oracle once uttered is regarded as remaining on record for all time.

Phædo 88 c, ἐδύκουν . . . εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλέν . . ., μὴ οὐδὲνος ἄξιον εἴμεν κρεταί, ἵ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἀποτε ἓ. There are here two Dependent clauses: the former, expressing a transitory contingency, is affected by the Main Construction and thrown into Oratio Obliqua; the second, expressing a hypothetical fact which if verified must be permanent, is not affected.

Tim. 32 c, ἔννέστησεν ὁ ἐννιστάς . . . τάδε διανοθεῖται, πρῶτον μὲν ἵνα . . . τίλεαν . . . εἶν, . . . ἡτ δὲ ἵνα ἄγηρον καὶ ἀνοσόν ἕ.

Cf. Lysias i. 6. p. 92, ἐπειδή . . . γνώνεα ἡγαγόμην . . . ἐφύλαττον . . . ἐπειδὴ δὲ μοι παιδίων γίγνεται κ.τ.λ.

§ 90. β. When the event contemplated as future in the Dependent clause is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by the speaker.

Apol. 17 a, ἔλεγον, ὅσ χρήν ἔμας εἰλαβείσαθαι μὴ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε—because the deception threatened was to be looked for in the speech which was now but begun.

Symp. 193 e, πάνυ ἄν ἐφοβοίμην, μὴ ἀπορήσωσι λόγων . . . νῦν δὲ ὅμως θαρρῶ. At the moment at which this is said, the point of time when the contingency of ἀπορήσωσι will be decided is still future.

Apol. 29 c, ἐφη . . . λέγων πρὸς ἔμας ὅσ, εἰ διαφευγόμην, ἤδη ἄν ἔμων οἱ νικεῖ διαφθαρήσωταί. The reason why διαφευγόμην is affected by the Oratio Obliqua, though equally future with διαφθαρήσωτα which remains unaffected, is that the Protasis describes an event purely hypothetical, not one assumed as about to happen at all. εἰ διαφευγόμαι would have implied an assumption that Socrates would be acquitted.

Symp. 198 b, ἐνθυμομένος ὅτι οὐχ οἷς τ’ ἐσομαι . . . οἱδὲν καλῶν εἰπεῖν, ὅπ’ αἰσχύνης ἐλίγου ἀποδρᾶς φόχορν. He has still the task before him, and still the feeling that he will be unequal to it.

Ib. 198 c, προορθήθη γὰρ, ὡς ἐοικεῖ, ἀπὸς ἐκατος ἠμῶν τὸν Ἐρωτα ἑγκατομαι διέχει.

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 85. p. 254, ἄ νῦν οὕτως ἐφη συμβήσομαι, ἐὼν ἐγὼ στεφανώμαι.
§ 91. The use of this construction is in Plato so carefully restricted to the cases just specified, that it would be unjustifiable to confound it with the simple irregular recurrence to the Oratio Recta, which is so common in other writers.

Symp. 190 c, ἐδουλεύωντο δ' τι χρη αὐτῶς ποιήσαι would be an exception to the rule, if χρῆ were an ordinary Verb.

The rule seems to hold in Homer, Il. v. 127, Od. iii. 15, and v. 23, and viii. 44, and xiii. 417, &c. Nitzsch (on Od. iii. 76) denies that the principle here pointed out is the true one. He points out two passages, Il. v. 567 and xv. 596, as refuting it. But in both these (1) the reading varies between Optative and Conjunctional, and (2) in both two purposes are mentioned, so that if the Conjunctional is the right reading it may well have been adopted for the purpose of distinguishing the nearer and the remoter purpose.

§ 92. b. Imperfect Tense used for the Oratio Obliqua of the 'Prophetic Present.'

Symp. 190 c, οὕτε γὰρ ὅπως ἀποκτείναμεν εἰχον . . . , οἷ τιμαὶ γὰρ αὐτῶς καὶ ἑρὰ τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἥφανίζετο—where, just as oίκε εἰχον is the Oblique Narration of the thought oίν ἔχομεν, 'they could not, they thought,' so ἥφανίζετο represents them thinking οἳ τιμαὶ ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ. ἅφανίζεια. Now ἅφανίζεια would have been a 'Prophetic Present,' and so ἥφανίζετο is the Oblique Narration of this.

Cf. Antiphon ii. Α. β. 9. p. 117, ἀλοῖς μὲν γὰρ τὴν γραφὴν τῆς μὲν ὀνείσια  ὅδε εἰκότων ὁμοιομενος, τῆς δὲ πόλεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἐστεροῦμεν—'I felt I could not be.' Andoc. i. 58-60. p. 8, φονεύς οὖν αὐτῶν ἐγνώμην κ.τ.λ. ταύτα δὲ πίστα σκοπῶν εὐρισκον κ.τ.λ.—where the σκοπῶν shews that ἐγνώμην means 'I felt I was on the way to become.'

§ 93. c. Aorist.

a. Its meaning strongly exhibited by force of the construction in which it stands.

Phdr. 249 a, αἰ δὲ ἄλλα, ὅταν . . . τελευτήσωσι, κρίσεως ἑτυχον.
Gorg. 484 a, εὖν . . . φύσιν ικανή γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ, . . . ἐπαναστὰς ἀνέφαυν δεσποτῆς ἡμέτερος ὁ δούλος.
Philcb. 17 d, ὅταν γὰρ ταύτα λάβης οὕτω, τότε ἐγένονος σοφός.
Lysis 217 d, ὅταν δὲ τὸ γύρος αὐταῖς ταύτων τούτο χρώμα ἐπαγάγη, τότε ἐγένοντο . . . λευκαί.

The Subjunctive construction with ἄν, not admissible with a past
Tense, constrains us to see in the Αorist the expression of an action instantaneously complete, rather than of an action necessarily past.

§ 94. β. Its meaning strongly exhibited by force of the context.


Ib. 108 e, [ἡ μέν] φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν ἡ δὲ . . . ἥκησε τον αὐτήν ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα—the good soul, without a moment of suspense, or sensible lapse of time, ‘at once finds a home in’ &c.

Symp. 172 a, οὗτος, οὗ περιμένεις; Κάκῳ ἐπιστᾶς περιμένω—not ‘waited for him to come up with me,’ but ‘let him come up with me.’

Ib. 173 b, τί οὖν οὗ διηγήσας μοι; Same phrase Protag. 310 a, ‘why not at once relate it to me?’ So Phædo 86 d, Soph. 251 e, &c.

Cf. Arist. Vesp. 213, Τί οὐκ ἀπεκαμήθηςεν;

Symp. 209 a, ἀ θυνόθη προσήκει καὶ κυήσαι καὶ κυεῖν. κυήσαι is the first moment of the state κυεῖν.

Hence Apol. 21 c, 22 d, ἐδοξεῖ, ἐδοξαν, ‘I came to think.’

§ 95. D. Impersonal Verbs.

Impersonal Verbs in the same rigid form as in Latin do not exist in Greek. Even those which express the processes of inanimate nature, as ἦν, ἐφες, ἔσεσε (Thuc. iv. 52), are only impersonal in that particular use, and not always so even then.

We find, however, in addition to these,

§ 96. a. Passive Impersonals (the nearest approach in Greek to strict Impersonals).

Plutarch 232 a, οὐκ ἄλλος αὐτοῖς πεπάνηται.

Ib. 261 b, λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται.

Political. 299 a, ἦν δὲ ἦν καταψηφισθη.

Legg. 914 a, δηλωθέντων (Genitive Absolute).

§ 97. b. Quasi-Impersonals (as we may call them), where a vague Nominative, such as ‘the circumstances,’ ‘the event,’ ‘the course of events,’ is understood. The common words ἐνδιέκειται, παρίδει (Thuc. iv. 85 &c.), the phrase οὔτως ἔχει, &c., are such cases. We do not know always whether the vague understood Nominative is Plural or Singular, except where the Verb is represented by a periphrasis
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(as Hom. II. iv. 345, φιλε' [ἢ], xiv. 98, Τρωά, μὲν εὐκτὰ γένηται, xvi. 128, οὐκέτι φυκτὰ πέλωνται, xxi. 533, ἦν λοίγη ἔσεθα, Od. ii. 203, ἐστι ἐσσεται, viii. 384, 'Ἑδ' ἐφ' έταιμα τέτυκτο, xi. 455, οὐκέτι πιστὰ γνωριζέων, Thuc. ii. 3, έπει έτομα ήν, i. 102, τούτου εὑρέθαι ἐφαίνετο, i. 7, πλαισιωτέρων ὑνων, Hdt. vi. 52, δῆλα σφι ἔσεθα, the common ἀδύνατα ἐστί, &c.), or where (as in several of the following) an Adjective stands in agreement with the vague understood Nominative.

Rep. 580 d, δεξιαται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ έτέραν ἀπόδειξιν—'the case will admit.'

Ib. 452 d, καὶ τούτο ἑνδείξησο—'the result made this plain also.'

Phaedo 73 b, εἰν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἀγγεναι ἑσθεται κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τούτο οὔτως ἔχει—'what ensues is proof positive,' &c.

Apol. 28 b, οὐδὲν δεινόν μὴ εὖ ἐμοὶ στρῆ—lit. 'lest the course of events should come to a stand-still.' 'There is no danger of the rule breaking down in my case.' Cf. Ar. Eth. VI. viii. 9, στήσεται γὰρ κακεί—'for there too demonstration must stop.' Hdt. iii. 82, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ φύσον ἀπέθη ἐν μοναρχίην.

Phileb. 25 d, ἀλλ' ᾤσος καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δύναι—'perhaps it will do equally well now.'

Phaedo 118 a, ἐπεδίκν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται—'when the action of the poison reaches the heart.'

§ 98. In the next instance, we find an Impersonal clause representing the Verb.

Tim. 24 e, εὖ ἐπιβατόν ἐπὶ τὰς ἄλλας νήσους . . . ἐγκρετο.

§ 99. In the following instances we find an Adjective or Particle in agreement with the vague understood Nominative.

Phileb. 20 c, προϊόν ἡ ἐτι σαφέστερων δείξει—'the sequel of the argument will make this yet clearer.'

Phaedo 117 b, καὶ οὖτος αὐτὸ πονηρεῖ—'the agent left to itself will complete its work.' There is delicacy in the vagueness with which both the deadly agent and its effect are designated.

Theæt. 200 c, ό τῶν ποταμῶν καθηγούμενος ἐφ' ἑρα δείξειν αὐτό. A man who goes first through a stream, if asked, "How deep is it?", says, "How can I tell beforehand? we shall see." From this passage we gather that the expression was in popular use.

Critias 108 c, τούτο μὲν οὖν οὖν ἐστιν, αὐτό σοι τάξα δηλώσει.
§ 100—103. VERBS.

Hyp. Ma. 288 b, oti mén epixeirhseis eiv oida' ei de' epixeirhshas èstai katagulastos autò deìzei—'we shall see by the event.'

Protag. 324 a, autò se didázei.

Ib. 329 b, ikanos mén makrous logous kai kalous eitein, ós autà dhloí.

§ 100. Cf. Hdt. v. 78, dhloí de ou kat' èn mou'ven, allá pantaXyi, ë isogorhò wò èstì chrh'ma spoudàvnon, vi. 86, oüte mèmenai to prh'gma, oüte me perifèreis oüdei eideína toutов tov vur'hies légete. Æsch. Choeph. 993, phlòv tèwv, wòv ò' exèròv, wòs fainèi, kakòv ('as the event shews.') Æschin. i. 40. p. 6, wòs autò toìr'goun èdeìzein. Antipho v. 60. p. 136, autò mou pròph'asis oüdei'mon èxei apoktëinai tòn avrà. Lysias x. 20. p. 118, dhlówei de' (sc. id quod sequitur dhlówei) oik'h'zetai gár.

§ 101. We find also Non-impersonal sentences on the model of some of the foregoing, e.g.

Crat. 393 c, to òwma, ð autò ë'min dhlówei k.t.l.

Ib. 402 c, toutò ge (to òwma) òl'yan autò lègei ñtì k.t.l.

Soph. 237 b, kai máistá ge ði pántov ò lo'gos autòs ìn dhlóweis.


§ 102. E. Intransitive use of Verbs Transitive.

Some Verbs Transitive recede, in particular significations, into Intransitive Verbs. At the same time, they do not cease to be Active; neither do they become strictly Reflexive.

This happens in two cases.

§ 103. a. When that, to which the action was originally represented as passing on, is, or comes to be regarded as, a part of the Agent; and when further the mention of it can be dropped without marring the sense. 'Èxew, in several of its senses, exemplifies this process.

From èxew governing an Accusative of part of the Subject we have, e.g. Hom. Od. xix. 38, kîwes ëf'sò' èxwtes—'holding,' properly not themselves, but their heads, or, vaguely, parts of themselves, aloft. So Hdt. i. 181, anâb'asis ès autòv ëxòthev kúlòr peri pántas tois pírgon èxousa pe'pòh'tai—where èxousa has for its Object each part of the anâb'asis in succession.

From èxew governing an Accusative of that which comes to be regarded as part of the Subject, we have e.g. Od. iii. 182, autòp èxovhe ël'lon'd' èxou—'held my ship on her course for Pylos;'—the
ship, as following the will of her captain, is, when we are speaking of his movements, virtually part of him;—whence simply 'I held on for Pylos.'

On the other hand, in the following passage κατέχειν has for its Object that which is literally a part of the Subject.

Phaedo 117 c, δοιον κατέχειν το μη δακρύειν—'to keep themselves,'—but properly those parts of themselves which had to do with the particular affection in question.

So again the common ἐκέ δή (Crat. 439 a, Gorg. 490 b, Lach. 198 b, Legg. 639 d) is 'hold,' scil. your foot from advancing—your tongue from speaking—your thoughts from running on—as the case may be.

Gorg. 475 d, τῷ λόγῳ ἄστερ ἱατρῷ παρέχουν—'offering,' not strictly oneself, but the particular limb or part needing treatment.

§ 104. Other examples in Plato are

Rep. 388 c, ὅταν τις εὐφὴ ἑσχυροῖ γέλωτι. So 563 a, ἄυγκαθεναι.

Ib. 422 c, ἀναστρέφειν. So Lach. 191 c.

Ib. 467 b, ἀναλαβεῖν.

Ib. 473 b, μεταβάλειν.

Ib. 540 a, 591 c, παρακανεῖν. So 573 c, ἵππωκεῖν.

Phaedo 65 a, εἴγυς τι τείνων τοῦ τεθνίων.

Ib. 98 d, χαλῶντα καὶ κυττύλοντα τὰ νεῦρα.

Phdr. 228 c, παῦμαι. Jelf instances this also in Hom. Od. i. 340, iv. 659. [In Od. i. 340 the reading seems doubtful.]

Polit. 258 a, ὄρειστα, . . . ἔννωμα.

Phaedo 72 b, εἰ τὸ καταδραμίνειν μὲν εἶῃ, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδότι—lit. (as we might say) 'put in an appearance on the other side.'

§ 105. This Intransitive use of these Verbs becomes so natural, that, after it is established, when in particular cases it is convenient that the Object should be expressed, it is expressed in the Dative.

E. g. II. xxiii, 686, ἄνασχεσθαι χερσὶ στιβαρῆς. The language had been accustomed to ἀνασχέσθαι Intransitive for holding up the hands; so that when, in order to characterise the hands, the poet desires to express the Object, it falls more naturally into the Dative.

So Od. ix. 489, ἐφύβαλλεν κώπης—ἐμβάλειν being used alone, e. g. in Aristoph. Ran. 206, for 'dashing in the oars.' (An erroneous interpretation of this last passage arises from neglect of the principle we are noticing.)

So Od. x. 140, ὅτι κατηγγύμεσθα.
§ 106. b. When the Accusative of the Object, not being in any way referable to the Agent, is nevertheless so natural a sequence to the Verb, that the Verb itself will suggest it if omitted.

Symp. 196 d, περατεύν μη ἔλειπεν—‘to fall short’—lit. ‘to leave a deficiency of so much in a given quantity.’

Phdr. 237 d, θέμενοι ὄρον, εἰς τούτο ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιώμεθα. ἀναφέροντες, ‘referring,’ scil. our assertions and reasonings.

Gorg. 512 e, ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ—‘entrusting,’ scil. the decision.

§ 107. Some uses of ἔχειν illustrate this process also.

We find, Thuc. iii. 89, τῶν σεισμῶν κατεχόντων—there is no need to express what they pervaded or occupied, since σεισμοί (so used) must be σεισμοί τῆς γῆς. Or when ἔχειν is used of an army occupying a position, the Verb alone suffices to express this. And (as we have seen in the parallel case) so fixed may this use become, that when the position occupied needs to be expressed, another construction is found for it; cf. Thuc. iii. 34, ἐν δικαιώματι εἶχαν. So viii. 28. Similarly a general moving his army is said ἔχειν, without any Object expressed: whence the next step is that the whole army, which strictly ἄγεται, is said ἔχειν’ cf. Thuc. v. 54, Ἀργείων δ’ ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τῶν χρῶν, ἐσῆλθον. [So Arnold: ἐσῆ-βαλλον Poppo and Göller].

§ 108. This is the account of a variation, which might else be taken merely for one of government:—

Phaedo 58 c—59 a, οὕτε γὰρ ὡς ἑαυτῷ παρόντα με ἄνθρωπος ἐπιγινέσθη φθορός εἶσηγε . . . διὰ δὴ ταύτα οὐδὲν πάνω μοι ἐλεεύων εἰσηγε. An emotion may be said either to enter the person himself (as in φθορός με εἰσηγε), or to enter his soul; but in this case if the reference to the person be made clear the mention of the soul may be spared; that is, the Verb becomes Intransitive, and is followed by a Dative of the person (as in the latter sentence of the passage quoted).

§ 109. F. Uses of the Participle.

a. Periphrastically, with Auxiliary Verb Substantive.

Politic. 273 b, πολλῆς ἴν μετέχων ἔστειλα.

Ib. 274 e, εἶναι γεγονός. 289 a, ἴν ἰδί τεῖνη. 308 e, ἐστὶν τείνωτα.

Tim. 38 e, ἐστίν ὅτι. 68 d, ἵγοικως ἵνα εἰη. 77 e, ἵνα διαδοθοῦν.
§ 110. B. Peculiar Intransitive use of ἔχων with Verbs.

Euthyd. 295 e, ἔχων φλαναίες.
Phdr. 236 e, τί δήτα ἔχων στρέφει;

§ 111. Idioms of Prepositions.

Ἀπό.

In Composition.

Phædo 87 a, ἀνατίθεμαι. Of withdrawing any deed or word. Not a metaphor from draughts particularly, though capable of being so applied—as in


Ἀπό.

Of the use of the bodily members.

Rep. 613 b, δροσὺν ὃπερ ὁ δρομῆς ὁσοι ἐν θέωσιν εὐ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπὸ δι τῶν ἁνὼ μὴ—‘who run fairly with their legs, but with the upper part of their bodies (head, neck, arms) in bad form.’ (Even supposing that κάτω could refer to the starting point and ἁνὼ to the turning point, which can scarcely be supported by instances, the absolute use of τὰ κάτω and τὰ ἁνὼ in this meaning is inconceivable.)

Legg. 795 b, ὁ τελέως παγκράτιον ἡσυχαῖος . . . οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἀριστερῶν ἀδύνατο ἐστὶ μαζευθεῖαι κ.τ.λ.


§ 112. Διά.

a. With Accusative; ‘by help of.’ This is the use so common afterwards in the Orators.

Rep. 352 c, εἴνη τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, . . . δὲ ἦν ἐπραξαῖν ἄ ἐπραξαῖν.

b. With Genitive.

Phædo 82 e, τῆν ψυχῆν . . . ἀναγκαζομένη . . . σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὀντα . . . μὴ αὐτῆν δὲ αὐτῆς—‘acting only by and through itself,’ independently of anything external to itself.

So Rep. 510 b, αὐτοῖς εἰδεῖς δὲ αὐτῶν τῷ μέθοδον ποιομένη, and similarly 511.
§§ 113—115.] PREPOSITIONS. 169


Rep. 463 e, εἰ ὄνοματα διὰ τῶν στομάτων μόνον φθέγγουτο.

Ib. 580 b, ὃ διὰ πάντων κριτῆς ἀποφαίνεται—'the paramount judge decides absolutely.' An ordinary sense of διὰ πάντων, beginning with Homer.

Men. 74 a, τὴν μίαν, ἢ διὰ πάντων τοῦτων ἐστὶ—'which is out beyond all these,' i.e. 'which all these run up to,' 'which is paramount to all these.'

Rep. 343 b, διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας—'night after night and day after day.'

Ib. 621 a, πορεύεσθαι διὰ καύματος τε καὶ πνίγους δεινοῦ.

Symp. 220 b, ἀνυπόθετος διὰ τοῦ κρυστάλλου ἐπορεύετο. This use of διὰ in prose is unique: see Bernhardy's Syntax, p. 234. It obtains in poetry, beginning with Homer's διὰ νήσου ἤν in Oil. xii. 335. Is its employment in the text intended for the sake of grandiloquence?

c. In Composition.

Symp. 221 b, διαπορεύεσθαι, and Critias 106 a, διαπορεία—of traversing a certain interval of space between two defined points, —'doing the distance.' Cf. διαθέω, Protag. 335 e.

§ 113. ἔκ.

a. Of progress along or in a certain route.

Phædo 114 b, φέρονται . . . εἰς τοὺς ποταμοὺς—not 'into' but 'along' or 'down' the rivers. 9

§ 114. β. 'To the number of.'

Legg. 704 b, ὀπέχει θαλάττης εἰς τινας ὀγδοίκοις σταδίους.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 124, ὄλιγον εἰς χλίους. So Xenophon and Demosth.

§ 115. γ. 'In regard to,' 'in the point of,' 'with a view to.'

Symp. 184 b, έσεργετούμενοι εἰς χρήματα.

Ibid. d, ὃ μὲν δυνάμενοι εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἄρετην ξυμβάλλεσθαι, ὃ δὲ δεόμενοι εἰς παθείνας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτάσθαι.

Ib. 196 e, εἰς γε ἀνθρώπων Ἑρωτει οὐδὲ Ἀρης ἀνθιστάται.

Ib. 219 d, ἀνθρώπω τοιοῦτος οὐρ ἑγὼ οὐκ ἂν ὁμοὶ ποτὲ ἐνυχεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς καρπείαν.

Thiset. 169 a, ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ἀστρονομίαν.

9 [Under this example is in the MS. "Cf. Odyss."]
Theat. 178 c, τὸ περὶ λόγους πεθανὸν ἐκάστῳ ἦμῶν ἐσάμενον εἰς δικα- στήμον βέλτιον ἃν προδοξάσαι ἢ τῶν ἱδωτῶν ὀστίσσων;
Legg. 635 α, ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως, εἰς ἀ καὶ μηδὲν γε ἅνης ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς νόμοις ἦμων.

Euthyd. 305 d, τῷ νικηφόρῳ εἰς δόξαν οἰσεθαί σοφίας πέρι.


§ 116. 'Εκ.

a. Euthyd. 282 a, ἐκ πιντὸς τρόπον παρασκευάζεσθαι.

b. Apol. 23 a, ἐκ τοῦτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο—'hereupon:' the notion is of sequence of time rather than consequence. Cf. Ἀσεχ. Ευμ. 2, ἐκ δὲ τῆς Θέμων, Choeph. 1055, Ποταίμον γὰρ αἰματι καὶ χεροίν ἔτη. 'Εκ τῶν τε τουταμέν ἐς φρένας πίναι.

§ 117. 'Εν.

a. 'In the point of.'

Rep. 402 d, ἐν τῷ ἐδεί κρίματος—'agreeing in their aspect.'

Symp. 213 c, νυκάντα ἐν λόγοις πάντας ἀνθρώπων.

Theat. 206 a, τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ ὁφεῖ διαγνωσκέων πειράματος.

b. Adverbially compounded.

Gorg. 457 a, ἐμβραχύ. Cf. the form καθεῖ in St. John viii. 9, ἐξηρ- χώτῳ εἰς καθεῖς.

§ 118. 'Επί.

a. With Dative;—'in connection with'—signifying a more material connection than it signifies with the Genitive.

Rep. 376 c, ἐστὶ δὲ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώματι γυμναστική, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς μοναστική.

Ib. 408 b, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτων τῷ τέχνῃ δεῖν εἰναι.

Ib. 532 c, ἐπὶ άδυνατία βλέπειν.

Symp. 186 a, ['Ερος] οὐ μόνον ἐστιν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

Ib. 184 c, ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐξαπατήθηναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν.

Ib. 186 b, ἄλλος μὲν ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑγειον ἔρος ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νοσώτει. Θε. 210 a, τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ οὐχόν όμορο, οὕτως.

Ibid. b, τὸ ἐπὶ' εἰδει καλών.

Soph. 247 d, τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀμα καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνους ξυμφωνεῖ γεγονός. Politic. 310 a, ἐπὶ τούτων δὴ τούτ' εἰναι τέχνη φάρμακον.
§§ 119—122.] PREPOSITIONS. 171

Tim. 48 c, ἰκανὰ ἤν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λειχθείσων.
Cf. Andoc. i. 25. p. 4, τῶν φευγόντων ἐπὶ τοῖς μυστηρίωσ.

§ 119. b. Adverbially compounded.
Legg. 697 c, ἐπὶ ἐτι χείρος.

§ 120. c. In Composition.
Crito 43 c, ἐπιλύεται—‘exempts.’ Perhaps the meaning of ἐπὶ is ‘with a further result’ or ‘condition,’ and so ἐπιλύεσθαι would be to obtain a man’s release, under the condition of a ransom to be paid. Similarly would ἐπαγγελθεῖν be ‘to announce so as to bind oneself in time to come,’ and so ‘to offer,’ ‘promise.’

Symp. 172 a, ἐπιστὰς περίμεινα. ἐπιστῆναι is to stop in the course of progress from one point to another. ἐπὶ is to stop, without any reference to moving again. So ἐπιλέγεσθαι is to pick out, e.g. in passing along a line. ἐπιστὰς περίμεινα is equivalent to the one word ἐπέμεινα. For ἐπιμένειν see under περί, § 127.

Phaedo 62 c, ὁ Σωκράτης . . . ἐπιβλέψας πρὸς ἤμας. From the notion of succession here again we should get ‘looking [from Cebes] to us,’—‘turning to us.’ Cf. Apol. 31 d, ἐπικοιμώδων.

§ 121. Katá.

a. With Accusative.
Legg. 918 a, ἐπισταύ κατὰ πόδα—‘in close succession.’
Soph. 243 d, κατὰ πόδα γε, ὁ θεαίστε, ὑπέλαβες—‘you have caught at once the train of the thought.’ This is of course a pregnant use of the Preposition, implying κατὰ πόδα ἐπέμενοι.

b. With Genitive, in Attributive sense.
Meno 74 b, μίαν ἄρετήν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων.
Ib. 76 a, κατὰ παντὸς σχήματος τούτῳ λέγω.
Ib. 77 a, κατὰ ὅλου εἰπὼν ἄρετὴς πέρι.

Phaedo 70 d, μὴ τοῖνος κατ’ ἀνθρώπων σκόπη μόνον τούτο—‘consider this not as an attribute of mankind only.’ The κατά, in a pregnant use, stands for ὡς κατ’ ἀνθρώπων λειχθεῖσεν.
Phdr. 260 b, συντεθεῖσ μόνον ἔσται κατά τοῦ ὅνου.

§ 122. c. In Composition.
a. Symp. 219 c, καταδρβάνειν—‘to earn by sleeping.’

b. Of doing a thing without regard to other considerations.
Apol. 33 e, oị́c án ẹ̀keị̂nị̂s ge ạ̀utộv katạdẹ̄theịn—implying the request to be unprincipled or arbitrary.

Legg. 861 b, dòUS dè oúdèna lóγou ós ὅρβως εἴ̣ρηκε, katạnovmọthẹ̄stei.

Cf. Lysias vi. 3. p. 103, ἡ κατελείγασε ἡ καταχαρίζασθαι Ἀνδοκίδη.

Isæus vii. 38. p. 67, τοὺς ἐχοντας ἀποδοουν τὰ διν’ αὐτῷ κατα̣νογκάσατε—‘peremptorily compelling.’

This kata often, but not always or necessarily (see the last instance), gives an unfavourable meaning to the word.

§ 123. Μέχρι.

Adverbially compounded.
Gorg. 487 c, μέχρι ὅποι.

§ 124. Παρά.

a. With Accusative.

a. Soph. 242 a, παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλῶν ἔμαντον.


β. Apol. 36 a, οὔτω παρ’ ἀλήγων—literally, ‘up to so little’ difference from the other quantity compared, i. e. so near it.

γ. In Comparison; signifying not ‘beyond’ but ‘contrasted with’ (lit. ‘put coordinate with’).

Phdr. 276 e, παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαιλῆν παιδιάν.

Theaet. 144 a, ἀνδρείον παρ’ ὀντινοῦν.

For other instances see Idioms of Comparison, § 174. Cf. Thuc. v. 90, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἕμφερον λέγεων ὑπέθεσθκ.

b. With Dative.

Rep. 366 b, καὶ παρὰ θεοὶς καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώπους πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν—‘our dealings both with gods and with men will be what we desire.’

Symp. 188 d, ὁ περὶ τἀγαθὰ μετὰ σωφροσύνης . . . ἀπότελομενος καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς [Ἑρως]—‘temperance exercised in dealings between ourselves (men) and with the gods.’

§ 125. c. With Genitive ;—‘obtained from’ or ‘proceeding from,’—of a sentiment or opinion.

Legg. 733 a, τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦ λόγου χρῆ λαμβάνοντα σκοπεῖν.

Soph. 226 d, λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρόμην τις.

Legg. 692 b, τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῶν γεγονόσκευται ταῦτα . . . οὐδὲν σοφόν—‘that these things should receive recognition from us.’

Crat. 412 e, παρὰ πολλῶν ὠμολογεῖται.
§ 126. In the remaining instances the Preposition has a pregnant
force: that is, the fact that an opinion or sentiment is referred to
is left to be understood from the para.

Rep. 362 c, para θεῶν καὶ para ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τῶν
βιον ἀμείνου.

Ib. 461 c, βεβαιωσάσθαι para τοῦ λόγου.

Ib. 612 c, μισθός . . . ὠσες τε καὶ ὄνειν τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει para ἀνθρώ-
πων τε καὶ θεῶν.

Ibid. d, ἄστερ ἔρχει δόξης καὶ para θεῶν καὶ para ἀνθρώπων.

Tim. 52 d, οἴτως . . . para τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ὄνειν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ
dedósta lógos.

With this use of para cf. that of πρός, Hdt. iii. 137, ἵνα φανῇ πρὸς
Δαρείου εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐννοίᾳ δύκαμος. Antiph. i. 25. p. 114, καὶ
γὰρ ἀν δικαίωτερον καὶ ὀσίωτερον καὶ πρὸς θεῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων
γίνοντο ἐμῖν.

§ 127. Ἐπέρ.

b10. With Dative—‘in the sphere of,’ literally.

Protag. 314 a, ἀρὰ μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυθεῖς τε καὶ κυθυνέης.

Phaedo 114 d, χάριν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἐννοίᾳ ψυχῆ ἀνδρα. The feeling
is represented as locally watching over its object.

d. In Composition.

Phaedo 59 c, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρὸς . . . εἰπε περιμένειν, καὶ μὴ
πρότερον παρέσκευα κ.τ.λ. The meaning of περιμένειν will be eluci-
dated by distinguishing it from ἐπιμένειν. ἐπιμένειν is to stop
in the course of a progress from one point to another until
somebody comes or something happens. The ἐπι, as in ἐπιστη-
να, is local, and it also presumes that the progress is to be
resumed. It answers to the Latin præstolari. περιμένειν is to
defer any intended proceeding, to remain in status quo, until

10 [In the MS. the uses of περὶ with
the Dative are lettered b, its uses in
Composition d. Apparently uses with
the Accusative and the Genitive were
to have come in, lettered a. and c.]
a certain future moment. The peri has reference simply to the lapse of the interval of time. Hence peri peri peri here is 'to wait a certain time,' which time is specified in the next words. peri peri peri would be unsuitable, as the admission of the visitors into the prison could hardly be regarded as a continuation of their walk to the prison.

Symp. 172 a, δο Φαλνερεις, ἕφη, οὖτος 'Απολλόδωρος, οὖ peri peri peri; Κάγω ἐπιστάς peri peri peri. Here the addition of the local peri peri peri in the second sentence shows that peri peri peri is not local, οὖ peri peri peri; 'wait a moment' is more civil than 'wait there.'

§ 128. Prós.

a. With Accusative. Pregnant force;—i.e. not 'for' but 'in regard of fitness for': in other words, the Preposition is related to the sentence, in which it stands, not immediately, but through the medium of an unexpressed clause.

Phaedo 117 b, τί λέγεις peri peri peri τοῦ τὸ πόματος, πρός τὸ ἀποσπεύσαι τινι;—'what sayest thou as to this draught admitting of a libation to a deity?' lit. 'in regard of its fitness for a libation.'

Protag. 328 b, νοσάται τινι, πρός τὸ καλὸν καγαθὸν γενέσθαι—'to notice a person [favourably] in regard of his fitness for becoming' &c.

Symp. 177 b, εὑρίσκω ἄλλο ἐπαυσίων διαμάσων ἐχοντες πρὸς ὀψίλειαν.

Lecg. 757 c, νεμεῖ τιμᾶς μείζονε μὲν πρὸς ἄρετην ἄρετην κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 69 a, ἡ ὄρθη πρὸς ἄρετὴν ἄλληρ—lit. 'right in regard of fitness for making men good.'

Rep. 581 c, ἀμφιβολούονται ἐκάστοτο τοῦ εἰδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ . . . πρὸς τὸ καλλιον καὶ ἀνόρθων ἔγν.

b. With Dative.

Phaedo 112 c, ἀνατες γάρ πρὸς ἀμφιτεροις τοῖς μείζονε τὸ ἐκατέρθεν γίγνεται μέρος. [So Oxon.]

Ib. 84 c, πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ὰρ—'absorbed in.'


§ 129. c. In Composition with a Verb proς sometimes has the general meaning of 'additionally;' and therefore rather qualifies the whole sentence than unites with the Verb, and does not affect in any way the meaning of the Verb.

Rep. 521 d, δει ἀρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα—'to have in addition.'

Ib. 607 b, προσείπωμεν δε αὑτῆ—'and let us say to her moreover.'
§§ 130, 131.] PREPOSITIONS.

Theaet. 208 c, τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ—'apprehends in addition its difference from other things.' So 209 d, προσ-

doξάσαι.

Apol. 20 a, σφίσει εὐνείκαν χρήματα διδόντας, καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι.

Phædo 74 a, τόδε προσπαύσει, ἐννοεῖν.

Gorg. 516 d, Θεματοκλεία ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ προσέγγι-

mówan.

§ 130. Ἰπέρ.

'With a view to.'

Phædo 107 c, ἐπιμελείας δεῖται οἷς ἐπί τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ὁ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν.

Protag. 318 d, εἰπὲ τῷ μεινίσκῳ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐπί τούτον ἐρωτώντι.

Cf. Lysias xii. 78. p. 127, οἷς ἐπί ἐμῶς ἀποδιωκότος Ἐγραμένους ἄλλη ἐπί τῆς οὗτος ποιημα.

§ 131. Ἰπό.

a. Adverbially compounded.

Phdr. 242 d, ἐπὶ τί ἄσεβη [λόγον]—'somewhat impious.'

Gorg. 493 c, ἐπὶ τί ἀποσπά.

b. In Composition.

a. ἢπολογίζομεθα.

Apol. 28 d, Crito 48 d, Phdr. 231 b.

Similarly,

Protag. 349 c, ἔγωγε οἷδέν σοι ἢπόλογον τίθεμαι.

Lach. 189 b, λέγ' οἷν μὴ δέν τὴν ἡμετέρων ἥλικίαν ἢπόλογον ποιοῦμενος.

Note, that ἢπολογίζομεθα is not restricted to an unfavourable sense; cf. Lysias xxx. 16. p. 184, οἷδέν εἰκός αὐτῷ τοῦτο ἢπόλογον γενίσθα ς [so Bekker; οἷδέν . . . τοῦτον Zurich editors]—where αὐτῷ

means 'in his favour,' and xxviii. 13. p. 180, οἷδε ἄδικως τούτοις φημί ἂν εἶναι ἢπόλογον τὴν ἐκεῖνον φυγὴν,—not, as Taylor, 'honestam

eccubationem in suo exsilio habere,' but 'non injuria is laudi

imputandum.'

The word does not mean 'to subtract,' according to our notion of the operation; but 'to reckon against,' 'per contra'—the same meaning of ἐπὶ which we get in ἐπανήν, ἐπιμοίῳ (.an affidavit to stop' proceedings), ἢποτιμάθαι (equivalent to ἀντιτιμάθαι).

β. ἢποτιμάν.

Rep. 372 d, μετρίως ἢποτιμώντες.
§ 132. Idioms of Particles.

A. Kai expletive,—preceding and indicating the emphatic word.

a. In Relative Interrogative or Conditional sentences. Here kai may generally be rendered 'at all.'

Phaedo 77 b, πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπων σώμα ἀφικέσθαι—'before it came at all.'

Ib. 88 a, πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς—'before we came into being at all.'

Ib. 110 a, ὅποι ἄν καὶ γῇ—'exists at all.'

Apol. 22 a, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνελεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γέρνωτο. Here kai fastens itself to the latter portion of the compound ἀνελεγκτος—'not to be called in question at all.'

Phaedo 66 d, εἷν τις ἡμῶν καὶ σχολή γίνεται.

Ib. 108 d, εἰ καὶ ἠπωτάμων—'if I even had had the knowledge.'

Ib. 110 b, εἰ δεῖ καὶ μεθ'ν λέγειν καλῶν—'if it is allowable to narrate a fiction at all.'

Cf. Thuc. i. 15, ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένετο.

This kai frequently enters into a set phrase with the Adjective σμικρός.

Apol. 28 b, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος ἐστίν.

Soph. 247 c, εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι συγχωρεῖν.

Ib. 261 b, βαρρεῖν ἄρη τὸν καὶ σμικρὸν τι δυνάμενον.

Phileb. 58 a, ξύμαπτας ὅσοι νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρχονται.

Politic. 275 d, πῶς . . . δύνατ' ἄν τις ἀρχήμενος ἀπό δόξης ψευδῶς ἐπὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ μικρὸν μέρος ἀρχηγόμενοι κτήσασθαι φρόνησον;

The remaining passages shew the kai entering into Interrogative phrases.

Enthyphro 3 a, τι καὶ ποιοῦντι σε φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους;

Ib. 6 b, τί γὰρ καὶ φήσωμεν;

Phaedo 61 c, τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ποιοὶ ἄλλο;

Laches 184 d, τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ποιοί;

11 Perhaps it is better to say that the key to these passages is e. g. Thuc. ii. 11, ὅκουν χρῆ, εἴ τρα καὶ δοκοῦσιν πλήθουσα ἵππα, τούτων ἕνεκα ἀμιλέστερον τι παρασκευασμένον χωρεῖ—'if any one considers that we are a numerous force, as we are,'—or rather 'if we are a numerous force, which it might strike any one we were.' So Arist. Eth. Nic. V. xv. 9, εἰς & δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν—'upon this view there is, what we are inclined to think there is, injury of oneself.'
§ 133.

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There is a latent affirmation in a simple Interrogative sentence with τι. The καί neutralises this affirmation. 'What have you done?' implies that you have done something: the first instance above shews how this implication is neutralised. It is not so with πῶς καί, ποῦ καί, &c., where the καί affirms the implied Proposition: Ἀσχ. Choeph. 528, Ποί καί τελεύτα...λόγος; 'what was the issue?'—implying expectation of one. [Dindorf with the MSS. reads Καί ποί. Cf. however Eurip. Phæn. 1354, Πῶς καί πέπρακται διπτέχων παίδων φῶνος;]

β. In Affirmative Independent sentences. Here the force of καί is often difficult to render by a word, but it seems to be always identical with the emphasis.

Phileb. 23 a, παντάπαυσιν ἄν τινα καί ἀτμίμαν σχοῖν.
Euthyd. 304 ε, οὔτωσι γάρ πως καί ἐπε τοῖς ὁνόμασι.
Rep. 328 ε, διὰ χρόνου γάρ καί ἐωράκεν αὐτῶν.
Ib. 395 ε, πολλοῦ καί δεήσομεν. This phrase often recurs.
Symp. 177 a, φάναι δή πάντας καί βούλεσθαι.
Ibid. b, καί τούτο μὲν ἤππον καί διαμαστῶν—where Stallbaum well compares Thuc. vi. 1, ἦ μᾶλλον καί ἐπιθέτο, but wrongly joins καί, both there and here, with the Adverb. [So Stallbaum, but his reference is wrong. He seems to mean Thuc. iv. 1, where the old editions have ἦ μᾶλλον καί ἐπιθέτο, Poppo and Göller with most of the MSS. ἦ καί μᾶλλον ἐπιθέτο.]
Phædo 107 c, ὁ κύνδυνος καί δόξειν ἄν δεινός εἶναι.
Phileb. 25 b, σὺ καί ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὡς οἴμαι.

§ 133. Adverbs of intensity are often thus emphasized.

Apol. 18 b, καί πάλαι πολλά ἤδη ἔτη.
Rep. 342 c, συνεχώρησεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ μᾶλα μόχις.
Symp. 189 a, ἢφι εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὃτι καὶ μᾶλ' ἐπαύσατο.
Ib. 194 a, εὗ καὶ μᾶλ' ἀν φοβοῖο,
Phædo 117 b, καί μᾶλα ἄλωσ. Ibid. c, καὶ μᾶλα εὐχερῶς.
Protag. 315 d, στρώμασι καὶ μᾶλα πολλοὶς.
Legg. 832 a, καὶ μᾶλ' εἶνος οὐκ ἀφνεῖς ὄντας.
Phædo 61 c, καὶ γάρ ἵως καὶ μᾶλλοτα πρέπει μελλοῦτα ἢ κείσαι ὀποθεν-μείν διασκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.
Rep. 404 b, ἅπλὴ ποι καὶ ἐπεικῆς γεμιστικῆ καὶ μᾶλλοτα ἢ περὶ τῶν πόλειμον.

N
DIGEST OF IDIOMS.  [§§ 134, 135.

Iægg. 773 c, ἀ μὴ βουλόμεθα εὐμβαίνειν ἢμῖν, καὶ μάλιστα εὐμβαίνει τάς ἀλήστας πόλεσιν.

Euthyd. 293 c, (A) 'Ἀλλ' οἴδεν ἄρα ἐπίστασθον; (B) Καὶ μάλα, ἢ δ' ὁ — on the contrary.'


§ 134. Καὶ is subject to Hyperbaton in this use as in others. In the foregoing examples the καὶ indicates the stress laid on the word next following it: but when the word to be emphasized begins the clause the καὶ is sometimes postponed.

Phaedo 63 c, εἰπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιοῦτων, διασχυρισάμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο —where the καὶ emphasizes διασχυρισάμην.

Ib. 68 c, ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἢν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὄνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην—where the stress of καὶ includes ἢν.

Gorg. 620 b, μόνοις δ' ἐγώ οὐ καὶ οὕμον τοὺς δημηγόρους καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τοῦτο—where καὶ emphasizes μόνοις.

Cf. Hdt. i. 191, ἐσ' ὁ δὴ καὶ τὸ κάρτα ἐπέδωστο—i.e. (if the order allowed it) τὸ καὶ κάρτα.

§ 135. Ἐν.

a. In Indicative sentences expressing a negative supposition.

Theet. 192 c, Σωκράτης ἐπιγενόσκει . . . , ὅρα δὲ μηδέτερον—'but sees, by the supposition, neither.'

Plutcb. 18 c, τοῦτ' αὐτό τοῖνυν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ πῶς ἔστιν ἂν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον, καὶ πῶς μὴ ἀπείρα εὐθὺς ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 106 d, σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο. The meaning is not 'of all things that exist scarce anything could be, in such a case, exempt from corruption,' but 'there could hardly exist anything not admitting corruption.' The existence of the whole class 'incorruptible' becomes questionable.

Hip. Ma. 297 c, ὁ ἂν χαίρειν ἡμᾶς ποιῇ, μὴ τι πάσαις τᾶς ἔδοξας, ἄλλ' ὁ ἂν διὰ τῆς ἰκονίας—'suppose we say, not.'
§§ 136—139.] PARTICLES. 179

Hipp. Ma. 299 d, ἃρ' οὖν ἦδεν ἡδέος... διαφέρει τῷ ἦδεν εἶναι; μὴ γὰρ εἰ μείζων τις ἠδονή ἢ εὐλαττων.

Politic. 292 e, πεπεπταλι οὐκ ἂν γένοντό ποτε, μὴ τι δὴ βασιλεῖς γε—'let alone kings.' Comparing this with the last instance but one, we see how the force of μὴ τι is enhanced by its following the clause with which it is contrasted.

Tim. 26 c, λέγειν εἰμὶ ἄτομος, μὴ μόνον ἐν κεφαλαῖο͂ς ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Politic. 295 e, μὴ ἐξεῖστω δὴ παρὰ ταῖτα ἑτερα προστάττευν; ('is he to be forbidden?')

Cf. Αἰσχ. iii. 21. p. 56, οὔτι ἤξε, μὴ ἀποδημήσω; ('am I not to' &c.?)

The μὴ in the Brachylogical combination μὴ ὅτι comes under this head; for instances see below, § 154.

§ 136. β. In the Deprecatory form of contradiction.

Euthyd. 294 c, (Α) οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ σαυ ἄκοιναι κ.τ.λ.; (Β) Μηδαιμών· ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 300 a, (Α) τί δέ; (Β) Μηδεῖν.

Protag. 318 b, τοῦτο μὲν αἰδέων βασιλεύσων λέγεις· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὔτως.

Men. 75 a, (Α) πειρῶ εἰσίν. (Β) Μη, ἀλλὰ σὺ εἰπέ.

Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 854, (Α) οὕτος σὺ, τοίθε σὲ; ἐπὶ καδίσκους; (Β) Μηδαιμῶς.

§ 137. γ. In the sense of 'whether.'—For instances see above, § 61.

§ 138. δ. In the sense of 'perhaps'—from which the sense of 'whether' just mentioned flows. See above, § 59.

Euthyd. 298 e, μὴ γάρ, ὥς Εὐθῆδημε, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνον λίνο συνάπτεις;—'are you perhaps not joining' &c.? i.e. 'perhaps you are not joining.'

Protag. 312 a, ἀλλ' ἄρα μὴ οὐχ ἀπολαμβάνεις—'perhaps, then, you on the contrary do not suppose.'

§ 139. Οὐ πάνυ.

The universal meaning of οὐ πάνυ is 'hardly,' 'scarcely.'

Theat. 149 d, οὐ πάνυ τοῦτο οἶδα.

Ib. 172 b, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τολμήσει φῆσισί.

Symp. 180 c, οὐ πάνυ διεμνήσθουσιν.

Ib. 204 d, οὐ πάνυ ἰφην ἐτὶ ἐχειν ἐγὼ προχείρως ἀποκρήνουσθαι.
Phædo 63 a, οὐ πάνω εἰθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι.
Ibid. e, οὐκ ἂν πάνω διασχυρισαίμην.
Ib. 85 d, οὐ πάνω φαίνεται ικανὸς εἰρήσθαι.
Ib. 100 a, οὐ πάνω ἔγγυρον.
Theet. 145 a, οὐ πάνω ἄξιον τῶν νοῶν προσέχειν.
Ib. 176 b, οὐ πάνω ράδιων πείσαι.
Phædo 59 a, οὐδεὶς πάνω μοι ἐλέηυν ἐιστῇ.
Apol. 41 d, καὶ ἔγογγο τοῖς καταψηφισσαμένοις μοι καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνω χαλεπαίνω.

The following three instances are decisive for the meaning 'scarcely'.

Euthyphro 2 b, οὐδ' αὐτῶς πάνω τι γιγνώσκω, ὃ Εἰθένιφρον, τὸν ἄνδρα.
Protag. 331 e, οὐ πάνω οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὐτὸς αὐτὸς οὐ μοι δοκεῖς ὃν ἔστη.
Phileb. 41 a, σχέδον γὰρ τῷ ψεύτει μὲν οὐ πάνω πονηρᾶς ἢν τις λέσας τε καὶ ἡδονᾶς θείη, μεγάλη δὲ ἄλλη καὶ πολλῆ συμπιπτοῦσας πονηρία.

The following three are to be interpreted on the principle of Litotes.

Symp. 195 e, κρανίων, ἃ ἔστιν οὐ πάνω μαλακὰ—'skulls, which can hardly be said to be soft things.'
Apol. 19 a, οἷς δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπῶν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνω μὲ λανθάνει οἶνον ἔστιν—'I can hardly say I do not know.'
Ib. 41 d, καὶ ἔγογγο τοῖς καταψηφισσαμένοις μοι ... οὐ πάνω χαλεπαίνω—'I can scarcely say I am displeased'—'I have no sufficient cause to be displeased.'


§ 140. Different is Laches 183 c, οὐ πάνω ὀλγοῖ έγώ τούτων παραγένοι—where πάνω goes closely with ὀλγοῖς. Quite different also are πάνω οὐ, παντάπασιν οὐ, &c.

§ 141. οὐδέ.

The use of οὐδὲ for καὶ οὐ in the sense not of 'and not' but of 'also not' is worth pointing out in cases where the οὐδὲ qualifies specially not a Substantive (the common case) but some other Part of Speech.

Phileb. 23 b, σχεδόν δὲ οὐδὲ ράδιων—for σχεδόν δὲ καὶ οὐ ράδιων.
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Legg. 730 d, τίμιος μὲν δή καὶ ὁ μηδὲν ἄδικῶς ὁ δὲ μηδ’ ἐπιτρέπων τοῖς ἄδικοισιν ἄδικων πλεον ἣ διπλασίας τιμῆς ἄξιος ἴκεινον—'but he who beyond this does not allow' &c.

Euthyphro 15 b, μέμψασε γὰρ που ὁτι κ.τ.λ. ἣ οὐδὲ μέμψασαι;—for ἢ καὶ οὐ μέμψασαι;' or on the contrary;' lit. 'or, which is also an alternative.'

Phædo 72 a, ἵδε τοινὰς ὅτι οὐθ’ ἄδικως ἁμολογήκαμεν—i. e. ἵδε τοινὰς καὶ τοινὰς ὅτι οὐκ ἄδικας ὁμ.

Crito 44 b, ὃς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐδὲ μία ἔμφορα ἐστίν, ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. Taking this reading now for granted [Oxon. and one other MS. have οὐδεμά], it will be explained by resolving the οὐδὲ, and attaching the καὶ to ὃς, ‘since moreover the event of your death is to me not one misfortune, but’ &c.

Ib. 45 a, καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ ταργύριον ἐστί—for καὶ γὰρ καὶ κ.τ.λ.
Ib. 45 c, ἐτὶ δὲ οὐδὲ δίκαιον—for ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ οὐ δίκαιον.
Cf. Isoer. xviii. 65. p. 383, δὴ οὖθ’ οὖτω ρώδιον ἥ—'when, besides, it was not easy.' Ar. Eth. V. viii. 10, ἐτὶ δὲ οὐδὲ—for ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ οὐ.

§ 142. ἄλλα.

a. Introducing a supposed objection.

Rep. 365 c–d, we have seriatisιν ἄλλα γὰρ— ἄλλα δὴ.

Apol. 37 b–c, we have the series πότερον— ἄλλα— ἄλλα δὴ.

β. Introducing an instance.

Symp. 196 d—197 a, we have the series πρῶτον μὲν—καὶ μὲν δὴ... γε— ἄλλα.

§ 143. Εἴθεσ, νῦν, αἰτία, πολλάκις, &c.

a. εἴθεσ, ‘from first to last,' Phdr. 259 c.

β. νῦν, ‘as the case now stands,’ Crito 54 b, Apol. 38 b.

γ. αἰτία, ‘for instance,’ Theæt. 166 b, Protag. 359 e, Phdr. 235 c, Legg. 727 a, Gorg. 483 a, ὁσπερ αἰτία, Laches 195 b, ἐτεί αἰτία.

δ. πολλάκις, ‘perchance,’ after μὴ, Protag. 361 c : after ἐτι ἀρα, Phædo 60 c, Laches 179 b, 194 a, Politic. 264 b, ἐτι τινων πολλάκις ἀρα διακήκασ, Phdr. 238 d, ἀρα πολλάκις νυμφιλητος γίνωμαι.

And perhaps Phædo 73 d, ὁσπερ γε καὶ Σμμίαν τις ἑδων πολλάκις κέβηστος αἰνιμνήσθη.

ε. ὅτε, ‘whereas,’ "Or' οὖν δὴ equivalent to ἐπειδὴ οὖν, Soph. 254 b, Tim. 69 a. So ὅπως, Euthyd. 297 d, Laches 169 d.
§ 144. The remaining heads treat of Particles in combination.

B. In order to understand and to interpret certain combinations of Particles, regard must be had to the fact, that they enter simultaneously into the sentence, as it were speaking at once rather than in succession.

a. A familiar instance is the combination καί—δέ, e.g.

Rep. 573 b, ἐν ἐν καθήη σωφροσύνης, καὶ μανίας δέ πληρώσῃ ἐπακ-τοῦ. The δέ and the καί enter into the meaning abreast of one another.

§ 145. b. Καί μέντοι only differs from καί—δέ in that the μέντοι is stronger than the δέ, and that the two Particles are not necessarily separated by the intervention of other words.

Symp. 214 c, καί μέντοι οὕτωι ποίησον.

Ib. 222 a, καί μέντοι οὐκ ἐμὲ μόνον ταῦτα πεποίηκεν, ἄλλα καὶ Χαρ-μίδην κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 17 c, καί μέντοι καὶ πάνυ τοῦτο ὕμων δέομαι.

Ib. 26 e, ἀπιστῶς γ' εἰ, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι σαντῷ.

Ib. 31 b, καί εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τοῦτων ἀπελανόν κ.τ.λ.

Euthyd. 289 e, καί μέντοι οὐδὲν θαυμαστῶν.

Alec. I. 113 c, καί μέντοι καί εἴ λέγεις.

§ 146. c. Such a combination again is καί ὀὖν καί.

Protag. 309 b, καί γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἴπε, βοηθῶν ἐμοί, καὶ ὀὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἑκείνου ἔρχομαι.

d. Such again is δ' ἄλλα.

Soph. 235 d, σὺ δ' ἄλλα εἴπε πρῶτον.

e. And again δε—μέντοι.

Phdr. 267 c, Πρωταγόρειος δὲ οὐκ ἤν μέντοι τοιαύτ' ἄττα;

§ 147. f. ἄλλα γὰρ.

Here we must observe that there is no Ellipse, such as is involved in the supposition that, whereas the γὰρ refers to the clause immediately subjoined to it, the ἄλλα belongs either to a clause understood or to a clause following at a greater distance. The sense forbids such a supposition: for the ἄλλα sits much closer to the clause immediately subjoined than the γὰρ does. ἄλλα γὰρ has two meanings: one when it introduces an objection, and is therefore ironical; the other, which alone needs illustration, when it has the force of 'but be that as it may,' or 'but the truth is.'
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$\S\ 148.$

Smyr. 180 a, Ἀπόκλισις δὲ φλιταρεί κ.τ.λ.: ἄλλα γὰρ τῷ ὅπτεν κ.τ.λ.
Phdr. 228 a, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαίδρων ἄγνωκ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέγομαι: ἄλλα γὰρ ὁδήγερα ὕπτεν τοίτων.
Phaed. 87 d, μέτρι· ἂν μοι φαίνοντο λέγειν, ὡς ἢ μὲν ψυχή πολυχρώμων ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενεστέρον καὶ ὀλγοχρώμωστερον. ἄλλα γὰρ ἂν φαίνεται ἵναι πολλὰ σώματα καταρρίπτειν ... ἀναγκαῖον μὲν· ἂν εἴη κ.τ.λ.—'but, he might say, be that as it may, ' &c.
Ib. 95 c-d, μνημέω ... ὅτι πολυχρώμων ἐστι ψυχή κ.τ.λ. ἄλλα γὰρ ὁδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθανατον.
Meno 94 c, ἄλλα γὰρ, ὡ ἐταῖρε, μή ὦκ ἢ διδακτῶν ἄρετή—'but the truth is.'
Apol. 19 c, καὶ οὐκ ὡς ἀτμαίσων λέγω κ.τ.λ. ἄλλα γὰρ ἐμοί τοίτων, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, οἰδίν μέτεσθι. So Ibid. d, Ib. 25 c, &c.

§ 148. g, 'Αλλ' ἢ, πλῆν ἢ.

The joint meaning is 'except.' By the ἄλλα the exception to the negative which has preceded is stated flatly: the ἢ allows the negative statement to revive, subject to this exception alone.

Smyr. 189 e, μὲν δ' οὐκ ἐστιν [ἀνδρόγυνον] ἄλλ' ἢ ἐν ὑνείδει ὅνομα κείμενον.

Phaed. 82 b, μὴ φιλοσοφήσατι οὐ δέμει ἀφικνείσθαι ἄλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλό—

P. 81 b, ὡστε μηδέν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἄλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές.
Ib. 97 d, οἰδέν ἄλλο σκόπειν προσήκειν ἀνδρόσφα ... ἄλλ' ἢ τὸ ἀριστον.
Protag. 329 d, οἰδέν διαφέρει ἄλλ' ἢ μεγέθει καὶ συμκρότητι.
Ib. 334 c, μὴ χρῆσαι εἰλαῖο, ἄλλ' ἢ ὁ τι συμκρότηρον.
Ib. 354 b, ἢ ἔχετε τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, ... ἄλλ' ἢ ἡδονάς τι καὶ λίπας;—The interrogative is equivalent to a negative; so that the rule stands good that ἄλλ' ἢ occurs only after a negative in the main construction. The ἄλλο is anticipatory of the exception, and this is also pleonastic.

Apol. 42 a, ἄδηλον παρτὶ πλῆν ἢ τῷ θεῷ—again a virtually negative sentence, the ἄδηλον παρτὶ being equivalent to ἄδηλον οἰδενι. The analogy of ἄλλ' ἢ perfectly justifies, so far as Syntax is concerned, the disputed reading πλῆν ἢ. The πλῆν and the ἢ enter the meaning simultaneously, introducing the exception
each in its own way; πλήρες implies 'it is known to none—
saving that [in contradiction to this] it is known to God;' ἦ, less harshly, 'it is known to none, or however [only] to God.'

Cf. Thuc. v. 60, οὐ μετά τῶν πλειονῶν βουλευσάμενος, ἀλλ' ἦ ἐνι ἀνδρὶ κοινώσας, 86, ἐψηφίσατο . . . μὴ ἐξομβάλειν τῷ ἀλλ' ἦ ἀρα, vii. 50, οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐκτιμοῖτο, ἀλλ' ἦ ἡ φανεραῖς γε ἀξίων ψηφίζεσθαι, viii. 28, οὗ προσδεχομένων ἀλλ' ἦ Ἀττικᾶς τὰς ναῦς εἶναι.

§ 149. h. νῦν δὲ . . . γάρ. This combination is always preceded by a hypothesis of something contrary to facts, and is parallel to the Protaasis of that sentence, which it contradicts. The δὲ and the γάρ exercise a simultaneous force; δὲ represents that the condition stands differently in fact from what it is in the supposed case, and γάρ further represents that the inference must be different.

The combinations νῦν δὲ . . . γάρ and ἀλλ' γάρ approach each other in meaning as well as in structure. Νῦν δὲ . . . γάρ is however only used in contradicting the Protaasis of a hypothetical proposition. There is of course no Ellipse to be supplied; that is, we are not to look on to a sentence beyond to supply a clause to the νῦν δὲ. The δὲ sits as close to the clause immediately subjoined as does the γάρ: the νῦν ('as the case actually stands') belongs to both Particles equally. Some of the instances which follow would admit of the Elliptical explanation of the νῦν δὲ but none of them necessitate it, and some others do not admit of it.

Euthyphro ii c, καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἵσως ἂν με ἐπέσκοπτες:
νῦν δὲ σαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν. ἀλλ' οὐ δὴ τωσοῦ δὲι σκόμματος.

Ib. 14 c, ὁ εἰ ἀπεκρίνο, ἵκανως ἂν ἢδ' ἐμεμαθήκη. νῦν δὲ ἀνέγκῃ γὰρ
τὸν ἑρωτώντα τῷ ἑρωτευμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν. τί δὴ αὐξ λέγεις κ.τ.λ.;

Apol. 38 a, εἰ μὲν ἢν μοι χρῆματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔσην.

Protag. 347 a, σὲ οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέτοχος ἔλεγες ἐπεικεία καὶ ἀληθῆ, οὐκ ἂν
ποτὲ ἐφεσον. νῦν δὲ σφαδήμα γὰρ ψευδομένως δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν
διὰ ταύτα σε ἐγὼ ψέων.

Charm. 175 a-b, οὗ γὰρ ἂν ποι . . . ἀνωφελεῖς ἐφάνη, εἰ τί εἴμοι οδηγεῖς
ἡν. νῦν δὲ πανταχὺ γὰρ ἑπτώμεθα.

Laches 184 d, εἰ μὲν γὰρ συνεφερέσθην τόδε, ἦττιν ἂν τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἔδει,
νῦν δὲ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γὰρ λάχης Νικία ἐθετο. εὖ δὴ ἔχει ἀκοάσαι καὶ σοῦ.

Ib. 200 c, εἰ μὲν αὖν κ.τ.λ., δίκαιως ἂν ἢν κ.τ.λ. νῦν δ' ὁμοίως γὰρ
πάντες ἐν ὑπορία ἐγενόμεθα. τί οὖν ἂν τις κ.τ.λ.;
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§ 150. i. The cases of ὦ μὴ and μὴ ὦ, when they make one negative, must be explained upon this principle of simultaneity of force. The resulting negation, though single, is both subjective and objective.

Of ὦ μὴ a single instance may suffice.

Laches 197 d, καὶ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖς οὐδὲ μὴ ἴσθήσαται ὦ τι κ.τ.λ.

Of the uses of μὴ ὦ Mr. Campbell, Theaetetus, Appendix B, has given a happy analysis and explanation. But it may be noticed that in a peculiar instance his restriction of μὴ ὦ to a Dependent clause, with the Infinitive or Participle, does not apply.

Phileb. 12 e, πῶς γὰρ ἤδονή γε ἤδονή μὴ οἷς ὀμοίωτατον ἦν εἰς;—

which however is virtually equivalent to πῶς γὰρ ἦν ἐνδίχοιτο,

ἤδονήν ἤδονή μὴ οἷς ὀμοίωτατον εἶναι;

§ 151. C. Many combinations of Particles are Elliptical. Such are those of a Negative with ὦτι or ὄπωσ which follow.

a. Οὐ μόνον ὀτι—'I was not only going to say' (parenthetically).

Symp. 179 b, ἔθελονσιν, οὐ μόνον ὀτι ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ καὶ κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 751 b, οὐ μόνον οὐδέν πλέον εἰ τεθέντων, οὐδὲ ὦτι γίλως ἦν πάμπολος ἐπιμαθεῖον, σχεδὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 85, καὶ γὰρ ὦ μόνον ὄτι αὐτοὶ ἄνθιστατε, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς ἦν εἰπὼ, ἴσθον τις ἐμοὶ πρώτεσιν.

§ 152. b. οἷς ὄπωσ has a similar meaning in Negative sentences. Whence moreover οἷς ὄπωσ is said to be equivalent to οἷς ὄπωσ ὄτι which means that the Negative which follows extends its meaning backwards over the οἷς ὄπωσ clause.

Meno 96 a, οἱ φάσκοντες διδάσκαλος εἶναι οἷς ὄπωσ ἄλλων διδάσκαλον ὀμολογοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθαν.

Cf. Thucyd. i. 35, οἷς ὄπωσ κωλυταὶ . . . γενήσεσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . περιόψιεσθε (where the Negative is borrowed by κωλυταί γενήσεσθε from περιόψιεσθε, which being its opposite is a virtual Negative), iii. 42, οἷς ὄπωσ (ημοῦν ἄλλα μὴ ἀπεμαζέων.

§ 153. c. οἷς ὦτι—'not but that'; lit. 'I was not going to deny
that' (parenthetically). Occurring in sentences of Negative form, it borrows their Negative. It is quite different from ὅπως ὅτι.

Thetæ. 157 b, ὅπως ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὔδεν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ κἂν αὐτῷ...τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἔξωρετον, οὐ̂χ ὅτι ἤμεις...ἡμακασμεθα...χρήσιβι αὐτῷ.

Protag. 336 d, Σωκράτης ἐγγύωμαι μη ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐ̂ξ ὅτι παίζει—'for all it be true that' &c.

Gorg. 450 e, οὐ̂δεμιᾶς οἴμαι σε βούλεσθαι ἡμητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐ̂χ ὅτι τὸ γέματο εἴπες.

Lysis 219 c, πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη σπούδη οὐ̂ξ ὅτι τούτως ἐστὶν ἐσπονδασμένη...οὐ̂ξ ὅτι πολλάκις λέγομεν κ.τ.λ.

§ 154. d. Μὴ ὅτι—'nedum,' 'much less' or 'much more,' according as the sentence is Negative or Affirmative: 'not to say,' i. e. not supposing us to say.

Symp. 207 e, μη ὅτι...ἀλλὰ καί. So 208 a.

Apol. 40 d, μη ὅτι...ἀλλὰ.

Protag. 319 d, μη τοιόντων ὅτι...ἀλλὰ.

Legg. 799 c, τὰς ποὺν νέους, μη ὅτι πρεσβύτης.

Crat. 427 e, ὅτιοι πράγμα, μη ὅτι τοσοῦτον.

Phileb. 60 d, καὶ ὅτιοι εἶναι ἡ γέγονεσθαι, μη ὅτι δὴ γε ἡδονὴν.

Phdr. 240 e, καὶ λόγῳ ἰκονεῖν οὐ̂ξ ἐπιτρέπει, μη ὅτι δὴ κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 512 b, δε οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μη ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλου οὐ̂δενὸς ἐλάπτω εἴποτε δύναται σώζειν.

§ 155. D. Elliptical also, but in a still greater degree, are the combinations which now follow.

a. Οὐ μέντοι ἄλλα—'yet, so far from the contrary.' After oὐ ἰπόται is to be understood a proposition the contrary of that which follows the ἄλλα.

Symp. 199 a, χαιρετὸν δὴ: οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ἑγκωμιάζω τούτων τὸν τρόπον οὐ̂ μέντοι ἄλλα τὰ γε ἀληθῆ...ἐθέλω εἴπειν—'yet not so that I am unwilling,—on the contrary I am willing,—to utter the truth.'

Meno 86 c, (A) βούλεις οὖν κ.τ.λ.; (B) Πάνω μὲν οὖν, οὐ̂ μέντοι, δε Σώκρατες, ἄλλα ἔγωγε ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἢδισσα σκέψαιμην—'yet not so that it would not,—on the contrary it would,—be most to my taste to' &c.

Crat. 436 d, ἑκεῖνης δὲ ἐξετασθεῖσα ἰκανοὶ, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἑκεῖνη ἐπίσημα, οὐ̂ μέντοι ἄλλα θαυμάζομ' ἐν τί καὶ τὰ ὄνομα σαμβοῶνει αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς—'yet I do not mean by this, that I should not wonder,—on the contrary I should wonder,—if' &c.
Cf. Thuc. v. 43, οὗ μέντοι ἄλλα καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν ἁπαντοίοτο. So viii. 56, ἵνα τῆς ἄλλης ἁπάρα νομίζοντες κ.τ.λ.

§ 156. b. Of οὗ γὰρ ἄλλα the same explanation holds;—'for not the contrary, but,' i.e. 'for, so far from the contrary.'

Euthyd. 305 ε, τί οὖν; δοκοῦσι σοι τι λέγειν; οὗ γὰρ τοι ἄλλα ὅ γε λόγος ἵπτει τινά εὐπρέπειαν—'for I must say;' &c.: more literally, 'for, do you know, so far from the contrary,' &c.

Ib. 286 b, πᾶς λέγεις; οὗ γὰρ τοι ἄλλα τοιτῶν γε τὸν λόγον . . . ἰδι παμάζω—'for, do you know, I must say I' &c.

Phaedo 83 e, κόσμοι τε εἰσι καὶ ἀνδρείαι, οἷς ὄν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐνεκά φασιν . . . οὗ γὰρ ἄλλα οὕτως λογίσατε ἰδι ψυχῇ ἀνδρῶς φιλοσοφοῦν—'for, so far from the contrary,—i.e. 'for, most assuredly.'

§ 157. c. οὗ μόνον ἡ γάλα.

Phaedo 107 b, οὗ μόνον γ' ἄλλα ταυτά τε εὐ λέγεις, καὶ τὰς ἱσποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ἵμων εἰσώ, ὅμως ἐπίσκεπται. The full construction is οὗ μόνον γε ταυτά εὐ λέγεις, ἄλλα ταυτά τε εὐ λέ-

§ 158. What is to be noticed as to all the three expressions, οὗ μέντοι ἄλλα, οὗ γὰρ ἄλλα, and οὗ μόνον γ' ἄλλα, is, that the οὗ is not retrospective but proleptic, referring to a proposition which is not expressed but is indicated by its contrary expressed in the ἄλλα clause.

§ 159. E. Other noticeable combinations of Particles are such as follow.

a. Μέν γε answered by δέ, in working out a contrast between two characters.

Symp. 180 d, πῶς δ' οὗ δύο τῷ θεί; ἢ μέν γε κ.τ.λ. ἢ δέ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 215 b, πολύ γε θαυμασιώτερος ἐκείνος' ὁ μέν γε κ.τ.λ. σὺ δέ κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. i. 70, οἱ μέν γε νεωτεροποιοί. Dem. de Cor. 93. p. 257,

b. καὶ μὴν οὔδέ . . . γε.

Legg. 728 d—e, τίμουν εἶτα σῶμα οὐ τῷ καλῶν οὔδέ ἱσχυρῶν κ.τ.λ., καὶ μὴν οὔδέ τα τούτων γ' ἐννοία, τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ κατω.

§ 160. The following are various combinations with δέ, to which γε is often subjoined.
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c. Kai μέν δή, with and without ςε subjoined.


Symp. 196 c, φ. δὴ πρώτα ἡμᾶς μαρτυρίῳ χρησθαι, ὅτι ποιηθής ὡς ἔρως . . . πίσων ποίησαν τὴν κατὰ μουσικὴν . . . καὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν γε τῶν ξών ποίησεν τίς ἐναντίωσεν κ.τ.λ.;

Soph. 217 b, καὶ μέν δὴ κατὰ τύχην γε, ὡς Σώκρατες, λόγων ἐπελάβουν παραπλησίων κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 231 d, καὶ μέν δὴ εἰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. So 232 b, 233 a.

d. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, without or with ςε.

Crat. 428 b, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ—well, no doubt.'

Crito 48 a, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . ςε—‘well, but then’ (in the mouth of an objector).

Phædo 75 a, Euthyphro 10 d, Gorg. 492 e, 506 d, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . ςε—‘but further’—in a consecutive proof.

c. Ἀτὰρ οὖν δὴ . . . ςε. Politic. 269 d.


g. Οὖ γὰρ δὴ . . . ςε. Phædo 92 b.

h. Ὑς δὴ τοι—‘how true is it that.’ Rep. 366 e, Tim. 26 b.

i. Ὑς δὴ σὺ—ironical. Gorg. 468 e, 499 b.

j. Kai δὴ καὶ—‘then, I suppose,’ ironically. Apol. 26 d.

§ 161. F. Correlative Particles.

a. It is worth observing that in the Laws of Plato ω is more frequently δὲ contrasted with it than ἀλλὰ.

b. Instead of the common ἀλλως τε καὶ we find sometimes καὶ ἀλλως καὶ, as Laches 181 a, 187 e.

c. Irregular Correlatives.

Tim. 20 d, μᾶλα μὲν ἕτων, παραπασί τι ςε μὲν ἅλθονς.

Legg. 927 b, δὲ μὲν ἁκούσας, βλέπουσα τε δὲ.

Symp. 205 d, τὸ μὲν κεφαλαίου, κ.τ.λ. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

H. 177 b, καὶ τούτο μὲν ἵπτον καὶ θαυμαστὸν, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 38 d, ἀπορία μὲν ἰδών, οὐ μέντοι λόγων.

§ 162. Note, that μέντοι is used, and not δὲ, (1) when particular emphasis has to be given to the opposition; (2) where, as in the instance here quoted, δὲ could not be conveniently used; (3) in expressing opposition to a clause which is itself introduced by δὲ.
COMPARISON.

§ 163. Idioms of Comparison.

A. Syntax of words of the Comparative Degree.
B. "", words of the Superlative Degree.
C. "", other Comparative words and formulae.

A. Comparatives.

a. Ordinary form.

The only case needing remark under this head is that of a clause compared by ἐγώ, while its pronominal pre-statement (see above, § 19) is compared in the Genitive.

Phædo 89 d, οὖκ ἂν τίς μείζων τούτων κακῶν πάθοι, ἡ λόγους μασήσας.

Crito 44 e, τίς ἂν αὐτῶιν εἰπ ταύτης δόξα, ἡ δοκεῖν κ.τ.λ.;

So Lysias xxv. 23. p. 173, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν εἰπ αὐτῶις χαλεπώτερον τούτων, ἡ πνευμάσθαι. We trace the Idiom back to Homer, Od. vi. 182, οὐ μέν γὰρ τούτῳ κρίεσον καὶ ἄρειον, Ὡ δὲ ομοφρονέοντε νομίσαι οἴκον ἔχτων Ὀμήρῳ ἤδε γνυν. So Hdt. i. 79, ὡς οἱ παρὰ δόξαν ἐσχέ τὰ πρήγματα, ἦ ὡς αὐτῶς κατεδόκει.

§ 164. b. Rarer forms.

a. ἐγώ as the Conjunction of Comparison.

Rep. 526 e, ἂ γε μείζων πόνον παρέχει οὖκ ἂν ῥαδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὔροι ὡς τοῦτο.

Apol. 36 d, οὐκ ἔστι τί μᾶλλον πρέπει ὡτός ὡς . . . συνείσθαι.


§ 165. β. Comparative followed by Prepositions.

Παρά. Note, that the παρά in this construction is not 'beyond,' but 'contrasted with' (lit. 'put co-ordinate with.') Cf. Phdr. 276 e, παγκάλην λέγει παρά φαύλην παιδίων. And Thucyd. v. 90, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ξυμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέλειπθε.

Politic. 296 a, εἰ τις γεγρώσκει παρὰ τούς τῶν ἐμπροσθεν βελτίων νόμους.

Legg. 729 e, ἐστὶ τά τῶν ξένων καὶ εἰς τούς ξένους ἀμαρτήματα παρὰ τά τῶν πολιτών εἰς θεὸν ἀνημητιμένα τιμωρών μᾶλλον.

Πρὸ.

Phædo 99 a, δικαιότερον . . . εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν . . . ἔπείχεν . . . δίκην.

Crito 54 b, μήπε παῦς περὶ πλείονος παιοῦ μήπε τὸ ξύν μήπε ἀλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου.

Cf. Hdt. i. 62, οἴσι ὡς τυραννίς πρὸ πλευθερίας ἦν ἀπαρακότερον.

\[\text{'Antr.}
\]
\[\text{Rep. 619 c, aitìaσθαι τῶν κακῶν πάντα μᾶλλον ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ.}
\]
\[\text{'Εν.}
\]
\[\text{Euthyd. 303 c, πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα οἱ λόγοι ὑμῶν καλὰ ἔχουσιν, ἐν}
\]
\[\text{δὲ τοις καὶ τούτῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον.}
\]
\[\text{Κατὰ αὖτέρα.}
\]
\[\text{Phædo 94 e, πολὶ θεωτέρου τῶν πράγματος ἡ καθ' ἄρμονίαν.}
\]

§ 166.  c. Irregularities.

\[\text{a. Pleonastic form.}
\]
\[\text{Crat. 433 d, ἔχεις τινὰ καλλίω τρόπων . . . ἔλλος, ἡ κ.τ.λ.;}
\]
\[\text{Gorg. 482 b, ὁμιᾷ τὴν λύραν μοι κρείττον εἶναι ἀναρροστεῖν . . . μᾶλλον}
\]
\[\text{ἡ ἐμὲ ἐρματὸ ἀνήμφοων εἶναι.}
\]
\[\text{Charm. 159 c, Politic. 286 a, Tim. 87 c, Legg. 729 e, 854 e;—all}
\]
\[\text{instances of a Comparative Adjective or Adverb with μᾶλλον or}
\]
\[\text{ἡπτὼν.}
\]

§ 167.  β. Comparative in regimen twice over.

\[\text{Protag. 350 b, θαρμαλεώτεραι εἰσίν αὐτῷ ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὰν μᾶθοσι, ἡ}
\]
\[\text{πρὶν μαθεῖν.}
\]
\[\text{Sympr. 220 c, προθυμότερος ἔγενοι τῶν ὀπταθηγῶν ἐμὲ λαβεῖν ἡ σεαυτῷ.}
\]
\[\text{A compendious way of saying two things; one, that Socrates}
\]
\[\text{was anxious that Aleibiades should be chosen rather than}
\]
\[\text{himself; the other, that, though the generals too were anxious}
\]
\[\text{for this, Socrates was more anxious than they. This}
\]
\[\text{construction is illustrated by the other simpler instance.}
\]
\[\text{Exactly parallel is Thuc. vii. 66, τὸ γ' ὑπόλοιπον τῆς δόξης ἀσθενεύστερον}
\]
\[\text{αὐτῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐι μηδ' θυμόταταν.}
\]

§ 168.  γ. Case after ἡ assimilated to the Case before it, by Attraction.

\[\text{Phædo 110 c, ἐκ [χρωμάτων] λαμπροτέρως καὶ καθαρωτέρως ἡ τούτων.}
\]
\[\text{Meno 83 c, ἀπὸ μείζονος ἡ τοσαίτης γραμμῆς.}
\]
\[\text{This does not appear to be the regular construction. Compare}
\]
\[\text{the constructions with ὀστέρ, §§ 175, 176, below. The Homeric use}
\]
\[\text{with ἡ varies: on the one hand we have, II. i. 260, καὶ ἄρεισσιν ἥπερ}
\]
\[\text{ὑμῶν Ἀνδρίσων ὑμίλημα; on the other hand, II. x. 557, ἀμείνων, ἡ}
\]
\[\text{περ ὀλέ, ἑίπτειν διαρρήγαιν, Od. xvii. 417, σὲ χρῆ δομέναι καὶ λάον ἡ}
\]
\[\text{περ ἄλλοι. II. xxiv. 486, Μνήσαι πατρός σείο . . . Τηλίκου ὀστέρ ἑγών.}
\]
\[\text{In Demosth. also there are both constructions with ἡ e.g. F. L. 27.}
\]
\[\text{p. 349, υἱὲν ἐλάττονος ἡ τούτου; but De Cor. 162. p. 281, τῶν πρότερον}
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η ἐγὼ δοκιμασάντων, ib. 178. p. 287, ἡμῶν ἁμείνον ἢ 'κενοῦ προορωμένων.


Legg. 956 a, ὅφη πὲ πλέον ἔργον γνωσθεύσης μᾶς ἐμμηνοῦ.
Ib. 958 e, ὑψηλότερον πέντε ἀνθρώπων ἔργον.
Phædo 75 a, οὗ περὶ τοῦ ἱσοῦ . . . μᾶλλον τι καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ.
[Oxon. alone omits η here. The other MSS. and the edd. have η καὶ.]

§ 170. e. Omission of μᾶλλον.

Rep. 370 a, ἀλλ' ἱσος οὔτω ρᾴδιον ἢ 'κεῖνος.
Meno 94 e, ἣ τοῦ ρᾴδιον ἐστὶ κακῶς ποιήσατε ἄνθρωπος η ἐν. Cf., as the
Zurich editors suggest, Lysias xii. 89. p. 128, Isocrates. v. 115.
Tim. 75 e, ἐξυπνοῦσε τοῦ πλείονος βίου φαντάστων δὲ τῶν ἐλάττων ἁμείνον ὡς παντὶ πώτερα αἰρέταιν.
Cf. Xen. Mem. IV. iii. 9, εἴ Ἰρανὶ ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔργον η ("other
than") ἄνθρωπον δείχνειν. Lysias ii. 62. p. 196, διανοοῦν μετ'
εὐθείας αἱρόμενοι η βίον μετ' δυσλείας, xxii. 22. p. 163, οὐκ οὖν
οὐ τινας ἡ ἕμας ἐξουσίθην περὶ ἐμοῦ δικαστὰς γενόθαι.

§ 171. B. Superlatives.

a. Ordinary form.

b. Rarer forms—with Prepositions.

'Επί.

Tim. 23 b, τὸ καλλίστον καὶ ἀριστόν γένος ἢ τ' ἄνθρωπους.

Perhaps this is consciously Homeric: cf. e. g. Od. xxiii. 124, σὴν
gάρ ἀριστήν Μήτην ἐν' ἄνθρωπους φάντ' ἐμμεναι.

Periphrastic with ἐν.

Legg. 742 e, τοὺς κεκτημένους ἐν ὁλίγοις τῶν ἄνθρωπων πλείονον νομίσματος ἄξιον κτήματα.
Ib. 892 a, ὡς ἐν πρῶτοις ἐστὶ σωμάτων ἐμπροσθεν ποιῶν γενομενή.

§ 172. c. Irregularities.

a. Legg. 969 a, ἄνθρωπος τῶν ύπερον ἐπιγραμμένων. Cf.
Phædo 62 a, τούτο μόνον τῶν ἀλλων ἀπάντων.

β. Pleonastic.

Symp. 218 d, τοῦ ὡς δ' τι βλέπτων ἡμε γενέθηκα.
Legg. 731 b, πράον ὡς δ' τι μάλιστα.
Ib. 908 a, ὡς δ' τι μάλιστα ἄγρυπνατος.
§ 173. C. Other Comparative words and formulae.

a. With ἐ.

Rep. 330 c, οἱ δὲ κτησίμενοι διπλὴ ἡ ὁ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά.

Ib. 534 a, ὅνι μὴ ἡμῖν πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἡ ὁσῶν οἱ παρελθόντες.

Ib. 455 c, διαφερόντως ἔχει ἡ τὸ τῶν γυναικών.

Phaedo 95 c, διαφερόντως ἡ εἰ ἐν ἄλλοι βιοί βιοῦς ἐτελεύτα.

Phdr. 228 d, διαφέρειν τὰ τοῦ ἐρώτητος ἡ τὰ τὸν μή.

Crat. 435 a, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνωμοίου γε ἡ ὁ διανοούμενος φθέγγομαι.

Phileb. 35 a, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐκατοντῶν ἡ πάσχει. So Phdr. 275 a.

Gorg. 481 c, ἀλλὰ τίς ἡμῶν ἢδον τι ἐπιστέο πάθος ἡ ὁ ἄλλοι.

Crito 53 e, τι ποιῶν ἡ εἰσχοῦμενος εν θεταλία;
§ 176. Note, that where the Noun brought into comparison by ὁς ἐπερ is the Subject of the Relative clause, there is a preference for the Nominative, in spite of such an Ellipse of the Verb as might have led to an Attracted Construction.

Cf. Hom. Il. xxiv. 486, ἔλασσαι πατρὸς σείο, θείος ἐπείκελ᾽ Ἀριλλεύν, ἦλικον, ὁς ἐπερ ὑγόν. Lysias vi. 32, p. 106, λυπουμένη ὁς ἐπερ αὐτός ὦ τὰ τῶν μειζόνων ἀπόρρητα. This non-admission of Attraction often secures the meaning; as Αἴσχιν. ii. 120, τούς μικροπολίτας, ὁς ἐπερ αὐτός, φοβεῖν ὑμᾶς ἐν ὁμίχλῃ. [So Bekker: αὐτοὺς Zurich ed.] Jelf (Gr. Gr. § 869) notices, as rare instances of Attraction, Thuc. vi. 68, οἷς ἀπολέστου ὁς ἐπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς, Soph. Ο. C. 869, δοιη βίον Τοιοῦτων οὖν καὶ γιρᾶναι ποτε, Λύσ. 492. 72, [i.e. xiii. 72. p. 136] ὅδεμοι γὰρ ἐστίν Ἀγάρατον Ἀθηναίων εἶναι ὁς ἐπερ θραυσίβουλον. We may add, however, from Plato, the instance in Apol. 17 c, οὕτω ἂν πρέπει τῇ τῇ ἠλικίᾳ ὁς ἐπερ μειρακίῳ πάλπτοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσίναι,—where μειρακίῳ is affected by Attraction to πάλπτοντι.

§ 177. d. Comparison of one Sentence as a whole with another.

Syrp. 179 c, διὰ ταύτα δίκην αὐτῷ ἐπέθεσαν, ... οὖ ός ἐπερ Ἀχιλλέα ἐτίμησαν.

Ib. 189 c, δοκοῦσι ... θυσίας ἂν ποιεῖν ..., οἷς ἐπερ νῦν τούτων οὐδὲν γίγνεται.

Ib. 213 b, ἀλλοχων αὖ μὲ ἐνταῦθα κατέκειτο, ὁς ἐπερ εἰώθης ἐξαίφνης ἀναφαίνεσθαι.

Ib. 216 d, ἐρωτικὸς διάκειται ... καὶ αὖ ... οὐδὲν οὐδὲν, ὥς το σχῆμα αὐτοῦ ποτέ οὖ Σεληνῶδες; This sentence becomes an instance under the present head by the removal of the stop after ποτέ. The liveliness of the passage gains by this, as much as it suffers by the common punctuation. The conversion of a categorical sentence at its close into an interrogative one is natural and common. [The Zurich editors have the common punctuation.]

Theæt. 187 b, χρῆ, ἢ θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύμως μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὄνειρος ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Apol. 39 c, τιμωριάν ὑμῖν ἤζειν ... χαλεπωτέραν κη Δί ἡ ὡς εἰς ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε.

Cf., perhaps, Thuc. i. 19, ἐγένετο αὐτῶς ἐς τῶν μικροπολίτας, ἰδίᾳ παρασκευή μείζων ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστὰ ποτε μετὰ ἀκραφυνοὺς τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἠθήσαν—taking ὡς to be not 'when' but 'how,' but
§ 178. We may notice the graceful use of the vague Comparative expressing a modified degree.

§ 179. Idioms of Sentences:—Attraction.

A full scheme of all the varieties of Attraction may be constructed upon the instances found in Plato. The varieties which are treated of here include all but some of the most common.

A. Attraction of Dependent sentences.

a. Infinitival sentences.

a. The ordinary form of Attraction here is that to be seen in Ar. Eth. III. v. 3, ἔφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπεικέσι καὶ φαύλους εἶναι, or Lysias xxviii. 10. p. 180, τοῖς ἀρχοσιν . . . ἐπιδείξετε πότερον χρῆ δικαῖος εἶναι,—in distinction from the unattracted form, e. g. Aesch. Choeoph. 140, ἅλτῆ τέ μοι δόσ σωφρονεστέραν πολὺ Μητρὸς γενέσθαι.

Crat. 395 c, κατ' ἐκείνου λέγεται οὐδὲν οὐκε τε γενέσθαι προσωπηθήναι.

Hipp. Mi. 292 c, τὸ καλῶν, ὅ παντὶ, ὃ ἄν προσγείηται, ὑπάρχει ἐκείνῳ καλῷ εἶναι.

It will be seen here that to present an opportunity for Attraction, there must be Ellipse of the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, and moreover its Copula and Predicate must be in distinct words. Where the subject of the Infinitival sentence is also the subject of the principal sentence, Attraction is invariable, and the construction cannot be conceived without it,—as βαυλομένον ὑμῶν προβιώνω εἴη, Thuc. i. 71; where notwithstanding there is Attraction (though Lobeck denies it).

β. A form, which in one or two particular Idioms is common, is developed in greater variety in Plato: where the Infinitival sentence is dismembered, and the Subject or some other prominent Noun of the Dependent sentence is placed in advance, under the direct government of the principal sentence.
§§ 180—183.] ATTRACTION.

One common type is (e.g.) Hdt. v. 38, ἅδεις ἰνωμαχής οἱ μεγάλης ἔξευρεθήμα. And primarily Homer, Il. xviii. 585, ὁ δ' ήτοι δακίειν μὲν ἄπετρωπωτο λεόντων, and vii. 409. Another common, though peculiar, type is ἑγὼ δικαιος εἰμὶ τοῖτο ποιεῖν which stands for δικαιον ἐστίν ἐμὲ τοῖτο ποιεῖν—the ἑμι being attracted out of the Infinitival government into that of the principal sentence. Cf. Hdt ix. 77, ἄξιοι ἐφασαν εἶναι σφέας ἰημιῶσαι.

§ 180. Of the Platonic type only specimens need be given here; for the rest cf. 'Binary Structure,' §§ 214, 220, below.

Symp. 207 a, εἴπερ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ ἡαυτῷ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἔρως ἐστίν—where τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ, the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, is separated from it, and placed under the government of ἔρως ἐστίν in the principal construction.

In the following it is not the subject, but some other Noun, of the Infinitival sentence, which is attracted.

Rep. 443 b, ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζεσιν.

Gorg. 513 e, ἐπιχειρησάντων ἤμιν ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν.

Legg. 790 c, τρόπον ὅπερ ἡρμηνεύει τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων διαπεράσεις.

§ 181. γ. In the following the two forms above exist together. The Subject of the Infinitival sentence suffers Attraction in the manner just mentioned, and secondly the Predicate of the Infinitival sentence is attracted into agreement with it.

Rep. 459 b, δεῖ ἀκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχώντων.

Euthyd. 282 d, οὖν ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρητικῶν λόγων εἶναι.

§ 182. Note, however, that when both constructions have the same Subject, the Predicate of the Infinitival sentence reverts to the main construction.

Legg. 773 b, τῶν αὐτῶ ἐνεκείστα ἐφεράμενον.

Charm. 169 a, οὗ ποιεῖν ἐραυνὸ ἱκανός εἶναι.

§ 183. δ. In another type, affecting the same class of sentences as the last, we have the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, after δικαίων ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη ἐστίν, οἷον τε ἐστίν, and the like, or after Verbs of judging, turned into a forced Dative of Reference after δικαίων &c. Doubtless, the Dative of Reference often finds its place in the meaning as well as the syntax; but this is not always the case,
e.g. in the passages from Hip. Ma. 294 b, Meno 88 e, and Crat. 392 a: whence the true account of it is Attraction.

Rep. 334 c, ἀλλ' ὁμοις δίκαιον τότε τούτοις τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὀφελεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Crito 50 c, καὶ σοι ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἷα δίκαιον εἶναι;
Phædo 75 c, ἀνίγκη ἡμῖν αὐτῷ εἰληφθέναι.
Hip. Ma. 289 c, τὸ ὀρθῶς λεγόμενον ἀνίγκη αὐτῷ ἀποδέχεσθαι.
Ib. 294 b, ἀνίγκη αὐτῶς μεγάλοις εἶναι.
Charm. 164 b, γεγυνώσκειν ἀνίγκη τῷ ἱστρῷ.
Meno 88 e, εἰ ἀρα ἀρετή τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ ἐστι καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὀφελίμῳ εἶναι.

Laches 196 e, ἀναγκαῖον οἷα τοῦ ταῦτα λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίου ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀνδρίαν.
Menex. 241 a, οἵων τε ἄμύνεσθαι ὀλέγοις πολλοῖς.
Phædo 106 b, ἀδύνατον ψυχὴ ἀπύλλυσθαι.
Phdr. 242 b, αἰτεσ γεγυνωσκαί λόγῳ τινι ῥηθήναι.
Phileb. 33 a, τῷ τῶν τὸν φρονεῖν ἔλομενον βίων οἰσθ' ὡς τοῖτον τῶν τρόπων οὐδέν ἀποκολούθει γεν.

Crat. 392 a, ὁμοθετεῖν ἐστι καλεῖσθαι χαλκὸς κυρινίδος τῷ αὐτῷ ὀρφεῖν.
Phædo 92 c, πρίπτει εὐνοοῦ 'ειναι καὶ τῷ περὶ τῆς ἄρμονίας [λόγῳ].
Soph. 231 e, ἐθέμεν αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχῆς καθαρτίν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

Rep. 598 d, ἀπολαμβάνειν δέ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅτι εὐθύς.
Apol. 34 e, δεδογμένων ἐστὶ τῷ Ἑκάρτει διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. [So Oxon. See note on the text, p. 90, above.]

Cf. Philolaus ap. Stob. p. 458, όὐχ οἷον τ' ἢ οἷον οἷον τῶν ἐόντων καὶ γεγυνωσκομένων ὑφ' ἧμον γνωσθέμεν, καὶ πάλιν οἷον οἷον ἔναν καὶ αὑταίς κοιμηθέμεν. [Quoted by Boeckh in his Philolaos, p. 62.]

Andoc. i. 140. p. 18, τάδε ἡμῖν ἄξιον ἐνυμηθῆναι. On the other hand we have, unusually,

Gorg. 458 d, αἰσχρῶν δ' ὑπὸ τῶν γέρωντο εἰμί γε μή ἐθέλειν.

§ 184. b. Attraction of Participial clause attached to the Infinitival sentence.

Here the unattracted form would be e.g.

Crito 51 d, προσαγορεύομεν Ἀθηναίοιν τῷ βουλομένῳ... ἐξεῖναι λα-βόντα τά αὐτοῦ ἀπείναι.
Cf. Hdt. ix. 78, καὶ τοι τεθεὶς παρέδωκε ῥυσάμενον τὴν Ἑλλάδα κλέος καταβίβασθαι, and Hom. II. x. 187, τῶν ὑπνοι ὀλόλει Νέκτα φυλασσομένου.
§§ 185—187.]

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Instances of the attracted form are

Apol. 17 c, oicē γιάρ ἀν πρέπει τῇ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ . . . πλάττοντι λόγον εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσίναι—where πλάττοντι is attracted into correspondence with ἡλικία' though the Gender follows the thought, as in Legg. 933 a, ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δυσωπομέναι πρὸς ἄλληνας.

Cf. Hom. II. iv. 101, Εὐξεί . . . ῥέξειν ἐκατόμηθν . . . , Οὐκαδε νοστῆσας.

§ 185. Reference to the unattracted form explains such places as

Symp. 176 d, οὐταί εὐθελήσαμι ἄν πιεῖν, οὗτοι ἄλλῳ συμβολεύσαμε, ἄλλω τε καὶ κραταλώντα—where κραταλώντα agrees regularly with the subject of the πιεῖν understood after συμβολεύσαμε. And somewhat similarly

Phdr. 276 c, τοῦ δυναμένου παίζειν . . . μεθολογοῦσα—this Accusative arising from a mis-recollection of the Infinitive construction last preceding.

§ 186 c. Dependent sentences introduced by Conjunctions or Oblique Interrogatives.

a. Here, too, as in the Infinitival sentence, the sentence is torn asunder, and a portion of it, consisting of a Noun or a Noun-phrase, brought under the direct government of the principal construction.

This Attraction manifests itself in an ordinary type in e.g.

Laches 196 a, τούτον οὐ μανθάνω δὲ τι βουλεύεται λέγειν.

More remarkable Platonic forms are e.g.

Soph. 260 a, διὶ λόγον ἡμᾶς διωμολογήσασθαι, τί ποτ' ἔστιν—where λόγον has been attracted into the principal construction, although this can supply only a loose government for it.

Phædo 64 a, κινδυνεύουσιν δέω τυχάνουσιν ὁρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λελειμένας τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οἱδέν ἄλλο εἶπηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. This is an Attraction for κινδυνεύει σελερέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι δει κ.τ.λ.

§ 187. In the following it is not the Subject, but some other Noun or Noun-phrase, of the Dependent sentence, which is attracted.

Phædo 102 b, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τῶν Σιμμίν ὑπερίχειν Σωκράτους οίχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὖτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθῆς ἔχειν—where τὸ . . . Σωκράτους is the Accusative attracted under government of ὁμολογεῖς (compare δεὶ λόγον ἡμᾶς διωμολογήσασθαι, above).
Crito 44 d, αὐτὰ δῆλα τὰ παρώντα νυνί, ὅτι οἶοι τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ συμκρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἑγράξεσθαι—i. e. δῆλον ἐστὶν ὅτι οἱ αὐτὰ τὰ παρώντα ἑργασάμενοι, οἱ πολλοὶ, οἶοι τ' εἰσίν οὐ τὰ κ.τ.λ.

Phile. 82 a, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τάλλα οἱ ἄν ἐκάστη ἵνα—i. e. δῆλον ἐστι δή, οἱ ἄν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη ἵνα.

For the rest of the instances under this head see ‘Binary Structure,’ §§ 213, 218, below.

§ 188. β. Comparative sentence introduced by ἴ, attracted, after omission of the Copula, into agreement with the principal construction.

Meno 83 c, ἀπὸ μείζονος ἴ τοσοῦτης γραμμῆς.
(See the remarks under ‘Idioms of Comparison,’ § 168, above.)

§. 189. B. Attractions involving the Relative.

a. Attraction of Relative to Antecedent.

a. From Accusative into Genitive.

Apol. 29 b, κακῶν δὲν οἶδα ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν.

Phdr. 249 b, ἀδίως οὐ ἐξίσωσαν βίον.

Cf. Hom. Il. v. 265, Τῆς γάρ τοι γενεῆς, ἢς Τρωὶ πέρ εὐνύπτα Ζεὺς Δῶκε.

β. From Accusative into various cases before βούλει; which with the Relative forms almost one word, like Latin quīvis.

Crat. 432 a, τὰ δέκα ἴ ὅσις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμὸς.

Gorg. 517 a, ἔργα ... ὅλα τοῦτων ὄς βούλει ἑργασται.

Phileb. 43 d, τρίῳ ὄντων ὄντων βούλει.

γ. From Dative into Genitive.

Legg. 966 c, πάντων ὄν κίνησις ... οὕσαν ἐπόρισεν.

δ. From Nominative into Genitive.

Theaet. 165 e, ξυνεποδίσθης ὦπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενος ... ἀν ἐλύτρον.

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 130. p. 270, οὔδε γὰρ ὄν ἔτυχεν ἵν—i. e. τοῦτων ἀ ἔτυχεν.

Compare (though these do not involve the Relative)

Rep. 414 c, ἐφ' ἡμῶν δ' οὐ γεγονός οὔδ' οἶδα εἰ γενόμενον ἄν.

Symp. 216 d, ἐνδεδείκτον δ' ἀνοιχθεῖσι πόησις οἰσθεθε γέμει συχνοποιή; Euthyphro 15 a, τί δ' οἶει ἄλλο ἡ τιμή τε καὶ γέρα; Phaedo 59 c, τίνες φίλοι ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;
§§ 190, 191.]  

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Dative.

Rep. 402 a, ἐν ἀπασιν οἷς ἦστι περιφερόμενα.

Phædo 69 a, τούτο δ' ὄμοιών ἄστιν ὑν καὶ ἐλέγετο.

Accusative.

Cf. Thuc. v. iii, perhaps, περὶ πατρίδος βούλευσθε [βούλην] ἵνας πέρι . . . ἰστι. (The same interpretation is suggested as "possible" in Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 822 note.)

§ 190. c. Preposition, by which the Relative is governed, absorbed by Attraction.

Rep. 520 d, ἐν πολεῖ ἣ ἡμιστα πρόδυμοι ὄρχειν οἱ μελλοντες ὄρχειν.

Ib. 533 d-e, οἷς τοιούτων πέρι σκέψεις ὡς ἣμιν πρόκειται.

Laches 192 b, τίς οὖν δίναμις ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν ἀπασιν οἷς νῦν ἕλεγομεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, ἵππητα ἀνδρία κίεληται—where οἷς must be for ἐν οἷς.

Crat. 438 e, ἄρα δὲ ἄλλου του ἢ οὔπερ εἰκός;

Gorg. 453 e, πάλιν δ' εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτών τεχνῶν λέγομεν οὔπερ νῦν δή.

Stallbaum (on Apol. 27 d) cites other instances from Plato, but he is not warranted in giving them the same interpretation. Thus Apol. 27 d, ἡ ἐκ των ἄλλων δν δὴ καὶ λέγονται is simply 'or [sprung] from some other beings, whose children accordingly they are called.'

Phædo 76 d, ἐν τούτῳ [τῷ χρόνῳ] ἀπολαμβανεὶν φιλερ κ.τ.λ. Here the best and most MSS. have ἐν φιλερ.


§ 191. b. Attraction of Antecedent to Relative.

Meno 96 a, ἰχθεὶς οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὅπωνοι πράγματος οὐ οἷς μὲν φῶςκοντες διδάσκαλου εἶναι κ.τ.λ.;

Politic. 271 c, τὸν βίον δν κ.τ.λ. πότερον . . . ἢν κ.τ.λ.;

Meno 96 c, ὁμολογήσομεν δ' γε, πράγματος οὐ μὴτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταί εἰείν, τούτο μηδὲ διδακτῶν εἰναι.

Crito 45 b, πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἄλλως ἄτοι δν ἀφίκη.

The last of these instances is of a peculiar type, though the
former are common, and have their prototypes in Homer: cf. II. x. 416, φύλακάς δ’ ἂς ἑρεμά . . . Οὗτος κεκριμένη μύεται στρατῶν, Od. viii. 74, ἀειδεμέμνα κλέα ἀνδρῶν, Οίμης τῆς τὸν ἄρα κλέος κ.τ.λ., xxii. 6, σκοπὸν ἄλλον ὄν ὀστώ τις βίλην ἄνηρ Ἐσσομαι αἳ γε τόχωμι, xxiii. 356, Μῆλα δ’ α μοι κ.τ.λ., Πολλα μὲν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ λησσομαι, ἄλλα δ’ Ἀχαιοι Δώσονυ’ (where μῆλα represents ἀντὶ μῆλων). On Od. viii. 74 Nitzsch holds οἴμης to be attracted from οἴμη not οἴμην because elsewhere the attracted word is the forerunner of a principal sentence to be completed, whereas here it is in sense but part of the exegetical Relative sentence. Thus the sentence would be one on the model of Od. i. 50, Νήσοι ἐν ἀμφιβατῇ . . . Νῆσος δευθέσσα, or II. vi. 396, Ἡσίωνος Ἵστο, ὃς ἦναι κ.τ.λ.

§ 192. c. Construction changed after Relative clause by Attraction to the Relative clause as the nearest construction.

N.B. This principle, of Attraction to the nearest construction, extends also to other cases where there is no Relative clause. See §§ 201–203, below.

Rep. 402 b, οὔδε μουσικὸν πρότερον ἐσώθειδα οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὐς φαμεν ἡμῖν παιδευτόν ἐστιν τοῦ φύλακας.
Phaedo 66 c, ἡμῖν ἐσται οὐ φαμὲν ἑφασμα θανατεῖ εἶναι φρονίσεως.
Protag. 342 b, σοφία τῶν Ἑλλήνων περίεσθιν, ὡσπερ οὖς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, τοὺς σοφιστάς.
Crito 48 c, ἂς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τάς σκέψεις . . ., μὴ ὅσ ἄληθῶς ταῦτα σκέματα ἦ κ.τ.λ.
Hip. Mn. 281 c, ἐκείνοι δὲν ὅνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφία, Πιτακοῦ κ.τ.λ.
Symp. 200 d, ἐκείνον ἐρὰν δ’ οὔπω ἱπομοῦν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν οὗτι ἐχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἐπεὶτα χρόνου ταῦτα ἐστίν αὐτῷ σωζόμενα τὰ νῦν παρόντα.
Apol. 41 a, εἰρήσει τοῦς ἄληθῶς δικαστᾶς οὔπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως κ.τ.λ.
Cf. Hom. II. ix. 131, μετὰ δ’ ἐσται ἴν τὸν ἀπηνάται, Κούρην Βρισῆς.

§ 193. It is not to be supposed that the Nouns which follow the Relative clauses in the first three of these examples are Antecedents to the Relatives. As in the fourth example the Relative has an expressed Antecedent ἐκείνον, so in the others it has one understood; and the Nouns τῶν φύλακας, τῶν σοφιστῶν, ταῦτα, are respectively exegetic of the understood Antecedent. (Ταῦτα represents a Feminine Noun by another Attraction, which see below, § 201.)
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Cf. Hom. Od. i. 69, Κύκλωτος κεχόλωται ὑπὸ όφθαλμον ἀλάσαεν, Ἀντίθεον Πολύφημον. Also II. xii. 18—20. To this explanation must be also conformed that of Soph. Antig. 404, ὅν σὺ τὸν νεκρὸν ἀπείπας.

§ 194. The same principle accounts for the following also.

Symp. 206 a, οὐδέν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὐ ἐρώτην ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

Phædo 89 a, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκείνῳ τι λέγω οὔτε ἐκείνος οὐδέν ἄτοπον—where ἐκείνος is attracted from ἐκείνων, since it is ἐκείνων and not λέγω which requires this Pronoun as its Subject.

Symp. 199 c, καλῶς μοι ἐδόξασα καθηγησάσθαι τοῦ λόγου, λέγων ὅτι πρώτων μὲν δὲν αὐτῶν ἐπιθείζεται ὁποῖος τίς ἐστιν ὁ Ἔρως, ὑστερον δὲ τὰ ἡγα αὐτοῦ—where we should have had αὐτῶν ... τῶν Ἐρωτα but for the intervention of ὁποῖος τίς ἐστιν, which prevented recurrence to the Accusative.

The same bias shews itself abnormally in Lysias xxv. 18. p. 173, ὀἴσσε ἥρναι, οὖν ἐκείνοι παρέλιπον ... ὑμεῖς ἀπολέσσας.

§ 195. d. Attraction of the entire Relative clause (i.e. of Subject and Predicate,—Copula having been omitted) to the Antecedent.

a.

Symp. 220 b, ὁτις πάγου οἴων διενότατον.

Phædo 104 a, τοῦ περίττου ὁτις οἷς οὔπερ τῆς τριάδος.

Sopha. 237 c, ὅφη γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἀποφαν.

Legg. 674 c, οἷς ἀμέλειω ἃν πολλῶν δέοι οἷς ἡτιν πόλει.

Rep. 607 a, ἵναν μᾶν οὖν τινος πανακέκτην ἐστὶ τῆς πολίν—

for ὅσον πανακέκτω ἐστὶν ὑμνοι.

Cf. Hom. Od. ix. 321, τὸ μὲν ... ἐσκομεν ... ὁσον θ' ἱστον νηός, x. 112, γυναῖκα Εὔρων ὅσην τ' ὄρεος κορυφὴν, 167, Πείσμα δ' ὅσον τ' ὄργαν Α. E. 977, πρεσβυτέρων τινῶν οἴων ὁργαλωτάτων. Soph. Α. 488, πατρὸς Εὔπερ τινὸς σθένοντος, 1416, ἄμμη ... ἀγαθῷ ... κοιναί ποι λήσον θυσίας, O. C. 734, πόλιν ... σθένουσαν ... εἰ τιν' ἕλλαξος μέγα. Arist. Metaph. IX. iii. 1, ἀντικείσα δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ πλείους τρόπους, ὅν ἐνα τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὡς ἀδιαίρετον καὶ διαίρετον.

§ 196. β. More peculiar (because the Relative is made to agree with the Subject of the Relative clause—contrasτ οἷς οὔπερ τῆς τριάδος above) are
Soph. 246 c, ἵππη ἄ τιδεντα τῆς οὐσίας—i.e. ἵππη [τοῦ] ἄ τιδενται τῆς οὐσίαν εἶναι.

Gorg. 477 a, (Λ) ὁφελεῖται ἄρα; (Β) Ναί. (Λ) ἵππη ἄγω ἐπολαμβάνω τῆς ὁφελείαν;—i.e. ἄρα [ὁφελεῖται τούτο] ὅπερ ἄγω ἐπολαμβάνω τῆς ὁφελείαν εἶναι;

§ 197. γ. In the following the Relative clause is represented by the Relative word only, the Subject being identical with that of the main sentence and being therefore, with the Copula, omitted.

Cf. Hom. Od. ii. 209, ἔφρωμαι ἧδε καὶ ἄλλοι ὤσοι μνηστήρες ἁγανοί,—i.e. ἄλλοι μνηστήρες ἁγανοί, ὤσοι ἔστε— and Hdt. iv. 28, ἀφόρητος ὤσος κρύμως,—frost which was insufferable,—to such a degree was it;’ and ib. 194, οἱ δὲ σφι ἀφθάνον ὤσο ἐν τοῖς ὦρεσι γίνοντας: in all which instances there is no patent Attraction, but it is made possible by the Ellipse, after the Relative, of its Subject and the Copula.

Euthyd. 275 c, σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὄσην,—'inconceivable, so great was it.'

Gorg. 477 d, ἑπερφνεῖ τινι ἄρα ὤς μεγάλη θλάθη καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ἑπερβάλλουσα.

Cf. the common Idiom ἐδωκεν αὐτῷ πλεῖστα ὄσα—'things superlatively many, so many were they'—where ὄσα is doubtless an Accusative.

The same explanation applies, though Attraction does not find place, in the Adverbial expressions ἀμήχανοι ὄς (Rep. 527 e, Phdr. 263 d), ἑπερφνῶ ὄς (Symp. 173 c, Gorg. 496 c), θαυμαστῶς ὄς (Phaedo 92 a, Symp. 200 a).

§ 198. The Homeric Idiom with τοῖς differs—e.g. in Od. i. 209, θαμὰ τοῖς, iii. 321, 'Ες πέλαγος μέγα τοῖς, iv. 371, Ἕπτιος . . . λήν τοῖς, ib. 776 and vii. 30, σειγὰ τοῖς, xi. 134, Ἀθηροῦς μᾶλα τοῖς, xv. 450, Κερδαλίων δὴ τοῖς, xx. 302, Σαρδάλιων μᾶλα τοῖς—'to that degree,'—indicating an imagined, and therefore an intense, degree.

Τοῖς expresses the degree of the epithet preceding; our ὄσο justifies the epithet being there at all.

§ 199. c. Attraction of the entire Antecedent clause (Copula omitted) to the Relative.

Charm. 175 c, οὐδὲν ὄσον οὐκ ἄλογωτερον. So Protag. 317 c.

Politie. 308 b, οὐδαμῶς ὄς οὐ φύσομεν.

§ 200. f. Attraction of the Relative into agreement with the Predicate of its own clause.

Phdr. 255 c, ἡ τοῦ ἰσόματος ἐκείνου πηγή, ὅν ἐμερω Ζεὺς ἀνάμασεν (where the Antecedent of ὁν is ἰσόματος.)

Cf. the Homeric Ἡ βίμις ἔστιν. II. ix. 276, &c.

§ 201. C.

a. Attraction of a Neuter Pronominal Subject into agreement with the Predicate.

Apol. 18 a, διόμεν ... τοῦτο σκοπεῖν, κ.τ.λ.: δικαστοῦ γάρ αυτῇ ἀρετῆ —where of course αυτῇ refers to τοῦτο σκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Soph. 240 b, οὐκ ὅν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄντως ἦν λέγομεν ἐκόνα;

Crat. 386 c, εἰ ... ἐστὶν αὐτῇ ἡ ἀληθεία (referring to what had just been agreed upon).

Minos 317 a, πολιτικά ἄρα ταῦτα συγγράμματα ἔστιν, οὐς οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμος καλοῦσιν.

Crito 48 c, δὲ δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις ..., μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα σκέψεις ἤ—where ταῦτα represents τὰς σκέψεις, but has been assimilated to σκέψεις, the Predicate of its own sentence.

Cf. Hom. Ι. i. 239, σκηνηπρον ... ὁ δὲ τοῦ μέγας ἔσται ὅρκος, ν. 305, ἢδα τε μηρὸς ἤσχω αὐτρέφεται, κοτύλην δὲ τὶ μὴν καλέουσι. Hdt. i. 86, ἀκροβία ταῦτα (sc. τῶν Κροίσου) καταγείν. Ἀesch. P. V. 753, ὃς θανεῖν μὲν ἕστιν οὐ πεπρώμενον. Λυτῇ γάρ ἦν ἄν πημείνων ἀπαλλαγῇ. So Virg. Ἀν. x. 828, Si qua est ea cura.

§ 202. b. Attraction of the Copula into agreement with the Predicate.

Meno 91 c, οὐτοὶ γε φανερά ἐστι λαβη.

Legg. 735 c, τοὺς μέγας ἡμαρτηκότας ἀνάτους δὲ ὄντας, μεγάστερην δὲ οὕσαν θλάβη.

Parmen. 134 b, πάντα, δὲ δή ὡς ιδεῖς αὐτὰς οὕσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

Politic. 271 e, θεῶς ἐνεμεν . . . , ζῶον ὃν ἐγέρον θεώτερον.

§ 203. c. Attraction of the Article of an Infinitival clause into agreement with a word preceding, with which that clause is in Apposition.

Charm. 173 c, ἐμείμενον τῷ λόγῳ τῷ εὐθαμευν αἰνεῖ τὸν ἑπιστημώνως ζώντα.

Legg. 908 c, τῇ δύσῃ, τῇ θεῷ ἐρημα εἶναι πάντα.

§ 204. Idioms of Sentences:—Binary Structure.

Certain Idiomatic affections of the Sentence are the grammatical result of expressing in two parts a conception which exists in the speaker's mind as one.

The immediate use of this artifice is to present the conception to the hearer in two parts, which, after entering his mind separately, will there reunite.

The ulterior use is (1) to facilitate a clear expression of a complex conception, and (2) to set before the apprehension two images of the object, as it presents itself at two successive moments; and by this means to give it the same kind of fullness with which the image of material objects is invested by "binocular vision."

This Idiom has been, in certain of its forms, ranked under Apposition. But it does not resemble it except in a nakedly grammatical point of view. Apposition forms but one description of the object, and therefore is no Binary Structure at all; in other words in Apposition the two representations are simultaneous; whereas in the Idiom before us they are substitutive; the thought has moved in the interval between them; and though the one is in some sort a repetition of the other, they are not identical.

§ 205. Examples of this Idiom in its main forms are to be found in all Greek literature; but its applications in Plato are preeminently various and subtle. These are embodied in the following classification.

A. When the Binary Structure embraces two different sentences, both descriptive of the same fact. The mark of the Binary Structure is that the two sentences are grammatically coordinated by Asyndeton.

Note, that the first-placed sentence always contains something which is unfolded more fully, or restated in another way (sometimes with anacoluthic redundancy of construction) in the latter.

B. When the Binary Structure, not extending to the Verb, consists of two successive expressions describing the same thing.

Note, that the first-placed expression is sometimes the less emphatic, or at least the more general, and is introductory to the other; sometimes it is the more emphatic and sufficient, and the other follows epexegetically.
C. When a Dependent sentence has been resolved into two parts, by disengaging from its construction, and placing in advance of it, a portion of it consisting of a Noun or Noun-phrase, and bringing both parts coordinately under the government of the Principal sentence.

§ 206. Note, that (1) the forestalled portion thus has a degree of attention ensured to it, which, not being always self-evidently emphatic, it might otherwise fail to obtain: and (2) grammatically, the forestalled portion may be said to suffer Attraction,—Attraction, that is, out of the Dependent construction into the Principal construction.

§ 207. A. Where the Binary Structure embraces two different sentences, both descriptive of the same fact, and grammatically coordinated by Asyndeton. (Note, that the effect of Asyndeton is always to make the connection closer; it is its office to denote simultaneity or rapid sequence.)

a. Common type of instances.

Apol. 41 a, δαυμαστῇ ἂν εἰσὶν ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτῶθι,—οπότε έντόσυμι Παλαιμῆδε κ.τ.λ., ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἑμαυτὸν πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἵκεινα, ὥς εἰγὼ οἴμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἄρθεί εἰσί.

Symp. 198 c, τὸ τοῦ Ἐμηροῦ ἔπειπόθι,—ἔφθοζομην κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 67 e, εἰ φοβοῖντο καὶ ἀγαπακτοίειν, οὐ πολλῇ ἄν ἄλογα εἰσί.—εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἵκεσι ἵοιν οἱ κ.τ.λ.;

Ib. 68 d, οὐ ταύτων τούτῳ πεπόνθαι,—ἀκολασία τινὶ σώφρονις εἰσίν;

Ib. 73 b, αὐτὸ τούτῳ διόμαι παθίν περὶ οὐ ὁ λόγος,—ἀναμνησθῆναι. So too 74 a, Gorg. 513 c, 519 b, Phileb. 46 c, Menex. 235 b,—in all of which the first-placed expression is formed with πάσχειν.

Ib. 70 a, [ψυχῇ] ἵκειν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηται τῆς καὶ ἀπολλύται, ἦ ἂν ἀνθρωπός ἀποθανόν—εἰδὼς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος . . . . ἵκεται διαπομείγναι καὶ οὐδέν ἐτι οὐδαμοῦ ἦ. Here the sentence εἴδει . . . . ἦ is the complete double of the sentence ἵκειν . . . . ἀποθανεῖ.

Ib. 86 b, τοοιτὸν τι μάλιστα ἵππομεθάνομεν . . . . εἰναί.—ὑπερ κ.τ.λ., κράςειν εἰναι τούτων κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 505 c, ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπικάρμου γένηται,—ἀ πρὸ τοῦ δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἔλεγον, εἰς ὅν οἶκος γένομαι.

Phileb. 35 c, (Α) τί δ', ὅταν ἐν μίσῃ τοῖτων γέρνηται; (B) Πῶς ἐν μίσῃ; (Α) Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἄλγῃ κ.τ.λ.;
Legg. 697 a, τὸ δὲ τριχῷ διελεῖν . . . πειραθῶμεν,—διατείμεν χωρίς τά
tε μέγιστα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα.
Ib. 708 b, ὅταν μῆ τῶν ἐσμῶν [ὁ κατοικισμὸς] γίγνηται τρόπων,—ἐν
gένος ἀπὸ μᾶς ἵνα ὅλα σώζησθαι.

This Idiom begins with Homer: see Od. viii. 339, Αἴ γὰρ τούτο
gένοιτο, ἣνας ἐκατηβῶλ Ἀπολλον.—Διεσμοὶ μὲν τρίς τούτου ἀπείρονες
άμφις ἔχουν, . . . Αὐτὰρ ἐγών εὕδοιμ παρὰ χρυσῆ Ἀφροδίτῃ. Cf.
Aristoph. Lys. 1219, εἰ δὲ πάντα δεὶ τούτο ὅραν, Ἦμιν χαρίζεσθαι,
tαλαιπωρήσωμεν.

Virtually similar is
Apol. 20 c, εἰ δὲ δῆσον σοῦ γε οὐδεὶς τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγ-
ματευμονέν ἔσται τοσαύτη φήμη . . . γέγονεν,—εἰ μῆ τι ἔπραττες
ἄλλων ἦ οἱ πολλοί: (for σοῦ . . . πραγματευμονέν is a virtual
protasis, of which εἰ . . . πολλοί is the double.)
Cf. Thuc. v. 97, καὶ τὸ ἄσφαλές ἥμιν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἃν παρὰ-
σχοτε . . . , εἰ μῆ περιγίνοσθε.

§ 208. b. 13 Instances involving anacoluthic redundancy.

Philib. 13 b, οἴει γὰρ τινα συγχωρήσεσθαι,—θέμενον κ.τ.λ., εἰτα ἄνεξε-
σθαι σου λέγοντος κ.τ.λ.;
Crito 45 c, μὴ δοξῇ ἢπει τὸ πράγμα . . . ἀναβρὰ πεπράχθαι . . . —
κακία καὶ ἀναβρὰ διαπεφυγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν.

Apol. 26 c, οὐτωσι σοι δοκῶ,—οὔδειν νομίζω θέον εἰναι; [So Oxon.
alone. See note at p. 69, above.]
Legg. 859 d, εἰναι τόσο δικαῖος ἀνθρώπους, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνωσι κ.τ.λ.,—
kαὶ αὐτὸ γε . . . παγκάλους εἰναι.

Ib. 933 b, ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν, ἂν ποτὲ ἁρα ἰδωσι κ.τ.λ.,—ὁλιγωρεῖν τῶν
tουσώτων διακελεύσεσθαι.

§ 209. c. In Similes or Comparisons. In such cases there is great
tendency to the Binary Structure: the fact illustrated is stated
(perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after
it. Note, that in these cases the pre-statement is often broken off
or merely hinted at, so that the full sense is first expressed in the
re-statement. (This is especially noticeable in expressions involving
dοκεῖ or the like.) The instances in other authors begin with Homer:
e. g. Il. ix. 13, ἀν δ' Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἰππαστο διακρύχεων, ὅστε κρήνη μελάνυ-
δρος . . .,—'Ως ὁ βαρὺ στενάχων ἐπέ' Ἀργείοις μετηρίδα. Cf. also Soph.

13 [In the margin of the MS. is written—"Quære. Are these really distinct
from those given in § 207?"]
§ 210. As a variation, the Binary Structure is sometimes developed in the illustration, and then there is no re-statement of the illustrated fact,—this being implied sufficiently in the re-statement of the illustration.

Phaedo 60 c, ὃ ἄν τὸ ἔτερον παραγένται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὡστερον καὶ τὸ ἔτερον ὡσπερ οὐ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.λ.,—ἤκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθεῖν τὸ ἡδοῦ.

Charm. 156 b, ἐστὶ γὰρ τοιαύτῃ [ἡ ἐπιφανεία] ὅτα ἡ διάνασθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν μοῖν ἐγὼ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἂν ἦδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἱστρῶν, ἐπειδὴν κ.τ.λ.,—λέγωσιν ὅσο ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

§ 211. d. Pairs of Interrogative sentences, the former of which is partly Pronominal,—a skeleton sentence, which is put forward to arrest attention, and to introduce the re-statement, of which it is
the double. The Pronominal part is the Interrogative τί, which represents the Predicate, or part of the Predicate, of the re-state-
ment. These Binary Interrogative sentences therefore follow the
general principle of Double Interrogatives in Greek; which is, that
the one introduces the other,—the first-placed being always the less
precise and definite.

Phdr. 234 c, τί σου φαίνεται ὁ λόγος; οὐχ ὑπερφυώς εἰρήσθαι;—
where τί foreshadows ὑπερφυώς εἰρήσθαι. (Cf. Symp. 204 d, ὃ
ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρῆ; Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ.)

Ib. 269 a, τί δὲ τῶν μελώριων Ἀδραστον οἴομεθα ἡ καὶ Περικλέα, εἰ
ἀκούσειν κ.τ.λ.; πότερον χαλεπῶς ἢν αὐτοῖς . . . εἰπών κ.τ.λ.;

Charm. 154 d, τί σου φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος; οὐκ εὑπρόσωπος;

Phileb. 27 ε, τί δὲ ὁ σῶς [Bios]; ἐν τίνι γένει ἡν λέγειο;

Ib. 56 c, τί δὲ λογιστικὴ κ.τ.λ.; πότερον ἡς μία λεκτέων;

Phdr. 277 d, τί δ’ αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλῶν ἡ αἰσχρῶν εἶναι τὸ λόγους λέγειν
κ.τ.λ.; ἁρά οὐ δεδήλωκε τὰ λεχθέντα . . . ὡς κ.τ.λ.;—τί foreshadows
ὡς κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 309 b, τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἡ παρ’ ἐκείνου φαίνει;

Soph. 266 c, τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἄρ’ οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκο-
δομικὴ φησομεν ποιεῖν;

Phaedo 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . .; ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα ἐχει, ἡ
κ.τ.λ.; (where the Genitive is suspended in a loose construc-
tion, which the re-statement supersedes.)

Gorg. 474 d, τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς
ἐκιστοτει καλά; Here the virtual Subject of the re-statement is
foreshadowed by τόδε, which therefore is Nominative; and the
Predicate by τί, which (as in all the other instances) is Ac-
cussative.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 101, τί γὰρ δή παῖς ὁ τοῦ Λαερτίου; Ποῦ σου τύχης
ἐστηκέν;

§ 212. The passages also (quoted under ‘Accusative Case,’ §§ 15–
19, above), in which a Pronoun Accusative is in Apposition to a
whole sentence following, are virtually of Binary Structure: for the
Accusative is the shadow of a sentence.

§ 213. B. When the Binary Structure, not extending to the Verb,
consists of two successive expressions describing the same thing,

a. Where the first-placed expression is the less logically specific;
or the less emphatic, and is introductory to the other.
§ 214. Where it is a Noun-phrase.

Apol. 37 c, τῇ ἀκὶ καθισταμένη ἁρχῇ, τοῖς ἔνδεκα.

Phaedo 65 d, λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους περὶ κ.τ.λ.—τῆς 

οὐσίας, δ' τυχώνει ἐκαστὸν ὁν.

Ib. 81 e, τοῦ ἔννοπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ σωματειδοῦς, ἐπιθυμία.

Ib. 82 b, εἰς ταῦτα, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος.

Ib. 113 a, τῶν τετελευτηκότων, τῶν πολλῶν.

Symp. 215 b, τῷ Σατύρῳ, τῷ Μαρσίᾳ.

Euthyd. 274 e, τὸ πράγμα, τὴν ἀρετήν, μαθητῶν εἶναι.

Crat. 415 a, τὸ ὄνομα ἡ μηχανή.

Ib. 435 c, τῷ φορτικῷ τοίῳ προσχρῆσθαι, τῇ ξυνθήκῃ.

Protag. 317 b, εἰλάξειν ταύτην οἷμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὀμολο-

γείν μᾶλλον ἡ ἐξάρην εἶναι.

Charm. 173 c, ἐμφύειν τῷ λόγῳ, τῷ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνων 

ζώτα.

Legg. 908 c, τῇ δόξῃ, τῇ θεών ἔρημα εἶναι πάντα.

Gorg. 462 c, οὐκοίν καλῶν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ἡπτορικὴ εἶναι,—χαρίζεσθαι οἷς 

τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;

§ 214. β. Where it is Pronominal.

Euthyphro 8 e, τοῖτο μὲν ἄληθες λέγεις, τὸ κεφαλαίων.

Apol. 24 e, αὐτὸ τοῖτο οἴδη, τοῖς νόμους.

Crat. 423 e, αὐτὸ τοῖτο μεμιᾶσθαι δύνατο ἐκάστον, τὴν οὐσίαν.

Gorg. 500 e, οὐ τί ἀν μᾶλλον σπουδαίεσθι τις, ἢ τοῖτο, ὡστια χρή 

τρόπων ζῆν; (the two expressions are οὐ and ἡ τοῖτο κ.τ.λ.)

Ib. 518 a, ταύτας μὲν δουλουρπεῖς εἶναι, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας.

Phileb. 38 b, ἐπεταί ταύταις . . . ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἄληθεὶ καὶ 

ψευδεὶ δόξῃ λέγω.

Tim. 22 d, οἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὕπερ διασώζονται, βουκολοὶ νομεῖς τε.

Protag. 351 a, τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίγνεσθαι, τὴν 

δύναμιν.

Rep. 396 c, οἱ μὲν μοι δοκεῖ, ἥν δ' ἐγὼ, μέτριος ἄνηρ, ἐθελήσειν.

Legg. 861 d, τῶν δυνῶν τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀνέκτον ἐμοὶ, τὸ γε μη 

λέγειν κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 198 d, τὸ δὲ ἄρα οὐ τοῖτο ἢν, τὸ καλῶς ἐπιστευέν ὁποῖον.

Ib. 207 d, δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον, τῇ γενέσει.

Ib. 222 a, ἅπτος αὐτῶν γνωρίμονος . . . νοῦν ἡχοῦντας μόνους εὑρήσει, τῶν 

λόγων.

Add to these the frequently-recurring expression ἦ δ' ὦς ὁ Σωκράτης.

§ 215. Under this head come also the instances of αὐτὸ in its 
peculiar Platonic meaning.
§ 216. γ. Where it is a Relative clause.

Rep. 402 b, ὠντε αὐτοὶ ὠντε ὀφειν ἡμῖν παιδευτέον εἶναι, τοὺς φύλακας.

Phaedo 74 d, οἷς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγομεν, τοῖς ἱερεῖς. Similarly Hip. Ma.

Crat. 422 b, δὲ ἔρωτας, τὰ ὑώματα. Similarly Phileb. 42 e.

Tim. 33 a, ἀ ξυνιστά, τὰ σώματα.

Hip. Ma. 294 a, ὁ πάντα τὰ μεγάλα ἄστι μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχουτι.

Symp. 200 d, ἐκείνου ἐράν, ὁ οὐκ ἔτοιμον αὐτῷ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἔχει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπαιτα χρόνον ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σωζόμενα τὰ νῦν παρῶντα.

Theaet. 167 b, δὲ τίνες τὰ φαντάσματα ... ἀλήθη καλοῦσιν—' and these, I mean their opinions, some call true.'

Tim. 40 b, εἰς δὴ τῆς αἰρέσις γέγονεν ὅσα ... ἅλε μένει—' and hence, from this cause namely, arise,' &c.

Legg. 647 a, φοβοῦμεθα δε γε πολλάκις δόξαν ... ὃν δὴ και καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἥμεις γε ... αἰσχύνη.

Another explanation might have been conceived of some of these passages, that they are simply cases of Antecedent and Relative in reversed order. But this would not apply to the last five; consequently, all must be referred to the principle of Binary Structure. It is to be noticed, that the operation of Attraction, probably in the three last instances, certainly in two of them, complicates the case; i. e. that the Relatives agree not with their Antecedents, but respectively with τὰ φαντάσματα, and τῆς αἰρέσις. See 'Attraction,' § 201, above.

Cf., as instances in other authors, Ἀeschin. i. 72. p. 10, δὲν ... ἡκούσατε τῶν νόμων. And Soph. Ant. 404, βάπτουσαν δὲν σῦ τῶν νεκρῶν Ἀπείπασ—' him whom thou forbadest to bury, namely that corpse' (the order is hyperbatic).

§ 217. Not to be identified with the foregoing are the following, which contain an implicit sentence, though it has been operated on by Ellipse, and in the first two by Attraction also.

Soph. 246 c, ὑπὲρ ἤς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας—i. e. ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὑπὲρ τῆς οὐσίας εἶναι.
§§ 218—220. ] BINARY STRUCTURE. 211

Gorg. 477 a, ἵππερ ἕγω ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ἀφελείαν—i. e. [τούτο] ὅπερ ἕγω ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ἀφελείαν εἶναι.

Phædo 78 d, ἢ λόγον δίδωμι τῷ εἰναι—where ἢ is the Predicate and τῷ εἰναι the Subject of a sentence of which the Copula is suppressed.

§ 218. b. Where the first-placed expression is the more emphatic and sufficient of the two.

a. Common type of instances.

Gorg. 503 e, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὄντως βουλεί αὐτῶν.

Critias 110 c, πάνθ' ὅσα ξίνωμα ξώα... πῶν δυνατὸν τέφυκεν.

Phdr. 246 c, ἢ δὲ... [ψυχῇ]... σῶμα γῆινον λαβοῦσα, ξῶον τὸ ξύμ-... παν ἐκλήθη.

Phædo 61 b, οὐς προχείρους εἰχον μίθους... τούτους ἐποίησα, οἷς πρώτους ἐντυχον.

Ib. 69 b, χωρίζομεν δὲ φρονήσεως, ... μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ τοιαύτη ἄρετη.

Ib. 105 a, ὃ ἀν ἐτιφέρη... αἰτο τὸ ἐτιφέρον τὴν ἐναντίωτη ἡμι-... ποτε δέξασθαι.

Crat. 408 a, τὸ ἐρμηνεία εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον κ.τ.λ., περὶ λόγου δύναμιν ἐστι πάσα αὐτῇ ἡ πραγματεία.

Legg. 668 d, τῶν μεμιμημένων ὃ τι ποτὲ ἐστὶν, ἔκαστον τῶν σωμάτων.

Ib. 734 e, καθάπερ οὖν ὅτι τυπα ξυνύφη ἢ καὶ πλέγμ' ἀλλ' ἀτοιον αὐτ' ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν οίον τ' ἐστὶ τῆς τ' ἐφύψην καὶ τὸν στίμονα ἀπεργύζονται.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 1662, αὐτῶν... σῶμα τυμβίκοι τάφον, 1147, Οὐτοὶ δὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὸ σῶν λάβρον στόμα... τὰχ' ἄν τις... Χειμών κατασβέ-... σει τὴν πολλὴν βοήν.

§ 219. A curious variation occurs in

Protag. 317 a, τὸ ἀποδιδιάσκοντα μὴ δινασθαι ἀποδρῖναι... πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος.

Phædo 99 a, εἴ τις λέγοι... ὡς δὲ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ... πολλὴ ἃν καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία εἰς τοῦ λόγου.

§ 220. b. Where the first-placed expression is collective, the other distributive.

Symp. 178 a, τούτων ὃμιν ἔρω ἐκάστου τὸν λόγον.

Ib. 190 d, αὐτὸς διατείμω δίχα ἔκαστον.

Tim. 32 b, πρὸς ἀλλήλα... ἀπεργασάμενοι, ὃ τι περ περ πρὸς ἄφα... τοῦτο ἀφρ πρὸς ἰδωρ, καὶ ὃ τι ἒρ πρὸς ἰδωρ ἰδωρ πρὸς γῆν.

We may trace this back to Homer: e. g. Od. i. 348, ὡςτε διδώσων
§ 221. γ. Where the latter expression is restrictive of the former, being in fact only a re-enunciation of part of it.

Phaedo 64 b, οἷμαι γὰρ ἂν δὴ τούς πολλούς ... ἥμαθαν ἂν, τούς μὲν παρ’ ἦμαν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνω.

Gorg. 517 e, δύσκαλοι καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότι ὅτι κ.τ.λ.


§ 222. δ. Where the latter expression is merely pronominal, and resumptive.

Grammatically, the pronominal resumption is (where no change of construction intervenes) a pleonasm: but rhetorically it is not redundant. Its function is to recall to the thoughts in its proper place an expression which has, for a special purpose, been set in advance of the main portion of the sentence, or which has been held in suspense by the intervention of some Adjectival, Adverbial, or Relative clause, or some change of construction.

Instances of main portion of sentence intervening.

Theae. 155 e, ἐὰν σοι ἀνδρῶν ὄνομαστόν τῆς διανοαῖ τήν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνησόμαι αὐτῶν.

Apoll. 40 d, οἷμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἵδωτην τινα, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐάριστον ὅτι εἰρένει αὐτῶν ταῦτα.

Rep. 375 d, οὐσθα γὰρ ποὺ τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἱδὸς.

Legg. 700 c, τοῖς μὲν γεγονόσι περὶ παίδευσιν δεδογμένων ἀκούειν ἢν αὐτῶς.

Phileb. 30 d (though the pronoun here has more force), ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφθηγμένως ὡς ἄγετο παρὰ νοῦς ἄρχει ἐχθρακος ἐκεῖνος.

Rep. 353 d, τὸ ἑπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἐσθ’ ὅτι ἄλλη ἡ ψυχή δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοίην;

Cf. Soph. O. T. 717, Παιδὸς δὲ βλάστασα τοὺς δεισχοῖν ἡμέραι Τρέις καὶ νω κ.τ.λ.
§ 223. Instances of Adjectival, Adverbal, or Relative clause intervening.

Symp. 200 a, τότερον ὁ ἔρως ἐκεῖνον, οὗ ἐστιν ἔρως, ἐπιθυμεῖ αὐτοῦ;
Similarly Charm. 195 a.

Theaet. 188 b, ἡ μὴ αὐτήν, ἣνειται αὐτά εἶναι ἔτερα;
Phaedo 104 d, ὃ τι ἀν κατάσχη, ἀναγκάζει... αὐτό ἵσχειν, and similarly in the next sentence.

Ib. 111 c, τοὺς δὲ, βαθύτερους ὄντας, τὸ χάσμα αὐτοῖς ἔλασσον ἔχειν.

Alcib. I. 115 e, τὸ ἄρα βοηθεῖν... ἡ μὲν καλὸν κ.τ.λ., καλὸν αὐτὸ προσείπας;
Legg. 625 a, τοῦτον οὖν φαίμεν ἂν ἥμεις..., ἐκ τοῦ τότε διανέμειν
κ.τ.λ., τοῦτον τῶν ἐπαίνων αὐτῶν εἰληφεῖνα.

§ 224. Instances of change of construction intervening.

Tim. 37 d, ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆρας καὶ ἑναιτοῦς οὐκ ὄντας
πρὸν οὐρανὸν γενοῖν, τότε ἁμα ἐκεῖνο ἐπισταμένο τήν γένεσιν
αὐτῶν μηχανάται.

Phileb. 49 b, πάντες ὁπόσοι... ἀνάθοται δοξάζοντας, καθάπερ ἀπάντων
ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαίωτατον ἐπεσεθα τοὺς μὲν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 13 b, κακὶ δε ὅτι αὐτῶν τὰ πολλά καὶ ἄγαθα δε, ὁμοιοὶ ποτα-
γορίεσι ἄγαθα αὐτά. [For it is αὐτῶν, not τὰ πολλά, which is represented by αὐτά.]

Hip. Ma. 292 d, δο παντὶ ό οὐ προσεγίνηται ἵπαρχει ἐκεῖνῳ καλῷ εἶναι.

§ 225. Note, that caution is needed before applying this explanation.

For instance, in Phldr. 265 c, τούτων δὲ τινῶν... ῥήθητον δυοὶ εἶδοι, εἰ αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν κ.τ.λ., the τούτων... εἶδος is a Genitive Absolute. So Symp. 195 a, φημί οὖν ἐγώ
πάντων θεῶν εὐδαιμονίων ὅταν ἔρωτα... εὐδαιμονεῖταν εἶναι αὐτῶν,—
pάντων... ὄντων is a Genitive Absolute. (For the construction, cf.
Laches 182 b, ἐπιτιθεμένου ἀλλο χαίνανται αὐτῶν.) Again, Laches 182 d,
τὸ ὁπλιτικόν τοῦτο εἰ μὲν ἐστιν μάθημα... χρή αὐτὸ μαθεῖν,—ὁπλιτικῶν
is Nomative. (Cf. a similar construction Symp. 202 h.) Again,
Rep. 439 b, τοῦ τοῦτον οὐ καλὸς ἢχει λίγως, ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἀμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ
tὸβον ἀπωθοῦται τε καὶ προσελκύοται, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθοῦσα χείρ,
κ.τ.λ.,—τοῦ τοῦτον belongs to the sentence ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθοῦσα χείρ, κ.τ.λ.

§ 226. C. Dependent sentence resolved into two parts, by
disengaging from its construction and premising a portion of it
consisting of a Noun or Noun-phrase, and bringing both parts
co-ordinately under the government of the Principal sentence.
a. The premised expression being one with a Finite Verb.

Euthyd. 294 c, οὕτω Εὐθύδημον, ὅπωσος ὁδόντας ἔχει;  
Hip. Ma. 283 a, τεκμήριον σοφίας τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων, διόν διαφέρουσι.  
Phaedo 75 b, εἰλθήτου ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ᾿Ιάου, δ’ τι ἐστίν.  
Theaet. 162 d-e, θεοῦ ... ὁν ἐγώ ... ὁν εἰσίν ἢ ὁν ὁν εἰσίν, ἐξαιρ.  
Phaedo 86 d, Κέβητος ἀκοῦσα, τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.  
Hb. 95 b, ταύτα δὴ ὁν ἅν θαυμάσαμε καὶ τῶν Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι.  
Laches 179 e, εἰσηγήσατο οὖν τοῖς ἡμῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸ μάθημα, ὅτι καλὸν εἰς μαθεῖν τὸ ἐν ὁπλαῖς μάχεσθαι.  
Gorg. 449 c, δῆλον οὖν τοὺς κάμφροντας, ὡς ἄν διατιθέμενοι ἐγγαίνουν.  

Note, that a very loose government suffices for the premised expression, as in the three instances following.  

Soph. 260 a, δεὶ λόγον ἡμᾶς διωμολογήσασθαι, τί ποι’ ἐστίν.  
Ibid. d, τῇν εἰδωλοποικήν ... διαμάχοιτ’ ἄν ... ὡς παντάσασν οὐκ ἐστιν.  
Protag. 354 a, οὐ τὰ τούδε λέγετε, οἷον τὰ τε γυμνάσα καὶ τὰς στρατείας κ.τ.λ.,—ὅτι ταύτα ἠγαθά;  

In the two remaining instances the premised expression becomes the Subject of the principal sentence.  

Gorg. 448 d, δῆλον γὰρ μοι Πᾶλος ... , ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικήν ... μεμελέτηκεν.  
Phaedo 64 a, καθισεύοντοι ὅσοι κ.τ.λ. λειπθέναι τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἄλλο ἐπιστηδέουσι.  

The form illustrated by some of the above examples is of course common enough in all authors, beginning with Homer: cf. Od. xvii. 373, Λυτών δ’ οὐ σάφα οἶδα, πόθεν γένος εὑχεται εἶναι, xviii. 374, Τῷ κέ μ’ θέωι, εἰ δικα διανικά προτομοίµην. The looser governments are illustrated by Thuc. iii. 51, ἐξουσίωτο δὲ Νικίας ... τοὺς Πελοποννησίους, ὅπως μὴ ποιῶτα ἔκπλουσ, Aristoph. Av. 1269, Δεινόν γε τὸν κήρυκα, τὸν παρὰ τούς βροτοὺς Οἰχόμενον, εἰ μηδέποτε νοστήσει πάλιν.  

§ 227. b. The Dependent sentence being an Infinitival one.  

Legg. 653 a, φρύνησιν δὲ [λέγω, εἶναι] εὑρίσκεσ ὑπὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο.  
Crat. 419 d, οὐδεὶς προσδεῖται τοῦ δῶτε μὴθήναι.  
Phdr. 242 b, αὕτως γεγενησαία λόγῳ τοῖς μὴθήναι.  
Symp. 207 a, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰστὶ εἶναι ἄτι ἐρως ἐστίν.
In the remaining instance the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Charm. 153 b, ἡγελται... ἡ μάχη πάνω ἵσχυρα γεγονέναι.

§ 228. Note, that Attraction occurs, where possible, in the residuary Dependent sentence also; as in the remaining instances.

Phædo 90 b, ἐπειδῶν τις πιστεύῃ λόγῳ των, ἀληθεὶς εἶναι.
Crat. 425 b, οὐ πιστεύεις σαυτῷ, οἷος τ' ἂν εἶναι—attracted for οἷος τ' ἂν εἶναι se.

Hipp. Ma. 283 c, ἐφθάνων τοῖς ἑαυτῶν παισίν, ὡς βελτίστους γενέσθαι.
Rep. 459 b, δεί ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἄρχων των.

Euthyd. 282 d, οἴων εἰπθυμῶ τῶν προτερετικῶν λόγων εἶναι.

§ 229. b. Or the premised expression may not be the Subject of the Dependent sentence.

Consequently redundancy, implicit or explicit, often occurs, as in some of the instances which follow, in which † is prefixed to the words in which the redundancy lies.

a. The Dependent sentence being one with a Finite Verb.

Phædo 58 e, εἴδαμεν μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαύγει καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ὀδύως καὶ γενναίος ἐτελεύτα. [ἀνὴρ Herm. with Oxon. and most of the other MMS.]

Crito 43 b, σὲ... εἴδαμεν σι συ τοῦ τρόπου, ὡς ραδίως αὐτὴν φέρεις.

Phdr. 264 d, τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν περίων ἀποβολῆς, δι' ἣν ψυχῆς †απορρέει.

Symp. 172 a, διαπιθεσθαι τὴν Ἀγάθωνος ξυνοσίαν... περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων, τίνης ἦσαν.

Euthyd. 272 b, οὐ φοβεῖ τὴν ἡλικίαν, μη ἦδη πρεσβύτερος γηςΕ;

Polite. 309 d, τὸν δὴ πολιτικὸν... ἤρ ἴσον, ὅτι προσήκει μόνον δυνατῶν εἶναι τῇ τῆς βασιλείας μονής †τούτο αὐτὸ ἐμποίείν;

Protag. 318 e, εἴδοσιν περὶ τῶν ῥητών, ὅπως ἂν... †οἰκίαν διόκειν.

Tim. 24 c, τὴν εὐκρατίαν τῶν ἄρων ἐν αὐτῷ κατιδούσα, ὅτι φρονιμωτάτους ἀνδρας οἶσαν—(sc. ὁ τόπος, referred to in αὐτῷ.)

Critias 108 b, προλέγω σοι τὴν τοῦ θεάτρου διάνοιαν, ὅτι θαυμαστώς ὁ πρότερος εὐδοκιμηκέν ἐν †αὐτῷ ποιήσει.

Apol. 25 c, ἀποφαίνει την σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι †μεμελήκε.

Meno 96 e, ὡμολογήκαμεν τούτῳ γε, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχων.

Phædo 65 d, τῆς οὐσίας, οὐ τυχάνει ἑκαστῶν †ον. (Cf. § 213, above.)

Meno 72 b, μελίτης περὶ οὐσίας, ὅ ὅ τοι ἐστὶ.
Cf. Thuc. v. 16, Πλειστοίαν... ἐς ἑνεχύμαν τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις ἐν προβαλλόμενος, ὡς διὰ τὴν ἤκεινον κάθοδον παρανομθέντας ταύτα ἐμβαινοι.

In the three remaining instances, the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Phaedo 82 a, δήλα δή καὶ τάλλα, οἴ ἂν ἐκάστη ταύτα, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιώτητας τῆς μελέτης—which means δήλον δή οία καὶ τάλλα ἦσται, τούτεστιν οἴ ἂν ἐκάστη ταύτα κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 d, αὖτα δήλα τὰ παρόντα, ὅτι οἴοι τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ συμκρότητα τῶν κακῶν ἔξεργάζεσθαι—which means δήλον ὃτι οἴοι τ' εἰσίν... ἔξεργάζεσθαι, τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐργον ἐστίν αὐτὰ τὰ παρόντα.

Ib. 45 c, μὴ δύξῃ ἄπαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανθρία τινὶ τῇ ἁμετέρᾳ πεπράξαθαι, καὶ ἡ εἰσόδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὡς τ' εἰσήλθο-θες, κ.τ.λ.

§ 230. β. The Dependent sentence being Ininitival.

Symp. 197 a, τὸν τῶν ζῶν πολίσιν τὰς ἐναντιώσεται, μὴ οὐχὶ Ἐρωτος εἰναι σοφιὰν ἣ 'τι γίνεται τὰ καὶ φύσει πάντα τὰ ζῶα;

Phaedo 102 b, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τῶν Σιγμίων ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους, οὐχ ὡς τοῖς μήβασι λέγεται οὖτω καὶ τὸ ἄλλης ἕχειν.

Legg. 641 d, τὸ ἄλλης διασυνριζέσθαι, ταύτα οὖτως ἕχειν.

Rep. 489 c, ἔδημεν τὴν φύσιν, οἷον ἄναγκη φύσιν τῶν καλῶν τε καγαθῶν ἐσόμενον.

Ib. 443 b, ἀφχόμενοι τοῖς πόλεως οἰκίζειν.

Gorg. 513 c, ἐπιχειρητέων ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολιτείαις περιτείνειν.

Legg. 790 c, ἡμρεθα τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων διαπερ- αίνειν.

Politic. 285 c, τοῖς μέν τῶν ὄντων, ῥαδίως καταμαθεῖν, αἰσθητὰ τινες ὁμοιώτητες πεφύκασι.

Hip. Ma. 294 c, οἴχεται ἢρ ἡμᾶς διαπεφυγός τὸ καλὸν, γνώσεται ὅ τι τοι ἐστίν.

Crito 52 b, οἴδ' ἐπισημαία σε ἄλλης πόλεως ἐλαβεν εἰδέναι.

Critias 115 d, ἐως εἰς ἐκπλήξιν μεγέθεσι τῇ κύλλεσι τῇ ἐργον ἤδειν τὴν ἐκπιστοὶ ἀπειργάσατο.

Phaedo 84 c, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαινετο.

Apol. 33 b, παρέχω ἐμαντὸν ἑρωτῶν.

§§ 231, 232. ABBREVIATED CONSTRUCTION. 217

Virtually similar is

Phileb. 26 b, ἢμν ... κατιδοῦσα ἡ θεός, πέρας, ... αἰδέν ... ἵνων.

In the remaining instances the premiss expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Apol. 37 d, καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἰη, ἐξελθόντι ... ζην.

Protag. 313 a, εἶν ό πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ σά, ή εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν—(sc. σέ.)

Rep. 525 b, προσήκον τὸ μάθημα ἂν εἰη νομοθετῆσαι καὶ πείδευν τοὺς μελλοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν μεγίστων μεθέξεν ἐπὶ ἡ λογιστικὴν ἴναι.

Gorg. 449 b-c, εἰσὶ μὲν ἤινα τῶν ἀπακρίσεων ἀνωγκαία διὰ μακρῶν ἂ τοὺς λόγους ποιήσαθαι.

Euthyd. 281 d, κινδυνεύει ἕξμπαντα δ. κτ.λ., οὗ περὶ τοῦτον ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ εἶναι ὅπως κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. viii. 46, εὑτελέστερα δὲ τὰ δευτί, ἂ βραχί μορφώ τῆς δαπάνης, καὶ ἀμα μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀσφαλείας, αὐτοίς περὶ ἑαυτοὺς τοὺς Ἑλληνας καταγρίψαι.

§ 231. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES:—ABBREVIATED CONSTRUCTION.

A. Antecedent and Relative clauses supplying each other's Ellipses.

Symp. 212 c, ὃ τι καὶ ὅπη χαίρεις ὀνομαζὼν, τοῖτο ὄνομαζε—where we must supplement the Antecedent sentence thus—τοῦτο καὶ ταύτη ὄνομαζε.

Phaedo 98 a, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἂ πάσχει—where the Relative sentence intended is fully ἂ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ.

Symp. 178 a, ὅ δὲ μιλιστα καὶ ὅν ἔδοξε μοι ἄξιομημόνευτον, τούτων ἤμιν ἔρω ἑκάστου τῶν λόγων—where the Antecedent sentence fully is τοῦτων ἑκάστου τῶν λόγων, καὶ ταῦτα, ἤμιν ἔρω.

§ 232. B. Ellipses supplied from parallel constructions in co-ordinative clauses.

Phaedo 62 a, τυγχάνει ... ἦστιν ὅτε καὶ οἰς βιλτιου τεθναίναι ἡ ζην. όις δὲ βιλτιου τεθναίναι, θαυμαστὸν ... εὶ τοῦτος τόις ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὀδηγόν ἔστι κ.τ.λ.,—where after oías δὲ must be supposed to be repeated καὶ ὅτε, and after τοῦτος τόις ἀνθρώποις similarly καὶ τότε.

1b. 69 b, τοῦτον μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ὀνομάει τε καὶ πιπρασκό-μενα ... μετὰ φρονήσεως—where must be supplied φρονήσεως καὶ before μετὰ φρονήσεως, parallel to τοῦτον καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον.
Politic. 258 a, θεατήτω ... συνέμενα χθές διὰ λόγων καὶ νόμν ακήκοα, Σωκράτους δὲ οὐδέτερα—where the clauses supply each other crosswise; ακήκοα requires the Genitive θεατήτων, and οὐδέτερα implies a Σωκράτει parallel to θεατήτω, as well as a Σωκράτους.

§ 233. C. Dependent Noun silently supplied from one of two co-ordinate clauses to the other, in a new and different government.
Apol. 19 d, ἄξιω ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν—where ἀλλήλους is to be supplied to φράζειν.
Laches 187 d, διδάστε τε καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγον παρ’ ἀλλήλων—where ἀλλήλων is to be supplied to διδάστε.
Legg. 934 c, διδασκέτω καὶ μανθανέτω τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦτα—το μανθανέται supply παρὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦτος.
Protag. 349 a, σὲ παρακαλεῖ ... καὶ ἀνακοινούσθαι—sc. σοί.
Phtdr. 238 e, τῷ ὑπὸ ἐπίθυμα ἄχρομων, δολευόντι τε—sc. ἐπιθυμία.
Ib. 278 c, πρὸς ἄλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαρῶν—sc. ἀπ’ ἄλληλων.
Symp. 195 b, μετὰ δὲ νέων ἀλ’ ἐξεστεί τε καὶ ἑστιν, ἵ. ὁ. καὶ ἑστὶ τῶν νέων.
Cf. Xen. Hell. I. iii. 9, ὥρκους ἔλαβον καὶ ἔδωσαν παρὰ Φαρμακίδαν.

§ 234. D.¹¹ New Subject in the second of two clauses silently supplied from the former.
Rep. 333 c, ὅταν μηδέν δὲν αὐτῷ χρήσθαι, ἀλλὰ κείσθαι—sc. αὐτό.
Symp. 212 c, θύραν ψόφον παρασχεῖν, ... καὶ οὐκηρίδος φωνὴν ἀκούειν—sc. αὐτοῦ, from αὐτοῦ implied by παρασχεῖν.
Ib. 187 c, ὅπως ἂν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καρπώσηται, ἀκολασίαν δὲ μηδείμαν ἐμποίησῃ—sc. ἥ ἡδονή.
Rep. 414 d, ἐδόκουν ταῦτα πάσχειν τε, καὶ γιγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ—sc. ταῦτα.
Phaedo 58 b, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πύλην, καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτινώναι—sc. αὐτοῦ.
Ib. 72 c, λῆγον τὸν Ἐνδυμίων ἐνδείξει καὶ οἰδάμοι ἂν φάνοιτο—sc. Ἐνδυμίων.
Apol. 40 a, ἃ γε δὴ οἰδήθη ἂν τίς καὶ νομίζεται ἄχρονα κακῶν εἶναι—where the Nominative to νομίζεται is ἂ supplied from the preceding Accusative ἄ. (This is an instance of the next head also.)

¹¹ [Under this section is written in the MS. “Illustr. from Homer:” and so under §§ 235, 269, 300, 301, 308, “Illustr.:” but the illustrations were never put in.]
§ 235. E. Relative Pronoun, in a new and different government, supplied to the second clause.

Symp. 200 d, δοθήντοι ἐτοιμον αὐτῷ ἑστιν, οὐδὲ ἔχει.

Ib. 201 a, οὐ εἶδεν ἐστιν, καὶ μὴ ἔχει.

Phaedo 65 a, ὃ μηδὲν ἥδι τῶν τοιούτων, μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν.

Gorg. 482 b, ἄ σο νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρῆσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένος.

Menex. 243 c, ἰν χρῆ αἰτὶ μεμηνεῖβαι τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν.

§ 236. In the following passages, the force of the Relative is still to be supplied, although a Demonstrative Pronoun fills its place in the construction.

Rep. 357 b, ἣδοναί ὡσαί αἰθαζεῖ καὶ μηδέν διὰ ταῦτας γίγνεται.

Ib. 395 d, ὃν φαμέν κηδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄμος ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι.

Phaedo 100 b, ὅ εί μοι δίδωσ τε καὶ ξυγχωρεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα.

Virtually similar is Rep. 337 e, πρότειν µὲν µὴ εἰδῶς, . . . ἐπιστὰ . . . ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἰ, where µὴ εἰδῶς is the equivalent of ὃς µὴ εἰδεῖς.

§ 237. F. Common part supplied from a preceding to a subsequent clause.

a. Definite Article.

The brackets indicate where Articles have to be supplied. The complete irregularity with which they are expressed and omitted shows that the object is, next to conciseness, to produce variety of expression and sound.

Rep. 344 c, τὸ µὲν τῷ κρεῖτων ξυμφέρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει δυ, τὸ δ' ἀδικον [ ] έαυτῷ λυπητελοῦν.

Ib. 438 b-c, τὰ πλεῖω πρός τὰ ελαστα . . . καὶ αὕ [ ] βαρότερα πρός [ ] κοιφότερα καὶ [ ] δαντοῦ πρός τὰ βραδύτερα.

Ib. 477 a, ἐπὶ µὲν τῷ ὄντι γνώσις, ἀγνωσία δ' ἐπὶ [ ] μὴ ὄντι.

Ib. 544 c, ἦ τε . . . ἐπαινομένη, ἦ ᾽Ερημή . . . καὶ [ ] δευτέρα . . . καλομεμένη δ' ὀλιγραχία.

Ib. 545 a, τῶν φιλόνεικων . . . καὶ [ ] ὀλιγραχικῶν αὐ καὶ [ ] δημοκρατίκων καὶ τῶν τυραννικῶν.

Phaedo 67 d, χρωσιμός τῆς γυνῆς ἢπὸ [ ] σῶματος. [So Oxon.]

Gorg. 469 e, καὶ τὰ γέ Αθηραίων νεώρια καὶ [ ] τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα. [So most MSS.]

Symp. 186 e, ἠ τῇ ἰατρικῇ . . . , ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ [ ] γυμναστικῇ καὶ [ ] γεωργία.
Phadr. 253 d, ἄρετὴ δὲ τίς τοῦ ἁγάθου, ἢ [ ] κακοῦ κκία, οὐ διεἴπομεν.
Phileb. 45 a, μεῖζους γέγονεται περὶ τοὺς κάμνουτας ... ἢ περὶ [ ] ἄγαίνουτας;
Legg. 789 c, τοὺς μὲν ἔλαττονας εἰς τὰς χείρας, [ ] μεῖζους δ ὑπὸ τὴν ἁγκαλίαν.
Ib. 960 c, [ ] Λάξεσιν μὲν τὴν πρώτην, [ ] Κλωθῶ δὲ τὴν δεύτεραν, τὴν "Ατροπόν δὲ [ ] τρίτην.

§ 238. b. Preposition.

Svp. 209 d, καί εἰς ὀμηρον βλέψας καὶ Ἡσίοδον.
Apol. 25 b, καί περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. So Phædo 111 d, &c.

§ 239. e. Some larger part of the clause.

Politic. 308 c, τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους κομωνεῖν ... ὅσα ἐστὶ τείνουτα πρὸς ἄρετην, ἄλλα εἰς ἀθέσπητα.

§ 240. G. Anastrophe; that is, the supplying of a word from a subsequent to a former clause. The object is, as Dissen (Pind. Nem. x. 38) remarks, to give liveliness to the sentence by strengthening the later clauses of it.

The use of this figure is more extensive in poetry than in prose; the following species of it, however, occur in Plato.

a. Anastrophe of Definite Article. (This is the converse of the usage considered under the last head.)

Rep. 491 d, εἰτε ἐγγείων εἰτε τῶν ζώων.
Phileb. 35 e, ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίας θ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τήν φθοράν.
Legg. 795 b, διαφερεῖ μαθῶν μὴ μαθάντως, καὶ ὁ γυμνασάμενος τοῦ μὴ γεγυμνασμένου.


Rep. 455 e, καὶ γνῆ ἵατρεῖ, ἢ δ᾽ οὐ. So 451 e.
Symp. 207 d, οίος δὲι γεγομένος, τὰ δὲ ἀπολλύ—where we must supply τὰ μὲν to νέος γεγομένου.
Phædo 105 d—e, (A) τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενος καὶ ὁ ἐν μοισικὸν μὴ διέχται [τὶ ἁναμάζωμεν]; (B) "Ἀμοισιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον—where before ἀμοισιον must be supplied to μὲν. So Soph. 221 e, 248 a, Phileb. 36 e, &c.
Theet. 191 c, είρηνον ἐκμαγείον, ... τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κατραμμαστέρου, καὶ σκληροστέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ ἱγροτέρου—where before σκληροστέρου must be supplied ἐνίοις μὲν.

Apol. 18 d, ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ ... χρώμουν ᾦμᾶς ἀνέπειδον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεσιμενοί ἄλλους πειθοῦσε—where before φθόνῳ must be supplied οἱ μὲν.

Cf. Hom. II. xi. 536, ἂφ' ἰπτείνων ὀπλεών ῥαθύμηγγες ἐξαλλὸν, Αἰ β' ἀπ' ἐπισαστέρων, xxii. 157, παραδραμάτην, φείγον, ὃ δ' ὀπισθε διώκων, ix. 511, Εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δάρα φέροι, τὰ δ' ὀπισθ' ὄνομάζοι, Od. iii. 33, κράνα ὄπτων ἀλλα δ' ἐπειρον, xiv. 232, Τῶν ἐξαιρεύμων μενοείκα, πολλά δ' ὀπίσω Λάγχανον (i.e. πολλά μὲν μενοείκα).

§ 242. c. Anastrophe of Correlative Adverbs.

Theet. 192 d, ὅκοιο, ... τότε δὲ αἰσθησιν οὐδεμίαν ἐχώ.

Phaedo 116 a, διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦστε, τότε δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς ἕμφορας διεξώστε—where τότε must be supplied before διαλεγόμενοι. So also Critias 119 d, Phileb. 35 e, Tim. 22 e.

The leaving μὲν to be supplied from an expressed δὲ in the Correlative clause is common: e.g. Rep. 357 c, 358 a, 572 a, Symp. 199 b, 201 e.


Soph. 217 e, κατ' ἔμαυτόν, εἴτε καὶ πρὸς ἑτερον.

Gorg. 488 d, διώρισον, ταύτων ἕ ἑτερόν ἐστι κ.τ.λ.

Theet. 169 d, ἰδωμέν, ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐνυσχεραίωμεν. So 161 d.

Hb. 173 d, εὔ δέ ἢ κακῶς ... μᾶλλον αὐτῶν λίησθεν.


§ 244. e. Anastrophe of Prepositions.

Phileb. 22 c, τῶν μὲν οὐκ ἰμπηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῷ πα ὑπὲρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερεύων ὀρῶν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ περὶ τι δράσομεν.

This kind of Anastrophe is as common in Homer as it is in later poets. The converse usage is noticeable in peculiar instances: cf. Hom. II. xi. 374, Ἡτοι ὁ μὲν θώρηκα 'Ἀγαστρόφου ἰφθίμοιο λιντ' ἀπο
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 245, 246.

στήθεσθι παναιόλου ἁσπίδα τε ὀρμον. And Theor. i. 83, Πάσας ἀνά κρίνας, πάντ' ἁλσεα, ib. 117, Οὐκ ἐτ' ἀνά δρύμως, οὐκ ἁλσεα.

§ 245. H. Verb supplied from a co-ordinate clause either preceding or subsequent.

Symp. 213 a, κελεύειν εἰςίναι, καὶ τὸν 'Αγάθωνα καλεῖν αὐτῶν—in the second clause is to be supplied λέγειν out of κελεύειν.

Apol. 38 b, κελεύοντι με τριάκοντα μνων τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυ-άσθαι.

In the following instance the Verb is supplied after an intervening complete clause.

Symp. 183 a, ἡ χρήματα βουλόμενος παρά τον λαβέιν ἡ ἀρχὴν ἂρξαι ἡ τιν' ἁλλήν δύναμι—where to the last clause must be supplied λαβέιν from the next but one preceding.

In all the following it is the Substantive Verb that has to be supplied.

Symp. 186 a, ὡς μέγας καὶ βαθμαστός καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεός τείνει—where ἐντὸς is to be supplied to μέγας καὶ βαθμαστώς.

Soph. 256 e, ἐξόπαντα . . . ἐροῦμεν . . . εἶναι τε καὶ [supply 'are'] ἐντα.

Phdr. 234 e, σαφῆ καὶ στρογγύλα καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐκαστα τῶν ὄνομάτων ἀποτελόμεναι.

Tim. 22 d, ὁ Νείλος εἰς τε τὰ ἅλλα σωτήρ καὶ τὸτε ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας σώζει.

Ib. 56 b, αὐτῶσ ὡς καθ' ἐν ἐκαστὸν μὴν . . . οἷδὲν ἄρωμεν, εὐναθρο-σθέντων δὲ . . . ὀράσθαι.

Legg. 872 a, ἦν δὲ αὐτόχειρ μὲν μῆ, βουλεύσῃ δὲ δανατῶν τις ἅλλος ἐτέρῳ.

§ 246. I. Verb or Participle supplied from subordinate construction to main construction, or vice versa.

Phdr. 330 d, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ βρέμματα βαλλόν . . . προσείνετε ἄγουντε—where to οἱ τὰ βρέμματα must be supplied ἄγουντε.

Phedo 114 b, οἱ ἄν διέξωθεν διαφερόντωσ πρὸς τὸ οὕτως βιώκαι—where to διαφερόντωσ must be supplied βεβιωκιναι.

Theat. 180 a, ἐπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οἷδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδ' σμικρῶν ἐνεκάν—where to τὸ οὐδ' οἷδὲν must be supplied ἐνεκάν.

Cf. Isocr. ix. 28. p. 194, παρακαλέσας ἀνθρώπους, ὡς οἱ τοὺς πλει-στοὺς λέγοντες, περὶ πεντάκοντα—where to οἱ . . . λέγοντες must be supplied λέγοντει. (Cf. Epist. ad Hebr. x. 10.) Hdt. ii. 86,
§§ 247—249.] ABBREVIATED CONSTRUCTION. 223

οὖν ἡμῖν τούς τὰ πολιτελέστατα σκεύησον περεύον. Thuc. ii. 53, ἐν τούτον ἐπιλαμβάνει τις ἡ προτέρων ὀπεκρύπτητο μὴ καθ’ ἤδονήν ποιεῖν—ἐτολμα δε. καθ’ ἤδονήν ποιεῖν.

§ 247. J.

Apol. 18 e, ὁ δὲ πάντων ἀλογότατον, ὅτι οἴδι τὰ ἀνάμετα αὐν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι—which is to be supplemented thus—ὁ δὲ πάντων ἐστίν ἀλογότατον, ὅτι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἡ τ. ἑ. Lys.

Symp. 183 b, ὁ δὲ δεινότατον, ὅτι γε λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι καὶ ὀμικρυτὶ μόνῃ συγγράμῃ.

Still more elliptical is

Phdr. 248 b, οὐ δὲ ἐνεχ’ ἐς ἡ πολλὴ σπουδή, ἐς προσῆκενα ... νομὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεὶ λειμάνων τυχάνει οὔσα—i.e. οὐ δὲ ἐνεχ’ ἐς πολλὴ σπουδὴ ἐστίν, ὅτι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἢ πρ. κ.τ.λ.


§ 248. K. Of two Nouns in regimen, the governing Noun left to be supplied by the context, while its place in the construction is taken by the governed Noun.

Symp. 214 c, μεθύσατα ἄνδρα παρὰ νηφώτων λόγους παραθάλλει—where μεθύσατα ἄνδρα stands for μεθύσατος ἄνδρος λόγους.

Ib. 217 d, τῇ ἐχομένη ἐμοῦ κλίνῃ—where ἐμοῦ stands for κλίνης τῆς ἐμῆς.

Protag. 310 e, οὕτ’ ἐν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλήποιμοι οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τῶν φίλων.

This natural idiom begins with Homer: cf. II. xvii. 51, κόμα ταραττοσον ὀμοίαν.

§ 249. L. Complementary ἄλλος omitted.

Theet. 159 b, καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα δ’ νῦν διὴλθομεν—where πάντα stands for ‘all besides.’

Ib. 145 a, ἀστραυμακός καὶ πολιτικός ... καὶ ὅσα παύειας ἔχεται.

Phædo 69 b, τοῦτον πάντα ... παπρασκόμενα—‘all other things being parted with for this.’

So τί μήν; ‘what, if not what you say?’
§ 250. M. Contrasted clause to be mentally supplied.

Rep. 475 e, οὐδαμῶς [φιλοσόφους φήσωμεν], ἀλλ' ὁμοίως μὲν φιλοσό-
φους—sc. φιλοσόφους δ' οὖ.

Themet. 201 b, οὐδαμὸς ἐγώνε οἷμαι [δύνασθαι διδάξαι], ἀλλὰ πείσαν
μὲν—sc. διδάξαι δ' οὖ.

Crito 43 d, οὐ δὴ τοι ἀδύκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν [so Oxon. and two more
MSS.] μὲν μοι, ἤξεν τίμητον—sc. 'but I am not sure.'

Phdr. 242 e, εἰμὶ μάντις μὲν, οὐ πάντα δὲ σπουδαίος, ἀλλ', ὅσπερ οἱ τὰ
γράμματα φαίλου, ὅσον μὲν ἐμαυτῷ μόνον ἰκανός.

Cf. Andoc. i. 22. p. 4, ταυτὶ ἐλεγεν ἄν, ἢ οὖ; ἐγώ μὲν οἷμαι—sc. 'but
another might not.' (οἷμαι μὲν ἐγὼ would have been 'I think,
but am not sure.'

§ 250*. MM. Disjunctive clause to be mentally supplied.

Crat. 389 e, ἐὼς ἂν τὴν αὐτήν ἰδέαν ἀποδίδω, ἓν τε ἐν ἂλλῳ σιδήρῳ,
[ἐὼν τε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ] ὀμοῖς ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ ὀργανό.

§ 251. N. Protasis of a hypothetical reason left to be mentally
supplied.

Symp. 236 b, (A) ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; (B) Οὐ μόντ' ἂν ... ἐφοίτων παρὰ σε
—i. e. 'No: for else I should certainly not have;' &c.

Phdr. 227 d, εἰδε γράψειεν κ.τ.λ.: ἡ γὰρ ἂν ἀστείου καὶ δημοψυχεῖ σειν
οἱ λόγοι.

Euthyd. 280 a, οὐ γὰρ δήπον ἀμαρτάνου γ' ἂν ποτὲ τις σοφία ... .
ἡ γὰρ ἂν οὐκέτι σοφία εἶη.

§ 252. O. Hypothetical sentence ;—εἴπερ representing the Pro-
tasis.

Euthyd. 296 b, οὐκοιν ἡμᾶς γε [σφαλεῖ], ἀλλ', εἴπερ, σέ.

Rep. 497 c, οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ', εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακω-
λύσει.

Legg. 667 a, οὐκ, ὡ γαθε, προσέχων τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν ὁρῶ τούτῳ, εἴπερ.

Ib. 900 c, καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, εἴπερ, ὁπόσα φλαίρα.

Cf. Arist. Eth. VIII. iii., ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σφαλείς βούλεται αὐτῶν, ἵνα
αιτῶς ἔχῃ also ib. IX. vii, X. iii. And Aristoph. Nub. 227,
"Ετέρων ἄπαν τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπερφρονεῖς, 'Αλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς,
εἴπερ.

§ 253. P. Hypothetical sentence ;—εἰ δὲ representing the Pro-
tasis.

Symp. 212 c, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὡς ἐγκώμιον εἰς "Ερωτα νόμοισον εἰρήσθαι;
εἰ δὲ, δὲ τι καὶ ὁπῇ χαίρειν ὁμολόγω, τοῦτο ὁμόραζε.
§§ 254, 255. ABBREVIATED CONSTRUCTION. 

Euthyd. 285 c, ει μὲν βούλεται, ἐφέτω, εἰ δ', ο τι βούλεται τοῖτο ποιεῖται.
Legg. 688 b, ει μὲν βούλεσθε, ὡς παῖζων' εἰ δ', ὡς σπουδάζων.
Alc. I. 114 b, τι οὐκ ἀπίδειγμα, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν με ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σέ' εἰ δέ, καὶ αὐτός ἐπὶ οὐκοῦν λόγῳ διεξέλθη.

This εἰ δὲ does not stand for εἰ δὲ μή, in reference to the βούλει of the former clause; but refers to a βούλει of its own, with reference to the coming clause.

The usage is common in Homer: cf. Π. vi. 376, Εἰ δ', ἀγε, xxii. 381, Εἰ δ', ἀγετε, ix. 46, εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοί, Φευγότων κ.τ.λ., 262, Εἰ δὲ, σὺ μὲν μὲν άκουσών.

§ 254. Q. Hypothetical sentence;—suppression of Apodosis.

Gorg. 520 e, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εἰεργεῖσαι άντ' εἰ πείσεται—' εἰ δὲ μή, οὖ.

More commonly the form is εἰν μὲν . . . . εἰ δὲ, as also in Thucydides.

Symp. 185 d, εἰν μὲν σοι ἐδήλη παύεσθαι ἡ λίγηξ—' εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.
Legg. 854 c, καὶ εἰν μὲν σοι λωφά τι τὸ νόσημα—' εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.
Protag. 325 d, εἰν μὲν εκὼν πείθηται—' εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.
Ib. 311 d, ἀν μὲν εξικήτηται . . . .—' εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.

Hipp. Ma. 287 a, εἰν . . . . άντιλαμβάνομαι—' suppose I' &c.

Symp. 199 e, ἀπόκριμαι ἀλίγαρ πλείο, ἵνα μάλλον καταμίθη ὁ βούλομαι εἰ γάρ ἐρούμην κ.τ.λ.—' suppose I were to ask, now,' &c.

Rep. 440 d, ἀλλ' εἰ πρὸς τούτο καὶ τόδε ἐνθιμεῖται . . . ., ὃτι κ.τ.λ.—

Symp. 177 b, εἰ δὲ βούλει αὐ σκέφασθαι κ.τ.λ.—

With εἰ βούλει, or εἰ βούλεσθε, the Protasis also is often curtailed.

Symp. 220 d, εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε εὖ ταῖς μάχαις κ.τ.λ.—where εἰ βούλεσθε represents εἰ βούλεσθε σκέφασθαι τὸν Σωκράτη ἄποιοι ἐστίν.

Crat. 392 a, εἰ δὲ βούλει περὶ τῆς ὀρθότος.

Theat. 196 e, εἰ δὲ βούλει . . . κεχρήμεθα.

Cf. Hom. Π. ii. 580, Εἴπερ γάρ κ' εἴθηλησεν κ.τ.λ., xvi. 559, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀκαύσσασαιμβ', κ.τ.λ., xxi. 487, Εἰ δ' εἴθελες πολέμου δοθήσει κ.τ.λ.,
Od. ΧV. 80, Εἰ δ' εἴθελες. Suppression of the Apodosis is also common in Homer after ἔτει,—as Π. iii. 59, Od. iii. 103, viii. 236.

§ 255. R. Form of Apodosis of a Hypothetical represented by ἄν, the Verb or Participle being understood.

Phaedo 98 c, ἔδεσεν ὰροιότατον πεποιθέιναι ὅσπερ ἄν εἰ τις . . . λέγων.
In this common phrase the 

In this common phrase the represents not so much a particular sentence, such as e.g. here πεπονθώς ἃν εἰς τις, but rather a vague sentence such as τὸ πράγμα ἃν εἰς.

Apol. 20 b, τοῦτο καὶ ἑναδέ οὐκ ἀναλέοντος τοις μικροῖς... καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφότερῳ τοῦ φαίνην εἰναι, τοῦτο ἃν—ὅτι, σοφότερος ἃν φαίνην εἰναι—but this suppression is a graceful escape from the appearance of self-assertion.

Politic. 308 c, εἰ τις πράγμα ὁτιοῦν... κἂν εἰ τὸ φαυλότατον... ἐννίστημι. Here the κἂν... φαυλότατον is exegetical of ὁτιοῦν—'any whatever, so that even if you understood it of the vilest it would mean that.' The κἂν is hyperbolically placed, and belongs to the εἰ clause.

Symp. 221 ε, ὁνόματα καὶ ἰμάτα ἐξοθεν περιμετέχονται, Σατύρον ἃν τινα ὑφιστοῦν δῶραν—'something [like] what a satyr's hide would be.' In this instance, as also in the last, it is a Participle, not a Verb, which is to be understood.

Rep. 468 a, τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον; πῶς ἐκτίνων κ.τ.λ.; Λέγ', ἐφη, ποι' ἃν;

§ 256. S. Condition or Reason referring to an implicit Proposition.

Phaedo 61 b, Εὐθύνον φράζε... ἃν σωφρότητι ἐμε διώκειν—'tell him to follow me,—which he will do if he is wise.'

Symp. 173 d, ὡπόθεν... τὰ τὰ πονηματία ἑλαθεί... οὐκ οἴδα ἔγωγε ἃν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις ἄει τοιοῦτος εἰ—'I do not know how you came by it, but at all events it fits you; for' &c.

Theet. 158 a, ὅκον εἰπεῖν οὕτω οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι λέγω... επὶ κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 333 c, αὐτόκεφαλόν ἃν ἔγωγε τούτῳ ὠμολογεῖν... επὶ πολλοί γάρ φασι κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 335 c, εἰμι' επὶ καὶ ταῦτ' ἃν ὅσον οὐκ ἄρκεις σου ἡκονομ.

§ 257. T. Direct conjunction of one or more particulars with a clause covering the rest.

a. In summarily breaking off enumeration of particulars.

Phaedo 100 d, ἡ ἐκείνῃν τοῦ καλοῦ εἰτε παρουσία εἰτε καυνοσία εἰτε ὁπῇ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγωγευμένη.

Legg. 834 c, εἰτε μοιητείδεσ εἰτε αὐτα ἀπει πειπτουν ἐτῶν εἰθ' ὁπῇ καὶ ὅπως ἃν... διαμεθρύσω.

Tim. 48 c, τὴν μὲν περὶ ἀπειτίων εἰτε ἀρχὴν εἰτε ἀρχὰς εἰτε ὁπῃ δοκεῖ.

Crito 50 a, εἰτε ἀποδοθήκετε, εἰθ' ὅπως δὲ ὄνυμάσαι τούτο.

Apol. 41 b, Ὁδυσσεία ἡ Σινθόν ἡ ἄλλος μυρίους ἃν τις εἶπον.
Phædo 70 c, οίνον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἑαυτὸν [τιγχάνει ὄν], καὶ ἄλλα δῆ μυρία οὔτως ἔχει. Similarly Phædo 73 d, 94 b, Gorg. 483 d, Legg. 944 b.

Protag. 325 a, δικαιοσύνη, καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ τὸ δικαὶ εἶναι, καὶ συλληβδὴν ἐν αὐτῷ προσαγορεύω εἶναι ἄνθρωπος ἀρετήν.

The peculiarity of these contracted forms of expression may be appreciated by comparing the following regularly composed sentence:—

Protag. 358 a, εἰτε γάρ ἢδ' εἰτε τερπών λέγεις εἰτε χαρτόν, εἰτε ύπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τουατα ὀνομάζων, ὁ βελτιστε Πρόδικος, τοῖτο μου σπέρ ὁ βούλομαι ὑπόκριναι.

The contracted forms give us always the feeling of abbreviation, as if the speaker was himself impatient of prolixity.

Gorg. 494 d, (A) φημὶ τῶν κωμομεν ἢδ' εἶναι βιώναι. (B) Πύτερον εἰ τήν κεφαλὴν μόνον κηπεκαί, ἣ ἢτι τι σε ἐρωτόν;

Apol. 20 d, οὕτω δὲ τάχ' ἄν ... μείζ' τινα ἡ κατ' ἀνδρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶνεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τι λέγω.

§ 258. b. In summary transitions to one particular.

Legg. 715 c, τοὺς ἀρχαῖος ... ἡπιήσας ... ἐκάλεσα ο秭 τι καινοτομίας ὄνομάτων ἔνεκα, ἄλλ' ἐγούμαι κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 36 a, τὸ μή ἀγαπητίν ... ἄλλα τι μοι πολλὰ συμβάλλεται, καὶ οὔκ ἀνέλπιστον μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο.

Cf. Lysias xxviii. 4-5. p. 179, οἶμαι ... οἰδέα ἄν ... ἐπιτρέψασι ..., ἀλλος τε καὶ Ἕρωκλῆς ἐλέγεν. St. Mark vi. 5, καὶ οὐκ ἂν διάκω ἐκεὶ αὐτέςμπο ὑπάγων, ἢ μῆ ... ἐθεράπευς.

Hip. Ma. 281 c, (A) τι ποτε τὸ αἴτητον ὅτι οἱ πάλαιοι ... φαίνονται ἀπεχώριν ... ; (B) Τι 6 οἴει ἄλλο γε ἢ ἀδύνατο ἢσαν; Phaedo 63 d, (A) σκεφτόμεθα τι ἐστὶν ὁ βούλος δια μοι δοκεῖ πᾶλαι εἰπτείν. (B) Τι δὲ ἄλλο γε ἢ πᾶλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μελλόν κ.τ.λ.

§ 259. U. Use of πολλοῦ δὲι instead of αὐ.

In the regular or full construction πολλοῦ δὲι is either interjected parenthetically, or subjoined, to strengthen a negation. But, in the instances which follow, a Negative is dropped out, and the πολλοῦ δὲι is made to fill the same place in the construction which the Negative filled.

Rep. 378 c, πολλοῦ δὲι μυθολογητικῶν ..., ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 203 c, πολλοῦ δὲι ἄπαλος ..., ἄλλα σκληρῶς. Fully and regularly this would have been ὁχ' ἄπαλος,—πολλοῦ γε καὶ δὲι,—ἄλλα σκληρῶς.
228 DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 260—262.

Gorg. 517 a, πολλού γε δεί μηποτε τις τοιαύτα ἐργάσηται. Fully οὐ μηποτε τις (πολλοῦ γε δεὶ) τοιαύτα ἐργάσηται.

§ 260. V. Extension of the government of a Verb, irrationally, so as to admit of the addition of an afterthought to a Participial clause without a new construction.

Politic. 276 c, εἰς ταύτων βασιλεία καὶ τύραννον εὐνέθεμεν, ἀνομοιοτάτους ὑπερ αὐτῶς τε καὶ τῶν τῆς ἀρχῆς εἰκατέρου τρόπων—where there is no justification in the sense for bringing τῶν τρόπων under the government of εὐνέθεμεν.

§ 261. W. Two Participles, representing the reciprocal action of two parties, made to agree each of them with both conjointly,—to avoid specification in set terms.

Crito 48 d, ἐξάγαγον τε καὶ ἐξαγόμεναι—i. e. σὺ τε ἐξάγων, ἐγὼ τε ἐξαγόμενος.

Cf. Isocr. vi. 47. p. 125, ἀπείτωμεν δὲ ἀν ἀκούοντες τε καὶ λέγοντες—i. e. ἵματες τε ἀκούοντες, ἐγὼ τε λέγων. Somewhat similarly Arist. Categ. vi. 13, ὅρος μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ μεγάλη, τὸ τῶν ὁμογενῶν μείζονα εἶναι—where however μείζονα, still more brachylogically, stands for τὴν μὲν μείζον, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον.

§ 262. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES:—PLEONASM OF CONSTRUCTION.

From instances of Pleonasm must be excluded

1. Cases in which the force of a word has been attenuated by its frequent use in that particular connection; e. g. εἶναι subjoined to ἐκὼν and the like:

2. All cases in which redundancy has resulted from Change of Construction, or from Binary Structure:

3. Cases of fullness of Construction: e. g.

Phaedo 62 a, τούτο μόνον τῶν ἀλλών ἀπάντων—which is simply the full form of which μόνον ἀπάντων would have been an abbreviation; as 'distinct from all the rest' is more accurate than 'distinct from all':

Or the use of ὅστε with the Infinitive, following δύναμαι &c.

Or the use of a deliberate form of speaking, as in

Apol. 19 b, τι δὴ λέγουτε διεξάλλων οὐ διαεξάλλωτε;
In. 34 d, ἐπικεὶ ἂν μοι δοκῶ ... λέγειν λέγων κ.τ.λ.
In. 36 a, οὐκ ἀνελπιστών μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονός τούτο.
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Legg. 858 a, τίνα τρόπον ἐν γιγνόμενον γίγνετο.
Phaedo 75 d, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεισιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρίνομενοι.

Cf. Isæus ii. 22, οὐκ ἂν ποιησάμενος ἄλλον οἰκείοτέρον ἔμοι ποιήσαιτο ἂν whereby we are reminded of Homer's (Od. xi. 612) Ἔφεσις σάμενος μηδ' ἄλλο τι τεχνήσωτο 'Ος κείνον τελαμώνα ἕγερκατέθετο τέχνη.

Or, in coordinate clauses which have a common part, the expression of this in each clause, as in
Phdr. 255 d, ὡσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρωτήτι ἑαυτὸν ὅρων.
Rep. 553 b, παίσαντα ὡσπερ πρὸς ἐρματι πρὸς τῇ πόλει.
Phaedo 67 d, ὡσπερ ἐκ δεισμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος.

(Compare these with the real Pleonasm of Prepositions below—§ 265.)

§ 263. A. Pleonasm of particular words.

a. Of the Negative.

a. In the same clause.

Rep. 339 b, οὔτω δῆλον οὔδ' εἰ μεγάλη.
Ib. 389 a, οὐκοῦν ὄμηρον οὔδ' τὰ τοιαίτα ἀποδεξώμεθα.
Crito 43 b, οὐ μᾶ τῶν Δι' οὔδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἰδέλοι.
Euthyd. 279 a, οὔδ' σεμνοῦ ἄνδρος πάντω τι οὔδὲ τοῦτο ἐξεικνύει εἰπορεύει. So Phaedo 115 c.

Politic. 300 e, μηδ' εἴπητο μηδ' ἑντυων δυνατόν λαβεῖν τέχνην.
Phaedo 100 a, οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία οὐ σφόδρα.

Hip. Ma. 292 b, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ὡ 'Ιππία, οὐκ, εἰ ταύτα γε ἀποκριαίμαιν.

Lysis 221 c, οὐκ ἂν, εἰ γε τὸ κακῶν κ.τ.λ., οὐκ ἂν ἢν κ.τ.λ.
Crat. 398 e, οὔδ' εἰ τι οἶδ' ἂν ἔμη εὑρεῖν, οὐ συντεῖνο.
Euthyphro 4 d, οὔτ' εἰ ὁ τι μάλιστ' ἀπέκτεινεν, . . . οὐ δεῖν.
Cf. Hom. II. i. 36, &c.

The usage is common, of course, where the Negative is distributed to subdivisions of the sentence, as in
Theæt. 163 a, ἀλλ' οὗ δίκαιον οὔτε σύ οὔτ' ἂν ἥμεις φαίμεν.

The object of the Pleonasm is, after premising the Negative as an announcement of the general form of the sentence, to place it also in close contact with the word which it immediately concerns.
§ 264. β. Not in the same clause. In this case the repetition seems almost \(^{15}\) irrational.

Apol. 27 c, ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πείθοις ἄν ὅς οὐ, κ.τ.λ., οὐδεμία μηχανὴ ἐστι.

Leegg. 747 d, μηδὲ τούθ' ἡμᾶς λαυβιανέω περὶ τόπων, ὡς οὐκ εἶλαν ἄλλοι τινὲς διαφέροντες ἄλλων πρὸς τὸ γενόμεν ἄνθρωπος ἁμείνους καὶ χείρον' οίς οὐκ ἐναντία νομοθετήσεν. οἱ μὲν γε που διὰ πνεύματα κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Antipho vi. 10. p. 142, οὔτε ὅσις οὐκ ἄλλα κατηγορεῖ ἡ διάκει ἐν πράγματι τοιοῦτοι διήπον αὐτῷ ἀξιώτερον ἔστιν ἡ ἀπιστήσα 

—where οὐκ is irrational.

§ 265. b. Of Prepositions.

Phdr. 278 a, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδασκομένοις . . . ἐν μονοὶς τὸ ἐναργές εἶναι.

Cf. Thuc. iii. 53, ἐν δικασταῖς οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις δεξάμενοι γενέσθαι ἡ ἕμιν.

§ 266. c. Of Conjunctions.

Symp. 210 b, καὶ εὼν ἐπιεικὴς ὅν τὴν ψυχὴν τις καὶ εὼν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ.

d. Of ἄν.

Phdr. 276 b, τῇ γεωργικῇ χρώμενος τέχνῃ ἄν σπείρας εἰς τὸ προσήκος ἀγαπῇ ἄν κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 31 a, κρούσαντες ἄν με, πειθόμενοι 'Ἀνύτη, ῥαδίως ἄν ἀποκτεῖναι.

c. Of ἐφη, &c.

Symp. 175 d, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Ἐθ ἄν ἔχω, φάναι, & 'Ἀγάθων.

Ib. 190 c, λέγει ὅτι Δοκό μοι, ἐφη, κ.τ.λ.

§ 267. B. Resumption of a Noun, where no Change of Construction has intervened, by Oblique Cases of αὐτός.

See under 'Binary Structure,' § 222, above.

§ 268. C. Pleonasm in sentences of Contrast.

Politic. 262 a, τὸ χρηστούμενον ἐν διπλασίαις τὰ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἡμίςεισιν εἰς τότε ποιήσει χρησίαι.

Leegg. 805 a, ἡμίςεια πόλει ἀντὶ διπλασίας.

Tim. 39 c, ὅληγοι τῶν πολλῶν.

Phaedo 58 a, πῶλου γεωρμένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ὑστερον φαίνεται ἀποτανῶν.

Ib. 7 c, ἐκ μείζονος δυστο πρότερον ὑστερον ἐλαττῶν γενήσεται.

\(^{15}\) Cf., perhaps, Thucyd. iii. 36, πῶλυ ἠλήν παρθένι ψυχαίρεται μᾶλλον ἡ ὅ τοις αὐτίοις.
§ 269—271. CHANGED CONSTRUCTION. 231

Soph. 219 b, ὤπερ ἀν μὴ πρῶτερον τις ὁν ὑστερον εἰς οὐσίαν ἀγή. So 265 b.


Cf. Xen. Anab. II. i. 22, καὶ ἠμὰν ταῦτα δοκεῖ ὁπερ καὶ βασιλεῖ, Hom. II. vi. 476, δότε δὴ καὶ τῶν γενέσθαι Παῖδ' ἐμῶν, ὥς καὶ εὖ ὄντος ἀρμπεσία Τρώεσσι, (and more in Heindorf, on Phædo 64 e).

§ 269. D. Pleonasm in stereotyped phrases. Phædo 91 d, πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις καταργίσας. Ib. 99 b, πολλῇ καὶ μακρᾷ ραθυμίᾳ. Ib. 79 e, ἀλφ καὶ πατί (perhaps). Legg. 823 e, μήτε ἐγρηγορόσι μήτε εὐδοκοί κύρτως ἄργων θῆραν διαιστομήνους. (This perhaps approaches nearer to Hyperbole—for which see § 317, below.)

§ 270. Idioms of Sentences:—CHANGED CONSTRUCTION.

A. As to Cases of Nouns.

a. Nominative Absolute—in exposition.

Soph. 266 d, τίθημι δῶ τι δῆ χαλυβικῆς ἐνήθεις θεία μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη κατὰ βάτερον τιμία, κατὰ δὲ βάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ὄν, τὸ δὲ ὁμοιώματων τινῶν γέννημα. Ib. 218 e, τι δὴτα προταξαίμεθ' ἀν εὐγνωστον καὶ σμικρὸν ...; οἷον ἀσπαλιμυθή.

§ 271. b. Inversion of government.

Theat. 192 a, δεὶ ἰδεὶ λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἓ ἄρχησι διοριζομένως. Apol. 21 c, διαλεγόμενοι αὐτῷ, ἔδοξε μοι οὕτως ὁ ἄνηρ κ.τ.λ. Legg. 811 e, ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ... , ἔδοξαν ... μοι ... ἀρέσθαν.

Ib. 922 b, ἀναγκαίων δὲ εἰπείν, πλέψας κ.τ.λ. Phileb. 49 b, πάντες ὑπόσιοι κ.τ.λ., ἀναγκαίωταν ἔπεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ρώμην αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ. Theat. 173 d, σπουδαὶ δ' ἑταρείων ἐπ' ἄρχησ καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δείπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίας κώμαι, οὐδε ὅναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς.
Symp. 208 c, ό δ' ἐκά ταῖς ψυχῆς—εἰσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.—τούτων ὅταν τις κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 474 c, καὶ μὴν τά γε κατά τοὺς νόμους . . . οὐ δῆπον ἐκτός τούτων ἐστὶ τά καλά.

Rep. 563 d–e, ὡς ἄρα ὁ γενεσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρώπινου σπλάγχνου . . . ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι.

Enthyd. 281 d, χωδοκείει σύμπαντα . . . οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι.

Critias 107 c, ἐκ δὴ τοῦ παραχρῆμα νῦν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρέπον ἃν μὴ δυνάμεθα πάντως ἀποδιδόναι, συγγραφέως χρεών.

§ 272. d. Different governments, either of them regular, brought together into one sentence.

Rep. 378 d, τοιαύτα λεκτέα μάλλον πρὸς τά παιδία εὐθύς καὶ γέρουσι.

Il. 566 e, ὥσαν πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθρούς τοὺς μὲν καταλαγῇ τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ.

Symp. 203 a, διὰ τούτον πάσα ἦστιν ἡ ὁμιλία . . . θεοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἐγγραφόσι καὶ καθεύδοσι—the words καὶ ἐγγραφόσι καὶ καθεύδοσι referring to ἀνθρώπους.

Phædo 88 c, εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλέων οὔ μόνον τοὺς προειρημένους λόγους, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὑστέρον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι.

§ 273. d. Change to a previous construction.

Rep. 413 c, τῶν ἀκήρατων ἐκβαινοντα καταστατεῖν ἄρχοντα . . ., καὶ τιμᾶς δοτέων καὶ ζωτίται καὶ τελευτῆσαι, . . . γέρα λαγχάνουσα.

§ 274. e. Change to a Genitive Absolute.

Rep. 590 d, ἄμεινον παντὶ . . . ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον ἓχοντος κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 755 d, τούτους εἶναι οὐσίαν . . ., δοκιμασθέως καβάσερ οἱ νομοπλάκης.

§ 275. f. The following are simple Anaecolutha, reducible to no principle whatever.

Legg. 823 d, εἰδ' ὡς ἐμὲ τοῖς ἐπιθυμίαι . . . ποτὲ λάβοι . . ., μήτε ἐγγραφώσι μήτε καθεύδουσι κύρτοις ἄρχον θήμαν διαπονομένοις.

Critias 116 d, νῦν ήν ἑκάτων μὲν μήκος, εὖρος δὲ τρωὶ πλέθροι.

§ 275*. AA. As to Number of Nouns and Pronouns.

a.

Phædo 62 a, τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ . . . ἐστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον.
§ 276, 277. [CHANGED CONSTRUCTION.]

Phaedo 82 a, οὐ ἂν ἐκάστῃ ίοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοίωτας τῆς μελέτης.
Syp. 207 b, ἐρωτικῶς διατίθεμεν περὶ τὴν προφήτην τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ἐγωμά ἐστιν ὑπὲρ τούτων διαμάχεσθαι—where τούτων = τοῦ γενομένου.
Protag. 345 e, οὐχ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὰ πονῇ ἐκών, τούτων φησιν ἐπανέτης εἶναι.
Rep. 426 c, ὡς ἀποθανομένους, ὃς ἂν τοιτὸ ὅρῃ.
Conversely to the last two instances
Syp. 187.e, προσφέρειν οἷς ἂν προσφέρῃ, ὡς ἂν τὴν ἡδονὴν καρπώσῃ.
b.
Rep. 554 a, θησαυροποιοῦσ ἄνηρ, οἷς δὴ καὶ ἐπαυεῖ τὸ πλῆθος.

§ 276. B. As to Verbs.

a. Original construction abandoned, after interposed clause, in favour of that of the interposed clause. (For other applications of the same principle, see ‘Attraction,’ §§ 192–194, above.)
Phaedo 107 b, τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταί ἐμῖν εἰσίν, ὁμως ἐπισκεπτέως σαφέστερον.
This change is commonest after such interposed clauses as express saying, seeming, or thinking.

Crat. 384 e, ὃς δὲ οὐ φησὶν κ.τ.λ., ὅσπερ ὑποπτεύω, αὐτῶν σκόπτεων.
Phdr. 272 d, παντάπασι γὰρ, ὃ καὶ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἐπομεν, ... ὃι οὐδὲν . . . δέοι κ.τ.λ.
Gorg. 493 b, τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἀρά λέγει, ὡς ἠφῇ ἀ πρῶς με λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι.
Legg. 728 d, τὸ δὲ τρίτον, πάς ἂν τοῦτο νοησεῖ, τὴν τοῦ σώματος εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν τιμήν.

§ 277. b. Construction changing from Infinitive to Finite Verb.

Syp. 177 c, τὸ ... “Ερωτά μηδένα ποι ἀνθρώπων τετολμηκέναι αξίως ὑμήμαι, ἀλλ’ οὐτως ἡμέληται.
Ib. 184 b, ἰστι . . . νομος, ὅσπερ κ.τ.λ., οὐτω δὴ καὶ ἀλλὰ μία μόνη δούλεια ἐκόστος λείπεται οὐκ ἐπονείδιστος.
Apol. 19 e, τοιτῶν ἔκαστος οἶτος τε ἰστίν ἐν ἐκάστῃ τῶν ποιέων τοὺς νόοι, οἷς ἔστη τῶν ἐαυτῶν πολιτῶν προικα εὐνείαν ὁ ἂν θεοῦ λαντότα, τούτωσι πείδουσι κ.τ.λ.
Theeat. 190 d, αἰ μαία δύνανται τὰς ὡδίνας ὑμβακωτέρας ποιεῖν, καὶ τίτικεν τῷ τὰς δυστοκοῦσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον ὃν δόξῃ ἀμβλύσκειν, ἀμβλύσκουσι.
§ 278. e. Construction begun afresh with Conjunction or Relative, after intervention of a Participial or Adverbial clause.

Legg. 810 d, κελεύεις γὰρ δή με, τῷ αὐτῷ ὦδων ἐχθροποιοῖ γεγονότας πολλοῖς, ἵσω δ' οὐκ ἐλάττωσιν ἐτέροις προσφιλοῦσι... μεθ' δὲ δια-κελεύει με κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 b, χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερήσατα τοιούτου ἑπτηδείου, οἷον ἑγὼ οὐδένα μήποτε εὐρήσω, ἐτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξῳ κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 457 b, έὰν δὲ, οὖμαι, ἢτορικὸς γεγομένως τις κατα ταύτη τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτῆ.

Rep. 530 b, ἀτοπον... ἡγήσται, τὸν νομίζοντα... καὶ ἐπηεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Critias 114 e, ἡ νήσου αὐτῆ παρείχετο... τὸ νῦν ὠνομαζόμενον μόνων, τότε δὲ πλέον ὀνόματος ἦν τὸ γένος ἐκ γῆς ὀρυτόμενων ὀρειχάλκου.

§ 279. d. Construction begun with ὅτι, after Verbs of knowing or saying, and finished without regard to it.

Gorg. 481 d, αἰσθάνομαι σοι ἐκάστοτε... ὃτι ὅποι' ἄν φη σοῦ τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ υπὸς ἄν φη ἐξειν οὐ δυναμένον ἀντιλέγειν.

Legg. 892 d, εἶπον ὅτι πρῶτον ἐμὲ χρῆναι περαβῆναι κατ' ἐμαυτόν.

Crito 50 b, ἐφοίμεν πρῶς αὐτοῖς ὅτι Ἰδίδιε γαι ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις;

Protag. 356 a, εἰ γὰρ τις λέγοι ὅτι 'Αλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει...

§ 280. Often, from the frequency of this use with ὅποι, ὅτι becomes in such contexts a mere expletive.

Rep. 501 a, οἷοθ' ὅτι τοῦτο ἄν διενεγκείν.

Apol. 37 b, δὲν εὖ οἰδ' ὅτι κακῶν δοτῶν.

Symp. 175 d, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Εἶ ἄν ἐχειν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 189 a, εἰπεῖν τὸν 'Δρυστοφάνη ὅτι Καὶ μᾶλ' ἐπαύσατο.

§ 281. C. As to Oratio Obliqua.

a. Change from Indicative to Infinitive Oratio Obliqua.

Gorg. 517 c–d, σὲ... οἴραι... ἐγνωκείαι ὡς... ὃ μὲν ἐτέρα διακονή ἐστίν, ὡς δυνατῷ εἶναι ἐκπαρίστειν κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 391 c–d, μὴ οὖμεν λέγειν, ὡς Θησεῦ... ἀρμήσῃν οὗτος ἔπει δεινᾶς ἀπαγάγει, μῆδε τιν' ἄλλων... ἦρω τολμήσαι ἁν κ.τ.λ.

Charm. 164 d, δικεῖ τὸ γράμμα ἀνακεύσας... ἀντὶ τοῦ χαίρε, ὡς τούτου μὲν οὐκ ὦρθοῦ οὖτος τοῦ προσρήματος, τοῦ χαίρειν, οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτο παρακελεύσας ἀλλήλους.

Laches 198 b, ἠγούμεθα... δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι κ.τ.λ. δέος δὲ παρέχει κ.τ.λ.: δέος γὰρ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.
§ 282. b. Change from Indicative to Optative Oratio Obliqua.

Protag. 327 c-d, εἰ δὲν αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, οἷς μὴ παρ- 
δεία ἐστιν, ἀλλ' εἶνεν ὄγριοι.

Phaedo 95 c-d, οὐδὲν καλέσεις φίλε πάντα ταύτα μνήσειν .... ὦτι πολυ- 
χρῶν τε ἐστι ψυχή κ.τ.λ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἄθανατον 
κ.τ.λ. καὶ ταλαπαρομοίη ἥν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 96 b, ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν .... πότερον τὸ αἰμά 
ἐστιν κ.τ.λ., ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη.

Phdr. 241 b, ὦ δὲ ἀναγκάζεται κ.τ.λ., ἡγομένως .... ὦτι οὐκ ἄρα ἦδει 
ποτὲ ἐρωτᾷ .... χαρίζοντα .... εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀναγκαῖον εἴη κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 301 d, δοξῶν εἰχομεν περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καί σοῦ, ὡς ἐκάτερος ἡμῶ 
εἰς ἐστι, τούτο δέ, ὦ ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν εἴη, οὐκ ἄρα εἴμεν ἀμφώτεροι.

Gorg. 512 a, λογίζεσθαι ὦτι οὐκ εἰ μὲν τις .... τοῖτο δὲ βιωτέον ἐστί 
καὶ τούτον ἀνήσειν.

Phileb. 41 d, [εἰρηται] ὦτι τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἦττον ἁμφῶ διεύθουν, καὶ 
ὅτι τῶν ἀπερίων εἴτη.

Charm. 156 d-e, Ζάμολυς, ἐφι, λέγει ὦτι .... οὐ δει κ.τ.λ., ἀλλὰ τοῦτο 
καὶ αίτιον εἴη κ.τ.λ.

It should be observed, however, that the Optative in these pas- 
sages is not simply the effect of Oratio Obliqua: for some of the 
passages are in Present time. The emergence of the Optative marks 
the transition from fact to inference; it indicates that we are not 
called upon to accept an additional assertion, but only to follow 
one step further in the direction already supposed. This is the 
principal account to be given of this change of construction: it 
may be, however, that a subsidiary cause is the increasing need, as 
the sentence unwinds, of marking the dependence upon the main 
construction of the later and therefore more remote clauses.

§ 283. c. The contrary change, from the Optative Oratio Obliqua 
to the Indicative, is in Plato very uncommon; such as is found in 
Tim. 18 c, ἐτίθημεν, μηχανόμενον ὅπως μηδεις .... γνώσοιτο, νομοίς δὲ 
πάντες κ.τ.λ.

§ 284. d. Change from Optative Oratio Obliqua to Infinitive 
Oratio Obliqua.

Phaedo 96 b, ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν .... ἀρ’, ἐπειδὰν 
κ.τ.λ., δε τινὲς ἑλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ἡμι ἐπικρίβεται καὶ πάτερον 
κ.τ.λ., ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης 
γίγνοσθαι ἐπιστήμην. This passage exemplifies b. also (where it
is quoted). The justification of this further change to the
Infinitive lies in the parenthetical ὃς τινες ἔλεγον, which usurps
here the influence properly due to πότερον.

§ 285. c. Participial clause, in a sentence of Infinitive Oratio
Obliqua, changing into Infinitive.

Phaedo 111 c, τούτους 8' ἐν αὐτῇ ἦναι, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀνα-
πεταμένους μᾶλλον ἦ ἐν φ' ἤμει ὁκούμεν, τούς δὲ τὸ χάσμα . . . .
ἐλάττων ἔχειν.

Politic. 293 e, λέκτιον μεμμεμήνας . . . , ὅς μὲν ὄς ευνόμους λέγομεν
ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω, ταῦτα δὲ ἄλλα ἐπὶ τὰ ἄισχίστα μεμμήσθαι.

Cf. Hom. II. xviii. 535, Ἔν δ' Ἐρις ἐν δὲ Κυδομός ὁμίλειον, ἐν δ' ὁλὴ
Κύρ, Ἀλλον ζωὸν ἔχοισα νεούστατον, ἄλλον ἰστοτον, Ἀλλον τεθνεώτα
κατὰ μᾶθον ἐλκε ποθοῦν, Od. vii. 125, ὁμφακε εἰσίν Ἀνθος ἀφιεῖσαι,
ἐτεραί δ' ὑποπερκάζουσιν.

§ 286. D. Inversion of the Antecedent clause, so that the Pronoun
in it does not refer to the Relative foregoing, but to some other
word in the Relative clause.

Thæt. 201 b, οἷς ἡ παρεγένεστο τινες . . . , τούτους δύνασθαι κ.τ.λ.,
where τούτους refers to τινες.

Phædo 70 c, ἄρα ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσιοι ἐστὶ τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν
αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι κ.τ.λ.;—αὐτὸ refers to τι.

Lysis 219 d, ὅ ἂν τίς τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσαι . . . , ἄρα καὶ ἄλλο τί ἂν
περὶ πολλοῦ πιστοῖ.

Phædo 105 b, ὃ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται, θερμὸν ἐσται;—sc. τὸ
σῶμα.

Symp. 204 b, ὅ ὃ δὲ σὺ φήσης Ἐρωτα εἶναι, θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ἐπαθεῖ.

§ 287.IDIOMS OF SENTENCES:—ARRANGEMENT OF WORDS
AND CLAUSES.

A. Hyperbaton.

The displacement of the natural order of words, which is called
Hyperbaton, is not of capricious adoption. Its use is 1. to increase
the facility of regulating the emphasis; and 2. to enable language
to represent, in a degree, the rapidity of thought, by making one
expression literally catch up another.

The Hyperbaton which results from the close adherence of Pre-
positions to their cases (see below, § 298) is to be excepted from
the account just given. It is the result simply of a grammatical
exigency.
The name Hyperbaton had been given, and the fact recognised, in Plato’s own time. Socrates in the Protagoras (343 e), in rectifying the explanation of the passage of Simonides, says ἵππες ἐπὶ θείαι ἐν τῷ ᾑσματι τὸ ἀλαβίσως.

§ 288. a. Clauses intermingled by Hyperbaton.

Legg. 693 c, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἡμᾶς τοιαῦτ’ ἀν γίγνεται ῥήματα μὴ διαταραττέτω.

Th. 860 d, ἀκοντίως δὲ ἰκανίων οἷκ ἦχει πράττεσθαι ποτε λόγον—

where the two clauses οἷκ ἦχει λόγον and ἀκοντίως ἰκανίων πρᾶττεσθαι are counterchanged.

Apol. 26 a, οὐ δεῖρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἑστί.

Instances frequently occur in clauses incidental to the machinery of the dialogue,—as in

Phædo 71 c, ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, ἔρω, ὁ ᾿Σωκράτης.

Symp. 214 c, ἀλλὰ, φάναι, ὧ Ἐρυξίμαχε, τῶν ᾿Αλκιβιάδην.

Apol. 25 c, εἶπε· ὁ πρὸς Δίως Μελητέ. Similarly 26 c, Meno 71 d.

Symp. 212 e, ὦν . . . τὴν τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ καλλίστου κεφαλήν—

ἐὰν ἐποὶ οὐτωσὶ—ἀναδησώ—ἄρα καταγελάσεσθε μου ὡς μεθύστος;

Two sentences are here counterchanged. As Alcibiades rehearses the form of words with which he intends to accompany the crowning of Socrates, he interrupts himself to justify them, and does his best to carry on the two sentences together. These, if one had been postponed to the other, would have run—“That from my own head to the head of the wisest and handsomest of men I may transfer this garland—Well! and if I shall say that,—what then? will you make fun of me?”

In trying to carry on both together, he breaks and counterchanges them, distinguishing them doubtless by difference of tone.

Even so violent a trajectory as this has its parallels in Homer.

§ 289. b. Grammatical governments intermingled by Hyperbaton.

Laches 195 a, πρὸς τί τοιτ’ εἶπες Βλέψας;

Symp. 191 d, ἐστιν . . . ὁ ἐρως ἐμφυτος ἀλλήλων τοῖς ἀνερώπως.

Phdr. 249 d, ἐστι δὴ οὖν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανιάς.

Politic. 309 a, ὑπὸ κακῆς βίας φύσεως ἀπωθεομένα.

Phileb. 19 e, παίσαι τῶν τρόπων ἡμῖν ἀπαιτῶν τοιτον.

§ 290. c. Pronouns (unemphatic) postponed by Hyperbaton.

Politic. 261 b, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἀφύξων γενέσεισιν αὐτοῦ τάσσοντες —where αὐτοῦ belongs to τὸ μὲν.

Theat. 166 d, τῶν δὲ λόγων αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματι μου διώκει—where μου belongs to τὸν λόγον.

Gorg. 469 d, κἂν τινα δόξη μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεγέναι δεῖν—where αὐτῶν belongs to τινα.

Phaello 60 b, ὡς ἄτοπον . . . ἔωσε τι εἶναι τοῦτο—where τι would normally have found its place beside ἄτοπον.

A common type is the postponement of an Antecedent τις.

Theat. 188 b, ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάσοντα δοξάσειν ἢ ἄν τι οἴκην ἢ μὴ οἴκην.

Crito 53 b, ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθης.

§ 290*. cc. Correlative Conjunctions,—the former postponed by Hyperbaton.

Apol. 18 d, ὄσπερ σκαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν.

Hb. 28 d, οὔ ἂν τις ἑαυτῶν τάξις ἢ ἐγγύσαμενος βελτιστοῖ εἶναι ἢ ἕπι ἄρχοντος χαλθῆσι.

§ 291. d. Adverbs and Particles displaced by Hyperbaton.

οὕτω.

Legg. 747 b, ἐν οὐδὲν οὕτω δύναμιν ἔχει παῖδειον μάθημα μεγάλην—where οὕτω belongs to μεγάλην.

Theat. 169 c, οὕτω τις ἐρωτ δεινὸς ἐνδέδοκε—where οὕτω belongs to δεινὸς.

§ 292. ἴσως.

Legg. 640 c, τάχι ἴν ὑφῆς ἴσως μέμφοιτο.

Symp. 194 c, τάχι ἴν αἰσχύνοι αὐτῶς εἰ τι ἴσως οἶον κτ.λ. That this is a trace of ἴσως we have ground for inferring, 1. from the analogy of the preceding instance, 2. from the familiarity of the combination τάχι ἴν ἴσως, and 3. from the perfect unfamiliarity of εἰ ἴσως.

§ 293. ἦτο.

Symp. 187 b, οὗ γὰρ δήποτε ἐκ διαφερομένων γε ἦτι τοῦ ὄξος καὶ θερέος ἄρμονία ἴν εἴη—where ἦτι is constructed with οὗ ἴν εἴη.
§§ 294—296.] ORDER OF WORDS AND CLAUSES. 239

Crat. 399 a, κινδυνεύω ἐτὶ τίμερον σοφότερος τοῦ δίωντος γενίσθαι—
ἐτι μετὰ σοφότερος.
Tim. 53 d, τὰς δ' ἐτι τούτων ἀρχὰς ἀνωθεν θεὸς οἶδε.

§ 294. Μέντα intrusive, i. e. displacing rather than displaced.
Phdr. 267 c, Πρωταγόρεια δέ, ὧν δὲ ἰωάννης, οὐκ ἦν μέντα τοιαίτ' ἄττα;
Apol. 35 e, μὴ οὖν ἀδικοὶ μὲ τοιαίτα διόν πρὸς ἠμᾶς πράττειν, ... ἀλλ' εἰς 
τὸ μέντα ἐν δία πάντως καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα. The phrase ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ 
pάντως καὶ is rent asunder to admit the words 
μέντα ἐν δία, which could have found no other convenient 
place. It is because ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ πάντως καὶ had become a fixed 
phrase that it can suffer this Tmesis without bringing the 
sense into doubt. In the disengaged μέντα ἐν δία another 
familiar sequence (as pointed out by the Zurich editors, coll. 
Phædo 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a,) is to be recognised.
Cf. Ar. Nub. 788, Τίς ὅν ἐν ᾧ ματτόμεθα μέντα τάλβητα;

§ 295. Ἐ intrusive.

Crito 48 a, ἄλλα μὲν δὴ φαίν γ' ἄν τις οἷοι ῥ' ἔσει ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ 
ἄκοσκινναι. It might seem at first sight improbable that this 
γ' should not belong to the clause within which it stands. 
But we have ground for recognising a trajectory here 1. in 
the sense, which is not helped by γ' with φαίν γ'. 2. in the 
familiarity of the sequence ἄλλα μὲν δή ... γε, coll. Phædo 
75 a, Euthyphro 10 d, Gorg. 492 e, 506 d: and 3. in the 
consideration that φαίν ἄν is not consciously to the speaker a 
separate clause; that is, it is a parenthesis so familiar that it 
does not interrupt the thought. It is parallel to Phædo 59 c, 
τίνες φής ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; Euthyphro 15 a, τι δ' οἷει ἄλλο ἡ 
τιμή; Symp. 216 d, πόσις οἰκεῖ δὲ γέμει ... σωφροσύνης; and to the 
instance next following. (It is plain that in all these cases 
the meaning does not admit of separating off the parenthetich 
Verb by commas.) Moreover we find the ἄν preceding the 
φαίν, as in Phædo 87 a, τι οὖν, ἄν φαίν ὁ λόγος, ἐτι ἄπιστεῖς; 
but ἄν could not commence the clause if it were consciously 
regarded as distinct.
Gorg. 492 e, ἄλλα μὲν δῆ καὶ ὅς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος.

§ 296. Ἀν, anticipated Hyperbatically with ὁμιμώ and the like.
Apol. 32 c, ἀρ' οὖν ἄν με σοφότερος τοῦ δίωντος γενίσθαι;
Phædo 64 b, οἶμαι γάρ ἄν δῆ τοῖς πολλοῖς ... δικεῖν.
Soph. 223 a, τὸ προσήκον ὄνομ' ἄν ἡγοῖμαι καλεῖν αἰτῶν.
§ 297. e. Prepositions postponed by Hyperbaton.
Legg. 711 c, ὡσαυτὸς δὲ καὶ ξυμπάτης δυνάμεως ὁ αὐτὸς πέρι λόγος.
Soph. 265 a, καὶ τιαν ἐν τοιούτοις εἶδοσιν.
Phædo 83 c, οὖχ δὲν οἱ πολλοὶ ἕνεκα φασί.
Cf. Andoc. i. 117. p. 15, ὃν ῥώπτ ἑνοῦ εἶνεκα ἐπεβουλεύθην.

§ 298. f. Prepositions intrusive; that is, retaining their place next to the Adjective prefixed to their Substantive, to the exclusion of Adverbs and the like which qualify that Adjective.

Rep. 391 d, ὁτως ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἀρπαγάς.
Ib. 395 b, ἔτι τούτων εἰς σμικρότερα.
Ib. 397 b, οὐλόγον πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν.
Symp. 195 c, ἐξῆς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς—for ἐν ἐξῆς πάσαις.
Theamat. 205 c, οὐλόγον ἐν τῷ πρᾶσθεν.
Phædo 70 c, οὐ περὶ προσηκότων.
Ib. 110 c, πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων.
Apol. 40 a, πάνω ἐπὶ σμικροῖς.
Phdr. 245 d, μηδὲ ἔξινός. So Politic. 310 c.
Gorg. 449 c, ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων.
Legg. 876 b, ὃ τι περὶ σμικρύτατα.

Cf. Thuc. i. 63, ὃς ὡς ἐλάξιστον χωρίων, iii. 46, ὦτι ἐν βραχυτάτῳ,
ibid. ὦτι ἐν' ἐλάγχαιτον, i. 23, ἦστι παρ' οἷς, 35, πολὺ ἐν πλείουν
αὐτῷ, vii. 36, οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ, 79, οὐκ ἔτι ὀλίγων ἀσπίδων, 42, οὐδὲ
. . . καθ' ἑτέρα, and so 59, μηδὲ καθ' ἑτέρα, and on the same
principle vii. 72, ἔτι τὰς λοιπὰς for τὰς ἔτι λοιπὰς.

§ 299.

Note, that Plato not unfrequently admits Tmesis: e.g.

Phdr. 230 c, ἐν ἱρέμα προσάγει.

Hipp. Ma. 297 b, ἐν πατρός τινος ἱδέα.
§ 300, 301.] ORDER OF WORDS AND CLAUSES. 241

Legg. 797 d, év, ὃς ἔστω εἰπὼν, οὐ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δ' ὄε.
Apol. 19 a, and 24 a, ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ (cf. Isæus vi. 33. p. 59,
ἐν πάνω ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ).
Phileb. 20 b, πρὸς δὲ αὐ τοῖς.
Legg. 666 c, εἰς μὲν γε τὸ προϊήνειν.
Ib. 729 d, εἰς μὴν πάλιν.
Ib. 832 c, σὺν ἀεὶ τινι βιγ.
Phædo 59 a, διὰ δὴ ταύτα.
Phileb. 35 c, διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος.
Rep. 371 d, ἀντὶ αὖ ἄργυρίων.
Phdr. 238 c, ὑπὸ αὖ τῶν . . . ἐπιθυμῶν.

§ 300. B. Primary intention of a sentence suspended by inter-
position of clause of (a) Contrast or (b) Explanation.

a. Clause of Contrast interposed.

Rep. 401 c, καὶ ὄρθως δὴ δυσχεραίνων, τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπανοί κ.τ.λ., τὰ δ' 
αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ' ἀν ὄρθως καὶ μισοὶ—where ὄρθως δὴ δυσχεραίνων is 
continued in τὰ αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι.

Symp. 173 c, ὅπερ εἰδομεθά σου, μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσῃς ἀλλὰ διήργησαι.
Ib. 179 c, ἔργον οὕτω καλῶν . . . ὡστε . . . εἰρεθήσετο δὴ τισιν ἐδοσαν 
tοιτο γέρας οἱ θεοὶ, εἴ Λιδοὺ ἀνέκιναι πάλιν τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ τὴν 
ἐκείνης ἀνέκεισαν—the ὡστε being continued at τὴν ἐκείνης ἀνέκεισαν.

Theet. 145 d, ἄλλ' ὀρμαῖ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐχα περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, συμκρὸν 
δὲ τι ἀπορῶ—where ὀρμαῖ appertains to συμκρὸν τι ἀπορώ.

Phædo 69 d, οἱ σεφίλοσοφικότες ὄρθως. ἦν δὴ καὶ εὐώ κατὰ γε 
tὸ δυστῶν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βιο, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προϊήθησθη 
γενίσταυ—where the construction of ἦν is continued at παντὶ 
τρόπῳ.

Ib. 87 d, ἄλλα γὰρ ἃν φαίη, ἐκάστην . . . ἀνυφάινοι, ἀναγκαίον μὲν ἃν 
εἰη, κ.τ.λ. The objection started by ἄλλα γὰρ ἃν φαίη is sus-
pended, while allowance is made for opposite truth, until 
ἀναγκαίον μὲν ἃν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 106 b, τι κολεταῖ, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιτῶν μὴ γίγνεσθαι . . . , ἀπολο-
μένου δὲ αἰτοῦ ἀντ ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονείνα;
Legg. 822 c, ἀρ' οίκι αἰώναθα γελοῖον τε καὶ οίκ ὄρθων, ἢκι γεγομένην 
ἂν τότε, νῦν εἴσαιδοι καὶ ἐν τοῖς γίγνεσθαι;

§ 301. b. Clause of Explanation interposed.

Symp. 206 b, οὐ μὲν ἃν οἱ ἐδαμαζοῦσ ἐπὶ σοφία καὶ ἐφοιτῶν παρὰ σε 
—where, in meaning, οὐ μὲν ἃν goes with ἐφοιτῶν, the ἐδα-
μαζοῦν ἐπὶ σοφία being explanatory.
Protag. 335 e, τῶν διολογοθράμοι τῷ διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἐπεσθαί. Pldhr. 244 d, ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἷς έδει. Logg. 648 e, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην πόσιν ἀπαλλάττοντο πρὶν αὐθικείσθαι. Gorg. 512 a, λογίζεται δ' οὐκ κ.τ.λ.—an elaborate instance.

§ 302. In other writers we have as illustrations

Of a.


Of b.

Thuc. i. 39, ὅν γε οὗ προθύγοντα καὶ έκ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς προκαλούμενον κ.τ.λ., ii. 91, περὶ ἦν ἡ Ἀττικὴ ναῦς φθοίσασα καὶ περιπλεύσασα. Hom. Π. x. 307, "ὅστε τε τλαίν, οἱ τ' αὐτῷ κίδος ἄροστο, Νηνών ἀκτιπώρων σχεδὸν ἐλθέμεν. Αἰσχ. Pr. V. 331, Πάντων μετασχόν καὶ τετολμήκας έμοι. Soph. Ant. 537, Καὶ ξυμμετίσχο καὶ φέρω τῆς αἰτίας, 1279, τὰ δ' ἐν δόμοις έσοικα ἤκειν καὶ τάξι' ὀφεσθαι κακά, El. 1154, ἤσ καὶ πολλὰς Ψήφας λάθρα προπερεύμετο ἡς φανεῖμεν Τιμορός, O. T. 717, Παοῦδος δὲ βλάστασο οὐ διόσχον ήμέρας Τρεῖς καὶ πάν ἄρθρα κείνος ἐξειδίκτιο ποῦδοι. Theocr. Id. xxv. 72, τὸν δὲ γέροντα . . .. κλάζων τε περίστασαν τ' [Allii κλάζοντε], Epigr. xix. 1, Ἀρκίλοχον καὶ στάθη καὶ εἰσίδε.

§ 303. C. Primary Intention of a sentence expressed apart from the Verb—(i.e. the virtual Primary Predicate to be sought in some other word, or in a Participial clause.)

Rep. 495 d, δι' ἑφιέμενον πολλοὶ ἀπελεῖς . . .. τυχχάνουσιν—where ἑφιέμενον is the virtual Primary Predicate.

Thewt. 142 c, δοκεῖ γ'/ρ μοι ἀλέγον πρὸ τοῦ θιαίτου ἐνιεχείν αὐτῷ. Ib. 173 b, πότερον βιώλει διδὼντες ἢ έσταντες . . .. τρεπόμεθα ; Phaedo 63 c, οτι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάν ἕλαθον [ἐλπίζω] ἤπειν . . .. διασχυμαίμῳν ἂν. The virtual Primary Predicate is δεσπότας πάν ἕλαθον.

Ib. 63 d, ακεφώμεθα τi είτων ἢ βοιλεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. The virtual Primary Predicate is βοιλέσθαι, not δοκεῖ.

Ib. 65 b, ἦ . . . καὶ οἳ ποιηταί . . .. θρυλοῦσιν, οτι . . .. ἰρῶμεν. The
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Primary Intention, with which  ἕ  connects itself, is in the ὁρώμεν clause.

Ib. 69 c, ἄλλα τῷ ὅντι πάλαι αἰνιτεσθαί ὅτι . . . κείσται. The ἄλλα τῷ ὅντι connects itself with the κείσται clause.

Ib. 88 b, οἴδειν προσήκει βώνανον βαρφορίτι μὴ οὐκ ἀνώτατον βαρφεῖν. Of the Infinitival sentence βώνανον . . . βαρφεῖν the virtual Primary Predicate is βώνανον βαρφορίτι—in other words, it would normally be βώνανον βαρφεῖν, but is changed into a Participial clause for the sake of linking a further sentence to it.

Symp. 207 d, οὕτος μέντοι οἰδέστορ τα ἄτα ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὁμος ὁ αὐτὸς καλίται. The Primary Intention of the sentence is satisfied at ἔχων.

Soph. 224 d, οἴμαι σε, κῶν εἰ τίς αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος . . . προιτάξωτο, καλεῖν οἰδέν ἄλλο πλήρ ὅπερ νῦν δή.

Apol. 31 b, τούτο γε οὐχ οἷον τε ἐγένοντο ἁπανασχυτήσας παραρχόμενοι μάρτυρα. The οὐχ οἷον τε connects itself with παραρχ. μάρτ.

In illustration, we have in Thuc. i. 2, ἀδῆλον ὅν ὅπότε τις ἑπελθὼν, καὶ ἀπειρώσω ἐμά ὅστοι, ἄλλοι αφαιρέσαντα. Hdt. ii. 134, οὐδὲ ὅν οἰδέ νόθε εἰδότες μοι φαινομαι λέγειν, ix. 105, τούτων δὲ κατέλαβε ὅστερον τοῖς ἀποδανώτα χείσθαι. Ημ. ο. ι. 739, Ἐδή δὴ ποὺ τινα κείνος ἕνι φρεσὶ μήτεν ὕφημας Ἐξέλθων λαοίσιν ὅπερεται. Ἀσκ. Αγ. 479, τὸς ὅδε πάρον . . . παραργήςμασι νέοι πυρωθείσα καρδίαν, ἄλλαγά λόγου καμένω; (the virtual Predicate in the Infinitival sentence being πυρωθείσα), 740, παρ' ἄτα δ' ἔλθεν εἰ  ἠλίον πολὺν λέγομαι ἀν φρόνιμα νηρίμον γαλάνας ('there came what I should call a spirit' &c.—virtual Predicate not ἔλθοι ἀλλ' ἔφθανεν but φρονήμα ν. γ.). 796, οἰκ ἐστι λαβεῖν ὄρματα φωτός τὰ δοκοῦντ' εὐφρόνους ἐκ διανοίας ἰδαρεῖ σαίνειν φιλότητι (where in the Infinitival sentence depending on δοκοῦντα the virtual Predicate is εὐφρόνους, not σαίνειν—'which with seeming-kindly heart fawn' &c.). Soph. Αγ. 798, τέρθε δ' ἢκοδου ὁλεθρίων Λάντωσ εὐπλείει φέρειν—'he fears that this foray, which [by me his messenger] he interprets, will be fatal to him.' Here ὁλεθρίων is the virtual Predicate.

§ 304. D. Chiasmus, or Inverse Parallelism of clauses and sentences.


Ib. 494 ε, πῶς μέν ἔργον πῶς δ' ἔπος λέγονται τε καὶ πράττονται.
Rep. 597 d, ὡς κλίνης πουρής ὡς ὄσης ἀλλὰ μὴ κλίνῃς τῶς μηδὲ κλίνοντος τις.

Symp. 186 a, οὐ μόνον ἑστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς . . . πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς· ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

Ib. 196 b, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖται, οὐδ' ἐπὶ θεοῦ, οὐτε θεόν.

Theoct. 173 d, νῦν δὲ καὶ ψυχήσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα, οὐτε ὁρῶσιν οὐτ' ἀκούσιν.

Symp. 218 a, δεδηγμένος τε ἐπὶ ἀλγευστέρου καὶ τὸ ἀλγευστάτον ὅν ἄν τις δηλθεῖ, τὴν καρδίαν ἡ ψυχὴν γὰρ δηλθεῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων.

Soph. 231 a, καὶ γὰρ καλὸς λέκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμεροτάτος.

Gorg. 474 c, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν.

Phaedo 102 c, σμικρὸς τε καὶ μέγας . . . , τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότερην ὑπερέχων, τῷ δὲ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότερης παρέχων ὑπερέχον.

Ib. 69 b, τούτου καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὁνομαζόμενα τε καὶ πιτυρασκόμενα.

§ 305. So in Dialogue.

Gorg. 453 d, (Λ) ποτέρον . . . πείθει, ἡ οὐ; (B) οὐ δήτα [sc. οὐ πείθει], ἀλλὰ πάντων μᾶλλον εἰς ἀρχηγόν πείθει.

Ib. 496 d, (Λ) ποτέρον οὖν ἐτί πλεῖον ἐρωτῶ, ἡ ὁμολογεῖ κ.τ.λ.; (B) ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.

In Dialogue, however, the Parallelism is often Direct, instead of Inverse.

Rep. 337 c, (Λ) ἀλλο τι . . . ποίησες; ὄν ἐγὼ . . . ἀποκρινέι; (B) ὅθεν ἄν ταχμάσαςτι· εἰ μια σκεψαμένῳ οὕτω δόξεις.

Ib. 428 d, (Λ) τίς, καὶ ἐν τίς; (B) Ἀρτή, ἡ φιλακική, καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἀρχηγοῖς.

Soph. 267 a, (Λ) Μιμητικήν δὴ . . . ἀποειμομεθείς· τὸ δ' ἄλλο πᾶν ἀφόμεν κ.τ.λ. (B) Νεμεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μεθεϊσθω.  

Cf. Hom. Od. vi. 170—197, where Odysseus is answered in order by Nausicaa,—170—4, corresponding to 187—190, and the remainder to the remainder. And Ἀesch. Ag. 622, 623, and ib. 1202—5, Κλ. Μάντης μ' Ἀπόλλων τῷ ἐπέστησεν τέλει. Προτὸν μὲν αἰδῶν ἦν ἐμοὶ λέγειν τάδε. ΧΟ. Μῶν καὶ θεός περ ἰμέρῳ πεπληγμένος· Ἄδρυνεται γὰρ πᾶς τις εὐ πράσσον πλέον.

§ 306. Often, also, of two points put by Λ, the former only is taken up by B.
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Rep. 341 b, (A) οὕτε γὰρ ἂν μὲ λάθος κακονυργῶν, οὕτε κ.τ.λ. (B) Οίδέ γ’ ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωμι.
Phædo 79 b, (A) τι δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὁ δρατόν, ἡ οἰκείες; (B) Οὔχ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώ-
πον γε.
Hip. Ma. 293 c, (A) τὸ πρῶτον ἀρὰ τούτῳ λέγομεν ὁ παραγενώμενον
ποιεῖ ἐκαστὰ φαίνεσθαι καλά, ... ἦ δὲ εἶναι ποιεῖ, ἡ οἰδέτερα τούτων;
(B) ἔμους δοκεῖ (sc. δ—φαίνεσθαι).
Gorg. 462 b, (A) ἐρώτα ἡ ἀποκρίνον. (B) Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καὶ
μοι ἀπόκριναι, ὡς Σώκρατες.

§ 307. E. Comparative emphasis in co-ordinate expressions
marked by the order (which is often the reverse in Greek of what
it would be in English).

Symp. 173 c, καὶ δηλόν γε ἦ δὲ οὕτω διανοούμενοι καὶ περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ
καὶ περὶ ἤμων μαίνομαι. The emphasis is on ἐμαυτοῦ, and the
ἡμῶν is quite faint.

Ib. 175 b, νῦν οὖν τοιεῖτες καὶ ἐμὲ ὑφ’ ἤμων κεκλήσθαι ἐπὶ δεῖπνον
καὶ τούσδε τούς ἄλλους, θεραπεύετε—'I your master, as well as
the others.'

Ib. 185 c, τυχεῖν δὲ αὐτῷ τινὰ ἢ ὑπὸ πλησμονῆς ἢ ὑπὸ τινὸς ἄλλου
λύγγα ἐπιπεπτωκείαν—from some cause, most probably reple-
tion.'

Ib. 189 e, καὶ εἴδος καὶ ὅνομα—'the class as well as the mere name.'

Euthyphro 3 d, εἰτ’ οὖν φόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἰτε δὲ ἄλλο τι—'for
whatever cause, most probably for envy.'

Apol. 39 b, καὶ ἐγώ τε τῷ τιμῆματι ἐμμένω καὶ αὐτοὶ—'I as well as
they.'

§ 308. F. Hysteron Proteron: where (in other words) the order
of expression, following that of thought, reverses the order of occur-
rence of facts.

Theæt. 162 b, εἴπερ μέλλοιν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι.

Apol. 19 d, ἄλλοις διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν.

Gorg. 474 a, γέλοστα παρείχον καὶ οίκ ἑπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν.

Phædo 80 c, συμπεσον τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταραξεθέν.

Ib. 100 b, ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνεφήσειν.

Ib. 87 c, πολλὰ κατατρίψασ τοιαῦτα ἴμαιτα καὶ ἐφηνύμενος.

Symp. 190 c, τὰς . . . ῥυτίδας τὰς πολλὰς ἐξελέαιει καὶ τὰ στήθη
diήρθησαν.

R 3
§ 309. G. Interrogation emerging late in the sentence. By this arrangement, so common in Plato, the sentence generally gains animation, and its emphatic part is distinctly indicated.

a. With Negative.

Phaed. 80 c, ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττησαι κ.τ.λ.—οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἐχοῦσα κ.τ.λ.;

Rep. 402 a, ὁσπερ ἄρα γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ἰκανῶς εἴχομεν ὅτε κ.τ.λ.—οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας κ.τ.λ.;

Ib. 581 c, τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον ποιώμεθα τάς ἄλλας ἡδωνάς νομίζειν . . . τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνω πόρρω κ.τ.λ.;

Ib. 587 a, πλείστων δὲ λόγου ἁφίσταται οὐχ ὅπερ νόμον καὶ τάξεως;

Ib. 590 a, ἢ δὲ αὐθαίδεα καὶ δυσκολία πέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ λεοντώδες . . . αὐξάται;

Legg. 830 d, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ φοβηθεῖς . . . μὴ φαίνηται τισι γελοῖα, οὐκ ἀρὰ νομοθέτησαι;

Protag. 351 c, ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, καθ' ὅ ἡδεα ἑστίν, ἢρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθά;

Ib. d, ἡδεα δὲ καλεῖς οὐ τὰ ἡδωνῆς μετέχοντα;

Men. 78 c, ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἰον ἐγίειαν κ.τ.λ.;

Ib. 88 d, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τάλλα, ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν . . . εἶναι, ἃρ' οὐχ ὁσπερ κ.τ.λ.;

Symp. 216 d, καὶ αὖ ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ ταῦτα οὐ σειληνώδες; [The Zurich editors give τοῦτο. οὐ σ. ;]

§ 310. b. Without Negative.

Soph. 233 c, ὅρωσι δὲ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἀπαντησα, φαμέν;

Hip. Ma. 301 c, ἐπεί καὶ νῦν, πρὶν ὑπὸ σου ταῦτα νουθετηθῆναι, ὡς εἰσῆλθα διεκείμενα, ἦτο σοι μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω κ.τ.λ.;

Gorg. 496 c, τὸ πειρήμα ἔλεγες πότερον ἢδον ἢ ἀναρχεῖν εἰναί;

Phileb. 44 d, οἷμαι τοινύν δε τι λέγειν αὐτούς, ὡς εἰ βουληθέωμεν ὑπόσχοντο εἰδοὺς τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, πότερον κ.τ.λ.;
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311. Politic. 265 e, ὁ πολιτικὸς ἄρ' ἐπιμελείαν ἔχειν φαίνεται πότερα κ.τ.λ.; Legg. 683 c, ἐπιμελείαν δὲ καταλέγει, ἃ πρὸς Διός, ἢ καὶ κ.τ.λ., μὲν ἕπο τιναν ἄλλων ἢ σφῆν αὐτῶν;
Apol. 37 b, πολλού δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσειν κ.τ.λ., τί δείσοι; [So Hermann punctuates.]
Crito 53 c, ἡ πλησιάσεις τούτων καὶ ἀνασχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενοι—τίνας λόγους, ὥς Σώκρατες;
Ibid. ε, ἐπιρροχόμενον δὴ βίωσε πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλείας,—τί ποιών; [The Zurich editors give δουλείουν] Cf. Lysias xii. 64. p. 135, Ἀγώρατος τοὺς μὲν ἀπίκτευε, τοὺς δὲ φυγάδας ἐντεύθεν ἐποίησε,—τίν ἃν αὐτὸς;

311. H. Enclitic recommencing, or even commencing, a clause.
Phileb. 16 c, θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσεις, ὥς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοὶ, ποθὲν ἕκ θεῶν ἐρρήθη. Ib. 25 b, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὥς Ὀρταρχεῖ, αὐτῶν φίλος ἡμῖν νῦν δὴ γεγονέθαι.
Ib. 46 c, ὅποταν... τις τάναντα ἀμα πάθη πάσχῃ, ποτὲ μηγῶν θέρηται καὶ δερμανόμενοι ἐνιός ψυχήται.
Phædo 65 d, τί δὴ οὖν; πῶποτε τι... εἰδες; [So Oxon. But the edd. give ἦδη οὖν πῶποτε τι εἰδες;]
Cf. Dem. de Cor. 44. p. 240, περιων ὁ Φιλίππος Ἑλληνικός καὶ Τριβάλλους, τυατέ δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, κατεστρέφετο.

Similarly αὐ commences a parenthetic clause.
Phædo 87 a, τί οὖν, ἃν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἢ τί ἀποστεῖς; (See above, § 295.)

312. A. Metonymy.
Rep. 497 d, ἃν ἡμεῖς ἀνταλαμβανόμενοι διδηλώκατε—'of those [objections], your allegation of which has shewed me that' &c.
Symp. 177 b, ἐνίγαν ἄλλες ἐπαυνον ἐχοντες—equivalent to ἐνιν ἐπαυνον ἄλλες διδόμενος. A strange instance.
Ib. 205 b, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἐν ἔστι ὁτρούν αἰτία—that is, ἢ τοῦ ἐναὶ ὅτι οὐκ αἰτία,
Theet. 167 c, ἀντὶ ποιμην δουτων αὐτοῖς ἐκαστῶν χρηστά ἐποίησεν εἰκαὶ δοκεῖν.
Theæt. 190 ε, αἰσχυνομένη ἄν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀναγκαζομένων ἁμολογεῖν—`I should be ashamed at being compelled' &c.

Apol. 33 κ. χαίρονσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰκόμενοι εἶναι σοφοίς.

Phædo 88 d, ὁ λόγος ... δόσσερ ὑπεμνησθὲ με ῥήθησι—`the recital of the argument as it were reminded me.'

Ib. 68 a, τούτων ἀπηλλάχθη ξυνάντος αὐτοῖς—`be rid of the company of this.'

Charm. 173 b, ἐκ τούτων οὗτος ἐχώσων. So Legg. 959 c.

Legg. 959 c, καλὸν ἔστω καλῶς καὶ μετρίος τὰ περὶ τὸν τετελευηκότα γεγράμενα—`let it be a credit to have the obscurely handsomely or decently performed.'

§ 313. B. Catachresis.

Ὑποπτεύειν for 'to expect.'

Theæt. 164 a, καὶ εἶγον, νῇ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύοι, οὐ μὴν ἴκανος γε συννοῶ. Ἀμήχανος of number.

Phdr. 229 d, καὶ ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλῆθη τεταλογῶν τινῶν φυσέων. Δαιμόνιος.

Critias 117 b, κάλλος ὤψος τε δαιμόνιον ἔχοντα.

§ 314. θαυμαστός, θαυμάσιος, has many gradations of Catachrestic meaning.

a. 'Strange,' eccentic.'

Symp. 182 c, θαυμαστὰ ἔργα. So 213 d, θαυμαστὰ ἔργαζεται.

β. 'Incomparable,' 'capital;'—only the intention of superlativeness being retained.

Apol. 41 b, θαυμαστὴ ἄν εἰς ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτῶθα.

γ. Of a recommendation or a feeling or an assertion,—`decided,' emphatic, 'positive.'

Symp. 182 d, ἡ παρακλεισις τῷ ἐφῶντι παρὰ πάντων θαυμαστὴ—'most positive is the encouragement given by all.'

Tim. 29 d, τὸ μὲν οὖν προσίμων θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξαμεθα σου—`most decidedly approved.'

Euthyd. 283 c, θαυμαστῶς σπουδαζομεν—`were particularly anxious.'

Phædo 74 b, (A) φῶμεν τι εἶναι ἡ μηδὲν; (B) Φῶμεν μὲντοι νῇ Δία, θαυμαστῶς γε. θαυμαστῶς qualifies φῶμεν not εἶναι—`say Yes most positively.'

Ib. 92 a, θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην—`was most decidedly convinced.'
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§ 315. Ὑπερφυῶς, καλῶς, σφόδρα, are also in the same way used to express decided assertion or assent to an assertion.

Gorg. 496 c, (A) ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; . . . . (B) ἈΛΛ' ἔπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ—'I agree most decidedly.'

Phaedo 76 e, ἔπερφυῶς δοκεῖ μοι ἢ αὐτή ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

Phileb. 26 a, (A) ἂρι οὗ ταῦτα ἔγγραμμα ταῦτα . . . μοναδικήν ἔμπασαν τελεώτατα ἔννεπτιστάτου; (B) Κάλλιστά γε. Probably an intermediate step to this Catachresis is the use of καλῶς λέγειν for 'to say truly,' e. g. Phdr. 227 b.

Ib. 24 b, (A) ἄτελὴ δ' ὅπειρ δῆπον παντιπᾶσιν ἀπείρω γίγνεσθον. (B) Καὶ σφόδρα γε. So 39 c.

Phdr. 263 d, (A) εἰπε. . . . εἰ χρισάμην ἔρωτα ἄρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου. (B) Νὴ Δι' ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα—'most decidedly you did.'

§ 316. Μέγας.

Phaedo 62 b, ὡ . . . λόγος . . . μέγας τε τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ράδιος διδών, 'cumbersome,' i. e. 'perplexing.'

Euthyd. 275 d, τὸ μεράκιον, ἀτε μεγάλον ἄντος τοῦ ἔρωτίματος, ἥρθησακε τε καὶ ἀπορήσας ἐξέλεψεν εἰς ἐμέ. So Ηιρ. Μα. 287 a.

§ 317. C. Hyperbole.

Euthyd. 303 b, ὅλιγον καὶ οἱ κίονες οἱ ἐν τῷ Δυκεῖῳ ἐθορίβησαν τ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἦσθεσαν.

Ηιρ. Μα. 295 a, ἀκριβείστερον τῆς ἀπάσης ἀκριβείας.

Legg. 823 c, μήτε ἐγγραφοῦσι μήτε εὐδοκοῦσι κύριοι άργον θηραν διαπονομένους—the supposition of the alternative εὐδοκοῦσι, in order to make the denial total, is hyperbolical. Cf. Arist. Eth. X. ix. 11, δει . . . μήτ' ἀκόντα μήθ' ἐκώστα πράττειν τὰ φαιλα. Soph. Antig. 1108, ἵτ'. ἵτ' ὑπάνες Οἴ τ' ὄντες οἱ τ' ἀπάντες.

§ 318. D. Formule expressive of Contempt.

a. οὗτος.

Apol. 23 d, τὰ κατὰ πᾶσιν τῶν ϕιλοσοφοῦντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν.

Cf. Ar. Nub. 296, οἱ τρυγοδαίμονες οὔτοι, 969, τὰς κατὰ Φρίννν ταῖτας τὰς δυσκολοκίμπτους [καμπάς].
§ 319. b. Ποίος;
Gorg. 490 d, (A) ἀλλ' ἵσως ἰματίων [τὸν βελτίων πλεον δειν ἔχειν φης] 
. . . . (B) Ποίων ἰματίων--; 'Clothes, forsooth!'
Charm. 174 b, (A) ἄρα γε ἵ [οίδε] τῶν πεπεντυκῶν; (B) Ποίων 
πεπεντυκῶν;

§ 320. c. Plural of Singular Terms.
Menex. 245 d, οὐ γὰρ Πέλαπες σωθὲ Κάδμου κ.τ.λ.
Phaedo 98 c, ἰέρας καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ἱδατα αἰτιώμενων.
Symp. 218 a, Φαιδρος, 'Αγάθωνας, 'Ερυξαμάχους.
Rep. 387 b, Κακουτοῦ τε καὶ Στύγας καὶ ἑνέρους καὶ ἀλιβάντας.
Cf. Ἀσκε. Ἀγ. 1439, Χρυσηθῶν μελίγμα τῶν ὑπ᾽ Ἰλίῳ. It is fre-
quent in Aristophanes: cf. Ecclezz. 1069, Ὅ Πάνες, Ὅ Κορώβαντες,
Ἀχ. 270, καὶ Δαμάχων ἀπαλαγεῖ, Ῥαν. 963, Κύκους ποιῶν καὶ 
Μέμνονας. It is equally used with a sense of dignity,—as in
the dithyrambic fragment of Pindar [p. 224 ed. Dissen], γῶν
ὑπάτων μὲν πατέρων μελπέμεν γυναῖκῶν τε Καδμειῶν ἐμοῖν, ἡς.
Bacchus the son of Zeus and Semele.

Legg. 953 c, βρίμματα Νείλου— for Egyptians.

§ 322. E. Simile introduced as a Metaphor,—i. e. with the
Particle of Comparison omitted.
(See this noticed by Aristotle, Rhet. III. x–xi, where he charac-
terises it as πρὸ ὁμάτων ποιεῖν.)
Euthyphro 11 c, οὐκ ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ὁ ἐτυπέλατο, ἀλλὰ σύ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος.
Cf. Soph. Ἀγ. 169, μέγαν αἰγυπτίων ὤ ὑποδεικτάς ταῖς ἐν ἐξαίφνης
εἰ σὺ φανεῖς σεγγη τήθειαιν ἄφωνοι, Ἀσκε. Π. Ὁ. 856, οἱ δ' ἐπο-
πεμνοι φρειάς Κήρκοι πελείων οὐ μακράν λελειμμένοι "Ἡξοισι, Ἀγ. 394,
ὑπελ διώκει παῖς ποταμάν ὄρνων, Ευριπ. Βασσ. 1114, Πρώτῃ δὲ μήτηρ
ἡξεϊ ἱερία φίλων.

§ 323. F. Play upon Words.
Rep. 621 b, μίνδος ἐσώθη καὶ οἰκ ἀπόλετο, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἄν σώσειεν.
Symp. 185 c, Πανακείου δὲ πανακείου,—διδασκοντι γὰρ με ἐσα
λέγειν οὐτασι οἱ συφοῖ.
Ib. 198 c, Γαργύου κεφαλῆν δειμοῦ λέγεις.
Ib. 174 b, ὥσ ἄρα καὶ ἁγάθων ἐπὶ δαίτας ἰςιν αὐτόματοι ἁγάθοι—in
allusion to Agathon.
§ 324. G. Hendiadys.

The Hendiadys which occurs in Plato (belonging to the last of Lobeck's four kinds,—cf. note on Soph. Ajax, 145) is that where Synonyms are set side by side with the view of expressing the idea more forcibly. This might be called Rhetorical Hendiadys. With Demosthenes it is a favourite instrument of deixis.

Phædo 98 b, τῷ μὲν νῦν οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδὲ τινα αἰτίας ἐπαιτίωμεν. 
Ib. 111 d, συνετήσασθαι τε πολλαχῇ καὶ διεξόδους ἕχειν.
Crito 47 b, γυμναζόμενος ἀνήρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων.
Gorg. 472 b, ἐκθάλλειν μὲ ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.
Tim. 87 d, δὲ οὐδὲν σκοποῦμεν, οὐδ' ἐννοοῦμεν ὅτε κ.τ.λ.
Phileb. 23 a, τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσιν καὶ ἐξ- λέγοντα.
Legg. 953 a, ἐπιμελείασθαι καὶ τημελεῖν.

§ 325. H. Interrogation answered by the speaker himself.

This may be called Rhetorical Interrogation. Its object is to awaken the attention.

Phædo 73 c, λέγω δὲ τίνα τρίτον; τόδε. ἐάν τίς τι κ.τ.λ.
Rep. 360 c, τίς οὖν ἢ διάστασις; ἢδε. μηδὲν ἀφαιρώμεν κ.τ.λ.
Apol. 34 d, τί δή οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων παύσασο; οίκ αἰθαδιζόμενος, ὁ Ἀθηνιός, κ.τ.λ.
Ib. 40 b, τί οὖν αἰτίων εἶναι ἰπολαρβίων; ἔγω ἵμν ἐρῶ.
Protag. 343 b, τοῦ δὴ ἑνεκα παῦς λέγω; ἵτι κ.τ.λ. So Gorg. 457 c.
Gorg. 453 c, τοῦ οὖν ἐνεκα δή αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σε ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἐνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου.

Ib. 458 a, ἔγω δὲ τίνοι εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 487 b, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἶ εὐνους. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρώμαι; ἔγω σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα κ.τ.λ.

Meno 97 e, πρὸς τί οὖν δή λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δύχας τὰς ἀληθείς.

Legg. 701 c, τίνος δὴ καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν αὐ χάριν ἐλέξθη; δείν φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 780 a, τίνος δὴ χάριν ταῦτα εἴρητι; τούτε, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Tim. 31 a, πάτερον οὖν ὄρθως ἕνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν, ἡ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἢν ὄρθοτερον; ἕνα, εἶτερ κ.τ.λ.

Critias 111 a, πῶς οὖν δή τοῦτο πιστῶν, καὶ κατὰ τί λείψανοι τῆς τότε γῆς ὄρθως ἂν λέγωτο; πᾶσα κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 206 e, πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. τί δή οὖν τῆς γεννήσεως; ὅτε κ.τ.λ.

[So Hermann punctuates. The Zurich editors give the answer to another speaker.]
October, 1881.


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